Competition Among Regulators
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Summary:
This paper shows that competition among regulators reduces regulatory standards relative to a centralized solution. It suggests that a central regulator is more likely to emerge for homogeneous and financially integrated countries. The paper proves these results in a model where regulators concerned with their banking system’s stability and efficiency and with their banks’ profitability set their regulatory policy non-cooperatively. Externalities in bank regulation make the independent solution collectively inefficient. These externalities and the benefits of centralized regulation increase with financial integration, while the costs associated with the loss of independence decrease with the homogeneity of the countries involved.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2001/073
Subject:
Bank soundness Banking Commercial banks Competition Financial institutions Financial integration Financial markets Financial sector policy and analysis Foreign banks
English
Publication Date:
May 1, 2001
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451849462/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA0732001
Pages:
24
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