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Author/Editor:
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Mishra, Prachi ; Mayda, Anna Maria ; Ludema, Rodney D.
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Publication Date:
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September 01, 2010
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 1,973KB).
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on Congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a model in which firms influence the government by transmitting information about the value of protection, via costless messages (cheap-talk) and costly messages (lobbying). We estimate our model using firm-level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures from 1999-2006, and find that indeed verbal opposition by import-competing firms, with no lobbying, significantly reduces the probability of a suspension being granted. In addition, lobbying expenditures by proponent and opponent firms sway this probability in opposite directions.
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Order a print copy
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 10/211
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Subject(s):
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Corporate sector | Economic models | Import tariffs | Imports | Political economy | Tariff structures | Trade policy | United States
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Author's Keyword(s):
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trade policy | political economy |
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English
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Publication Date:
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September 01, 2010
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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WPIEA2010211
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Pages:
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48
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Price:
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US$18.00 )
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Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
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