Why Do Firms Pay Antidumping Duty?

Author/Editor:

Poonam Gupta

Publication Date:

December 1, 1999

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

With the virtual elimination of tariffs and quotas under GATT, antidumping measures emerged as a key instrument of protection. Under antidumping actions exporters can either raise the price to eliminate the dumping margin or pay an antidumping duty. This paper analyzes the incentives to exporters to choose between duty or settlement outcomes and finds that due to the smaller loss in market share exporters may prefer an antidumping duty over voluntary settlement. The paper analyzes the welfare implications of these outcomes and finds that they are ambiguous.

Series:

Working Paper No. 99/166

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

December 1, 1999

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451858082/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1661999

Price:

$15.00 (Academic Rate:$15.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

24

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