Fiscal Surveillance in a Petro Zone: The Case of the CEMAC

 
Author/Editor: Wiegand, Johannes
 
Publication Date: January 01, 2004
 
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
 
Summary: This paper discusses fiscal surveillance criteria for the countries of the Central African Monetary and Economic Union (CEMAC), most of which depend heavily on oil exports. At present, the CEMAC's macroeconomic surveillance exercise sets as fiscal target a floor on the basic budgetary balance. This appears inadequate, for at least two reasons. First, fluctuations in oil prices and, hence, oil receipts obscure the underlying fiscal stance. Second, oil resources are limited, which suggests that some of today's oil receipts should be saved to finance future consumption. The paper develops easy-to-calculate indicators that take both aspects into account. A retrospective analysis based on these alternative indicators reveals that in recent years, the CEMAC's surveillance exercise has tended to accommodate stances of fiscal policy that are at odds with sound management of oil wealth.
 
Series: Working Paper No. 04/8
Subject(s): Fiscal policy | Oil | Monetary unions | Cameroon | Congo, Republic of | Equatorial Guinea | Chad | Central African Republic | Gabon

Author's Keyword(s): Fiscal policy | oil | macroeconomic surveillance
 
English
Publication Date: January 01, 2004
ISBN/ISSN: 1934-7073 Format: Paper
Stock No: WPIEA0082004 Pages: 25
Price:
US$15.00 (Academic Rate:
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