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Author/Editor:
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Shiells, Clinton R.
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Publication Date:
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December 01, 2002
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 484KB).
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
Under imperfect competition, Russia and Ukraine may choose to deviate from optimal tax considerations which suggest use of a destination-based VAT regime. Oil and gas trade is a major source of Russian tax revenue, which is collected partly through an origin-based VAT on intra-CIS energy trade. The paper shows that Ukraine may try to capture part of the tax revenue if it has monopsony power. It is far from clear whether Ukraine would succeed in shifting the rents through taxation, since this depends on the form of imperfect competition and the curvature of Ukraine's import demand function.
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Order a print copy
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 02/235
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Subject(s):
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Competition | Value added tax | Russian Federation | Ukraine | Oil | Energy | Trade | Tax revenues
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Author's Keyword(s):
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Russia | Ukraine | Energy Trade | VAT | Imperfect Competition |
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English
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Publication Date:
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December 01, 2002
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ISBN/ISSN:
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1934-7073
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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WPIEA2352002
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Pages:
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18
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Price:
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US$15.00 )
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Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
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