IMF Working Papers

Country Insurance

Author/Editor:

Eduardo Levy Yeyati ; Tito Cordella

Publication Date:

August 1, 2004

Electronic Access:

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Summary:

In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay off more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2004/148

Subject:

Financial crises Insurance Moral hazard Solvency Tax incentives