

The Global Financial Crisis: Preliminary Lessons

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The first global crisis

- Origin
 - Originated in the U.S. housing market
 - Subprime market sparked the crisis but global leverage was the real problem.

Nature

- A crisis of the linkages between the financial sector and the real economy.
- A global crisis.

The Global Economy is Slowing Rapidly

Latest IMF growth forecasts


		Projections	
	2008	2009	2010
World output	3.2	-1.0 to -0.5	1.5 to 2.5
Advanced economies	0.8	-3.5 to -3.0	0.0 to 0.5
United States	1.1	-2.6	0.2
Euro area	0.9	-3.2	0.1
Japan	-0.7	-5.8	-0.2
Emerging and developing economies	6.1	1.5 to 2.5	3.5 to 4.5

Source: IMF Staff Note for G-20 Meeting of Ministers and Central Bank Governors, March 13-14, 2009

Industrial activity and global trade have fallen dramatically




(Annualized percent change of 3mma over previous 3mma)




Merchandise Exports

(Annualized percent change of 3mma over previous 3mma)




Unemployment is rising



1/ Unemployment data series were aggregated using total labor force as weights.


2/ Excludes China and India.

Inflation is falling



Our estimate of financial sector losses is now over \$2 trillion


Estimates of Potential Financial Sector Writedowns on US Assets (as of January 2009)



Numbers are in \$ Billions


Source: Staff Estimates

This is reflected in markets and confidence



Systemic risks remain elevated

CDS Spreads for High-Grade Financials (basis points)




Source: Bloomberg

Interbank liquidity remains impaired

Libor-Overnight Index
Swap Spreads
(basis points)




Spot and Forward LIBOR-OIS Spreads (basis points)



Source: Bloomberg

Bank lending standards have tightened

G-3 Bank Lending Conditions (net percentage of respondents tightening loan standards)




Source: Haver Analytics, Staff Estimates

Emerging markets face external financial pressures and lower commodity prices




Emerging market corporates face large rollover needs

Historical Issuance and Upcoming FX-Denominated Debt (in billions of U.S. dollars)




Source: Dealogic, Bloomberg, Staff Estimates

At the same time, cross-border bank flows are dropping sharply



Deterioration in emerging markets may be transmitted back to mature markets banks

Banking System Exposures to Emerging Markets (as % of Mature Market's GDP)



Policy Response


The first line of defense: monetary policy

Inflation concerns are receding rapidly.

Some countries still have scope to cut policy rates.

Monetary policy is supportive

(Policy rates; percent)




The second line of defense: fiscal stimulus

- The IMF has asked for 2 percent of GDP as an average.
- While some countries have room to raise deficits, others do not.
- Fiscal packages will boost growth but need an exit strategy.
- Eventually, coordination was not that bad.

While some countries have room to raise



(5yr Sovereign CDS; in basis points)




Selected Europe

(5yr Sovereign CDS; in basis points)



Source: Bloomberg, L.P.

Fiscal packages are expected to boost economic activity



The third line of defense: cleansing of banks' balance sheets

- Despite efforts so far, no decisive breakthrough.
- Three pronged approach.
 - Deal aggressively with distressed assets.
 - Recapitalize banks.
 - Continue to provide broad-based liquidity support.
- Contingency plans needed in countries where the situation could quickly turn for the worse.

The fourth line of defense: the IMF

- IMF lending has been large.
- Focus and streamlining of IMF conditionality has improved.
- Need to double resources, including for concessional lending.
- Increase flexibility of IMF lending arrangements.

IMF lending has been large


Program Access Levels

	% of Quota	% of GDP
Average Current Crises	941	8.7
Pakistan (2008)	500	4.7
Iceland (2008)	1,190	12.5
Ukraine (2008)	800	9.1
Hungary (2008)	1,015	9.7
Latvia (2008)	1,2 00	7.7
Average of Past Crises ¹	1,140	6.3
Memo: Precautionary arrangements		
El Salvador (precautionary, 2009)	300	2.2
Costa Rica (expected precautionary, 2009)	300	2.5
Serbia (precautionary, 2009)	75	1.4
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¹ Thailand(1997), Indonesia(1997), Korea(1997), Turkey(2002)

Focus and streamlining of conditionality has improved

Number of Structural Conditions in Initial Programs Core measures: financial/monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policy



/1 Thailand(1997), Indonesia(1997), Korea(1997), Turkey(2002)

Despite all this, risks are to the downside

- Overarching Risk: further delays in implementing policies to stabilize financial conditions – this would intensify feedback loops
- Deflation: could reinforce a deeper and longer downturn
- Rollover of external financing for emerging economies
- Protectionism: trade; but also "backdoor" financial
- Sovereign fiscal sustainability concerns