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Author/Editor:
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Dabán Sánchez, Teresa ; Detragiache, Enrica ; Di Bella, Gabriel ; Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria ; Symansky, Steven A.
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Publication Date:
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November 14, 2003
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Electronic Access:
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Link to Abstract
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Summary:
Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.
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Series:
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Occasional Paper No. 225
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Subject(s):
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Fiscal policy | France | Germany | Italy | Spain
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English
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Publication Date:
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November 14, 2003
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ISBN/ISSN:
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978-1-58906-216-0 / 0251-6365
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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S225EA
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Pages:
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46
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Price:
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Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
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