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Author/Editor:
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De Nicoló, Gianni ; Lucchetta, Marcella
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Publication Date:
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December 01, 2011
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
(PDF file size is 1,325KB).
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
We study versions of a general equilibrium banking model with moral hazard under either constant or increasing returns to scale of the intermediation technology used by banks to screen and/or monitor borrowers. If the intermediation technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, or it is relatively efficient, then perfect competition is optimal and supports the lowest feasible level of bank risk. Conversely, if the intermediation technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or is relatively inefficient, then imperfect competition and intermediate levels of bank risks are optimal. These results are empirically relevant and carry significant implications for financial policy.
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Order a print copy
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 11/295
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Subject(s):
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Banks | Competition | Economic models | Financial stability
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Author's Keyword(s):
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General Equilibrium | Bank Competition | Financial Stability |
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English
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Publication Date:
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December 01, 2011
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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WPIEA2011295
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Pages:
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38
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Price:
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US$18.00 )
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Please address any questions about this title to
publications@imf.org
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