DESIGNING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: SOME THOUGHTS

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* These are preliminary thoughts. They are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the IMF or its member countries

INTRODUCTION: MARKET FAILURES, POLICY FAILURES

- Focus on UI and EPL in EMDEs in particular
- Over-arching objectives : economic efficiency and equity
- Rationale for efficiency-based intervention = market imperfections:
 - Information asymmetries → credit and insurance market failures → case for UBs to smooth consumption (Chetty, 2008)
 - Compound with matching frictions → quality of matching (Marimon-Zilibotti, 1999; Tatsiramos, 2009) and risk taking (Acemoglu-Shimer 2009)
 - Externalities (under UBs \rightarrow case for lay-off tax, Blanchard-Tirole 2008)
 - Transaction costs (in principle, state has legal and administrative capacity to run more cost-effective UI system).
 - Uneven bargaining power/monopsonistic power of firms
- But policy failures:
 - Information asymmetries and UI (monitoring always imperfect)
 - Form and stance of EPL (can be sub-optimal)

INTRODUCTION: ARE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES SPECIAL?

- Market failures greater:
 - Credit and insurance market failures (Chetty and Looney, 2006)
- But risk of policy failures also usually greater:
 - Two main reasons: informality and weak administrative capacity
 - UI as an example: both issues make moral hazard risk greater
- Set of policy choices often more restricted as a result:
 - UI as an example again: how to extend coverage without creating important distortions? (formal work disincentives)
 - Can lead to sub-optimal choices: more on this in a minute
- Key issue: how to achieve insurance and equity objectives of these institutions in cost-efficient way, considering both general and EMDEspecific challenges

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: BASIC CHALLENGES


- Need balance between insurance provision and maintaining job search incentives and avoiding excessive wage levels (e.g. Blanchard-Tirole 2008):
 - Means full insurance cannot be optimal...
 - Even more so in EMDEs where moral hazard risk is stronger:
 - Poor enforcement of eligibility and job search criteria
 - Unemployed may take up informal work rather than search while receiving benefits (Hopenhayn-Nicolini, 1999; Alvarez Parra-Sanchez, 2009)
 - ...although latter effect should be weighed against positive "liquidity effect" of UBs on job search, which may dominate provided duration is short (Bardey-Jaramillo-Pena 2015)
- Partly explains low UI coverage, benefit levels and duration in EMDEs (cash) transfers no substitute: anti-poverty more than income-insurance tool)

• How can UI be scaled up, in particular to cover informal workers?

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: STILL IN INFANCY

Proportion of countries with UI system for different country income groups

Unemployment benefit coverage for different country income groups



Source: International Labour Organization, 2014. "World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building economic recovery, inclusive development and social justice". International Labour Office - Geneva: ILO, 2014.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: OPTIONS

• Extend coverage of contributory system to non-contributing workers:

- Has been done e.g. for health and pensions (Mexico: Levy, 2008)
- But sharp trade-off with efficiency: the smaller the difference in benefits, the greater the marginal tax on taking up a formal job

• UISAs:

- Address incentive issues in principle, and have been tested (e.g. Chile)
- But provide insufficient insurance for some workers (youth, high U risk)
- In practice countries with UISAs *also* have state-provided UI featuring risk pooling (e.g. Chile)
- Way forward = two-tier system?
 - Fully funded, mandatory, non-redistributive first tier (UISA)
 - Transparent and progressive subsidies to encourage opting-in

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: INTERACTIONS

- UI-ALMPs:
 - Complementary: stronger ALMPs needed for more extensive UI (DNK)
 - Even more so in EMDEs: serve as job-search test and matching device
- UI-informality/administrative capacity:
 - Also complementary: addressing these issues facilitates UI extension
- UI-tax policies:
 - Labor tax wedges in EMDEs (surprisingly high) can reduce formal and overall employment (Betcherman-Daysal-Pages 2010; Kugler-Kugler 2009)
 - Consider other sources of financing that distort less decision to create and take up formal vs. informal jobs (e.g. VAT)
- UI-EPL:
 - Substitute in theory (insurance against risk of job loss)—but UI superior
 - Substitute in practice? Maybe to some extent but not striking
 - Could reflect that the greater the limits to UI, the more there is a case for some form of EPL as a complement



UI AND EPL: SUBSTITUTES?

UI coverage versus ILO EPL indicator

UI coverage versus OECD EPL indicator

100 100 percentage of unemployed receiving benefits Percentage of unemployed receiving benefits 90 90 80 80 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 ILO Summary EPL indicator for regular contracts OECD summary EPL indicator for regular contracts

Sources: International Labour Organization, 2014. "World Social Protection Report 2014/15: Building economic recovery, inclusive development and social justice". International Labour Office - Geneva: ILO, 2014. EPLex summary indicators in the area of terminating regular contracts. Available at http://www.ilo.org/travail/areasofwork/WCMS_435450/lang--en/index.htm

OECD, 2015. OECD Indicators of Employment Protection Legislation, summary index for protection against individual and collective dismissals. Available at http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm.


EPL: BASIC CHALLENGES

- Two main motives:
 - Non-economic: protection from abuse and discrimination
 - Economic: insurance against income loss risk (Pissarides 2001)
- Two components:
 - Transfer (e.g. severance pay): *not necessarily* distortive (Lazear 1990; Pissarides 2001) but only under strict conditions (Garibaldi-Violante 2005)
 - Tax (e.g. administrative procedures incl. uncertainties): distortive
- Nature of distortions of tax component:
 - Lower productivity (Autor-Kerr-Kugler 2007; Bassanini-Venn-Nunziata 2009; Eslava-Haltiwanger-Kugler-Kugler 2004), possibly more so in EMDEs where rule of law is weaker (Caballero-Cowan-Engel-Micco 2004)
 - Higher U duration (Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Pissarides 2000)
 - Dualism, incl. informality in EMDEs (BRA: Bosch-Esteban Pretel 2012, Bosch-Goni Pacchioni-Maloney 2012; IND: Besley-Burgess 2004)
 - Possibly employment in EMDEs (Botero et al. 2004; Fallon-Lucas 1991; Ahsan-Pages 2009; Heckman-Pages 2004)

EPL: DOMINATED BY WELL-FUNCTIONING UI

- Theory points to weak case for EPL under optimal UI:
 - No insurance against unemployment *duration* risk
 - No risk sharing across workers in different firms → risk of non-payment as the likelihood of dismissal correlated with that of bankruptcy
 - Only case for lay-off tax to correct UI externality (Blanchard-Tirole 2008)
- Changing world of labor further strengthens case for UI vis-à-vis EPL: need to protect workers rather than jobs through portable rights
- Practical issues further weaken case for tight EPL in EMDEs:
 - Weaker enforcement (weaknesses of administrative & judicial systems)
 - Litigation costs can be significant
 - Many workers do not qualify due to short tenure and informality
- But the stronger the limits to UI, the more there is some case for EPL:
 - Partly explains why EPL is rather tight in many EMDEs
 - A lot of scope for reform however

EPL STANCE: COMPARABLE TO ADVANCED ECONOMIES



Sources: OECD, 2015. OECD Indicators of Employment Protection Legislation, summary index for protection against individual and collective dismissals. Available at http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.against International Labour Organization. EPLex summary indicators in the area of terminating regular contracts. Available at http://www.ilo.org/travail/areasofwork/WCMS 435450/lang--en/index.htm

EPL AND DUALISM

- Poorly-designed EPL can encourage labor market dualism of 2 types:
 - Between regular and non-regular contracts (dominant in AEs)
 - Between formal and informal workers (dominant in EMDEs)
- Dualism can be detrimental to both efficiency and equity:
 - Inefficiently high labor turnover (temporary contracts) and informality
 - Slower (on-the-job) human capital accumulation
 - Static/dynamic wage inequality between otherwise comparable workers
- Suggests EPL should be neither too strict nor too asymmetric + EMDEs can learn from AEs' experience with partial reforms

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

- Too much reliance on EPL and too little on UI to provide income loss insurance in EMDEs...
- ...partly for understandable reasons—hard to build well-functioning UI system under pervasive informality and weak administrative capacity...
- ...but also partly for bad reasons
 - EPL not only tight but often poorly designed and enforced
 - Scope for smart UI design combining individual saving and risk pooling
- Gradually rebalancing away from EPL toward UI along development path:
 - Can start now-lot of scope for reform even under current constraints
 - Amplify as informality declines and administrative capacity improves
 - And consider carefully complementary policies: ALMPs, financing (general taxation vs. labor taxation)

Thank you!