Optimal Monetary Policy with Overlapping Generations of Policymakers

 
Author/Editor: Shamloo, Maral
 
Publication Date: February 01, 2010
 
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
 
Summary: In this paper I study the effect of imperfect central bank commitment on inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which the monetary authority is a committee that consists of members who serve overlapping, finite terms. Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a bargaining process. I show that this setup gives rise to a continuous measure of the degree of monetary authority's commitment. The model suggests that the lower the churning rate or the longer the tenure time, the closer social welfare will be to that under optimal commitment policy.
 
Series: Working Paper No. 10/32
Subject(s): Economic models | Governance | Monetary authorities | Monetary policy | Russian Federation

Author's Keyword(s): Monetary Policy Committee | Commitment | Discretion | Optimal Monetary Policy
 
English
Publication Date: February 01, 2010
Format: Paper
Stock No: WPIEA2010032 Pages: 35
Price:
US$18.00 (Academic Rate:
US$18.00 )
 
 
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