Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State

Author/Editor:

Christian Harm ; Joshua Charap

Publication Date:

July 1, 1999

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption.

Series:

Working Paper No. 1999/091

Subject:

Corruption Crime Labor National accounts Personal income Public sector wages Technology

English

Publication Date:

July 1, 1999

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451851496/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0911999

Pages:

24

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