SYSTEMIC POLICY PARTNERSHIP

THE DESIGN OF A MACROPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK

GAVIN BINGHAM

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In a nutshell

- What type of institutional structure is needed for macroprudential policy? Options are:
 - Central bank centric
 - Council focused
 - None use existing institutions with existing mandates
- Answer depends on the failings that a macroprudential policy is intended to correct
 - In supervisory policies?
 - In macroeconomic policies?
 - In structural polices?
- Choice will shape the future of central banking

What type of institutional structure is needed for macroprudential policy

Cross country comparisons show different approaches
 Central bank centric (UK/EU)

Council focused (US/Mexico)

Implicit (Switzerland, some EME)

What role does the central bank play in macroprudential policy?

Different jurisdictions envisage different roles

- U.K. overarching responsibility
- EU a prominent role in diagnosis and prescription, but a limited one in implementation
- U.S. will supervise big players but overall policy will be formulated by an inter-agency committee (FSOC)

Why such diversity?

Different views on the sources of systemic instability
 Different views about the role of the central bank
 Different views about concentration of power

Views on sources of instability

Failure of microsupervisors to see systemic risks

- Use supervisory tools for macroprudential purposes
- Failure of macro-economic policy makers to take account of financial system stability issues

Use macroeconomic tools for stability purposes

Failure of "free markets" – crisis of capitalism

Use structural tools

Views on the role of the central bank

Modern view – Primacy of price stability
Traditional view – Primacy of financial stability
Back to the future?

Views about the concentration of power

Avoid it at all costs – even if it is more effective

Accept it – but strengthen governance

Choice of institutional structure

Choice of structure will depend on:
 Source(s) of systemic instability
 Are existing arrangements broken?


What will it mean for central banking?
A greater role in supervision?
A more diffuse mandate?
More powers?
Less independence?

Key features of central banks (today)

Price stability as an overriding objective

- Quantifiable and observable
- Subject to influence by market-based tools
- Autonomy to prevent fiscal capture
 - Time consistency
- Accountability through transparency
 - For achieving a clearly specified objective
 - To ultimate stakeholders

Weight of central bank objectives in central bank laws




Source: BIS analysis of central bank laws.

Banking supervision

By focus of responsibility

Per cent of 125 countries



Source: FSI (2006).

Governance challenges

Vaguer objectives

Financial stability objectives cannot be quantified

Different powers

- More administrative instruments
- Need for greater safeguards

Autonomy and accountability
 Does more cooperation imply less autonomy?
 Role of transparency

Powers and safeguards

More administrative powers – back to the future?

- Liquidity and credit controls
- Role in regulation and supervision
- Greater need for safeguards
 - Financial stability decisions are more "political"
 - Vested interests of the industry
 - Legal challenge
 - Financial risk

Autonomy and accountability

- Greater power requires greater accountability
- Close cooperation with other public bodies is essential
 - Creates risk for autonomy
 - Clarity about roles and responsibilities helps
- Accountability through transparency and oversight
 - Transparency about decisions and procedures
 - Testimonies and legislative oversight
 - Board oversight

Damage control

- How to avoid "throwing the baby out with the bathwater"
 - Limit central bank involvement
 - Bifurcate monetary and financial stability policy
 - Ensure the financial integrity of the central bank
 - Use "double key" decision making comply or explain
 - Create effective, impartial boards

Conclusions

- There is no one institutional design suitable for all countries
- Choice will depend on beliefs about sources of instability
- Central banks will (and should) play a role in any macroprudential framework
- Greater power will require greater accountability
- The design should ensure that central banks remain effective policy institutions