|
Table 1. East Timor: Key Economic Indicators,
1998–2006
|
|
|
1998 |
1999
Est. |
2000
Est. |
2001
Proj. |
2002
Proj. |
2003
Proj. |
2004
Proj. |
2005
Proj. |
2006
Proj. |
|
Nominal GDP (non-oil, in millions of US$)1 |
390 |
263 |
312 |
380 |
392 |
412 |
441 |
481 |
526 |
|
Real GDP growth (non-oil,
percent change)1 |
-2 |
-34 |
15 |
18 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
|
Inflation (percent change,
end of period)2 |
80 |
140 |
20 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(In percent
of non-oil GDP) |
|
Consumption |
74 |
74 |
107 |
117 |
113 |
112 |
111 |
110 |
108 |
|
Non-government
|
60 |
66 |
100 |
88 |
93 |
93 |
92 |
92 |
91 |
|
Government3 |
15 |
9 |
7 |
29 |
20 |
19 |
19 |
19 |
17 |
|
Investment4 |
47 |
27 |
27 |
44 |
27 |
17 |
14 |
14 |
16 |
|
Non-government
|
10 |
8 |
15 |
15 |
12 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
11 |
|
Government3 |
37 |
19 |
12 |
29 |
15 |
7 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
|
Domestic
saving |
26 |
26 |
-7 |
-17 |
-13 |
-12 |
-11 |
-10 |
-8 |
|
Non-government |
32 |
30 |
-3 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
|
Government3 |
-6 |
-5 |
-3 |
-24 |
-15 |
-15 |
-14 |
-14 |
-11 |
|
External savings |
21 |
1 |
34 |
61 |
41 |
30 |
26 |
25 |
24 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(In percent
of non-oil GDP) |
|
Money, credit, and interest
rates5 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Broad money |
38.7 |
27.8 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Currency |
4.5 |
5.5 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Demand
deposits6 |
6.4 |
6.2 |
4.6 |
8.4 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Quasi
money6 |
27.8 |
16.1 |
. . . |
3.7 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Domestic
assets (net) |
36.8 |
24.3 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Interest
rates (in percent per annum) |
38.5 |
36.0 |
|
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Onlending7 |
|
|
10.0 |
10.0 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Consumer
loans6 |
|
|
. . . |
10.7-18.7 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Business
loans6 |
|
|
. . . |
8.3-16.8 |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(In millions
of U.S. dollars) |
|
Current account excl. official
transfers |
-119 |
-56 |
-100 |
-628 |
-743 |
-699 |
188 |
228 |
297 |
|
Current account incl. official
transfers |
-19 |
7 |
-3 |
-467 |
-662 |
-657 |
209 |
231 |
297 |
|
Trade balance |
-88 |
-40 |
-48 |
-388 |
-435 |
-444 |
2 |
216 |
416 |
|
Merchandise
exports |
54 |
49 |
48 |
40 |
59 |
38 |
129 |
356 |
572 |
|
Oil-related |
0 |
1 |
39 |
32 |
45 |
19 |
105 |
325 |
534 |
|
Other |
54 |
48 |
9 |
8 |
14 |
18 |
24 |
31 |
38 |
|
Merchandise
imports |
142 |
89 |
96 |
428 |
494 |
481 |
127 |
141 |
156 |
|
Oil-related |
. . . |
. . . |
0 |
253 |
361 |
364 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
Other |
142 |
89 |
96 |
175 |
133 |
117 |
127 |
141 |
156 |
|
Current
transfers (net) |
100 |
64 |
97 |
161 |
82 |
43 |
22 |
5 |
2 |
|
Capital and financial account
(net) |
10 |
-3 |
26 |
462 |
634 |
628 |
-223 |
-187 |
-183 |
|
Changes in foreign assets
(increase -)8 |
0 |
0 |
-19 |
6 |
0 |
-2 |
-16 |
-87 |
-141 |
|
Gross foreign assets (end-period)
8 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
13 |
13 |
15 |
31 |
119 |
260 |
Sources: Data provided by the UNTAET and Indonesian authorities;
and IMF staff estimates.
1Calculated on the basis of a constant purchasing power parity exchange
rate (base year: 1996).
2Rupiah-based CPI for Dili through 2000 and, thereafter, dollar-based CPI
for Dili.
3On the basis of the combined sources budget.
4Excludes investment relating to the oil sector.
5Figures for 1999 are at end-September.
6Figures for 2001 relate to end-September.
7Relates to the interest rate on loans extended under the Small Enterprise
Project funded by the TFET.
8Includes oil-related financial savings.
|

5. Recent price and financial developments have also been encouraging.
Reflecting a significant easing in the scarcity of goods witnessed in
early 2000, rupiah-based CPI inflation stood at only two percent as
of October (12-month change). Progress in financial intermediation,
however, is mixed. While bank deposits have risen, commercial bank credit
is still very limited ($1.8 million as of September), reflecting an
absence of adequate collateral and other risk factors. Meanwhile, efforts
by the Central Payments Office (CPO) to promote the U.S. dollar as East
Timor's sole currency are continuing. In addition to administering an
education program, the CPO has carried out rupiah exchanges, facilitated
by a repatriation agreement with Bank Indonesia which has just been
extended for another six months. Nevertheless, the Indonesian rupiah
continues to be widely used, indicating that the dollarization process
is far from complete.
6. Recent fiscal developments indicate that revenue and expenditure
targets for this year's CFET budget are broadly on track. On the revenue
side, direct taxes (income tax collection) are running ahead of budget
estimates (due to one-off payments relating to income for 2000), while
indirect taxes (border and service taxes) are running somewhat below
expectations (due to low imports in the run-up to the August election).
On the expenditure side, budget execution has fallen short of targets
through October, but is expected to pick up with the reallocation of
spending priorities undertaken by the Council of Ministers. The main
concern for the remainder of the year relates to the still unfinanced
gap of about $10 million (assuming that pledged contributions of
$7 million are received), which could give rise to a cash squeeze. Additionally,
notwithstanding improved billing collections, a deficit in the power
sector could necessitate an increased budgetary transfer.
Near-term Economic Outlook
7. Though economic conditions have improved, the near-term outlook
is clouded by the pending withdrawal of UN and related staff, and the
still unfavorable climate for private investment. Given the adverse
impact of the withdrawal on economic activity (as described in the Background
Paper), near-term growth prospects will depend on the extent to which
private sector activity can fill the void. While some private sector
observers expect a severe contraction next year, we believe that real
growth over the next 1-2 years is likely to be zero or slightly positive,
given that there will still be a significant international presence,
and indications that the recovery has become more broad-based.
8. In a well functioning economy, resources freed up by the decline
in activity in one sector would work their way toward other productive
activities. While this will no doubt occur in East Timor, prospects
for a rapid recovery are hampered by impediments to private investment,
including the lack of: (i) skilled labor; (ii) adequate infrastructure;
(iii) legislation for property rights and land ownership; and (iv)
a legal and regulatory framework for business. The attention these impediments
have received in the present meeting is well-founded, and the East Timorese
authorities' commitment to accelerating progress in these areas is encouraging.
It will also be important to implement flexible labor market policies
by allowing high wages rates--reported in some cases to be 2-3 times
the prevailing rates in neighboring countries―to adjust downward
in response to changing labor market conditions.
Near-term Fiscal Outlook
9. The broad magnitudes of the three-year budget outlook presented
at this meeting appear to be within a reasonable range, consistent with
East Timor's development needs. The presentation implies a three-year
cumulative external financing need of $154-184 million for the CFET
budget (Table 2). After taking into account indicative ranges for direct
bilateral support for technical assistance, capital projects, international
staffing, and newly identified transition costs, the total financing
need amounts to $304-354 million (excluding TFET). These estimates are
based on realistic revenue projections and a continuation of the current
policy to accumulate first tranche petroleum revenues. The latter merits
support in order to establish the principle of saving oil revenue, and
to build a base of international reserves.
|
Table 2. East Timor: Fiscal Accounts of the Consolidated
Fund (CFET), 2000/1–2004/5
|
|
|
2000/1 |
|
2001/2 |
|
2002/3 |
2003/4 |
2004/5 |
|
02/3–04/5 |
|
|
Budget |
Act. |
|
Budget |
Proj. |
|
Proj. |
|
Total |
|
|
(In millions
of U.S. dollars) |
|
Revenue |
25.1 |
28.5 |
|
30.0 |
31.1 |
|
36.0 |
52.0 |
101.2 |
|
189.2 |
|
Domestic
revenue |
19.1 |
15.5 |
|
19.0 |
19.1 |
|
19.0 |
19.0 |
19.2 |
|
57.2 |
|
Direct
taxes |
2.1 |
0.8 |
|
2.0 |
4.0 |
|
4.0 |
4.0 |
4.6 |
|
12.6 |
|
Indirect
taxes |
12.0 |
11.4 |
|
15.0 |
13.0 |
|
12.0 |
12.0 |
11.6 |
|
35.6 |
|
Non-tax
revenue |
5.0 |
3.3 |
|
2.0 |
2.1 |
|
3.0 |
3.0 |
3.0 |
|
9.0 |
|
Timor Sea
revenue |
6.0 |
13.1 |
|
11.0 |
12.0 |
|
17.0 |
33.0 |
82.0 |
|
132.0 |
|
First
Tranche Petroleum1 |
0.0 |
3.1 |
|
5.0 |
6.0 |
|
2.0 |
1.0 |
30.0 |
|
33.0 |
|
Taxes |
0.0 |
10.0 |
|
6.0 |
6.0 |
|
15.0 |
32.0 |
52.0 |
|
99.0 |
|
Expenditure |
60.8 |
51.3 |
|
64.8 |
63.4 |
|
97.2 |
111.7 |
115.2 |
|
324.1 |
|
Recurrent
expenditure |
45.5 |
29.6 |
|
55.7 |
53.1 |
|
67.4 |
82.1 |
85.2 |
|
234.7 |
|
Wages
and salaries |
16.5 |
13.9 |
|
23.3 |
23.5 |
|
29.0 |
32.8 |
33.9 |
|
95.7 |
|
Goods
and services |
29.0 |
15.7 |
|
32.4 |
29.5 |
|
38.3 |
49.3 |
51.3 |
|
139.0 |
|
Other |
0.0 |
0.0 |
|
. . . |
. . . |
|
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
. . . |
|
Capital
expenditure2 |
15.3 |
21.7 |
|
9.2 |
10.3 |
|
29.8 |
29.6 |
30.0 |
|
89.5 |
|
Overall balance |
-35.7 |
-22.8 |
|
-34.8 |
-32.3 |
|
-61.2 |
-59.7 |
-14.0 |
|
-134.9 |
|
Financing3 |
35.7 |
22.8 |
|
6.2 |
22.3 |
|
-2.0 |
-1.0 |
-30.0 |
|
-33.0 |
|
Financing gap4 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
|
28.6 |
10.0 |
|
63.2 |
60.7 |
44.0 |
|
167.9 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(In percent
of non-oil GDP) |
|
Revenue |
7.2 |
8.1 |
|
7.6 |
7.9 |
|
9.1 |
12.2 |
21.9 |
|
. . . |
|
Domestic
revenue |
5.4 |
4.4 |
|
4.8 |
4.8 |
|
4.8 |
4.5 |
4.2 |
|
. . . |
|
Timor Sea
revenue |
1.7 |
3.7 |
|
2.8 |
3.0 |
|
4.3 |
7.7 |
17.8 |
|
. . . |
|
Expenditure |
17.3 |
14.6 |
|
16.4 |
16.0 |
|
24.5 |
26.2 |
25.0 |
|
. . . |
|
Recurrent
expenditure |
13.0 |
8.4 |
|
14.1 |
13.4 |
|
17.0 |
19.3 |
18.5 |
|
. . . |
|
Capital
expenditure2 |
4.3 |
6.2 |
|
2.3 |
2.6 |
|
7.5 |
7.0 |
6.5 |
|
. . . |
|
Overall balance |
-10.2 |
-6.5 |
|
-8.8 |
-8.1 |
|
-15.4 |
-14.0 |
-3.0 |
|
. . . |
|
Financing gap4 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
|
7.2 |
2.5 |
|
15.9 |
14.3 |
9.6 |
|
. . . |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(In millions
of U.S. dollars) |
|
Memorandum items: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total financing requirement |
. . . |
. . . |
|
. . . |
. . . |
|
133.2 |
110.7 |
84.0 |
|
327.9 |
|
CFET |
. . . |
. . . |
|
. . . |
. . . |
|
63.2 |
60.7 |
44.0 |
|
167.9 |
|
Direct bilateral5 |
. . . |
. . . |
|
. . . |
. . . |
|
70.0 |
50.0 |
40.0 |
|
160.0 |
|
Of
which: transition costs6 |
. . . |
. . . |
|
. . . |
. . . |
|
10.0 |
5.0 |
5.0 |
|
20.0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CFET assets |
10.4 |
16.7 |
|
10.6 |
11.6 |
|
13.6 |
14.6 |
44.6 |
|
44.6 |
|
Of which:
Timor Sea account |
6.0 |
3.1 |
|
8.1 |
9.1 |
|
11.1 |
12.1 |
42.1 |
|
42.1 |
Source: National authorities; and Fund staff estimates and
calculations. 1Under current policy, first tranche petroleum revenue is accumulated
in the Timor Sea special account. 2Consists of Canberra forward estimates, and additional capital
and development expenditure. Excludes transition costs of $20 million. 3Consists of accumulation first tranche petroleum revenue and
float. 4The budget financing gap for FY2001/2 consists of the request
made at the Canberra meeting ($20 million) and pledges for Y2000/1 that
were not received by the end of the fiscal year. The projected financing
gap for FY2001/2 is derived by including grants received through November
2001 and confirmed new pledges for FY2001/2. 5Consists of bilateral assistance not reflected in the CFET accounts. 6Consists of projects associated with re-establishing effective
government operations after independence. |
10. A definitive assessment, however, would need to await details on
the composition of spending and the recurrent costs associated with
new capital spending. In this regard, it is reassuring that the authorities
are committed to allocating spending to the highest priorities, and
are cognizant of the need to assess the recurrent cost implications
of new capital projects. We also support the authorities' plans to improve
tax administration and to explore measures to increase revenue over
the medium term.
11. In the interest of fiscal transparency and efficiency, donors should
be encouraged to channel as much of their support as possible through
the CFET budget, effectively bringing capital projects on-budget. The
effort to bring on-budget $25-35 million per year in capital programs
previously funded under TFET merits support, as would an effort to bring
on budget the proposed $20 million in capital and development costs
of transition.
II. Macroeconomic Framework and Fiscal Sustainability
12. As the government and its donor partners are aware, the three-year
budget outlook should be assessed within the context of long-term fiscal
sustainability. The analysis needs to take into account the expected
future oil revenue stream, which is likely to commence in 2005/06. It
will be important to manage these revenues effectively, to maintain
macroeconomic stability, foster the development of the non-oil economy,
and ensure sufficient savings for future generations. In this regard,
the government's endorsement of a sound saving/investment strategy is
welcome.
13. In discussions with East Timor's economic team, IMF staff have
assessed fiscal sustainability within a comprehensive macroeconomic
framework (Figure 2). Based on the latest oil revenue projections, which
are significantly higher than those available in Canberra, the analysis
suggests that the three-year budget proposal gives rise to a sustainable
fiscal path over a longer time horizon. Importantly, however, this assessment
hinges on the implementation of sound policies needed to generate a
stable macroeconomic environment and high rate of growth of the non-oil
economy.

14. The assessment is based on a scenario consistent with a poverty
reduction strategy. It envisages an ambitious, though achievable, growth
target for the non-oil economy of six percent over the long term. The
large fiscal deficits projected over the next few years would yield
to surpluses as the significant oil revenues commence (Figure 2, top
panel). Following the high expenditure levels associated with the reconstruction
effort, total spending would stabilize at around 20 percent of non-oil
GDP, a level consistent with the economy's absorptive capacity, and
capital spending needs. For the scenario to be sustainable, and to avoid
an over-reliance on oil revenues, domestic resource mobilization will
be required. While the domestic resource base is constrained over the
near term by the low level of economic activity and limited administrative
capacity, over the longer term implementation of revenue measures would
ensure a steadily rising domestic revenue-to-GDP ratio (an IMF technical
assistance mission is scheduled early next year to assess medium-term
revenue issues). The fiscal strategy is sustainable in the sense that
expenditure would be fully covered by domestic revenues, interest earnings
on oil savings, and a manageable level of concessional borrowing.
15. In devising a savings strategy for oil revenues, a useful point
of departure would aim to keep real oil wealth constant. This would
imply spending only the interest component of the stock of oil wealth,
to ensure that such wealth is passed on fully to future generations.
The scenario presented above is somewhat less stringent, as it would
enable some oil wealth to be invested over time in projects with high
rates of return (at least as high as the returns on financial savings),
including on health and education. This would permit a public investment
level sufficient to support the targeted economic growth rate (Figure 2, bottom panel).
16. It is important to note that the scenario described above is illustrative,
as it is sensitive to underlying assumptions―oil prices and volumes,
among others―and the supporting policy package. The following
policy requirements to achieve an ambitious growth target are worth
highlighting:
Maintenance of macroeconomic stability. In particular, public expenditure
will need to be contained to levels consistent with the government's
capacity to spend wisely, and with the economy's broader absorptive
capacity;
Maintenance of an open trade and investment regime in order to attract
much-needed foreign direct investment and enhance the economy's competitiveness;
Fostering a favorable investment climate by adopting a sound regulatory
framework and resolving pending issues relating to land and property
rights; and
A strong tax effort over the long term to sustain expenditure levels
consistent with public sector investment requirements, and avoid excessive
reliance on oil revenues.
From our discussions with the authorities, we are confident that
East Timor's leadership is committed to the set of policies required,
including maintaining fiscal discipline.
III. Institution Building
17. Developing strong institutions will be critical for effective economic
management. The recently established Planning Commission has been instrumental
in performing a coordinating role and establishing priorities for the
forthcoming national development plan. With respect to the areas in
which the IMF has provided direct support, significant progress has
been made to strengthen the Central Fiscal Authority (CFA), which is
now effectively carrying out the functions of a Ministry of Finance.
The recent passage of the Banking and Payments Authority regulation
is welcome, as it will bring the CPO closer to a properly functioning
monetary authority, whose objectives include preserving price stability,
fostering the liquidity and solvency of the financial system, executing
foreign exchange policy, and promoting a safe, sound, and efficient
banking and payments system. Work to build a statistical base has advanced
with the installment of an IMF-supported advisor to coordinate efforts
across agencies, including with respect to the national accounts exercise.
IV. Concluding Remarks
18. The support of the international community and commitment of East
Timor's leadership to establishing the conditions for economic growth
and stability have achieved results. To sustain this progress, much
remains to be done. In addition to capacity building and establishing
strong economic institutions, the most important task is to promote
an environment conducive to private sector development. This, in turn,
will require additional investments in physical and human capital, implementation
of an adequate legal framework to facilitate private investment, and
sound economic management. The IMF will work in support of these efforts,
including through the continued provision of technical assistance, training,
and policy advice. At the request of the East Timorese authorities,
we also look forward to initiating the membership process, with a view
to East Timor joining the IMF and World Bank as close as possible to
independence.