Missing Link: Volatility and the Debt Intolerance Paradox

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Author/Editor:

Catão, Luis | Kapur, Sandeep

Authorized for Distribution:

March 1, 2004

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.

Summary: A striking feature of sovereign lending is that many countries with moderate debt-to-income ratios systematically face higher spreads and more stringent borrowing constraints than others with far higher debt ratios. Earlier research has rationalized the phenomenon in terms of sovereign reputation and countries' distinct credit histories. This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence to show that differences in underlying macroeconomic volatility are key. While volatility increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic consumption, the ability to borrow is constrained by the higher default risk that volatility engenders.

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Series:

Working Paper No. 04/51

Subject(s):

External debt | Emerging markets

Author's keyword(s):

Sovereign debt | macroeconomic volatility | emerging markets

English

Published:	March 1, 2004
ISBN/ISSN:	1934-7073	Format:	Paper
Stock No:	WPIEA0512004	Pages:	34
Price:	US$15.00 (Academic Rate: US$15.00 )


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