|
|
|
|
|
|
Author/Editor:
|
Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla ; Zhou, Jian-Ping ; Le Leslé, Vanessa ; Moore, Michael
|
|
|
|
|
|
Publication Date:
|
January 25, 2011
|
|
|
|
Electronic Access:
|
Free Full text
(PDF file size is 779KB).
Use the free
Adobe Acrobat Reader
to view this PDF file
|
|
|
|
Summary:
The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in the crisis-hit countries had to provide unprecedented levels of support to contain the crisis and protect financial stability. These interventions have not only contributed to a significant increase in sovereign exposures but, in many countries, they have also risked weakening market discipline and worsening moral hazard.
|
|
|
|
Order a print copy
|
|
|
|
|
|
Series:
|
Staff Discussion Notes No. 11/1
|
|
|
|
|
|
Subject(s):
|
Moral hazard | Banks | Bonds | Financial institutions | Financial instruments | Risk management
|
|
|
Author's Keyword(s):
|
financial regulation | financial reform | Contingent Capital | too big to fail | moral hazard |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Publication Date:
|
January 25, 2011
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN/ISSN:
|
9781462304141
|
|
Format:
|
Paper
|
|
Stock No:
|
SDNEA2011001
|
|
Pages:
|
35
|
|
Price:
|
|
|
|
US$20.00 )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Publication Date:
|
January 25, 2011
|
|
|
|
|
ISBN/ISSN:
|
978-1-61635-075-8 / 2072-3202
|
|
Format:
|
A web quality merged PDF
|
|
Stock No:
|
SDNET2011001
|
|
Pages:
|
34
|
|
Price:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
|
|
|
