Communiqué of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund
September 26, 1999September 26, 1999
1. The Interim Committee held its fifty-third meeting in Washington, D.C. on September 26, 1999, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequér of the United Kingdom. The Committee expresses its appreciation to the outgoing Chairman, Mr. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, formerly Minister of the Treasury of Italy and currently President of Italy, for his invaluable contribution to the Committee's work.
Global Economic and Financial Conditions
2. The Committee welcomes the improvement in global economic and financial conditions since the beginning of this year. It has reviewed the challenges required to ensure that the recovery is sustained.
In many emerging market economies and developing countries, raising growth rates on a lasting basis will require not only sustained growth in industrial countries, but also key structural reforms. These include banking reform, corporate restructuring, tax reform and tax administration, establishment of effective legal systems, protection of property rights, and improved governance.
- Recovery is taking hold in crisis-affected countries in Asia, aided by supportive
fiscal policies, accommodative monetary policies, and a return of financial market confidence.
Financial sector restructuring is generally moving ahead, but further efforts are needed to
complete the task. In addition, corporate restructuring and institutional reforms should be
accelerated. Indonesia's recovery has been interrupted by structural and political problems that
will need to be resolved speedily in order for economic recovery and reform to resume. China
and India have weathered the crisis relatively well and economic performance has been
sustained, but significant challenges in some areas remain to be addressed.
- In Russia, the Committee welcomes the efforts of the IMF to work with the Russian
authorities to encourage macroeconomic stabilization, the continuation of reforms, and the
further integration of Russia into the global economy. While acknowledging the recentinitial
measures to restructure the banking system, strengthen the integrity of financial policies and
institutions, and improve governance and transparency, the Committee stresses the urgent need
for further progress. It calls on the IMF to work with the Russian authorities to strengthen
reforms in these and other areas that are important for economic growth.
- In Brazil, strict implementation of the Fund-supported program has restored confidence,
and the outlook for some other countries in Latin America has also improved. In many other
countries in this region, adjustment and reform efforts still require further strengthening.
- In the Middle East and Africa, countries that have benefited from the improvement in
commodity prices, particularly for oil, have a renewed opportunity to accelerate progress on
fiscal consolidation and diversification of their economies.
- Heavily-indebted sub-Saharan African countries should take full and prompt advantage
of the opportunity offered by debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative to intensify and
press ahead with reforms, including allocating additional resources for, and improving the
efficiency of, spending aimed at poverty reduction. Outward-oriented strategies and peaceful
resolution of armed conflicts are critical for sustaining economic development and higher
- The tragic events that took place in Kosovo this year have had severe negative economic
effects on other countries in the region. Coherent stabilization and reform policies supported by
the international financial institutions are important for further economic development in the
region. Therefore the Committee calls upon the IMF to continue its strengthened support in the
form of programs and technical assistance to the countries involved.
A sustained pickup in domestic demand in Europe and Japan, together with medium-term growth in the U.S. in line with potential, will help to achieve a more balanced pattern of growth among the major industrial countries.
- The Committee welcomes the continued strong performance of the U.S. economy that
has been critical in supporting global activity. Policies should continue to be directed to
sustaining growth on a long-term basis by maintaining a strong fiscal position and increasing
- The Committee welcomes the growth of the Japanese economy in the first two quarters
of 1999, which was supported by a rebound in consumer demand. Given that the prospect for
continuing recovery in private demand remains uncertain, however, it urges the authorities to
maintain a supportive stance of fiscal and monetary policies through a supplementarybudget of
appropriate size while, in the context of their zero interest rate policy, providing ample liquidity
until deflationary concerns are dispelled. It is also critical to continue efforts to strengthen the
banking system and foster corporate restructuring in order to achieve sustained growth in Japan,
which should facilitate needed medium-term fiscal consolidation.
- The Committee is also encouraged by the pickup in growth in Europe in the context of
price stability. While monetary conditions in the euro area are accommodative and should remain
supportive, further efforts toward fiscal consolidation and structural reform, especially regarding
the tax system and the labor and product markets, would improve prospects for sustained growth
and a further reduction in unemployment.
3. The Committee emphasizes the importance of open and competitive markets as a key component of efforts to sustain growth and stability in the global economy. The proposed launch of new trade negotiations in Seattle later this year is an important opportunity to make further progress in this direction. Further broad-based liberalization in a strengthened rules-based multilateral trading system will help underpin global growth and stability. To ensure that the benefits of liberalized trade and investment are fully realized and shared, the Committee encourages the Fund to work with the Bank and the WTO to strengthen their programs of work to achieve better coherence in global policy making. It recognizes that coordinated programs of support for developing countries, including targeted technical assistance and policy advice, will support them in meeting WTO commitments and implementing current agreements.
4. The Committee notes that, in fostering economic growth through appropriate macroeconomic policies and structural reforms, the IMF, in close cooperation with the World Bank, and consistent with their mandates, must also take into account the direct social consequénces of adjustment and reform efforts as well as the complementarity of macroeconomic and social policies for long-term growth and improved social indicators.
Poverty Reduction Initiatives
5. The Committee endorses the proposed replacement of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) by the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, which aims at making poverty reduction efforts among low-income members a key and more explicit element of a renewed growth-oriented economic strategy. The cornerstones of the new approach, which should continue to be based on sound macroeconomic policies, are as follows:
- A comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) will be prepared by
each country, with assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, and with strong country
ownership based on public partnership, to guide the design of programs; the PRSP will need the
approval of both Bank and Fund Boards.
- Social and sectoral programs aimed at poverty reduction will be taken fully into account
in the design of economic policies for promoting faster sustainable growth.
- Greater emphasis will be accorded to good governance, in particular in all government
activities, through greater transparency, effective monitoring procedures, anti-corruption
initiatives, accountability, and the involvement of all sectors of society.
- High priority will be accorded to key reform measures critical to achieving governments'
6. The Committee takes note of the crucial role to be played by the World Bank and other relevant international organizations in helping governments develop and monitor the implementation of their poverty reduction strategies. It endorses the proposal that PRSPs, as they are developed, provide the basis for all IDA and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility lending operations and closer Bank-IMF collaboration.
7. The Committee welcomes the joint meeting of the Interim and Development Committees, held earlier today, on the enhanced HIPC Initiative. The proposals made by the Bank and the IMF to this end, which build upon wide-ranging comments from civil society and the international community, are aimed at providing faster, deeper, and broader debt relief and strengthening the link between debt relief and poverty reduction.
8. The Committee welcomes the agreement on the financing of the IMF's participation in the HIPC Initiative and continued concessional lending by the IMF for growth and poverty reduction in its low income member countries. It highly appreciates the financial support provided by a wide cross-section of the IMF's membership through bilateral contributions and endorses the decision adopted by the Executive Board for the Fund's participation. The Committee considers that the off-market transactions of up to 14 million ounces of fine gold by the IMF that are envisaged will be a one-time operation of a highly exceptional nature. This is part of a broader financing package to allow the IMF to contribute to the resolution of the debt problems of the HIPCs at the turn of the millennium and to the continuation of concessional operations to support countries' efforts to achieve sustained growth and poverty reduction. The Committee endorses the Executive Board's recommendation that the Board of Governors adopt a Resolution to this effect.
9. The Committee welcomes the progressive translation of broad principles into concrete actions in developing and monitoring standards of importance to the international monetary and financial system.
- The Committee encourages the IMF to continue its collaborative efforts with the
World Bank and other relevant organizations to complete work on the Financial Stability
Forum's compendium of standards.
- The Committee urges all 47 Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS)
subscribers to continue to enhance their statistical practices, and to report data on international
reserves and related liabilities according to the agreed reserves template by March 2000. It
encourages further work by the Fund on the SDDS, including on strengthening external debt data
and developing macro-prudential indicators. It looks forward to the launch of the operational
phase of the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) early next year. The Committee also
urges the IMF and member countries to press ahead with efforts to improve the timeliness and
comprehensiveness of data on capital flows. The IMF should provide technical assistance to
enhance the quality and timeliness of data. Country authorities and relevant international
organizations should also take urgent action to improve data on social spending and social
- The Committee adopts the attached Code of Good Practices on
Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles as a guide for members to
increase transparency in the conduct of these policies. The Committee urges all members to
implement the new Code as well as the previously agreed Code of Good Practices on Fiscal
- The Committee welcomes the assessments of the implementation of the Basel Core
Principles that have been made in the course of IMF surveillance and technical assistance, and
urges that these be embedded into regular surveillance activities. It notes the work under way by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to review the 1988 Capital Accord and urges the
Basle Committee to complete that review. It encourages the IMF to continue to support this
10. The Committee encourages the IMF, in cooperation with other standard-setting bodies, to continue to experiment with assessments of members' observance of international standards and codes of good practice and invites the Executive Board to consider whether to integrate such assessments into the surveillance process.
11. The Committee reiterates the importance of greater transparency in policy-making. With respect to IMF practices and members' policies, it strongly welcomes the steps taken:
- The widespread release of Public Information Notices (PINs), for which there is an
agreement on presumption of publication; the public release of many IMF policy papers and the
associated summaries of Board discussions; and the release of the external evaluators' reports on
IMF surveillance and economic research activities;
- The decisions of 46 countries that have already volunteered to participate in the
pilot program for the release of Article IV reports, with 15 reports already available on the
- The agreement to establish a presumption in favor of publication of Letters of Intent,
Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies, and Policy Framework Papers, and the
widespread release of documents that has occurred since the policy of greater transparency was
- The efforts to ascertain the views of the private sector on the experimental transparency
12. The Committee encourages further actions to make IMF practices and members' policies more transparent without compromising the IMF's role as confidential advisor.
13. Experience in a few cases has highlighted the importance of promoting transparency and accountability especially when IMF resources are being used. In this connection, the Committee notes that the implications of corruption and money laundering raise important issues for the credibility and effectiveness of IMF programs, and calls on the IMF to perform an authoritative review of its procedures and controls to identify ways to strengthen safeguards on the use of its funds and to report at its next meeting. The Committee considers that further actions for strengthening governance at the national and international levels are crucial. In the financial area, governments must maintain strong internal financial controls and tighten supervision and regulation of domestic financial institutions and off-shore banking centers, including measures to deter money laundering. The Committee urges the IMF to enhance its support for members' efforts in these areas, building on its guidelines and other international standards for fostering good governance and transparency in all member countries, including through the application of the codes of good practice that the membership has established in the fiscal and monetary areas.
14. The Committee welcomes the progress made in financial sector reform and banking system restructuring in the context of IMF surveillance, technical assistance, and programs. It looks forward to the continued collaborative work of the IMF, the World Bank, and other institutions, including on the pilot Financial Sector Assessment Program that should facilitate early detection of financial system weaknesses and support a better coordinated dialogue with national authorities. The Committee encourages countries that have not done so to participate in the pilot program.
15. The Committee welcomes the recent independent, external evaluations of IMF surveillance and research activities, and encourages the Executive Board to examine the recommendations of the former further in the context of the next internal review in late 1999. The Committee also reaffirms the importance of independent evaluations of the Fund's operations and policies.
16. The Committee reiterates the importance of ongoing efforts to involve the private sector in forestalling and resolving financial crises, and notes the progress achieved in securing the involvement of the private sector in individual cases. In this connection, the Committee considers that the balance of the various considerations reflected in the report by G-7 Finance Ministers to the Köln Economic Summit provides a helpful framework within which the international community can work to address individual cases that may arise. The Committee asks the Executive Board to build on this framework and to report at the Committee's next meeting on the ways in which the broad principles have been implemented.
17. The Committee considers that increased mobility of capital has raised the requirements, in terms of both policy adaptability and institutional preparedness, for maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. That said, members should be able to choose a regime that is appropriate to their particular circumstances and longer-term strategy. The choice of exchange rate regime and the implementation of supporting policies are critical for countries' economic development and financial stability, and in some cases potentially for the world economy. In all cases, IMF programs and surveillance should further focus on consistency of macroeconomic and other policies and institutional arrangements with the chosen exchange rate regime. The IMF should assist members to adapt to a world of global financial flows. The Committee encourages the Executive Board to continue to consider these matters, and to report to the Committee on its work.
18. Persistent and sizeable capital inflows can be highly destabilizing particularly if they are intermediated by poorly regulated and unsupervised financial institutions. In this context, the Committee welcomes the IMF's recent work on the appropriate pace and sequéncing of capital account opening, which has led to a fuller understanding of the conditions for orderly and sustainable liberalization, and has broadly confirmed earlier conclusions that, over the long term, open capital flows accompanied by appropriate prudential measures will benefit the world economy. The Committee encourages the IMF to build on its examination of individual countries' use and liberalization of controls, paying particular attention to the relationship between capital account liberalization and financial sector stability.
19. The Committee calls on the IMF and World Bank to work together, in cooperation with national debt management experts, to develop a set of best practices in public debt management by the spring to assist countries in their efforts to reduce vulnerability.
20. The Committee encourages all members to continue to work on preventive action and to put in place millennium contingency plans, noting that, although business, financial institutions, and government agencies around the world have made considerable progress in preparing computer systems, a risk remains that Y2K problems will be anticipated or will arise, with potential negative consequénces for growth, international trade, and international capital flows. To help forestall, and if necessary resolve, possible balance of payments problems related to the Y2K phenomenon, the Committee endorses the Executive Board's decision to introduce atemporary new facility for providing outright short-term access to IMF resources to members facing identifiable Y2K-related balance of payments needs.
21. The Committee endorses the Executive Board's recommendation that the Board of Governors adopt a Resolution transforming the Interim Committee into the International Monetary and Financial Committee and strengthening its role as the advisory committee of the Board of Governors.
* * *
22. The next meeting of the Committee will be held in Washington, D.C. on April 16, 2000.
1. In the context of strengthening the architecture of the international monetary and financial system, the Interim Committee in its April and October 1998 Communiqués called on the Fund to develop a code of transparency practices for monetary and financial policies, in cooperation with appropriate institutions. The Fund, working together with the Bank for International Settlements, and in consultation with a representative group of central banks, financial agencies, other relevant international and regional organizations,1 and selected academic experts, has developed a Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies. The Code parallels the Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency developed by the Fund and endorsed by the Interim Committee in April 1998.
2. The Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies identifies desirable transparency practices for central banks in their conduct of monetary policy and for central banks and other financial agencies in their conduct of financial policies. The definitions of "central bank," "financial agencies," "financial policies," and "government" as used in this Code are given in the attached Annex.
3. For purposes of the Code, transparency refers to an environment in which the objectives of policy, its legal, institutional, and economic framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to monetary and financial policies, and the terms of agencies' accountability, are provided to the public on an understandable, accessible and timely basis. Thus, the transparency practices listed in the Code focus on: (1) clarity of roles, responsibilities and objectives of central banks and financial agencies; (2) the processes for formulating and reporting of monetary policy decisions by the central bank and of financial policies by financial agencies; (3) public availability of information on monetary and financial policies; and (4) accountability and assurances of integrity by the central bank and financial agencies.
4. The case for transparency of monetary and financial policies is based on two main premises. First, the effectiveness of monetary and financial policies can be strengthened if the goals and instruments of policy are known to the public and if the authorities can make a credible commitment to meeting them. In making available more information about monetary and financial policies, good transparency practices promote the potential efficiency of markets. Second, good governance calls for central banks and financial agencies to be accountable, particularly where the monetary and financial authorities are granted a high degree of autonomy. In cases when conflicts might arise between or within government units (e.g., if the central bank or a financial agency acts as both owner and financial supervisor of a financial institution or if the responsibilities for monetary and foreign exchange policy are shared), transparency in the mandate and clear rules and procedures in the operations of the agencies can help in their resolution, strengthen governance, and facilitate policy consistency.
5. In making the objectives of monetary policy public, the central bank enhances the public's understanding of what it is seeking to achieve, and provides a context for articulating its own policy choices, thereby contributing to the effectiveness of monetary policy. Further, by providing the private sector with a clear description of the considerations guiding monetary policy decisions, transparency about the policy process makes the monetary policy transmission mechanism generally more effective, in part by ensuring that market expectations can be formed more efficiently. By providing the public with adequate information about its activities, the central bank can establish a mechanism for strengthening its credibility by matching its actions to its public statements.
6. Transparency by financial agencies, particularly in clarifying their objectives, should also contribute to policy effectiveness by enabling financial market participants to assess better the context of financial policies, thereby reducing uncertainty in the decision-making of market participants. Moreover, by enabling market participants and the general public to understand and evaluate financial policies, transparency is likely to be conducive to good policy-making. This can help to promote financial as well as systemic stability. Transparent descriptions of the policy formulation process provide the public with an understanding of the rules of the game. The release of adequate information to the public on the activities of financial agencies provides an additional mechanism for enhancing the credibility of their actions. There may also be circumstances when public accountability of decisions by financial agencies can reduce the potential for moral hazard.
7. The benefits for countries adopting good transparency practices in monetary and financial policies have to be weighed against the potential costs. In situations where increased transparency in monetary and financial policies could endanger the effectiveness of policies, or be potentially harmful to market stability or the legitimate interests of supervised and other entities, it may be appropriate to limit the extent of such transparency. Limiting transparency in selected areas needs to be seen, however, in the context of a generally transparent environment.
8. In the case of monetary policy, the rationale for limiting some types of disclosure arises because it could adversely affect the decision-making process and the effectiveness of policies. Similarly, exchange rate policy considerations, notably, but not exclusively, in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, may provide justification for limiting certain disclosure practices. For example, extensive disclosure requirements about internal policy discussion on money and exchange market operations might disrupt markets, constrain the free flow of discussion by policymakers, or prevent the adoption of contingency plans. Thus, it might be inappropriate for central banks to disclose internal deliberations and documentation, and there are circumstances in which it would not be appropriate for central banks to disclose their near-term monetary and exchange rate policy implementation tactics and provide detailed information on foreign exchange operations. Similarly, there may be good reasons for the central bank (and financial agencies) not to make public their contingency plans, including possible emergency lending.
9. Additional concerns could be posed by some aspects of the transparency of financial policies. Moral hazard, market discipline, and financial market stability considerations may justify limiting both the content and timing of the disclosure of some corrective actions and emergency lending decisions, and information pertaining to market and firm-specific conditions. In order to maintain access to sensitive information from market participants, there is also a need to safeguard the confidentiality and privacy of information on individual firms (commonly referred to as "commercial confidentiality"). Similarly, it may be inappropriate for financial authorities to make public their supervisory deliberations and enforcement actions related to individual financial institutions, markets, and individuals.
10. Transparency practices differ not only in substance, but also in form. With regard to informing the public about monetary and financial institutions and their policies, an important issue concerns the modalities that these public disclosures should take. In particular with regard to monetary policy, should transparency practices have a legislative basis in a central bank law, or be based in other legislation or regulation, or be adopted through other means? The Code takes a pragmatic approach to this issue and recognizes that a variety of arrangements can lead to good transparency practices. On matters pertaining to the roles, responsibilities, and objectives of central banks (and for principal financial regulatory agencies), it recommends that key features be specified in the authorizing legislation (e.g., a central bank law). Specifying some of these practices in legislation gives them particular prominence and avoids ad hoc and frequént changes to these important aspects of the operations of central banks and relevant financial agencies. Information about other transparency aspects, such as how policy is formulated and implemented and the provision of information, can be presented in a more flexible manner. However, it is important that such information be readily accessible, so that the public can with reasonable effort obtain and assimilate the information.
11. In the context of good governance and accountability, as well as the promotion of efficient markets, reference to the public in this code should ideally encompass all interested individuals and institutions. In some cases, particularly for financial policies, it may be expedient for the purposes of administering or implementing certain regulations and policies to define the concept of the public more narrowly to refer only to those individuals and institutions that are most directly affected by the regulations and policies in quéstion.
12. The focus of the Code is on transparency. While good transparency practices for the formulation and reporting of monetary and financial policies help to contribute to the adoption of sound policies, the Code is not designed to offer judgments on the appropriateness or desirability of specific monetary or financial policies or frameworks that countries should adopt. Transparency is not an end in itself, nor is transparency a substitute for pursuing sound policies; rather, transparency and sound policies are better seen as complements. In the realm of financial policies, there are complements to this code that go beyond transparency to promote good policies, notably the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision formulated by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation formulated by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and standards being developed by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). As these and other financial sector groupings develop and make significant adjustments in their principles and standards as they relate to transparency practices for financial agencies (e.g., in data dissemination requirements for financial agencies), this Code may have to be adjusted accordingly.
13. The Code is directed at the transparency requirements of central banks and financial agencies, not at the transparency procedures relating to firms and individual institutions. However, the benefits of transparency for monetary and financial policies may be fostered by appropriate policies to promote transparency for markets in general, for the institutions that are being supervised, and for self regulatory organizations.
14. Monetary and financial policies are interrelated and often mutually reinforcing, with the health of the financial system affecting the conduct of monetary policy and vice versa. However, the institutional arrangements for these two types of policies differ considerably, particularly with regard to their roles, responsibilities, and objectives and their policy formulation and implementation processes. To take account of this, the Code is separated into two parts: good transparency practices for monetary policy by central banks; and good transparency practices for financial policies by financial agencies. The basic elements of transparency for both policies are, however, similar. It should be recognized that not all transparency practices are equally applicable to all financial agencies, and the transparency objectives among different financial sectors vary. For some, the emphasis is on market efficiency considerations, for others the focus is on market and systemic stability, while for others the principalconsideration is client-asset protection.
15. The operation of a country's payment system affects the conduct of monetary policies and the functioning of the financial system, and the design of payment systems has implications for systemic stability. The institutional structures of the payment system, however, are often significantly more complex than for monetary and other financial policies, and differ considerably across countries. In many instances, the operation of a country's payment system is split between the public and private sectors, including self-regulatory bodies. Nevertheless, most of the transparency practices listed in the Code for financial agencies are applicable for the roles and functions of central banks or other relevant public agencies exercising responsibility for overseeing the nation's payment systems. The coverage of transparency practices for financial policies in the Code includes those for the operation of systemically important components of the nation's payment system, and, where appropriate, makes allowance for the special nature of the payment system's operations (e.g., 5.3).
16. The Code is of sufficient breadth to span and be applied to a wide range of monetary and financial frameworks, and thus to the full range of the Fund membership. Elements of the Code are drawn from a review of good transparency practices used in a number of countries and discussed in the professional literature. The Code thus represents a distillation of concepts and practices that are already in use and for which there is a record of experience. The manner in which transparency is applied and achieved, however, may differ, reflecting different institutional arrangements with respect to monetary and financial policies and legal traditions. The good transparency practices contained in the Code will, therefore, have to be implemented flexibly and over time to take account of a country's particular circumstances. A number of Fund members currently lack sufficient resources and the institutional capacity to implement all of the good transparency practices listed in the Code. These practices are included in the Code in the anticipation that countries would aspire over time to introduce such good practices.
GOOD TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES FOR MONETARY POLICY BY CENTRAL BANKS
|1.2||The institutional relationship between monetary and fiscal operations should be clearly defined.2|
|1.2.1||If credits, advances, or overdrafts to the government by the central bank are permitted, the conditions when they are permitted, and any limits thereof, should be publicly disclosed.|
|1.2.2||The amounts and terms of credits, advances, or overdrafts to the government by the central bank and those of deposits of the government with the central bank should be publicly disclosed.|
|1.2.3||The procedures for direct central bank participation in the primary markets for government securities, where permitted, and in the secondary markets, should be publicly disclosed.|
|1.2.4||Central bank involvement in the rest of the economy (e.g., through equity ownership, membership on governing boards, procurement, or provision of services for fee) should be conducted in an open and public manner on the basis of clear principles and procedures.|
|1.2.5||The manner in which central bank profits are allocated and how capital is maintained should be publicly disclosed.|
|1.3||Agency roles performed by the central bank on behalf of the government should be clearly defined.|
|1.3.1||Responsibilities, if any, of the central bank in (i) the management of domestic and external public debt and foreign exchange reserves, (ii) as banker to the government, (iii) as fiscal agent of the government, and (iv) as advisor on economic and financial policies and in the field of international cooperation, should be publicly disclosed.|
|1.3.2||The allocation of responsibilities among the central bank, the ministry of finance, or a separate public agency,3 for the primary debt issues, secondary market arrangements, depository facilities, and clearing and settlement arrangements for trade in government securities, should be publicly disclosed.|
|Public Availability of Information on Monetary Policy|
|3.1||Presentations and releases of central bank data should meet the standards related to coverage, periodicity, timeliness of data and access by the public that are consistent with the International Monetary Fund's data dissemination standards.|
|3.2||The central bank should publicly disclose its balance sheet on a preannounced schedule and, after a predetermined interval, publicly disclose selected information on its aggregate market transactions.|
|3.2.1||Summary central bank balance sheets should be publicly disclosed on a frequént and preannounced schedule. Detailed central bank balance sheets prepared according to appropriate and publicly documented accounting standards should be publicly disclosed at least annually by the central bank.|
|3.2.2||Information on the central bank's monetary operations, including aggregate amounts and terms of refinance or other facilities (subject to the maintenance of commercial confidentiality) should be publicly disclosed on a preannounced schedule.|
|3.2.3||Consistent with confidentiality and privacy of information on individual firms, aggregate information on emergency financial support by the central bank should be publicly disclosed through an appropriate central bank statement when such disclosure will not be disruptive to financial stability.|
|3.2.4||Information about the country's foreign exchange reserve assets, liabilities and commitments by the monetary authorities should be publicly disclosed on a preannounced schedule, consistent with the International Monetary Fund's Data Dissemination Standards.|
|3.3||The central bank should establish and maintain public information services.|
|3.3.1||The central bank should have a publications program, including an Annual Report.|
|3.3.2||Senior central bank officials should be ready to explain their institution's objective(s) and performance to the public, and have a presumption in favor of releasing the text of their statements to the public.|
|3.4||Texts of regulations issued by the central bank should be readily available to the public.|
|V.||Clarity of Roles, Responsibilities and Objectives of Financial Agencies Responsible for Financial Policies4|
|5.1||The broad objective(s) and institutional framework of financial agencies should be clearly defined, preferably in relevant legislation or regulation.|
|5.1.1||The broad objective(s) of financial agencies should be publicly disclosed and explained.|
|5.1.2||The responsibilities of the financial agencies and the authority to conduct financial policies should be publicly disclosed.|
|5.1.3||Where applicable, the broad modalities of accountability for financial agencies should be publicly disclosed.|
|5.1.4||Where applicable, the procedures for appointment, terms of office, and any general criteria for removal of the heads and members of the governing bodies of financial agencies should be publicly disclosed.|
|5.2||The relationship between financial agencies should be publicly disclosed.|
|5.3||The role of oversight agencies with regard to payment systems should be publicly disclosed.|
|5.3.1||The agencies overseeing the payment system should promote the timely public disclosure of general policy principles (including risk management policies) that affect the robustness of systemically important payment systems.|
|5.4||Where financial agencies have oversight responsibilities for self-regulatory organizations (e.g., payment systems), the relationship between them should be publicly disclosed.|
|5.5||Where self-regulatory organizations are authorized to perform part of the regulatory and supervisory process, they should be guided by the same good transparency practices specified for financial agencies.|
To facilitate presentation, certain general terms are used to capture different institutional arrangements in a summary fashion. The following descriptive definitions are used in the Code.
The institutional arrangements for assigning responsibility for the conduct of a country's monetary policy differ among the Fund's membership. For most Fund members, this responsibility is assigned to the central bank or to a system of constituent national central banks in a multinational central bank arrangement. There are a number of countries, however, where this role is designated to a "monetary authority" or to a "currency board." To facilitate presentation, the term "central bank" in the Code refers to the institution responsible for conducting monetary policy, which may or may not be a central bank.
A wide range of institutional arrangements prevail among Fund members with regard to which unit of government carries exclusive or primary responsibility for the regulation, supervision, and oversight of the financial and payment systems. In a few countries, an agency has been established with responsibility for regulating and supervising an array of financial institutions (banking, insurance, and securities firms) and markets (securities, derivatives, and commodity futures). For most countries, the oversight responsibility for the financial sector is shared among several agencies. Thus, responsibility for the conduct of bank regulation and supervision or for bank deposit insurance policies in some countries is assigned to the central bank, or to an independent bank supervisory or deposit insurance agency, or split among several units of government. Similarly, responsibility for the conduct of policies related to the oversight of certain categories of financial institutions is assigned to the central bank or to a specialized agency. In some cases (e.g., payment systems) a public agency oversees the activities of private sector self-regulatory bodies. To facilitate presentation, the phrase "financial agencies" is used to refer to the institutional arrangements for the regulation, supervision, and oversight of the financial and payment systems, including markets and institutions, with the view to promoting financial stability, market efficiency, and client-asset and consumer protection. (Where the central bank carries responsibility for financial policies, some of the good transparency practices listed for financial agencies in Sections V-VIII of the Code are already specified in the transparency practices listed for central banks in Sections I-IV of the Code.)
The term "financial policies" in the Code refers to policies related to the regulation, supervision, and oversight of the financial and payment systems, including markets and institutions, with the view to promoting financial stability, market efficiency, and client-asset and consumer protection.
Unless a particular unit of government is specifically identified in the Code, reference to "government" in the Code refers either to the executive branch of government or to a particular ministry or public agency, depending on the issue at hand or the established tradition of government in particular countries.
1In addition to the Bank for International Settlements, the following international and regional organizations and international financial sector groupings were consulted: Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS), Center for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), European Central Bank, International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Finance Corporation, International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank.
2The practices in this area should be consistent with the principles of the International Monetary Fund's Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.
3The principles for transparency procedures listed in this Code, where applicable and adjusted as necessary, apply where a separate public agency has been designated to manage the country's public debt.
4Refer to the Annex for definitions of financial agencies and financial policies.
September 26, 1999
Members or Alternates
Ibrahim A. Al-Assaf, Minister of Finance and National Economy, Saudi Arabia
Giuliano Amato, Minister of the Treasury, Budget, and Economic Planning, Italy
Eddie George, Governor, Bank of England
(Alternate for Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequér, United Kingdom)
Antonio Casas González, President, Banco Central de Venezuela
Peter Costello, Treasurer, Australia
Dai Xianglong, Governor, People's Bank of China
Emile Doumba, Minister of Finance, Economy, Budget and Privatization, Gabon
Hans Eichel, Minister of Finance, Germany
Roqué B. Fernández, Minister of Economy and Public Works and Services, Argentina
Viktor Gerashchenko, Chairman, Central Bank of the Russian Federation
Marianne Jelved, Minister of Economic Affairs, Denmark
Abdelouahab Keramane, Governor, Banqué d'Algérie
Sultan Bin Nasser Al-Suwaidi, Governor, United Arab Emirates Central Bank
(Alternate for Mohammed K. Khirbash, Minister of State for Finance and Industry,
United Arab Emirates)
Pedro Sampaio Malan, Minister of Finance, Brazil
Trevor A. Manuel, Minister of Finance, South Africa
Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, Canada
Kiichi Miyazawa, Minister of Finance, Japan
Didier Reynders, Minister of Finance, Belgium
Syahril Sabirin, Governor, Bank Indonesia
Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Finance, India
Dominiqué Strauss-Kahn, Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, France
Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury, United States
Kaspar Villiger, Minister of Finance, Switzerland
Gerrit Zalm, Minister of Finance, Netherlands
Yilmaz Akyuz, Chief, Macro-Economics and Development Policies Branch, UNCTAD
Andrew D. Crockett, Chairman, Financial Stability Forum
Willem F. Duisenberg, President, ECB
Andre Icard, Assistant General Manager, BIS
Donald J. Johnston, Secretary-General, OECD
Ian Kinniburgh, Director, Development Policy Analysis Division, UN
Michael Moore, Director-General, WTO
Pedro Solbes Mira, Commissioner in charge of Economic and Monetary Affairs,
Juan Somavia, Director-General, ILO
Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda, Chairman, Joint Development Committee
James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank