Tax Rate Cuts and Tax Compliance--The Laffer Curve Revisited

 
Author/Editor: Papp, Tamás K. ; Takáts, Elöd
 
Publication Date: January 01, 2008
 
Electronic Access: Free Full text (PDF file size is 617KB).
Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file

 
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
 
Summary: The paper shows how tax rate cuts can increase revenues by improving tax compliance. The intuition is that tax evasion has externalities: tax evaders protect each other, because they tie down limited enforcement capacity. Thus, relatively small tax rate cuts, which decrease incentives to evade taxes, can lead to increased revenues through spillovers - creating Laffer effects. Interestingly, tax rate cuts here imply increasing effective taxes. The model is consistent with what happened in Russia, and may provide basis for further thinking about tax rate cuts in other countries.
 
Series: Working Paper No. 08/7
Subject(s): Tax evasion | Russian Federation | Tax revenues | Taxes

Author's Keyword(s): Tax compliance | Tax evasion | Laffer curve
 
English
Publication Date: January 01, 2008
Format: Paper
Stock No: WPIEA2008007 Pages: 20
Price:
US$18.00 (Academic Rate:
US$18.00 )
 
 
Please address any questions about this title to publications@imf.org