Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features

 
Author/Editor: Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla ; Zhou, Jian-Ping ; Le Leslé, Vanessa ; Moore, Michael
 
Publication Date: January 25, 2011
 
Electronic Access: Free Full text (PDF file size is 779KB).
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Summary: The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in the crisis-hit countries had to provide unprecedented levels of support to contain the crisis and protect financial stability. These interventions have not only contributed to a significant increase in sovereign exposures but, in many countries, they have also risked weakening market discipline and worsening moral hazard.
 
Series: Staff Discussion Notes No. 11/1
Subject(s): Moral hazard | Banks | Bonds | Financial institutions | Financial instruments | Risk management

Author's Keyword(s): financial regulation | financial reform | Contingent Capital | too big to fail | moral hazard
 
English
Publication Date: January 25, 2011
ISBN/ISSN: 9781462304141 Format: Paper
Stock No: SDNEA2011001 Pages: 35
Price:
US$20.00 (Academic Rate:
US$20.00 )
 
 
English
Publication Date: January 25, 2011
ISBN/ISSN: 978-1-61635-075-8 / 2072-3202 Format: A web quality merged PDF
Stock No: SDNET2011001 Pages: 34
Price:
Free
 
 
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