

# EU funds: What can the Western Balkans learn from the New Member States (NMS)?

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# Outline:

- An overview of available funds
  - Comparing IPA and pre-accession in the NMS
  - Prospects for after-accession
- Lessons from the NMS
  - Institutional and legal frameworks
  - Challenges in economic policy
- Conclusions

# IPA commitments for Western Balkans

Instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA)  
*(EU commitments, millions of Euro)*

	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2007-2009</b>
<b>Croatia</b>	138.5	146	151.2	436
<b>Macedonia, FYR</b>	59	70	82	211
<b>Albania</b>	61	71	81	213
<b>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</b>	62	75	89	226
<b>Montenegro</b>	31	33	33	97
<b>Serbia</b>	187	191	195	572
<b>Kosovo</b>	63	65	66	194
<b>Total</b>	<b>463</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>1513</b>

Source: European Commission (EC).


# While IPA is lower than pre-accession in the NMS...

IPA and pre-accession commitments  
(annual average per country, Euro million)




# ...its economic significance is broadly comparable

IPA and pre accession assistance in NMS  
(commitments in percent of GDP)



# And this may be just the beginning

Comparison of pre-accession and post-accession funds in NMS  
(in percent of GDP)




Source: EC, Eurostat, staff estimates

# How to manage the increasing EU funds?

- NMS developed two models:
  - “Baltic model”: single institution (MoF) acting as both managing and paying authority
  - “CE5 model”: different managing and payment authorities—MoF detached from managing role
  - *Different role of regional authorities: the strongest in Poland, the largest country among NMS*

# It is hard to judge which model works better

NMS: Absorption of EU structural funds  
(claims for interim EU refunds as of June 2007,  
in percent of 2004-06 commitments)




Source: National authorities, EC, staff estimates




# Poland's case shows that complex initial setups may evolve...

Poland:  
Initial Managing Authorities for EU-financed Operating Programs



# ...to streamlined versions to ensure more efficient coordination

## Poland: Modified Managing Authorities for EU-financed Programs



# Poland: Legal and regulatory changes followed a similar route

Poland: Measures to improve absorption of EU funds:

Payment system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>* more frequent and simplified submission of refund claims</li><li>* accelerated certification of payments</li><li>* simplified (one-stage) verification of invoices</li></ul>
Legal framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>* simplified public procurement rules</li><li>* no court appeals on bids below Euro 60,000</li><li>* no ministerial regulations required in all program documents</li></ul>
"Political" suasion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>* government monthly monitoring of absorption progress against planned targets</li></ul>

# EU funds may be a challenge for fiscal policy

A simple framework for assessing the fiscal impact of  
EU transfers.

## **(1) EU related receipts**

budget compensation  
refunds on EU projects

## **(2) EU related expenditures**

contribution to EU  
spending on EU projects  
national co-financing

**Direct fiscal impact = (1) - (2)**

**(3) Domestic spending substituted by EU transfers**

**Adjusted fiscal impact (1) - (2) + (3)**

# Hungary: Fiscal impact of EU transfers (in percent of GDP)

	2004	2005	2006	2007 budget
<b>Transfers from EU</b>	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.9
<b>Expenditure on EU projects</b>	0.4	0.9	1.3	1.8
<b>Co-financing</b>	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.7
<b>Contribution to EU</b>	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8
<b>Direct fiscal impact</b>	-0.4	-1.3	-1.5	-1.3
<b>Substituted spending 1/</b>	0.2	0.7	1.1	1.5
<b>Adjusted fiscal impact</b>	-0.2	-0.6	-0.4	0.2

1/ Estimate: includes cohesion funds, CAP transfers, and co-financing.

# Demand impact: A very simplified approach

$$D = \alpha ( T + NC ) - C - A ; \alpha \in \{0,1\}$$

D - demand impact

T - transfers received from EU

NC - national co-financing of EU funds


C - contributions paid to EU

A - advances received


$\alpha$  - degree of substitution between EU- related projects and domestic spending that would have happened anyway (depending on the implementation of additionality guidelines)

# First round effect on demand depends on additionality assumptions

Partial additionality  
( $\alpha = 0.55-0.65$ )




Full additionality  
( $\alpha = 1$ )



# Model-based estimates point at positive, albeit ambiguous, impact on growth

Poland: Impact of cohesion policy on GDP level (deviation from baseline in %)



Source: J. Bradley, G. Untiedt, "Do economic models tell us anything useful about Cohesion Policy impacts?", 2007



# EU transfers could also have negative side-effects

- If the recipient economy operates at its potential, the impulse from EU transfers could add to economic imbalances by:
  - Creating pressure on wages and prices
  - Leading to appreciation of the real effective exchange and undermining external competitiveness

# Some conclusions based on the NMS' experience:

- IPA may be just a prelude to much larger funding, it is important to use it well:
  - ✓ Institutional and regulatory frameworks should ensure efficient coordination and relatively high degree of flexibility.
  - ✓ A possible negative budgetary impact should be considered and, if necessary, prevented by re-prioritizing expenditures.
  - ✓ The demand impulse from EU transfers needs to be managed carefully not to add macroeconomic imbalances