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Author/Editor:
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Schimmelpfennig, Axel ; Gardner, E. H.
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Publication Date:
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January 01, 2008
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 469KB).
Use the free
Adobe Acrobat Reader
to view this PDF file
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
This paper reviews Lebanon's ability to manage financial pressures following severe shocks despite its large public debt overhang and significant external vulnerabilities. Based on interviews with market participants in Beirut and London, the paper concludes that Lebanon's ability to weather what appear to be "perfect storms" derives from three characteristics: a perceived implicit guarantee from donors; Lebanon's track record of having never defaulted on external debt or deposits; and the unique market structure for Lebanese debt which is dominated by local banks and "dedicated" investors and depositors.
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 08/17
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Subject(s):
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Public debt | Lebanon | Investment | Financial crisis
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Author's Keyword(s):
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Lebanon | public debt | debt crisis | debt sustainability |
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