

#### The Global Financial Crisis: Preliminary Lessons

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### The first global crisis

# Origin Originated in the U.S. housing market Subprime market sparked the crisis but global leverage was the real problem.

#### Nature

A crisis of the linkages between the financial sector and the real economy.

A global crisis.

# The Global Economy is Slowing Rapidly

### Latest IMF growth forecasts


		Projections	
	2008	2009	2010
World output	3.2	-1.0 to -0.5	1.5 to 2.5
Advanced economies	0.8	-3.5 to -3.0	0.0 to 0.5
United States	1.1	-2.6	0.2
Euro area	0.9	-3.2	0.1
Japan	-0.7	-5.8	-0.2
Emerging and developing economies	6.1	1.5 to 2.5	3.5 to 4.5

Source: IMF Staff Note for G-20 Meeting of Ministers and Central Bank Governors, March 13-14, 2009

## Industrial activity and global trade have fallen dramatically


#### **Industrial Production**

(Annualized percent change of 3mma over previous 3mma)




#### **Merchandise Exports**

(Annualized percent change of 3mma over previous 3mma)




### Unemployment is rising



1/ Unemployment data series were aggregated using total labor force as weights.


2/ Excludes China and India.

### Inflation is falling



# Our estimate of financial sector losses is now over \$2 trillion


#### Estimates of Potential Financial Sector Writedowns on US Assets (as of January 2009)




Numbers are in \$ Billions

Source: Staff Estimates


#### This is reflected in markets and confidence





#### Systemic risks remain elevated

#### CDS Spreads for High-Grade Financials (basis points)




Source: Bloomberg

#### Interbank liquidity remains impaired

#### Libor-Overnight Index Swap Spreads (basis points)


#### Spot and Forward LIBOR-OIS Spreads (basis points)






#### Bank lending standards have tightened

G-3 Bank Lending Conditions (net percentage of respondents tightening loan standards)






#### **Emerging market corporates face large** rollover needs **Historical Issuance and Upcoming FX-Denominated Debt** (in billions of U.S. dollars) 500 ssuance Amortization 450 400 Sovereign Corporate 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 $\mathbf{O}$ 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006 2007 2005 2012

Source: Dealogic, Bloomberg, Staff Estimates


# At the same time, cross-border bank flows are dropping sharply



Source: BIS

Deterioration in emerging markets may be transmitted back to mature markets banks

> Banking System Exposures to Emerging Markets (as % of Mature Market's GDP)



Source: BIS


**Policy Response** 

The first line of defense: monetary policy

Inflation concerns are receding rapidly.

Some countries still have scope to cut policy rates.

#### Monetary policy is supportive (Policy rates; percent)




# The second line of defense: fiscal stimulus

- The IMF has asked for 2 percent of GDP as an average.
- While some countries have room to raise deficits, others do not.
- Fiscal packages will boost growth but need an exit strategy.
- Eventually, coordination was not that bad.

#### While some countries have room to raise deficits, others do not Industrial Economies Selected Europe

(5yr Sovereign CDS; in basis points)






Source: Bloomberg, L.P.

## Fiscal packages are expected to boost economic activity

General Government Fiscal Balances (Percent of GDP)



# The third line of defense: cleansing of banks' balance sheets

Despite efforts so far, no decisive breakthrough.

Three pronged approach.
Deal aggressively with distressed assets.
Recapitalize banks.
Continue to provide broad-based liquidity support.
Contingency plans needed in countries where the situation could quickly turn for the worse.

#### The fourth line of defense: the IMF

IMF lending has been large.
Focus and streamlining of IMF conditionality has improved.
Need to double resources, including for concessional lending.
Increase flexibility of IMF lending arrangements.

## IMF lending has been large


**Program Access Levels** 

	% of Quota	% of GDP
Average Current Crises	941	8.7
Pakistan (2008)	500	4.7
Iceland (2008)	1,190	12.5
Ukraine (2008)	800	9.1
Hungary (2008)	1,015	9.7
Latvia (2008)	1,200	7.7
Average of Past Crises <sup>1</sup>	1,140	6.3
Memo: Precautionary arrangements		
El Salvador (precautionary, 2009)	300	2.2
Costa Rica (expected precautionary, 2009)	300	2.5
Serbia (precautionary, 2009)	75	1.4

<sup>1</sup> Thailand(1997), Indonesia(1997), Korea(1997), Turkey(2002)

# Focus and streamlining of conditionality has improved

Number of Structural Conditions in Initial Programs Core measures: financial/monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policy



/1 Thailand(1997), Indonesia(1997), Korea(1997), Turkey(2002)

#### Despite all this, risks are to the downside

 Overarching Risk: further delays in implementing policies to stabilize financial conditions – this would intensify feedback loops

Deflation: could reinforce a deeper and longer downturn

Rollover of external financing for emerging economies

Protectionism: trade; but also "backdoor" financial

Sovereign fiscal sustainability concerns