



8TH JACQUES POLAK ANNUAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 15-16, 2007

Estimation of De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes: Synthesis of the Techniques for Inferring Flexibility and Basket Weights

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Paper presented at the 8th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference
Hosted by the International Monetary Fund
Washington, DC—November 15-16, 2007

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**IMF Annual Research Conference
November 16, 2007, Washington DC**

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The authors wish to thank Danxia Xie for excellent research assistance, and to thank the Mossavar-Rahmani Center of Business and Government and the Kuwait Fund of the Kennedy School of Government for support.

Abstract

The paper offers a new approach to estimate de facto exchange rate regimes, a synthesis of two techniques. One is a technique that the authors have used in the past to estimate implicit de facto weights when the hypothesis is a basket peg with little flexibility. The second is a technique used by others to estimate the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility when the hypothesis is an anchor to the dollar or some other single major currency, but with a possibly-substantial degree of flexibility around that anchor. Since many currencies today follow variants of Band-Basket-Crawl, it is important to have available a technique that can cover both dimensions, inferring weights and inferring flexibility. We try out the technique on twenty-some currencies, over the period 1980-2007. Most are currencies that have officially used baskets as anchors for at least part of this sample period. But a few are known floaters or known simple peggers. In general the synthesis technique seems to work as it should.

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Exchange rate surveillance has moved back to the top of the lists of the IMF's mandates and priorities. Before one can evaluate whether a given country is following the right exchange rate regime, however, one must decide what the regime is that it is following. This seemingly simple task is far harder than one might think. Perhaps the Fund staff could use some new analytical tools if it is to pursue this assignment conscientiously and persuasively. This paper proposes a technique to classify a *de facto* regime. It estimates simultaneously the implicit currency weights in the basket that anchors the home currency, and the degree of flexibility around that anchor.

De facto versus De Jure Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes

It is by now well-known that there is a big difference between *de facto* exchange rate regimes, that is, the regimes that countries follow in practice, and *de jure* exchange rate regimes, that is, the regimes that national governments officially claim to be following and which, at least until 1997, were reproduced by the International Monetary Fund almost unquestioningly in the table at the front of *International Financial Statistics*. The discrepancy between *de facto* and *de jure* is pervasive. In the first place, most countries that claim to "fix" are not, in fact, firmly fixed. Countries declaring a peg, often abandon it. Obstfeld & Rogoff pointed out in their 1995 article "The Mirage of Fixed Rates," that only 6 major economies (leaving aside some with capital controls) had kept a peg longer than five years. Klein and Marion (1997) reported that the mean duration of pegs in the Western Hemisphere was only 10 months.

In the second place, most countries that claim to "float," are not in fact floating. Calvo & Reinhart (2002) coined the phrase "Fear of Floating." They showed that the variability of foreign exchange reserves relative to the variability of the exchange rate was not only substantial for those who claimed to be floating (one might expect zero for a true pure floater), but that it tended to be fully as great as for those who are officially pegging. Many countries in Asia and elsewhere that claim to float, sometimes under an official monetary rule of Inflation Targeting, in fact have intervened heavily in recent years to dampen the appreciation of their currencies.

In the third place, many countries that claim to be following one of the transparent intermediate regimes, namely a basket peg (or even a basket with a band), keep the weights in the basket secret. The only logical motivation is so that the government can surreptitiously depart from the official regime. When a country declares a basket peg with a band, it typically would take more than 100 observations for an observer to distinguish statistically whether it is in fact following this policy (Frankel, Schmukler & Servén, 2000). The national authorities are no doubt aware of this when they decide to keep the basket weights secret.

There is no more topical illustration of this problem than the Chinese yuan. The Beijing authorities announced a change in exchange rate regime in July 2005, a switch away from a dollar peg and toward a more flexible regime with reference to a basket of 11 currencies, with a (small but) cumulative band. They did not announce what were the weights on the currencies. As with so many other basket peggers, there is reason to suspect that the secrecy is not an accidental oversight. It is there deliberately to cloak a discrepancy between de jure and de facto. That the yuan is not just another currency -- but lies at the heart of the disagreement to which the United States currently chooses to give top priority in its relations with China -- makes it a particularly relevant example.

There are by now many attempts to discern the true “de facto” exchange rate regimes that countries actually follow. Some of the more prominent include Shambaugh (2004), Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005), Ghosh, Gulde & Wolf (2002), and Reinhart & Rogoff (2003, 2004). Most of these classification schemes depart from the official classification in the direction of counting as de facto floating a country that has high variability of the exchange rate (or of the change in the exchange rate), relative to variability of reserves (or of the monetary base), and counting as fixed a country that has low variability of the exchange rate relative to reserves. A recent survey covers 11 studies.¹ It divided the studies into two categories, viewed as:

- “pure de facto classifications because...assignment of regimes is based solely on statistical algorithms and/or econometric estimation.”
- Vs. “mixed de jure-de facto classifications, because the self-declared regimes are adjusted by the devisers for anomalies.” One of the latter is the official product of the IMF’s former Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department: Bubula & Otker-Robe (2002), where the adjustment is accomplished both by consulting IMF economists and by looking at movements in reserves & exchange rates.

While the discrepancy between the de jure regimes and any given de facto regime is well-known, it is less widely recognized that the various de facto regimes hardly correspond any more closely to each other than to the official classification. Tables 1 and 2 report calculations of correlations or correspondence across different classification schemes. There are various explanations for the variation in conclusions reached by the different classification schemes: differences in methodology, different choices as to where to draw the line between regimes, differences in timing of the data, and so forth. But perhaps the best way of summarizing the problem is that, apart from a relatively small number of countries that peg firmly (e.g., countries with institutional commitments in the form of currency boards) and the handful that float freely (e.g., the United States), most follow some messy intermediate regime that is not easily identified or unambiguously classified. This flies in the face of the famous “Corners Hypothesis” that rapidly became the conventional wisdom in the late 1990s, and has subsequently declined almost as rapidly. The Corners Hypothesis claimed that countries were abandoning the intermediate regimes in favor of the two corners: exchange rates fixed institutionally, as through a currency board, vs. freely floating exchange rates. But it is a fact that a

¹ Tavlas, Dellas & Stockman (2006).

majority of countries continue to follow some regime in between firm fixing and free floating.²

Table 1a: Correlations Among Regime Classification Schemes

	IMF	GGW	LY-S	R-R
IMF	1.00 (100.0)			
GGW	0.60 (55.1)	1.00 (100.0)		
LY-S	0.28 (41.0)	0.13 (35.3)	1.00 (100.0)	
R-R	0.33 (55.1)	0.34 (35.2)	0.41 (45.3)	1.00 (100.0)

(Frequency of outright coincidence, in %, given in parenthesis.)

Sample: 47 countries. From Frankel, “Experience of and Lessons from Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Economies,” ADB, 2004. Table 3, prepared by Marina Halac & Sergio Schmukler.

Table 1b: Correlations Among Regime Classification Schemes

Table 5

Coefficients of correlation between 3-item regime classifications

		Pre crises ^(a)				Post crises ^(b)			
		BQCM	LYS	IMF	BOR	BQCM	LYS	IMF	BOR
<i>Pre crises^(a)</i>	BQCM	1							
	LYS	0.19	1						
	IMF	0.34	0.29	1					
	BOR	0.28	0.26	0.63	1				
<i>Post crises^(b)</i>	BQCM	0.24				1			
	LYS		0.50			0.60	1		
	IMF			0.58		0.62	0.69	1	
	BOR				0.55	0.64	0.65	0.76	1

Source: Author's calculations.

^(a) 1994–1997 (BQCM) or 1996 (LYS, IMF, BOR).

^(b) 1999–2004 (BQCM) or 2000 (LYS, IMF, BOR).

Bénassy-Quéré *et al* (2004).

Notes: BQCM is the authors' own classification scheme.

LYS is Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger.

BOR is the MEA Department's own “de facto classification” – which is still the closest to the official IMF scheme.

² Masson (2001).

One intermediate regime is the basket peg. Often it comes combined with a managed float that “leans against the wind” to push the current exchange rate back in the direction of the central parity when it wanders afield, or more specifically with an announced band (target zone). In any case, the weights in the basket are often kept secret, as already noted. There exists a branch of the de facto classification literature that is different from and smaller than the research on flexibility versus fixity cited above. The second approach applies especially to countries that are thought possibly to use baskets, for example because they say they do. This approach discerns from actual data the implicit weights placed on the constituent foreign currencies of the basket. The simple methodology was first developed in the early 1990s to test whether a country that announces a basket peg but does not reveal the exact weighting of the component currencies is acting in a manner consistent with its words: Frankel (1993) and Frankel and Wei (1994, 1995). The approach has since been used by others, including Bénassy-Quéré (1999), Ohno (1999), Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000), Frankel, Schmukler, Servén and Fajnzylber (2001) and Bénassy-Quéré, Coeuré, and Mignon (2004).³

These two branches of the literature have hitherto remained separate, in splendid isolation. It could be argued that each has its own place. If one is confident that a country is following a basket peg, and is unsure only of the weights, one should then use the weight-inference technique. If one is confident of the major anchor currency (dollar, euro, etc.) in terms of which a government defines the value of its own currency, and is unsure only of the strength of the effort to stabilize, then one should use one of the methods of the larger branch of the literature, such as comparing the variability of the exchange rate (vis a vis the dollar or euro, etc.) to the variability of reserves. The problem is that some countries do define a central parity in terms of weights but then allow variation around that parity. China since 2005 is a good example of a country that claims to be doing this, and Chile in the 1990s is a good example of a country that actually did it.⁴ And even if one suspects that a country is in truth following a simple peg, it is always better to have a meaningful alternative hypothesis within which the null hypothesis is nested. Thus we want to allow for endogenously estimated basket weights, rather than presuming we know the anchor currency, while at the same time allowing for some variation around the central parity, as in a target zone or managed floating. Hence our proposal for a synthesis of the two types of techniques in use for estimating de facto regimes.

Inferring the De facto Degree of Flexibility

It is important when inferring the de facto flexibility of an exchange rate regime to look beyond the variability of the exchange rate in itself. The korona could show a higher degree of variability than the thollar, and yet this might be because the korona has been subject to larger shocks than the thollar, rather than because the authorities intervene less and allow a given shock to show up more in the form of price movement. Thus we

³ More recently, it has been applied to China’s yuan: Eichengreen (2006), Shah, Zeileis, and Patnaik (2005), Yamazaki (2006, p.8) and Frankel and Wei (2007).

⁴ Williamson (2001) proposes that many Asian countries should adopt combinations of baskets and bands (and perhaps crawls, which he pioneered).

want to look at the variability of the exchange rate *relative to* the variability of foreign exchange reserves, or the monetary base, or some other monetary aggregate.

Figure 1 is a preliminary look at the data on exchange rate variability and reserve variability for 15 countries. We selected our sample to emphasize countries that claim to follow a basket peg, but added in a few that are known to be firm peggers and others that are known to be floaters, to be able to calibrate the results along the fixed-versus-floating dimension. We chose nine (small) countries that have been officially identified by the IMF as following basket pegs: Latvia, Papua New Guinea, Botswana, Vanuatu, Fiji, Western Samoa, Malta and the Seychelles. We also added several known floaters: Australia, Canada and Japan, and two peggers of special interest: Hong Kong and China. We also give emphasized commodity-exporting countries in our list of currencies examined, for reasons that will be obvious later.⁵ Variances are computed for 7-year intervals, within the period 1980-2007. The aim in choosing this length of the interval is that it be long enough to generate reliable estimates of the parameters, and yet not so long as inevitably to include important changes in each country's exchange rate regime. Here, as throughout this paper, we work with logarithmic changes in the exchange rate and in the reserves.

An upward-sloping line runs from the origin, and through the point representing average variance of (logarithmic change in) reserves and the average variance of (logarithmic change in) reserves. The points that lie well above this upward-sloping line represent countries that intervened actively in the foreign exchange market to stabilize their currencies during the period in question, for example, the Seychelles. The points that lie well below this upward-sloping line represent flexible-rate countries, where the authorities allow fluctuations in the demand for their currencies to show up primarily as movements in the exchange rate, for example, Japan. The downward sloping line runs through the point representing the medians of reserve variability and exchange rate variability, and is also drawn so that half the points are above and to the right of the line, and the other half are below and to the left. The points in the first category represent countries where shocks tend to be large; this tends particularly to be the case with commodity producers, such as Botswana and Papua New Guinea. The points below and to the left of the downward-sloping lines represent countries where shocks tend to be small, for example, Hong Kong.

⁵ Before any readers hear faint alarm bells about the absence of a complete or random sample, we will note that we have no need of a random or complete sample. We have no need of a random sample because, although we are testing hypotheses about individual currencies, we are not testing any general hypotheses (like all countries are at the corners). We have no need of a complete sample, because we are not attempting to offer a complete classification of IMF members as many of the other papers in the literature have done. Rather we are proposing a new technique. We have chosen to try it out on countries that we think are of interest for one reason or another.


Figure 1: Comparison of Reserve Variability Vs. Exchange Rate Variability

Currencies:

Canadian dollar (cad), Hong Kong dollar (hkd), Malaysian ringgit (myr), Chinese yuan (cny), Japanese yen (jpy), Latvian lat (lvl), Papua New Guinea kina (png), Botswana pula (bwp), Vanuatu (vuv), Fiji dollar, Western Samoa tala (wst), Maltese lira (mtl), Seychelles rupee (scr), Norwegian kroner (nok), and Australian dollar (aud).

(Each data point represents a 7-year period, denoted in the suffix by the starting year of each period)

Periods of countries with yearly inflation rate higher than 40% have been eliminated



Several interesting lessons emerge from the graph, even without further analysis. The first is the folly of judging a country's exchange rate regime – specifically, the extent to which it seeks to stabilize the value of its currency – by looking simply at variation in the exchange rate. The 1980-86 Australian dollar shows a higher exchange rate variance than the 2001-07 Japanese yen. But this is not because the Australian dollar followed a more flexible exchange rate policy at that time. It is rather because Australia was hit by much larger shocks. One must focus on exchange rate variability *relative to* reserve variability to gauge where the country sits on the spectrum from fixed to floating. Perhaps this is obvious, but some have focused exclusively on exchange rate variability.⁶

The second interesting lesson to be drawn from the graph – even less of a surprise than the first – is that countries that specialize in mineral products tend to have larger shocks, which presumably take the form primarily of volatility in their terms of trade. The third lesson, which was quite surprising when it was first noticed but should be familiar by now, is that even countries that float hold and use foreign exchange reserves in substantial magnitudes, sometimes more actively than countries that peg.⁷ An example in the graph is Canada in the 1980s. The fourth lesson is a counterpart to the third: a country with a firm peg like Hong Kong can experience very low variability of reserves, because it has very low variability of shocks. It may in part be the absence of commodities in Hong Kong's production portfolio that makes possible the low level of shocks. But the low variability in international demand for the Hong Kong dollar must also result in part from the stability and credibility that the currency board has itself achieved. After all, Hong Kong did experience large shocks in the late 1990s – the reversion of the territory from Britain to China and the East Asia crisis – and yet the shocks do not show up in either the exchange rate *or reserves*; this presumably was the goal when the currency board was adopted in the first place.

It is for just such reasons that the classification schemes of Calvo & Reinhart (2002), Shambaugh (2004), and Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2005) do not look at exchange rate variability alone (prices), but rather compare it to variability in reserves or money supplies (quantities). The question is: when there is a shock that increases international demand for korona, to what extent do the authorities allow it to show up as an appreciation, and to what extent as an increase in reserves. In this paper, we frame the issue in terms of the Exchange Market Pressure variable, which is defined as the percentage increase in the value of the currency plus the percentage increase in reserves (or the monetary base, or M1).⁸ When this variable appears on the right-hand side of an equation and the percentage increase in the value of the currency appears on the left, a coefficient of 0 signifies a completely fixed exchange rate (no changes in the value of the

⁶ Among the egregious sinners one could point to all are the Frankel and Frankel-Wei papers listed in the references.

⁷ In the early 1970s, when the international monetary system moved from fixed exchange rates to floating, the demand for international reserves did not fall as would have been predicted. Early references include Frenkel (1978) and Bilson and Frenkel (1979). Similarly, when many emerging market countries switched to more flexible exchange rate exchange rate regimes, or even to outright floating, in the currency crises of 1994-2002, the demand for reserves subsequently did not fall, but rather rose sharply.

⁸ The progenitor of the Exchange Market Pressure variable, in a rather different context, was Girton and Roper (1977).

currency), a coefficient of 1 signifies a freely floating rate (no changes in reserves) and a coefficient somewhere in between indicates a correspondingly flexible/stable intermediate regime.

One limitation of these and other papers that estimate flexibility versus stability of exchange rate regimes is that they sometimes have to make arbitrary judgments regarding what is the major currency in terms of which flexibility and stability are to be defined. The dollar is the most common choice. This is fine for most Western Hemisphere countries (though in fact not for Chile, and perhaps not Argentina and Brazil either). But for European countries, the euro is obviously more relevant. And for many others, particularly in Asia and the Pacific, and perhaps also the Middle East and parts of Africa, the relevant foreign currency is neither the dollar nor the euro, but some (possibly trade-weighted) basket. It would be better to let the data tell us what is the relevant anchor for a given country, especially for those that are not clearly in either the dollar or euro camp, rather than making the judgment subjectively or a priori.

Inferring De Facto Weights

If the main branch of the regime classification literature has the drawback that -- in its zeal to uncover the true degree of flexibility -- it is unable to infer the relevant anchor -- the smaller branch of the literature specializes in inferring the relevant anchor currency or basket under the null hypothesis of a perfect fit, but omits to include anything to help make sense out of the error term under the alternative hypothesis that the country is not perfectly pegged to a major currency or to a basket. The equation is correctly specified to infer the weights in the case of a perfect basket peg, with an R2 of 1, but is on less firm ground if the authorities allow even a relatively small band of flexibility around the central parity. Thus the contribution of this paper is to bring these two branches of the literature together to produce a complete equation suitable for us in inferring de facto regimes across the spectrum of flexibility *and* across the array of possible anchors.

Assume that the value of the home currency is indeed determined by a currency basket, how does one uncover the currency composition and weights in the basket? This is a problem to which Ordinary Least Squares regression is unusually well suited. If we know the list of currencies in the basket, or a list that includes as a subset those that are used in the basket, then we regress changes in the log of H , the value of the home currency against changes in the log values of the candidate currencies. This technique has recently been applied to the current Chinese exchange rate regime.⁹

⁹ Shah, Zeileis, and Patnaik (2005) adopted the implicit-weight methodology to study the Chinese currency basket after July 21, 2005 and found that the RMB is still tightly pegged to the dollar and nothing else. However, they only consider four candidate currencies in the RMB basket (the dollar, the yen, the euro, and the pound), probably unaware of the eleven-currency disclosure made the Chinese central bank. In addition, their sample was only the initial few months after July 21, 2005. Frankel and Wei (2006) extended to 11 the components of the basket, but found that the RMB regime in the second half of 2005 was still a tight dollar peg -- as tight as that of the Hong Kong SAR regime. Eichengreen (2006, p. 22-25) had daily observations of data that ran from July 22, 2005, to March 21, 2006, and found a dollar weight around .9, but with no evidence of a downward trend in the weight, and no significance on non-dollar currencies.

The reason to work in terms of changes rather than levels is the likelihood of non-stationarity. Concern for nonstationarity goes beyond the common refrain of modern time series econometrics, the inability to reject statistically a unit root, which in many cases can be attributed to insufficient power. Working in changes, we should also include a constant term to allow for the likelihood of a trend appreciation (a key question of interest in the new RMB regime) or trend depreciation (as in the crawling pegs popular in Latin American and elsewhere in the 80s), whether against the dollar alone or a broader basket. Algebraically, if the value of the home currency H is pegged to the values of currencies X_1, X_2, \dots and X_n , with weights equal to w_1, w_2, \dots and w_n , then

$$\log H(t+s) - \log H(t) = c + \sum w(j) [\log X(j, t+s) - \log X(j, t)] \quad (1)$$

If the exchange rate is truly governed by a strict basket peg, then we should be able to recover the true weights, $w(j)$, precisely, so long as we have more observations than candidate currencies, and the equation should have a perfect fit.

One methodological question, before we turn to the new synthesis estimation specification. How do we define the “value” of each of the currencies? This is the question of the numeraire.¹⁰

If the exchange rate is truly a basket peg, the choice of numeraire currency is immaterial; we estimate the weights accurately regardless. If the linear equation holds precisely in terms of any one “correct” numeraire, then add the log exchange rate between that numeraire and any arbitrary unit to see that the equation also holds precisely in terms of the arbitrary numeraire. This assumes the weights add to 1, and there is no error term, constant term, or other non-currency variable.

In practice, few countries take their basket pegs literally enough to produce such a tight fit. One must then start to think about the nature of the error term and non-basket factors in the regression (such as the trend term), and about whether they are better measured in terms of one numeraire or another. The introduction of reserves or the exchange market pressure variable as explanatory variables should soak up some of the error term and give better estimates: by including on the right-hand side of the equation percentage changes in total exchange market pressure (defined as percentage changes in the value of the currency plus percentage change in reserves), the test can allow for the fluctuations in demand for the currency that can push the exchange rate away from the central basket parity. The hope is that this approach may do a better job of answering

Each of these three papers was too early to catch the evolution in 2006. Yamazaki (2006, p.8) updated the estimation, and found some weight had shifted to the euro, yen and won; but he estimated the equation in terms of levels rather than changes (risking non-stationarity), did not allow for a trend, did not allow for the other currencies on the list, and had a relatively small number of (bimonthly) observations. Frankel and Wei (2007) updated the estimation, ran the equation in monthly changes, included the full list of 11 candidate currencies, and allowed for gradual evolution during the sample period in both the basket weights and the trend term.

¹⁰ Frankel (1993) used purchasing power over a consumer basket of domestic goods as numeraire; Frankel and Wei (1995) used the SDR; Frankel and Wei (1994, 2006), Ohno (1999), and Eichengreen (2006) used the Swiss franc; Bénassy-Quéré (1999), the dollar; Frankel, Schmukler and Luis Servén (2000), a GDP-weighted basket of five major currencies; and Yamazaki (2006), the Canadian dollar.

the question to what extent the authorities intervene to stabilize the currency, not just the question what is the basket in terms of which the authorities define stability.

If the true regime is more variable than a rigid basket peg, then the choice of numeraire does make some difference to the estimation. Some authors in the past have used a remote currency, such as the Swiss franc (e.g., Frankel and Wei, 1994). But a weighted index such as the SDR or a trade-weighted measure is probably more appropriate. Here is why. If the true regime is a target zone or a managed float centered around a reference basket, where the authorities intervene to an extent that depends on the magnitude of the deviation – and this seems the logical alternative hypothesis in which a strict basket peg is nested -- then the error term in the equation represents shocks in demand for the currency that the authorities allow to be partially reflected in the exchange rate (but only partially, because they intervene if the shocks are large). Then one should use a numeraire that is similar to that used by the authorities in measuring what constitutes a large deviation. The authorities are unlikely to use the Swiss franc or Canadian dollar in thinking about the size of deviations from their reference point. They are more likely to use a weighted average of major currencies. If we use a similar measure in the equation, it should help minimize the possibility of correlation between the error term and the numeraire.¹¹ Similarly, if there is a trend in the exchange rate equation (a constant term in the changes equation) representing deliberate gradual appreciation of the currency, then H should be defined in terms of whatever weighted exchange rate index the authorities are likely to use in thinking about the trend. These considerations suggest a numeraire that is itself composed of a basket of currencies. We choose here the Special Drawing Right (SDR).

Results of the Synthesis of Flexibility-Inference and Weight-Inference Techniques.

Our equation is:

$$\log H(t+s) - \log H(t) = c + \sum w(j) [\log X(j, t+s) - \log X(j, t)] + \beta \{ \log EMP(t+s) - \log EMP(t) \} + u_{t+s} \quad (2)$$

where the percentage change in total exchange market pressure is calculated by $\{ \log EMP(t+s) - \log EMP(t) \} = \{ [\log H(t+s) - \log H(t)] + [\log Res(t+s) - \log Res(t)] \}$. The $w(j)$ coefficients capture the de facto weights on the constituent currencies. The coefficient β captures the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility : $\beta=1$ means the currency floats purely, because there is no foreign exchange market intervention (no changes in reserves) ; $\beta=0$ means the exchange rate is purely fixed, because it never changes in value ; and most currencies probably lie somewhere in between. Endogeneity is a possible problem, and is addressed below.

We have tried estimating the equation without imposing a constraint on the sum of the weights in the basket. But there is a good argument for constraining the weights

¹¹ A methodological innovation, relative to Frankel-Wei (1994) and other past work estimating currency weights for a putative basket peg, We were not able to implement this approach for the post-2005 RMB because reserve data are only available monthly, and 18 observations are not enough for estimation.

on the currencies to add up to unity: $\sum w(j) = 1$. However weak one thinks the link to the reference basket might be and or however large or small the weight on the dollar, the authorities must view movements in the home currency through the metric of distance from some reference rate or effective exchange rate. There is no point throwing away the information represented by the summing-up constraint; we only have 48 observations per regression, and we need every degree of freedom we can get. The easiest way to implement the adding up constraint is to run the regressions with the changes in the log value of the home currency on the left-hand side of the equation transformed by subtracting off the changes in the log value of one of the currencies, say the British pound, and the changes in the values of the non-pound currencies on the right-hand side transformed in the same way.

To see this, we repeat equation (2), with some of the major currencies made explicit:

$$\begin{aligned} \log H(t+s) - \log H(t) &= c + \sum w(j) [\log X(j, t+s) - \log X(j, t)] \\ &\quad + \beta \{ \log EMP(t+s) - \log EMP(t) \} + u_{t+s} \quad (2') \\ &= c + w(1) \Delta \log \$ + w(2) \Delta \log \text{€} + w(3) \Delta \log \text{¥} + w(4) \Delta \log \text{£} + \dots \\ &\quad + \beta \{ \log EMP(t+s) - \log EMP(t) \} + u_t \end{aligned}$$

We want to impose the adding up constraint $w(4) = 1 - w(1) - w(2) - w(3) - \dots$. We implement it by running the regression equation (3):

$$\begin{aligned} [\Delta \log H_t - \Delta \log \text{£}_t] \\ &= c + w(1) [\Delta \log \$ - \Delta \log \text{£}] + w(2) [\Delta \log \text{€} - \Delta \log \text{£}] + \\ &\quad w(3) [\Delta \log \text{¥} - \Delta \log \text{£}] + \dots + \beta \{ \log EMP(t+s) - \log EMP(t) \} + u_t \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

The results reported in Table 2 come from the estimation of this equation. One can recover the implicit weight on the pound by adding the estimated weights on the non-pound currencies, and subtracting the sum from 1. This coefficient estimate is reported in the last row of the table. Imposing the constraint sharpens the estimates a bit.

Tables 2.1 through 2.20, respectively, present the individual results for 20 currencies.¹² Again the currencies are those that are hypothesized to have followed a basket peg, to try out the ability of the technique to infer the weights or reject the null hypothesis, plus some clear floaters and clear peggers thrown in to calibrate the inference of flexibility

One concern is endogeneity of the exchange market pressure variable. One would prefer to observe changes in the international demand for the home currency that are known to originate in exogenous shocks. In the case of countries that specialize in the production of mineral or agricultural products, there is a ready-made instrumental

¹² We omit the yen and other very major currencies from the list of home countries. Such a currency is sufficiently large in world monetary markets that one cannot take the value of the other major currencies as exogenous as is necessary to estimate the weights on the right-hand side of our equation. For other smaller currencies, the assumption that the value of the dollar, euro, and other major currencies can be taken as exogenous seems reasonable.

variable : changes in the terms of trade reflecting the price of the mineral or agricultural product on world markets. (This assumes that the home country is too small to affect the world price, which is a reasonable assumption in all but a few cases, such as Saudi Arabia and oil.) Accordingly, Tables 3 repeat the synthesis estimation technique, but for the commodity producers it uses changes in the world price of the commodity in question as an instrumental variable for changes in exchange market pressure.

We begin with the estimated equation for the Australian dollar, reported in Table 2.1. The coefficient on Exchange Market Pressure shows a lower degree of exchange rate flexibility than one would have expected, given that the currency is thought to have floated fairly freely throughout this period. Perhaps the problem is endogeneity of the Exchange Market Pressure. The Australian dollar is considered a commodity currency, so world commodity prices are a natural instrumental variable. Table 3.1 reports the IV estimation for Australia. For each of the sub-periods the estimated flexibility coefficient is higher than it was under OLS, but they remain surprisingly low in magnitude and statistical significance.

The results for the Botswana pula, reported in Table 2.2, make more sense. For 1980-87, the coefficient on EMP is essentially zero, suggesting very little exchange rate flexibility. This is the right answer, since Botswana at this time was in a monetary union with South Africa. One would have needed to use a priori knowledge to include the South African rand on the right-hand side of the equation, which we did not do, but probably should do. Botswana's exit from the currency union shows up as a large increase in the EMP variable during 1988-2007; in the current decade more than half of fluctuations in the demand for the pula have been allowed to show up in the exchange rate. Botswana is officially on a basket peg. Indeed, the estimates show significant weights on the dollar (around .5 during 1988-95, but declining thereafter), and later the yen (.2), the mark or euro (.3-.6) and the pound (.2-.4), and they show R2s around .8, suggesting a semi-tight peg. There is a significant negative trend in the value of the pula throughout.

The Canadian dollar (Table 2.3) shows up as mostly flexible, though experiencing some intervention [the EMP coefficient ranges from .1 to .4], with the US dollar usually receiving the largest weight in the basket that the authorities are treated as implicitly using as a reference. As with Australia, the other rich commodity-exporting floater, the IV estimates show estimates of the flexibility parameter in each sub-period that are higher than they were under OLS, but that are surprisingly insignificant statistically.

Table 2.4 applies the synthesis estimation technique to the Chilean peso. The EMP coefficient shows an intermediate degree of flexibility, consistent with the proclaimed band of the 1980s and 1990s. The combination of a basket, band and crawl seems able to explain most of the variation in the value of the peso in the 1990s ($R^2 > .9$). The weight on the dollar is always high, but the yen also gets some weight in some years, until after 1999 when only the euro complements the dollar. There is a significant downward trend from 1980 to 1999. Of those countries to follow a BBC (Band-Basket-Crawl) regime in the 1980s and 1990s, Chile is one of the few that announced explicitly

what were the parameters: basket weights, band width and rate of crawl.¹³ Our findings correspond to the official regime, but only rather roughly. The band was officially centered on the dollar alone in the 1980s, and was broadened to a basket starting in 1992. Our estimates qualitatively capture the shift in emphasis away from the dollar; but they find an apparently spurious weight on the yen in the mid-1980s and they miss entirely the 30% weight officially placed on the mark in the mid-1990s. Likewise, Chile officially moved to full floating in 1999. Our estimates qualitatively show the increase in the flexibility coefficient in 2000-03, but the estimates do not show the (loose) basket peg disappearing completely as the Chileans claim is the reality.

Possible explanations for the lack of a close match between the official regime and the estimates include: (1) the common disjuncture between de facto and de jure (though it is much less likely to apply here than for other countries), (2) endogeneity of the EMP variable, (3) some other shortcoming of the estimation technique, and (4) changes in the parameters that occur more frequently than the four-year sub-periods examined here. For the years since the September 1999 move to floating, (5) the failure of the flexibility coefficient to approach 1.0 might possibly have the same explanation as for Mexico: copper export earnings that add to reserves and yet are not considered by the authorities to constitute active foreign exchange intervention.

Explanation (2) can be addressed by the instrumental variables technique, for which Chile is a natural candidate since copper is half its exports. Table 3.3 uses the world copper price as the instrumental variable. At least the spurious significant coefficient on the yen in the mid-1980s disappears. But the German mark still does not make the dramatic appearance onstage in 1992-1999 that one would expect from the official announcements.

Proposition (4) may be the real explanation, and it is harder to address. The Chilean authorities announced 18 changes in regime parameters (basket weights, width of band, and rate of crawl) during the 18-year period 1982 -1999. One could imagine estimating each year separately, or matching the sub-samples to the official announcements, or using more sophisticated econometric techniques that allow endogenously-estimated breakpoints. The obstacle in all cases is that we have only monthly data, so it is not possible to estimate meaningful parameter values if they change every 12 months on average. The original Frankel-Wei technique required only exchange rate data, which allowed estimation at a daily frequency (or even intra-day). But the synthesis technique requires data on foreign exchange reserves, which are only available monthly. Indeed the attempt to estimate six or more parameters on each set of 48 observations may already be producing too much “estimation error.”

Table 2.5 reports the results for the Chinese yuan or RMB. It confirms earlier findings of a perfect peg to the dollar during 2001-04 (dollar coefficient =.99, flexibility coefficient insignificantly different from zero, and an R2 of .99. In 2005-07 the EMP coefficient suggests that only 90% of increased demand for the currency shows up in reserves rather than 100%; but the dollar weight and R2 are as high as ever.

Table 2.6 illustrates the Danish krone. The EMP coefficient suggests that a very high share of fluctuations in currency demand are accommodated from foreign exchange

¹³ Details reported in Appendix of Frankel, Schmukler, Servén and Fajnzylber (2001).

reserves. The weight on European currencies begins above .8, and rises to 1.0 with the advent of the euro in 1999. The R2 ranges from .85 to .99. In short the evidence is consistent with the known regime: Denmark remained behind in the 2 ¼ % band, when its (non-Scandinavian) neighbors joined the euro.

Table 2.7 shows the Fiji dollar as being tightly pegged in most of the seven sub-periods, with only 1984-87 and 1996-99 showing significant flexibility coefficients and R2s below .9. It is another official basket pegger. High multicollinearity between the US dollar and the Thai baht in 1988-95 prevents meaningful estimation of the coefficients during that period. (The baht should be dropped on a priori grounds.) But the weights are fairly well-estimated during the early and late years of the sample period. For the sub-period 1980-83, the US dollar receives a weight of .4, with the rest falling on the yen, Australian dollar and British pound. For the sub-period 2000-2003 they are: .2 on the US dollar, .2 on the euro, and .4 on the Australian dollar. (The New Zealand dollar should be added on a priori grounds.)

The Hong Kong dollar is covered by Table 2.8. As one would expect given the currency board arrangement, it is a simple tight peg to the US dollar: close to complete weight on the dollar, zero flexibility, and perfect fit.

Table 2.9 reports estimation for Indonesia. The rupiah exhibits a downward trend throughout. Otherwise, the estimates show great rigidity in 1992-95, followed by a large leap in flexibility beginning in the late 1990s, at the time of the East Asia crisis. Like some other Asian countries, Indonesia's flexibility parameter comes back down in 2004-07 ("fear of floating"). Table 3.4 uses world prices of oil and natural gas as the instrumental variable, but little is learned.

The Kuwaiti dinar shows a firm peg throughout most of the period: a near-zero flexibility parameter and R2 mostly above .9 (IV estimates in Table 3.5). In the second half of the sample, the anchor was usually a simple dollar peg, though a small weight was assigned to other currencies in the 1980s basket. In a widely watched move, the Kuwaitis in 2007 abandoned the simple dollar peg that its partners in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) partners have been wedded to, and returned to a basket peg; but this shift is probably too recent to be substantial effect any of the estimates.

The Latvian lat, shown in Table 2.10, is officially on a basket peg. Here the estimation technique appears to work well. The flexibility coefficient is low during the 1990s, and has disappeared altogether since 2000. The R2 exceeds .9 during 1996-2003. The combination of low flexibility coefficient and a high R2 during 2000-2003 suggests a particularly tight basket peg during these years. Initially the estimated weights include .4 on the dollar and .3 on the yen, but both decline over time. There is a weight of .3 on the mark up until 1999, which is then transferred to the euro: .2 in 2000-2003 and .5 in 2004-07. Latvia is of course preparing to enter the eurozone. Surprisingly, however, the estimation shows a coefficient of similar size on the Russian ruble popping up during 2004-07.

Table 2.11 refers to the Malaysian ringgit. Only in 1996-99 – the period that includes the East Asia crisis – is there evidence of exchange rate flexibility. During the years 2000-2003 there is a perfect peg to the dollar (coefficient and R2 both =1). [This confirms the danger of extreme multicollinearity if one includes the ringgit alongside the dollar as candidate components of other Asian currencies, such as the Chinese yuan. In 2004-07 the peg is still fairly strong, but here the weight of the US dollar falls to .6, partially replaced by the Singapore dollar (with a weight of .4). Table 3.6 uses for instrumental variables the prices of tin and semiconductors (which, though a manufactured good, has the properties of a commodity export). The most important findings remain” a perfect dollar peg during 2000-2003, followed by shift to a basket consisting of an average of the US dollar and the Singapore dollar.

The Maltese lira (Table 2.12) shows a tight peg during 1984-1991 and 2004-07 (low flexibility coefficient and high R2). The share of the dollar varies between .2 and .4 during 1980-2003. The European currencies garner .3-.4 during 1980-1995, the pound perhaps .2-.3 and the yen .1. At the end of the sample period, the weight on the euro rises almost to .9, with perhaps bit parts assigned to the dollar and pound. Malta is one of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2005 and is presumably on a path to join the euro.

Table 2.13 looks at the Mexican peso. It shows a significant downward crawl throughout (until 2004), but it shows a peg to the dollar that is otherwise quite tight in 1988-91. Flexibility increases after the mid-point of the sample, which happens to be the peso crisis years of 1994-95. The flexibility parameter does not climb out of the range .3-.4, indicating that reserve changes have remained substantial during the latter three sub-periods, when the peso was supposedly floating. One likely explanation is that many monthly increases in reserves are associated with revenue earned by PEMEX oil exports which the authorities leave in the form of dollar deposits, but which are not conventionally considered foreign exchange intervention. Table 3.7, using the oil price as an instrumental variable, again finds flexibility parameters estimated higher, but lower in significance.

The Norwegian kroner (Table 2.14) is one of the few basket peggers in the developed world. The estimates show heavy intervention, though the R2 never crosses .8. The weights are initially .3 on the dollar and .4 on European currencies (and perhaps a little weight on the yen and pound). But the weight on the European currencies rises at the expense of the dollar, until the latter part of the sample period shows full weight on the euro and none on the dollar. Table 3.8 uses the world oil price as the instrumental variable for exchange market pressure, with results similar to OLS.

Table 2.15 refers to Papua New Guinea. In 2004-07 the flexibility coefficient for the kina falls to zero and the R2 rises to .97, suggesting a tight peg. The peg is to the US dollar. (The only other currency ever to receive significant weight is the Australian dollar, during 1992-95.) Table 3.9 uses prices of gold, copper, oil, gas and timber as instrumental variables. The only qualitative change relative to OLS is a fall in the estimated flexibility parameters in 1996-2003

The Russian rouble (Table 2.16) shows high intervention from the beginning. There is evidence of an attempt to stabilize around the dollar during 1996-2003, but the peg is loose; this no doubt reflects both the discrete devaluation of 1998 and the band that preceded it. More recently, the rouble has acted more like a basket peg, and has assigned somewhat less weight to the dollar. In table 3.10, which uses the oil price as the instrumental variable, the flexibility parameter in the current decade drops more rapidly than under OLS.

The Seychelles rupee (Table 2.17) confirms its official classification as a basket pegger, particularly in 1984-1995: not only is the flexibility coefficient essentially zero, but the R2 exceeds .97. The estimated weights are .4 on the dollar, .3 on the European currencies, .2 on the yen, and .1 on the pound. After 2004, however, the weight on the dollar suddenly shoots up to .9

Table 2.18 reports the estimation for Thailand. The authorities are seen to have intervened heavily in the 1980s and 1990s. During 1988-1995 they indeed adhered to a very tight basket peg (R2=.999). The weight on the dollar reached .75-.88, but there was still a significant weight of .1 on the yen. These parameters may come as a surprise to those who, in the wake of the Thai crisis of 1997, received the impression that the baht had been explicitly pegged to the dollar. But the official policy was a basket peg, not a dollar peg. In the early 1990s, observers were surprised that the estimated weight on the dollar was so *high*, because the orthodoxy of the time had been that Southeast Asia was rapidly becoming a yen bloc.¹⁴ The flexibility parameter rises sharply in 2000-2007, though there is still plenty of intervention.¹⁵ Table 3.11 uses the price of rice as an instrumental variable. Once again the point estimates of the flexibility parameter rise, but the significance levels fall.

Vanuatu (2.19) shows relatively low exchange rate flexibility and a fairly close fit. This is another official basket pegger. The estimates suggest roughly comparable weights on the dollar, yen, euro and pound. On a priori grounds, the Australian and New Zealand dollars ought to be added the equation.

Finally, Western Samoa (Table 2.20) shows heavy intervention during the first three sub-periods, around a basket that weights the dollar most and the yen second (and possibly the pound third). After 1992, however, there is more flexibility. The weights in the reference basket during 2000-2003 are similar to the earlier period, except that the euro now receives a large significant weight (.4). Table 3.12 uses the price of coconuts as an instrumental variable. Again flexibility parameter estimates rise, but significance levels generally fall.

¹⁴ Frankel (1993), Frankel and Wei (1994), and references cited therein.

¹⁵ Very high multicollinearity between the US dollar and the Malaysian ringgit impedes the estimation. The won, Australian dollar, and ringgit probably ought to be dropped on a priori grounds.

Extensions

In various extensions of the basic analysis, we have :

1. allowed coefficients to vary over time, even within the four-year sub-samples ;
2. relaxed the constraint that $\{[\log H(t+s)-\log H(t)]$ and $[\log Res(t+s)-\log Res(t)]\}$ enter with the same coefficient ;
3. entered the change in the interest rate alongside the change in reserves and the change in the exchange rate;
4. checked for robustness with respect to the numeraire unit used to define currency values ; and
5. tried Monte Carlo studies on fabricated currencies (some constructed with the monetary authorities leaning halfway against the wind of any fluctuations in EMP, and others constrained more narrowly to remain within a 5% band) to see if the technique is giving us the right answer.

The results in the extensions are generally in line with the results reported here. Using a different numeraire does not make too much difference, for example.

Tables 4.1-4.10 report the extension that allows the coefficients to vary over time, even within the sub-periods (extension 1, above). We expand the specification of (3) to allow for trends in level and in the currency weights :

$$[\Delta \log H_t - \Delta \log \pounds_t] = f(t) + w(1) [\Delta \log \$ - \Delta \log \pounds] + w(2) [\Delta \log \text{€} - \Delta \log \pounds] + w(3) [\Delta \log \text{¥} - \Delta \log \pounds] + \dots + \beta \{ \log EMP(t+s) - \log EMP(t) \} + u_t \quad (4)$$

where $f(t) = c0 + c1*t$. The time-dependent weight terms can be defined either using the exponential functional form for the weights $w(j)$ so that they are automatically bounded by 0 and 1 or, for simplicity, linearly: $w(j) = b0(j) + b1(j)*t$.

The case of most interest is probably China (2005-2007). There is absolutely no sign of a downward trend in the coefficient on the dollar: the estimated trend is .000. But there is a sign that the trend in the value of the yuan itself is rising over time: since the the dependent variable is first differences, the statistically significant coefficient on “t” indicates an upward acceleration. The other results are as before: zero coefficients on non-dollar currencies are zero, zero coefficient on exchange market pressure, and an R2 of 1.00, all of which indicate a simple dollar peg holding during most of this period.

Tables 5.1-5.8 relax the constraint that $\{[\log H(t+s)-\log H(t)]$ and $[\log Res(t+s)-\log Res(t)]\}$ enter Exchange Market Pressure with the same coefficient (extension 2 above). The estimation takes into account that the variation of reserve changes is much larger than the variation of exchange rate changes (as can be seen in Figure 1), so that giving them equal weight means allowing the former to dominate in the estimates already reported. We define the new EMP variable as :

$$\Delta[\log EMP] = \{ \{ \text{var} \Delta[\log Ex] / (\text{var} \Delta[\log Ex] + \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])) \} \cdot \Delta[\log Res] + \{ \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res]) / (\text{var} \Delta[\log Ex] + \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])) \} \cdot \Delta[\log Ex] \} \quad (5)$$

And $\lambda = \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])$

Tables 6.1-6.5 broaden the definition of EMP another step (extension 3 above). Here the change in the interest rate is entered alongside the change in reserves and the change in the exchange rate, as three alternative ways that the authorities can respond to a change in demand for their currency (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz). We define the new EMP variable as :

$$\Delta[\log EMP] = \{ \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res]) \} \cdot \Delta[\log Res] + \{ \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta i) \} \cdot \Delta i + \Delta[\log Ex] \quad (6)$$

$$\lambda = \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])$$

$$\gamma = \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta i)$$

That is, $\Delta[\log EMP] = \lambda \cdot \Delta[\log Res] + \gamma \cdot \Delta i + \Delta[\log Ex]$

Table 7 checks whether the results are robust with respect to the choice of numeraire, by using the Swiss franc as the standard by which currencies are valued, in place of the SDR. The results are similar. The choice of numeraire does not appear to make much difference.

The last tables report results from the Monte Carlo exercises. We construct artificial exchange rate series under two regimes : managed float (Table 8.1) and band (table 8.2). In the former case we assume that a certain percentage of any change in exchange market pressure is absorbed in reserves and the rest in the exchange rate (« leaning against the wind' »). In the latter case we restrict the width of the band or target zone to plus or minus 2 and ½ per cent. Within the band we have tried a random walk subject to the restriction that they can't wander outside the band. One could consider other distributions. The Krugman theory of target zones provides a precise mathematical specification for the distribution within the band ; but it assumes unrealistically that there is no intervention inside the band (only the margins) and also that the band is 100% credible.

In each case we try one version where the central parity is a basket that puts 1/3 weight on the dollar, 1/3 on the euro and 1/3 on the yen, and we try another version where the central parity is simply pegged to the dollar. In the estimation, we constrain the weights to add to 1. Although the disturbances are drawn from a random normal distribution, the magnitude (variance of the distribution) is drawn from real-world cases. We try two such cases : we take the Canadian dollar's parameters as representative of a (relatively) small country with a floating currency (a low-variance reserve case), and we take Papua New Guinea's parameters as representative of a high-variance (attributable to commodity exports) small country with an intermediate regime.

In most cases, the estimates correspond well with the parameters that were built in. For example, the difference between a band with sharp borders and a policy of consistently leaning against the wind turns out to be not all that important. In every case, the estimated weights are within one or two standard errors of 1/3-1/3-1/3 for the basket case, and 1 for the dollar peg case. The technique tends to pick out the correct weights even though it is not designed for the specific statistical distribution of a band. The results are especially insensitive to the choice of numeraire, as between SDR and Swiss Franc. This is reassuring, since previously we have had to rely on the a priori theorem

that the choice of numeraire makes no difference in the special case of a perfect peg. The technique seems equally robust when estimating the parameter that represents the degree of exchange rate flexibility.

Typical R^2 s tend to lie in the range .87-.89. Our conclusion is that the technique works fairly well and robustly, when the true exchange rate regime is the one assumed (in this case leaning against the wind, around either a basket or the dollar). The technique may not always work as well in practice (of which one reflection may be lower R^2 s), because in practice many countries do not in fact follow a regime such as a basket band for more than a few years in a row, without devaluing or otherwise changing the parameters. To allow for changes in parameters within the sample period one would have to take the technique to the next stage of econometric sophistication.

Conclusion

Intermediate exchange rate regimes remain alive and well. Some countries have announced basket regimes, often with an intermediate degree of flexibility that can be captured by some combination of a crawl, a band, or leaning-against-the-wind intervention. Most basket peggers keep the weights in the basket secret, which usually means they want to preserve a degree of freedom from prying eyes (whether to pursue a lower degree of de facto exchange rate flexibility, as with China, or a higher degree, as with others).

This is a case of the necessity of distinguishing de facto from de jure exchange rate regimes, a task that has produced a lively recent sub-literature. But inferring de facto weights and inferring de facto flexibility are equally important, whereas most authors have hitherto done only one or the other. Thus the main contribution of this paper is to propose a synthesis specification that allows estimation of true weights at the same time as estimation of the true tendency of monetary authorities to allow exchange market pressure to show up in the price, versus the quantity, of foreign exchange.

We have tried out the technique on some 20 currencies. The majority are countries reported by the IMF to have declared the use of baskets. But we have also included some floaters and some simple peggers. For the most part the synthesis technique seems to work as it should. Known floaters tend to score much higher flexibility parameters than known peggers, with the BBC countries in between. In some cases, the inferred behavior differs in some way from the de jure regime. For example China's "basket" puts more weight on the dollar than the impression given by the government, while other declared basket peggers are not as firmly tied to the basket as they claim. Meanwhile, declared floaters often intervene heavily to dampen exchange rate fluctuations (fear of floating), but sometimes with reference to an anchor that is not a simple dollar parity as other authors may have assumed.

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Appendix 1

Table 2: Estimating the De Facto Exchange Rate Regime with Basic Setup
(01/1980 – 06/2007)
(numeraire currency = SDR)

2.1 Australian dollar (aud)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	aud 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.008	0.210	0.250**	0.160
	(0.102)	(0.135)	(0.104)	(0.150)
USD	1.036***	0.676***	0.294	0.181
	(0.070)	(0.236)	(0.201)	(0.142)
German mark	-0.171	-0.140		
	(0.141)	(0.180)		
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.242***	0.062	0.175***	0.047
	(0.043)	(0.070)	(0.043)	(0.040)
EUR			0.554***	0.107
			(0.123)	(0.247)
Constant	0.002	-0.006	-0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.833	0.327	0.538	0.171
GBP	0.143	0.254	-0.098	0.552

2.2 Botswana pula (bwp)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	bwp 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.365**	0.477**	0.062	0.028	0.169***	0.211***	0.190
	(0.146)	(0.211)	(0.081)	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.136)
USD	0.654***	0.030	0.470***	0.569***	-0.008	0.296**	0.063
	(0.076)	(0.281)	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.206)	(0.110)	(0.149)
French franc	0.022	0.613*	0.417***				
	(0.130)	(0.359)	(0.109)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	-0.010	0.016	0.440***	0.236***	0.566***	0.636***	0.725***
	(0.064)	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.053)	(0.096)
German mark				0.314***	0.433***		
				(0.061)	(0.157)		
Euro						0.312***	0.581***
						(0.105)	(0.194)
Constant	-0.009*	-0.018**	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.009***	0.003	-0.011***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	37
R-squared	0.652	0.266	0.827	0.905	0.801	0.783	0.811
GBP	-0.041	-0.120	0.051	0.089	0.406	0.181	0.166

2.3 Canadian dollar (cad)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	cad 90-93	94-97	98-01	02-05	06-09
JPY	0.046 (0.058)	0.018 (0.080)	0.035 (0.076)	0.324*** (0.092)	-0.162 (0.283)
USD	0.902*** (0.049)	0.966*** (0.095)	0.321 (0.322)	0.449*** (0.112)	0.543* (0.282)
German mark	0.007 (0.066)	0.018 (0.075)	0.101 (0.313)		
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.106*** (0.014)	0.067*** (0.024)	0.124** (0.034)	0.366*** (0.112)	0.401** (0.129)
EUR				0.337* (0.179)	0.189 (0.522)
Constant	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.004 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.005)
Observations	48	48	8	48	14
R-squared	0.958	0.790	0.776	0.708	0.684
GBP	0.046	-0.002	0.543	-0.110	0.430

2.4 Chile (clp)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	clp 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.077 (0.084)	0.638** (0.255)	0.046 (0.134)	0.201*** (0.057)	0.108*** (0.035)	0.172 (0.108)	-0.031 (0.143)
USD	0.642*** (0.232)	0.609** (0.269)	0.957*** (0.112)	0.644*** (0.072)	0.884*** (0.079)	0.376** (0.181)	0.755*** (0.152)
French franc	0.421 (0.282)	-0.101 (0.442)	-0.233** (0.112)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.192** (0.081)	0.513** (0.222)	0.036 (0.052)	0.390*** (0.062)	0.228*** (0.037)	0.675*** (0.100)	0.217*** (0.050)
German mark				0.029 (0.091)	0.109* (0.062)		
Euro						0.238** (0.100)	0.584** (0.259)
Constant	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.681	0.768	0.886	0.907	0.911	0.769	0.692
GBP	0.014	-0.146	0.230	0.127	-0.101	0.214	-0.307

2.5 Chinese yuan (cny)

	(1)	(2)
	cny 01-04	05-08
USD	.987917*** (0.0231488)	1.055*** (0.110)
JPY	-0.0058267 (0.0090792)	0.039 (0.035)
KRW		0.061 (0.051)
SGD		-0.163 (0.104)
MYR		0.025 (0.042)
RUB		-0.131 (0.146)
AUD		0.026 (0.026)
THB		0.036 (0.048)
CAD		-0.052 (0.031)
Euro	0.0539523 (0.0524937)	0.080 (0.081)
Δ [logRes+logEx]	0.0349175 (0.0382657)	0.106* (0.051)
Constant	-0.0005595 (0.0007976)	0.000 (0.002)
Observations	48	23
R-squared	0.9859	0.995
GBP	-0.036043	0.024

2.6 Danish krone (dkk)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.063 (0.060)	0.107 (0.083)	-0.015 (0.053)	0.004 (0.038)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.021)	0.008 (0.017)
USD	0.091 (0.091)	-0.052 (0.047)	0.053* (0.030)	0.041 (0.037)	0.007 (0.014)	0.000 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.017)
French franc	0.833*** (0.118)	0.851*** (0.102)	0.985*** (0.047)				
Δ [logRes+logEx]	-0.003 (0.020)	0.011 (0.010)	0.016 (0.013)	0.022 (0.021)	0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)
German mark				0.869*** (0.097)	0.964*** (0.019)		
Euro						1.000*** (0.023)	0.939*** (0.055)
Constant	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.852	0.856	0.918	0.838	0.991	0.981	0.965
GBP	0.013	0.094	-0.022	0.086	0.025	0.004	0.073

2.7 Fiji dollar

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	fiji 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.154***	0.057	-0.086	-0.184	0.085	0.086	0.008
	(0.030)	(0.157)	(0.090)	(0.141)	(0.106)	(0.055)	(0.053)
USD	0.379***	1.435**	-1.517***	-2.401**	0.482**	0.229***	0.317
	(0.108)	(0.616)	(0.549)	(1.122)	(0.197)	(0.063)	(0.205)
KRW	-0.158*	-0.981	0.050	0.785**	-0.030	0.044	0.137
	(0.083)	(0.587)	(0.093)	(0.292)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.096)
SGD	-0.040	-0.329	0.091	0.121	-0.064	0.064	-0.151
	(0.092)	(0.273)	(0.122)	(0.204)	(0.276)	(0.090)	(0.208)
AUD	0.266***	0.344**	0.241***	0.214***	-0.195	0.436***	0.436***
	(0.084)	(0.159)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.342)	(0.054)	(0.076)
MYR	0.177*	0.276	-0.074	-0.013	0.330	0.000	0.061
	(0.100)	(0.352)	(0.180)	(0.074)	(0.237)	(0.000)	(0.261)
THB	0.025	-0.046	2.344***	2.528**	-0.037	-0.075	-0.086
	(0.023)	(0.050)	(0.681)	(1.171)	(0.099)	(0.069)	(0.080)
French franc	0.007	0.096	-0.092				
	(0.030)	(0.183)	(0.062)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.006	0.201***	-0.011	-0.025	0.373*	0.031	0.014
	(0.006)	(0.059)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.212)	(0.021)	(0.020)
German mark				-0.207**	0.186		
				(0.087)	(0.183)		
Euro						0.187***	0.106
						(0.042)	(0.103)
Constant	-0.003*	-0.003	-0.001	0.002	-0.006	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	34
R-squared	0.954	0.730	0.963	0.966	0.562	0.946	0.885
GBP	0.191	0.147	0.043	0.158	0.243	0.029	0.171

2.8 Hong Kong dollar (hkd)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	97-00	01-04	05-08
JPY	-0.000	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.021)
USD	0.987***	-326.832	1.010***
	(0.016)	(334.373)	(0.039)
KRW	0.003	0.001	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.029)
SGD	0.003	-0.021	0.020
	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.049)
AUD	0.004	-0.003	0.023
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.020)
MYR	-0.005	327.834	-0.009
	(0.005)	(334.370)	(0.034)
THB	-0.002	0.018	-0.024
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.031)
German mark	-0.003		
	(0.008)		
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.001	-0.027*	-0.018
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.032)
Euro		-0.004	-0.003
		(0.010)	(0.033)
Constant	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	23	48	30
R-squared	0.998	0.998	0.997
GBP	0.012	0.011	-0.017

2.9 Indonesia (idr)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	idr 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.056*	0.298**	0.111	-0.207
	(0.029)	(0.135)	(0.152)	(0.132)
USD	1.475***	-0.118	-2,355.834	0.213
	(0.273)	(0.666)	(4,298.661)	(0.287)
KRW	-0.097*	-0.286***	0.000	0.016
	(0.048)	(0.074)	(0.126)	(0.163)
SGD	-0.002	-0.090	0.657**	0.660*
	(0.072)	(0.783)	(0.263)	(0.331)
AUD	0.011	-0.165	0.051	0.287**
	(0.015)	(0.257)	(0.125)	(0.138)
MYR	-0.006	0.286	2,355.762	-0.017
	(0.012)	(0.372)	(4,298.726)	(0.330)
THB	-0.486	0.164	-0.164	0.584***
	(0.299)	(0.313)	(0.232)	(0.177)
Germany amrk	0.042*	0.345		
	(0.021)	(0.397)		
Δ [logRes+logEx]	-0.006	0.892***	0.736***	0.226***
	(0.006)	(0.065)	(0.117)	(0.041)
Euro			0.388**	-0.314*
			(0.160)	(0.158)
Constant	-0.003***	-0.017*	-0.005	-0.006**
	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Observations	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.998	0.952	0.875	0.892
GBP	0.008	0.568	0.030	-0.222

2.10 Latvian lat (lvl)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	lvl 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.319***	0.168***	0.110***	-0.008
	(0.079)	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.055)
USD	0.427**	0.434***	0.338***	-0.096
	(0.169)	(0.025)	(0.088)	(0.124)
RUB	0.014	-0.006	0.118	0.455***
	(0.039)	(0.006)	(0.085)	(0.154)
German mark	0.260	0.270***		
	(0.148)	(0.032)		
Δ [logRes+logEx]	0.109**	0.024**	0.009	0.027
	(0.045)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Euro			0.197***	0.496***
			(0.024)	(0.092)
Constant	0.004	-0.001	0.000	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Observations	16	36	48	42
R-squared	0.824	0.958	0.925	0.617
GBP	-0.019	0.133	0.237	0.154

2.11 Malaysian ringgit (myr)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	myr 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.072 (0.192)	-0.131 (0.149)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.038 (0.057)
USD	-0.001 (2.019)	0.191 (0.268)	1.000*** (0.000)	0.619*** (0.097)
KRW	-0.163 (0.447)	-0.046 (0.063)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.111 (0.070)
SGD	0.930* (0.493)	1.125* (0.583)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.441*** (0.148)
AUD	-0.075 (0.104)	-0.121 (0.174)	0.000 (0.000)	0.023 (0.046)
THB	0.487 (2.145)	0.065 (0.244)	0.000 (0.000)	0.051 (0.067)
German mark	-0.072 (0.174)	-0.061 (0.205)		
Δ [logRes+logEx]	0.009 (0.038)	0.350*** (0.098)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.081** (0.035)
Euro			-0.000 (0.000)	0.008 (0.088)
Constant	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
Observations	48	36	48	40
R-squared	0.831	0.868	1.000	0.942
GBP	-0.034	-0.021	0.000	0.005

2.12 Maltese lira (mtl)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	mtl 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.054* (0.030)	0.163*** (0.049)	0.011 (0.033)	0.085 (0.086)	0.178 (0.143)	0.041** (0.020)	-0.002 (0.032)
USD	0.405*** (0.053)	0.258*** (0.036)	0.288*** (0.027)	0.242*** (0.077)	0.400** (0.187)	0.212*** (0.034)	0.055* (0.031)
French franc	0.280*** (0.053)	0.407*** (0.064)	0.381*** (0.041)				
Δ [logRes+logEx]	0.061** (0.028)	0.083 (0.089)	0.034 (0.039)	0.212 (0.162)	0.540*** (0.126)	0.073*** (0.026)	0.029 (0.021)
German mark				0.419*** (0.088)	0.168 (0.230)		
Euro						0.502*** (0.024)	0.859*** (0.054)
Constant	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	45	41
R-squared	0.875	0.918	0.933	0.592	0.724	0.934	0.894
GBP	0.261	0.171	0.321	0.253	0.253	0.245	0.089

2.13 Mexico (mxn)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	mxn 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.321 (0.609)	-0.168 (0.248)	0.049 (0.036)	0.497** (0.205)	0.077 (0.057)	0.098 (0.100)	0.179** (0.075)
USD	1.210* (0.675)	1.358*** (0.154)	0.988*** (0.026)	0.702*** (0.226)	1.110*** (0.259)	0.795*** (0.146)	0.617*** (0.134)
French franc	-0.378 (0.592)	-0.189 (0.239)	-0.062 (0.047)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.212* (0.124)	0.132** (0.061)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.212*** (0.074)	0.335*** (0.086)	0.398*** (0.094)	0.336*** (0.090)
German mark				-0.715* (0.411)	-0.073 (0.134)		
Euro						0.229 (0.148)	-0.105 (0.230)
Constant	-0.036** (0.017)	-0.047*** (0.004)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.307	0.758	0.979	0.683	0.805	0.774	0.721
GBP	0.489	-0.001	0.026	0.516	-0.113	-0.122	0.310

2.14 Norwegian kroner (nok)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	nok 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.117 (0.073)	0.119* (0.068)	0.016 (0.058)	-0.037 (0.048)	-0.074 (0.051)	0.081 (0.079)	0.123 (0.168)
USD	0.332*** (0.089)	0.067 (0.067)	0.177*** (0.033)	0.089** (0.044)	0.260** (0.114)	0.017 (0.110)	-0.089 (0.144)
French franc	0.391*** (0.092)	0.699*** (0.116)	0.578*** (0.066)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.017 (0.026)	0.106* (0.054)	0.069** (0.029)	0.050 (0.031)	0.076** (0.035)	0.029 (0.057)	0.093** (0.044)
German mark				0.776*** (0.066)	0.873*** (0.100)		
Euro						0.803*** (0.113)	1.135*** (0.220)
Constant	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.728	0.768	0.781	0.798	0.793	0.624	0.546
GBP	0.160	0.115	0.229	0.171	-0.060	0.100	-0.169

2.15 Papua New Guinea kina (png)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	png 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.209 (0.285)	0.545** (0.200)	0.155 (0.319)	0.004 (0.048)
USD	1.987 (2.344)	1.148*** (0.390)	14,177.172 (8,742.646)	1.068*** (0.093)
KRW	-1.244** (0.515)	-0.038 (0.092)	0.196 (0.282)	0.009 (0.060)
SGD	-0.427 (0.666)	-0.811 (0.647)	-0.147 (0.606)	0.091 (0.143)
AUD	0.288** (0.136)	0.078 (0.307)	0.083 (0.219)	0.013 (0.053)
MYR	-0.008 (0.206)	0.365 (0.233)	-14,176.404 (8,742.737)	-0.191* (0.095)
THB	0.189 (2.626)	0.000 (0.099)	-0.092 (0.392)	-0.004 (0.062)
German mark	0.140 (0.254)	-0.228 (0.293)		
*				
Δ [logRes+logEx]	0.008 (0.012)	0.105** (0.041)	0.308*** (0.050)	0.010 (0.010)
Euro			0.271 (0.309)	-0.017 (0.070)
Constant	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	0.002** (0.001)
Observations	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.725	0.545	0.671	0.965
GBP	-0.134	-0.059	-0.234	0.026

2.16 Russia (rub)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	rub 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.491 (0.437)	-0.272 (0.291)	0.105 (0.070)	0.101** (0.043)
USD	0.873 (1.077)	2.746** (1.142)	0.787*** (0.070)	0.591*** (0.049)
German mark	-0.802 (1.410)	-0.798 (0.783)		
Δ [logRes+logEx]	0.111 (0.141)	0.379** (0.145)	0.101*** (0.019)	0.088* (0.048)
Euro			0.064 (0.070)	0.150 (0.151)
Constant	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.024** (0.012)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Observations	11	36	48	42
R-squared	0.514	0.602	0.863	0.832
GBP	1.420	-0.675	0.045	0.158

2.17 Seychelles rupee (scr)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	scr 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.068 (0.154)	0.230*** (0.033)	0.178*** (0.020)	0.201*** (0.016)	0.030 (0.049)	0.321*** (0.115)	0.073 (0.086)
USD	0.391*** (0.099)	0.417*** (0.024)	0.370*** (0.021)	0.396*** (0.016)	0.586*** (0.113)	0.367*** (0.125)	0.934*** (0.080)
French franc	0.430*** (0.135)	0.250*** (0.038)	0.312*** (0.028)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.015 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.013 (0.015)	0.011 (0.017)	0.007 (0.009)
German mark				0.277*** (0.018)	0.085 (0.140)		
Euro						-0.030 (0.126)	0.149 (0.096)
Constant	0.007 (0.006)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.530	0.972	0.982	0.992	0.565	0.391	0.833
GBP	0.246	0.103	0.140	0.125	0.299	0.343	-0.156

2.18 Thailand (thb)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	thb 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.146 (0.134)	0.093** (0.042)	0.115*** (0.009)	0.106*** (0.008)	-0.005 (0.206)	0.121 (0.107)	0.034 (0.072)
USD	1.033*** (0.130)	0.319 (0.446)	0.754*** (0.040)	0.883*** (0.026)	-0.510 (0.365)	-1,767.883 (2,073.342)	0.255 (0.225)
KRW	-0.186 (0.236)	0.238 (0.457)	0.026 (0.018)	-0.099*** (0.029)	0.116 (0.071)	0.022 (0.099)	0.155 (0.111)
SGD	-0.291 (0.307)	0.304 (0.190)	0.036* (0.020)	0.016 (0.032)	0.598 (0.621)	0.068 (0.217)	0.188 (0.207)
AUD	-0.090 (0.086)	-0.006 (0.061)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.016* (0.009)	-0.264 (0.206)	0.107* (0.060)	-0.014 (0.074)
MYR	0.436 (0.451)	0.018 (0.196)	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.575** (0.259)	1,768.353 (2,073.400)	-0.001 (0.250)
French franc	-0.061 (0.080)	-0.026 (0.074)	0.049*** (0.010)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.004 (0.014)	-0.093 (0.089)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)	0.239 (0.185)	0.368*** (0.114)	0.458*** (0.076)
German mark				0.071*** (0.010)	0.361 (0.345)		
Euro						0.255** (0.118)	0.158 (0.100)
Constant	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.840	0.650	0.999	0.999	0.839	0.828	0.861
GBP	0.012	0.059	0.012	0.010	0.128	-0.043	0.225

2.19 Vanuatu (vuv)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	vuv 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.074 (0.054)	0.583* (0.312)	0.242 (0.164)	0.101 (0.064)	0.097** (0.044)	0.240*** (0.059)	0.035 (0.075)
USD	0.407*** (0.104)	0.347* (0.179)	0.504*** (0.131)	0.744*** (0.080)	0.681*** (0.104)	0.435*** (0.073)	0.463*** (0.079)
French franc	0.320*** (0.104)	-0.180 (0.377)	0.557** (0.237)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.001 (0.003)	0.010 (0.053)	0.152*** (0.056)	0.100** (0.042)	-0.009 (0.042)	0.104*** (0.037)	0.153*** (0.049)
German mark				-0.004 (0.087)	0.039 (0.084)		
Euro						0.293*** (0.081)	-0.009 (0.121)
Constant	0.001 (0.001)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.002)
Observations	34	48	48	48	36	44	37
R-squared	0.834	0.461	0.683	0.872	0.675	0.704	0.709
GBP	0.199	0.250	-0.303	0.159	0.184	0.033	0.511

2.20 Western Samoa tala (wst)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	wst 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.254*** (0.051)	0.152 (0.132)	0.350*** (0.075)	0.153*** (0.042)	0.211*** (0.048)	0.176*** (0.062)	0.037 (0.074)
USD	0.597*** (0.104)	0.400** (0.193)	0.538*** (0.136)	0.759*** (0.047)	0.710*** (0.154)	0.574*** (0.079)	0.542*** (0.070)
French franc	0.075 (0.129)	0.084 (0.228)	0.004 (0.209)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.007 (0.005)	0.114 (0.078)	0.131 (0.078)	0.099*** (0.024)	0.146** (0.069)	0.161*** (0.035)	0.094*** (0.034)
German mark				-0.029 (0.053)	0.172* (0.093)		
Euro						0.405*** (0.083)	0.054 (0.134)
+Constant	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)
Observations	40	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.567	0.447	0.728	0.948	0.717	0.786	0.747
GBP	0.075	0.364	0.108	0.117	-0.093	-0.156	0.367

Table 3: Estimating the De Facto Exchange Rate Regime with commodity prices as instrumental variables for the change in EMP in the case of commodity exporters (01/1980 – 06/2007) numeraire currency = SDR

3.1 Australia (aud)

IV: world commodity price index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	aud-IV 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta [\log \text{Res} + \log \text{Ex}]$	0.295**	0.380	0.632	0.333
	(0.122)	(0.471)	(1.034)	(0.905)
JPY	0.012	0.202	0.101	0.261
	(0.109)	(0.131)	(0.400)	(0.372)
USD	1.010***	0.561	0.768	0.263
	(0.095)	(0.342)	(1.146)	(0.353)
German mark	-0.144	-0.058		
	(0.153)	(0.392)		
Euro			0.507	0.446
			(0.347)	(1.177)
Constant	0.003	-0.007	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Observations	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.829			
GBP	0.123	0.294	-0.375	0.030

Notes:

1. Use the level of commodity prices as instrumental variables for the change in EMP
2. Commodity prices have been converted to SDR
3. The commodity prices have been deflated by the weighted world CPI: we calculate the weighted CPI by using the weights and currencies that are used to define SDR, and have adjusted their weights according to their evolution since 1980
4. Data source: IMF International financial statistics
5. Indices of Unit Values (Prices) In Terms of US Dollars: 2000=100

3.2 Canadian dollar (cad)

IV: world commodity price index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	cad-IV 90-93	94-97	98-01	02-05	06-09
$\Delta [\log \text{Res} + \log \text{Ex}]$	0.288	0.292	0.190	0.633	1.333
	(0.263)	(0.929)	(0.108)	(0.674)	(0.960)
JPY	0.236	0.055	0.073	0.323***	-0.215
	(0.300)	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.105)	(0.841)
USD	0.672*	0.802	0.225	0.320	-0.038
	(0.359)	(0.719)	(0.423)	(0.321)	(1.036)
German mark	0.291	0.040	0.051		
	(0.437)	(0.189)	(0.394)		
Euro				0.331*	-0.159
				(0.183)	(0.713)
Constant	-0.002	-0.005	-0.008	0.003	-0.017
	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.019)
Observations	48	48	8	48	13
R-squared	0.835	0.303	0.626	0.627	

3.3 Chile (clp)

Instrumental Variable : Price of copper

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	clp-IV 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.359*** (0.098)	1.171 (1.113)	0.435 (1.296)	0.333* (0.166)	0.291*** (0.085)	0.310 (0.758)	-11.766 (416.229)
JPY	-0.043 (0.126)	0.883 (0.574)	0.344 (0.955)	0.207*** (0.059)	0.116*** (0.034)	0.113 (0.190)	-5.265 (179.614)
USD	0.534*** (0.190)	-0.731 (2.242)	0.422 (1.724)	0.691*** (0.135)	0.843*** (0.088)	0.587 (0.507)	10.803 (348.039)
French franc	0.483** (0.210)	0.576 (1.318)	0.106 (1.102)				
German mark				-0.006 (0.113)	0.131* (0.064)		
EUR						0.080 (0.332)	-4.345 (173.089)
Constant	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.037 (1.185)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.566	0.289	0.619	0.905	0.902	0.628	
GBP	0.025	0.272	0.128	0.108	-0.089	0.220	-0.192

3.4 Indonesia (idr)

IV: average price of oil and gas

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	idr-IV 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.263 (0.421)	0.869* (0.491)	0.334 (0.467)	0.364 (0.329)
JPY	0.007 (0.123)	0.303 (0.189)	-0.097 (0.329)	-0.142 (0.166)
USD	-0.039 (1.889)	-0.142 (0.876)	27.967 (51.509)	0.571 (1.053)
KRW	0.043 (0.220)	-0.281* (0.153)	0.095 (0.197)	-0.004 (0.231)
SGD	0.013 (0.265)	-0.043 (1.371)	1.374 (1.189)	0.525 (0.481)
AUD	-0.015 (0.058)	-0.188 (0.523)	0.103 (0.187)	0.320* (0.180)
MYR	-0.036 (0.097)	0.306 (0.676)	-28.750 (51.078)	-0.295 (0.911)
THB	0.916 (1.823)	0.169 (0.305)	0.229 (0.414)	0.440 (0.381)
German mark	0.111 (0.207)	0.329 (0.529)		
Euro			0.116 (0.354)	-0.237 (0.292)
Constant	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)
Observations	47	36	48	41
R-squared	0.953	0.952	0.730	0.858
GBP	-0.001	0.547	-0.037	-0.177

3.5 Kuwait (kwd)

IV: Price of oil

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	kwd-IV 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	-0.019 (0.029)	0.224 (0.392)	0.030 (0.033)	-0.053 (0.073)	-0.123 (0.649)	0.095 (0.253)	0.028 (0.046)
JPY	0.079*** (0.016)	0.305 (0.227)	0.126* (0.070)	0.041 (0.041)	0.007 (0.225)	0.085 (0.089)	0.038 (0.044)
USD	0.814*** (0.031)	0.435 (0.394)	0.637*** (0.044)	0.834*** (0.095)	0.945* (0.521)	0.723** (0.317)	0.972*** (0.059)
French franc	0.032 (0.029)	0.270 (0.201)	0.155** (0.063)				
German mark				0.065 (0.073)	0.001 (0.290)		
Euro						0.084 (0.110)	-0.062 (0.052)
Constant	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	46	48	39	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.980	0.755	0.953	0.937	0.873	0.931	0.980
GBP	0.075	-0.009	0.083	0.060	0.048	0.107	0.052

3.6 Malaysia (myr)

IV: average of prices of semiconductors and tin

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	myr-IV 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta [\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.092 (0.060)	-0.154 (0.571)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.253 (0.150)
JPY	-0.137 (0.195)	-0.180 (0.210)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.033 (0.082)
USD	-0.833 (2.205)	-0.194 (0.627)	1.000*** (0.000)	0.493*** (0.168)
KRW	0.042 (0.380)	-0.120 (0.109)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.086 (0.097)
SGD	0.858* (0.442)	1.222* (0.670)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.463** (0.192)
AUD	-0.110 (0.149)	0.029 (0.328)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.028 (0.084)
THB	1.262 (2.428)	0.542 (0.482)	0.000 (0.000)	0.029 (0.094)
German amrk	-0.116 (0.196)	-0.206 (0.352)		
Euro			-0.000 (0.000)	0.103 (0.167)
Constant	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.004 (0.003)
Observations	48	36	48	40
R-squared	0.798	0.784	1.000	0.903
GBP	0.034	-0.093	0.000	0.059

3.7 Mexico (mxn)

IV: oil price

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	mxn-IV 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	2.300 (4.951)	1.056 (1.249)	-0.050 (0.032)	0.573 (0.479)	0.174 (0.274)	1.069 (1.552)	0.389 (0.754)
JPY	1.250 (3.833)	0.629 (1.143)	0.095 (0.097)	0.613 (0.506)	0.065 (0.064)	0.557 (1.055)	0.193 (0.256)
USD	0.504 (4.467)	-0.418 (2.482)	0.996*** (0.039)	0.143 (0.811)	1.314*** (0.388)	-0.109 (2.031)	0.556 (0.903)
French franc	0.618 (6.156)	1.492 (2.760)	-0.117 (0.090)				
German mark				-0.341 (0.928)	-0.174 (0.194)		
Euro						0.808 (1.342)	-0.050 (0.856)
Constant	-0.003 (0.130)	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.004)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
GBP	-1.373	-0.703	0.027	0.584	-0.205	-0.256	0.301
R-squared			0.950		0.754	0.297	0.714

3.8 Norway (nok)

IV: oil price

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	nok-IV 80- 83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	-0.219 (0.469)	0.097 (0.090)	0.081 (0.079)	-0.182 (0.374)	0.219* (0.113)	30.036 (2,045.207)	0.206 (0.471)
JPY	0.075 (0.166)	0.117* (0.066)	0.018 (0.058)	-0.121 (0.150)	0.001 (0.077)	14.527 (983.036)	0.155 (0.205)
USD	0.178 (0.350)	0.065 (0.068)	0.179*** (0.035)	-0.012 (0.235)	0.279* (0.161)	7.677 (523.059)	-0.066 (0.161)
French franc	0.334*** (0.115)	0.699*** (0.118)	0.578*** (0.066)				
German mark				0.865*** (0.226)	0.779*** (0.134)		
EUR						-29.766 (2,086.199)	1.095*** (0.345)
Constant	0.001 (0.008)	-0.005* (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.155 (10.623)	-0.001 (0.004)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.327	0.767	0.780	0.203	0.610		0.493
GBP	0.412	0.118	0.225	0.269	-0.059	8.561	-0.184

3.9 Papua New Guinea kina (png)

IV: average price of gold, copper, oil, gas and timber

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	png-IV 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
Δ [logRes+logEx]	-0.001	0.139	0.028	-0.042
	(0.028)	(0.179)	(0.888)	(0.035)
JPY	0.193	0.577**	0.759	0.009
	(0.325)	(0.248)	(1.952)	(0.056)
USD	2.019	1.185***	1.463	1.243***
	(2.543)	(0.360)	(2.037)	(0.150)
KRW	-1.264**	-0.047	-0.405	-0.023
	(0.502)	(0.099)	(1.553)	(0.110)
SGD	-0.457	-0.885	-0.509	0.047
	(0.666)	(0.615)	(2.016)	(0.229)
AUD	0.311**	0.054	0.300	-0.042
	(0.141)	(0.316)	(0.894)	(0.061)
MYR	-0.003	0.356	0.000	-0.351**
	(0.213)	(0.258)	(0.000)	(0.158)
THB	0.205	0.034	-0.335	0.014
	(2.862)	(0.182)	(0.745)	(0.083)
German mark	0.134	-0.229		
	(0.329)	(0.292)		
Euro			0.498	-0.005
			(0.578)	(0.094)
Constant	-0.008**	-0.009	-0.007	0.004**
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.002)
Observations	47	36	48	41
R-squared	0.715	0.533	0.433	0.941
GBP	-0.138	-0.045	-0.770	0.108

3.10 Russia (rub)

IV: Price of oil

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	rub-IV 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
Δ [logRes+logEx]	-0.243	0.661*	0.125**	-0.066
	(0.280)	(0.353)	(0.047)	(0.552)
JPY	-0.126	-0.381	0.106	0.121
	(0.496)	(0.411)	(0.071)	(0.117)
USD	1.248	2.353**	0.755***	0.542***
	(1.278)	(0.921)	(0.083)	(0.197)
German mark	-1.444	-0.059		
	(0.794)	(1.162)		
Euro			0.067	0.104
			(0.072)	(0.373)
Constant	0.032	-0.006	-0.007***	0.006
	(0.051)	(0.021)	(0.003)	(0.024)
Observations	11	36	48	41
R-squared	0.040	0.399	0.860	0.728
GBP	1.322	-0.912	0.072	0.233

3.11 Thailand (thb)

IV: rice

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	thb-IV 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.716	0.483	0.218	-0.860	0.235	0.596	0.605***
	(1.159)	(0.957)	(2.012)	(11.002)	(0.258)	(0.534)	(0.178)
JPY	-0.289	0.072	0.237	-0.153	-0.007	0.094	0.069
	(0.744)	(0.167)	(1.099)	(3.254)	(0.227)	(0.087)	(0.077)
USD	1.459	1.094	0.734***	1.497	-0.515	0.582*	0.419
	(1.255)	(1.246)	(0.224)	(7.833)	(0.426)	(0.289)	(0.286)
KRW	0.694	0.072	-0.110	-0.444	0.117	0.017	0.065
	(1.752)	(0.760)	(1.224)	(4.436)	(0.101)	(0.147)	(0.093)
SGD	0.498	-0.081	-0.246	0.680	0.605	-0.109	0.194
	(1.553)	(0.694)	(2.538)	(8.331)	(0.677)	(0.395)	(0.252)
AUD	-0.011	-0.264	0.028	-0.245	-0.265	0.075	-0.023
	(0.355)	(0.514)	(0.133)	(3.287)	(0.209)	(0.107)	(0.080)
MYR	-2.301	-0.651	0.151	0.312	0.578**	0.000	-0.176
	(4.483)	(1.358)	(1.393)	(3.972)	(0.250)	(0.000)	(0.305)
French franc	0.181	0.471	0.192				
	(0.462)	(0.859)	(1.278)				
German mark				-0.505	0.361		
				(7.240)	(0.346)		
Euro						0.373	0.165
						(0.310)	(0.107)
Constant	0.007	-0.013	-0.005	0.010	0.003	-0.003	-0.007***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.046)	(0.128)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
GBP	0.769	0.286	0.014	-0.141	0.127	-0.032	0.286

3.12 Western Samoa tala (Wst)

IV: Price of coconuts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	wst-IV 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	-7.677	0.288	0.257	0.262	0.795	1.539	0.225
	(1,794.239)	(0.262)	(0.460)	(0.167)	(0.596)	(4.821)	(0.228)
JPY	-16.820	0.006	0.398**	0.244**	0.402*	0.366	0.046
	(3,987.521)	(0.234)	(0.179)	(0.111)	(0.198)	(0.950)	(0.096)
USD	-33.465	0.337	0.414	0.609***	0.010	1.387	0.540***
	(7,961.609)	(0.205)	(0.490)	(0.176)	(0.751)	(2.984)	(0.082)
French franc	33.903	0.207	0.247				
	(7,902.798)	(0.291)	(0.996)				
German mark				0.062	0.274		
				(0.125)	(0.269)		
Euro						0.335	0.073
						(0.605)	(0.149)
Constant	0.910	-0.014	-0.006	0.000	-0.004	-0.002	-0.000
	(215.500)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.002)
Observations	40	48	48	48	36	48	41
GBP	17.382	0.450	-0.059	0.084	0.313	-1.089	0.342
R-squared		0.238	0.660	0.889			0.540

Table 4:

Extension 1
Estimating the De Facto Exchange Rate Regime
By allowing for trends in level and in the currency weights
(01/1980 – 06/2007) numeraire currency = SDR

4.1 China (cny)

	(1)
	Cny 05-08
EUR	0.006
	(0.052)
USD	1.070
	(1.917)
JPY	0.029
	(0.025)
t_usd	0.000
	(0.006)
KRW	0.060
	(0.041)
SGD	-0.132*
	(0.067)
MYR	0.009
	(0.036)
RUB	-0.091
	(0.094)
AUD	-0.010
	(0.024)
THB	0.053
	(0.031)
CAD	-0.032
	(0.026)
Constant	-0.070**
	(0.025)
t2	2.284**
	(0.801)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.004
	(0.043)
Observations	23
R-squared	0.997
GBP	0.038

Notes:

1. $t2 = observation/10,000$
2. $t_currency = observation * currency\ value$
3. $\Delta[\log EMP] = \Delta[\log Res + \log Ex]$

4.2 Danish krone (dkk)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	dkk 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.215*	0.008	1.974***	-0.647	0.289	-0.320	0.448
	(0.114)	(0.315)	(0.456)	(0.434)	(0.192)	(0.559)	(0.350)
USD	-0.092	0.267	-0.673***	1.020**	0.431	-0.023	-0.493
	(0.093)	(0.272)	(0.214)	(0.467)	(0.342)	(0.350)	(0.612)
French franc	1.347***	1.295***	1.349***				
	(0.136)	(0.392)	(0.408)				
t_jpy	0.017***	0.001	-0.016***	0.004	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
t_usd	0.009*	-0.004	0.006***	-0.006**	-0.002	0.000	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
t_French franc	-0.027***	-0.006	-0.003				
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.003)				
t2	-3.670**	-0.444	0.457	0.752	-0.104	-0.370	-0.223
	(1.447)	(0.730)	(0.500)	(0.792)	(0.300)	(0.528)	(0.259)
Δ[logEMP]	-0.029	0.018	0.014	0.023	0.002	0.005	-0.001
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.007)
German mark				1.853***	0.201		
				(0.561)	(0.345)		
EUR						1.477***	-0.663
						(0.361)	(0.954)
t_eur						-0.002	0.005*
						(0.001)	(0.003)
Constant	0.007*	0.002	-0.004	-0.012	0.002	0.010	0.007
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.008)
t_German mark				-0.006	0.004**		
				(0.004)	(0.002)		
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.908	0.865	0.946	0.846	0.992	0.983	0.971
GBP	-0.040	-0.569	-1.650	-1.225	0.079	-0.133	1.708

4.3 Latvian lat (lvl)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	lvl 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-3.037	0.752**	0.165	1.147
	(2.372)	(0.283)	(0.631)	(2.151)
USD	5.144	0.770	2.197***	1.993
	(4.026)	(1.890)	(0.760)	(3.486)
RUB	0.110	-0.765	-1.932**	-4.694
	(0.983)	(1.743)	(0.788)	(5.805)
German mark	0.453	-0.900		
	(4.168)	(0.778)		
t_jpy	0.018	-0.003*	-0.000	-0.004
	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)
t_usd	-0.025	-0.001	-0.007**	-0.007
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.012)
t_rub	-0.001	0.003	0.008**	0.017
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.020)
t_German mark	-0.001	0.006		
	(0.023)	(0.004)		

EUR			-0.446	1.545
			(0.498)	(4.280)
t_eur			0.003	-0.004
			(0.002)	(0.014)
t2	-3.840	1.020	-0.281	0.098
	(4.310)	(2.031)	(0.532)	(1.373)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.029	0.021	0.011	0.033
	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.030)
Constant	0.073	-0.023	0.007	-0.006
	(0.080)	(0.044)	(0.014)	(0.041)
Observations	16	36	48	42
R-squared	0.953	0.964	0.941	0.629
GBP	-1.670	1.143	1.016	1.009

4.4 Maltese lira (mtl)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	mtl 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.115	0.153	0.539	-0.230	2.178	-0.050	-0.756
	(0.109)	(0.230)	(0.423)	(0.632)	(3.207)	(0.391)	(0.564)
USD	0.355***	0.834***	0.501**	0.629	-8.397*	1.967***	2.174**
	(0.088)	(0.175)	(0.225)	(0.823)	(4.491)	(0.362)	(0.821)
French franc	0.432***	-0.076	0.216				
	(0.089)	(0.335)	(0.332)				
t_jpy	0.009**	-0.001	-0.004	0.002	-0.009	0.000	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.002)
t_usd	0.003	-0.008***	-0.002	-0.002	0.042*	-0.007***	-0.007**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.001)	(0.003)
t_French franc	-0.009***	0.007*	0.001				
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)				
German mark				0.706	5.671**		
				(1.203)	(2.084)		
EUR						-0.921**	-1.088
						(0.340)	(1.383)
t_eur						0.006***	0.006
						(0.001)	(0.004)
t_German mark				-0.002	-0.026**		
				(0.007)	(0.011)		
t2	-1.375	-0.510	0.351	2.181	-1.211	0.016	0.119
	(1.051)	(0.608)	(0.422)	(1.739)	(1.961)	(0.498)	(0.443)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.039	0.101	0.041	0.219	0.598***	0.062**	0.022
	(0.026)	(0.090)	(0.036)	(0.170)	(0.161)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Constant	0.004	0.003	-0.004	-0.039	0.026	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	45	41
R-squared	0.899	0.942	0.947	0.608	0.760	0.962	0.911
GBP	0.328	0.089	-0.257	-0.106	1.548	0.004	0.670

4.5 Mexico (mxn)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	mxn 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.606	0.896	1.013*	-5.586**	1.865	1.575	-0.740
	(0.734)	(1.312)	(0.548)	(2.116)	(1.614)	(1.887)	(2.752)
USD	0.272	0.993	0.841***	5.408*	6.148	2.699	0.541
	(0.573)	(1.012)	(0.278)	(2.703)	(4.247)	(2.095)	(3.784)
French franc	0.412	0.794	-1.248**				
	(0.523)	(1.313)	(0.561)				
t_jpy	-0.036	-0.014	-0.008*	0.036***	-0.008	-0.006	0.003
	(0.056)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
t_usd	0.048	0.002	0.001	-0.030	-0.025	-0.007	0.000
	(0.054)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.013)
t_F. franc	-0.030	-0.014	0.010**				
	(0.039)	(0.018)	(0.005)				
Ger. mark				16.001***	-4.846**		
				(5.061)	(2.329)		
EUR						0.523	8.341*
						(1.814)	(4.520)
t_eur						-0.001	-0.028*
						(0.007)	(0.015)
t_Ger. mark				-0.104***	0.023*		
				(0.033)	(0.011)		
t2	-14.909	-10.595***	0.984	-3.209	-1.391	0.036	1.007
	(9.239)	(2.976)	(0.805)	(3.802)	(2.922)	(1.681)	(1.671)
Δ[logEMP]	0.207*	0.112	-0.005	0.208***	0.346***	0.395***	0.360***
	(0.122)	(0.068)	(0.004)	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.083)
Constant	-0.003	0.026	-0.019*	0.046	0.017	-0.008	-0.032
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.362	0.823	0.982	0.780	0.833	0.786	0.744
GBP	-0.291	-1.682	0.394	-14.823	-2.168	-3.797	-7.142

4.6 Norwegian kroner (nok)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	nok 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.226	0.444	2.307***	-0.637	-0.037	0.140	-1.575
	(0.160)	(0.346)	(0.682)	(0.530)	(0.850)	(1.846)	(3.651)
USD	0.323***	0.031	0.262	0.391	1.064	0.631	5.032
	(0.115)	(0.470)	(0.286)	(0.529)	(2.637)	(2.511)	(3.519)
French franc	0.894***	0.704*	-0.773				
	(0.126)	(0.400)	(0.834)				
t_jpy	0.020***	-0.005	-0.018***	0.004	-0.000	-0.000	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.012)
t_usd	0.003	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.017
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)
t_Fr. franc	-0.027***	0.000	0.011				
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)				
Ger. mark				3.005***	-0.343		
				(1.008)	(2.127)		
t_G. mark				-0.014**	0.006		
				(0.006)	(0.010)		
EUR						-2.259	5.779
						(2.733)	(5.261)

t_eur						0.012	-0.015
						(0.011)	(0.017)
t2	-4.883***	0.673	0.490	1.974	-2.674	-2.348	-1.183
	(1.655)	(1.212)	(0.717)	(1.306)	(2.111)	(2.307)	(2.530)
Δ[logEMP]	0.039*	0.107*	0.050*	0.060*	0.062	0.010	0.082*
	(0.021)	(0.060)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Constant	0.007*	-0.010	-0.005	-0.034	0.055	0.061	0.038
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.079)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.814	0.774	0.864	0.823	0.804	0.658	0.587
GBP	0.009	-0.179	-0.796	-1.760	0.316	2.489	-8.235

4.7 Russia (rub)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	rub 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-55.359	-8.026	2.014	2.132*
	(46.199)	(6.905)	(1.546)	(1.056)
USD	-35.260	-42.904	-0.419	2.101
	(65.462)	(25.901)	(1.302)	(1.374)
German mark	-55.747	28.974		
	(41.391)	(19.384)		
t_jpy	0.294	0.037	-0.008	-0.007*
	(0.248)	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.004)
t_usd	0.189	0.221*	0.005	-0.005
	(0.347)	(0.129)	(0.005)	(0.004)
t_German mark	0.300	-0.142		
	(0.227)	(0.095)		
EUR			1.986*	-8.006***
			(1.171)	(2.539)
t_eur			-0.008*	0.027***
			(0.004)	(0.008)
t2	-10.071	-18.877	4.448***	-0.461
	(35.121)	(11.763)	(1.218)	(0.761)
Δ[logEMP]	0.249	0.287***	0.134***	0.076**
	(0.280)	(0.083)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Constant	0.167	0.373	-0.123***	0.013
	(0.665)	(0.245)	(0.033)	(0.023)
Observations	11	36	48	42
R-squared	0.873	0.721	0.926	0.885
GBP	147.365	22.956	-2.580	4.773

4.8 Seychelles rupee (scr)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	scr 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.411	-0.069	0.406*	0.062	1.209	0.288	-0.795
	(0.435)	(0.108)	(0.233)	(0.200)	(1.197)	(2.232)	(2.336)
USD	0.383***	0.941***	-0.169	0.533***	-2.579	-0.561	3.901
	(0.136)	(0.090)	(0.135)	(0.159)	(2.938)	(2.731)	(2.574)
French franc	0.579***	0.295*	0.722***				
	(0.190)	(0.156)	(0.162)				
t_jpy	0.016	0.003**	-0.002	0.001	-0.005	0.000	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
t_usd	0.002	-0.007***	0.005***	-0.001	0.015	0.003	-0.010
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.009)

t Fr. franc	-0.011*	0.000	-0.003**				
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.001)				
t2	-4.150	0.083	0.170	-0.031	-1.871	-2.320	-3.870**
	(4.002)	(0.276)	(0.192)	(0.325)	(1.793)	(2.342)	(1.627)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.009	-0.000	-0.000	-0.004*	0.010	0.010	0.013
	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.009)
Ger. mark				0.322	0.433		
				(0.292)	(2.919)		
EUR						0.221	-3.943
						(1.990)	(3.949)
t eur						-0.001	0.014
						(0.008)	(0.013)
Constant	0.016	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.037	0.061	0.116**
	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.049)
t Ger. mark				-0.000	-0.002		
				(0.002)	(0.014)		
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.560	0.983	0.992	0.992	0.604	0.406	0.881
GBP	0.449	-0.167	0.040	0.084	1.937	1.051	1.836

4.9 Vanuatu (vuv)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	vuv 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.222	-0.109	3.527*	-0.387	0.635	0.374	-1.079
	(0.191)	(0.701)	(1.981)	(0.851)	(1.008)	(1.198)	(2.118)
USD	-0.094	0.893*	-2.218***	0.779	-0.344	-0.427	0.911
	(0.255)	(0.470)	(0.812)	(0.946)	(2.811)	(1.445)	(2.971)
French franc	0.923***	2.572*	-0.462				
	(0.223)	(1.327)	(2.082)				
t_jpy	0.011*	0.008	-0.027*	0.003	-0.002	-0.001	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
t_usd	0.019**	-0.008	0.023***	-0.000	0.005	0.003	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.010)
t_Fr. franc	-0.023***	-0.036*	0.009				
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.017)				
Ger. mark				2.549***	-3.045		
				(0.822)	(2.197)		
t Ger. mark				-0.016***	0.015		
				(0.005)	(0.011)		
EUR						-1.278	2.357
						(1.434)	(4.029)
t eur						0.006	-0.008
						(0.006)	(0.013)
t2	-1.321	-2.950	1.128	2.307**	-3.370	2.386*	-0.196
	(1.588)	(3.066)	(1.935)	(0.938)	(2.046)	(1.326)	(1.711)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	-0.000	0.026	0.140**	0.107**	-0.008	0.097**	0.152***
	(0.003)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.050)
Constant	0.003	0.012	-0.014	-0.039**	0.066	-0.061*	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.053)
Observations	34	48	48	48	36	44	37
R-squared	0.905	0.515	0.736	0.889	0.743	0.731	0.716
GBP	0.392	-2.356	0.152	-1.942	3.755	2.330	-1.190

4.10 Western Samoa tala (wst)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	wst 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.198 (0.237)	1.097 (0.920)	4.081** (1.847)	-0.867** (0.388)	0.125 (1.652)	2.129 (1.277)	0.777 (2.049)
USD	0.584*** (0.175)	-1.411 (1.072)	-1.532 (1.026)	1.762*** (0.648)	-0.064 (2.942)	-2.972** (1.441)	-0.503 (2.377)
French franc	-0.023 (0.260)	1.077 (1.242)	-4.268 (2.828)				
t_jpy	0.001 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.030** (0.015)	0.006** (0.002)	0.000 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.007)
t_usd	0.001 (0.010)	0.026* (0.014)	0.018** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.014)	0.014** (0.005)	0.003 (0.008)
t_Fr. franc	0.004 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.016)	0.036 (0.023)				
Ger. mark				1.003 (0.668)	-3.143 (2.857)		
t_Ger. mark				-0.006 (0.004)	0.016 (0.014)		
EUR						0.654 (1.175)	0.162 (3.157)
t_eur						-0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.010)
t2	-2.156 (4.721)	5.195* (2.722)	1.826 (2.064)	0.616 (0.742)	-5.839** (2.650)	2.062* (1.173)	0.516 (1.559)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.008 (0.007)	0.086 (0.072)	0.118* (0.069)	0.093*** (0.024)	0.092 (0.076)	0.156*** (0.035)	0.094** (0.036)
Constant	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.045* (0.023)	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.012)	0.118** (0.055)	-0.053* (0.031)	-0.016 (0.048)
Observations	40	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.576	0.522	0.786	0.954	0.782	0.826	0.751
GBP	0.241	0.238	2.719	-0.898	4.083	1.189	0.564

Table 5:**Extension 2:**

Taking into account the relative variance of reserve changes and exchange rate changes in the computation of Exchange Market Pressure When Estimating the De Facto Exchange Rate Regime

(01/1980 – 06/2007) numeraire currency = SDR

5.1 Australian dollar (aud)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	aud 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.060 (0.082)	0.171*** (0.030)	0.174*** (0.050)	0.145*** (0.035)
USD	0.868*** (0.062)	0.436*** (0.073)	0.437*** (0.083)	0.379*** (0.030)
Germany	-0.044 (0.110)	0.228** (0.107)		
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.718*** (0.102)	1.038*** (0.061)	0.911*** (0.058)	0.999*** (0.036)
EUR			0.374*** (0.053)	0.382*** (0.081)
Constant	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Observations	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.891	0.907	0.923	0.951
GBP	0.116	0.166	0.014	0.093
λ	0.541	0.145	0.153	0.056

Notes:

- $\lambda = \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])$
- $\Delta[\log EMP] = \{ \text{var} \Delta[\log Ex] / (\text{var} \Delta[\log Ex] + \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])) \} \cdot \Delta[\log Res] + \{ \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res]) / (\text{var} \Delta[\log Ex] + \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])) \} \cdot \Delta[\log Ex]$

5.2 Canadian dollar (cad)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	cad 90-93	94-97	98-01	02-05	06-09
JPY	0.149*** (0.021)	0.140*** (0.027)	0.105 (0.050)	0.295*** (0.081)	-0.092 (0.209)
USD	0.562*** (0.025)	0.544*** (0.044)	0.394* (0.139)	0.404*** (0.095)	0.465* (0.206)
Germany	0.209*** (0.024)	0.221*** (0.039)	0.150 (0.155)		
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.770*** (0.033)	0.798*** (0.055)	0.628*** (0.060)	0.923*** (0.162)	0.989*** (0.233)
EUR				0.338** (0.151)	0.230 (0.343)
Constant	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)
Observations	48	48	8	48	14
R-squared	0.994	0.963	0.939	0.785	0.828
GBP	0.080	0.096	0.351	-0.037	0.397
λ	0.076	0.077	0.121	0.710	0.555

5.3 Chile (clp)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	clp 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.025 (0.053)	0.662** (0.317)	0.194** (0.079)	0.201*** (0.057)	0.131*** (0.022)	0.130 (0.150)	0.094 (0.061)
USD	0.519*** (0.089)	0.752** (0.279)	0.518*** (0.071)	0.646*** (0.073)	0.704*** (0.059)	0.520** (0.246)	0.480*** (0.083)
French franc	0.376*** (0.085)	-0.202 (0.466)	0.133* (0.069)				
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.838*** (0.091)	0.910* (0.498)	0.754*** (0.102)	0.778*** (0.125)	0.709*** (0.075)	0.939*** (0.322)	0.909*** (0.068)
German mark				0.027 (0.092)	0.184*** (0.042)		
EUR						0.098 (0.132)	0.484*** (0.107)
Constant	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.922	0.708	0.952	0.906	0.962	0.487	0.927
GBP	0.080	-0.212	0.156	0.126	-0.019	0.252	-0.058
λ	0.198	1.292	0.208	1.007	0.349	2.357	0.223

5.4 Chinese yuan (cny)

	(1)	(2)
	cny 01-04	05-08
EUR	0.074 (0.069)	0.079 (0.081)
USD	0.949*** (0.058)	1.058*** (0.110)
JPY	0.003 (0.011)	0.039 (0.035)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.136 (0.141)	0.209* (0.101)
KRW		0.061 (0.052)
SGD		-0.164 (0.105)
MYR		0.025 (0.042)
RUB		-0.131 (0.147)
AUD		0.027 (0.026)
THB		0.037 (0.048)
CAD		-0.052 (0.031)
Constant	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)
Observations	48	23
R-squared	0.987	0.995
GBP	-0.026	0.023
λ	0.623	1.025

5.5 Danish krone (dkk)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	dkk 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.065** (0.024)	0.228*** (0.056)	0.120*** (0.030)	0.182*** (0.026)	0.053** (0.019)	0.018 (0.027)	0.044** (0.019)
USD	0.619*** (0.050)	0.368*** (0.064)	0.222*** (0.051)	0.343*** (0.025)	0.126** (0.048)	0.072 (0.052)	0.103* (0.056)
French franc	0.173*** (0.055)	0.317*** (0.112)	0.612*** (0.080)				
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	1.283*** (0.095)	0.902*** (0.146)	0.608*** (0.123)	0.940*** (0.061)	0.322*** (0.116)	0.164 (0.103)	0.313** (0.153)
German mark				0.340*** (0.047)	0.763*** (0.079)		
EUR						0.889*** (0.080)	0.749*** (0.109)
Constant	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.981	0.946	0.958	0.983	0.994	0.984	0.973
GBP	0.143	0.088	0.045	0.135	0.058	0.022	0.104
λ	0.033	0.032	0.071	0.021	0.035	0.141	0.079

5.6 Hong Kong dollar (hkd)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	hkd 97-00	01-04	05-08
JPY	0.004 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.021)
USD	0.975*** (0.032)	1.005*** (0.011)	1.008*** (0.040)
KRW	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.014)	0.007 (0.029)
SGD	0.000 (0.009)	-0.023 (0.023)	0.020 (0.049)
AUD	0.004 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.023 (0.020)
MYR	-0.005 (0.005)		-0.008 (0.034)
THB	-0.000 (0.005)	0.018 (0.018)	-0.025 (0.032)
Germany	0.005 (0.016)		
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.022 (0.043)	-0.032** (0.016)	-0.017 (0.034)
EUR		-0.005 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.034)
Constant	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	23	48	30
R-squared	0.998	0.997	0.997
GBP	0.015	0.009	-0.016
λ	0.111	0.689	0.941

5.7 Malaysian ringgit (myr)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	myr 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.156** (0.077)	-0.171 (0.166)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.021 (0.047)
USD	0.085 (0.732)	0.028 (0.306)	1.000*** (0.000)	0.490*** (0.079)
KRW	0.133 (0.145)	-0.077 (0.068)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.057 (0.055)
SGD	0.039 (0.151)	1.243* (0.609)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.299*** (0.105)
AUD	-0.039 (0.048)	-0.072 (0.201)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.004 (0.038)
THB	0.253 (0.842)	0.246 (0.227)	0.000 (0.000)	0.016 (0.053)
German mark	0.218*** (0.070)	-0.140 (0.247)		
$\Delta[\log\text{EMP}]$	0.958*** (0.071)	0.305 (0.236)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.588*** (0.126)
EUR			-0.000 (0.000)	0.167** (0.078)
Constant	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Observations	48	36	48	40
R-squared	0.981	0.837	1.000	0.969
GBP	0.155	-0.059	0.000	0.068
λ	0.062	1.612	0.292	0.254

5.8 Panama (pab)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	pab 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)
USD	0.988*** (0.007)	1.005*** (0.007)	0.997*** (0.010)	0.987*** (0.007)	0.982*** (0.013)	0.961*** (0.010)	0.998*** (0.017)
French franc	0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)				
$\Delta[\log\text{EMP}]$	0.026* (0.013)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.015)	0.023** (0.011)	0.034 (0.023)	0.062*** (0.015)	0.006 (0.027)
German mark				0.005 (0.004)	0.013* (0.007)		
EUR						0.017*** (0.005)	0.006 (0.011)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	37
R-squared	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
GBP	0.005	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.009	-0.004
λ	0.002	0.004	0.016	0.038	0.008	0.015	0.004

Table 6:

Extension 3

Entering the change in the interest rate alongside the change in reserves and the change in the exchange rate in the definition of Exchange Market Pressure when Estimating the De Facto Exchange Rate Regime

(01/1980 – 06/2007) numeraire currency = SDR

6.1 Australian dollar (aud)

	aud 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.062 (0.083)	0.170*** (0.029)	0.143*** (0.048)	0.149*** (0.032)
USD	0.866*** (0.061)	0.445*** (0.082)	0.466*** (0.092)	0.370*** (0.040)
Germany	-0.047 (0.109)	0.249** (0.110)		
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.472*** (0.064)	0.933*** (0.060)	0.774*** (0.043)	0.909*** (0.039)
EUR			0.364*** (0.048)	0.394*** (0.069)
Constant	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
Observations	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.894	0.904	0.922	0.939
GBP	0.119	0.137	0.027	0.088
λ	0.541	0.145	0.153	0.056
γ	0.011	0.009	0.026	0.039

Notes:

1. $\lambda = \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])$
2. $\gamma = \text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta[i])$
3. $\Delta[\log EMP] = \{\text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta[\log Res])\} \cdot \Delta[\log Res] + \{\text{var}(\Delta[\log Ex]) / \text{Var}(\Delta i)\} \cdot \Delta i + \Delta[\log Ex]$
that is,
 $\Delta[\log EMP] = \lambda \cdot \Delta[\log Res] + \gamma \cdot \Delta i + \Delta[\log Ex]$

6.2 Canadian dollar (cad)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	cad 90-93	94-97	98-01	02-05	06-09
JPY	0.154*** (0.022)	0.142*** (0.027)	0.112 (0.053)	0.291*** (0.080)	-0.099 (0.209)
USD	0.552*** (0.025)	0.541*** (0.045)	0.375* (0.142)	0.421*** (0.090)	0.466** (0.199)
Germany	0.206*** (0.026)	0.220*** (0.039)	0.165 (0.155)		
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.729*** (0.032)	0.753*** (0.051)	0.588*** (0.051)	0.521*** (0.086)	0.637*** (0.149)
EUR				0.303* (0.151)	0.242 (0.336)
Constant	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)
Observations	47	48	8	48	14
R-squared	0.994	0.962	0.937	0.792	0.829
GBP	0.088	0.097	0.347	-0.014	0.391
λ	0.076	0.077	0.121	0.710	0.555
γ	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.029	0.014

6.3 Chinese yuan (cny)

	(1)	(2)
	cny 01-04	05-08
EUR	0.071 (0.067)	0.078 (0.079)
USD	0.956*** (0.051)	1.040*** (0.113)
JPY	0.000 (0.009)	0.039 (0.034)
$\Delta[\log EMP]$	0.078 (0.080)	0.105* (0.050)
KRW		0.062 (0.053)
SGD		-0.162 (0.104)
MYR		0.040 (0.054)
RUB		-0.123 (0.145)
AUD		0.021 (0.026)
THB		0.034 (0.045)
CAD		-0.052 (0.031)
Constant	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)
Observations	48	22
R-squared	0.987	0.995
GBP	-0.027	0.022
λ	0.623	1.025
γ	0.028	0.011

6.4 Hong Kong dollar (hkd)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	hkd 97-00	01-04	05-08
JPY	0.004 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.022)
USD	0.975*** (0.032)	1.007*** (0.010)	1.006*** (0.040)
KRW	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.014)	0.006 (0.029)
SGD	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.022 (0.023)	0.020 (0.049)
AUD	0.004 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.023 (0.020)
MYR	-0.005 (0.005)		-0.007 (0.034)
THB	-0.000 (0.005)	0.018 (0.018)	-0.025 (0.032)
Germany	0.005 (0.016)		
$\Delta[\log\text{EMP}]$	0.023 (0.042)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.014 (0.035)
EUR		-0.006 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.034)
Constant	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	23	48	30
R-squared	0.999	0.997	0.997
GBP	0.015	0.008	-0.015
λ	0.111	0.689	0.941
γ	0.000	0.002	0.001

6.5 Norway (nok)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	nok 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.091*** (0.026)	0.190*** (0.050)	0.124*** (0.035)	0.146*** (0.030)	0.128*** (0.022)	0.193*** (0.055)	0.169** (0.070)
USD	0.500*** (0.045)	0.282*** (0.046)	0.305*** (0.025)	0.317*** (0.040)	0.388*** (0.034)	0.298*** (0.058)	0.211*** (0.067)
French	0.315*** (0.056)	0.444*** (0.063)	0.411*** (0.042)				
$\Delta[\log\text{EMP}]$	0.994*** (0.046)	0.679*** (0.114)	0.690*** (0.077)	0.750*** (0.085)	0.827*** (0.062)	0.782*** (0.054)	0.754*** (0.058)
Germany				0.415*** (0.050)	0.400*** (0.036)		
EUR						0.358*** (0.064)	0.556*** (0.104)
Constant	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.959	0.919	0.947	0.959	0.977	0.896	0.885
GBP	0.094	0.085	0.160	0.122	0.084	0.151	0.064
λ	0.032	0.140	0.108	0.075	0.061	0.149	0.175
γ	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.006	0.024

Table 7
Extension 4:
Check for robustness with respect to the numeraire used to define currency
(01/1980 – 06/2007)
(numeraire currency = Swiss Franc)

7.1 Australian dollar (aud)

In swissf	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	aud 92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.066	0.201	0.200*	0.172
	(0.103)	(0.133)	(0.104)	(0.151)
USD	0.825***	0.604**	0.168	0.118
	(0.111)	(0.245)	(0.187)	(0.142)
Germany	0.106	-0.012		
	(0.190)	(0.234)		
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.203***	0.076	0.180***	0.055
	(0.046)	(0.071)	(0.041)	(0.039)
EUR			0.778***	0.173
			(0.129)	(0.258)
Constant	0.003	-0.006	-0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	48	36	48	42
R-squared	0.809	0.340	0.582	0.186
GBP	0.136	0.207	-0.146	0.537

7.2 Botswana pula (bwp)

In swissf	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	bwp 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.366**	0.486**	-0.031	-0.036	0.107	0.112	0.320*
	(0.147)	(0.217)	(0.103)	(0.039)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.172)
USD	0.672***	0.004	0.286***	0.497***	-0.260	-0.008	-0.755***
	(0.091)	(0.283)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.276)	(0.149)	(0.235)
French	-0.010	0.626*	0.711***				
	(0.176)	(0.355)	(0.177)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	-0.025	0.017	0.244***	0.113***	0.457***	0.488***	0.626***
	(0.055)	(0.032)	(0.061)	(0.035)	(0.084)	(0.051)	(0.106)
Germany				0.422***	1.134***		
				(0.108)	(0.282)		
EUR						0.896***	1.312***
						(0.128)	(0.245)
Constant	-0.009*	-0.018**	-0.009***	-0.005***	-0.009***	0.003	-0.011***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	37
R-squared	0.656	0.267	0.739	0.879	0.732	0.705	0.741
GBP	-0.027	-0.115	0.033	0.116	0.020	-0.000	0.123

7.3 Canadian dollar (cad)

In swissf	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	cad 90-93	94-97	98-01	02-05	06-09
JPY	0.040	0.003	0.012	0.338***	-0.067
	(0.058)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.092)	(0.321)
USD	0.800***	0.921***	0.253	0.192	0.130
	(0.055)	(0.110)	(0.320)	(0.138)	(0.316)
Germany	0.119*	0.106	0.305		

	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.315)		
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.102***	0.053**	0.114**	0.285***	0.331**
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.085)	(0.122)
EUR				0.644***	0.536
				(0.224)	(0.568)
Constant	-0.003**	-0.001	-0.009	0.003	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Observations	48	48	8	48	14
R-squared	0.960	0.778	0.787	0.699	0.605
GBP	0.041	-0.030	0.431	-0.174	0.401

7.4 Chile (clp)

In swissf	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	clp 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	-0.096	0.804***	0.025	0.159**	0.081**	0.002	0.007
	(0.082)	(0.296)	(0.122)	(0.076)	(0.032)	(0.085)	(0.130)
USD	0.530*	0.039	0.978***	0.463***	0.696***	0.035	0.496***
	(0.282)	(0.450)	(0.137)	(0.118)	(0.085)	(0.181)	(0.169)
French	0.568	0.235	-0.239**				
	(0.343)	(0.475)	(0.114)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.155**	0.482**	0.014	0.257***	0.220***	0.561***	0.216***
	(0.072)	(0.195)	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.062)	(0.050)
Germany				0.322**	0.466***		
				(0.155)	(0.074)		
EUR						0.887***	0.810***
						(0.134)	(0.257)
Constant	-0.004	-0.017**	-0.009***	-0.004*	-0.003***	-0.000	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.669	0.781	0.884	0.876	0.926	0.808	0.708
GBP	-0.003	-0.078	0.236	0.057	-0.244	0.076	-0.314

7.5 Chinese yuan (cny)

In swissf	(1)	(2)
	cny 01-04	05-08
EUR	0.060	0.186*
	(0.059)	(0.087)
USD	0.993***	1.031***
	(0.018)	(0.097)
JPY	-0.009	0.039
	(0.011)	(0.030)
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.016	0.082**
	(0.017)	(0.030)
KRW		0.049
		(0.047)
SGD		-0.160
		(0.092)
MYR		-0.015
		(0.039)
RUB		-0.174
		(0.140)
AUD		0.027
		(0.024)
THB		0.046
		(0.040)
CAD		-0.045
		(0.028)

Constant	-0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Observations	48	23
R-squared	0.986	0.996
GBP	-0.043	0.017

7.6 Danish krone (dkk)

In swissf	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	dkk 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.078	0.108	-0.024	-0.001	0.003	-0.005	0.007
	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.017)
USD	0.084	-0.065	0.046	0.017	0.004	-0.001	-0.017
	(0.089)	(0.047)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
French	0.821***	0.860***	0.997***				
	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.048)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	-0.026	0.006	0.009	0.021	0.004	0.001	-0.004
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Germany				0.900***	0.971***		
				(0.080)	(0.019)		
EUR						1.001***	0.939***
						(0.017)	(0.055)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	41
R-squared	0.857	0.855	0.916	0.837	0.991	0.981	0.965
GBP	0.018	0.097	-0.019	0.084	0.022	0.004	0.071

7.7 Fiji dollar

In swissf	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	fiji 80-83	84-87	88-91	92-95	96-99	00-03	04-07
JPY	0.152***	0.127	-0.082	-0.201	0.065	0.080	0.008
	(0.030)	(0.153)	(0.091)	(0.147)	(0.107)	(0.052)	(0.054)
USD	0.354***	1.075*	-1.525***	-2.540**	0.210	0.201***	0.308
	(0.105)	(0.536)	(0.556)	(1.168)	(0.225)	(0.065)	(0.200)
KRW	-0.152*	-0.921*	0.055	0.820**	-0.031	0.040	0.140
	(0.082)	(0.535)	(0.097)	(0.308)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.095)
SGD	-0.027	-0.366	0.074	0.102	-0.150	0.075	-0.153
	(0.088)	(0.265)	(0.121)	(0.215)	(0.267)	(0.088)	(0.205)
AUD	0.264***	0.326**	0.242***	0.206***	-0.209	0.415***	0.438***
	(0.080)	(0.153)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.351)	(0.052)	(0.075)
MYR	0.175*	0.345	-0.108	-0.001	0.378	0.000	0.056
	(0.099)	(0.326)	(0.193)	(0.072)	(0.257)	(0.000)	(0.260)
THB	0.034	-0.020	2.407***	2.713**	-0.073	-0.073	-0.088
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.692)	(1.238)	(0.122)	(0.064)	(0.081)
French	0.013	0.243	-0.105*				
	(0.030)	(0.189)	(0.059)				
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	0.009	0.208***	-0.015	-0.029	0.346	0.038*	0.012
	(0.006)	(0.054)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.204)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Germany				-0.263**	0.764		
				(0.113)	(0.456)		
EUR						0.244***	0.119
						(0.055)	(0.108)
Constant	-0.002*	-0.004	-0.001	0.002	-0.006	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	46	48	48	48	36	48	34
R-squared	0.955	0.749	0.963	0.967	0.555	0.948	0.885
GBP	0.188	0.191	0.040	0.163	0.046	0.017	0.171

7.8 Hong Kong dollar (hkd)

In swissf	(1)	(2)	(3)
	hkd 97-00	01-04	05-08
JPY	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.017)
USD	0.997*** (0.018)	-315.466 (335.352)	1.071*** (0.046)
KRW	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.011 (0.026)
SGD	0.009 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.022)	0.014 (0.046)
AUD	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.006)	0.025 (0.019)
MYR	-0.005 (0.005)	316.470 (335.348)	0.007 (0.026)
THB	-0.004 (0.005)	0.018 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.030)
Germany	-0.012 (0.012)		
$\Delta[\log\text{Res}+\log\text{Ex}]$	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.046** (0.020)
EUR		-0.016 (0.014)	-0.066 (0.041)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	23	48	30
R-squared	0.999	0.998	0.997
GBP	0.010	0.014	-0.032

Table 8
Extension 5:
Monte Carlo Simulation

In this extension, we tried Monte Carlo studies on fabricated currencies -- some constructed with the monetary authorities leaning halfway against the wind of any fluctuations in EMP, and others constrained more narrowly to remain within a Plus and minus 2.5% Band -- to see if the technique gives us the right answer.

We use the true path of the euro, dollar and yen (in SDR) over the last 8 years to make up a currency (abbreviated as MCSA for Monte Carlo Simulation) with certain configurations of weights, and then try to see if we can recover these weights with the methodology introduced in this paper.

8.1 The case of leaning against the wind

8.1.1 Simulated currency MCSA computed as basket (with weights 1/3 euros, 1/3 dollars and 1/3 yen) valued with the SDR as numeraire:

$$\text{Log}[MCSA + rw] = (\text{log}[jpy])/3 + (\text{log}[eur])/3 + (\text{log}[usd])/3$$

Note:


rw is a random walk variable which is defined as:

$$rw(t) = rw(t-1) + a$$

a is a normally distributed random variable and $a \sim N(0, 0.03)$

We use the true variance of EMP drawn from some real countries, choosing two representatives: a high variance case from a commodity producer (PNG) and a low-variance case (CAD).

Var of Delta Reserve VS Var of Delta Ex 2001-2007, in 4 years' interval



Reserve data: after subtracting off the imputed interest

<1> The Case of PNG:

Regression specification:
$$Dl(mcsa) - dl(gbp) = x_1 \cdot [dl(usd) - dl(gbp)] + x_2 \cdot [dl(eur) - dl(gbp)] + x_3 \cdot [dl(jpy) - dl(gbp)] + x_0 \cdot \{0.5 \cdot dl(PNGRes) + 0.5 \cdot dl(mcsa)\}$$

8.1 Leaning against the wind, around a basket (1/3 euros, 1/3 dollars and 1/3 yen) Calibrated by PNG reserve changes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	0.290*** (0.039)	0.272*** (0.041)	0.363*** (0.119)	0.278*** (0.034)	0.264*** (0.032)	0.346*** (0.120)
JPY	0.320*** (0.039)	0.334*** (0.054)	0.290*** (0.060)	0.320*** (0.040)	0.334*** (0.056)	0.288*** (0.062)
USD	0.387*** (0.035)	0.385*** (0.047)	0.374*** (0.062)	0.396*** (0.035)	0.389*** (0.048)	0.397*** (0.061)
$\Delta[\log Res + \log Ex]/2$	-0.024 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.043 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.036)
Constant	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Observations	89	48	41	89	48	41
R-squared	0.849	0.874	0.820	0.847	0.874	0.816
GBP	0.003	0.009	-0.026	0.006	0.013	-0.030

<2> The Case of CAD

Regression specification:

$$Dlg(mcsa)-dlg(gbp)=x1 \cdot [dlg(usd) - dlg(gbp)] + x2 \cdot [dlg(eur) - dlg(gbp)] + x3 \cdot [dlg(jpy) - dlg(gbp)] + x0 \cdot \{0.5 \cdot dlg(CADRes)+0.5 \cdot dlg(mcsa)\}$$

8.2 Leaning against the wind around a basket (1/3 euros, 1/3 dollars and 1/3 yen)

Calibrated by CAD reserve changes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	0.295*** (0.031)	0.291*** (0.036)	0.347*** (0.099)	0.410*** (0.045)	0.389*** (0.071)	0.468*** (0.101)
JPY	0.316*** (0.034)	0.330*** (0.043)	0.287*** (0.050)	0.306*** (0.034)	0.307*** (0.045)	0.308*** (0.052)
USD	0.364*** (0.033)	0.383*** (0.044)	0.334*** (0.055)	0.278*** (0.041)	0.322*** (0.052)	0.202*** (0.073)
$\Delta[\log Res + \log Ex]/2$	0.242*** (0.053)	0.263** (0.121)	0.249*** (0.062)	0.197*** (0.041)	0.171** (0.082)	0.229*** (0.053)
Constant	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Observations	90	48	42	90	48	42
R-squared	0.877	0.889	0.867	0.879	0.887	0.876
GBP	0.025	-0.004	0.031	0.007	-0.018	0.022

8.1.2 Simulated currency MCSA with dollar peg, valued with SDR as numeraire:

$$\log[MCSA + rw] = \log[usd]$$

note: rw is a random walk variable, defined as: $rw(t) = rw(t-1) + a$

a is a normally distributed random variable and $a \sim N(0, 0.03)$

<1> The Case of PNG:

Regression specification: $Dlg(mcsa)-dlg(gbp)=x1 \cdot [dlg(usd) - dlg(gbp)] + x2 \cdot [dlg(eur) - dlg(gbp)] + x3 \cdot [dlg(jpy) - dlg(gbp)] + x0 \cdot \{0.5 \cdot dlg(PNGRes)+0.5 \cdot dlg(mcsa)\}$

8.3 Leaning against the wind, around a dollar peg;

Calibrated by PNG reserve changes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.014* (0.008)	0.001 (0.024)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.025)
JPY	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)
USD	1.017*** (0.007)	1.015*** (0.010)	1.016*** (0.013)	1.019*** (0.008)	1.016*** (0.010)	1.023*** (0.014)
$\Delta[\log Res + \log Ex]/2$	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.011 (0.008)
Constant	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	89	48	41	89	48	41
R-squared	0.996	0.996	0.995	0.995	0.996	0.995
GBP	-0.000	0.001	-0.003	0.001	0.002	-0.004

<2> The Case of CAD:

Regression specification: $Dlg(mcsa)-dlg(gbp) = x1 \cdot [dlg(usd) - dlg(gbp)] + x2 \cdot [dlg(eur) - dlg(gbp)] + x3 \cdot [dlg(jpy) - dlg(gbp)] + x0 \cdot \{0.5 \cdot dlg(CADRes) + 0.5 \cdot dlg(mcsa)\}$

8.4 Leaning against the wind, around a dollar peg Calibrated by CAD reserve changes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.008 (0.024)	0.012 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.031 (0.025)
JPY	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.013)
USD	1.003*** (0.009)	1.011*** (0.012)	0.994*** (0.016)	0.989*** (0.011)	1.004*** (0.014)	0.968*** (0.019)
$\Delta[\log Res + \log Ex]/2$	0.031*** (0.011)	0.010 (0.029)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.014 (0.016)	0.043*** (0.011)
Constant	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	90	48	42	90	48	42
R-squared	0.996	0.996	0.995	0.996	0.996	0.995
GBP	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.003

8.2 The case of a Plus and minus 2.5% Target Zones with random walk

8.2.1 Simulated currency MCSA computed as basket (with weights 1/3 euros, 1/3 dollars and 1/3 yen), valued with the SDR as numeraire:

$$\log[MCSA + rw] = (\log[jpy])/3 + (\log[eur])/3 + (\log[usd])/3$$

Note:

rw is a random walk variable: $rw(t) = rw(t-1) + a$, $a \sim N(0, 0.01)$
with a plus or minus 2.5% credible band.

The defined currency is illustrated in the following graph Figure 8.1.




Figure 8.1

Notes:

1. mcsa_non demonstrates a perfect peg with USD, EUR and JPY.
2. upperb is the upper 2.5% bound and lowerb is the lower bound.
3. mcsa is the makeup currency with combination of a random walk and the perfect peg.

We use the EMP values of some real countries to recover the currency weights and also try two types of countries: a high variance case (PNG) and a low-variance case (CAD).

<1> The Case of PNG:

We then try to recover the weights.

Regression specification:

$$D\lg(mcsa) - d\lg(gbp) = x_1 \cdot [d\lg(usd) - d\lg(gbp)] + x_2 \cdot [d\lg(eur) - d\lg(gbp)] + x_3 \cdot [d\lg(jpy) - d\lg(gbp)] + x_0 \cdot \{d\lg(PNGEMP)\}$$

**8.5 Target Zones with random walk,
around basket (with weights 1/3 euros, 1/3 dollars and 1/3 yen)
Calibrated by PNG EMP changes,
valued with the SDR as numeraire:**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	0.323*** (0.040)	0.296*** (0.043)	0.426** (0.172)	0.347*** (0.037)	0.323*** (0.039)	0.469** (0.203)
JPY	0.287*** (0.034)	0.301*** (0.044)	0.252*** (0.067)	0.284*** (0.035)	0.293*** (0.044)	0.262*** (0.060)
USD	0.343*** (0.048)	0.350*** (0.056)	0.318 (0.197)	0.323*** (0.048)	0.332*** (0.054)	0.268 (0.188)
$\Delta[\log PNGEMP]$	0.040** (0.019)	0.044** (0.020)	0.027 (0.267)	0.045** (0.017)	0.049** (0.018)	0.063 (0.153)
Constant	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)
Observations	89	48	41	89	48	41
R-squared	0.831	0.881	0.760	0.833	0.884	0.761
GBP	0.047	0.053	0.004	0.046	0.051	0.000

<2> The Case of CAD:

Regression specification:

$$Dlg(mcsa) - dlg(gbp) = x1 \cdot [dlg(usd) - dlg(gbp)] + x2 \cdot [dlg(eur) - dlg(gbp)] + x3 \cdot [dlg(jpy) - dlg(gbp)] + x0 \cdot \{dlg(CADEMP)\}$$

**8.6 Target Zones with random walk
around basket (weights 1/3 euros, 1/3 dollars and 1/3 yen)
Calibrated by CAD EMP reserve changes**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	0.424*** (0.120)	0.451*** (0.152)	0.248 (0.207)	0.619*** (0.151)	0.722*** (0.224)	0.341 (0.219)
JPY	0.409*** (0.100)	0.456*** (0.137)	0.375** (0.157)	0.398*** (0.096)	0.403*** (0.127)	0.390** (0.150)
USD	0.043 (0.153)	-0.118 (0.238)	0.297 (0.183)	-0.118 (0.165)	-0.267 (0.254)	0.177 (0.198)
$\Delta[\log CADEMP]$	0.275** (0.122)	0.422* (0.248)	0.132 (0.164)	0.321*** (0.106)	0.427** (0.199)	0.177 (0.147)
Constant	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)
Observations	90	48	42	90	48	42
R-squared	0.377	0.338	0.526	0.404	0.368	0.538
GBP	0.124	0.210	0.080	0.101	0.141	0.092

8.2.2 Simulated currency MCSA around dollar peg, valued with SDR as numeraire:

$$\log[MCSA + rw] = \log[usd]$$

Note: rw is a random walk variable: $rw(t) = rw(t-1) + a$, $a \sim N(0, 0.01)$
with a Plus and minus 2.5% credible band

<1> Case of PNG:

Regression specification:

$$Dlg(mcsa) - dlg(gbp) = x1 \cdot [dlg(usd) - dlg(gbp)] + x2 \cdot [dlg(eur) - dlg(gbp)] + x3 \cdot [dlg(jpy) - dlg(gbp)] + x0 \cdot \{dlg(PNGEMP)\}$$

8.7 Target Zones with random walk, around a dollar peg
 Calibrated by PNG EMP changes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	-0.009 (0.034)	-0.033 (0.035)	0.087 (0.159)	0.010 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.031)	0.127 (0.188)
JPY	-0.040 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.076 (0.061)	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.036)	-0.066 (0.055)
USD	1.008*** (0.042)	1.014*** (0.045)	0.985*** (0.182)	0.992*** (0.042)	1.000*** (0.044)	0.939*** (0.173)
$\Delta[\log\text{PNGEMP}]$	0.031** (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.024 (0.245)	0.035** (0.014)	0.038** (0.015)	0.057 (0.140)
Constant	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	89	48	41	89	48	41
R-squared	0.921	0.948	0.890	0.922	0.949	0.891
GBP	0.041	0.043	0.004	0.040	0.042	0.001

<2> Case of CAD:

Regression specification:
$$D\lg(mcsa) - d\lg(gbp) = x_1 \cdot [d\lg(usd) - d\lg(gbp)] + x_2 \cdot [d\lg(eur) - d\lg(gbp)] + x_3 \cdot [d\lg(jpy) - d\lg(gbp)] + x_0 \cdot \{d\lg(\text{CADEMP})\}$$

8.8 Target Zones with random walk, around a dollar peg
 Calibrated by CAD EMP changes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	In SDR 00-07	In SDR 00-03	In SDR 04-07	Swiss franc 00-07	Swiss franc 00-03	Swiss franc 04-07
EUR	-0.001 (0.033)	-0.020 (0.034)	0.086 (0.107)	0.005 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.049)	0.071 (0.111)
JPY	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.068 (0.056)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.035)	-0.073 (0.055)
USD	1.028*** (0.039)	1.031*** (0.049)	1.016*** (0.073)	1.013*** (0.041)	1.014*** (0.053)	1.023*** (0.063)
$\Delta[\log\text{CADEMP}]$	-0.045 (0.052)	-0.035 (0.067)	-0.066 (0.078)	0.005 (0.039)	0.020 (0.044)	-0.029 (0.066)
Constant	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	90	48	42	90	48	42
R-squared	0.918	0.944	0.891	0.918	0.944	0.889
GBP	0.009	0.008	-0.033	0.015	0.004	-0.022