Other Titles in the Occasional Paper Series
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Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy and Spain
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Author/Editor: |
Dabán Sánchez, Teresa | Detragiache, Enrica | Di Bella, Gabriel | Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria | Symansky, Steven A. |
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November 14, 2003 |
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Electronic Access: |
Link to Abstract |
Summary: Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.
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Series: |
Occasional Paper No. 225 |
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Subject(s): |
Fiscal policy | France | Germany | Italy | Spain |
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Published: |
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November 14, 2003 |
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ISBN/ISSN: |
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978-1-58906-216-0 / 0251-6365 |
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Format: |
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Paper |
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Stock No: |
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S225EA |
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Pages: |
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46 |
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Price: |
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US$25.00 (Academic Rate: US$22.00 )
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