BOND RESTRUCTURING AND MORAL HAZARD:
ARE COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES COSTLY? *

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Abstract

Recent emerging market crises have prompted debate over the costs and benefits of collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts. CACs may facilitate the restructuring of repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Proponents of CACs argue they should lower borrowing costs, while opponents contend that they lead to moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper examines the pricing of bonds with and without CACs using data for both primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of CACs has increased yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers.

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1. Introduction

Discussions on the reform of the "international financial architecture" have highlighted bail-outs by the international financial institutions and *lender* moral hazard as undesired aspects of the current system (see, e.g., Frankel and Roubini, 2001 for a summary). To reduce lender moral hazard, there have been suggestions of "bailing-in" or "involving" the private sector, which implies that lenders should bear part of the burden when countries encounter debt-servicing problems and approach the international financial institutions for assistance. Part of the debate has been over the use of collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts, which—among other things—allow a qualifying majority of bondholders to agree to restructure the payment terms on their bonds, and to make these changes binding on dissenting bondholders. CACs have been viewed as one tool that could facilitate such bail-ins in the future and reduce the need for bail-outs by international financial institutions.

CACs have also featured more recently in the debate over the desirability of some form of sovereign debt restructuring mechanism to reduce the output costs and loss of value that may result in the event of prolonged restructuring negotiations. CACs have been proposed as a way of facilitating restructuring of obligations that would move the framework for dealing with financial distress in sovereigns closer to the framework that applies to corporate borrowers in domestic markets. Proponents of a market-driven or contractual approach (see, e.g., Taylor, 2002) have pointed to CACs as a major part of the solution and an alternative to a statutory approach (see, e.g., Krueger, 2002) that would require an international legal framework to replicate some of the features of national bankruptcy systems.

Proponents of CACs maintain that facilitating restructuring can benefit lenders as well as borrowers, because the value of a restructured claim is likely to be higher than any amount that can be recovered after a messy default—somewhat analogous to the "debt overhang" models (e.g. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1989) that followed the 1980s debt crisis and showed that lenders may benefit from debt restructuring if it increases countries' current and future output and creates more resources for debt service. However, these arguments have met with skepticism by some market participants. Although some market groups (e.g., the Institute for International Finance) have moved from strong opposition to support for CACs, others have argued that CACs would significantly increase the cost of debt financing due to *borrower* moral hazard, i.e., if it is easier to restructure, more restructuring will occur.[1]

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[1] Dixon and Wall (2000) and Chamberlin (2002) provide further details on private sector views.

Theory provides little guidance on how CACs should affect the pricing of bonds. The only formal model dealing with CACs is by Dooley (2000) who provides a model with standard assumptions about sovereign borrowers—namely that they cannot be forced to repay, and collateral or other monitoring arrangements are impossible.[2] Dooley shows that lenders should protect their interests by making default costly (e.g., in terms of output loss) and using contractual terms that make renegotiation as difficult as possible.[3] In reality, bonds with CACs are more common than might be predicted by such a model. One explanation might be that there must be costs to seeking restructuring that induce borrowers to repay when they are able to repay, similar to the costs of default (reputational costs, loss of market access, output losses) that encourage repayment in the seminal models by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoff (1989), and Atkeson (1991).

Fortunately, empirical analysis can shed light on the pricing issue, since a substantial proportion of international bonds already incorporate CACs. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to investigate the important and unresolved question of how CACs have been priced by financial markets by taking a careful look at data for a large sample of emerging market bonds. Without such an understanding of how CACs have been priced in the past, it is impossible to have a serious debate over the assertions that wider use of CACs would result in higher borrowing costs. However, this paper does not directly address questions of social optimality of particular contractual forms, such as whether there is a market failure in the current allocation of resources between markets that include CACs and markets that do not.

The main innovation of this paper is that it is the first to do a systematic study of the secondary market yields of a large sample of bonds. Secondary market data allow the researcher to analyze the pricing of a large number of existing bonds at particular points in time, including before and after different events that may have resulted in changes in the relative values that investors place on bonds with and without CACs. By analyzing yields at a particular point in time, we obviate the need to also model the changing overall level of yields as is necessary with primary market data for different issuance dates over a long period of time. In addition, primary market data might be more subject to selectivity or endogeneity problems, so the researcher may essentially be required to attempt to model both the supply and demand curves for bonds. Thus, secondary market data may be a more straightforward way to investigate the impact—if any—of

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[2] See, e.g., Kletzer (1994) and Eaton and Fernandez (1995), for surveys of theoretical models of sovereign debt.

[3] A related model by Chowdhry (1991) shows that international loans should occur in syndicates of large numbers of banks, with sharing and cross-default clauses. Selective defaults to individual banks are then no longer possible, and the costs of default become much larger, so voluntary defaults are discouraged.

CACs on bond yields. Nonetheless, for comparison with some earlier studies, we also estimate equations using primary market data, adding several additional relevant variables that substantially improve the fit of such equations.

To summarize our results, we find no evidence to support the proposition that the use of CACs has increased borrowing costs for lower-rated issuers that would be most subject to moral hazard concerns. The point estimates for the impact of CACs on borrowing costs for both high- and low-rated borrowers are almost always negative, but are often not statistically significantly different from zero. The effects are quite small compared with those in a widely cited set of papers by Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001). Our results therefore appear consistent with conventional wisdom in the financial markets where international bonds are issued and traded, with most market participants having been unaware of this aspect of the legal documentation of the bonds that they buy and sell. Hence, they suggest that market participants have not associated the use of CACs with substantial borrower moral hazard.

2. Review of the Nature and Use of Collective Action Clauses

The possibility of wider use of CACs for sovereign borrowers appears to have been first raised by Eichengreen and Portes (1995) and Greenwood and Mercer (1995). It has since been endorsed by a number of international groups including the G-7, G-10 and G-22 groups of countries. CACs are typically considered to include clauses that allow for:

- collective representation—procedures for bondholders to organize and designate a representative to negotiate on their behalf with the debtor;

- qualified majority voting—which enables changes to be made in the terms of a bond contract without the unanimous consent of bondholders, and thus prevent a small number of dissident bondholders from blocking an agreement beneficial to the majority; and

- sharing among bondholders—which requires bondholders to share the proceeds of litigation against a debtor with all other creditors, thus reducing the incentive for individual creditors to take independent legal action against the debtor.

"British-style" bonds issued in the euromarket under English governing law account for about 25 percent of all sovereign issuance and almost invariably contain CACs. However, most other internationally issued sovereign bonds are issued under formats and governing laws (most notably New York, and also German) for which CACs are not customary. For example, "American-style" international bonds typically do not include contractual provisions allowing qualified majorities to modify the payment terms of a bond and to

impose these modifications on minority holders. Further, these bonds provide few contractual limitations on the ability of individual bondholders to initiate and benefit from legal action on their claims.

However, the absence of CACs in U.S. issues has been a matter of market convention rather than a legal requirement. Indeed, CACs were typically included in U.S. bonds prior to the 1930s. However, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, there was concern about abuses by corporate insiders who had enacted changes to the terms of bond contracts to the detriment of minority bondholders. Subsequently, for bonds that fall under its purview, the Trust Indenture Act (TIA) has in effect prohibited any involuntary reduction in the claims of bondholders (with the exception of those that occur in formal bankruptcy proceedings).[4] The TIA applies to corporate borrowers, both domestic and foreign when they make public issues in the U.S.. However, it does not apply to foreign sovereign issuers, nor to private issues by domestic or foreign entities. As Buchheit (2000, p.21) states "There is no reason why ... majority action clauses could not be included in foreign sovereign bonds issued under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions." However, in practice, almost all such bonds issued in the U.S. market have contained such terms. Similarly, a recent statement by the German Government (German Finance Ministry, 2000) clarified that nonresident borrowers could include clauses permitting the reduction or postponing of interest and principal payments, providing such actions occurred in good faith (i.e., were not designed to serve to the detriment of particular bondholders).

Although there are no specific data available on the presence or absence of CACs in international bonds, there are data on the governing law that applies to the contractual terms of bonds, and this is almost always indicative of the nature of the contract terms. We first present some summary data on the governing law of international bonds issued by emerging market borrowers based on a sample from Capital Data's Bondware database of fixed and floating rate bonds issued. To simplify the task of presenting some summary statistics, we concentrate on international issues by borrowers from emerging markets between January 1990 and August 2000, in those currencies for which there were at least 10 issues.[5] This yields a sample of 2452 bonds and floating rate notes. In Table 1 we show the distribution of bonds by currency and by governing law.

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[4] In practice, however, there is a way for a qualified majority to force changes to payment terms on a dissenting minority. By proposing changes to the other *nonpayment* terms of the bond that would make the bond less attractive for any holdout creditors, potential holdouts may be effectively forced into agreeing to a proposed restructuring or exchange (see Buchheit and Gulati, 2000). Such "exit amendments" were used in the restructuring of Ecuador's sovereign external debt in 2000.

[5] The reason why the number of governing law observations (2485) is slightly larger than the number of bonds (2452) is that Bondware shows 33 bonds as having two governing laws.

With one exception, the data show that the use of governing law is highly correlated with the currency of a bond issue. The exception is English law, which is used for bonds of many different currencies, including U.S. dollar issues. However, those bonds issued under New York law—the other most commonly used governing law—are overwhelmingly denominated in U.S. dollars. Further, other governing laws that are used less frequently are often only seen on bonds issued in a particular currency. In this sample of bonds, for example, Japanese, Swiss, Austrian and Spanish governing laws are used only on bonds issued in those respective currencies. Further, German governing law is used almost exclusively on bonds issued in marks or euros.

Examining the data by the type or market of issue yields other (sometimes related) patterns in the use of particular governing laws. In the floating rate note market, for example, 80 percent of all issues in the sample are under English governing law. Distinct patterns are also apparent in the bond market (i.e., excluding floating rate notes), when issues are divided into euromarket issues, global bonds, Yankee bonds, and other foreign bonds issued into particular markets.[6] For example, among foreign bonds, Samurai and Matador bonds in the sample are issued exclusively under Japanese and Spanish governing laws respectively. Further, Yankee bonds and almost all global bonds have been are issued under New York governing law. That is, in many cases, the governing law used in a bond issue would appear to be very strongly associated with the sector where issuance occurs. The one exception, however, is the dollar euromarket sector, where issuance is split almost equally between English and New York governing law.

Governing law is also partly explained by the nationality of the securities house or houses that underwrite the bond issue. To investigate this, we examined data from Bondware data on the nationality of the lead manager(s) of 715 fixed-rate dollar eurobonds issued under English or New York governing law. The data showed that only 38 percent of issues arranged by U.S. houses (defined to include the London operations of U.S. firms) were issued under English governing law, while 64 percent of issues arranged by non-U.S. houses were under English governing law.

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[6] Eurobonds are bonds issued by an international syndicate into different markets, without falling under the jurisdiction of any particular country. Because they are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), they cannot be sold to the U.S. public until they have become "seasoned", typically 40 days after their issue. "Foreign" bonds are sold into particular national markets from issuers domiciled outside that market. The most prominent type are Yankee bonds which are issued by foreign issuers in the U.S. market, registered with the SEC, and directed primarily (but not exclusively) at U.S. investors. Global bonds are a hybrid, issued in different markets, and designed to trade and settle in the euromarket, U.S. market, and other foreign markets.

Based on the above data, it is clear that governing law and the presence or absence of CACs is substantially correlated with a number of other variables, due to market conventions. When testing for whether governing law has an impact on borrowing costs, it will be important to control for these other variables so that one does not mistakenly attribute any impact from these other factors on yields to governing law and the use or absence of CACs. However, it should also be noted (as we show in Section 6a) that the governing law that is used is far from fully explained by observable factors such as those discussed above, so it should still be possible to get estimates of the separate effects (if any) of CACs and these other factors on borrowing costs.

3. Existing Literature on the Impact of Governing Law on Borrowing Costs

Two early studies of the impact of governing law compared the sovereign yields of a few countries with bonds issued under both New York and English laws. Petas and Rahman (1999) show that the secondary market yields on different bonds issued by three sovereigns (Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and Turkey) suggested—if anything—a higher valuation for English law bonds, and concluded that (as of early 1999) markets remained unaware in the difference in governing laws. Dixon and Wall (2000) compare bonds of similar maturity and liquidity characteristics from six countries and concluded that the choice of governing law had no systematic effect on yields, and that any yield differences were small.

An alternative approach is to use data on yield spreads for a large sample of bonds at the time of issuance. The first such study by Tsatsaronis (1999) was based on a sample of 263 sovereign bonds (194 from emerging market sovereigns). Based on OLS regressions of the primary market yield spread on a number of explanatory variables associated with the bond, Tsatsaronis found no statistically significant difference in yields on bonds issued under different governing laws.

More comprehensive studies of the possible impact of governing law on spreads are provided by Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001). These authors use a sample of up to around 2400 bonds issued from 1991 to the end of 1999. The dependent variable in their equations is the log of the spread, and they include variables for global economic conditions, issuer characteristics, bond characteristics, and dummies for governing law (New York, English, and "other"). Eichengreen and Mody focus on the impact of issuing under English versus New York governing law. When the entire sample of bonds is included, Eichengreen and Mody (2000a) find the coefficient on the English law variable to be insignificant. However, when they attempt to correct for possible endogeneity and selection bias and allow for the impact of governing law on borrowing costs to differ across credit rating levels (proxied by country ratings from Institutional Investor), they find larger and statistically significant results. In particular, in Eichengreen and Mody (2000b) the use of English law is estimated to increase borrowing costs for

borrowers from countries with poor credit ratings (below 50 on the II scale) by 150 basis points while lowering them by 53 basis points for borrowers from countries with high credit ratings (above 50 on the II scale).[7] Furthermore, the regression coefficients in Eichengreen and Mody (2001, Table 5) suggest even larger impacts. For very highly rated countries (above 70 on the II scale), the implied impact from using English governing law is a 105 basis point cut in spreads from 130 to 25 basis points.[8] For very low rated countries (below 30 on the II scale), the implied impact is a 390 basis point increase from 210 to 600 basis points. It need hardly be said that these estimated impacts are very large.

Eichengreen and Mody interpret their results as showing that markets perceive little moral hazard when more highly rated emerging market borrowers include CACs in their bonds, and that they value the flexibility that CACs may offer in the extremely unlikely event that a restructuring is necessary. By contrast, they argue that lower rated borrowers are perceived to increase moral hazard when they include CACs, which increases their borrowing costs, more than offsetting the benefits from easier restructuring. It is noteworthy that their cutoff point between higher- and lower-rated countries corresponds to a rating above the standard investment grade cutoff. Hence, if these results are robust, they imply that even some emerging markets with relatively good credit ratings—low investment rate ratings or stronger noninvestment grade ratings—would pay higher spreads when their bonds are issued under English law and with CACs. That is, on their face, the results of Eichengreen and Mody would not seem favorable for most emerging market borrowers.

4. Using Secondary Market Data to Estimate the Impact of Governing Law

We see three key advantages to using secondary market yield data in analyzing if the presence of CACs (proxied by the governing law of the bonds) is associated with differences in the pricing of bonds. First, the question of whether CACs have an impact on bond yields is essentially a question of the relative valuation of different bonds at a particular point in time. However, studies that examine the yield spreads on bonds at issuance over long periods of time are required to explain the overall movement of absolute yields spreads over time as well as the relative valuation of bonds of different characteristics. Indeed, there

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[7] We estimate that the Institutional Investor rating ranges used by Eichengreen and Mody correspond to the following Moody's ratings scales: 0-30, B2 or worse; 30-50 Baa3-B1; 50-70, A1-Baa2; 70-100, Aa3 or better. A chart comparing the different ratings is available upon request.

[8] The regression coefficients (of 1.054 and −1.667) for the lowest-rated and highest-rated countries in their Table 5 imply that English governing law increases the spread by about 180 percent for the former group and decreases the spread by 80 percent for the latter group. The estimates in the text here are based on the average spread levels shown in their Table 3.

is presumably much more variation in overall spreads over time than there is difference in yields on bonds with different governing laws. For example, the variation in the yield spread on JP Morgan's EMBI index between its highest and lowest points over 1991-2000 is over 1500 basis points, which is far larger than any estimate of the impact of governing law. Our preferred solution to this problem is to use secondary market yields at snapshots in time, which obviate the need to model the overall level of spreads.

Second, it may be the case that investors (and issuers) have only begun to focus on governing law quite recently. Hence, the impact of governing law on yields may have changed, and snapshots of secondary market yields at different points in time may be the only way to properly identify any such changes, at least until a large sample of post-crisis primary issues are available. Third, as we discuss further in Section 6, when spreads are measured well after bonds are issued (rather than at the time of issue) there may be fewer problems of potential endogeneity of the choice of governing law or of sample selection related to the issuance decision.

4.1. Data

We use data on secondary market spreads provided by Merrill Lynch from the Merrill Lynch Global Index database. The Merrill Lynch indices seek to include all international bonds with a remaining maturity of at least one year, and an outstanding amount equivalent to at least $300 million for sovereign bonds and at least $100 million for corporates. The yields data are based on actual or indicative price quotes from dealers in the market, and the bonds included are almost all ones for which several of the large international banks publish daily quotes. We define emerging markets broadly, focusing on issuers from countries rated at A1/A+ or below, including some lower-rated industrial countries such as Greece and Israel (but also including corporates from AA-rated Singapore). We include bonds issued in dollars and in major European currencies. Since the coverage of non-dollar issues for mid-1998 is less than complete, we supplemented the Merrill Lynch data with yield data from Bloomberg in cases where we could verify the comparability of the data. The sample includes eurobonds, global bonds and yankee bonds, but not Brady bonds. Our data for yield spreads is calculated as the (bid) yield on the security less the yield on the corresponding mature market government security of similar currency and maturity.

For brevity of presentation, we focus on secondary market yields on two particular dates—June 30, 1998 and June 30, 2000—chosen because they provide evidence on the pricing of bonds before and after the Russian crisis and the bond restructurings of Pakistan, Ecuador and Ukraine. However, it should be noted that we have obtained similar results for two other dates, namely June 30, 1997 and June 30, 1999. For June 2000, our sample includes 488 bonds with composite ratings of CCC1 or better, while the sample for June 1998 includes 296 bonds. The samples consist only of fixed rate bonds (i.e., no floating rate notes),

and due to the Merrill Lynch index inclusion criteria is a far more homogeneous sample than the samples used in previous studies using primary market data. The sample includes bonds issued under New York, English and German law and we focus on the yield spread of English law bonds relative to New York law bonds. The sample includes 113 English law bonds in June 2000 and 64 English law bonds in June 1998.

4.2. Methodology

Initially, we use simple OLS regressions and we follow some earlier studies using primary market data (e.g., Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001) by defining our dependent variable as the log of the yield spread, S. The regression model is summarized by

$$\log(S_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 D_{CAC,i} + B_2 X_{2,i} + B_3 X_{3,i} + \varepsilon_i \, , \tag{1}$$

where D_{CAC} is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for bonds with CACs, and β_1 is the coefficient of ultimate interest. In addition, X_2 and X_3 contain two sets of control variables; issuer characteristics and bond characteristics respectively, and the associated vectors B_2 and B_3 contain the corresponding parameter estimates.

The variables for issuer characteristics include regional or country dummies, and dummies for the type of issuer—public or corporate, as opposed to sovereign. For our credit risk measure—the most important variable in terms of explanatory power—we use the composite credit rating for each particular bond for the particular trading date in question.[9] Variables for the characteristics of the bond include the size of the issue outstanding, the remaining maturity of the bond in years, the modified duration of the bond, the currency of issue, and dummies for whether the issue was a private placement, or contained put or call options. For the June 2000 sample, we also include the bid-ask spread for each bond as a proxy for the liquidity of each bond.[10] We also include dummy variables for subordinated or collateralized bonds (while recognizing that any effects may already be captured in the credit ratings variable). We include some

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[9] Our use of credit ratings would be problematic if agencies considered the presence or absence of CACs in setting ratings. Discussions with agencies and examination of ratings reports indicate that agencies have not hitherto considered CACs in setting ratings. Nonetheless, the tests in Section 6B get around any possible problems from the use of ratings by using issuer dummies and excluding ratings.

[10] Bid-ask spread data were obtained from JP Morgan and were available for 306 bonds in the sample. We fitted an equation to explain the bid-ask spreads for these bonds and then used the parameters from this equation to obtain predicted values for the missing spreads.

additional variables not included in earlier studies in an attempt to control for the investor class at which the bond is targeted. These include dummy variables for the market of issue, with dummies for global or yankee issues (with euromarket issues as the "default"), and dummy variables for the nationality of the lead manager(s) for the bond issue and for whether the bond was issued only in bearer form. Finally, although the information in Bondware is incomplete, we include dummies for whether or not the bond is registered with the SEC for sale in the United States and whether it is eligible for sale in the United States under Rule 144a. A full listing of the variables is shown in Tables 2 and 3.

Our strategy was to first ensure that we had a basic equation that appeared to fit the data well for the two sample dates, and then to see if borrowing law added explanatory power and if the estimated coefficients were robust to a wide range of specification changes. The specification changes we use to address the robustness of our results are as follows. Starting with a basic model using variables similar to those in earlier studies, we then add simple governing law dummy variables for English and German governing law, with New York governing law as the omitted law (Model 1). In our next specification (Model 2), we follow Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001) by including dummies indicating whether English law bonds are issued by high or low rated borrowers, where the cut-off is determined by the median rating.[11] The inclusion of separate dummies based on credit ratings is intended to provide an assessment of whether the valuation of CACs differs for lower rated borrowers who might be viewed as more likely to seek a restructuring of payment terms.

In our third specification (Model 3), we add a number of additional variables including proxies for the way that the bond is sold and the investor base that is targeted. The motivation is that these are variables that might be determinants of both governing law and yields, so their inclusion will provide greater confidence that the estimated coefficients on the governing law variables are not simply picking up the effect of other variables that have separate impact on yields. Given our fairly large samples, we preferred to err on the side of including too many control variables rather than too few: accordingly we retain all the control variables in our equation regardless of significance levels.

Our fourth specification (Model 4) sequentially omits the five bonds with the largest residuals in an attempt to check the possibility of our estimates being driven by just a few outliers or by any remaining errors in the data. In our fifth specification (Model 5), we attempt to account for the likelihood that yields

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[11] Throughout the paper, we estimate only a single equation for all bonds, rather than estimating separate equations for the high- and low-rated samples (as Eichengreen and Mody do for most of their results). We do so to maintain our sample size. However, we have estimated many of the specifications using separate samples and obtained similar results.

on large issues contain more information than those of small issues, because they are generally traded more actively. Accordingly, we use weighted least squares with weights based on the size of the issue. Our sixth specification (Model 6) excludes corporate bonds, since the focus on CACs is on their use for sovereign borrowers, where there is a possible need to attempt to replicate the type of procedures for dealing with financial distress that are available (for corporates) in most national bankruptcy frameworks.

4.3. Results

To conserve space, we focus on the coefficient estimates for the English governing law variables (see Table 2). However, detailed parameter estimates for the basic equations (Models 2 and 3) are provided in Tables 3 and 4. Tests for significance are all based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

For June 2000, we obtained a basic equation for log spreads with an adjusted R-squared of 0.765. Most of the explanatory variables took the expected sign, and the impact of declining credit quality is to increase yields close to monotonically. When we added dummies for English and German law, neither is close to statistical significance (Model 1 in Table 2). Our next specification (Model 2) allows for the possibility of different impacts from the inclusion of collection action clauses for bonds of different credit ratings. Our cut-off point (between Ba1 and Ba2) corresponds to a lower cut-off than is effectively used by Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001) (between Baa2 and Baa3), which should increase the likelihood that we will be able to capture any increase in spreads that results when low rated borrowers use English governing law. The results with the separate dummies are substantially different. In particular, the use of English governing law by higher rated borrowers is associated with higher yields than equivalent issues under New York law, while the use of English law by lower rated borrowers is associated with lower spreads than under New York law, with both results statistically significant.

However, when we make further specification changes, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient estimates for English governing law generally fall. The specification with additional control variables yields a higher adjusted R-squared of 0.794, but reduces the magnitude and significance of the English governing law parameters: only the coefficient for low rated issuers is significant (Model 3). When we exclude those five bonds with the five largest residuals to ensure that our results are not excessively affected by just a few bonds (Model 4) or use weighted least squares to ensure that our results are not driven by smaller bonds that may have less accurate pricing (Model 5), we obtain slightly smaller estimates for both English law parameter estimates, though the estimate for low-rated bonds remains statistically significant. When we exclude corporate issues so as to concentrate on sovereign (and public) borrowers (Model 6), we find that governing law is no longer significant for either high- or low-rated bonds.

For the June 1998 data, we obtain somewhat different results, although the relatively small sample size suggests caution against overinterpreting our results. Our basic model, without governing law, yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.698 for the 296 bonds in the sample. When we add dummy variables for English and German governing laws (Model 1), we obtain a statistically significant negative impact on yields for bonds under English governing law. When we allow for different impacts for bonds with different credit ratings (Model 2), the estimates imply no impact on yields from governing law for the low-rated issuers but a substantial reduction in spreads for higher-rated issuers using English governing law. However, the magnitude of the latter coefficient is substantially reduced and its significance disappears when we add the extra control variables, which bring the adjusted R-squared of the equation up to 0.750 (Model 3). In addition, the coefficients on both the English law variables fall and remain insignificant when we omit the five bonds with the largest residuals (Model 4). Moreover, both English governing law variables remain insignificant when we use weighted least squares to give greater weight to larger bonds (Model 5). When we omit corporate bonds from the sample, there are only 51 English law bonds remaining, so rather than estimating two coefficients on English governing law, we estimate a single coefficient which is again statistically insignificant (Model 6).

The mixed statistical results in Table 2 make it somewhat difficult to summarize them. However, one general result is that as we move away from the basic model (Model 2) that allows for different impacts on high- and low-rated bonds, the statistical significance of the governing law variables is largely eliminated. The changes that are made to the subsequent models (Models 3-6) arguably all go towards a better specification, so we are inclined to think that the significance of the results in Model 2 is largely spurious. If we pool the estimates for both years, the median parameter estimates for the English law variables for the higher- and lower-rated issues are –0.02 and –0.05 respectively. If we then take the median standard error, we would conclude that these median estimates were nowhere near statistically significant. And any implied effects on borrowing costs are very small. Based on the median yield spreads for the high-rated samples (240 basis points in mid-1998 and 210 basis points in mid-2000) the implied reduction in borrowing costs is no more than 5 basis points. For the low-rated samples, the median spreads (430 basis points in mid-1998 and 520 basis points in mid-2000) imply a reduction in borrowing costs of only about 25 basis points. These impacts are clearly far smaller than those estimates obtained by Eichengreen and Mody.

The results for 1998 imply, if anything, that higher-rated borrowers would have benefited from lower yields when borrowing under English law, while the results for 2000 imply, if anything, that these borrowers pay more when borrowing under English governing law. By contrast, the results for 2000 imply that it is the low-rated borrowers that benefit from borrowing under English governing law. This latter

result is at odds with a view that the costs associated with increased moral hazard are larger than any benefits from easier restructuring. In particular, if investors are wary of the moral hazard that results when low-rated borrowers issue bonds with CACs, then one might expect that the bond restructurings by Ukraine, Pakistan and Ecuador in 1999 and 2000 should have increased this wariness, and increased the yield premium that investors require to hold lower rated English law bonds. Our results, however, would suggest otherwise.

5. Using Primary Market Data to Estimate the Impact of Governing Law

As noted above, the time-series variation in nearly a decade of data complicates the task of extracting information about the relative valuation of bonds of different types. Nonetheless, by using primary market data it is possible to use data on a substantially larger number of bonds than are available in databases of secondary market yields, so it may be worthwhile to also use examine primary market data. In doing so, we depart from previous studies by including explanatory variables intended specifically to better account for the time-series variation of yields.

5.1. Data

We began with a sample of all bonds issued by borrowers domiciled in emerging market countries between January 1991 and September 2000 and included in Bondware. We omit all bonds issued in domestic rather than international markets, as well as notes with a maturity of less than one year. We include only those bonds that Bondware lists as straight fixed or floating rate issues, excluding instruments such as convertibles and bonds with warrants.

We then omitted all bonds for which we did not have data for governing law or for which there were only a small number of bonds issued under a particular governing law—we include only bonds issued under New York, English, German, Japanese and Luxembourg law. We then also excluded particular currencies for which there were only a small number of bonds issued—we focus on bonds issued in U.S. dollars, Japanese yen, pound sterling, Swiss franc, euro, ECU and the legacy currencies of the euro—most often deutsche mark or Italian lire. The reason for these exclusions was to limit the heterogeneity of our sample and focus on the more conventional issues. By contrast, Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001) include all bonds, putting bonds in laws other than New York and English in an "Other governing laws" dummy variable. They also include all currencies except dollars, yen and deutsche mark in an "Other currencies" dummy variable: there would seem to be about 15 different governing laws and currencies in these dummies, including many "exotics".

The data for yield *spreads* in Bondware are far from complete. Indeed, although Eichengreen and Mody do not mention this, around 50 percent of bonds contain data for the *yield*, but no information in the yield spread field. Following Eichengreen and Mody, we attempted to fill in missing values by calculating yield spreads from the reported yield to maturity and from the yield on an industrial country government security of comparable maturity and currency. However, we discovered that in many cases there are good reasons why Bondware does not contain data for the spread—for example, because bonds have complex coupon payment structures that complicate the calculation of yields and yield spreads: we identified such bonds by searching the Bondware report field for words such as "dual currency", "currency linked", or "hybrid". We omitted these bonds on the grounds that the yields in Bondware are frequently incorrect— typically they are simply the initial coupon.[12] We also checked the data for yields in cases of step-up and step-down bonds, and corrected frequent errors. Furthermore, information on credit rating at launch was missing for a large number of bonds and we checked Bloomberg and filled in gaps where issues were indeed rated.[13] In the end, we were required to add additional information for a majority of the bonds in our sample and this allowed substantial checking and numerous corrections to the data in Bondware.

Our final sample includes 1520 bonds issued in the currencies and under the governing laws noted above, versus around 2400 bonds in Eichengreen and Mody (2001). Based on our sample criteria (including the existence of a bond rating), our sample is biased towards more conventional issues for which good information exists, and towards sovereign issues rather than smaller corporate issues. The average size of issue include in our sample is about $290 million, versus an average size of about $100 million for those bonds that we omit. Our assessment is that Eichengreen and Mody's decision to include all bonds from Bondware was appropriate in their earlier studies (e.g., Eichengreen and Mody, 1998) that attempted to explain the determinants of bond flows, but we suspect that our decision to focus on a limited sample of larger issues for which accurate yield spread data exist is more appropriate for answering questions about the precise (and possibly very small) impact of contractual terms on the pricing of bonds issued by sovereigns.

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[12] Indeed, our attention to the importance of looking for securities with peculiar cashflows (and frequent apparent errors in the yields reported by Bondware) was prompted by our examining the Bondware and Bloomberg reports for those bonds which had the largest errors in some initial regressions.

[13] We used the Moody's rating where available, otherwise the Standard and Poor's rating or Fitch IBCA rating. We excluded a few collateralized bonds with ratings with Aa or Aaa ratings, so as to concentrate on bonds rated between A1/A+ and B3/B-.

5.2. Methodology

We again estimate an equation for the log of the yield spread on emerging market bonds at issuance,

$$\log(S_i) = \alpha + \beta_1 D_{CAC,i} + B_2 X_{2,i} + B_3 X_{3,i} + B_4 X_{4,i} + \varepsilon_i \ , \tag{2}$$

where the explanatory variables now also include measures of external conditions in the X_4 variable vector, while the other explanatory variables are issuer characteristics, and bond characteristics as discussed for equation (1).[14] For measures of external conditions, we use two variables in addition to Eichengreen and Mody's (2000a,b) and (2001) measures of yields in the U.S. Treasuries market. In particular, since we are interested in explaining as much of the variation in emerging market yields over time, we include an index of secondary market spreads on existing emerging market bonds, namely the J.P. Morgan EMBI spread. However, since this index is dominated by low-rated issues—for example, Kamin and von Kleist (1999) characterize the EMBI spread as being representative of B-rated issuers—we would ideally also include an index of higher rated emerging market bonds as well. Since there is no good index for the higher-rated segment of the market, we include the yield spread on BBB-rated U.S. corporate debt as a proxy. This can be justified on the grounds that U.S. corporate debt is often viewed as a competitor asset of emerging markets debt, and because movements in the two markets are quite closely related (e.g., see Box 3.3 of IMF, 2000). Thus, we include two variables that can be viewed as very close proxies for the risk premium on newly issued emerging market bonds.

Many of our other explanatory variables are similar to those used by Eichengreen and Mody. However, we again also include several additional variables for the characteristics of each bond and which attempt to control for the investor class at which the bond is targeted. These include dummy variables for: the existence of put and call options; for subordinated or collateralized bonds; the market of issue; whether the bond is fungible with earlier issues; the nationality of the lead manager of the bond issue; and how the bond can be sold into the U.S. market.

Most importantly, for our credit risk measure—the most important issuer characteristic—we depart from Eichengreen and Mody's use of macroeconomic variables and the Institutional Investor (II) *country* ratings and use the more standard *bond* ratings for each individual bond on the day of issue. We prefer to use

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[14] Since we do not have data on the issuer-specific cost of swapping from floating to fixed rate funding (standard LIBOR swap spread data are for AA-rated banks), the spread measure for floating rate notes is simply the spread over the appropriate LIBOR (or other) index.

rating agencies' measures for several reasons. First, the ratings issued by agencies are the risk measure that is used overwhelmingly by market participants. By contrast, the II ratings are a more general survey measure of country creditworthiness that is not widely used (except by researchers). Second, the ratings agencies' data are more timely in that we know the exact credit rating that applied to a bond on the day it was issued and was available to market participants on that day. By contrast, the II ratings are published only twice a year (in March and September) and are subject to calculation and publication lags.[15] The use of macroeconomic risk variables also raises timing issues. One should presumably use the actual estimates for variables that were available on the day of the bond issue—e.g., the consensus forecast for that month—rather than historical data for the previous year, or the actual outturn for the current year that became known only after the bond issue occurred. Third, the II ratings apply to countries and are not measures of credit worthiness for individual issuers or bonds—they allow no differentiation between the risk of different issuers in the country or of different bonds from an issuer. By contrast, bond ratings allow corporates to be rated very differently to the sovereign, and subordinated or collateralized bonds to be rated below or above other bonds from the same issuer. Finally, conventional sovereign credit ratings have been shown by Cantor and Fitzgerald (1996) to subsume the information in macroeconomic variables.

As with the secondary market spread data, we again estimate a number of different specifications to assess the robustness of the parameter estimates, with three additional specifications. First, we include an equation that focuses only issues that have occurred since the start of 1996 and which may be more reflective of recent determinants of yields than those issues that occurred as the market for emerging markets bonds was developing in the first half of the 1990s. Second, we attempt to take account of possible problems from including a substantial number of issues with very low yield spreads. These are predominantly floating rate notes with spreads over LIBOR that are unrepresentative of what borrowers would have paid for fixed-rate funding, as well as a few Samurai issues with very low spreads. The potential problem is that these bonds may have an undue influence on the estimates, given that the log of the spread approaches negative infinity as the spread approaches zero. Accordingly, we examine the impact of excluding any bonds with spreads of 50 basis points or less. Third, in addition to a specification that excludes corporate issues, we have an additional specification that also excludes all floating rate issues and all non-dollar issues. This specification represents an attempt to get a set of bonds that is as homogeneous as possible, for a potentially more precise estimate of any effect from governing law.

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[15] The Russian devaluation and domestic default of August 1998 illustrates the timeliness problem of the II country ratings. While the three major ratings agencies all cut Russia's debt rating by at least four notches between March and September of 1998, the II rating was barely changed in this period, and was not sharply reduced until March 1999.

5.3. Results

As before, we first estimated a basic model (excluding governing law variables) that appears to fit the data quite well, with an adjusted R-squared of nearly 0.80, comparable with that of Kamin and von Kleist (0.82) and substantially higher than the R-squared of around 0.61 obtained by Eichengreen and Mody (2000a). Most of the explanatory variables take the expected sign, and the impact of declining credit quality is to increase yields monotonically, except between the A1 and A2 categories. To conserve space, we again limit the discussion to the impact of governing law, which is summarized in Table 5—detailed results for Models 2 and 3 are shown in Table 6.

When we add three governing law dummies to the basic equation (English, German, and Luxembourg, with New York governing law as the "base case") we observe a modest increase in adjusted R-squared from 0.797 to 0.801 (Model 1 in Table 5).[16] The coefficient on English governing law is negative and statistically significant. Although this estimate would be consistent with a view that CACs reduce required yields, the dummy variables on the other two governing laws are less consistent with such an inference: German law bonds (which traditionally do not have CACs) have an even larger negative coefficient and Luxembourg law bonds (which normally do have CACs) have a significant positive coefficient.

In our second specification, we again include dummies indicating whether English law bonds are issued by high or low rated borrowers, using a Ba1/Ba2 cut-off (Model 2). This specification shows essentially no difference for the two groups in the coefficient on English governing law—which remains negative—and is preliminary evidence against low-rated borrowers paying a premium to issue under English law. Our third specification adds a number of further control variables in an attempt to reduce the possibility that our significant negative coefficients on English law are being driven by omitted factors (Model 3). The result of adding these extra variables is to increase the adjusted R-squared to 0.817. The coefficients on the English law dummies become much smaller, both at around -0.05, with only the low-rated dummy remaining statistically significant.

Further specification changes tend to confirm that the coefficients on the English governing law variables are always negative for both high- and low-rated borrowers, but often insignificant. For example, in the specification where we sequentially omit the 20 bonds with the largest residuals (Model 5), the negative coefficient in Model 3 on the lower-rated issues now becomes insignificant. We interpret this as evidence

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[16] Since all Japanese law issues in our sample are Samurai bonds (and vice versa) we are unable to include a Japanese law dummy in our sample.

that even in large samples such as this, researchers must be mindful of the possible impact of possible data quality problems in commercial databases. In the case of the specification where we use weighted least squares (Model 6), we obtain a very high weighted R-squared (0.975), the result of larger issues typically having smaller residuals. This is consistent with our expectation that these bonds may contain more useful information on bond pricing and suggests caution in drawing inferences from samples that contain a large proportion of small bonds for which pricing and other information in Bondware may be less accurate or comprehensive. In the case of the specification that omits spreads of 50 basis points or less (Model 7), we obtain a substantially smaller regression standard error, indicating that these low spread issues did have a substantial impact on our estimates, and suggesting caution in the use of the log spread specification or the inclusion of floating rate notes in a study of bond yields. Finally, we note that we obtain quite different parameter estimates when we exclude corporate bonds, floating rate issues and non-dollar issues to focus on a more homogeneous set of bonds (Models 8 and 9). This result suggests the need for caution in including bonds of too many structures and currencies into a single equation, since the empirical determinants of spreads may be quite different.

We have presented nine different specifications of the equation including governing law so that readers can choose which specification they find most appropriate and can arrive at their own judgments as to whether governing law has been a significant determinant of yields in primary market issues over period studied. Our own interpretation is as follows. With five of the nine specifications showing significant negative coefficients for low-rated borrowers that use English law, our results appear to be substantial evidence against the proposition that the use of English governing law by these borrowers raises borrowing costs. Further, there seems to be no clear trend for the coefficient for low-rated borrowers to be higher or lower than the coefficient on higher-rated borrowers: the median coefficient for the high-rated issuers is around –0.08 and that for low-rated issuers is about -0.06. Hence, we would conclude that there is no convincing evidence that low-rated borrowers are at a disadvantage relative to higher-rated ones when they use English law.

However, the substantial variability in estimates on the governing law variables leads us to be cautious about making assertions that the use of English governing law has actually lowered borrowing costs for emerging market borrowers, either high- or low-rated. In addition, the estimated impacts on yield spreads are arguably not especially large. To illustrate, estimates of coefficients around -0.07 correspond to reductions in spreads of around 12 basis points for the higher rated issues and 30 basis points for the lower rated issues for the average spreads paid by these groups over the last decade—these impacts are substantially smaller in absolute value than the estimates of Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001). In addition, despite the high R-squareds of our equations, we are mindful of the possibility that there are other factors determining yields—probably those relating to the investor base at which an issue is

targeted—that are not easily quantified and included in regressions like these. Hence, we prefer to simply draw the conclusion from the primary market data that there is no evidence that the use of English governing law (and CACs) increases borrowing costs for low- or higher-rated borrowers. This is consistent with our results from the secondary market data.

6. The Impact of "Correcting" for Possible Endogeneity

Some readers might be curious as to why our results (from both primary and secondary market data) of modest impacts of CACs on yields differ from those of Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001) who find major impacts from the inclusion of CACs.

In part, our different results for the primary market data may relate to four substantial differences in modeling strategy. First, we spent considerable time dealing with problems of data quality in the Bondware database, either correcting errors or omitting bonds for which true spreads cannot be calculated. In addition, for a more homogeneous sample we excluded issues that were not in the major currencies or governing laws, thus excluding some fairly "exotic" issues. Second, for our risk measure we used the actual bond rating from credit rating agencies for the particular issuer and bond on the day of issue, rather than using country (not issuer) risk variables for the year or half-year in which the bond was issued. Third, we use additional explanatory variables including some that clearly affect yields (e.g., the overall level of secondary market spreads in emerging markets) as well as others which potentially affect yields and are clearly correlated with governing law (e.g., the market of issue—euro, yankee and global). Fourth, to maintain sample size we estimate the impact of governing law in a sample of all bonds, rather than in two or four subsamples. We believe that each of these helps to improve the precision of estimates of the determinants of spreads. Indeed, as a result of our different modeling choices we have an adjusted R-squared of 0.81 in our Model 3, versus 0.61 in Eichengreen and Mody (2000a).

While these are important differences, the major difference is that the results presented so far have not explicitly taken account of the possible endogeneity of governing law. Eichengreen and Mody's decision to correct for endogeneity is based on their view that the choice of governing law "is presumably" or "is plausibly" endogenous and is related to the risk of borrowers. This view appears to be based purely on an *a priori* expectation rather any evidence from market participants or market observers. However, they partly justify their assertion by noting that the proportion of bonds issued under New York or English law and the ratio of their yields varies over time and regions (2000a, p.10). Our own view is that this latter observation is exactly what one would expect if—as occurs in practice—certain governing laws are traditional in particular sectors of the market, if borrowers from different regions have traditionally gravitated to different sectors (e.g., Mexican borrowers typically go to the Yankee market where CACs are

customary), if spreads in the different currencies or markets have systematic differences (e.g., spreads are typically lower in the yen market than in other markets), and if the "borrowing windows" into these different currencies or sectors open and close at different times based on broader macroeconomic factors.

Indeed, we are somewhat skeptical of the proposition that governing law is an important choice variable that is related to perceptions by either borrowers or investors about risk and the potential for restructuring the terms of the bond. Instead, the data presented in Section 2 would suggest that the governing law that is used is substantially determined by factors such as the currency of issue, the market of issue, and the standard documentation preferred by the investor group that is targeted or used by the law firm or investment bank that is handling the issue. (This view is indeed confirmed in extensive discussions with market participants.) Hence our strategy so far has been to include in our yields equation any variables that could possibly determine either yields or the choice of governing law. This strategy corresponds to identification by controlling for confounding variables (Angrist and Krueger, 1999) and the far higher R-squared in our spreads equation would suggest it has been substantially effective. However, other strategies are possible for controlling for endogeneity and we explore two such methods in the remainder of this section.[17]

6.1. The Use of Instrumental Variables

To correct for possible endogeneity, Eichengreen and Mody use an instrumental variables methodology whereby they use a multinomial logit model for the governing law decision and include the fitted value from this equation in the spreads equation. In this section, we use the primary market data for 1991-2000 and also use an instrumental variables procedure similar to Eichengreen and Mody, albeit with some modifications in the included variables. Whereas Eichengreen and Mody estimate a multinomial logit equation, we concentrate on the 1196 bonds in our sample that were issued under New York or English governing law to reduce the heterogeneity of the sample and accordingly focus on a single choice. We estimate a probit equation for the decision to issue under English governing law (as opposed to New York law):

$$\Pr(D_{CAC,i} = 1 | X_{2,i}, X_{3,i}, X_{4,i}, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3, \Gamma_4) = \Phi\left(\Gamma_{2,i} X_{2,i} + \Gamma_{3,i} X_{3,i} + \Gamma_{4,i} X_{4,i}\right), \tag{3}$$

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[17] We thank—without implication for any errors—Joshua Angrist, Mitali Das, Tom Mroz, Patrick Puhani and Joe Terza for advice on correcting for endogeneity.

where the variables are defined as in equation (2), and Γ_2, Γ_3, and Γ_4 contain the parameter estimates of the probit. The fitted value from the probit is then included in the spreads equation. As in Eichengreen and Mody, we include the exact same set of control variables in both the probit equation (3) and spreads equation (2). Hence, although the yields equation is identified in a mathematical sense by the nonlinearity of the probit, it is not identified by any exclusion restrictions and it would not be surprising if the resulting estimates in the spread equation are subject to collinearity and other problems.

In Table 7, we first show the parameters on the English governing law variable using the actual value of that variable (Model 1). We then estimate two probit equations for the governing law of these bonds, and include the predicted value as the explanatory variable, as in Eichengreen and Mody. In the first case (Model 2), the equation for governing law includes variables similar to Eichengreen and Mody's probit equation and has a pseudo R-squared of 0.29 which is quite close to that of 0.35 obtained by Eichengreen and Mody (2000b) in a multinomial equation. In the second case, the probit equation is augmented with variables that are not included by Eichengreen and Mody, but which are intended to capture the market or investor group that was targeted. The variables include the market of issuance (euro, yankee or global), the nationality of the lead manager of the issue, variables for how and if the issue can be sold in the U.S. market, as well as some other issue characteristics including a few country dummies. The resulting probit equation has an R-squared of 0.54.

The increase in R-squared that results from the inclusion of the additional variables in the probit illustrates the importance of the market of issue and the targeted investor group in explaining governing law. Indeed, when these additional variables are included without any of the variables corresponding to those used by Eichengreen and Mody, the pseudo R-squared is as high as 0.48, with the market of issuance variable alone able to achieve an R-squared of 0.28. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that when the 11 credit ratings dummies and 4 market conditions variables are excluded from the augmented governing law model, the R-squared falls only from 0.54 to 0.52. The extremely modest impact of credit ratings suggests that the risk of borrowers is not a major determinant of governing law choice. This represents evidence against the proposition that governing law choices are substantially determined by borrower or investor perceptions about the probability that renegotiation of payment terms may become necessary.

Turning to the spreads equations, we find that the instrumental variables endogeneity corrections of Models 2 and 3 both produce coefficients on English governing law that remain negative for both high- and low-rated borrowers, implying that the use of English law and CACs is still associated with lower borrowing costs for both groups of borrowers. However, in both cases the parameter estimates are far larger than the OLS estimates.

The phenomenon of much larger coefficients after the correction for endogeneity is interesting. It appears to be most extreme when one uses predicted values from a probit equation that has a poor fit (the average value of the English law parameters in Model 2 is 9 times larger than in Model 1) and is less pronounced when one includes additional variables that better explain governing law (in Model 3 the parameters are only 3.9 times larger). Part of the reason for this may be that the fitted values for the governing law variable are no longer distributed as a zero-one variable but are distributed along the zero-one interval, with implications for the standard deviation of the variable. In particular, as the goodness of fit of the governing law equation shrinks, the predicted values move towards the center of the zero-one interval and the standard deviation of the predicted value falls (compare column 1 for Models 1-3). Simply reducing the scale of an explanatory variable of course has no impact on tests for statistical significance, but it may have the effect of blowing up the parameter estimates. One way to avoid this particular problem of the endogeneity correction would be to take the predicted values for the governing law dummy and then redefine as a zero-one dummy based on whether or not the probability of English law issuance is less than or more than 0.5—this yields a governing law variable with approximately the same standard deviation as the original variable. When we do this with the basic governing law model, the English law parameter estimates are far smaller than before (compare Models 2 and 4). But regardless of how we do the "correction" for endogeneity, the parameter estimates for English governing law remain negative, with no statistically significant difference between high- and low-rated issues.

Thus, unlike Eichengreen and Mody, we find no evidence to support the notion that moral hazard factors increase spreads for some borrowers. However, consistent with their work, we find that instrumental variables corrections can result in much larger parameter estimates on the governing law variables. The fact that we obtain opposite signs to those of Eichengreen and Mody for these large impacts suggests that the results from instrumental variables corrections may be quite fragile. Accordingly, we wonder if the large and variable parameter estimates might be the outcome of correcting for endogeneity when there is actually no (or only very modest) endogeneity. In addition, the lack of exclusion restrictions (i.e., variables that affect governing law but do not affect spreads) in Eichengreen and Mody's correction and the reliance only on the nonlinearity of the logit or probit model for identification may create further problems. The conflicting results and apparent problems in using instrumental variables to correct for possible endogeneity or selection bias in primary market data suggest that alternate approaches might be desirable.

6.2. Selection via Fixed Effects

Fortunately, the use of secondary market data offers an alternative means of correcting for possible endogeneity. One general benefit of secondary market data is the passage of time between the issuance

decision and the observation of the yield spread. Whereas primary market data reflect the interaction of supply and demand at the time of issuance and may be subject to the standard problems, the supply of bonds is fixed in the secondary market, so it may be far easier to estimate the way that investors value bonds of different characteristics.

But the secondary market data also allow a very direct way around the endogeneity or selection problem. In particular, our sample of 488 bonds as of June 2000 include 245 bonds issued by borrowers which have bonds that are issued both under English law (i.e., with CACs) and under New York or German laws (i.e., without CACs) in our sample.[18] These bonds are issued by 29 different borrowers, including most of the largest emerging market sovereign borrowers over the last ten years, and are representative of the full range of the ratings spectrum.[19] If we can control for effects of the other characteristics of the bonds (such as maturity, currency, liquidity, etc) then by including a dummy for each issuer we can directly estimate the impact of governing law on spreads. This corresponds to a fixed effects identification strategy for selection bias (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).[20]

In Table 8, we begin by presenting summary results for a basic OLS equation for the 245 bonds from these 29 issuers, estimated with a reduced number of explanatory variables relative to the results in Table 4 due to the smaller sample. This equation suggests that higher-rated issuers pay more when they use English rather than New York governing law, with no difference for lower- rated issuers. When we correct for possible selection bias by adding issuer dummies (and removing other issuer-related variables—notably credit ratings—which are now extraneous), the significance of the effect for the higher rated issuers disappears, but there is now a statistically significant reduction in yield spreads for lower rated issuers when their bonds are issued under English law.

While the exact size and sign of the parameter estimates should not be relied on too heavily given the smaller sample size, there are two noteworthy points. First, the corrected estimates imply relatively small impacts on borrowing costs (impacts on spreads of 10 percent or less), as opposed to the far larger implied impacts from instrumental variables corrections. Second, the results in Table 7 are consistent with the

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[18] In a few cases where there is clear support from the sovereign (e.g. the Korea Development Bank and the Export Import Bank of Korea), we include quasi-sovereign issuers with their sovereign.

[19] The sovereigns include Argentina, Brazil, China, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Slovenia, Turkey and Venezuela.

[20] It can also be thought of as similar to the work of Petas and Rahman (1999) and Dixon and Wall (2000), albeit using 245 bonds (and around 15 control variables) rather than 12 or fewer bonds.

results from our instrumental variables correction for primary market data, suggesting that no matter how one corrects for endogeneity, there is no evidence that investors require higher yields when the bonds of lower-rated issuers include CACs.

Thus, an alternative strategy for correcting for endogeneity—and importantly one that does not involve the potential pitfalls of instrumental variables—suggests that there are only modest impacts on yields from the choice of governing law. One possible criticism of this approach is that by focusing on issuers with bonds outstanding both with and without CACs we are looking at those issuers whose borrowing behavior indicates that there should be no impact. The problem with this explanation is that the borrowers that are included in this group represent about 90 percent of all outstanding sovereign emerging markets debt. Thus, although we cannot rule out that there is some group of borrowers for which endogeneity is important, it is apparently a fairly small group.

7. Conclusion

A simple of way of summarizing the results of this paper would be to combine all our various estimates of the price impact of CACs. If we combine all the estimates from the primary market yield data for 1990-2000 and the secondary market yield data for mid-1998 and mid-2000, we obtain median regression estimates that English governing law is associated with a reduction of 5 or 6 percent in yield spreads for both lower and higher rated borrowers. While we hesitate to rely too much on particular estimates, the implied impacts on borrowing costs are only about 10 basis points for higher rated borrowers and about 25 basis points for lower rated borrowers (and we would not be surprised if the inclusion of some other relevant, but harder-to-measure explanatory variables might reduce these impacts even further). The regression coefficients in particular equations are sometimes statistically significant but are more often insignificant.

Our results imply a far smaller impact on yields from CACs than the estimates implied in some frequently cited work by Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) and (2001) and provide no evidence in support of Eichengreen and Mody's finding that lower rated borrowers on average pay a premium of hundreds of basis points for borrowing under English governing law with CACs. The primary reason for the difference with the estimates in Eichengreen and Mody appears to be their use of an instrumental variables technique for correcting for possible endogeneity or selectivity by borrowers in the choice of governing law. By contrast, we have paid careful attention to issues of data quality and used several different approaches to correcting for possible endogeneity, and found no evidence of large impacts on borrowing costs.

We believe that our conclusion that any impact on borrowing costs from CACs is small is consistent with the conventional wisdom of those people—investors, issuers and lead managers—who actually work in the market for sovereign emerging market bonds. The sell-side research of investment banks never refers to CACs as a factor in explaining the pricing of individual bonds. The several data and news services that report in detail on each new issue never explain the pricing of a new bond in terms of the presence or absence of CACs. Further, many borrowers switch frequently between governing laws—apparently sometimes without being aware of it—which seems inconsistent with a careful consideration of the benefits of a lower yield versus the ability to easily restructure when it suited them.[21] Finally, bond ratings from ratings agencies do not differ based on governing law—agencies have not considered governing law as a risk factor. In summary, we consider it unlikely that governing law and the presence of CACs could have an average impact of hundreds of basis points without market participants being acutely aware of this effect.[22]

There may, of course, be good reasons for investors and other market participants not to have focused on governing law and the presence or absence of CACs. If moral hazard is indeed small and borrowers do not habitually restructure or default on their bonds, the precise legal terms for dealing with financial distress will not be especially important. Indeed, it seems unlikely that making restructuring of bond contracts somewhat easier will have any major impact on the frequency with which countries will seek to reduce their payment obligations. As noted in IMF (2000, p.136), "The restructuring of a country's external debt is a serious step and something most sovereigns only do as a last resort." In particular, seeking the restructuring of payment terms is likely to entail significant costs in terms of market access and output losses, albeit costs that are not as large as those following a default. We would not, of course, argue that the terms of bond contracts never matter, merely that this particular part of the contract does not appear to have had a systematic large impact on bond pricing.

Indeed, the experience of some recent sovereign debt exchanges provides further reason why we might expect to see only modest impacts on borrowing costs from the inclusion of CACs in bond contracts.[23] In

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[21] Of 45 emerging markets issuers that we could identify with more than 10 issues over 1990-2000, 35 appeared to have bonds issued both with CACs and without CACs.

[22] Indeed, a statement in early 1999 by Petas and Rahman (1999, p.78)—emerging markets analysts at a major international bank—provides concrete supporting evidence that market participants have not traditionally focused on governing law and the presence or absence of CACs: "This far, we do not believe that the market has made the distinction between the two different systems of law."

[23] See Dixon and Wall (2000), Lipworth and Nystedt (2001), Frankel and Roubini (2001), IMF (2001), and Moody's (2001) for further discussion on this point.

particular, the recent exchanges involving Pakistan and Ecuador have shown an example where CACs were not invoked when they were present, and another where a sovereign managed to restructure obligations even under contracts that required the unanimous approval of all borrowers. In the first case (Pakistan), it seems quite possible that the presence of CACs may have smoothed the process of obtaining creditors' agreement to carry out a voluntary bond exchange (rather than a restructuring of the existing bond contract). In the second case (Ecuador), although the bond contract required unanimous consent for changes in the bond's payment terms, the contract allowed a simple majority of bondholders to change other terms of the contract. By changing some of these other terms, a simple majority of bondholders was able to make the bond sufficiently unattractive that most potential holdout creditors agreed to a voluntary exchange offer. These two instances show that the actual resolution of cases of financial distress may evolve in ways that make CACs less important in practice than would be suggested by a strict reading of contractual terms. Hence, our finding that the presence or absence of CACs has not had a significant impact on borrowing costs may suggest that the ongoing nature of the relationship between sovereign borrowers and investors means that each group has an incentive to minimize the costs of the resolution of financial distress, regardless of the particular contract terms that govern the relationship.

Like all empirical studies, the results obtained above reflect the conditions and relationships that existed during the sample period and may not be an accurate guide to the future. In particular, the default of Argentina and the debate in early 2002 over improving the mechanisms for dealing with sovereign debt problems might imply a regime change that makes the earlier results less relevant. This remains to be seen, although we have some preliminary evidence that CACs were still not priced as this article was being finalized in mid-2002. In particular, in results available upon request, we have examined a sample of 130 bonds from 14 emerging market sovereigns with bonds outstanding on April 30, 2000 both with and without CACs. The results imply that even after the extensive debate over CACs in early 2002, there was still no economically or statistically significant difference in the pricing of bonds with and without CACs. The implication is that market participants still had not focused on which bonds had CACs and which did not have CACs, or that they did not believe that the presence or absence of CACs affected the value of these bonds.

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Table 1. Emerging Market Bond Issuance by Currency and Governing Law, 1990-August 2000

Currency	English	New York	Japan	German	Luxem.	Swiss	HK	Austria	Span.	Ital.	Other	Total
UK pound	17	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
U.S. dollar	752	812	0	3	8	0	5	0	0	0	60	1614
Yen	94	11	249	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	355
Dmark	27	5	0	142	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	182
Euro	79	23	0	42	6	0	0	0	0	3	1	152
Swiss franc	0	1	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	17
HK dollar	27	1	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	1	38
Austr. sch.	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	18
Span. Peseta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	11
Italian lira	30	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	46
Total bonds	1031	871	249	187	25	16	15	13	11	3	64	2452

Governing law (spanning header over English, New York, Japan, German, Luxem., Swiss, HK, Austria, Span., Ital., Other)

Source: Capital Data's Bondware database.

Table 2. Full Model for Secondary Market Data, June 2000

Variable	Model 2 Coef	S.E	Prob.	Model 3 Coef	S.E	Prob.
Issuer Characteristics						
A2	0.700	0.246	0.00	0.491	0.277	0.08
A3	0.646	0.243	0.01	0.496	0.269	0.07
BBB1	0.753	0.230	0.00	0.591	0.258	0.02
BBB2	1.155	0.245	0.00	0.999	0.279	0.00
BBB3	1.206	0.237	0.00	1.065	0.265	0.00
BB1	1.401	0.231	0.00	1.111	0.262	0.00
BB2	1.676	0.220	0.00	1.362	0.244	0.00
BB3	2.090	0.231	0.00	1.714	0.252	0.00
B1	2.045	0.239	0.00	1.807	0.259	0.00
B2	2.044	0.251	0.00	1.911	0.296	0.00
B3	2.303	0.314	0.00	2.163	0.316	0.00
CCC1	2.880	0.258	0.00	2.714	0.280	0.00
Public	-0.053	0.059	0.37	-0.007	0.061	0.91
Corporate	0.110	0.065	0.09	0.095	0.067	0.16
Asian	0.060	0.063	0.34	-0.005	0.067	0.94
Latin	0.166	0.067	0.01	0.211	0.089	0.02
Bond Characteristics						
Log(US dollar amount)	-0.002	0.036	0.96	0.024	0.036	0.50
Years to maturity	0.008	0.002	0.00	0.008	0.002	0.00
Put	-0.293	0.074	0.00	-0.258	0.069	0.00
Call	0.123	0.078	0.12	0.083	0.076	0.27
Duration	0.028	0.013	0.04	0.023	0.014	0.09
DM	-0.287	0.095	0.00	-0.283	0.101	0.01
Lira	-0.243	0.068	0.00	-0.254	0.099	0.01
Euro	-0.246	0.056	0.00	-0.214	0.067	0.00
Other European currencies	-0.183	0.179	0.31	-0.163	0.168	0.33
Market						
Global	0.069	0.056	0.22	0.075	0.085	0.38
Yankee	0.033	0.057	0.56	0.068	0.084	0.42
Log(bid-ask spread)	0.130	0.037	0.00	0.139	0.041	0.00
Private placement	-0.068	0.072	0.35	0.178	0.156	0.25
Law Dummies						
Low-rated UK law	-0.155	0.061	0.01	-0.134	0.063	0.03
High-rated UK law	0.132	0.076	0.08	0.060	0.080	0.45
German law	-0.085	0.088	0.33	-0.140	0.098	0.15
Adjusted R-squared	0.785			0.814		
Number of observations	488			488		

Model 3 has a number of variables in addition to Model 2 that are omitted to conserve space. The variables are country dummies for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey and S. Korea as well as dummies indicating if a bond was eligible to be sold in the U.S. under Rule 144A, if it was registered with SEC, if it is a bearer bond, subordinated debt, if it is collateralized and finally dummies for US- and European-only bookrunners.

Table 3. Full Model for Secondary Market Data, June 1998

Variable	Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef	S.E.	Prob.	Coef	S.E.	Prob.
Issuer Characteristics						
A2	-0.693	0.227	0.00	-0.840	0.214	0.00
A3	-0.546	0.184	0.00	-0.777	0.174	0.00
BBB1	-0.648	0.144	0.00	-0.958	0.134	0.00
BBB2	-0.694	0.147	0.00	-0.992	0.141	0.00
BBB3	-0.342	0.163	0.04	-0.658	0.155	0.00
BB1	0.047	0.157	0.77	-0.212	0.140	0.13
BB2	0.063	0.146	0.67	-0.056	0.122	0.65
BB3	0.321	0.162	0.05	0.241	0.147	0.10
B1	0.734	0.201	0.00	0.574	0.214	0.01
B2	0.542	0.156	0.00	0.427	0.166	0.01
B3	0.593	0.166	0.00	0.292	0.229	0.20
CCC1	0.607	0.152	0.00	0.400	0.132	0.00
CCC2	1.191	0.269	0.00	0.974	0.268	0.00
Public	0.116	0.059	0.05	0.103	0.058	0.08
Corporate	0.168	0.075	0.03	0.098	0.078	0.21
Asian	0.524	0.100	0.00	0.578	0.113	0.00
Latin	0.210	0.086	0.02	0.482	0.118	0.00
Bond Characteristics						
Log(US dollar amount)	0.127	0.026	0.00	0.113	0.028	0.00
Years to maturity	0.001	0.002	0.58	0.002	0.002	0.36
Put	-0.086	0.096	0.37	-0.089	0.096	0.36
Call	-0.026	0.108	0.81	0.059	0.107	0.58
Non US dollar	-0.074	0.094	0.43	0.192	0.099	0.05
Duration	0.036	0.014	0.01	0.023	0.013	0.09
Market						
Global	-0.185	0.073	0.01	0.016	0.104	0.88
Yankee	0.015	0.064	0.81	0.139	0.100	0.16
Law Dummies						
Low-rated UK law	-0.037	0.068	0.58	0.044	0.070	0.53
High-rated UK law	-0.295	0.113	0.01	-0.135	0.116	0.24
German law	-0.476	0.119	0.00	-0.347	0.113	0.00
Adjusted R-squared	0.74345			0.7828		
Number of observations	296			296		

Model 3 has a number of variables in addition to Model 2 that are omitted to conserve space. The variables are country dummies for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and S. Korea as well as dummies indicating if the bonds was eligible to be sold in the U.S. under Rule 144A, if they were registered with SEC, if it is a bearer bond and, finally, dummies for US- and European-only bookrunners

Table 4. Estimated Parameters on English Governing Law Variables, Secondary Market Yield Spread Data
(Standard errors shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates)

Model Number and Description of Specification	June 2000			June 1998		
	Adjusted R-squared	Coefficient on Higher-rated English Law Issues	Coefficient on Lower-rated English Law Issues	Adjusted R-squared	Coefficient on Higher-rated English Law Issues	Coefficient on Lower-rated English Law Issues
1. Full sample, basic list of variables, with no differentiation between high and low rated English law bonds	0.765	-0.040 (0.056)		0.714	-0.117* (0.063)	
2. Model 1 plus separate dummies for high and low rated English law bonds	0.770	0.132* (0.076)	-0.155** (0.061)	0.718	-0.295*** (0.113)	-0.037 (0.068)
3. Model 2 plus additional control variables	0.794	0.060 (0.080)	-0.134** (0.063)	0.750	-0.135 (0.116)	0.044 (0.070)
4. Model 3 but excluding 5 largest outliers	0.813	0.052 (0.076)	-0.102* (0.069)	0.799	-0.085 (0.107)	0.011 (0.066)
5. Model 3 but with weighted least squares, based on US$ size of issue (unweighted R-sq in parentheses)	0.879 (0.781)	0.058 (0.071)	-0.117** (0.058)	0.869 (0.728)	-0.124 (0.110)	0.062 (0.071)
6. Model 3, but excluding issues by corporates	0.842	0.003 (0.080)	-0.061 (0.066)	0.781	0.064 (0.095)	

***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 5. Estimated Parameters on English Governing Law Variables, Primary Market Yield Spread Data
(Standard errors shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates)

Model Number and Description of Specification	Adjusted R-squared	Coefficient on Higher-rated English Law Issues	Coefficient on Lower-rated English Law Issues
1. Full sample, basic list of variables, with no differentiation between high and low rated English law issues	0.801	-0.123*** (0.031)	
2. Model 1 plus separate dummies for high and low rated English law issues	0.801	-0.133*** (0.044)	-0.116*** (0.036)
3. Model 2 plus additional control variables	0.818	-0.055 (0.044)	-0.063* (0.036)
4. Model 3 but only including issues since the start of 1996	0.823	-0.059 (0.055)	-0.002 (0.052)
5. Model 3 but excluding 20 largest outliers	0.853	-0.055 (0.042)	-0.028 (0.031)
6. Model 3 but with weighted least squares, based on US$ size of issue (unweighted R-squared in parentheses)	0.974 (0.808)	-0.160*** (0.052)	-0.042 (0.040)
7. Model 3, but excluding issues with spreads of 50 basis points or less	0.774	-0.003 (0.044)	-0.058* (0.034)
8. Model 3, but excluding corporate issues	0.802	-0.106* (0.055)	-0.133*** (0.045)
9. Model 3, but excluding issues by corporates, floating rate issues and nondollar issues	0.839	-0.141* (0.075)	-0.042 (0.048)

***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6. Full Model for Primary Market Data

Variable	Model 2 Coef	S.E	Prob.	Model 3 Coef	S.E	Prob.
Issuer Characteristics						
A1	4.067	0.340	0.00	3.154	0.352	0.00
A2	3.952	0.342	0.00	2.954	0.353	0.00
A3	4.295	0.332	0.00	3.278	0.346	0.00
BBB1	4.533	0.325	0.00	3.499	0.343	0.00
BBB2	4.659	0.333	0.00	3.610	0.346	0.00
BBB3	5.060	0.329	0.00	3.990	0.339	0.00
BB1	5.361	0.328	0.00	4.384	0.340	0.00
BB2	5.479	0.333	0.00	4.505	0.340	0.00
BB3	5.826	0.326	0.00	4.792	0.338	0.00
B1	5.827	0.335	0.00	4.831	0.343	0.00
B2	5.891	0.334	0.00	4.883	0.345	0.00
B3	6.081	0.344	0.00	5.075	0.350	0.00
Public	-0.064	0.035	0.07	-0.081	0.036	0.02
Corporate	-0.019	0.036	0.61	-0.011	0.039	0.78
Supranational	-0.011	0.081	0.89	-0.116	0.089	0.19
Asian	-0.017	0.037	0.66	0.084	0.052	0.11
Latin	0.003	0.031	0.93	-0.023	0.056	0.68
Bond Characteristics						
Log(US dollar amount)	0.034	0.016	0.04	0.026	0.017	0.12
Years to maturity	0.010	0.002	0.00	0.009	0.001	0.00
Floating rate	-0.681	0.048	0.00	-0.609	0.053	0.00
Put	-0.045	0.089	0.61	-0.030	0.081	0.71
Call	0.194	0.058	0.00	0.139	0.056	0.01
Yen	-0.209	0.049	0.00	-0.096	0.056	0.09
DM	-0.043	0.069	0.54	0.040	0.069	0.57
Euro	0.015	0.042	0.72	0.028	0.046	0.55
Lira	-0.115	0.067	0.09	-0.006	0.067	0.93
Other European currencies	-0.098	0.072	0.17	0.001	0.071	0.99
Market						
Global	0.012	0.039	0.76	-0.040	0.054	0.46
Yankee	0.045	0.039	0.24	-0.003	0.051	0.96
Samurai	-0.107	0.064	0.09	-0.345	0.114	0.00
Private placement	0.138	0.045	0.00	0.124	0.059	0.04
External Conditions						
Log(10 years US yield)	-0.712	0.112	0.00	-0.467	0.112	0.00
Log(Slope of US yield curve)	0.205	0.121	0.09	0.633	0.145	0.00
Log(EMBI spread)	0.188	0.038	0.00	0.265	0.038	0.00
Log(BBB spread)	0.332	0.053	0.00	0.177	0.063	0.01
Law Dummies						
Low-rated UK law	-0.116	0.036	0.00	-0.063	0.036	0.08
High-rated UK law	-0.133	0.044	0.00	-0.055	0.044	0.20
German law	-0.213	0.059	0.00	-0.127	0.057	0.03
Luxembourg law	0.283	0.109	0.01	0.264	0.101	0.01
Adjusted R-squared	0.8012			0.8167		
Number of observations	1520			1520		

Model 3 has a number of variables in addition to Model 2 that are not reported in the table due to space considerations. The additional variables are country dummies for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. Furthermore, dummies for the following bond characteristics were added: collateralization, sinking funds, bearer bond only, fungible. Finally, the following market characteristics were added: dummies for US, Japanese, and European book runners, registration with SEC, and whether or not a bond was eligible for sale in the U.S. under Rule 144A.

Table 7. Examining the Impact of Instrumental Variables Corrections for Possible Endogeneity
(Standard errors shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates)

Model and Endogeneity Correction	Pseudo-R Squared of Gov. Law Equation	Standard Devn. of Gov. Law Variable	Coefficient on Higher-rated English Law Bonds	Coefficient on Lower-rated English Law Bonds
1. No correction (OLS)	n.a.	0.496	-0.084* (0.046)	-0.033 (0.037)
2. Using predicted value from basic gov. law equation (similar to Eich. and Mody)	0.294	0.292	-0.599*** (0.135)	-0.456*** (0.127)
3. Using predicted value from augmented governing law equation	0.542	0.382	-0.260*** (0.091)	-0.200** (0.088)
4. Using predicted law (zero/one) from basic governing law equation	0.294	0.489	-0.188*** (0.053)	-0.092*** (0.047)
5. Using predicted law (zero/one) from augmented governing equation	0.542	0.500	-0.164*** (0.057)	-0.098** (0.049)

***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 8. Alternative Correction for Possible Endogeneity of Governing Law, Secondary Market Yield Spread Data

(Standard errors shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates)

Description of Specification	Adjusted R-squared of Yield Equation	Coefficient on Higher-rated English Law Issues	Coefficient on Lower-rated English Law Issues
1. No correction	0.808	0.231***	-0.008
		(0.075)	(0.067)
2. Selectivity correction via fixed effects (issuer dummies)	0.888	0.062	-0.107*
		(0.075)	(0.060)

   *** and * denote significance at 1 and 10 percent levels, respectively.