Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries : Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy

Author/Editor:

Giorgio Brosio ; Ehtisham Ahmad

Publication Date:

March 1, 2008

Electronic Access:

Free Full Text (PDF file size is 499 KB).Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.

Series:

Working Paper No. 08/71

Subject:

Frequency:

Monthly

English

Publication Date:

March 1, 2008

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451869330/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2008071

Price:

$18.00 (Academic Rate:$18.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

27

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