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Other Titles in the Occasional Paper Series

Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy and Spain

Author/Editor: Dabán Sánchez, Teresa | Detragiache, Enrica | Di Bella, Gabriel | Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria | Symansky, Steven A.
Published: November 14, 2003
Electronic Access: Link to Abstract

Summary: Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.
Series: Occasional Paper No. 225
Subject(s): Fiscal policy | France | Germany | Italy | Spain
    Published:   November 14, 2003        
    ISBN/ISSN:   978-1-58906-216-0 / 0251-6365   Format:   Paper
    Stock No:   S225EA   Pages:   46
    Price:   US$25.00 (Academic Rate: US$22.00 )
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