## 2013 REVIEW OF THE FUND'S TRANSPARENCY POLICY— BACKGROUND PAPER

May 14, 2013

## MAIN FINDINGS

## Key Trends

- Publication rates have risen since the last review, averaging around 90 percent for country reports and policy papers. However, the share of published FSSAs is low and volatile, and the proportion of published UFR reports has fallen in the past couple of years.
- Nearly half of the Fund members now allow all documents to be published, a more than two-fold increase since 2006-08, but a smaller though still significant group of countries do not permit the publication of staff reports.
- Average publication lags have fallen, reaching 35 days in 2009-12 for Article IV/UFR cases compared with 42 days in 2006-08. Average publication lags are higher in emerging markets (EMs) (36 days) than in advanced markets (AMs) (nine days), and marginally higher in low-income countries (LICs) (42 days). However, a significant number of reports are published with considerably longer delays.
- Modification rates have risen significantly during the crisis. AMs account for the highest share of both corrections and deletions, although individual countries with the highest modification rates include several EMs and LICs.


## Analysis of Modifications

- An in-depth analysis of samples of deletions and corrections points to a significant reduction in the share of cases in the "gray zone" where modifications do not fully comply with Fund rules. Staff assesses that around 5 percent of deletions and 10 percent of corrections on account of evident ambiguity fall into this "gray zone" category.


## Views of Civil Society Organizations

- Civil Society Organizations provided a number of recommendations on the IMF's transparency policy. In particular, they called on the Fund to emulate other IFIs in terms of publication and information disclosure, to allow broader involvement in staff policy papers before they are presented to the Executive Board, increase transparency on the Fund's decision-making and improve the clarity of communications.


## Stakeholder Surveys

- Survey respondents were generally positive about the reforms undertaken in 2009, and the responses indicate that publication intentions have not been dented by the crisis. The major concern of Executive Directors and country authorities was a perceived lack of evenhandedness in the implementation of the policy, with a number of respondents expressing concern at the high rate of modifications for reports on AMs. In some regions, particularly in the Middle East, there were worries about the treatment of confidential information.
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## I. KEY TRENDS ${ }^{\mathbf{1}}$

Publication trends have broadly improved since the introduction in 2009 of the "transparency principle" and changes in the way that members consent to publication. The share of published staff reports has increased somewhat, to above 90 percent on average, all countries have published at least one of the documents considered by the Board in 2009-12, and publication lags have declined or stabilized in all regions except in the Middle East. Nevertheless, publication rates for Financial Sector Stability Assessments (FSSAs) remain low, modification rates have increased since the crisis, particularly for advanced markets (AMs), and there has been a reduction in the publication of program documents in recent years.

## A. Publication Rates and Lags

1. The introduction of the transparency principle in 2009 and earlier progressive extension of the "voluntary but presumed" publication regime to a greater range of documents appear to have helped raise the publication rates of country reports. On average, 92 percent of country reports (Article IV, UFR, or combined) were published in 2009-12 compared with 85 percent prior to the last review. Nevertheless, this upward trend is not uniform for all country reports during 2009-12: the publication rate for standalone Article IVs has edged upwards towards the 90 percent level, whereas the rate for UFR cases has fallen back from the 95-100 percent rates achieved in 2009-10. The latter reflects the heavy incidence of exceptional access cases at the peak of the crisis ${ }^{2}$ (Table 1b) and
 more recently the non-publication of a few mainly low-income country (LIC) program cases (see Table 11 and discussion below). ${ }^{3}$
2. However, certain country reports exhibit volatile publication rates. For instance, the extension of the "voluntary but presumed" publication regime to FSSAs appears not to have delivered a meaningful increase in their publication rates, which continue to fluctuate in the
[^0]65-85 percent range. ${ }^{4}$ This may be partly due to the sensitivity of information in FSSAs, particularly at a time of a financial crisis. Moreover, the share of published ROSCs has fallen to just under 50 percent, compared with 80 percent before 2009.
3. Publication rates for policy papers have edged higher. The share of published policy papers has increased from 84 percent in 2006-08 to 89 percent in 2009-12, peaking at 98 percent in $2012 .^{5}$ Unpublished policy papers are mainly those pertaining to the Fund's finances.

## 4. The differences in publication rates across country groupings have narrowed, with emerging markets (EMs) and low-income countries (LICs) starting to catch up with advanced markets (AMs) (Table 2a):

- As was the case in 2006-08, all Article IV and UFR staff reports for AMs as well as EMs in Central and Eastern Europe continue to be published. Publication rates for both EMs and LICs have each risen by around 5 percentage points to average around 90 percent during 2009-12.
- Among EMs and LICs, publication rates in Africa and the CIS have remained at or in excess of 90 percent, and rates for Asia have climbed steadily. Publication rates are lower in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere, and in the latter case edged downwards in 2012.



[^1]5. The number of countries permitting publication of all their country documents has increased steadily. ${ }^{6}$ In 2012, nearly half the membership allowed all their documents to be published, more than double the rate in 2006-08 (Table 8), and all members published at least some of the country documents considered by the Board in 2009-12 (Table 12). Five members (Brunei Darussalam Eritrea, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) did not authorize publication of their staff reports during 2009-12, of which three (Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are among the 25 countries that require explicit consent to publication and have not yet agreed to provide consent on a non-objection basis. ${ }^{7}$

## 6. The number of non-publishers of Article IVs has been stable whereas the number of countries not permitting the publication of UFR staff reports has increased since 2009.

In 2011-12, some 10 countries did not publish their Article IVs (Table 10), but two large economies—Saudi Arabia and Brazil—permitted the publication of their Article IVs for the first time, in 2011 and 2012 respectively (Table 6). In 2009, only two countries did not publish all staff reports relating to Fund-supported programs, compared with four such countries in 2012 (Table 11). In recent years non-publishers have been concentrated in Africa, the Middle East and the Caribbean.

## Publication lags

7. Publication lags have decreased since the last review (Table 3a and 3b). The average lag for Article IV, UFR, and combined reports fell from 42 days in 2006-08 to 32 days in 2012, and for FSSAs, from around 80 days to below 20 days. ${ }^{8}$ The declining trend in average lags for UFR staff reports was reversed in 2012 because of an uptick in the number of cases that were published more than 100 days after the Board meeting. ${ }^{9}$ Meanwhile, a small but growing number of reports is being published the day of the Board meeting, ${ }^{10}$ and the longest lag has declined from 615 days to 401 days
 (Table 14); in 2012 only six reports were published with delays in excess of 150 days.
[^2]
## 8. The declining average lag masks significant differences between country income groups, as well as a number of outliers with extremely long publication lags (Table 3a):

- AMs continue to have the shortest publication lags, averaging 9 days in 2009-12, with 90 percent of reports published within 20 days. Only three reports on AMs were published 20 or more days after the Board meeting. ${ }^{11}$
- Lags for EMs remain longer, averaging 36 days in 2009-12. Although 75 percent of reports were published within 50 days, the most delayed 10 percent of reports were published between 80 and 224 days after the Board meeting.
- LICs exhibit the longest average lags of 42 days in 2009-12, although this represents a decline of 6 days relative to 2006-08. Longer average lags in LICs reflect capacity constraints, and in some cases the need to translate reports into languages other than English. This average lag masks significant differences across countries: while just over 50 percent of reports are published within 30 days, the 10 percent of reports with the longest lags are published between 90 and 158 days after the Board meeting.



[^3]
## 9. Among EMs and LICs, publication lags continue to vary widely across regions. ${ }^{12}$

Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have the shortest average lag (22 days in 2009-12, a decline since 2006-08), while the longest lags are concentrated in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere countries (Table 3a). Lags have fallen in most regions except in the Middle East, reflecting challenging developments in Arab countries in transition, and Asia.
10. Publication lags reflect common factors and country-specific features. The main crosscutting reason is staff's reluctance to enforce the presumption of publication. Under the policy, consent to publication of country documents is obtained on a "non-objection" basis, and documents should be published "promptly" after the meeting or adoption of the LOT decision, unless the member has notified the Fund that it objects to publication, requires more time to decide, or seeks some modifications before publication. In practice, however, staff continues to seek the authorities' explicit consent for publication, leading to publication delays. Differences across regions likely reflect capacity constraints and the need to translate documents in some cases.

## B. Modifications

## Deletions

11. The incidence of deletions to published staff reports has risen sharply since the last review (Table 4a). In 2009-12, deletions occurred in some 21 percent of published staff reports, compared with around 10 percent before the last review. This has been driven by a significant jump in the rate of deletion of financial sector issues, which rose from 4 percent during 2006-08 to some 12 percent of total deletions during 2009-12. This reflects not only the sensitivity of financial sector issues during the crisis, but also longer-term attempts by Fund staff to provide more in depth coverage of financial sector issues. By contrast, the other major theme of deletions- exchange rate issues-has remained around the pre-crisis level of 6 percent.
12. Deletion rates have become tilted towards AMs (see text table). During 2009-12, the deletion rate for AMs averaged around 35 percent, outstripping EMs (24 percent) and LICs (11 percent). This represents a change from the past, when EMs had consistently recorded the highest deletion rates. The rate of deletions to stand-alone UFR documents for AMs is much higher than the rate for EMs, but falls to zero if Greece, Ireland and Portugal are excluded.

[^4]

Incidence of Deletions (2009-2012)

|  | No. of <br> Published <br> Reports | \% with <br> deletions |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Stand-alone Article IV | 113 | 19 |
| AM | 166 | 19 |
| EM | 72 | 11 |
| LIC |  |  |
| Stand-alone UFR | 26 | 58 |
| AM | 124 | 18 |
| EM | 160 | 10 |
| LIC |  |  |

13. The increase in deletion rates in AM reports is largely explained by the impact of

Fund-supported programs for euro area countries and the greater coverage of financial-sector issues in staff reports for these countries. During 2009-12, the majority of deletions made to reports of AMs were related to banking or financial sector issues, while deletions for EMs and LICs are more widely dispersed across six major areas. Deletions for countries with fixed or crawling pegged exchange rates have also increased since 2009, reflecting more in-depth and candid exchange rate analysis. For these regimes, the deletions rate rose from some 8 percent in 2009 to 21 percent in 2011 (Table 4b).

## Corrections

## 14. Around 65 percent of published staff reports were subject to corrections in 2009-12

(Table 5a), a ten percentage point increase since the last review. The incidence is even more heavily tilted towards AMs than is the case for deletions, with 92 percent of reports on AMs subject to corrections, compared with 68 percent for EMs and 48 percent for LICs. Reports on AMs also account for just over half of the country documents with the highest number of corrections, with a number of EMs also appearing in the top 20. Traditional explanations for the greater incidence of corrections to reports on AMs have been their greater familiarity with the IMF's rules on corrections and the fact that the Fund's relationships with AMs is more likely to be surveillance, implying less frequent contact. Conversely, the greater incidence of Fund arrangements among EMs and LICs implies closer engagement with Fund staff, potentially reducing the need for corrections. Staff
believes these traditional explanations remain broadly valid, even though there are some counter-examples among the countries that request the largest number of deletions. The increase in the rate of corrections was already evident in 2009, and so pre-dates the introduction of the possibility of corrections on account of evident ambiguity.

Reports with the Largest Number of Corrections in 2012

| 1 | Turkey (2012 Art IV) |
| :---: | :--- |
| 2 | Korea (2012 Art IV) |
| 3 | Japan (FSSA) |
| $4=$ | Mexico (2012 Art IV) |
| $4=$ | France (2012 Art IV) |
| 6 | Australia (FSSA) |
| $7=$ | Sweden (2012 Art IV) |
| $7=$ | United Kingdom (2012 Art IV) |
| 9 | Ireland (2012 Art IV) |
| $10=$ | Jordan (Request for SBA) |
| $10=$ | Australia (2012 Art IV) |
| $10=$ | Ireland (8th Review under EA) |
| 13 | Ireland (6th Review under EA) |
| 14 | Russia (2012 Art IV) |
| 15 | Hungary (2012 Art IV and 2nd PPM) |
| 16 | Fiji (2012 Art IV) |
| 17 | India (FSSA) |
| $18=$ | Ireland (5th Review Under the EA) |
| $18=$ | Spain (2012 Art IV) |
| 20 | Morocco (Request for an Arrangement Under the PLL) |

Table 1a. Trends in Publication Rates (2003-12) 1/2/

| Type of Report | 2003-2005 |  | 2006-2008 |  | 2009-2012 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) |
| Staff Reports | 734 | 85 | 700 | 85 | 930 | 92 |
| Article IV, UFR, or Combined | 598 | 83 | 547 | 88 | 823 | 92 |
| Stand-alone Article IV | 283 | 78 | 303 | 85 | 396 | 89 |
| Article IV combined with UFR, PPM, SMP, EPA, PSI | 96 | 91 | 79 | 90 | 103 | 98 |
| Stand-alone UFR | 219 | 86 | 165 | 92 | 324 | 95 |
| Stand-alone PPM, SMP, EPA, PSI | 28 | 89 | 42 | 79 | 52 | 87 |
| Joint Staff Advisory Note | 92 | 93 | 89 | 75 | 36 | 86 |
| HIPC Country Papers | 16 | 94 | 22 | 73 | 19 | 100 |
| Selected Issues/Statistical Annexes | 390 | 77 | 348 | 81 | 205 | 82 |
| FSSAs | 55 | 75 | 59 | 64 | 70 | 65 |
| ROSCs ${ }^{3 /}$ | 349 | 81 | 234 | 79 | 249 | 47 |
| Article IV Public Information Notices (PINs) ${ }^{4 /}$ | 373 | 94 | 378 | 96 | 471 | 99 |
| UFR and PSI Chairman's statements | 271 | 98 | 252 | 97 | 439 | 98 |
| Authorities' statements ${ }^{5 /}$ | 592 | 61 | 560 | 68 | 699 | 82 |
| Country Policy Intention Documents | 588 | 97 | 540 | 97 | 1078 | 98 |
| LOIs/MEFPs ${ }^{6 /}$ | 277 | 97 | 244 | 93 | 686 | 99 |
| TMUs ${ }^{6 /}$ | 210 | 96 | 197 | 95 | 327 | 98 |
| PRSPs, I-PRSPs, and related reports | 101 | 97 | 99 | 79 | 65 | 94 |
| All Policy Papers |  |  |  |  | 231 | 85 |
| Policy Papers that are presumed to be published ${ }^{7 /}$ | 120 | 86 | 68 | 84 | 218 | 89 |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.
2/ Data include documents issued for the information of the Board and documents sent to the Board for consideration on lapse-of-time basis.
3/ Includes initial ROSC assessments and reassessments produced by the IMF, as well as the World Bank and, in the case of AML/CFT ROSCs, by FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRB), issued on a stand-alone basis or in FSSAs. Does not include assessments done under detailed standards assessments. Completions and publications for the three standards led by the World Bank are updated as of February 28, 2009.
4/ Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100 percent of PINs are published.
5/ Does not include authorities' statements that are included in ROSCs. Includes Executive Directors' Statements and "right of reply" documents.
6/ Includes LOIs/MEFPs and TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs.
7/ Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed under the Transparency Policy. Data collection started in January 2002.

Table 1b. Trends in Publication Rates (2009-12) ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$

| Type of Report | 2009 |  | 2010 |  | 2011 |  | 2012 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) |
| Staff Reports | 231 | 94 | 251 | 93 | 227 | 91 | 221 | 90 |
| Article IV, UFR, or Combined | 208 | 94 | 222 | 92 | 204 | 91 | 189 | 93 |
| Stand-alone Article IV | 94 | 88 | 105 | 87 | 100 | 90 | 97 | 90 |
| Article IV combined with UFR, PPM, SMP, EPA, PSI | 26 | 100 | 29 | 100 | 22 | 91 | 26 | 100 |
| Stand-alone UFR | 88 | 98 | 88 | 97 | 82 | 93 | 66 | 94 |
| Stand-alone PPM, SMP, EPA, PSI | 12 | 92 | 7 | 100 | 17 | 88 | 16 | 75 |
| Joint Staff Advisory Note | 7 | 100 | 11 | 91 | 6 | 100 | 12 | 67 |
| HIPC Country Papers | 4 | 100 | 11 | 100 | 0 | n/a | 4 | 100 |
| Selected Issues/Statistical Annexes | 57 | 82 | 46 | 74 | 56 | 84 | 46 | 87 |
| FSSAs | 16 | 69 | 15 | 67 | 22 | 82 | 17 | 65 |
| ROSCs ${ }^{3 /}$ | 67 | 45 | 64 | 38 | 66 | 53 | 52 | 52 |
| Article IV Public Information Notices (PINs) ${ }^{\text {4/ }}$ | 118 | 99 | 132 | 98 | 121 | 98 | 100 | 99 |
| UFR and PSI Chairman's statements | 113 | 100 | 118 | 100 | 127 | 94 | 81 | 100 |
| Authorities' statements ${ }^{5 /}$ | 194 | 79 | 177 | 80 | 168 | 90 | 160 | 77 |
| Country Policy Intention Documents | 258 | 100 | 291 | 97 | 254 | 98 | 275 | 99 |
| LOIs/MEFPs ${ }^{6 /}$ | 165 | 100 | 177 | 97 | 152 | 98 | 192 | 100 |
| TMUs ${ }^{6 /}$ | 85 | 100 | 93 | 97 | 83 | 98 | 66 | 100 |
| PRSPs, I-PRSPs, and related reports | 8 | 100 | 21 | 95 | 19 | 100 | 17 | 82 |
| All Policy Papers | 54 | 91 | 63 | 75 | 68 | 87 | 46 | 91 |
| Policy Papers that are presumed to be published ${ }^{7 /}$ | 54 | 91 | 56 | 84 | 65 | 91 | 43 | 98 |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.
2/ Data include documents issued for the information of the Board and documents sent to the Board for consideration on lapse-of-time basis.
3/ Includes initial ROSC assessments and reassessments produced by the IMF, as well as the World Bank and, in the case of AML/CFT ROSCs, by FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRB), issued on a stand-alone basis or in FSSAs. Does not include assessments done under detailed standards assessments. Completions and publications for the three standards led by the World Bank are updated as of February 28, 2009.
4/ Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100 percent of PINs are published.
5/ Does not include authorities' statements that are included in ROSCs. Includes Executive Directors' Statements and "right of reply" documents.
6 / Includes LOIs/MEFPs and TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs.
7/ Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed under the Transparency Policy. Data collection started in January 2002.

Table 2a. Trends in Publication Rates for Article and UFR Staff Reports (2003-12) ${ }^{1 / 2}$
(by economic and regional characteristics)

| Reports by group | 2003-2005 |  | 2006-2008 |  | 2009-2012 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) |
| Article IV, UFR, or Combined staff reports | 598 | 83 | 547 | 88 | 823 | 92 |
| Advanced markets | 75 | 100 | 70 | 100 | 144 | 100 |
| Emerging markets | 150 | 77 | 112 | 84 | 361 | 90 |
| Developing countries | 373 | 83 | 365 | 87 | 318 | 92 |
| Emerging market and developing countries ${ }^{2 /}$ | 523 | 81 | 477 | 86 | 679 | 91 |
| Africa | 167 | 89 | 172 | 92 | 211 | 94 |
| Asia | 76 | 68 | 71 | 82 | 112 | 89 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 68 | 93 | 52 | 100 | 77 | 100 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 47 | 91 | 46 | 91 | 72 | 93 |
| Middle East | 33 | 52 | 40 | 75 | 67 | 82 |
| Western Hemisphere | 132 | 76 | 96 | 74 | 140 | 85 |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009
2/ WEO definitions.

Table 2b. Trends in Publication Rates for Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (2009-12) ${ }^{1 /}$
(by economic and regional characteristics)

| Reports by group | 2009 |  | 2010 |  | 2011 |  | 2012 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) | Reports discussed | Published (percent) |
| Article IV, UFR, or Combined staff reports | 208 | 94 | 222 | 92 | 204 | 91 | 189 | 93 |
| Advanced markets | 28 | 100 | 37 | 100 | 43 | 100 | 36 | 100 |
| Emerging markets | 92 | 91 | 101 | 90 | 72 | 86 | 96 | 91 |
| Developing countries | 88 | 94 | 84 | 90 | 89 | 91 | 57 | 91 |
| Emerging market and developing countries ${ }^{2 /}$ | 180 | 93 | 185 | 91 | 161 | 89 | 153 | 91 |
| Africa | 57 | 96 | 53 | 94 | 51 | 94 | 50 | 92 |
| Asia | 30 | 87 | 29 | 93 | 26 | 81 | 27 | 96 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 20 | 100 | 22 | 100 | 19 | 100 | 16 | 100 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 21 | 95 | 20 | 90 | 15 | 93 | 16 | 94 |
| Middle East | 15 | 87 | 20 | 85 | 14 | 71 | 18 | 83 |
| Western Hemisphere | 37 | 89 | 41 | 83 | 36 | 86 | 26 | 81 |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.
2/ WEO definitions.

| Table 3a. Trends in Publication Lags (2003-12) ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$ <br> (by type of reports, and by economic and regional characteristics) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Reports by type and group | Number published | $2003$ <br> Average lag 4/ | 2005 <br> percent with lag $>1$ <br> month | $\begin{gathered} \text { percent } \\ \text { with lag } \\ >2 \\ \text { months } \end{gathered}$ | Number published | 2006 <br> Average lag 4/ | 2008 <br> percent <br> with lag $\text { > } 1$ <br> month | percent <br> with lag $>2$ <br> months | Number published | $2009$ <br> Average lag 4/ | 2012 <br> percent <br> with lag $\text { > } 1$ <br> month | percent <br> with lag $>2$ <br> months |
| Article IV and UFR staff reports | 498 | 49 | 41 | 21 | 481 | 42 | 38 | 18 | 761 | 35 | 32 | 13 |
| Article IV | 222 | 48 | 33 | 20 | 259 | 38 | 27 | 12 | 351 | 29 | 29 | 11 |
| Combined | 87 | 57 | 54 | 29 | 71 | 58 | 39 | 21 | 101 | 40 | 44 | 19 |
| UFR | 189 | 47 | 43 | 18 | 151 | 41 | 42 | 21 | 309 | 35 | 30 | 12 |
| Advanced markets | 75 | 13 | 7 | 1 | 70 | 14 | 6 | 3 | 144 | 9 | 5 | 1 |
| Emerging markets | 115 | 59 | 44 | 25 | 94 | 42 | 44 | 21 | 324 | 36 | 37 | 15 |
| Developing countries | 308 | 54 | 48 | 24 | 317 | 48 | 44 | 20 | 293 | 42 | 39 | 16 |
| Emerging market and developing countries 3/ | 423 | 56 | 47 | 24 | 411 | 47 | 44 | 20 | 617 | 37 | 38 | 16 |
| Africa | 148 | 54 | 58 | 29 | 158 | 46 | 50 | 18 | 199 | 42 | 41 | 16 |
| Asia | 52 | 44 | 44 | 19 | 58 | 32 | 22 | 9 | 100 | 35 | 36 | 14 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 63 | 31 | 18 | 10 | 52 | 28 | 19 | 15 | 77 | 22 | 22 | 4 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 43 | 28 | 28 | 9 | 42 | 32 | 38 | 7 | 67 | 27 | 27 | 10 |
| Middle East | 17 | 41 | 53 | 24 | 30 | 30 | 40 | 10 | 55 | 46 | 47 | 22 |
| Western Hemisphere | 100 | 94 | 58 | 36 | 71 | 90 | 69 | 51 | 119 | 49 | 46 | 24 |
| Selected other documents |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FSSAs | 40 | 39 | 35 | 23 | 36 | 84 | 53 | 33 | 50 | 52 | 38 | 18 |
| Selected Issues/Statistical Annexes | 301 | 46 | 43 | 23 | 281 | 52 | 44 | 21 | 168 | 25 | 24 | 7 |
| Article IV Public Information Notices (PINs) ${ }^{5 /}$ | 350 | 33 | 29 | 12 | 361 | 24 | 20 | 6 | 465 | 20 | 19 | 6 |
| UFR and PSI Chairman's statements | 266 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 245 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 432 | 8 | 4 | 2 |
| Country Policy Intention Documents ${ }^{6 /}$ | 470 | 31 | 29 | 17 | 413 | 24 | 20 | 12 | 738 | 39 | 27 | 11 |
| Policy papers ${ }^{7 /}$ | 103 | 78 | 38 | 20 | 57 | 43 | 28 | 18 | 197 | 20 | 11 | 5 |
| 2/ Country-specific documents are published as soon as the final consent from the member country is received by the Fund, with technical delays typically not exceeding a couple of business days. Policy papers are published after authorization by the Board. <br> 3/ WEO definitions. <br> 4/ Number of calendar days. <br> 5/ Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100percent of PINs are published. <br> 6/ Includes LOIs/MEFPs/TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs. <br> 7/ Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 3b. Trends in Publication Lags ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$
(by type of reports, and by economic and regional characteristics)

|  | 2009 |  |  |  | 2010 |  |  |  | 2011 |  |  |  | 2012 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Reports by type and group | Number published | Average lag 4/ | percent <br> with lag $\text { > } 1$ <br> month | percent <br> with lag $>2$ <br> months | Number published | Average lag 4/ | percent with lag $\text { > } 1$ <br> month | percent <br> with lag $>2$ <br> months | Number published | Average lag 4/ | percent with lag $\text { > } 1$ <br> month | percent <br> with lag $\text { > } 2$ <br> months | Number published | Average lag 4/ | percent <br> with lag $\text { > } 1$ <br> month | percent <br> with lag $>2$ <br> months |
| Article IV and UFR staff reports | 195 | 42 | 41 | 15 | 205 | 36 | 31 | 15 | 186 | 28 | 22 | 9 | 175 | 32 | 33 | 12 |
| Article IV | 83 | 37 | 34 | 16 | 91 | 28 | 26 | 11 | 90 | 25 | 26 | 10 | 87 | 26 | 32 | 9 |
| Combined | 26 | 50 | 58 | 23 | 29 | 41 | 38 | 21 | 20 | 33 | 35 | 15 | 26 | 33 | 42 | 15 |
| UFR | 86 | 40 | 42 | 13 | 85 | 38 | 34 | 16 | 76 | 24 | 13 | 5 | 62 | 36 | 31 | 15 |
| Advanced markets | 28 | 12 | 7 | 4 | 37 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 43 | 8 | 5 | 0 | 36 | 5 | 6 | 0 |
| Emerging markets | 84 | 46 | 42 | 18 | 91 | 46 | 36 | 19 | 62 | 24 | 29 | 8 | 87 | 34 | 38 | 15 |
| Developing countries | 83 | 46 | 51 | 17 | 77 | 39 | 39 | 17 | 81 | 37 | 25 | 14 | 52 | 42 | 44 | 15 |
| Emerging market and developing countries ${ }^{3 /}$ | 167 | 43 | 46 | 17 | 168 | 37 | 38 | 18 | 143 | 29 | 27 | 11 | 139 | 36 | 40 | 15 |
| Africa | 55 | 60 | 55 | 20 | 50 | 37 | 38 | 16 | 48 | 27 | 25 | 10 | 46 | 42 | 46 | 15 |
| Asia | 26 | 41 | 35 | 19 | 27 | 45 | 44 | 22 | 21 | 29 | 24 | 10 | 26 | 23 | 38 | 4 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 20 | 24 | 30 | 5 | 22 | 29 | 23 | 9 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 0 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 0 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 20 | 43 | 60 | 25 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 0 | 14 | 17 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 27 | 13 | 7 |
| Middle East | 13 | 56 | 62 | 31 | 17 | 33 | 47 | 18 | 10 | 27 | 20 | 10 | 15 | 63 | 53 | 27 |
| Western Hemisphere | 33 | 32 | 36 | 9 | 34 | 62 | 47 | 32 | 31 | 53 | 45 | 23 | 21 | 50 | 62 | 38 |
| Selected other documents |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FSSAs | 11 | 114 | 36 | 36 | 10 | 51 | 30 | 20 | 18 | 34 | 56 | 6 | 11 | 16 | 9 | 9 |
| Selected Issues/Statistical Annexes | 47 | 38 | 36 | 15 | 34 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 47 | 16 | 15 | 0 | 40 | 19 | 17 | 17 |
| Article IV Public Information Notices (PINs) ${ }^{5 /}$ | 117 | 24 | 23 | 8 | 130 | 21 | 16 | 0 | 119 | 20 | 22 | 7 | 99 | 13 | 14 | 1 |
| UFR and PSI Chairman's statements | 113 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 118 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 120 | 22 | 12 | 5 | 81 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Country Policy Intention Documents ${ }^{6 /}$ | 173 | 32 | 45 | 11 | 191 | 50 | 28 | 14 | 168 | 38 | 26 | 11 | 206 | 17 | 11 | 6 |
| Policy papers ${ }^{7 /}$ | 49 | 16 | 16 | 4 | 47 | 26 | 17 | 11 | 59 | 25 | 19 | 7 | 42 | 6 | 5 | 2 |

1/Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for $2006-2008$ refers to documents published by June 30 , 2009.

Country-specific documents are published as soon as the final consent from the member country is received by the Fund, with technical delays typically not exceeding a couple of business days. Policy papers are published after authorization by the Board.
3/ WEO definitions.
/ Number of calendar days.
5/ Publication rate of PINs is expressed as a share of the number of relevant Article IV Board discussions; by definition, 100 percent of PINs are published.
Includes LOIs/MEFPs/TMUs issued in the context of SMPs and PSIs.
7/ Only includes policy papers for which publication is presumed.

Table 4a. Deletions in Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (2003-12) ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$
(by economic and regional characteristics)

| Reports by group | 2003-2005 |  |  |  | 2006-2008 |  |  |  | 2009-2012 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | With deletions | With deletions for exch. rate issues | With deletions for fin. sector |  | With deletions | With deletions for exch. rate issues | With deletions for fin. sector |  | With deletions | With deletions for exch. rate issues | With deletions for fin. sector |
|  | Number published | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | Number published | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | Number published | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports |
| All Article IV and UFR reports | 498 | 14 | 5 | 7 | 481 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 761 | 21 | 7 | 12 |
| Advanced markets | 75 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 70 | 13 | 6 | 4 | 144 | 35 | 3 | 25 |
| EU |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 80 | 36 | 3 | 26 |
| Other Europe |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 27 | 22 | 0 | 19 |
| ROW |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 37 | 14 | 5 | 8 |
| Emerging markets | 115 | 30 | 6 | 18 | 94 | 22 | 14 | 10 | 324 | 24 | 11 | 11 |
| Developing countries | 308 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 317 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 293 | 11 | 3 | 6 |
| Emerging market and developing countries ${ }^{3 /}$ | 423 | 15 | 5 | 8 | 411 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 617 | 18 | 7 | 9 |
| Africa | 148 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 158 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 199 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| Asia | 52 | 14 | 4 | 14 | 58 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 100 | 20 | 14 | 6 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 63 | 27 | 14 | 13 | 52 | 25 | 23 | 12 | 77 | 22 | 9 | 16 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 43 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 42 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 67 | 25 | 16 | 15 |
| Middle East | 17 | 18 | 12 | 0 | 30 | 17 | 10 | 0 | 55 | 13 | 7 | 5 |
| Western Hemisphere | 100 | 28 | 6 | 13 | 71 | 13 | 3 | 6 | 119 | 33 | 7 | 18 |
| Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or bands | 193 | 11 | 6 | 4 | 194 | 9 | 6 | 4 | 345 | 18 | 7 | 11 |
| Countries with other exchange rate regimes | 305 | 15 | 4 | 8 | 287 | 11 | 6 | 4 | 416 | 23 | 6 | 13 |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006 - 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.
2/Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, e.g., exchange rate, financial sector and/or other areas, there is no fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fourth columns under each year.
3/ WEO definitions.

Table 4b. Deletions in Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (2009-12) ${ }_{\text {(by economic and regional characterisics) }}^{\text {1/2/ }}$

| Reports by group | 2009 |  |  |  | 2010 |  |  |  | 2011 |  |  |  | 2012 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { With } \\ & \text { deletions } \end{aligned}$ | With deletions for exch. rate issue |  |  | With deletions | With deletions for exch. rate issue | With deletions for fin. sector |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { With } \\ & \text { deletions } \end{aligned}$ |  | With deletions for fin. sector |  | With deletions |  | With deletions for fin. sector |
|  | Number published | percent of all publ. reports | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of <br> all publ <br> reports | Number published | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | Number published | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | Number published | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports |
| All article IV and UFR reports | 195 | 18 | 7 | 11 | 205 | 14 | 8 | 7 | 186 | 22 | 4 | 11 | 175 | 17 | 5 | 11 |
| Advanced markets | 28 | 36 | 4 | 29 | 37 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 43 | 37 | 2 | 28 | 36 | 25 | 3 | 19 |
| EU | 15 | 27 | 0 | 27 | 19 | 21 | 5 | 5 | 25 | 56 | 4 | 40 | 21 | 33 | 0 | 29 |
| Other Europe | 5 | 80 | 0 | 60 | 8 | 13 | 0 | 13 | 7 | 14 | 0 | 14 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Row | 8 | 25 | 13 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 0 | 10 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 25 | 13 | 13 |
| Emerging markets | 84 | 17 | 10 | 7 | 91 | 18 | 13 | 8 | 62 | 31 | 8 | 10 | 87 | 20 | 8 | 13 |
| Developing countries | 83 | 13 | 5 | 8 | 77 | 10 | 4 | 8 | 81 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 52 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| Emerging market and developing countries ${ }^{3 /}$ | 167 | 15 | 7 | 8 | 168 | 14 | 9 | 8 | 143 | 17 | 5 | 6 | 139 | 15 | 6 | 9 |
| Africa | 55 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 48 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Asia | 26 | 23 | 15 | 8 | 27 | 22 | 22 | 7 | 21 | 10 | 5 | 5 | 26 | 12 | 8 | 0 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 20 | 25 | 20 | 10 | 22 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 19 | 21 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 13 | 0 | 13 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 20 | 35 | 15 | 30 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 14 | 21 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 33 | 27 | 13 |
| Middle East | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 24 | 18 | 6 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 13 | 7 | 7 |
| Western Hemisphere | 33 | 9 | 0 | 6 | 34 | 32 | 9 | 24 | 31 | 45 | 13 | 10 | 21 | 38 | 5 | 33 |
| Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or bands | 84 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 95 | 18 | 11 | 11 | 87 | 21 | 7 | 10 | 79 | 1 | 13 | 11 |
| Countries with other exchange rate regimes | 111 | 25 | 7 | 15 | 110 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 99 | 23 | 2 | 12 | 96 | 7 | 9 | 11 |

1/Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.9., the publication rate for $2006-2008$ refers to documents published by June 30 , 2009 .
$2 /$ Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, e.g, exchange rate, financial sector and/or other areas, there is no fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fourth columns under each year
3/ WEO definitions.

Table 5a. Corrections in Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (Average 2009-12) ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$
(by economic and regional characteristics)

| Reports by group | 2009-2012 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | With corrections | With corrections for Evident Ambiguity | With corrections for Mischaracterization |
|  | Number published | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports |
| All Article IV and UFR reports | 761 | 65 | 15 | 13 |
| Advanced markets | 144 | 92 | 40 | 33 |
| EU | 80 | 91 | 43 | 25 |
| Other Europe | 27 | 93 | 26 | 30 |
| ROW | 37 | 95 | 46 | 51 |
| Emerging markets | 324 | 68 | 13 | 14 |
| Developing countries | 293 | 48 | 3 | 3 |
| Emerging market and developing countries ${ }^{3 /}$ | 617 | 59 | 6 | 7 |
| Africa | 199 | 44 | 2 | 2 |
| Asia | 100 | 61 | 8 | 11 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 77 | 79 | 17 | 16 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 67 | 54 | 4 | 1 |
| Middle East | 55 | 51 | 13 | 11 |
| Western Hemisphere | 119 | 74 | 16 | 16 |
| Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or band: | 345 | 59 | 12 | 11 |
| Countries with other exchange rate regimes | 416 | 69 | 17 | 16 |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.
2/ Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, e.g., exchange rate, financial sector and/or other areas, there is no fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fourth columns under each year. 3/ WEO definitions.

Table 5b. Corrections in Article IV and UFR Staff Reports (2009-12) ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$

| Reports by group | 2009 |  |  |  | 2010 |  |  |  | 2011 |  |  |  | 2012 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { With } \\ \text { corrections } \end{gathered}$ | With corrections <br> for Evident <br> Ambiguity | With corrections <br> for <br> Mischaracterization |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { With } \\ \text { corrections } \end{gathered}$ | With corrections for Evident Ambiguity | With corrections <br> for <br> Mischaracterizati <br> on |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { With } \\ \text { corrections } \end{gathered}$ | With corrections for Evident Ambiguity | With corrections <br> for <br> Mischaracterizati <br> on |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { With } \\ & \text { corrections } \end{aligned}$ | With corrections for Evident Ambiguity | With corrections for Mischaracterizati on |
|  | Number published | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | Number published | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | Number published | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports | Number published | percent of <br> all publ. <br> reports | percent of all publ. reports | percent of all publ. reports |
| All Aricicle V and UFR reports | 195 | 66 | 0 | 10 | 205 | 63 | 10 | 14 | 186 | 69 | 23 | 15 | 175 | 62 | 27 | 15 |
| Advanced markets | 28 | 96 | 0 | 25 | 37 | 86 | 30 | 38 | 43 | 95 | 58 | 30 | 36 | 92 | 61 | 36 |
| Eu | 15 | 93 | 0 | 13 | 19 | 89 | 26 | 26 | 25 | 92 | 56 | 24 | 21 | 90 | 71 | 33 |
| Other Europe | 5 | 100 | 0 | 20 | 8 | 75 | 13 | 25 | 7 | 100 | 43 | 43 | 7 | 100 | 43 | 29 |
| Row | 8 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 10 | 90 | 50 | 70 | 11 | 100 | 73 | 36 | 8 | 88 | 50 | 50 |
| Emerging markets | 84 | 68 | 0 | 12 | 91 | 67 | 8 | 13 | 62 | 87 | 24 | 19 | 87 | 54 | 24 | 13 |
| Developing countries | 83 | 53 | 0 | 4 | 77 | 47 | 3 | 3 | 81 | 41 | 4 | 4 | 52 | 56 | 10 | 4 |
| Emerging market and developing countries ${ }^{3 /}$ | 167 | 60 | 0 | 8 | 168 | 58 | 5 | 8 | 143 | 61 | 3 | 4 | 139 | 55 | 19 | 9 |
| Africa | 55 | 56 | 0 | 4 | 50 | 42 | 2 | 2 | 48 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 46 | 37 | 4 | 2 |
| Asia | 26 | 77 | 0 | 15 | 27 | 48 | 4 | 7 | 21 | 57 | 10 | 14 | 26 | 62 | 19 | 8 |
| Central and Eastern Europe | 20 | 60 | 0 | 10 | 22 | 86 | 14 | 14 | 19 | 100 | 21 | 21 | 16 | 69 | 38 | 19 |
| CIS and Mongolia | 20 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 36 | 7 | 0 | 15 | 60 | 13 | 7 |
| Middle East | 13 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 47 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 70 | 30 | 20 | 15 | 53 | 20 | 20 |
| Western Hemisphere | 33 | 64 | 0 | 8 | 34 | 76 | 9 | 21 | 31 | 84 | 26 | 19 | 21 | 71 | 38 | 14 |
| Countries with fixed or crawling pegs or band: | 84 | 57 | 0 | 8 | 95 | 58 | 8 | 12 | 87 | ${ }_{6} 6$ | 17 | ${ }^{13}$ | 79 | 54 | 23 | 10 |
| Countries with othe exchange rate regimes | 111 | 72 | 0 | 12 | 110 | 67 | 11 | 15 | 99 | 72 | 28 | 17 | 96 | 67 | 31 | 19 |

Because a single report can have deletions falling into multiple categories, eg, exchange rate, financial sector and/or other reas, there is nof fixed relationship between the second column and the third and fouth columns under each year: 2/Because single

Table 6. First-Time Publishers of Article IV/UFR Staff Reports (2009-12) ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$

| 2003-2005 |  | 2006-2008 |  | 2009-2012 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Afghanistan, I. R. of | Korea | Bhutan | Namibia | Brazil | Myanmar |
| Angola | Libya | Egypt | Philippines | Dominican Republic | Saudi Arabia |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Micronesia | El Salvador | Qatar | Guyana | Thailand |
| Central African Republic | Samoa | India | Seychelles | Kosovo | Tuvalu |
| China, P.R. of | Serbia and Montenegro | Lebanon | Syrian Arab Republic | Malaysia |  |
| Congo, Republic of | Sierra Leone | Maldives | Togo |  |  |
| Djibouti | Singapore | Marshall Islands, Rep. | Uzbekistan |  |  |
| Ecuador | Solomon Islands | Republic of Montenegro | Yemen, Republic of |  |  |
| Equatorial Guinea | Suriname |  |  |  |  |
| Eritrea | Timor Leste |  |  |  |  |
| Honduras | Tonga |  |  |  |  |
| Indonesia | United Arab Emirates |  |  |  |  |
| Iraq | Zambia |  |  |  |  |
| Jordan |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009. <br> 2/ Timor Leste, Republic of Montenegro, Kosovo, and Tuvalu joined the Fund in 2002, 2006, 2009, and 2010 respectively. |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 7. Members Publishing all Article IV/UFR Reports ${ }^{1 /}$

| 2000-2008 | 2006-2008 |  | 2009-2012 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Afghanistan, I. R. of | Australia | Luxembourg | Afghanistan, I. S. of | Kyrgyz Republic | United Kingdom |
| Algeria | Austria | Macedonia, FYR | Albania | Lao People Dem. Rep. | United States |
| Armenia | Bahamas | Madagascar | Algeria | Latvia | Vanuatu |
| Austria | Bangladesh | Malawi | Armenia | Lebanon | Zambia |
| Bahamas | Barbados | Malta | Australia | Liberia | Zimbabwe |
| Belgium | Belarus | Marshall Islands, Rep. | Austria | Lithuania |  |
| Bolivia | Belgium | Mauritania | Azerbaijan | Luxembourg |  |
| Cambodia | Belize | Mauritius | Bahamas | Macedonia, FYR |  |
| Canada | Benin | Mexico | Bangladesh | Malaysia |  |
| Chile | Bhutan | Micronesia | Barbados | Maldives |  |
| Colombia | Bolivia | Moldova | Belarus | Mali |  |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of the | Bosnia \& Herzegovina | Mongolia | Belgium | Malta |  |
| Costa Rica | Botswana | Montenegro, Republic of | Belize | Marshall Islands, Rep. |  |
| Croatia | Bulgaria | Morocco | Benin | Mauritania |  |
| Cyprus | Burkina Faso | Mozambique | Bhutan | Mauritius |  |
| Czech Republic | Burundi | Namibia | Bolivia | Mexico |  |
| Denmark | Cambodia | Nepal | Bosnia \& Herzegovina | Micronesia |  |
| Dominica | Cameroon | Netherlands | Botswana | Moldova |  |
| Estonia | Canada | New Zealand | Bulgaria | Mongolia |  |
| Finland | Cape Verde | Niger | Burkina Faso | Montenegro, Republic of |  |
| France | Central African Republic | Nigeria | Burundi | Morocco |  |
| Germany | Chad | Norway | Cambodia | Mozambique |  |
| Greece | Chile | Pakistan | Cameroon | Namibia |  |
| Grenada | China, P.R. of | Palau | Canada | Nepal |  |
| Iceland | Colombia | Papua New Guinea | Cape Verde | Netherlands |  |
| Iraq | Comoros | Paraguay | Chile | New Zealand |  |
| Ireland | Congo, Democratic Rep. o | Philippines | Colombia | Niger |  |
| Israel | Congo, Republic of | Poland | Comoros | Nigeria |  |
| Italy | Costa Rica | Portugal | Congo, Republic of | Norway |  |
| Jamaica | Cote d'Ivoire | Qatar | Costa Rica | Palau |  |
| Japan | Croatia | Romania | Cote d'Ivoire | Panama |  |
| Lao People Dem. Rep. | Cyprus | Russian Federation | Croatia | Papua New Guinea |  |
| Latvia | Czech Republic | Rwanda | Cyprus | Paraguay |  |
| Liberia | Denmark | Samoa | Czech Republic | Peru |  |
| Lithuania | Dominica | San Marino | Denmark | Philippines |  |
| Luxembourg | Egypt | Sao Tome \& Principe | Dominica | Poland |  |
| Malawi | El Salvador | Senegal | Egypt | Portugal |  |
| Malta | Equatorial Guinea | Serbia, Republic of | El Salvador | Qatar |  |
| Mauritius | Estonia | Sierra Leone | Estonia | Romania |  |
| Montenegro, Republic of | Ethiopia | Singapore | Fiji | Russian Federation |  |
| Nepal | Finland | Slovak Republic | Finland | Rwanda |  |
| Netherlands | France | Slovenia | France | Samoa |  |
| New Zealand | Gambia | Solomon Islands | Gabon | San Marino |  |
| Norway | Georgia | South Africa | Gambia | Sao Tome \& Principe |  |
| Pakistan | Germany | Spain | Georgia | Senegal |  |
| Palau | Greece | St. Kitts \& Nevis | Germany | Serbia, Republic of |  |
| Poland | Grenada | St. Lucia | Ghana | Seychelles |  |
| Portugal | Guinea | St. Vincent and Grenadines | Greece | Singapore |  |
| Romania | Guinea-Bissau | Suriname | Guatemala | Slovak Republic |  |
| Russian Federation | Hungary | Swaziland | Guinea | Slovenia |  |
| San Marino | Iceland | Sweden | Guinea-Bissau | Solomon Islands |  |
| Sao Tome \& Principe | India | Switzerland | Haiti | South Africa |  |
| Serbia, Republic of | Indonesia | Syrian Arab Republic | Hong Kong SAR | Spain |  |
| Slovenia | Iran. I. Rep of | Tajikistan | Hungary | Sudan |  |
| Spain | Iraq | Tanzania | Iceland | Suriname |  |
| St. Lucia | Ireland | Timor Leste | India | Sweden |  |
| Sweden | Israel | Tonga | Indonesia | Switzerland |  |
| Switzerland | Italy | Trinidad \& Tobago | Iran. I. Rep of | Syrian Arab Republic |  |
| Timor Leste | Jamaica | Tunisia | Iraq | Tajikistan |  |
| Trinidad \& Tobago | Japan | Turkey | Ireland | Tanzania |  |
| Tunisia | Jordan | Uganda | Israel | Thailand |  |
| United Kingdom | Kazakhstan | Ukraine | Italy | Timor Leste |  |
| United States | Korea | United Arab Emirates | Japan | Togo |  |
|  | Kyrgyz Republic | United Kingdom | Jordan | Tonga |  |
|  | Lao People Dem. Rep. | United States | Kazakhstan | Trinidad \& Tobago |  |
|  | Latvia | Uruguay | Kenya | Tunisia |  |
|  | Lesotho | Uzbekistan | Kiribati | Turkey |  |
|  | Liberia | Vanuatu | Korea | Tuvalu |  |
|  | Libya Lithuania | Vietnam Zambia | Kosovo Kuwait | Ukraine <br> United Arab Emirates |  |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of
the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009

Table 8. Members Publishing All Documents ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$

| 2003-2005 |  | 2006-2008 | 2009-2012 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Afghanistan, I.R. of | Switzerland | Albania | Afghanistan, I. R. of | Maldives | Tonga |
| Albania | Trinidad \& Tobago | Austria | Albania | Mali | Trinidad \& Tobago |
| Angola | Tunisia | Belarus | Austria | Malta | Tuvalu |
| Austria | United Arab Emirates | Bhutan | Azerbaijan | Marshall Islands, Rep. | United Kingdom |
| Belarus | United Kingdom | Bolivia | Bangladesh | Mauritania | Vanuatu |
| Benin | Vanuatu | Chile | Belize | Mauritius | Zambia |
| Botswana |  | Cyprus | Benin | Moldova | Zimbabwe |
| Cambodia |  | Denmark | Bhutan | Montenegro, Republic of |  |
| Chile |  | Estonia | Bosnia \& Herzegovina | Monzambique |  |
| Croatia |  | Ethiopia | Botswana | Namibia |  |
| Cyprus |  | Finland | Burundi | Nepal |  |
| Denmark |  | Guinea | Cambodia | Netherlands |  |
| Equatorial Guinea |  | Guinea-Bissau | Cameroon | Niger |  |
| Estonia |  | Indonesia | Cape Verde | Norway |  |
| Finland |  | Iran, I. Rep of | Chile | Palau |  |
| Gabon |  | Israel | Colombia | Panama |  |
| Gambia |  | Korea | Costa Rica | Papua New Guinea |  |
| Ghana |  | Latvia | Croatia | Paraguay |  |
| Guinea-Bissau |  | Lesotho | Cyprus | Peru |  |
| Iceland |  | Luxemboug | Czech Republic | Philippines |  |
| Iraq |  | Moldova | Denmark | Poland |  |
| Lao People Dem. R |  | Morocco | Egypt | Portugal |  |
| Latvia |  | Mozambique | El Salvador | Rwanda |  |
| Lesotho |  | Namibia | Finland | Samoa |  |
| Liberia |  | Nigeria | Gabon | San Marino |  |
| Lithuania |  | Portugal | Gambia | Senegal |  |
| Malta |  | Romania | Georgia | Serbia, Republic of |  |
| Mexico |  | San Marino | Germany | Seychelles |  |
| Norway |  | Serbia, Republic of | Ghana | Singapore |  |
| Panama |  | Spain | Greece | Slovenia |  |
| Papua New guinea |  | Suriname | Guinea | Solomon Islands |  |
| Romania |  | Swaziland | Guinea-Bissau | South Africa |  |
| Rwanda |  | Switzerland | Haiti | Spain |  |
| San Marino |  | Tajikistan | Iceland | Suriname |  |
| Servia and Monten |  | Timore Leste | India | Sweden |  |
| Slovak Republic |  | Tunisia | Indonesia | Switzerland |  |
| Slovenia |  | United Kingdom | Iran. I. Rep of | Syrian Arab Republic |  |
| Spain |  |  | Italy | Tajikistan |  |
| Suriname |  |  | Jordan | Tanzania |  |
| Sweden |  |  | Kiribati | Thailand |  |
|  |  |  | Luxembourg | Timor Leste |  |
|  |  |  | Malaysia | Togo |  |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.
2/ Documents considered here include: Staff Report, PIN, UFR/PSI Chairman's statement, Selected Issues, Statistical Appendix, background documents,

Table 9. Members Not Publishing Any Article IV/UFR Staff Reports ${ }^{1 /}$
2000-2008 $\quad$ 2009-2012

Bahrain
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Dominican Republic
Guyana
Malaysia
Myanmar
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Venezuela

1/ Publication refers to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication list for 2000-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

| Table 10. Members Not Publishing Article IV Staff Reports ${ }^{1 /}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
| Angola <br> Brazil | Brazil | Libya | Brunei |
|  | Brunei | Brazil | Chad |
|  |  |  | Congo, Democratic Republic |
| Brunei | Honduras | Brunei | of |
| China | Kingdom of Lesotho | Equatorial Guinea | Grenada |
| Eritrea | Kingdom of Swaziland | Ethiopia | Guyana |
| Guyana | Myanmar | Myanmar | Jamaica |
| Honduras | Nicaragua | Oman | Kingdom of Bahrain |
| Kingdom of Bahrain | Oman | St. Lucia | Oman |
| Myanmar | Saudi Arabia | Turkmenistan | Uzbekistan |
| Saudi Arabia | St. Kitts and Nevis | Vietnam |  |
| Turkmenistan | St. Vincent and the Grenadines |  |  |
|  | Turkmenistan |  |  |
|  | Uzbekistan |  |  |
|  | Yemen |  |  |
| 1/ Publication refer to documents considered by the Board during the period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009. |  |  |  |

Table 11. Members Not Publishing UFR Staff Reports ${ }^{1 /}$

| 2009 |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Nicaragua |  |  |  |  |

1/ Publication refer to documents considered by the Board during the period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2009.

Table 12. Members Not Publishing Any Documents ${ }^{1 / 2 /}$

| $2003-2005$ | 2006-2008 |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Eritrea |  |
| Myanmar | Kiribati |  |
| Qatar | Zimbabwe |  |
| Seychelles |  |  |
| Turkmenistan <br> Venezuela |  |  |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for $2006-2008$ refers to documents published by June 30, 2009. The following countries did not have any Article IV or UFR discussions during the periods: Somalia (2003-2005); Fiji, Somalia, and Venezuela (2006-2008); Argentina, Ecuador, Madagascar, Somalia, South Sudan and Venezuela (2009-2012).
2/ Documents considered here include: Staff Report, PIN, UFR/PSI Chairman's statement, Selected Issues, Statistical Appendix, background documents, Authorities' Statement, and HIPC documents.

Table 13. Members Requesting Explicit Consent Prior to Publication
Bahrain
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cape Verde
Dominican Republic
Egypt
Guyana
Haiti
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Maldives
Oman
Panama
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Suriname
Syrian Arab Republic
Timor-Leste
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Yemen

Table 14. Longest and Shortest Lags for the Publication of Article IV/UFR Staff Reports ${ }^{1 /}$

| Longest Publication Lags ${ }^{2 /}$ |  |  | Shortest Publication Lags ${ }^{2 /}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Board date | Country | Days | Board date | Country | Days |
| 03/03/09 | Liberia | 401 | 02/06/09 | Italy | 0 |
| 04/07/10 | Dominican Republic | 349 | 04/17/09 | Mexico | 0 |
| 02/09/09 | Kingdom of Lesotho | 332 | 05/06/09 | Poland | 0 |
| 05/23/12 | Botswana | 332 | 10/16/09 | Mexico | 0 |
| 07/21/09 | Djibouti | 302 | 10/28/09 | Iceland | 0 |
| 02/28/11 | St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 287 | 03/25/10 | Mexico | 0 |
| 05/28/10 | Congo, Republic of | 279 | 09/20/10 | Jordan | 0 |
| 11/06/09 | Sri Lanka | 273 | 12/17/10 | Greece | 0 |
| 03/11/09 | Congo, Democratic Republic of | 257 | 01/10/11 | Mexico | 0 |
| 01/12/11 | St. Lucia | 240 | 01/21/11 | Poland | 0 |
| 06/15/12 | Comoros | 238 | 02/25/11 | Ireland | 0 |
| 02/12/11 | Maldives | 226 | 05/09/11 | New Zealand | 0 |
| 04/15/09 | Lebanon | 211 | 03/29/10 | Germany | 1 |
| 12/17/10 | Dominican Republic | 208 | 05/07/10 | Colombia | 1 |
| 01/30/12 | Central African Republic | 196 | 05/09/10 | Greece | 1 |
| 12/21/11 | Burkina Faso | 194 | 10/27/10 | Australia | 1 |
|  | Lao People's Democratic |  |  |  |  |
| 07/30/10 | Republic | 192 | 11/08/10 | United Kingdom | 1 |
| 11/09/09 | Dominican Republic | 189 | 12/16/10 | Ireland | 1 |
| 03/17/10 | Guyana | 184 | 04/06/11 | Czech Republic | 1 |
| 02/04/10 | Jamaica | 176 | 05/25/11 | Guinea-Bissau | 1 |
| 06/29/09 | Central African Republic | 169 | 07/11/11 | Italy | 1 |
| 02/06/12 | Djibouti | 169 | 08/23/11 | Chile | 1 |
| 02/22/12 | Nigeria | 153 | 09/12/11 | Portugal | 1 |
| 10/22/10 | Dominican Republic | 151 | 10/05/11 | Australia | 1 |
| 06/29/12 | Ukraine | 151 | 12/19/11 | Portugal | 1 |

1/ Publication rates refer to documents considered by the Board during a period mentioned above, and published within six months after the end of the relevant period; e.g., the publication rate for 2006-2008 refers to documents published by June 30, 2/ Calendar days.

## II. ANALYSIS OF MODIFICATIONS ${ }^{1}$

To complement the analysis of overall trends in modification rates, staff carried out an indepth examination of a sample of deletions and corrections to determine whether there was any evidence that the rules were not being fully respected ("gray zone" modifications) in a significant share of the sample; ${ }^{2}$ and if so whether there was any evidence of a bias toward larger and more influential members. The analysis showed that although gray zone modifications persist, they seem to have diminished significantly since this exercise was last undertaken in 2009, and staff could find no meaningful evidence of a bias.

## A. Context and Policy Background

## 1. The Fund's modification policies were established to protect the integrity of Fund

 documents in a consistent way across the membership. The deletions policy aims to preserve the candor of published reports, while allowing deletions of certain types of material to protect members, and support the Fund's role as a confidential advisor. ${ }^{3}$ Since deletions affect only the published versions of reports, they enable staff to be as candid as needed in the report presented to the Executive Board ("internal candor"), while retaining the main messages and clarity in the published report ("external candor"). This approach reduces the risk of staff self-censorship, and helps ensure that the Board receives an unembellished assessment of the member's economy, thereby promoting meaningful peer review. The rules for corrections-which affect the internal versions of reports-are intended to ensure that reports are factually correct and do not mislead readers. ${ }^{4}$
## 2. Concerns have emerged in the past that modification policies may not have been

 applied evenhandedly. The 2009 review highlighted the differences in modification rates between different groups of members, with emerging markets (EMs) making the greatest use of deletions, and advanced markets (AMs) making the most use of corrections, and considerably lower modification rates for low-income countries (LICs). ${ }^{5}$ Staff suggested in 2009 that these patterns could be due to differing degrees of administrative capacity, a higher degree of market sensitivity in EMs and, for corrections, the close program engagement of many LICs. But there would be greater concerns to the extent this reflects differing ability or inclination to influence staff and management.[^5]3. The 2009 review uncovered cases of modifications that were not fully in line with the policy, but concluded that there was insufficient evidence to suggest systematic bias. Around 25 percent of deletions were found to be in a "gray zone" that did not fully comply with the rules, as were over 20 percent of corrections. The 2009 review also noted a higher incidence of "gray zone" modifications for larger or "influential" countries, but not sufficiently as to suggest that the policy was not being implemented evenhandedly.
4. Measures have been put in place since then to help address these concerns. A new category of corrections on account of evident ambiguity was introduced with the aim of allowing the Fund to accept requests that help external audiences to understand the meaning of a text but were not previously permitted under the policy, while drawing a firmer line around unacceptable requests. A detailed guidance note for the Transparency Policy was prepared in 2010, and operational procedures have been strengthened.

## 5. To reassess whether the modifications policy is being applied even-handedly, staff

 conducted an ex-post assessment of a sample of modifications in recent years. This involved a detailed re-examination of whether modifications in the sample conformed to the policy and if not, if there was any evidence of bias. The exercise was based on 25 percent of all deletion requests to country reports presented to the Executive Board between 2009 and 2012. The same sample of reports was used to examine whether corrections on grounds of evident ambiguity were| Composition of Deletions Sample by Region |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | - Africa |
|  | - Asia |
|  | - Commonwealth of |
|  | $\square$ Europe |
|  | - Middle East |
|  | - Western Hemisphere | in line with the policy. ${ }^{6}$

## B. Assessing the Implementation of the Deletions Policy

6. The sample of deletions under examination is primarily composed of cases in EMs and Europe (see text figures). Just over half the total is accounted for by EMs, reflecting the high share of reports covering EMs issued to the Board, and a relatively high incidence of deletions for EM reports (26 percent). AMs represent just under 30 percent of the sample, reflecting their smaller

[^6]share in the total number of reports issued to the Board but higher incidence of deletions (34 percent). LICs account for only 16 percent of sample, due to the lower share of LIC reports issued to the Board and the lower incidence of deletions in this group (11 percent). Around 90 percent of the sample covered requests to delete highly market sensitive (HMS) information, against 20 percent concerning deletions on account of premature disclosure of policy intentions.
7. Financial sector issues made up the largest single category of deletions. This is a departure from the pre-crisis period, when issues surrounding exchange rate assessments, exchange rate regimes, or reserves dominated. These external sector issues have now been displaced into second position. Fiscal policy, debt, output/inflation and political or governance issues account for smaller shares of deletions, and there were no deletions relating to structural issues such as labor markets.
8. The rising rate of deletions and compositional shift is to be expected during the global financial crisis. Staff's increased focus on risks and financial sector issues during the global financial crisis meant that staff reports have included more sensitive material than in the past. The higher number of deletions for AMs and EMs may be due to the location of the crisis, as well as the size and interconnectedness of their financial systems. Staff reports for these economies are therefore more likely to contain highly market-sensitive information than those for LICs.


## 9. A detailed examination of the deletions sample suggests that the "gray zone" has

 diminished significantly, but not disappeared altogether, and there is no evidence of bias towards any particular group of countries. Staff re-examined all cases in detail and found only two cases-representing 5 percent of the total—of deletions that were approved even though they did not seem to fully meet the relevant criteria. ${ }^{7}$ The reduction in the gray zone seems to reflect the changes made since 2009. Even so, assessing whether information is highly market-sensitive can involve careful judgments, including on the likelihood and severity of a market reaction, making it hard to eliminate entirely the "gray zone".
## 10. All the deletions for premature disclosure of policy intentions were found to be in line

 with the policy. This category of deletion is requested primarily by EMs and LICs, which have a close policy dialog with the IMF, including through IMF-supported programs. Most of these deletions involved detailed information, such as petroleum price increase schedules or tax reforms, which if released would have complicated the authorities' efforts to implement these policies.11. As in the last review, staff found instances where more text than strictly needed had been deleted, which is strongly discouraged by the policy. This mostly relates to reports on EMs, where entire paragraphs had unnecessarily been deleted, in sections on the exchange rate assessments. Only 60 percent of the deletions fully complied with the requirements of the policy which recommends a high degree of parsimony.

## C. Assessing Corrections for Evident Ambiguity

12. To assess whether the corrections policy is being implemented evenhandedly, staff also carried an in-depth analysis of corrections on account of evident ambiguity. This category was introduced to ensure factual accuracy by correcting the possibility of a plausible, specific misinterpretation. ${ }^{8}$ As this involves a degree of judgment, especially about whether there is ambiguity, there seems to be a higher risk that such cases could fall into the gray zone. Staff is aware of a few cases where requests for deletions were rejected, but the authorities subsequently successfully requested a correction to the same material on account of evident ambiguity. Focusing on this subset of corrections could shed light on whether the "gray zone" has indeed declined, or perhaps shifted from deletions towards corrections for evident ambiguity.

[^7]13. Staff's first step was to return to the sample of country reports used for the analysis of deletions and examine all cases of corrections for evident ambiguity. Since they had been subject to deletions, many of the reports in this sample included complex and sensitive material. It was also likely that any corrections on account of evident ambiguity would involve difficult issues requiring careful judgment, with the possibility of cases where the rules had not been fully respected.

## 14. The incidence of "gray zone" cases in this sample seems modest, albeit slightly higher

 than for deletions, but again not enough for a conclusive evidence of bias. Around 10 percent of cases appear not to comply fully with the rules, including both AMs and Ems, ${ }^{9}$ and there are signs of an increase as the global financial crisis intensified in 2010-11 (see Box 1 for examples). However, given the modest proportion of gray zone cases, this exercise provides no conclusive support for claims that the policy is not being implemented evenhandedly.
## Box 1. Examples of 'Gray Zone' Corrections for Evident Ambiguity

EM: a sentence was toned down even though there was no clear evidence of a plausible, specific misinterpretation:
for "with the private sector becoming the driver for growth and employment."
read "with enhancing the private sector's role for growth and employment."
AM: a correction on the ground of evident ambiguity appears to cover sensitive material that does not qualify for HMS.
for "Disclosure of financial sector data falls short of best international practice and enhancements would be highly desirable."
read "...banks, and listed companies more generally, make extensive public financial disclosures under IFRS, and as a result of bank regulations (Pillar III of Basel II). Nonetheless, disclosure of financial sector data falls short of best international practice and enhancements would be highly desirable."

AM: a correction on the grounds of evident ambiguity requested the addition of a long footnote to the staff appraisal summarizing policy developments since the issuance of the Staff Report to the Board. According to the Transparency Policy, corrections should not be used to extend the staff's or authorities' arguments, or to update information after the report has been issued to the Board.

## D. Implementation Challenges

15. To widen the scope of the analysis, staff also examined in depth a small number of controversial cases of modification requests. Six cases (Table 1)—four AMs (all in Europe), one EM and one LIC-were selected based on their complexity.
16. Staff sees these cases as illustrative of the more extreme challenges that can materialize in implementing the policy. Each of the six cases initially involved requests to delete

[^8]sensitive material, which staff rejected as they did not fully meet the relevant criteria under the policy. In most cases, this led to follow-up requests for corrections on account of evident ambiguity. The requests were ultimately rejected in two cases and the staff report was published without modification, while modifications were made in the other four cases, suggesting that they might qualify as gray zone cases. In practice, only few requests, such as these six, have involved pressure on staff to identify options to satisfy country authorities. In the vast majority of cases, staff is able to apply the policy evenhandedly, and to reject cases that do not comply with the rules.

| Table 1. Select Cases of "Gray Zone" Deletion Requests |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country Group | Initial Modification request | Process | Request Accepted? |
| AM | Request to delete a sentence relating the size of the financial sector and openness of the economy to contagion and financial stability risks. | Staff rejected the request because it did not meet the criteria for HMS deletions (not already in the public domain, market-relevant within the near term, sufficiently specific to create a clear risk of triggering a disruptive market reaction if disclosed). | No |
| AM | Third party request to delete all references to its name in a report referring to risks in the Euro Area. | Staff rejected the request because it did not meet the criteria for HMS deletions (not already in the public domain, market-relevant within the near term, sufficiently specific to create a clear risk of triggering a disruptive market reaction if disclosed). | No |
| AM | Request to delete 'GIIPS' acronym. | After staff rejected the initial request, it was resubmitted as a request to correct on account of evident ambiguity. | Partially |
| AM | Two requests to delete politically sensitive material. | After staff rejected the initial request to delete, the authorities requested corrections on account of mischaracterization of their views and evident ambiguity. | Yes |
| EM | Request to delete reference to possible deposit outflows and recapitalization needs. | Staff initially rejected the requests, because they were not specific | Yes |
| LIC | Request to delete politically sensitive material, including a reference to a politician's powerbase ahead of elections. | After staff rejected the initial requests, they were resubmitted as requests for corrections on account of evident ambiguity. | Partially |
| Source: IMF Staff |  |  |  |

## III. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION (CSO) VIEWS ON THE IMF'S TRANSPARENCY POLICY ${ }^{1}$

To ensure that a wide range of views are reflected in the 2013 review, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were invited to express their views on the Fund's transparency policy. The consultation comprised two approaches. First, CSOs were invited to respond to an online consultation page. Second, representatives from selected CSOs participated in a conference call to exchange views on the Fund's Transparency Policy. ${ }^{2,3}$ While CSOs conceded that some improvements have occurred since the 2009 review, they saw the need for further reforms for the Fund to catch up with current international standards. The discussions centered around five key themes summarized below:

## Overarching Principles: Follow the lead of other IFIs

Despite recent reforms, the Fund's transparency policy continues to be seen as more restrictive than that of other IFIs, including the World Bank. The CSOs urged the Fund to follow the lead of other IFIs in the following areas:

- Presumption of disclosure. The World Bank moved in 2010 to a policy of full disclosure except for a limited set of documents on a "negative list," an approach that was seen as superior to the Fund's practice of seeking consent from country authorities or Board approval prior to publication.
- Executive Board meetings. Some institutions provide live streaming of Board meetings and the World Bank issues summary minutes immediately after the meeting. In contrast, the Fund's summings up are issued later, without attribution, and verbatim minutes are made available to the public with a five-year lag. More generally, information about the Fund Board's calendar and activities is seen as limited and often unreliable; the calendar is available only seven days in advance (whereas the World Bank's calendar is released two months in advance).
- Governance of information releases. A number of IFIs have clear procedures for handling information requests from the public and have established independent bodies to adjudicate complaints in this area, including appeals when information requests are turned down. The Fund has not established such developed procedures.

[^9]
## Consultations with Stakeholders: Gather Broader Perspectives

- The Fund should strike a balance between its duty to advise country authorities and its wider responsibility to countries as a whole. In response to worldwide moves towards participatory democracy, the Fund should step up its interaction with other stakeholders, e.g. parliaments, opposition groups, CSOs and trade unions.
- The Fund's handling of consultations with CSOs on policy papers is seen as suboptimal, including the current review of the transparency policy, as CSOs are allowed only to provide general comments ahead of the issuance of draft policy papers to the Board, limiting their scope to influence decisions. Instead, CSOs should be given an opportunity to review and comment on draft policy papers before they are issued to the Executive Board.
- The Fund should increase its interactions with CSOs and representation on public forums, including through IMF's Resident Representatives (Res. Rep.) offices.
- The Fund should publish CSOs' full comments on its website.


## Candor and Timely Disclosure: Increase Transparency on Decision-Making Processes

- Greater candor and timely disclosure of information would enhance the Fund's accountability, and reduce the risk of it being used as a scapegoat by governments.
- The emphasis on market sensitivity in the Fund's transparency policy was seen as overblown. The Fund should define more clearly the concept of "market sensitivity." The Fund should put the emphasis on keeping the public informed rather than on maintaining market stability in cases when these two objectives come into conflict. In general, the Fund should realize the difference between secrecy and responsibility.
- Fund documents should clearly highlight differences of views between the various parties concerned: the Board, staff, management, and the authorities. This would strengthen staff independence and avoid the suppression of views, as flagged by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). More attribution of views was also seen as needed in Board summing ups.
- The Fund should disclose the list of unpublished and modified documents, as well as modification requests with justifications as to why they have been permitted. If documents are modified, they should be published with black line redactions to clarify the nature of the change.
- While the Fund is seen as having made progress at releasing information on "outcomes", information on "processes" that lead up to decisions is more limited. There is a need for more systematic disclosure on how decisions are made, including on technical assistance, funding, and program conditionality.


## Evenhandedness: A New Approach to Information Sharing

- The Fund should be more willing to respond to information requests from IMF outside stakeholders. This would improve evenhandedness as information would be "pushed out" in addition to voluntary publication.
- The Fund should systematically include a section on stakeholders' views in staff reports.


## Communication: Cut Back on Jargon and Improve Ease of Access

- The Fund should cut back on jargon, and more broadly use language that makes documents more accessible to the general public. More documents-including policy papers-should be translated, including into languages beyond the five official UN languages. Country papers should be translated into at least the language of the country concerned.
- The Fund should make a clearer distinction between papers with policy content cleared by the Fund, and those that do not represent the Fund's official position. Doing so would help clarify the Fund's position on key issues and the Fund's message to stakeholders.
- The Fund should create a web page for all resident representative offices, and those offices should maintain a mailing list of key CSOs and distribute news releases electronically.
- Information related to a country should be housed in a single location to facilitate searching. In addition, country pages on the IMF website should include a factsheet on IMF involvement with the country, and a list of forthcoming and recently completed interactions with authorities (staff visits, technical assistance, meetings with CSOs, etc.). Information on ways to engage with the visiting teams should also be disclosed.


## IV. SUMMARY OF SURVEYS OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, COUNTRY AUTHORITIES, AND MISSION CHIEFS ${ }^{1}$

To strengthen the evidence base for the review, staff solicited views from IMF Executive Directors, country authorities, IMF mission chiefs, and the media. ${ }^{2}$ The major concern for Executive Directors and country authorities was a perceived lack of evenhandedness in the implementation of the policy, with a number of respondents expressing concern at the high rate of modifications for reports on advanced markets (AMs). There were also some worries about the treatment of confidential information, which was an issue in a few countries, particularly in the Middle East. All respondents were generally positive about the reforms undertaken in 2009, and the majority doubted that there was a need to make the policy more flexible.

## A. Introduction

## 1. The surveys addressed core aspects of the Fund's Transparency Policy, centered on the following four themes:

- Publication and Communication. A number of questions focused on whether country authorities' willingness to publish country documents had diminished during the global financial crisis with the increased coverage of sensitive issues in staff reports. Other questions looked at views on publication lags, and the scope for streamlining post-Board outputs. Respondents were also asked whether the changing shape of Fund surveillance, such as more explicit risk assessments and exchange rate analyses, has complicated efforts to publish candid staff reports.
- Candor. Another focal point, was whether there were factors that may have affected the candor of Fund documents both with respect to external audiences and internally, for instance because members of staff might be self censoring themselves to avoid conflicts with country authorities over publication.
- Evenhandedness. Following up on concerns expressed during previous reviews, the survey asked respondents whether they thought that the transparency policy is being applied evenhandedly across the Fund membership, and invited comments on reasons behind perceptions.

[^10]- Reforming the policy. Finally, the surveys asked about experiences with the 2009 transparency policy reforms, and invited respondents to provide further suggestions to improve the policy.


## B. Publication and Communication

2. The surveys provide a reassuring message that country authorities' willingness to publish has been largely unaffected by the crisis. Around 75 percent of country authorities said their willingness to publish has remained unchanged, with a similar proportion of mission chiefs supporting this view. Only 7 percent of the responding country authorities reported that they had become more reluctant to publish, with higher shares among emerging markets (EMs) and African countries.

## 3. Most respondents doubted that the increased focus on external sector

 assessments and risks would hinder the publication of staff reports. These constitute some 80 percent of mission chiefs, 65 percent of Directors and 56 percent of country authorities. Mission chiefs who found that the increased risk focus did, to some extent, hinder publication, were mostly working on EMs and low-income countries (LICs). Likewise, a majority of country authorities and Executive Directors thought the material in staff reports on risk assessments was appropriate; less than 5 percent of country authorities (from EMs and LICs only) viewed this material as excessively alarmist. Views differed somewhat across regions:
 respondents in Africa were more comfortable with external assessments, while a smaller share of them viewed risk assessments as appropriate. The reverse relationship held in Asia - and especially the Middle East, with the latter region having the highest share of comfort with risk assessments. Most mission chiefs thought that the increased focus on risk did not impede their ability to prepare candid staff reports, or had a neutral stance on this issue, although around 20 percent of them almost evenly spread across the Fund, did have concerns. Only a small number of mission chiefs
expressed concerns about new products such as the pilot External Sector Report or Spillover Reports, with which many mission chiefs may not yet have experience.

## 4. The surveys also underscored the importance of reducing publication lags and shed some light on the factors that might be behind lags:

- The media emphasized the importance of efforts to reduce publication lags. Over 90 percent of respondents took the view that Board documents should normally be published immediately after the Board meeting, and some 60 percent of respondents thought that the Fund needed to speed up its overall approach to publication.
- On the causes of delays, the main factor cited by mission chiefs (especially those working on EMs and LICs) was the continuing tendency to obtain the authorities' explicit consent even though it is no longer necessary in the "voluntary but presumed" publication framework. Communications with the authorities on corrections and deletions also ranked high for them. Executive Directors attached roughly equal weight to discussions within the Fund on modifications alongside communication with country authorities, while country authoritiesmostly non-G20 non-program countries, (about 59 percent of respondents)—emphasized discussions on modifications. Several mission chiefs and country authorities mentioned the need to translate documents as a reason for delays.

5. Most mission chiefs saw scope to streamline summary documents produced for Board meetings. Irrespective of the countries they cover, most mission chiefs agreed that merging some of the outputs prepared following Board meetings would help to avoid duplication and reduce the risk of confusing the outside world. Suggestions included combining the Chairman's Statement and the Summing-up, and merging the press release with the Public Information Notice (PIN).

## C. Candor and Integrity

6. The Fund aims to ensure candor between authorities, the staff and the Executive Board ("internal candor") while maintaining candor in publications ("external candor"). The transparency policy allows staff to report to sensitive issues to the Board, with the assurance that the most sensitive information can be removed from the document for publication. However, because allowed modifications are limited, there is a risk that the original Fund documents may be drafted to avoid what might be controversial, to reduce the likelihood of non-publication. The survey explored stakeholder views on how candor has been affected by the policy.
7. The surveys indicate that there is marginal loss of candor arising from external pressures on staff before publication. Few Executive Directors thought that reports had been watered down to facilitate publication. A few others attributed loss of candor to concerns about the risk of leaks. For country authorities, political processes were the most acknowledged as a factor in the dilution. About one-quarter-mostly in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere-cited the risk of leaks as a constraint for publication of candid reports. To the extent that mission chiefs felt pressure to dilute messages, it was mostly slight, and it came from the authorities, Executive

Directors and, to a lesser extent, from Fund senior staff and management. Those reporting high external pressure were mostly mission chiefs covering European countries, followed by the Western Hemisphere. Some 20 percent of mission chiefs flagged the need to maintain good relations with the authorities as a factor constraining their ability to product candid staff reports, but the vast majority thought that all the important economic information remained in the published staff reports.
8. The surveys also indicate that the rules on modifications have allowed for the preparation of candid staff reports. All groups surveyed generally thought that the policy on corrections and deletions did not impede candor in staff reports, and that important economic information was rarely omitted from reports as a result of modifications. However, a few mission chiefs on EMs, mostly in the Americas, thought that some important economic information had been omitted.
9. The media generally had a positive view on the candor of Fund documents. Around 60 percent or more of media respondents thought that the Fund was candid in its presentation of financial stability risks, risks more generally, and of its lending operations.

## D. Evenhandedness

10. A significant number of respondents had doubts, that the Fund is applying the policy evenhandedly, although the strength of views varies significantly by type of respondent (see Box 2):

- Executive Directors were the most concerned, with about half of the respondents disagreeing that the policy is applied evenhandedly (including 11 percent who were in strong disagreement), while a third of Executive Directors had a neutral stance on this issue.
- Mission chiefs, on balance, felt the policy is not applied evenhandedly, although views
 were not as strongly felt as Directors. Some 30 percent of mission chiefs thought the policy was not applied evenhandedly, versus 18 percent who thought it was. However, around half, working on various country types, took a neutral stance on this issue.
- Country authorities were, on average, more positive about the Fund's evenhandedness, although with significant differences between different groups. Around half thought the policy was applied evenhandedly to some or a great extent, whereas only 16 percent thought it was not at all or only slightly evenhanded. Perhaps reflecting their distance from decisions concerning other countries, around 35 percent of country authorities had no views on this issue. The
greatest concerns about evenhandedness were expressed by country authorities in the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.


## Box 1. Assessing the Evidence on Evenhandedness

The surveys shed some light on the discussion of evenhandedness. So far, discussions in this area had focused on the ex post rate of modification to reports for various groups. In principle, however, the ex post modification rate can be decomposed into the product of: (i) the ex ante rate of requests from different groups, and (ii) the share of requests that are rejected. Staff has little scope to influence the rate of requests. However, it would be a source of concern if rejection rates were materially higher for certain groups.

Propensity to request modifications. Staff believes that the higher incidence of modifications to reports for AMs is largely due to much higher rates of requests from AMs. In the absence of comprehensive data set on modification requests, surveys asked respondents whether or not they made any requests. The aggregate response varies between mission chiefs and country authorities. With regards to corrections, the surveys broadly supported staff's views that request rates are highest for AMs, followed by EMs and with lower rates for LICs. Concerning deletions, however, the surveys are inconclusive. While the mission chief survey is aligned with staff's priors of a very low rate of request from LICs (reflecting lower market development), the survey of country authorities suggests a higher rate of request. We should note the low participation of LICs in the survey.

Rejection rates. The surveys provide some more limited - and illustrative - evidence on rejection rates. Results need to be interpreted with considerable caution as respondents were asked essentially qualitative questions, which complicates efforts to aggregate them into one answer. On this basis, surveys suggest marginally higher rates of rejection in the case of corrections for EMs than for AMs, but even higher rates of rejection for LICs (particularly in the survey of mission chiefs). By contrast, in the case of deletions, the rejection rate is systematically higher for AMs, suggesting no bias in their favor in this category.

11. Those who claimed that the policy is not being implemented evenhandedly tended to cite the larger number of modifications in favor of AMs. They attributed the results to the greater leverage of these countries to push through their proposals. Some respondents pointed out, however, that unlike in the past, the dividing line is more between larger economies-including influential emerging markets-and smaller countries that lack the administrative capacity or clout to lobby for changes. Staff takes the view that ex post modification rates are a poor indicator of evenhandedness, because they are heavily influenced by the rates of requests for modifications, which largely lie outside staff's control (Box 2).

## E. Reforms to the Transparency Policy

## Views on 2009 reforms

12. All groups broadly supported the reforms that came into effect after the last review. ${ }^{3}$

Response rates to this question were low, with half the Executive Directors, 42 percent of country authorities, and around 30 percent of mission chiefs expressing no view. Of those with a view, around two-thirds of mission chiefs and country authorities agreed to some or a great extent that the 2009 reforms had made the policy more flexible, while 89 percent of Directors with a view thought the policy had become more effective. Negative views were concentrated among country authorities, with
 11 percent of respondents-mainly from EMs and LICs-judging that the 2009 reforms had done nothing to make the policy more flexible

## Options for further changes

## 13. The respondents' views on the consequences of making the policy on modifications more flexible varied.

- An equal share of country authorities thought that greater flexibility would reduce the risk of reports being misinterpreted and improve candor. While agreeing on the need for greater flexibility, Executive Directors and mission chiefs generally believed that this could come at the cost of less candid staff reports.

[^11]- A large majority of Directors and mission chiefs thought that more flexibility would result in more publication, whereas only a small number of country authorities (all from LICs), supported that view. Some mission chiefs and Executive Directors (20 percent in each group) thought that publication rates would be unaffected.
- Although a majority of Directors and mission chiefs thought that greater flexibility would make it easier to strike reasonable agreements with stakeholders, a higher share of both groups were worried that this would make it harder for them to resist unreasonable requests Most mission chiefs also expressed concerns about the additional staff time that would be required to respond to requests.

14. Surveys indicate that country authorities and mission chiefs see no need for major changes to strengthen safeguards in the transparency policy. Most country authorities responding to the survey thought that the current transparency rules provide adequate protection against adverse market reactions, premature release of information on planned policies, possible misinterpretation of information in reports by the public, and disclosure of confidential information. However, views varied across regions, with lower support in Africa and the Americas as regards adverse market reactions, and in the Middle East concerning confidential information. While most mission chiefs did not have an opinion, the majority of those who responded thought there was no need to tighten confidentiality understandings. Mission chiefs who felt a need to tighten these agreements were predominantly those working on LICs and EMs (13 percent of both groups), and from a regional perspective only those working in the Middle East (31 percent of the total) versus less than 10 percent of mission chiefs working on other regions.


## Appendix I. Methodology and Survey Results

1. Staff conducted five separate surveys of stakeholders to create an evidence base for the review. The surveys were distributed by email in January/February 2013, and responses were provided anonymously. The surveys included questions to help stratify the results by various categories, including income level, size (G-20 as a proxy for a large country), region, program or non-program country. To ensure the confidentiality of all responses, no individual respondents were identified and the survey results were provided in aggregate groupings that are large enough to ensure the anonymity of respondents.
2. The response rate varied significantly among the various groups. The highest response rates came from those inside the Fund, namely Executive Directors and IMF mission chiefs, with responses rates in both cases similar to the level for the surveys conducted for the 2011 TSR. However, lower rates were recorded for country authorities and the media, in the latter cases considerably below the 2011 TSR result. The response rate for the survey of financial markets was too low for inclusion.

| 2013 Transparency Review: Survey Statistics |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No. of Responses |  |  |  |  |  |
| Survey | No. of Surveys Sent | Received | Response Rate (in percent) |  | Comment |
|  |  |  | Transparency 2013 | TSR 2011 |  |
| Country Authorities | 362 | 102 | 28.2 | 32.9 |  |
| Executive Directors | 24 | 20 | 83.3 | 75.0 |  |
| IMF Mission Chiefs | 163 | 97 | 59.5 | 61.7 |  |
| Media | 90 | 12 | 13.3 | 32.2 |  |
| Financial markets | 320 | 8 | 2.5 | 13.7 | Not Used |

3. Two main problems emerged. The response rate for financial markets was deemed too low for inclusion, which deprives the review of a potentially useful source of views. Also, response rates varied by region, and thus the sample of respondents to a survey may not be fully representative of the original population targeted. Results are made available by relevant subsets in the tables that follow.

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results ${ }^{1 /}$


1/ Country authority surveys were sent to both the central bank/financial supervision agency and the ministry of finance/treasury of each member country.
2/A weighted average was used to convert the responses to questions to select one from four or five answer choices to a 4 -point or 5 -point scale to make the responses more comparable across questions.
Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued)

|  |  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging Low-income |  | Asia |  | Middle |  |  | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Yes | No |
| 3. To your knowledge did any of the following cause the message of the reports on other countries to be "watered down"?(Please mark all that apply) | The political process in the country concerned |  | 32 | 34 | 28 | 38 | 25 | 33 | 33 | 43 | 26 | 27 | 33 | 29 | 33 |
|  | Staff or IMF management |  | 21 | 28 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 20 | 21 | 7 | 32 | 33 | 18 | 19 | 21 |
|  | No view/N/A |  | 48 | 41 | 52 | 50 | 58 | 60 | 45 | 29 | 53 | 27 | 52 | 57 | 46 |
|  | Others |  | 9 | 13 | 9 | 4 | 8 | - | 7 | 14 | 16 | 33 | 5 | 10 | 9 |
| 4. Aside from pressures from other parties in question 3 , did any of the following factors constrain you in consenting to the publication of a candid staff report? | Concerns on possibility/continuation of an IMF arrangement | Not at all | 87 | 100 | 93 | 61 | 71 | 75 | 100 | 80 | 83 | 100 | 85 | 87 | 88 |
|  |  | Slightly | 6 | . | - | 22 | 14 | 17 | - | - | 8 | - | 7 | 7 | 5 |
|  |  | To some extent | 7 | - | 7 | 17 | 14 | 8 | - | 20 | 8 | - | 8 | 7 | 7 |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.20 | 1.00 | 1.13 | 1.56 | 1.43 | 1.33 | 1.00 | 1.40 | 1.25 | 1.00 | 1.23 | 1.20 | 1.20 |
|  | Concerns about risk of leaks | Not at all | 71 | 96 | 68 | 47 | 50 | 85 | 84 | 45 | 65 | 83 | 69 | 56 | 75 |
|  |  | Slightly | 14 | 4 | 8 | 37 | 25 | 15 | 10 | 27 | 6 | - | 16 | 31 | 9 |
|  |  | To some extent | 9 | - | 11 | 16 | 25 | - | 3 | 18 | 12 | - | 10 | 13 | 8 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 6 | - | 14 | - | - | - | 3 | 9 | 18 | 17 | 4 | - | 8 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.50 | 1.04 | 1.70 | 1.68 | 1.75 | 1.15 | 1.26 | 1.91 | 1.82 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.56 | 1.48 |
|  | Other Factors | Not at all | 81 | 92 | 83 | 50 | - | 75 | 93 | 40 | 88 | 83 | 80 | 75 | 81 |
|  |  | Slightly | 10 | 8 | . | 33 | - | 25 | . | 20 | 13 | 17 | 8 | 25 | 7 |
|  |  | To some extent | 3 | - | - | 17 | - | - | - | 20 | - | - | 4 | - | 4 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 6 | - | 17 | - | - | - | 7 | 20 | - | - | 8 | - | 7 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.35 | 1.08 | 1.50 | 1.67 | - | 1.25 | 1.21 | 2.20 | 1.13 | 1.17 | 1.40 | 1.25 | 1.37 |
| 5. Did you request any corrections on the reports on your |  | No | 28 | 24 | 27 | 33 | 75 | 21 | 28 | 15 | 11 | 21 | 29 | 43 | 24 |
| country? |  | Yes | 72 | 76 | 73 | 67 | 25 | 79 | 72 | 85 | 89 | 79 | 71 | 57 | 76 |


| Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Overall |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  |  | By income level <br> Advanced Emerging Low-income |  |  |  | Asia Pacific | By | Middle |  | G-20 Non-G-20 |  | Yes | No |
| 6. Were the requests for corrections approved? | Yes, all the requests were approved | 18 | 9 | 28 | 8 | 33 | 33 | 14 | 30 | 6 | - | 21 | 20 | 18 |
|  | Most of the requests were approved | 42 | 64 | 28 | 38 | 67 | 22 | 57 | 40 | 24 | 55 | 39 | 50 | 40 |
|  | Some requests were approved | 25 | 18 | 28 | 31 | - | 22 | 14 | 30 | 47 | 36 | 23 | - | 30 |
|  | Only a few of the requests were approved | 13 | 9 | 13 | 23 | . | 22 | 14 | - | 18 | 9 | 14 | 30 | 11 |
|  | None of the requests were approved | 1 | - | 3 | . | . | - | - | . | 6 | - | 2 | - | 2 |
| 7. Did you request any deletions on the reports on your country? | No | 63 | 72 | 61 | 54 | 100 | 57 | 67 | 54 | 42 | 57 | 64 | 76 | 59 |
|  | Yes | 37 | 28 | 39 | 46 | - | 43 | 33 | 46 | 58 | 43 | 36 | 24 | 41 |
| 8. Were the requests for deletions approved? | Yes, all the requests were approved | 12 | 13 | 13 | 10 | - | - | 8 | 20 | 20 | 17 | 11 | - | 13 |
|  | Most of the requests were approved | 21 | 25 | 25 | 10 | - | 17 | 38 | 20 | - | 17 | 21 | - | 23 |
|  | Some requests were approved | 38 | 25 | 38 | 50 | - | 50 | 31 | 60 | 30 | 50 | 36 | 50 | 37 |
|  | Only a few of the requests were approved | 24 | 25 | 19 | 30 | - | 33 | 23 | - | 30 | - | 29 | 50 | 20 |
|  | None of the requests were approved | 6 | 13 | 6 | - | - | - | - | - | 20 | 17 | 4 | - | 7 |
| 9. All the important economic information was included in the staff reports for your country. | Strongly disagree | 1 | - | 2 | - | - | 7 | - | - | 5 | 7 | 1 | - | 1 |
|  | Disagree | 3 | 7 | 2 7 | - | - 25 | 7 | 3 | - | 5 | 7 | 2 7 | 5 | 4 |
|  | Neutral | 6 | - 77 | 7 | 13 | 25 | - | 3 | 8 | 5 | - | 7 | 5 | 6 |
|  | Agree | $76$ | 77 | 75 | 78 | 58 | 93 | 78 | 75 | 74 | 87 | 74 | 85 | 74 |
|  | Strongly agree | 13 | 17 | 14 | 9 | 17 | - | 18 | 17 | 11 | 7 | 15 | 10 | 14 |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.98 | 4.03 | 3.95 | 3.96 | 3.92 | 3.86 | 4.10 | 4.08 | 3.79 | 3.93 | 3.99 | 4.05 | 3.96 |


| Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Overall | By income level |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  |  | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | Asia | Middle |  |  | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Yes | No |
| 10. Are you familiar with the IMF's rules on corrections? | No | 18 | 28 | - 11 | 17 | 33 | 8 | 20 | East | - 21 | 20 | - 17 | 10 | 20 |
|  | Somewhat | 30 | 17 | 32 | 42 | 42 | 31 | 28 | 54 | 11 | 13 | 33 | 38 | 28 |
|  | Yes | 53 | 55 | 57 | 42 | 25 | 62 | 53 | 46 | 68 | 67 | 50 | 52 | 53 |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.35 | 2.28 | 2.45 | 2.25 | 1.92 | 2.54 | 2.33 | 2.46 | 2.47 | 2.47 | 2.33 | 2.43 | 2.33 |
| 11. Would you agree that the IMF's rules on corrections allow for the preparation of candid staff reports for your country? | Not at all | 6 | - | 13 | - | - | - | 5 | - | 15 | - | 8 | - | 8 |
|  | Slightly | 10 | 7 | 8 | 22 | 33 | 13 | 5 | 20 | 8 | - | 13 | 22 | 8 |
|  | To some extent | 42 | 20 | 54 | 44 | 33 | 50 | 37 | 60 | 38 | 50 | 39 | 33 | 44 |
|  | To a great extent | 42 | 73 | 25 | 33 | 33 | 38 | 53 | 20 | 38 | 50 | 39 | 44 | 41 |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.19 | 3.67 | 2.92 | 3.11 | 3.00 | 3.25 | 3.37 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.50 | 3.11 | 3.22 | 3.18 |
| 12. Are you familiar with the IMF's rules on deletions? | No | 23 | 23 | 20 | 29 | 50 | 14 | 20 | 23 | 21 | 20 | 24 | 29 | 22 |
|  | Somewhat | 34 | 23 | 32 | 50 | 33 | 43 | 33 | 46 | 21 | 20 | 36 | 38 | 32 |
|  | Yes | $43$ | 53 | 48 | 21 | 17 | 43 | 48 | 31 | 58 | 60 | 40 | 33 | 45 |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.19 | 2.30 | 2.27 | 1.92 | 1.67 | 2.29 | 2.28 | 2.08 | 2.37 | 2.40 | 2.16 | 2.05 | 2.23 |
| 13. Would you agree that the IMF's rules on deletions allow for the preparation of candid staff reports for your country? | Not at all | 5 | - | 10 | - | - | - | - | - | 18 | - | 6 | - | 6 |
|  | Slightly | 12 | 7 | 14 | 20 | 50 | 17 | 11 | - | 9 | - | 16 | 29 | 9 |
|  | To some extent | 54 | 47 | 57 | 60 | 50 | 50 | 56 | 75 | 45 | 67 | 50 | 57 | 53 |
|  | To a great extent | 29 | 47 | 19 | 20 | - | 33 | 33 | 25 | 27 | 33 | 28 | 14 | 32 |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.07 | 3.40 | 2.86 | 3.00 | 2.50 | 3.17 | 3.22 | 3.25 | 2.82 | 3.33 | 3.00 | 2.86 | 3.12 |


| Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  Overall Advanced Emerging Low-income  Asia <br> Africa  <br> Pacific        |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Europe | Middle East | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Yes | No |
| 14. The IMF's rules on corrections are |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 11 | 23 | 59 | 29 | 31 | 45 | 27 |
| sufficiently flexible. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 89 | 77 | 41 | 71 | 69 | 55 | 73 |
| 15. Indicate how more flexibility in the IMF's rules on corrections in staff reports would help most. | Result in more candid reports. <br> Result in more publication. <br> Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of |  |  | 12 | - | 7 | 20 | 50 | - | - | . | 10 | - | 14 | 29 | 5 |
|  |  |  | 23 | - | 36 | 10 | 25 | 14 | - | 50 | 30 | 75 | 14 | - | 32 |
|  |  |  | 65 | 100 | 57 | 70 | 25 | 86 | 100 | 50 | 60 | 25 | 73 | 71 | 63 |
| 16. Do you think that the IMF's transparency rules provide adequate protection against the following? | Adverse market reactions | Not at all | 11 | - | 15 | 18 | 25 | - | 6 | 9 | 25 | 8 | 12 | 22 | 8 |
|  |  | Slightly | 10 | 13 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 27 | 9 | - | 6 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 10 |
|  |  | To some extent | 56 | 54 | 53 | 65 | 25 | 45 | 66 | 73 | 44 | 54 | 56 | 39 | 60 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 23 | 33 | 25 | 6 | 38 | 27 | 20 | 18 | 25 | 31 | 22 | 28 | 22 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.91 | 3.21 | 2.88 | 2.59 | 2.75 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.69 | 3.08 | 2.88 | 2.72 | 2.97 |
|  | Release of information on planned policies that could undermine the authorities' effort to implement their policies | Not at all | 5 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 14 | - | 3 | 8 | 6 | - | 6 | 11 | 3 |
|  |  | Slightly | 23 | 9 | 30 | 28 | 14 | 25 | 21 | 25 | 31 | 23 | 24 | 33 | 21 |
|  |  | To some extent | 42 | 30 | 40 | 61 | 43 | 58 | 35 | 50 | 38 | 38 | 43 | 39 | 43 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 30 | 57 | 25 | 6 | 29 | 17 | 41 | 17 | 25 | 38 | 28 | 17 | 33 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.96 | 3.39 | 2.85 | 2.67 | 2.86 | 2.92 | 3.15 | 2.75 | 2.81 | 3.15 | 2.93 | 2.61 | 3.06 |
|  | Possible misinterpretation of messages and/or information by the general public | Not at all | 7 | 4 | 10 | 6 | - | - | 6 | - | 24 | 15 | 6 | 6 | 8 |
|  |  | Slightly | 20 | 17 | 21 | 22 | 13 | 50 | 14 | 17 | 18 | 23 | 20 | 28 | 18 |
|  |  | To some extent | 49 | 38 | 50 | 61 | 50 | 50 | 46 | 67 | 41 | 54 | 48 | 44 | 50 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 24 | 42 | 19 | 11 | 38 | - | 34 | 17 | 18 | 8 | 27 | 22 | 24 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.89 | 3.17 | 2.79 | 2.78 | 3.25 | 2.50 | 3.09 | 3.00 | 2.53 | 2.54 | 2.96 | 2.83 | 2.91 |
|  | Disclosure of information provided to staff on a confidential basis | Not at all | 15 | 9 | 17 | 17 | - | 15 | 12 | 27 | 20 | - | 17 | 22 | 13 |
|  |  | Slightly | 11 | 5 | 10 | 22 | 38 | 23 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 25 | 9 | 11 | 11 |
|  |  | To some extent | 35 | 27 | 34 | 44 | 25 | 38 | 35 | 36 | 33 | 25 | 36 | 39 | 33 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 40 | 59 | 39 | 17 | 38 | 23 | 50 | 27 | 40 | 50 | 38 | 28 | 43 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.99 | 3.36 | 2.95 | 2.61 | 3.00 | 2.69 | 3.24 | 2.64 | 2.93 | 3.25 | 2.94 | 2.72 | 3.06 |

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued)

|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | By income level |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | Asia Pacific | Europe | Middle East | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Yes | No |
| 17. Did the reforms introduced in 2009, such as the addition of a new justification ("evident ambiguity") for corrections, make the Transparency Policy more flexible? | Not at all | 10 | - | 10 | 20 | 33 | - | - | 14 | 30 | - | 12 | 23 | 7 |
|  | Slightly | 22 | 29 | 17 | 27 | - | 45 | 29 | 14 | - | 13 | 24 | 31 | 20 |
|  | To some extent | 60 | 64 | 62 | 53 | 67 | 55 | 67 | 57 | 50 | 75 | 58 | 46 | 64 |
|  | To a great extent | 7 | 7 | 10 | - | - | - | 4 | 14 | 20 | 13 | 6 | - | 9 |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.64 | 2.79 | 2.72 | 2.33 | 2.33 | 2.55 | 2.75 | 2.71 | 2.60 | 3.00 | 2.58 | 2.23 | 2.76 |
| 18. The information in IMF reports on risks surrounding the macroeconomic outlook was | Not discussed/NA | 3 | - | 2 | 8 | 8 | 7 | - | - | 5 | - | 4 | 5 | 3 |
|  | Insufficien | 4 | 3 | - | 13 | 8 | 14 | 3 | - | - | - | 5 | 10 | 3 |
|  | Useful | 28 | 27 | 27 | 29 | 50 | 21 | 30 | 15 | 21 | 40 | 25 | 33 | 26 |
|  | Appropriate | 61 | 70 | 64 | 46 | 33 | 57 | 68 | 77 | 58 | 53 | 63 | 48 | 65 |
|  | Too alarmist | 4 | - | 7 | 4 | - | - | - | 8 | 16 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.59 | 3.67 | 3.73 | 3.25 | 3.08 | 3.29 | 3.65 | 3.92 | 3.79 | 3.67 | 3.58 | 3.38 | 3.65 |
|  | Not discussed/NA | 11 | 7 | 9 | 21 | 33 | - | 8 | - | 21 | 13 | 11 | 14 | 10 |
|  | Insufficien | 13 | 17 | 11 | 13 | - | 14 | 13 | 15 | 21 | 20 | 12 | 14 | 13 |
|  | Useful | 23 | 13 | 27 | 29 | 42 | 29 | 20 | 23 | 16 | 27 | 23 | 33 | 21 |
|  | Appropriate | 49 | 63 | 45 | 38 | 25 | 57 | 58 | 54 | 37 | 40 | 51 | 38 | 52 |
|  | Too alarmist | 3 | - | 7 | - | - | - | 3 | 8 | 5 | - | 4 | - | 4 |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.19 | 3.33 | 3.30 | 2.83 | 2.58 | 3.43 | 3.35 | 3.54 | 2.84 | 2.93 | 3.24 | 2.95 | 3.26 |
| 19. In your view to what extent is the IMF's Transparency Policy applied evenhandedly across countries? | Not at all | 6 | - | 15 | - | - | - | 4 | - | 30 | 8 | 6 | - | 7 |
|  | Slightly | 20 | 5 | 19 | 39 | 43 | 18 | 7 | 50 | 20 | 23 | 20 | 60 | 13 |
|  | To some extent | 53 | 74 | 37 | 56 | 14 | 55 | 75 | 38 | 30 | 46 | 55 | 20 | 59 |
|  | To a great extent | 20 | 21 | 30 | 6 | 43 | 27 | 14 | 13 | 20 | 23 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.88 | 3.16 | 2.81 | 2.67 | 3.00 | 3.09 | 3.00 | 2.63 | 2.40 | 2.85 | 2.88 | 2.60 | 2.93 |

Appendix, Table 1. Transparency Policy Review Country Authorities' Survey Results (continued)

|  |  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | By income level |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | Asia Pacific | Europe | Middle East | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Yes | No |
| 20.To what degree do concerns about the |  | Not at all | 57 | 85 | 46 | 42 | 56 | 36 | 71 | 30 | 61 | 46 | 59 | 56 | 58 |
| IMF's external assessments (including |  | Slightly | 16 | - | 22 | 26 | 33 | 27 | 3 | 30 | 17 | 8 | 17 | 25 | 14 |
| assessments) hinder the |  | To some extent | 22 | 15 | 24 | 26 | 11 | 27 | 24 | 30 | 17 | 38 | 19 | 13 | 24 |
| staff reports for your |  | To a great extent | 5 | - | 8 | 5 | - | 9 | 3 | 10 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.74 | 1.31 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.56 | 2.09 | 1.59 | 2.20 | 1.67 | 2.08 | 1.68 | 1.69 | 1.76 |
| 21. To what extent were lags in publication of your country's staff report the result of the following? | The need for internal discussions among our authorities | Not at all | 51 | 87 | 42 | 26 | 44 | 23 | 78 | 27 | 38 | 33 | 55 | 35 | 56 |
|  |  | Slightly | 26 | 13 | 28 | 37 | 11 | 46 | 22 | - | 46 | 33 | 24 | 41 | 21 |
|  |  | To some extent | 18 | - | 22 | 32 | 22 | 31 | - | 55 | 15 | 17 | 18 | 12 | 20 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 5 | - | 8 | 5 | 22 | - | - | 18 | - | 17 | 3 | 12 | 3 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.77 | 1.13 | 1.97 | 2.16 | 2.22 | 2.08 | 1.22 | 2.64 | 1.77 | 2.17 | 1.70 | 2.00 | 1.70 |
|  | Discussions on corrections/deletions | Not at all | 40 | 67 | 33 | 20 | 44 | 23 | 55 | 40 | 21 | 36 | 41 | 38 | 41 |
|  |  | Slightly | 32 | 21 | 27 | 55 | 44 | 46 | 23 | 30 | 36 | 45 | 30 | 44 | 30 |
|  |  | To some extent | 21 | 13 | 24 | 25 | 11 | 31 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 18 | 21 | 19 | 21 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 6 | - | 15 | - | - | - | 3 | 10 | 21 | - | 8 | - | 8 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.94 | 1.46 | 2.21 | 2.05 | 1.67 | 2.08 | 1.71 | 2.00 | 2.43 | 1.82 | 1.95 | 1.81 | 1.97 |
|  | Others | Not at all | 82 | 86 | 86 | 67 | 100 | 67 | 86 | 100 | 67 | 83 | 82 | - | 88 |
|  |  | Slightly | 6 | 14 | - | - | - | - | 14 | - | - | - | 9 | - | 6 |
|  |  | To some extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | To a great extent | 12 | - | 14 | 33 | - | 33 | - | - | 33 | 17 | 9 | 100 | 6 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.41 | 1.14 | 1.43 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.14 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.50 | 1.36 | 4.00 | 1.25 |

Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results ${ }^{1 /}$

|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  |  | IMF Program? |  |  |  |
|  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | Asia Pacific | Europe | Middle East | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Some are } \\ \text { G-20, } \\ \text { others are } \\ \text { non-G20 } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | All or most of the countries <br> in my constituency have programs | None of the countries in my constituency have programs | Some of the countries in my constituency have programs |
|  | Number of Responses Participation Rate (in Percentage) | $\begin{gathered} 20 \\ 83.3 \end{gathered}$ | 8 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 9 |
| 1. In the five years preceding the financial | Strongly disagree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| crisis, the Fund generally published reports on | Disagree | 10 | 2 | 16 | 14 | - | - | 1 | 35 | 22 | - | 20 | 14 | - | - | - | 22 |
| countries in your | Neutral | 30 | 12 | 39 | 50 | 57 | 70 | - | 35 | 31 | 38 | 20 | 29 | 20 | 50 | 25 | 33 |
| constituency within one month of the board | Agree | 35 | 45 | 28 | 29 | 43 | 30 | 49 | 15 | 24 | 25 | 20 | 57 | 40 | 50 | 25 | 33 |
| meeting. | Strongly agree | 25 | 41 | 17 | 6 | - | - | 49 | 15 | 24 | 38 | 40 | - | 40 | - | 50 | 11 |
|  | Weighted average score 3/ | 3.75 | 4.24 | 3.46 | 3.28 | 3.43 | 3.30 | 4.47 | 3.08 | 3.49 | 4.00 | 3.80 | 3.43 | 4.20 | 3.50 | 4.25 | 3.33 |
| 2. In the aftermath of the | Strongly disagree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| financial crisis, the Fund | Disagree | 10 | 2 | 16 | 14 | - | - | 1 | 35 | 22 | - | 20 | 14 | - | - | - | 22 |
| reports on countries in | Neutral | 25 | 12 | 28 | 50 | 57 | 70 | - | - | 31 | 25 | 20 | 29 | - | 50 | 25 | 33 |
| your constituency within | Agree | 45 | 57 | 39 | 29 | 43 | 30 | 63 | 50 | 24 | 38 | 40 | 57 | 60 | 50 | 50 | 33 |
| one month. | Strongly agree | 20 | 28 | 17 | 6 | - | - | 36 | 15 | 24 | 38 | 20 | - | 40 | - | 25 | 11 |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.75 | 4.12 | 3.57 | 3.28 | 3.43 | 3.30 | 4.33 | 3.44 | 3.49 | 4.13 | 3.60 | 3.43 | 4.40 | 3.50 | 4.00 | 3.33 |
|  | Strongly disagree | 10 | 4 | 17 | 6 | - | - | 8 | 50 | - | 13 | 20 | - | 20 | - | - | 11 |
| crisis made us more | Disagree | 50 | 47 | 39 | 91 | 100 | 10 | 64 | 15 | 53 | 38 | 40 | 71 | 40 | 100 | 25 | 56 |
| reluctant to publish our | Neutral | 35 | 37 | 44 | 3 | - | 90 | 14 | 35 | 47 | 50 | 20 | 29 | 40 | - | 50 | 33 |
|  | Agree | 5 | 12 | - | - | - | - | 14 | . | - | - | 20 | - | - | - | 25 | - |
|  | Strongly agree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.35 | 2.58 | 2.27 | 1.96 | 2.00 | 2.90 | 2.33 | 1.85 | 2.47 | 2.38 | 2.40 | 2.29 | 2.20 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 2.22 |

1/A weighted average was used to convert the responses to questions to select one from four or five answer choices to a 5 -point scale to make the responses more comparable across questions.

Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued)

| Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | Asia Pacific | Europe | $\begin{gathered} \text { Middle } \\ \text { East } \end{gathered}$ | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Some are } \\ G-20, \\ \text { others are } \\ \text { non-G20 } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  | All or most of the countries in my constituency have programs | None of the countries in my constituency have rams programs | Some of the countries in constituency have programs |
| 4. To what extent have pressures from the following parties caused the messages of reports on countries in your constituency to be "watered down" ? | Authorities, because they might otherwise not consent to the publication of report. | Not at all | 67 | 65 | 63 | 80 | 100 | 25 | 77 | 50 | 55 | 83 | 40 | 71 | 80 | 100 | 33 | 63 |
|  |  | Slighty | 33 | 35 | 37 | 20 | - | 75 | 23 | 50 | 45 | 17 | 60 | 29 | 20 | - | 67 | 38 |
|  |  | To some extent |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |  |  |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.33 | 1.35 | 1.37 | 1.20 | 1.00 | 1.75 | 1.23 | 1.50 | 1.45 | 1.17 | 1.60 | 1.29 | 1.20 | 1.00 | 1.67 | 1.38 |
|  | Staff or IMF management | Notat all | 75 | 79 | 71 | 77 | 86 | - | 92 | 77 | 59 | 60 | 80 | 83 | 100 | 100 | 33 | 75 |
|  |  | Slighty | 13 | 21 | 7 | 6 | - | - | 8 | 23 | 31 | 20 | 20 | - | - | - | 33 | 13 |
|  |  | To some extent | 13 | - | 22 | 17 | 14 | 100 | - | - | 10 | 20 | - | 17 | - | - | 33 | 13 |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.38 | 1.21 | 1.51 | 1.40 | 1.29 | 3.00 | 1.08 | 1.23 | 1.51 | 1.60 | 1.20 | 1.33 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.38 |
|  | Others | Notat all | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  |  | Slightly | - | - | - | - | - |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | To some extent | - | - | - | - | - |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | . | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| 5. Have any of the following factors constrained the publication of a candid staff report for any country in your constituency? | The need to preserve good relationships within the constituency | Not at all | 93 | 86 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 25 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 80 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 88 |
|  |  | Slighty | 7 | 14 | - | - | - | 75 | - | - | - | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | 13 |
|  |  | To some extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.07 | 1.14 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.20 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.13 |
|  | Concerns on possibility/continuation of an IMF arrangement | Notat all | 92 | 97 | 90 | 88 | 100 | - | 99 | 100 | 72 | 100 | 100 | 83 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 86 |
|  |  | Slightly | 8 | 3 | 10 | 12 | - |  | 1 | - | 28 | - | - | 17 | - | - | - | 14 |
|  |  | To some extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.08 | 1.03 | 1.10 | 1.12 | 1.00 | . | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.28 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.17 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.14 |
|  | Concerns about risk of leaks | Notat all | 53 | 75 | 38 | 34 | 43 | - | 83 | 35 | 31 | 83 | 40 | 33 | 100 | 50 | 100 | 22 |
|  |  | Slighty | 29 | 6 | 47 | 43 | 43 | - | 9 | 50 | 59 | - | 40 | 50 | - | 50 | - | 44 |
|  |  | To some extent | 18 | 18 | 15 | 23 | 14 | 100 | 8 | 15 | 10 | 17 | 20 | 17 | - | - | - | 33 |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.65 | 1.43 | 1.77 | 1.90 | 1.71 | 3.00 | 1.25 | 1.79 | 1.79 | 1.33 | 1.80 | 1.83 | 1.00 | 1.50 | 1.00 | 2.11 |
|  | Others | Not at all | 69 | 91 | 50 | 73 | 100 |  | 88 | - | 51 | 100 | 50 | 67 | 100 | 100 | 67 | 50 |
|  |  | Slighty | 15 | 3 | 26 | 15 | - |  | 1 | - | 49 | - | - | 33 | - | - | 33 | 17 |
|  |  | To some extent | 8 | 6 | - | 8 | - | - | 10 | 29 | - | - | 25 | - | - | - | - | 17 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 8 | - | 16 | 4 | - |  | - | 71 | - | - | 25 | - | - | - | - | 17 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.54 | 1.16 | 1.90 | 1.42 | 1.00 | - | 1.22 | 3.71 | 1.49 | 1.00 | 2.25 | 1.33 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.33 | 2.00 |

Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued)



Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued)

|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | 6-20 or non-G-20 |  |  | IMF Program? |  |  |  |
|  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income |  |  |  |  |  | G-20 Non-G-20Some are <br> others are <br> oren- 620 |  |  |  | All or most of the countries in my constituency have programs | None of the countries in my ency have programs | Some of the countries in my constituency have programs |
| 13.Generaly, the | Not discussed/NA | - | - | - | - | , | - | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| information in Fund | Insufficien | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| reports on risks | Useful | 37 | 35 | 45 | 18 | - | 86 | 9 | 15 | 92 | 43 | 20 | ${ }^{43}$ | - | - | 75 | 44 |
| surrounding the ${ }_{\text {marreeconomic outlook }}$ | Appropriate | 53 | 51 | 45 | 80 | 100 | 14 | 77 | 50 | 8 | 43 | 60 | 57 | 75 | 100 | 25 | 44 |
| in country reports is: | Too alarmist | 11 | 14 | 10 | 3 | - | - | 14 | 35 | - | 14 | 20 | $\checkmark$ | 25 | - | - | 11 |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.74 | 3.80 | 3.65 | 3.85 | 4.00 | 3.14 | 4.05 | 4.21 | 3.08 | 3.71 | 4.00 | 3.57 | 4.25 | 4.00 | 3.25 | 3.67 |
|  | Strongly disagree | 15 | - | 27 | 20 | 14 | 40 | - | 35 | 8 | 13 | 20 | 14 | . | - | 25 | 22 |
| 14.The transparency | Disagree | 35 | 30 | 26 | 74 | 86 | 30 | 23 | 15 | 45 | 13 | 60 | 43 |  | 100 | 50 | 33 |
| evenhandedly across | Neutral | 30 | 29 | 41 | - | - | 30 | 41 | 35 | 24 | 38 | - | 43 | 60 | - | - | 33 |
| countries. | Agree | 20 | 41 | 6 | 6 | - | - | 36 | 15 | 24 | 38 | 20 | - | 40 | - | 25 | 11 |
|  | Strongly agree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  | - |  |  |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.55 | 3.10 | 2.25 | 1.93 | 1.86 | 1.90 | 3.13 | 2.29 | 2.63 | 3.00 | 2.20 | 2.29 | 3.40 | 2.00 | 2.25 | 2.33 |
| 15.To what degree do | Notat all | 61 | 82 | 45 | 61 | 75 | - | 92 | 50 | 45 | 71 | 50 | 57 | 100 | 100 | 50 | 44 |
| concerns on the Fund's | Slighty | 17 | 4 | ${ }^{23}$ | 35 | 25 | 14 | 8 | 15 | ${ }^{31}$ | - | 25 | 29 |  | - | 25 | 22 |
| (including exchange rate assessments) hinder the | To some extent | 17 | 14 | 22 | 4 | - | ${ }^{43}$ | - | 35 | 24 | 14 | 25 | 14 | - | - | - | 33 |
| staff reports for countries | To a great extent | 6 | - | 11 | - | - | 43 | - | - | - | 14 | - | - | - | - | 25 | - |
|  | Weighted average score | 1.67 | 1.32 | 2.00 | 1.43 | 1.25 | 3.29 | 1.08 | 1.85 | 1.78 | 1.71 | 1.75 | 1.57 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.89 |
| 16. Did the reforms | Notat all | 10 | - | 11 | 21 | 14 | 25 | - | - | 25 | - | - | 25 | - | - | - | 33 |
| the Transparency Policy | Slighty | 10 | - | 22 | - | - | - | - | - | 75 | - | - | 25 | - | - | 33 |  |
| more effective? | To some extent | 70 | 66 | 68 | 79 | 86 | 75 | 72 | 100 | - | 100 | 67 | 50 | 100 | 100 | 33 | 67 |
|  | To a great extent | 10 | 34 | - | - | - | - | 28 | - | - | - | 33 | - | - | - | 33 | - |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.80 | 3.34 | 2.57 | 2.58 | 2.71 | 2.50 | 3.28 | 3.00 | 1.75 | 3.00 | 3.33 | 2.25 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.33 |

Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued)

Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (continued)

|  |  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  |  | IM P Program? |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | Asia Pacific | Middle |  |  | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Some are G-20, others are non-G20 | A singlecountry constituency without a program | All or most of the countries in my constituency have | None of the countries in my constituency have | Some of the countries in my constituency have |
| 18. More flexibility in the rules on deletions (as | Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information | Not at all | 44 | 51 | 45 | 21 | - | - | 63 | 50 | 74 | 43 | 40 | 50 | 50 | - | 50 | 50 |
|  |  | Slighty | 13 | 30 | . | . | - | 33 | 23 | . | . | 29 | . | . | 50 | - | . |  |
|  |  | To some extent | 19 | 15 | 19 | 27 | 50 | 33 | . | - | 26 | 14 | - | 50 | . | 50 | 25 | 17 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 25 | 4 | 36 | 51 | 50 | 33 | 14 | 50 | - | 14 | 60 | - | - | 50 | 25 | 33 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.25 | 1.72 | 2.47 | 3.09 | 3.50 | 3.00 | 1.65 | 2.50 | 1.51 | 2.00 | 2.80 | 2.00 | 1.50 | 3.50 | 2.25 | 2.33 |
|  | Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the stakeholders | Notat all | 38 | 58 | 20 | 23 | - | - | 79 | 17 | 49 | 29 | 50 | 40 | 25 | - | 50 | 50 |
|  |  | Slightly | 19 | 28 | 15 | . | - | 33 | 21 | 41 | - | 43 | . | . | 75 | - | - | . |
|  |  | To some extent | 19 | 14 | 30 | - | - | 67 | - | - | 26 | 29 | - | 20 | - | - | 25 | 33 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 25 | - | 34 | 77 | 100 | - | - | 41 | 26 | - | 50 | 40 | - | 100 | 25 | 17 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.31 | 1.56 | 2.78 | 3.31 | 4.00 | 2.67 | 1.21 | 2.66 | 2.28 | 2.00 | 2.50 | 2.60 | 1.75 | 4.00 | 2.25 | 2.17 |
| opposed to current rule | Make your job more difficult, | Not at all | 20 | 16 | 14 | 47 | 50 | 50 |  | 41 | - | 17 | 50 | - | - | 50 |  | 33 |
| limiting deletions to highly market sensitive material and premature disclosure of policy intentions) would... | e.g., by increasing the | Slighty | 27 | 33 | 20 | 30 | 50 | - | 21 | - | 51 | 33 | - | 40 | 33 | 50 | 50 |  |
|  | number of requests for | To some extent | 27 | 27 | 35 | - | - | 50 | 43 | - | 26 | 33 | - | 40 | 33 | - | 25 | 33 |
|  | changes | To a great extent | 27 | 24 | 31 | 23 | - | . | 36 | 59 | 23 | 17 | 50 | 20 | 33 | - | 25 | 33 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.60 | 2.59 | 2.83 | 1.99 | 1.50 | 2.00 | 3.14 | 2.76 | 2.72 | 2.50 | 2.50 | 2.80 | 3.00 | 1.50 | 2.75 | 2.67 |
|  | Result in less candid reports | Not at all | 31 | 20 | 34 | 51 | 50 | 50 | 11 | 50 | 26 | 17 | 60 | 20 | - | 50 | 25 | 43 |
|  |  | Slighty | 25 | 31 | 28 | - | - | 50 | 38 | 35 | - | 67 | - | - | 100 | - | 25 | - |
|  |  | To some extent | 13 | 11 | 19 | - | - | - | 19 | - | 26 | - | - | 40 | - | - | - | 29 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 31 | 38 | 19 | 49 | 50 | - | 32 | 15 | 49 | 17 | 40 | 40 | - | 50 | 50 | 29 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.44 | 2.67 | 2.22 | 2.46 | 2.50 | 1.50 | 2.71 | 1.79 | 2.98 | 2.17 | 2.20 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 2.50 | 2.75 | 2.43 |
|  | Result in more staff reports being published on the external website | Not at all | 23 | 21 | 28 | 15 | - | - | 30 | - | 66 | - | . | 60 | - | - | - | 50 |
|  |  | Slighty | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
|  |  | To some extent | 46 | 79 | 38 | 8 | - | 50 | 70 | 59 | 34 | 75 | 50 | 20 | 100 | - | 67 | 33 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 31 | - | 34 | 77 | 100 | 50 | - | 41 | - | 25 | 50 | 20 | - | 100 | 33 | 17 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.85 | 2.59 | 2.79 | 3.48 | 4.00 | 3.50 | 2.41 | 3.41 | 1.69 | 3.25 | 3.50 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 4.00 | 3.33 | 2.17 |


| Appendix, Table 2. Transparency Policy Review Executive Directors' Survey Results (concluded) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  |  | IM P Program? |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging L | Low-income | Africa | Asia Pacific | Europe | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Middle } \\ & \text { East } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Some are <br> G-20, others are non-G20 | A singlecountry constituency without a program | All or most of the countries in my constituency have programs | None of the countries in my constituency have programs | Some of the countries in my constituency have programs |
|  |  | Notat all | 27 | 47 |  | 34 | 43 | $\cdot$ | 38 |  | 31 | 60 | 20 |  | 100 | - 50 | 25 |  |
|  | Communication with the | Slighty | 33 | 42 | 20 | 40 | 57 | 57 | 38 | - | 10 | 20 | 20 | 60 | . | 50 | 25 | 43 |
|  | authorities on the rules for | To some extent | 33 | 12 | 63 | 24 | . | 43 | 24 | 45 | 59 | 20 | 40 | 40 | - | - . | 50 | 43 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 7 | - | 16 | 3 | - | - | - | 55 | - | - | 20 | . | - | - | . | 14 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.20 | 1.65 | 2.96 | 1.96 | 1.57 | 2.43 | 1.86 | 3.55 | 2.28 | 1.60 | 2.60 | 2.40 | 1.00 | 1.50 | 2.25 | 2.71 |
| 19. To what extent were |  | Not at all | 38 | 62 | 28 | 6 | - | 43 | 68 | 50 | - | 67 | 20 | 20 | 100 | - | - | 43 |
| lags in the publication of | The internal IMF processes | Slightly | 25 | 20 | 13 | 63 | 86 | - | 11 | 15 | 31 | 17 | 40 | 20 | . | 100 | 25 | 14 |
| your staff report the | on corrections/deletions | To some extent | 25 | 18 | 30 | 28 | 14 | 14 | 21 |  | 69 |  | 20 | 60 | - | - - | 50 | 29 |
| result of the following? |  | To a great extent | 13 | - | 29 | 3 | - | 43 | - | 35 | - | 17 | 20 | - | - | - - | 25 | 14 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.13 | 1.56 | 2.61 | 2.27 | 2.14 | 2.57 | 1.52 | 2.21 | 2.69 | 1.67 | 2.40 | 2.40 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 2.14 |
|  |  | Notat all | 60 | 94 | 8 | 78 | 100 | 100 | 72 | - | - | 60 | 50 | 100 | 50 | 100 | 100 | 50 |
|  | Other | Slightly | 10 | - | 27 | - | - | - | - | 41 | - | 20 | - | . | 25 | - | - | - |
|  | Otner | To some extent | 10 | 6 | 14 | 15 | $\cdot$ | - | 11 | 17 | - | - | 25 | - | - | - | - | 25 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 20 | - | 51 | 7 | - | - | 18 | 41 | - | 20 | 25 | - | 25 | - | - | 25 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.90 | 1.12 | 3.08 | 1.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.75 | 3.00 | - | 1.80 | 2.25 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.25 |
|  | Existing policies on public |  | 32 | 25 | 32 | 55 | 75 | 43 | 29 | 39 | 18 | 27 | 50 | 29 | 20 | 100 | 14 | 39 |
|  | The three-year time period |  | 16 | 20 | 15 | 11 | 13 | 7 | 14 | 22 | 22 | 13 | 13 | 21 | 10 | - | 43 | 11 |
|  | Earlier release of Board papers would affect candor |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 14 | 11 | 16 | 12 | - | . | 18 | 9 | 18 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 20 | - | . | 17 |
| 20. The Fund has been making efforts to facilitate | The five-year time period for access to Executive Board |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| public access to its | minutes is too lona |  | 14 | 20 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 7 | 14 | - | 22 | 7 | 13 | 21 | . | - - | 43 | 11 |
| Archives. | Earlier release of Board minutes would affect the |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | candor of Board discussions |  | 22 | 25 | 21 | 12 | - | 43 | 18 | 30 | 18 | 33 | 13 | 14 | 40 | - | . | 22 |
|  | It does not matter when |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Board minutes are released, as long as the staff reports |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | are nubliched on time |  | 3 | - | 5 | - | - | . | 7 | - | - | 7 | . | - | 10 | - | - | $\cdot$ |
|  | The release of Board minutes is more important to me than the release of staff reports |  | - | - | . | - | . | . | - | . | . | - | . | . | . | - | . |  |



Appendix, Table 3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (continued)

|  |  |  | Distribution | of answer in | percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | By income | level |  | By region |  |  |  |  | $\mathrm{G}-20$ or no | on-G-20 | IMF Pro | gram? |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | Asia <br> Pacific | Europe | Middle <br> East | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Yes | No |
| 4. Have any of the following other factors constrained your ability to draft a candid staff report? | The need to maintain relationships with the authorities | Not at all | 44 | 59 | 35 | 46 | 46 | 43 | 55 | 38 | 33 | 58 | 42 | 45 | 43 |
|  |  | Slightly | 36 | 18 | 38 | 44 | 35 | 43 | 27 | 31 | 48 | 8 | 40 | 43 | 31 |
|  |  | To some extent | 18 | 18 | 28 | 8 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 31 | 19 | 33 | 15 | 7 | 26 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 2 | 6 | - | 3 | 4 | - | 5 | - | - | - | 2 | 5 | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.78 | 1.71 | 1.93 | 1.67 | 1.77 | 1.71 | 1.68 | 1.92 | 1.86 | 1.75 | 1.79 | 1.71 | 1.83 |
|  | Concerns on possibility/continuation of an IMF arrangement | Not at all | 88 | 100 | 86 | 84 | 83 | 100 | 89 | 75 | 89 | 100 | 86 | 83 | 93 |
|  |  | Slightly | 9 | - | 9 | 13 | 13 | - | 11 | 13 | 6 | - | 10 | 12 | 5 |
|  |  | To some extent | 4 | - | 6 | 3 | 4 | - | - | 13 | 6 | - | 4 | 5 | 3 |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.16 | 1.00 | 1.20 | 1.19 | 1.21 | 1.00 | 1.11 | 1.38 | 1.17 | 1.00 | 1.18 | 1.22 | 1.10 |
|  | Concerns about risk of leaks | Not at all | 76 | 76 | 77 | 74 | 81 | 64 | 73 | 85 | 74 | 83 | 74 | 69 | 81 |
|  |  | Slightly | 20 | 18 | 15 | 26 | 19 | 36 | 23 | 15 | 11 | 17 | 21 | 26 | 15 |
|  |  | To some extent | 3 | - | 8 | - | - | - | - | - | 16 | - | 4 | 2 | 4 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 1 | 6 | - | - | - | - | 5 | - | - | - | 1 | 2 | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.30 | 1.35 | 1.31 | 1.26 | 1.19 | 1.36 | 1.36 | 1.15 | 1.42 | 1.17 | 1.32 | 1.38 | 1.23 |
|  | The expectation of publication of the staff report | Not at all | 54 | 71 | 43 | 58 | 62 | 50 | 59 | 33 | 52 | 67 | 52 | 57 | 51 |
|  |  | Slightly | 32 | 18 | 38 | 32 | 27 | 29 | 23 | 67 | 29 | 17 | 34 | 31 | 32 |
|  |  | To some extent | 13 | 6 | 18 | 11 | 12 | 21 | 14 | - | 14 | 17 | 12 | 10 | 15 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 2 | 6 | 3 | - | - | - | 5 | - | 5 | - | 2 | 2 | 2 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.63 | 1.47 | 1.80 | 1.53 | 1.50 | 1.71 | 1.64 | 1.67 | 1.71 | 1.50 | 1.65 | 1.57 | 1.68 |
|  | The sensitivity of issues covered given the vulnerability of the economy | Not at all | 57 | 59 | 53 | 62 | 65 | 50 | 55 | 62 | 52 | 83 | 54 | 62 | 54 |
|  |  | Slightly | 27 | 24 | 28 | 28 | 27 | 43 | 18 | 23 | 29 | 17 | 29 | 14 | 37 |
|  |  | To some extent | 14 | 12 | 18 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 23 | 15 | 14 | - | 15 | 19 | 9 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 2 | 6 | 3 | - | - | - | 5 | - | 5 | - | 2 | 5 | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.60 | 1.65 | 1.70 | 1.49 | 1.42 | 1.57 | 1.77 | 1.54 | 1.71 | 1.17 | 1.67 | 1.67 | 1.56 |
|  | Other Factors | Not at all | 90 | 80 | 82 | 100 | 89 | 100 | 83 | 100 | 86 | 100 | 88 | 86 | 94 |
|  |  | Slightly | 3 | - | 9 | - | 11 | - | - | - | - | - | 4 | - | 6 |
|  |  | To some extent | 7 | 20 | 9 | - | - | - | 17 | - | 14 | - | 8 | 14 | - |
|  |  | To a great extent | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.17 | 1.40 | 1.27 | 1.00 | 1.11 | 1.00 | 1.33 | 1.00 | 1.29 | 1.00 | 1.19 | 1.29 | 1.06 |

Appendix, Table 3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (continued)


Appendix, Table 3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (continued)


Appendix, Table3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (continued)

| Appendix, Table3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced Emerging Low-income |  |  | Africa | Asia Pacific | Europe | Middle East | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 | Yes | No |
| 18. Did concerns about the Fund's externalsector assessments (including exchange rate assessments) hinder the publication of your staff reports? |  | Not at all | 81 | 73 | 78 | 87 | 89 | 83 | 80 | 73 | 76 | 82 | 81 | 85 | 78 |
|  |  | Slightly | 10 | 20 | 14 | - | - | 8 | 10 | 9 | 19 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 12 |
|  |  | To some extent | 8 | - | 8 | 13 | 11 | 8 | 5 | 18 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 10 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 1 | 7 | - | - | - | - | 5 | - | - | - | 1 | 3 | - |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.30 | 1.40 | 1.30 | 1.26 | 1.21 | 1.25 | 1.35 | 1.45 | 1.29 | 1.27 | 1.31 | 1.26 | 1.33 |
| 19. More flexibility in the rules on corrections (as opposed to the current rule limiting corrections to factual errors, typographical errors, mischaracterizations of the authorities' views, and evident ambiguity) would: | Reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of information | Not at all | 35 | 35 | 42 | 28 | 32 | 50 | 38 | 25 | 33 | 45 | 34 | 35 | 35 |
|  |  | Slightly | 28 | 29 | 28 | 28 | 37 | - | 33 | 17 | 39 | - | 32 | 35 | 24 |
|  |  | To some extent | 27 | 18 | 25 | 34 | 32 | 25 | 19 | 42 | 22 | 36 | 25 | 19 | 31 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 10 | 18 | 6 | 10 | - | 25 | 10 | 17 | 6 | 18 | 8 | 10 | 10 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.11 | 2.18 | 1.94 | 2.28 | 2.00 | 2.25 | 2.00 | 2.50 | 2.00 | 2.27 | 2.08 | 2.03 | 2.16 |
|  | Make your job easier, e.g., by facilitating reasonable 4ments with the authorities | Not at all | 48 | 53 | 51 | 42 | 50 | 46 | 59 | 42 | 40 | 64 | 46 | 44 | 51 |
|  |  | Slightly | 22 | 18 | 24 | 21 | 35 | - | 27 | 8 | 25 | - | 25 | 31 | 16 |
|  |  | To some extent | 17 | 18 | 14 | 21 | 10 | 31 | 9 | 17 | 25 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 18 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 13 | 12 | 11 | 15 | 5 | 23 | 5 | 33 | 10 | 18 | 12 | 8 | 16 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.94 | 1.88 | 1.84 | 2.09 | 1.70 | 2.31 | 1.59 | 2.42 | 2.05 | 1.91 | 1.95 | 1.89 | 1.98 |
|  | Make your job more difficult by making it more difficult to resist unreasonable requests | Not at all | 20 | 12 | 18 | 26 | 35 | 17 | 9 | 17 | 20 | 30 | 18 | 27 | 15 |
|  |  | Slightly | 16 | 24 | 11 | 19 | 10 | 25 | 18 | 17 | 15 | 10 | 17 | 24 | 11 |
|  |  | To some extent | 38 | 35 | 37 | 42 | 35 | 33 | 32 | 58 | 40 | 20 | 41 | 30 | 43 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 26 | 29 | 34 | 13 | 20 | 25 | 41 | 8 | 25 | 40 | 24 | 18 | 30 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.70 | 2.82 | 2.87 | 2.42 | 2.40 | 2.67 | 3.05 | 2.58 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.39 | 2.89 |
|  | Make your job more difficult by increasing the number of requests for changes, absorbing more staff time | Not at all | 16 | 12 | 13 | 23 | 33 | 18 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 27 | 15 | 26 | 10 |
|  |  | Slightly | 20 | 29 | 13 | 23 | 10 | 18 | 23 | 33 | 21 | - | 23 | 23 | 18 |
|  |  | To some extent | 39 | 24 | 47 | 37 | 38 | 36 | 41 | 58 | 26 | 36 | 39 | 37 | 40 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 25 | 35 | 26 | 17 | 19 | 27 | 27 | - | 42 | 36 | 23 | 14 | 32 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.72 | 2.82 | 2.87 | 2.47 | 2.43 | 2.73 | 2.86 | 2.50 | 3.00 | 2.82 | 2.70 | 2.40 | 2.94 |
|  | Result in less candid reports | Not at all | 27 | 19 | 25 | 33 | 29 | 20 | 19 | 23 | 38 | 33 | 26 | 37 | 20 |
|  |  | Slightly | 27 | 31 | 20 | 33 | 29 | 40 | 33 | 31 | 10 | 17 | 28 | 37 | 20 |
|  |  | To some extent | 28 | 38 | 30 | 20 | 29 | 20 | 29 | 38 | 24 | 33 | 27 | 17 | 35 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 19 | 13 | 25 | 13 | 14 | 20 | 19 | 8 | 29 | 17 | 19 | 9 | 25 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.38 | 2.44 | 2.55 | 2.13 | 2.29 | 2.40 | 2.48 | 2.31 | 2.43 | 2.33 | 2.39 | 1.97 | 2.67 |
|  | Result in more staff reports being published on the external website | Not at all | 20 | 25 | 21 | 15 | 23 | 22 | 27 | - | 21 | 20 | 20 | 14 | 23 |
|  |  | Slightly | 41 | 50 | 36 | 45 | 46 | 78 | 45 | 22 | 21 | 80 | 37 | 43 | 40 |
|  |  | To some extent | 34 | 13 | 36 | 40 | 31 | - | 18 | 78 | 43 | - | 37 | 38 | 31 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 5 | 13 | 7 | - | - | - | 9 | - | 14 | - | 6 | 5 | 6 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.25 | 2.13 | 2.29 | 2.25 | 2.08 | 1.78 | 2.09 | 2.78 | 2.50 | 1.80 | 2.29 | 2.33 | 2.20 |


| Appendix, Table 3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (continued) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced Emerging Low-income |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Asia } \\ & \text { Pacific } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Europe | Middle <br> East | Americas | G-20 | Non-G-20 |  | No |
| 20. To what extent were lags in the publication of your staff report the result of the following? | Communication with the authorities on the rules for corrections/deletions | Not at all | 68 | 77 | 58 | 77 | 89 | 63 | 65 | 60 | 58 | 57 | 70 | 74 | 63 |
|  |  | Slightly | 14 | 15 | 18 | 10 | 5 | 13 | 15 | 30 | 16 | 29 | 13 | 6 | 22 |
|  |  | To some extent | 5 | - | 12 | - | - | . | 5 | 10 | 11 | - | 6 | 9 | 2 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 12 | 8 | 12 | 13 | 5 | 25 | 15 | - | 16 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 12 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.61 | 1.38 | 1.79 | 1.50 | 1.21 | 1.88 | 1.70 | 1.50 | 1.84 | 1.71 | 1.59 | 1.57 | 1.63 |
|  | The internal process on corrections/deletions | Not at all | 69 | 62 | 61 | 83 | 89 | 50 | 60 | 67 | 68 | 57 | 71 | 70 | 69 |
|  |  | Slightly | 16 | 23 | 15 | 14 | 11 | 25 | 25 | 33 | - | 29 | 15 | 12 | 19 |
|  |  | To some extent | 11 | 8 | 21 | - | - | - | 10 | - | 32 | - | 12 | 18 | 5 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 4 | 8 | 3 | 3 | - | 25 | 5 | - | - | 14 | 3 | - | 7 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 1.49 | 1.62 | 1.67 | 1.24 | 1.11 | 2.00 | 1.60 | 1.33 | 1.63 | 1.71 | 1.47 | 1.48 | 1.50 |
|  | The practice of obtaining the authorities' explicit consent even within the current "voluntary but presumed" publication framework. | Not at all | 46 | 83 | 27 | 52 | 50 | 33 | 58 | 40 | 39 | 57 | 45 | 55 | 40 |
|  |  | Slightly | 21 | 8 | 21 | 26 | 25 | 22 | 16 | 30 | 17 | 14 | 22 | 18 | 23 |
|  |  | To some extent | 13 | 8 | 18 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 20 | 17 | - | 14 | 18 | 9 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 20 | - | 33 | 13 | 15 | 33 | 16 | 10 | 28 | 29 | 19 | 9 | 28 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.07 | 1.25 | 2.58 | 1.84 | 1.90 | 2.44 | 1.84 | 2.00 | 2.33 | 2.00 | 2.07 | 1.82 | 2.26 |
|  | Other. | Notat all | 38 | 75 | 33 | 27 | 33 | 50 | 60 | - | 33 | - | 38 | 40 | 36 |
|  |  | Slightly | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  |  | To some extent | 38 | 25 | 33 | 45 | 67 | - | 40 | 100 | - | - | 38 | 60 | 18 |
|  |  | To a great extent | 24 | - | 33 | 27 | - | 50 | - | - | 67 | - | 24 | - | 45 |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.48 | 1.50 | 2.67 | 2.73 | 2.33 | 2.50 | 1.80 | 3.00 | 3.00 | - | 2.48 | 2.20 | 2.73 |

Appendix, Table 3. Transparency Policy Review Mission Chiefs' Survey Results (concluded)

|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | By income level |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  | G-20 or non-G-20 |  | IMF Program? |  |
|  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | Africa | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Asia } \\ \text { Pacific } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Europe | Middle East | Americas | G-20 Non-G-20 |  | Yes | No |
| 21. Do you see scope to rationalize the number of summary documents produced after Board meetings (e. PINs, press releases, chairman's statements, summing up)? | Not at all | 16 | 15 | 15 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 11 | 8 | 27 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 19 |
|  | Slightly | 10 | 15 | 9 | 9 | 17 | - | 11 | - | 13 | - | 11 | 10 | 10 |
|  | To some extent | 41 | 46 | 38 | 41 | 35 | 67 | 50 | 31 | 27 | 60 | 38 | 38 | 43 |
|  | To a great extent | 33 | 23 | 38 | 32 | 30 | 17 | 28 | 62 | 33 | 30 | 34 | 38 | 29 |
|  | Weighted average score | 2.91 | 2.77 | 3.00 | 2.88 | 2.78 | 2.83 | 2.94 | 3.46 | 2.67 | 3.10 | 2.89 | 3.03 | 2.81 |
| 22. Does the transparency policy include sufficient provisions for handling the increased focus on risk assessments? | Strongly diagree | 2 | 6 | 3 | - | - | - | 9 | - | - | 9 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
|  | Disagree | 11 | 6 | 18 | 5 | 4 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 9 |
|  | Neutral | 66 | 71 | 49 | 82 | 80 | 57 | 59 | 54 | 70 | 64 | 66 | 68 | 65 |
|  | Agree | 19 | 18 | 26 | 13 | 12 | 29 | 18 | 31 | 15 | 18 | 19 | 13 | 24 |
|  | Strongly agree | 2 | - | 5 | - | 4 | - | - | - | 5 | - | 2 | 5 | - |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.09 | 3.00 | 3.13 | 3.08 | 3.16 | 3.14 | 2.86 | 3.15 | 3.15 | 2.91 | 3.11 | 3.05 | 3.11 |
| 23. Have you encountered any specific problems regarding modifications in multi-country products, such as the | No | 94 | 100 | 88 | 100 | 100 | 80 | 100 | 80 | 100 | 80 | 96 | 93 | 94 |
| spillover reports, and the external sector report that warrant changes to the transparency policy? | Yes | 6 | - | 12 | - | - | 20 | - | 20 | - | 20 | 4 | 7 | 6 |



## Appendix, Table 4. Transparency Policy Review Media' Survey Results (continued)




Appendix, Table 4. Transparency Policy Review Media' Survey Results (continued)

|  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | By income level |  |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | N/A | Africa $\begin{array}{r}\text { Asia } \\ \text { Pacific }\end{array}$ |  | Europe | Middle | Americas | N/A |
| 7. In current market circumstances, it is hard to | Strongly disagree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| provide candid assessments of | Disagree | 25 | 22 | 17 | - | 50 | - | - | 20 | 100 | 25 | - |
| financial stability without discussing highly market sensitive | Neutral | 17 | 11 | 17 | - | - | - | - | 20 | - | - | - |
| information such as | Agree | 42 | 44 | 50 | 100 | 50 | - | 50 | 50 | - | 50 | 100 |
| financial institutions. | Strongly agree | 17 | 22 | 17 | - | - | - | 50 | 10 | - | 25 | - |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.50 | 3.67 | 3.67 | 4.00 | 3.00 | - | 4.50 | 3.50 | 2.00 | 3.75 | 4.00 |
|  | Strongly disagree |  | - |  | - |  | - | - |  |  |  | - |
| 8. The IMF is candid about its | Disagree | 8 | 11 | - | 33 | - | - | - | 10 | - |  | - |
| recommendations to countries | Neutral | 33 | 33 | 17 | 33 | - | - | 25 | 30 | - | 50 | - |
|  | Agree | 50 | 44 | 67 | 33 | 100 | - | 50 | 50 | 100 | 50 | 100 |
|  | Strongly agree | 8 | 11 | 17 | - | - | - | 25 | 10 |  | - | - |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.58 | 3.56 | 4.00 | 3.00 | 4.00 | - | 4.00 | 3.60 | 4.00 | 3.50 | 4.00 |
|  | Much worse |  | - |  | - |  | - | - |  |  |  | - |
| 9. How would you rate the information content of IMF | Slightly worse | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| reports compared with other | About average | 25 | 22 | 17 | 33 | - | - | - | 30 |  | 25 | - |
| sources? | Slightly better | 58 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 50 | - | 75 | 60 | - | 75 | 100 |
|  | Much better | 17 | 11 | 17 | - | 50 | - | 25 | 10 | 100 | - | - |
|  | Weighted average score | 3.92 | 3.89 | 4.00 | 3.67 | 4.50 | - | 4.25 | 3.80 | 5.00 | 3.75 | 4.00 |




| Appendix, Table 4. Transparency Policy Review Media' Survey Results (concluded) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Distribution of answer in percentage |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | By income level |  |  |  |  | By region |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Overall | Advanced | Emerging | Low-income | N/A | ${ }_{\text {Africa }} \begin{gathered}\text { Asia } \\ \text { Pacific } \\ \text { Europe }\end{gathered}$ |  |  | Middle East | Americas | N/A |
| 12. (cont'd) Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: | The IMF has not gone far enough in expanding risk assessments in published reports. | Strongly diagree | - | - | 硣 | - | , | - | - | - |  | - |  |
|  |  | Disagree | 17 | 11 | - | - | 50 | - | - | 10 | 100 | - |  |
|  |  | Neutral | 58 | 56 | 67 | 67 | 50 | - | 50 | 60 | - | 75 | 100 |
|  |  | Agree | 25 | 33 | 33 | 33 |  | - | 50 | 30 | - | 25 |  |
|  |  | Strongly agree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  | - | , |  |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 3.08 | 3.22 | 3.33 | 3.33 | 2.50 | - | 3.50 | 3.20 | 2.00 | 3.25 | 3.00 |
|  | The IMF's risk assessments in published reports are too alarmist. | Strongly diagree | 8 | 11 | - | 33 | - | - |  | 10 |  |  |  |
|  |  | Disagree | 42 | 44 | 33 | 33 | 100 | - | 75 | 30 | 100 | 50 | 100 |
|  |  | Neutral | 42 | 33 | 67 | 33 | - | - | 25 | 50 | - | 50 |  |
|  |  | Agree |  | 11 | - | , | - | - | - | 10 |  | - |  |
|  |  | Strongly agree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 2.50 | 2.44 | 2.67 | 2.00 | 2.00 | - | 2.25 | 2.60 | 2.00 | 2.50 | 2.00 |
|  | Economic information is becoming more and more available on a real-time basis, and the IMF needs to speed up its publication policies in response | Strongly diagree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  | - |  |
|  |  | Disagree | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
|  |  | Neutral | 42 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 100 | - | 50 | 30 | 100 | 50 | 100 |
|  |  | Agree | 42 | 44 | 50 | 33 | - | - | 50 | 50 | - | 25 |  |
|  |  | Strongly agree | 17 | 22 | 17 | 33 | - | - |  | 20 | - | 25 |  |
|  |  | Weighted average score | 3.75 | 3.89 | 3.83 | 4.00 | 3.00 | - | 3.50 | 3.90 | 3.00 | 3.75 | 3.00 |
| 13. Which of the following IMF communication products do you consult regularly (mark all that apply): | Public Information Notices |  | 92 | 89 | 100 | 100 | 100 | - | 100 | 90 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
|  | Press releases |  | 75 | 67 | 100 | 67 | 100 | . | 75 | 80 | 100 | 75 | 100 |
|  | Other |  | 25 | 11 | 17 | 33 | 50 | - | - | 20 | 100 | - |  |


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Prepared by Sarah Kwon and Nicolas Million (SPR).
    ${ }^{2}$ The Managing Director will generally not recommend the approval of a request or completion of a review for exceptional access cases and flexible credit lines (FCLs) unless the member consents to the publication of the associated staff report. There were 10 such requests in 2009, and 6 per year in 2010, 2011, and 2012.
    ${ }^{3}$ In this chapter, the term low-income country (LIC) is used to describe countries referred to in the tables as "developing countries".

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ Until 2010, the publication of FSSAs was merely voluntary.
    ${ }^{5}$ These figures consider only policy papers for which there is a presumption of publication. The publication rate in 2009-12 was 85 percent based on a wider sample including all policy papers.

[^2]:    ${ }^{6}$ Country documents considered here are: staff reports, PINs, UFR/PSI Chairman's Statements, Selected Issues, Statistical Appendices, Informational Annexes, Background Documents, Authorities' Statements, and HIPC documents.
    ${ }^{7}$ See Tables 9 and 13.
    ${ }^{8}$ The average publication lag for FSSAs spiked upwards in 2009 because of two outliers Romania and Mozambique.
    ${ }^{9}$ These included Comoros (238 days), Djibouti (169 days) and Jordan (Request for a Stand-by Arrangement; 146 days).
    ${ }^{10}$ Countries whose staff reports were published on the same day as their Board meetings included Greece, Italy, Jordan (2010 Article IV), Mexico, New Zealand, and Poland.

[^3]:    ${ }^{11}$ The longest average lag among AMs is 23 days for Czech Republic.

[^4]:    ${ }^{12}$ The main contributors to the reduction in publication lags are Dominica and Haiti in WHD, Liberia, Lesotho and Kenya in AFR and Czech Republic, Belarus, Spain, Macedonia, Romania and Poland in EUR.

[^5]:    ${ }^{1}$ Prepared by Nicolas Million (SPR).
    ${ }^{2}$ The term "gray zone" was introduced in the 2009 Review of the Fund's Transparency Policy to describe modifications to staff reports that with hindsight do not appear to fully comply with the rules of the policy.
    ${ }^{3}$ Deletions are limited to information not already in the public domain that constitutes either highly market-sensitive material or premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions.
    ${ }^{4}$ Corrections are limited to: (i) typographical errors; (ii) factual mistakes; (iii) mischaracterization of the authorities' views; and (iv) evident ambiguity.
    ${ }^{5}$ Modification rates increased further in 2009-12, and AMs now account for the highest rates of both deletions and corrections (see Chapter I. Key Trends).

[^6]:    ${ }^{6}$ The 25 percent share represented 43 memoranda of deletion requests, with each memorandum containing one or more requests. These reports were selected by a random draw from a pool of member countries (AMs, EMs, and LICs). To ensure that the sample of Board documents was representative of all deletion requests, the sample was stratified, and a target number of documents specified to match the percentage of the income group within each stratum. Documents considered for the sample were: Article IV Reports, UFR Staff Reports, Combined Reports (i.e. UFR/Art. IV) and FSSAs.

[^7]:    ${ }^{7}$ The two countries were both EMs, involving information about the banking sector and reserves respectively. Both are small, together representing only 0.2 percent of the aggregate quota base.
    ${ }^{8}$ In some cases, correction requests may reflect a fear that the public will misunderstand or misinterpret the unmodified text.

[^8]:    ${ }^{9}$ This included a small EM and two large AMs.

[^9]:    ${ }^{1}$ Summary prepared by Mame Astou Diouf (SPR).
    ${ }^{2}$ CSOs were also invited to provide comments via the online CSO Consultation Page for 2013 Transparency Review.
    Two institutions provided written comments: Global Research Priorities in Global Governance (UK) and New Rules for Global Finance (US).
    ${ }^{3}$ Eight organizations participated in the conference call, which was held on March 8: Save the Children (Norway), European Network on Debt and Development (Belgium), Human Rights Watch (US), ITUC (US), Oxfam (US), ONE Campaign (US), Center for Law and Democracy (Canada), The Bretton Woods Project (UK).

[^10]:    ${ }^{1}$ The surveys were prepared by Wasima Rahman-Garrett (SPR) and conducted by Kevin Bailey (TGS). The summary was prepared by Perry Perone, Mame Astou Diouf and Di Wang (SPR).
    ${ }^{2}$ A detailed presentation of responses and response rates can be found in Appendix I.

[^11]:    ${ }^{3}$ The key change was the introduction of evident ambiguity as a new reason for corrections.

