



8TH JACQUES POLAK ANNUAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 15-16, 2007


Estimation of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes: Synthesis of the Techniques for Inferring Flexibility and Basket Weights

Discussion by

Steven Kamin
Federal Reserve Board

Presentation given at the 8th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference
Hosted by the International Monetary Fund
Washington, DC—November 15-16, 2007
Please do not quote without the permission from the author(s).

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author(s) only, and the presence of them, or of links to them, on the IMF website does not imply that the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management endorses or shares the views expressed in the presentation.



Comments on:
“Estimation of De Facto Exchange
Rate Regimes: Synthesis of the
Techniques for Inferring Flexibility
and Basket Weights”

Jeffrey Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei

Steven B. Kamin
Federal Reserve Board
November 16, 2007

- Exchange rate regimes matter
- Much work focused on identifying them
- Particularly at IMF

Jeff and Shang-Jin's Contribution

- Some countries target a basket of currencies
- Methodology for simultaneously identifying currency weights and exchange rate flexibility

Frankel-Wei Basic Specification

$$\begin{aligned} \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{thb}) = & C \\ & + [w1 * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{Jap.}) + w2 * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{\$US}) \\ & + (1 - w1 - w2) * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{UK})] \\ & + \beta * [\% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{thb}) + \% \Delta R] \end{aligned}$$

Frankel-Wei Basic Estimates of β

approx. 2000–2004

1. Indonesia	.736	11. Russia	.101
2. Chile	.675	12. Malta*	.073
3. Botswana*	.636	13. China	.035
4. Mexico	.398	14. Fiji*	.031
5. Thailand	.368	15. Norway	.029
6. Canada	.366	16. Seych.*	.029
7. Pap. N.G.*	.308	17. Latvia*	.009
8. Australia	.175	18. Denmk.	.001
9. Samoa*	.161	19. Malaysia	0
10. Vanuatu*	.104	20. HK	-.027

* IMF-designated basket-peg

Hypothesis #1 for too-low beta:
endogeneity of $\% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{thb})$

$$\begin{aligned} & \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{thb}) = C \\ & + [w1 * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{Jap.}) + w2 * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{\$US}) \\ & + (1 - w1 - w2) * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{UK})] \\ & + \beta * [\% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{thb}) + \% \Delta R] \end{aligned}$$

Hypothesis #2 for too-low beta:
faulty restriction that currency coefficients
sum to one

$$\begin{aligned} \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{thb}) = C & \\ + [& w1 * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{Jap.}) + w2 * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{\$US}) \\ & + (1 - w1 - w2) * \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{UK})] \\ + \beta * [& \% \Delta(\text{ESDR}/\text{thb}) + \% \Delta R] \end{aligned}$$

Un-Restricting the Currency Weights Canada 2002-2005

	Frankel-Wei	Kamin	Kamin Unrestricted
JPY	.324	.201	-.061
USD	.449	.784	.024
EUR	.337	.322	-.360
GBP	-.110	-.306	-.527
EMP	.366	.441	.462

Un-Restricting the Currency Weights

Australia 2000-2003


	Frankel-Wei	Kamin	Kamin Unrestricted
JPY	.250	.221	.449
USD	.294	.397	.941
EUR	.554	.503	.902
GBP	-.098	-.121	.052
EMP	.175	.175	.170

Hypothesis #3 for too-low betas:
% ΔR term not accurately capturing
exchange market intervention

$$\begin{aligned} \% \Delta (E_{SDR/thb}) = & C \\ & + [w1 * \% \Delta (E_{SDR/Jap.}) + w2 * \% \Delta (E_{SDR/\$US}) \\ & + (1 - w1 - w2) * \% \Delta (E_{SDR/UK})] \\ & + \beta * [\% \Delta (E_{SDR/thb}) + \% \Delta R] \end{aligned}$$


Australia

Indexed, January 2000 = 100



Canada

Indexed, Jan 2000 = 100



Implications

- Reserves data need to be cleansed of movements not reflecting interventions to target the exchange rate
- Scaling changes in reserves and exchange rates by their relative variance can boost beta's
- but may lead to misleading results if country intervenes frequently

Does estimating currency weights and exchange rate flexibility simultaneously lead to better estimates?

Separating the Currency Weights from the EMP

Canada 2002-2003

	<u>Frankel-Wei</u>	<u>Kamin</u>	<u>Kamin Unrestricted</u>		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
JPY	.324	.201	-.061	.435	--
USD	.449	.784	.024	1.140	--
EUR	.337	.322	-.360	.821	--
GBP	-.110	-.306	-.527	-.300	--
EMP	.366	.441	.462	--	.443

Separating the Currency Weights from the EMP

Fiji 2000-2003

	<u>Frankel-Wei</u>	<u>Kamin</u>	<u>Kamin Unrestricted</u>		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
JPY	.086	.099	.079	.072	--
USD	.229	.267	.217	.170	--
EUR	.187	.170	.133	.116	--
GBP	.029	.037	.022	.034	--
AUD	.436	.427	.428	.465	
EMP	.031	.033	.033	--	.177

Separating the Currency Weights from the EMP

Thailand 2000-2003

	<u>Frankel-Wei</u>	<u>Kamin</u>	<u>Kamin Unrestricted</u>		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
JPY	.121	.084	-.028	.364	--
USD	-1768	.782	.527	.623	--
EUR	.255	.213	.025	.274	--
GBP	-.043	-.079	-.161	.040	--
KRW	.022				
SGD	.068				
AUD	.107				
MYR	1768				
EMP	.368	.433	.443	--	.321

Conclusion

- Interesting and provocative paper
- Novel methodology
- Helpful for countries that may target more than a single currency
- Requires careful attention to data, especially reserves
- Complementary to, not substitute for, institutional analysis