Tax Rate Cuts and Tax Compliance—The Laffer Curve Revisited

Author/Editor:

Elöd Takáts ; Tamás K. Papp

Publication Date:

January 1, 2008

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

The paper shows how tax rate cuts can increase revenues by improving tax compliance. The intuition is that tax evasion has externalities: tax evaders protect each other, because they tie down limited enforcement capacity. Thus, relatively small tax rate cuts, which decrease incentives to evade taxes, can lead to increased revenues through spillovers - creating Laffer effects. Interestingly, tax rate cuts here imply increasing effective taxes. The model is consistent with what happened in Russia, and may provide basis for further thinking about tax rate cuts in other countries.

Series:

Working Paper No. 08/7

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

January 1, 2008

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451868692/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2008007

Price:

$18.00 (Academic Rate:$18.00)

Format:

Paper

Pages:

20

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