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Author/Editor:
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Enoch, Charles ; Baldwin, Barbara E. ; Frécaut, Olivier ; Kovanen, Arto
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Publication Date:
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May 01, 2001
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Electronic Access:
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Free Full text
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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate
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Summary:
This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges.
This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges.
This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges.
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Series:
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Working Paper No. 01/52
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Subject(s):
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Banking | Indonesia | Financial sector | Financial crisis | Bank supervision
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Author's Keyword(s):
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Banking crisis | bank restructuring | blanket guarantee | lender of last resort | banking supervision |
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English
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Publication Date:
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May 01, 2001
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ISBN/ISSN:
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1934-7073
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Format:
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Paper
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Stock No:
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WPIEA0522001
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Pages:
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139
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Price:
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US$15.00 )
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Price Delivery Note:
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Prepayment required for individual copies. An annual subscription is $375.00 a year. It includes 12 monthly shipments and priority mail delivery. The Stock No. for the subscription is WPEA.
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