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Author/Editor:
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Coady, David ; Parker, Susan
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Publication Date:
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March 01, 2009
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 640KB).
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
Mexico’s main social support program, Oportunidades, combines two methods to target cash to poor households: an initial self-selection by households who acquire knowledge about the program and apply for benefits, followed by an administrative determination of eligibility based on a means test. Self-selection improves targeting by excluding high-income households, while administrative targeting does so mainly by excluding middle-income households. The two methods are complementary: expanding program knowledge across households substantially increases applications from non-poor households, thus reinforcing the importance of administrative targeting. The paper shows that targeting can be further improved through redesigning the means test and differentiating transfers according to demographic characteristics.
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Order a print copy
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 09/60
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Subject(s):
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Transfer of real resources | Mexico | Social policy | Social safety nets | Data analysis
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Author's Keyword(s):
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Targeting | self selection | administrative selection | Mexico | Oportunidades | social welfare | coverage | leakage |
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