



ANGOLA

September 2020

THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED FUND FACILITY, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION AND REPHASING OF ACCESS, WAIVERS OF NONOBSERVANCE OF PERFORMANCE CRITERION AND APPLICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE CRITERION, MODIFICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND COMPLETION OF FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW—PRESS RELEASE; STAFF REPORT; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR ANGOLA

In the context of the Third Review under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, Requests for Augmentation and Rephasing of Access, Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion and Applicability of Performance Criterion, Modifications of Performance Criteria, and Completion of Financing Assurances Review, the following documents have been released and are included in this package:

- A **Press Release** including a statement by the Chair of the Executive Board.
- The **Staff Report** prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board's consideration on September 16, 2020, following discussions that ended on April 16, 2020, with the officials of Angola on economic developments and policies underpinning the IMF arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on July 20, 2020.
- A **Staff Supplement** updating information on recent developments.
- A **Statement by the Executive Director** for Angola.

The IMF's transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents.

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IMF Executive Board Completes the Third Review of Angola's Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility and Augments Disbursement to Address the Impact of COVID-19

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

- The Executive Board decision allows an immediate disbursement of US\$1 billion to Angola and an augmentation of total access by about US\$765 million through the end of the arrangement.
- Angola's economy has been hit hard by a multifaceted shock stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and the decline in oil prices.
- The authorities have adopted timely measures to tackle the challenges rising from the shock and remain strongly committed to the economic program under the Extended Fund Facility with broadly satisfactory implementation.

Washington, DC – September 16, 2020. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the third review of Angola's economic program supported by an extended arrangement under the [Extended Fund Facility \(EFF\)](#). Completion of this review unlocks access to SDR 731.7 million (about US\$1 billion), bringing total disbursements under the extended arrangement to SDR 1,804.7 million (about US\$2.5 billion).

Angola's three-year extended arrangement [was approved by the IMF Executive Board on December 7, 2018](#), in the amount of SDR 2.673 billion (about US\$3.7 billion at the time of approval). It aims at restoring external and fiscal sustainability, improving governance, and diversifying the economy to promote sustainable, private sector-led economic growth.

In completing the third review, the Executive Board also approved the authorities' request for an augmentation of access under the EFF arrangement of 72 percent of Angola's quota (SDR 540 million or about US\$765 million) to support authorities' efforts to control the spread of COVID-19 pandemic, mitigate its economic impact, and persevere with the implementation of structural reforms.

Angola's economy has been hit hard by a triple, COVID-19-induced external shock. The shock led to economic and health crises, compounded by the decline in oil prices in view of Angola's dependence on oil exports. In response, the authorities have adopted decisive measures to tackle the impact of the shock, and they remain strongly committed to the program, including the fight against corruption. On the fiscal front, the National Assembly adopted a conservative supplementary budget, which includes non-oil revenue measures and compression of non-essential expenditure, while creating space for essential spending on health and the social safety net. On the monetary front, the central bank has adopted several measures to ease liquidity and credit constraints to help the private sector cope with the crises.

The Executive Board also approved today the authorities' request for waivers of nonobservance and applicability of performance criteria and modification of some performance criteria, indicative targets, and structural benchmarks.

Following the Executive Board's discussion on Angola, Ms. Antoinette Sayeh, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

"The Angolan authorities remain committed to sound policies under the IMF-supported program despite a deteriorated external environment due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including negative impacts on public health, social protection, the budget, and public debt. The authorities have taken swift and decisive action, in response to lower oil exports and revenue, consistent with broad program objectives.

"The authorities adopted a conservative supplementary budget for 2020, taking measures to increase non-oil revenue, and reining in non-essential expenditure. Despite the crisis, fiscal consolidation will continue, while creating space for adequate spending on health and social safety nets. The authorities will also persevere with implementing measures to strengthen public financial management.

"The authorities have secured debt reprofiling agreements from several large creditors to reduce risks related to debt sustainability. Continued vigilance in managing public debt is critical to mitigate such risks in the context of heightened oil-price volatility.

"The National Bank of Angola (BNA) has continued to reform the exchange rate regime, including migrating the bulk of foreign exchange transactions to an electronic platform. Efforts should continue to remove constraints toward reaching a market-clearing exchange rate. The monetary stance has been eased to help counteract the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the oil-price shock. However, there is little room for further monetary easing and the BNA should stand ready to keep inflationary pressures in check.

"Timely implementation of banking sector recapitalization and restructuring is essential to address financial sector risks. In light of the shortfalls identified by the completed asset quality reviews, the authorities are preparing to address capital deficiencies and enhance credit risk management frameworks. The authorities need to advance the restructuring of two public banks. These efforts will be supported by the forthcoming BNA and Financial Institutions Laws, enabling the authorities to strengthen bank supervision and resolution.

"Pursuing structural reforms is critical to diversify the economy and lay the foundations for private sector-led economic growth. The Government will need to remain steadfast in enhancing the business environment, strengthening governance, and fighting corruption. "

More information

IMF Lending Tracker (emergency financing request approved by the IMF Executive Board)
<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker>

IMF Executive Board calendar
<https://www.imf.org/external/NP/SEC/bc/eng/index.aspx>



ANGOLA

July 20, 2020

THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED FUND FACILITY, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION AND REPHASING OF ACCESS, WAIVERS OF NONOBSERVANCE OF PERFORMANCE CRITERION AND APPLICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE CRITERION, MODIFICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND COMPLETION OF FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context. The economic outlook has substantially deteriorated since the Second Review, driven by the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on global economic activity and oil prices. The adverse impact of the shock on the Angolan economy, which is highly dependent on oil (95 percent of exports, two-thirds of government revenue), adds to the hardship from five consecutive years of recession. Rapid exchange rate depreciation and the decline in oil prices have pushed the public debt-to-GDP ratio to a very high level. However, continued fiscal retrenchment, prudent debt management, and debt reprofiling are expected to improve debt dynamics progressively.

Program performance. It has been broadly satisfactory since the Second Review. End-December 2019 and end-June 2020 *performance criteria* (PCs) on net international reserves; central bank claims on the Central Government; and reserve money were met. The end-December 2019 PC on non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD) and all *continuous* PCs, except those on external arrears, were met. There is no reason to believe that the end-June 2020 PC on NOPFD was missed. All end-December 2019 and end-March 2020 *indicative targets* were met, some by a margin. Of the 12 *structural benchmarks* up to end-June 2020, five were met and seven were not met, although two of the latter have since then been implemented.

Exceptional financing. In light of the decline in oil prices, the authorities requested IMF access augmentation; decided to avail themselves of the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative for 2020; and, in staff's judgement, have undertaken credible steps toward a debt restructuring with two large creditors; and are seeking specific and credible assurance on debt relief from a third official creditor. Staff supports the requests for access augmentation and rephasing.

Risks. Although significant risks remain, in particular very high risks to debt dynamics and oil prices, the authorities are keeping the program on track by implementing prudent fiscal and debt policies, including a conservative supplementary budget for 2020; pursuing sound monetary and exchange rate policies; and continuing structural reforms.

Approved By
Abebe Aemro Selassie
(AFR) and Gavin Gray
(SPR)

Discussions took place during March 18–April 16, 2020 through teleconferencing. The mission held discussions with Minister of State for Economic Development Manuel Nunes Júnior, Minister of Finance Vera Daves, Minister of Economy and Planning Sérgio dos Santos, Minister of Industry and Commerce Victor Fernandes, Minister of Mineral Resources, Petroleum, and Gas Diamantino Azevedo, *Banco Nacional de Angola* Governor José Massano, and other senior officials. The staff team comprised Messrs. de Zamaróczy (head), de Resende, and Mmes. Gove and Mwase (all AFR); Ms. Chen (FAD); and Messrs. Halikias (SPR), Monaghan, and Otero (both MCM), Souto (resident representative), and Miguel (local economist). Messrs. Mahlinza and Essuvi (OEDAE) participated in key policy meetings. Ms. Donoso provided research support. Mr. Ogaja and Ms. Adjahouinou assisted with the preparation of this report.

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WEATHERING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

1. Angola's economy and short-term perspectives have been devastated by a triple, COVID-19-induced external shock. The shock includes economic and health crises and the collapse of oil prices, compounded by agreed reductions in Angola's oil exports under OPEC+. The third component of the shock is specific to Angola, which is highly dependent on oil exports. The authorities have adopted timely measures to tackle the challenges rising from the shock (Box 1), and remain committed to the program, including the fight against corruption.

Box 1. Angola: Response to the Pandemic and Lower Oil Prices

Containment Measures

A mandatory 14-day quarantine for passengers arriving from high-risk countries and suspension of most flights and passenger ships were instituted on March 20. A state emergency, followed by a state of calamity, have been implemented since March 27, 2020. The latest extension has less restrictive requirements: (i) compulsory confinement at home, except to go to work and to purchase essential goods; (ii) borders are closed except to import humanitarian goods; (iii) circulation between provinces is allowed for business and commerce activities, except to and from Luanda, which is under a cordon sanitaire; (iv) public services and private businesses are allowed to function with 50 percent of personnel and with reduced hours; schools, universities, restaurants are closed and public events banned; (v) private and public transportation is limited to essential purposes; and (vi) violation of rules is subject to prosecution.

Fiscal Measures

The authorities announced a fiscal package in late March to tackle the impact of the pandemic and lower oil prices. The main revenue measures include: (i) extension of the corporate income tax deadline by up to 60 days for selected companies; (ii) exemption of value-added tax (VAT) and customs duties on goods imported under humanitarian aid and donations, and these goods, including those produced locally, and their associated services, are tax-deductible; (iii) a 12-month VAT tax credit for imported capital goods and raw materials used in the production of 54 essential goods in the basic basket; (iv) an interest-free, deferred payment option for social security contributions into the second half of 2020; and (v) deferred payment of the urban property tax until October 2020.

The main spending measures include: (i) a 30 percent freeze on goods and services, except for essential health expenditure; (ii) reduction in the number of ministries from 28 to 21; (iii) suspension of selected capital expenditure; (iv) suspension of non-priority social support programs; (v) suspension of "additional credits" with few exceptions; (vi) hiring freeze in the civil service, except for essential staff; (vii) enhanced expenditure processing and reporting; (viii) reduced travel and real estate investments; (ix) reclassification of vehicles for senior officials' business transportation; (x) suspension of purchase of new vehicles for personal use and reprioritization of vehicles whose acquisition has started; (xi) suspension of exports of essential goods for 30 days; (xii) regulated prices for an approved list of medical goods related to COVID-19.

Monetary Policy Measures

The *Banco Nacional de Angola* (BNA) introduced several measures to support liquidity and credit: (i) the rate of the 7-day permanent liquidity absorption facility was cut from 10 percent to 7 percent on March 27; (ii) additional liquidity support equivalent of 0.5 percent of GDP was provided to banks and a liquidity line of Kz 100 billion (about US\$170 million) for the purchase of government securities from non-financial corporations was opened; (iii) the credit-stimulus program has been expanded to allow banks to deduct the amount of credit extended to selected sectors from their reserve requirement obligations; (iv) financial institutions were instructed to grant a moratorium of 60 days for debt service; (v) the minimum allocation of credit to promote the production of essential products increased from 2 percent to 2.5 percent of commercial banks' net assets; and (vi) banks have been instructed to provide credit in local currency to assist importers of essential goods.

2. Low oil prices, heightened oil-price volatility, and restricted oil exports are delaying growth recovery (Figures 1–4; Tables 1–6).

- *The economy is in its fifth year of recession.* Economic activity in 2020 is projected to contract (–4 percent—the deepest yearly contraction in three decades) on the back of a decline in oil exports and its spillover to non-oil sectors.
- *The adverse terms-of-trade shock has led to sizeable real and nominal depreciations of the exchange rate.* After the significant progress toward a market-clearing regime in 2019Q4, the exchange rate is expected to continue to absorb the bulk of the external shock.
- *Inflation is projected to increase.* Despite the continuation of fiscal retrenchment and a large negative output gap, end-year inflation is projected to increase to 22 percent, mainly because of exchange rate depreciation and a moderately accommodative monetary policy.
- *Despite the projected decline in oil revenue, fiscal retrenchment continues.* The non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD) at end-December 2019 outperformed the program target; the indicative target (IT) at end-March 2020 was met; and in the absence of data, there is no evidence to suggest that the end-June performance criterion (PC) was missed.¹ In response to the shock, the authorities have prepared a supplementary budget for this year. Nonetheless, the debt-to GDP ratio is projected to surge, mainly because of the expected exchange rate depreciation and output contraction.
- *The outlook for Angola’s external position has deteriorated.* This mainly reflects the projected decline in oil exports in 2020. In 2019, the floating exchange rate helped mitigate the impact of lower oil prices and kept the current account in substantial surplus. Together with bringing planned Eurobond issuance of US\$1.5 billion forward, this allowed a buildup in gross international reserves (GIRs) by year end to the equivalent of 13 months of prospective imports of goods and services. The current account in 2020 is projected to swing to a deficit, because of the slump in oil exports; the impact on the balance of payments (BOP) would only be partially offset by lower services imports (owing to lower oil production) and stronger foreign direct investment, mainly reflecting higher inflows to domestic oil companies from overseas parents). The brunt of the adjustment will be borne by the exchange rate, although part of the BOP deterioration will be accommodated by net international reserves (NIRs) decumulation. Even so, a substantial external financing gap is projected to emerge, which will be filled by access augmentation, and debt reprofiling under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (G20DSSI) and selected debt reprofiling by Angola’s large creditors.

¹ This PC will be assessed during the Fourth Review.

- *Monetary policy has evolved with the onset of the crisis.* The BNA suspended the gradual tightening in late-March 2020—which had aimed at supporting disinflation and the exchange rate—and increased liquidity and credit support to the economy.
- *Some banks remain weak and highly vulnerable to shocks.* The economic crisis could exacerbate existing strains in the banking sector. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) had grown to 35 percent by September 2019 and two public banks need deep restructuring. The crisis may adversely affect liquidity and asset quality.

3. The outlook remains subject to very high risks (Annexes I–II). Growth is subject to elevated risks stemming from deep and prolonged effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Depressed global demand may keep oil prices low and the pandemic may put pressure on the health system. The materialization of these risks could aggravate revenue shortfall, increase expenditure, stymie economic recovery, and delay the expected reduction in public debt. Upside risks could arise from the lifting of oil quotas and higher oil prices than assumed in the program.² Continued technical assistance (TA) will help mitigate implementation risks.

THE PROGRAM REMAINS ON TRACK, DESPITE DAUNTING CHALLENGES

4. Program implementation has been broadly satisfactory despite the crisis (MEFP Tables 1–2). End-December 2019 and end-June 2020 PCs on net international reserves; central bank claims on the Central Government; and reserve money (RM) were met. The end-December 2019 PC on NOPFD and all *continuous* PCs, except those on external arrears, were met. There is no reason to believe that the end-June 2020 PC on NOPFD was missed. All end-December 2019 and end-March 2020 ITs were met, some by a margin. Of the 12 *structural benchmarks* (SB) up to end-June 2020, five were met and seven were not met, although two of the latter have since then been implemented.

POLICY DISCUSSIONS

Policy discussions were conducted against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. They focused on measures to keep the economy afloat and continue with essential reforms in the midst of the crisis, while recalibrating the program’s macroframework and conditionality.

A. Preserving Fiscal Retrenchment

5. Additional non-oil revenue measures are being taken in 2020. With reductions in oil exports, oil revenue in 2020 is projected to decline by 14 percent, compared to the 2019 outcome.

² Reference oil prices for the remainder of 2020 and for 2021 in the baseline scenario are below the projected prices in the recent *World Economic Outlook Update* (WEO).

Non-oil revenue will suffer from reduced activity and pandemic-related tax relief measures, amounting to 0.3 percent of GDP. However, the National Assembly approved a non-oil revenue package in July, which increases personal income tax (PIT) progressivity and eliminates several exemptions. The supplementary budget, under consideration by the National Assembly, also contains non-oil revenue measures, such as higher excise taxes on imported luxury cars and cigarettes. The estimated yield of these measures is 0.3 percent of GDP, which offsets the tax relief shortfall (Text Table 1). The brunt of non-oil revenue will come from a reduction in the VAT refund stock, an administrative decision involving no collection effort.

Text Table 1. Angola: Main Non-Oil Revenue and COVID-19 Relief Measures, 2020

| | Annual Yield (billion Kzs) | Annual Yield (percent of GDP) | Expected in 2020 (percent of GDP) ^{1/} |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Non-oil revenue measures | 123 | 0.36 | 0.32 |
| <i>Value added tax - lowering refund stock from 35% to 25%</i> | 88 | 0.26 | 0.26 |
| <i>Excise tax - raising taxes for imported luxury cars and cigarettes</i> | 9 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| <i>Personal income tax</i> | 79 | 0.23 | 0.08 |
| Removing exemptions, applying new regime | 58 | 0.17 | 0.08 |
| Applying to military income | 21 | 0.06 | 0.0 |
| <i>Corporate income tax - reduce rate from 30% to 25%</i> | -102 | -0.30 | -0.08 |
| <i>Property tax - administrative change</i> | 23 | 0.07 | 0.00 |
| <i>Other revenue measures</i> | 27 | 0.08 | 0.04 |
| COVID-19 tax relief measures | -100 | -0.29 | -0.29 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff projections.

^{1/} The estimated yield is based on partial implementation of the measures from mid-2020.

6. Despite the crisis, the conservative fiscal stance will continue in 2020, although its composition will tilt toward selected expenditure compression. The budget was in overall surplus at end-2019 for the second consecutive year. Despite the crisis, the NOPFD may end up even lower than the end-2020 program target, as a result of the supplementary budget, which will weigh on non-essential expenditure. Within this tight fiscal position, however, the authorities intend to increase healthcare spending to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.³ They also have contingent plans to delay domestically financed investment and accelerate revenue measures should risks materialize. Staff proposes an adjustor to the NOPFD to avoid undue compression in essential social and investment spending in the event of excessive exchange rate depreciation

³ The baseline scenario assumes US\$100 million (16 percent of 2019 healthcare spending) in COVID-19 health spending in 2020. Several initiatives to increase COVID-19 spending are being coordinated with the UN, WHO, and World Bank (WB), which have procedures to transparently account for resources being directed at fighting the pandemic. The overall social spending envelope is expected to remain above the social spending floor (IT).

(TMU ¶11). Under this proposal, the NOPFD target would be adjusted upward by the impact of excess depreciation above the program baseline on foreign-financed public investment—to safeguard debt sustainability, this adjustment would be limited annually to 1 percent of GDP.⁴

7. Non-oil revenue mobilization will continue in 2021. Implementation of reforms introduced in 2019 and 2020, together with gradual recovery of growth in 2021, will raise non-oil revenue by 0.2 percent of GDP. Continued reform measures in major tax categories will increase revenue by at least another 0.6 percent of GDP (Text Table 2).

The measures will include further reducing the stock of the VAT refund account; expanding the base of the VAT at customs; removing some VAT exemptions; further reforming the PIT to broaden its base and progressivity; introducing a minimum tax for the corporate income tax; strengthening transfer pricing rules; improving property registration; and starting to integrate the informal sector (MEFP ¶8).

Text Table 2. Angola: Main Revenue Measures, 2021

| | Annual Yield (Percent of GDP) |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Total | 0.60-1.30 |
| Value added tax | 0.35-0.71 |
| Personal income tax | 0.12-0.25 |
| Corporate income tax | 0.10-0.22 |
| Excise tax | 0.05-0.10 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff projections.

8. Payments arrears. In 2019, total payments arrears, equivalent to 2.4 percent of GDP, were cleared—about one third through cancellations (Text Table 3). About 79 percent of the arrears *not recorded* in the budget information technology system (SIGFE) were cleared, thus exceeding the end-March 2020 target. Because of the tight fiscal situation, the authorities have suspended cash payments of arrears for

the remainder of the year, and are requesting a modification of the corresponding IT. To prevent new arrears accumulation, the authorities are enhancing the reporting and recording of arrears and plan to accelerate their clearance, once liquidity conditions improve.

Text Table 3. Angola: Clearance of Payments Arrears Accumulated up to End-2017

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Total |
|----------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| TOTAL ^{1,2,3} | 1.5 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 5.6 |
| SIGFE | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 2.7 |
| NON-SIGFE | 1.1 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 3.0 |
| Memorandum Items: | | | | | |
| Percent SIGFE ^{2,3} | 19 | 32 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Percent Non-SIGFE ^{2,3} | 30 | 79 | 79 | 100 | 100 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Gross amounts, i.e., not netting out claims that could be deemed invalid by the certification.

² In cumulative terms.

³ The stock of arrears includes cancellations.

9. As a result of the revenue shortfall, gross financing needs (GFNs) will be sizable in 2020, but will gradually decline to more manageable levels in the medium term (Tables 7–8). COVID-19-induced expenses, bank recapitalization, arrears clearance, and critical investment will all contribute to higher GFNs. Those will be filled by exceptional financing from the G20DSSI, debt reprofiling from Angola’s large creditors, budget support from multilateral organizations (including

⁴ The proposed adjustor is asymmetric and is based on the difference between the projected and the actual average exchange rates during the year.

IMF access augmentation), privatization proceeds, disbursements from existing credit lines within program limits, drawdowns from government deposits, and sale of financial assets of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA). The latter will reduce borrowing needs.

B. Protecting Debt Sustainability

10. Public debt remains very elevated and subject to heightened risks. The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected at 123 percent at end-2020, mostly reflecting large currency depreciation and lower nominal output. Because oil exports are projected to remain subdued in the coming years, debt indicators will remain high, albeit declining. Debt dynamics are sensitive to growth, oil prices, and the real exchange rate. To keep the debt-to-GDP ratio on a steadily declining path, in addition to fiscal retrenchment, the authorities remain committed to their conservative medium-term debt strategy.

11. Debt sustainability has required proactive external debt management and exceptional financing. The authorities hired legal and financial advisors to help manage external debt. They repaid the outstanding oil-collateralized debt stock owed to an official bilateral creditor. Significant reprofiling of debt service commitments will ease financing pressures and help bring down the GFNs. The authorities have requested debt relief under the G20DSSI for 2020 and, in staff's judgement, have undertaken credible steps with two of their large creditors toward a debt rescheduling. Specifically, selective reprofiling of amortization due in the three-year period starting in June 2020, with a corresponding deferral of three years, with some further partial relief of principal in 2024–25, and repayments phased gradually over a seven-year period, starting in 2023.⁵ The authorities are also seeking specific and credible assurance from a third creditor for a reprofiling on similar terms in order to deliver an outcome in line with program parameters. Staff assesses that, with these operations, the 2020–21 fiscal financing gaps will be closed, including with the drawdown of reserves. These operations have been incorporated in the DSA (Annex III). However, given heightened uncertainty in the current environment, the authorities have indicated that they would seek debt relief from a wider group of creditors, should downside risks materialize.

C. Adapting Monetary Policy to Help Mitigate the Crisis

12. Monetary policy is used to mitigate some of the impacts of the crisis. BNA's crisis-mitigating measures have signaled a flexibilization of liquidity control, with potential implications for inflation and exchange rate depreciation, and will need to be carefully managed and reversed, once the crisis abates. The baseline scenario assumes a tightening of monetary policy from 2021 onward.


⁵ Steps include engaging with the concerned creditors for an extended period (including explaining the program parameters and the debt sustainability analysis (DSA); making a public announcement about such engagement; hiring financial and legal advisors; and securing agreements with two of them, whereas for the third creditor, an agreement is being worked out. For two of the smaller facilities, the principal amortization schedule has been shifted into the future by three years. Where relevant, interest payments during the grace period will be financed by drawing down corresponding escrow account balances.

D. Enhancing Exchange Rate Regime Reform

13. Exchange rate reform has progressed.

Following the transition toward a market-clearing exchange rate since mid-October 2019, the large overvaluation, which had built up through the first half of last year, was eliminated. In fact, the exchange rate appears to have overshot to some extent in late last year and is currently estimated to be moderately undervalued (Annex IV). On the basis of standard methodologies, the external position is assessed to be stronger than warranted by fundamentals for 2019. With the onset of the crisis in mid-March, the depreciation of the exchange rate accelerated and is expected to continue throughout the

remainder of the year (Text Figure 1). Several reforms have been implemented recently to continue the transition toward market determination: (i) since January 2020, oil companies are authorized to sell foreign exchange (FX) directly to banks with which they have business relations; and (ii) on April 1, an electronic trading platform started to be used for FX transactions; the platform was extended to include diamond companies at end-June, and is expected to be expanded to other market participants, including the Treasury. These reforms, combined with others undertaken by the BNA, including the new regulation to eliminate informal restrictions imposed by banks on the withdrawal of FX deposits (end-December 2019 SB), and new regulations to reduce operational cost in over-the-counter FX sales by banks have increased exchange rate flexibility and helped reduce the spread between the official and the parallel market rates from 151 percent in December 2017 to an all-time low of 6 percent in mid-April (Annex V). However, the spread has widened lately to about 30 percent, the cause of which remains under investigation, and could be linked to the shallowness of the parallel market and a tendency to overshoot temporarily, when strong depreciation pressures arise (e.g., when oil prices fall), as happened in the past.



E. Safeguarding Banking Sector Stability

14. Banking sector weaknesses were quantified at end-2019. The BNA completed asset quality reviews (AQRs) of 13 banks, comprising 93 percent of system assets (SB; MEFP ¶15). Those confirmed private banks' resilience to previous challenges with modest capital shortfalls identified in five smaller banks. However, two public banks had a combined capital shortfall equivalent to 3.7 percent of 2020 GDP (Annex VI). Four of the seven weak banks returned to regulatory compliance by end-June 2020 (SB, missed) and recapitalization plans for the remaining three banks are at an advanced stage. The AQRs also identified systemic shortfalls in banks' risk management, including large related-party exposures.

15. The authorities are preparing plans to restructure two public banks. As the losses identified in the AQRs exceed shareholder and subordinated debt holder value in these banks, and there is limited fiscal support available, these banks need deep restructuring. The authorities are finalizing plans to preserve deposits and maintain financial stability (SB, missed; MEFP ¶16). Although one bank has commenced restructuring, the losses identified by the AQR have yet to be fully recognized and both banks have not returned to full compliance with regulatory requirements by end-June (SB, missed). The second bank engaged external consultants to assist with restructuring and discussions with the BNA are continuing. In light of these delays and the impact of COVID-19 on these two banks, staff will request an updated time-bound action plan for the restructuring of these two banks during the Fourth Review.

16. Governance and operational procedures at the bad-asset-management company, *Recredit*, have markedly improved. Changes in *Recredit*'s internal regulations now allow it to take operational decisions without prior approval and its Board members are without conflicts of interest. It has also formed a strategic and monitoring committee that meets quarterly. The authorities plan to strengthen *Recredit*'s accountability and mandate by amending the relevant Presidential Decree (modified SB; MEFP ¶17). *Recredit* has made notable progress with the recovery process for most of the original six business groups under its purview. It acquired 80 percent of the largest public bank's residual NPLs in June 2020 at a price of 6 percent of nominal value.

17. The authorities are strengthening bank oversight and credit-risk management.

This includes more rigorous fit and proper requirements for bank owners in the new Financial Institutions Law (FIL); updating asset classification and provisioning rules by end-September 2020; adopting new bank guidance on bank corporate governance and on effective credit-risk management practices by end-December 2020 (MEFP ¶18); and preparing an action plan to strengthen credit infrastructure (MEFP ¶19).

F. Accelerating Structural Reforms and Improving Governance

18. Structural reforms have progressed, but with delays.

- *Revenue administration.* The authorities remain committed to improving tax efficiency and governance and supporting a broad range of tax policy reforms. With help of IMF TA, measures under preparation aim at accelerating computerization and requiring mandatory e-filing; speeding up recovery of tax arrears; enhancing audit and verification; and improving payment modalities to reduce tax fraud. In addition, a post-crisis revenue collection action plan, with a focus of enhanced monitoring of key industries and largest taxpayers, will be developed to strengthen compliance and secure revenue streams.
- *Subsidy reform.* The pilot phase of the WB-supported cash-transfer program started in May to cover several thousands of poor households, with an eventual objective of reaching 1.6 million households nationwide by end-2021. The next phase of subsidy reform, which involves raising public transportation tariffs and the prices of gasoline and diesel, will start in

2021, when a critical number of low-income households are reached by the cash-transfer program, with the ultimate objective of introducing an automatic fuel-pricing mechanism.

- *State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform.* By end-June, 40 SOEs were offered for public tender and 14 were privatized for US\$53 million, with another 40 assets slated for sale by end-2020. Of Sonangol's (the state oil company) 9 non-core assets offered for privatization between September 2019 and June 2020, 5 were sold for US\$17 million, and 4 will be tendered by end-2020. The arrears accumulated during 2016–19 between Sonangol and PRODEL (the state electricity company) were verified in early 2020 and will be cleared by end-August. To improve transparency, the 12 largest SOEs (by assets) published their audited 2019 annual reports on the SOE oversight institute's webpage by end-June, and the remaining 3 will publish them by end-August, with external audits to be completed by end-September (MEFP 123).
- *Public financial management (PFM) reforms.* The authorities submitted a draft Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) to the National Assembly in July (SB, missed), which defines the fiscal policy framework, including a fiscal rule.⁶ They published an end-year fiscal report for 2019 (full year and fourth quarter) in June 2020 to support the pilot Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF), which was largely completed by end-June and will be revised after the supplementary budget is approved, to help anchor the 2021 budget proposal. In line with the recommendations from the Public Investment Management Assessment completed in December 2019, the authorities will publish initial project appraisal reports for all projects above Kz 10 billion (about US\$17 million) undertaken from January 2021 onward (new SB, MEFP 118). The authorities have continued to improve the efficiency and transparency of the public procurement process. By end-June, they awarded 69 percent of all qualified projects through public tender, on track to meet their target of 45 percent for 2020 (SB). By mid-June, they published the Annual Purchase Plans of 308 (of 593) Budget Units on the Public Purchases' Portal. The Ministry of Finance is working on improving the portal where information on public procurement processes are made available.

19. The reform of the AML/CFT legal framework has been completed, albeit with a delay (SB, missed). As part of the effort to fight corruption, improve governance, and help mitigate correspondent bank pressures, a revised AML/CFT Law was unanimously approved by the National Assembly and came into force in January 2020. It addresses a number of previously identified deficiencies—inter alia by introducing a comprehensive definition of politically exposed persons. Complementary legal and regulatory amendments are being adopted to strengthen the overall AML/CFT framework. To that end, following the adoption of the Law, the BNA recently enacted an AML/CFT regulation for financial institutions and AML/CFT-related aspects have been included in the FIL to strengthen 'fit and proper' requirements.

⁶ The fiscal rule includes the following key elements: (i) until 2025, the NOPFD-to-non-oil GDP ratio is defined in the MTFF; (ii) a downward path of the Central Government's public debt toward the target of 60 percent of GDP; and (iii) from 2025 onwards, a NOPFD-to-non-oil GDP ratio below 5 percent.

20. Reforms to the BNA Law and FIL are progressing, but the corresponding SBs were missed. They will ensure that the BNA has increased operational autonomy, a mandate to pursue price stability, enhanced governance and oversight, and stronger legal tools to preserve financial stability, in line with international good practices.

- Regarding the BNA Law, the main issues are the lack of adequate personal and financial autonomy provisions. In particular, the definition of a price stability mandate, the procedure of appointment and dismissal of key BNA officials, provisions on BNA's capital, profits, and earnings, and quasi-fiscal activities still fall short of international good practice.
- The FIL's early intervention and resolution framework, despite significant improvements in line with IMF recommendations, still needs additional work, notably regarding the asset management tool, the early intervention and resolution regimes, and the need for safeguards to protect public funds.

The gaps in the two draft Laws will be addressed by end-September 2020, (SBs, missed and proposed resets).

21. The Government remains committed to improving governance and fighting corruption. It continues to pursue important reforms to enhance governance at SOEs. A SOE Law and associated regulations are planned to be submitted to the National Assembly, to enhance reporting, transparency, monitoring, and internal and external controls (new SB, MEFP ¶124). Focus will also be placed on increasing the professionalism of SOE management. The Government has been discussing ways to increase cooperation with the UN on combating corruption, drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.

PROGRAM ISSUES AND RISKS

22. Confronted with a major external shock, the authorities have requested access augmentation. Sharply lower oil prices, compounded by restrictive OPEC+ quotas, have opened up a large BOP gap, with the current account worsening by US\$1.4 billion in 2020 and US\$1.2 billion in 2021, compared to Second Review projections, and temporary loss of market access. On the fiscal side, the Covid-19 shock, by sharply lowering oil revenues, has generated additional financing needs relative to the Second Review, of US\$3.8 billion in 2020 and US\$2.9 billion in 2021 (Text Table 4).⁷ Accordingly, the

Text Table 4. Angola: Additional Fiscal Financing Needs due to Covid-19 Shock
(Millions of U.S. dollars)

| | 2020 | 2021 |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| Additional Financing Needs | 3,821 | 2,899 |
| Fund augmentation | 369 | 370 |
| Policy adjustment | 860 | 295 |
| Required reprofiling | 2,591 | 2,234 |
| G20 Covid-19 debt service relief | 1,062 | 0 |
| Debt reprofiling from largest creditors | 1,529 | 2,234 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff calculations and estimates.


⁷ The additional financing needs relative to the Second Review in Text Table 4 are part of the overall fiscal financing gap in Table 7, which incorporates the fiscal adjustment of the supplementary budget in the fiscal framework and records reprofiling as identified financing.

authorities have requested access augmentation, to be used for budget support, from 361 percent of quota (SDR 2,673 million) to 434 percent (SDR 3,213 million), within normal access limits under the GRA, corresponding to an additional SDR 540 million. After considering the policy adjustment in the supplementary budget, the augmentation would provide part of the needed additional financing, with the remainder provided by the G20DSSI and selected debt reprofiling.⁸ In addition, with the expected expansion of the pandemic in Angola, the authorities would like to have room for advancing the import of medical and testing supplies and thus are requesting a rephrasing of IMF disbursements for the remainder of 2020 (Table 10). Staff supports the authorities' requests, as the additional fiscal adjustment in the supplementary budget already pushes the limit of what is advisable, given the economy's weakness and crisis-related pressures on health spending.

23. Capacity to repay the IMF remains adequate, albeit subject to higher-than-usual risks. With the proposed access augmentation, some capacity to repay indicators move toward the upper end of their ranges, compared to other normal access programs (Text Figures 2–3 and Tables 9–10). IMF credit outstanding, as a share of GDP, peaks at 6.2 percent, at the high end compared to other upper-credit tranche arrangements. IMF credit, as a percent of non-collateralized external debt and GIRs, net of collateralized debt service, is at relatively more moderate at 12.6 percent and 26.2 percent, respectively. Peak repayments to non-pledged exports of goods and services are in line with other normal access EFF arrangements. Risks to the IMF are mitigated by the extended debt reprofiling.


24. Financial burden sharing is expected to continue. The World and the African Development Banks are expected to provide budget support of US\$1 billion in 2020 and US\$665 million in 2021. The G20DSSI and selected debt reprofiling will fill a major part of Angola's

Text Figure 2. Angola: Peak IMF Credit-to-GDP Ratio in Recent EFFs
(Percent of GDP)



Sources: IMF Staff reports for program requests; and IMF staff calculations.

Text Figure 3. Angola: Peak Repayment-to-Exports in Recent EFFs
(Percent of Exports of Goods and Services)



Source: IMF staff calculations.
1/ Relative to exports of goods and services.
2/ Relative to unencumbered exports of goods and services, i.e., net of oil-collateralized external debt service.

⁸ Text Table 4 presents the formal terms of reprofiling. Reprofiting in Table 4b and DSA Text Table 2 also includes the impact on interest payments on the higher debt levels of reprofiled credit lines.

financing needs. On this basis, the program is fully financed for the next 12 months, with good prospects for its last half-year.

25. There are delays with the implementation of the recommendations of the Safeguards Policy Assessment. The BNA is strengthening important functions, including reserves management, internal audit, and risk management. The timeliness of financial statements publication has improved, but the full implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards is still missing. Delays also include the establishment of a framework for BNA lending to commercial banks to mitigate financial risks and the legal amendments to the BNA Law for governance and oversight reforms, noted above.

26. Multiple currency practices (MCPs) and exchange restrictions (ERs) continue to be reduced, and there is no breach of the continuous PCs, as the remaining ones pre-date the program.⁹ The trade restrictions related to import licensing to foster economic diversification are also assessed not to constitute a breach of the relevant continuous PC. The application of a stamp tax on foreign exchange operations (SB) was eliminated in October 2019, removing an ER and an MCP (ER, Article VIII, 2a and MCP, Article VIII, 3). The authorities will present a detailed plan and timeline to continue the removal of ERs and MCPs by end-September 2020, including the elimination of the special tax on transfers to non-residents under foreign TA or management service contracts (ER, Article VIII, 2a) by end-March 2021. Import licensing requirements introduced in January 2019 (Presidential Decree No. 23–19), which require importing firms to demonstrate prior efforts to secure domestic sourcing, constitute a trade restriction. However, staff assesses that they were not primarily motivated by BOP-related reasons—given their primary objectives of economic diversification, compelling evidence that they did not materially distort trade flows, and concurring judgment by the WTO—and hence do not give rise to a breach of the relevant continuous PC. Nonetheless, from a policy perspective, staff urged the authorities to scale back the regulations.

27. External debt payments arrears.

- *Private creditors.* Angola accumulated US\$46 million in new arrears between end-September 2019 and end-December 2019, owing to constraints associated with correspondent banks transacting in U.S. dollars. The authorities report having accumulated up to US\$52 million in new arrears between end-December 2019 and end-June 2020. Going forward, they are expecting to accumulate small monthly additional arrears, until the correspondent banking issues are resolved (see below). The authorities continue good-faith discussions to resolve outstanding payments arrears and thus the lending-into-arrears policy is deemed satisfied.
- *Official creditors.* The authorities continue to verify one successor state's legacy claims on arrears to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

⁹ As described in the Informational Annex of IMF Country Report No. 18/156, with the exception of the ER arising from the operation of a priority list and the ER and MCP deriving from the stamp tax on FX operations, which were eliminated (see below).

28. The authorities request waivers of nonobservance of and applicability for PCs and propose modifications to program conditionality as follows.

- They request a waiver for the nonobservance of the continuous PC on external debt payment arrears linked to continued problems with external payments rejected by correspondent banks, with a breach of up to US\$52 million by end-June 2020. However, the authorities took remedial action, as per the last MEFP, by setting up an independent escrow account in a bank in Angola (MEFP 18) and enacting the new AML/CFT Law. Going forward, rejected payments will be deposited in this account, hence they will not give rise to a breach for the purpose of the PC. In view of these remedial actions, and given the criticality of Fund support for the success of the program, staff assesses that the requirements of the lending into arrears policy are satisfied.
- They request a waiver of applicability for the end-June 2020 PC on NOPFD, as in the absence of data, there is no evidence that this PC was not met.
- They propose to change the PC on the NIR floors to help mitigate the crisis to US\$8,085 million for end-December 2020. The proposed modification mainly reflects lower Eurobond issuance and lower oil prices relative to the Second Review baseline and is consistent with the program's NIR adjustor. Despite lower gross reserves, reserve adequacy would improve (due to lower imports) to 104 percent of the ARA metric, and is projected to improve further, to 107 percent by the end of the program, and 118 percent by 2024. They propose to change the PCs on RM ceilings starting at end-December 2020 to accommodate increases observed in monetary aggregates, largely caused by the BNA's response to the COVID-19 shock, but consistent with the relevant program adjustor.
- They propose modifications to the IT for the ceiling on the stock of Central Government debt and debt of Sonangol to accommodate the slower pace of debt repayment.
- They propose to reset three SBs and to introduce two new SBs to strengthen governance and PFM.

STAFF APPRAISAL

29. Angola's economy is devastated by a triple shock in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Looking ahead, restricted oil production and lower oil prices are expected to continue to weigh on oil exports, putting pressure on economic activity, the current account, international reserves, and the exchange rate, while also contributing to an elevated debt burden. Risks on the external side will continue to stem mostly from oil prices and production. On the domestic side, risks come from potential health and humanitarian crises and an aggravated economic downturn.

30. Despite the shock, the authorities remain strongly committed to the program. They submitted a conservative supplementary budget to the National Assembly in July, with additional non-oil revenue measures and stringent expenditure management, while preserving

critical social and health outlays. The remaining financing gap will be financed by running down government deposits and assets, exceptional financing under the G20DSSI, and selected bilateral debt reprofiling. In the medium term, fiscal consolidation will be largely achieved through increased non-oil revenue, in particular through enhanced VAT collection.

31. Angola’s public debt is assessed to be sustainable, but risks remain very high. Following its 2020 peak, the debt ratio is projected to decline steadily toward the authorities’ medium-term target. There are high risks associated with this debt trajectory given Angola’s high vulnerability to oil price and exchange rate shocks. The authorities should remain proactive, particularly in dealing with the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. They should continue to seek further debt relief and additional fiscal adjustment to safeguard debt sustainability, if downside risks materialize.

32. There is limited scope for further monetary policy easing. The BNA has been quick to react to the onset of the crisis and implement several mitigating measures, which relaxed monetary policy. Once the crisis abates, the authorities should stand ready to rein in pressures on inflation and the exchange rate.

33. Exchange rate reform has continued to progress and remaining MCPs and ERs will be eliminated. The transition toward a market-clearing exchange rate regime since mid-October 2019 has been a major step forward and has served Angola well in the crisis. The exchange rate can now play a shock-absorbing role to ensure better allocation of real resources and scarce FX. The BNA should not try to counter the expected depreciation of the exchange rate.

34. Safeguarding financial sector stability requires decisive action, given the limited fiscal space available for bank recapitalization. Timely restructuring of two troubled banks is important to protect deposits and safeguard financial stability. The AQRs performed in late 2019 were a point-in-time exercise that could not have anticipated the crisis. The resulting fall in economic output, combined with the April moratorium on loan repayments and enforcement of collateral, introduces substantial risks to asset quality in the medium term.

35. Ongoing structural reforms will enhance fiscal governance, reduce fiscal risks, and reinvigorate private-sector-led growth. The authorities’ progress in SOE privatization, public procurement, and the fiscal policy framework will allow more efficient use of public resources, while giving room for private-sector-led development and economic diversification.


36. Risks have dramatically risen, but the authorities’ strong policy response and perseverance with reforms will help keep the program on track. The Government’s resolve to tackle the crisis head-on and significant international financing support (access augmentation, G20DSSI, selected debt reprofiling) are critical to keep the program on track. Despite the crisis, the authorities are persevering with their prudent fiscal and debt policies and reforms. Appropriate balancing of monetary and exchange rate policies against the economic impact of the COVID-19 shock will complement the fiscal effort and help mitigate the impact of oil-price volatility. Implementation of structural reforms (e.g., privatization programs) will help diversify the economy and improve potential growth prospects, while new safety nets will lessen the hardships for the most

vulnerable. The program continues to act as a strong commitment device, sending a positive signal to stakeholders, and helping catalyze donor support. Continued IMF TA, in coordination with development partners, will continue to strengthen implementation capacity.


37. Staff supports the authorities' requests for the completion of the Third Review, access augmentation, rephasing, waivers, and modifications to conditionality. The program continues to provide a consistent framework for reforms, while mobilizing support from international financial institutions and debt reprofiling from bilateral creditors. Given the authorities' efforts to keep the program on track and ownership of reforms, staff (i) recommends completion of the Third Review; (ii) supports the waiver of non-observance of the continuous PC on external debt payment arrears given corrective action; (iii) support the waiver of applicability for the PC on NOPFD; (iv) supports the proposed modification of the PCs on RM and NIRs; (v) supports access augmentation and rephasing; (vi) supports the setting of targets for the Fourth and Fifth Reviews; and (vii) recommends the completion of the financing assurances review.

Figure 1. Angola: Selected High-Frequency Indicators, 2016–20


Before COVID-19, business confidence was rising.




The COVID-19 shock dramatically reduced oil prices and increased Angolan bond yields until recently.




Consumer price disinflation stopped and is reversing...




...While wholesale price inflation continues trending up.



Lower oil exports continue to drive the trade balance.




Net foreign assets are the main contributor to M3 growth.




Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Figure 2. Angola: Fiscal Developments, 2014–20


Oil production continues to decline...




... Negatively affecting both oil exports and oil revenues.




Expenditures will be under pressure in 2020...




... Yet, the non-oil primary fiscal balance will improve.



Oil prices will remain subdued.




Mobilization efforts on non-oil tax revenue will continue.




Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Figure 3. Angola: Monetary Developments, 2015–20


BNA policy rate and T-Bill rates are below market rates.




Growth of broad money aggregates has accelerated.




Excess reserves declined in late 2019, but are up again.




Credit and M2 growth will decelerate in 2020.



Dollarization remains elevated.




Inflation is expected to accelerate in 2020.




Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Figure 4. Angola: External Sector Developments, 2014–20


The trade balance will decline in 2020 with oil exports.




International reserves will decline in 2020, compared to future imports.




Yet, the reserve position will improve compared to GDP...




... And to money supply.



International reserves in dollars will bottom out this year.



Exchange rate developments reflect regime liberalization in 2019.



Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Table 1. Angola: Main Economic Indicators, 2019–23
(Units as indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 | |
|--|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Est. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. |
| Real economy (percent change, except where otherwise indicated) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Real gross domestic product | -1.1 | -0.9 | 1.2 | -4.0 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Oil sector | -5.0 | -6.6 | 1.3 | -6.8 | 2.5 | 6.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Non-oil sector | 0.6 | 1.4 | 1.1 | -2.8 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 4.8 |
| Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) | 21.5 | 21.8 | 26.4 | 7.3 | 18.4 | 25.2 | 13.6 | 19.2 | 10.5 | 13.6 |
| Oil sector | 28.5 | 27.5 | 27.7 | -17.8 | 16.7 | 31.2 | 10.5 | 23.1 | 6.5 | 12.2 |
| Non-oil sector | 18.6 | 19.5 | 25.8 | 18.2 | 19.2 | 23.4 | 15.0 | 18.0 | 12.2 | 14.1 |
| GDP deflator | 22.8 | 22.9 | 25.0 | 11.8 | 15.2 | 21.4 | 10.1 | 15.7 | 6.3 | 9.3 |
| Non-oil GDP deflator | 18.0 | 17.8 | 24.5 | 21.6 | 15.7 | 20.6 | 10.7 | 14.0 | 6.9 | 8.9 |
| Consumer prices (annual average) | 17.2 | 17.1 | 23.9 | 21.0 | 15.7 | 20.6 | 10.7 | 14.0 | 6.9 | 8.9 |
| Consumer prices (end of period) | 17.5 | 16.9 | 23.0 | 22.2 | 14.0 | 19.6 | 8.0 | 10.0 | 6.0 | 8.0 |
| Gross domestic product (billions of kwanzas) | 32,537 | 32,622 | 41,131 | 34,993 | 48,712 | 43,819 | 55,358 | 52,249 | 61,197 | 59,377 |
| Oil gross domestic product (billions of kwanzas) | 9,978 | 9,899 | 12,744 | 8,133 | 14,872 | 10,671 | 16,432 | 13,134 | 17,504 | 14,738 |
| Non-oil gross domestic product (billions of kwanzas) | 22,558 | 22,723 | 28,387 | 26,861 | 33,840 | 33,147 | 38,926 | 39,114 | 43,693 | 44,639 |
| Gross domestic product (billions of U.S. dollars) | 88.4 | 89.4 | 75.7 | 61.8 | 78.7 | 65.8 | 82.2 | 70.7 | 86.7 | 77.4 |
| Gross domestic product per capita (U.S. dollars) | 2,934 | 2,968 | 2,439 | 1,991 | 2,462 | 2,058 | 2,498 | 2,148 | 2,556 | 2,281 |
| Central government (percent of GDP) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total revenue | 19.8 | 20.0 | 20.9 | 17.6 | 21.5 | 18.8 | 21.7 | 19.7 | 21.5 | 19.7 |
| Of which: Oil-related | 12.4 | 12.1 | 13.4 | 9.7 | 12.9 | 10.3 | 12.6 | 10.7 | 12.2 | 10.6 |
| Of which: Non-oil tax | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 8.3 | 8.0 |
| Total expenditure | 18.8 | 19.2 | 20.0 | 21.1 | 19.9 | 20.5 | 19.8 | 19.7 | 19.1 | 18.8 |
| Current expenditure | 15.9 | 15.8 | 17.0 | 18.3 | 16.7 | 17.5 | 16.6 | 16.4 | 15.8 | 15.4 |
| Capital spending | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Overall fiscal balance | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | -3.6 | 1.6 | -1.6 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 1.0 |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -5.6 | -5.7 | -5.6 | -6.0 | -4.7 | -5.1 | -4.4 | -4.5 | -4.3 | -4.1 |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance (percent of non-oil GDP) | -8.1 | -8.2 | -8.1 | -7.9 | -6.8 | -6.8 | -6.3 | -6.0 | -6.0 | -5.5 |
| Money and credit (end of period, percent change) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Broad money (M2) | 22.6 | 30.2 | 21.6 | 4.4 | 25.6 | 18.1 | 12.3 | 19.1 | 8.1 | 12.8 |
| Percent of GDP | 29.6 | 31.3 | 28.5 | 30.5 | 30.2 | 28.8 | 29.8 | 28.7 | 29.2 | 28.5 |
| Velocity (GDP/M2) | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Velocity (non-oil GDP/M2) | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| Credit to the private sector (annual percent change) | 25.8 | 25.9 | 28.8 | 6.2 | 22.2 | 25.4 | 14.0 | 21.0 | 17.5 | 17.8 |
| Balance of payments | | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade balance (percent of GDP) | 22.7 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 15.5 | 22.6 | 17.2 | 22.6 | 18.7 | 22.7 | 19.2 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (percent of GDP) | 39.9 | 38.8 | 41.4 | 32.0 | 40.7 | 33.5 | 40.2 | 35.0 | 39.3 | 34.7 |
| Of which: Oil and gas exports (percent of GDP) | 38.4 | 38.3 | 39.4 | 29.5 | 38.6 | 30.9 | 37.5 | 31.9 | 36.2 | 31.5 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percent of GDP) | 17.2 | 15.8 | 18.4 | 16.5 | 18.1 | 16.4 | 17.6 | 16.3 | 16.6 | 15.5 |
| Terms of trade (percent change) | -14.1 | -10.8 | -12.5 | -43.8 | 2.1 | 11.3 | 5.7 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 8.3 |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP) | 3.3 | 5.7 | 0.5 | -2.0 | 0.4 | -1.4 | 0.5 | -0.9 | 1.2 | -0.3 |
| Gross international reserves (end of period, millions of U.S. dollars) | 15,470 | 17,321 | 17,152 | 15,582 | 18,631 | 16,729 | 19,831 | 17,929 | 20,831 | 18,929 |
| Gross international reserves (months of next year's imports) | 7.6 | 12.9 | 8.2 | 10.6 | 8.6 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 10.3 | 9.3 | 10.3 |
| Net international reserves (end of period, millions of U.S. dollars) | 9,447 | 11,302 | 10,006 | 8,100 | 10,356 | 7,782 | 11,556 | 8,982 | 11,556 | 10,080 |
| Exchange rate | | | | | | | | | | |
| Official exchange rate (average, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 368 | 365 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| Official exchange rate (end of period, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 485 | 482 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| Public debt (percent of GDP) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Public sector debt (gross) ¹ | 110.9 | 109.2 | 102.0 | 122.8 | 95.1 | 112.5 | 86.0 | 97.5 | 77.4 | 86.8 |
| Of which: Central Government debt and Sonangol ² | 110.8 | 108.9 | 101.7 | 122.5 | 94.9 | 112.2 | 85.8 | 97.3 | 77.2 | 86.6 |
| Of which: Central Government debt ³ | 107.2 | 105.6 | 97.0 | 118.8 | 88.7 | 108.8 | 79.1 | 94.7 | 71.4 | 83.8 |
| Oil | | | | | | | | | | |
| Oil and gas production (millions of barrels per day) | 1,517 | 1,493 | 1,537 | 1,392 | 1,575 | 1,477 | 1,600 | 1,500 | 1,625 | 1,524 |
| Oil and gas exports (billions of U.S. dollars) | 33.9 | 34.2 | 29.8 | 18.3 | 30.4 | 20.3 | 30.9 | 22.5 | 31.4 | 24.4 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 37.4 | 55.0 | 39.3 | 55.0 | 42.9 | 55.0 | 45.7 |
| Brent oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.4 | 64.0 | 60.5 | 41.3 | 58.0 | 43.2 | 57.3 | 45.2 | 57.4 | 46.9 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

² Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2a. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23
(Billions of Kwanzas, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 6,426 | 6,529 | 8,576 | 6,145 | 10,466 | 8,248 | 11,996 | 10,283 | 11,705 |
| Taxes | 6,009 | 6,058 | 8,156 | 5,734 | 9,966 | 7,741 | 11,420 | 9,685 | 11,022 |
| Oil | 4,036 | 3,952 | 5,508 | 3,403 | 6,305 | 4,529 | 6,976 | 5,582 | 6,272 |
| Non-oil | 1,973 | 2,105 | 2,649 | 2,331 | 3,660 | 3,212 | 4,444 | 4,103 | 4,750 |
| Social contributions | 231 | 311 | 281 | 245 | 335 | 302 | 386 | 357 | 407 |
| Grants | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other revenue | 186 | 157 | 138 | 166 | 165 | 205 | 190 | 242 | 276 |
| Expenditure | 6,103 | 6,271 | 8,241 | 7,399 | 9,686 | 8,968 | 10,970 | 10,301 | 11,137 |
| Expense | 5,183 | 5,144 | 6,975 | 6,399 | 8,152 | 7,654 | 9,171 | 8,577 | 9,118 |
| Compensation of employees | 1,936 | 1,999 | 2,203 | 2,218 | 2,649 | 2,651 | 3,059 | 2,916 | 3,150 |
| Use of goods and services | 740 | 844 | 1,186 | 1,001 | 1,404 | 1,309 | 1,596 | 1,560 | 1,773 |
| Interest | 1,743 | 1,703 | 2,718 | 2,436 | 3,035 | 2,857 | 3,283 | 3,086 | 3,041 |
| Domestic | 791 | 795 | 1,219 | 1,045 | 1,389 | 1,140 | 1,432 | 1,134 | 986 |
| Foreign | 952 | 908 | 1,498 | 1,390 | 1,645 | 1,717 | 1,851 | 1,951 | 2,055 |
| Subsidies | 159 | 79 | 253 | 242 | 202 | 182 | 230 | 217 | 246 |
| Other expense | 605 | 519 | 615 | 502 | 861 | 655 | 1,003 | 797 | 908 |
| Net investment in nonfinancial assets | 920 | 1,127 | 1,266 | 1,001 | 1,534 | 1,315 | 1,799 | 1,724 | 2,019 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 324 | 258 | 336 | -1,254 | 779 | -720 | 1,026 | -18 | 568 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0 | 137 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 27 | -713 | -1,181 | -2,446 | -58 | -1,530 | -574 | -571 | 183 |
| Domestic | 214 | -686 | -861 | -2,290 | -32 | -1,061 | -552 | 0 | -256 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 9 | -686 | -1,011 | -2,510 | -507 | -1,061 | -552 | 0 | -256 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 205 | 0 | 150 | 220 | 475 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Foreign | -187 | -27 | -320 | -157 | -25 | -469 | -22 | -571 | 439 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -296 | -834 | -1,517 | -1,192 | -837 | -810 | -1,600 | -554 | -386 |
| Domestic | -1,388 | -1,796 | -2,339 | -2,341 | -615 | -884 | -1,640 | -891 | -307 |
| Debt securities | 72 | -122 | -1,462 | -2,156 | 214 | -684 | -1,033 | -741 | -307 |
| Disbursements | 1,884 | 1,583 | 2,068 | 1,679 | 1,925 | 1,848 | 1,893 | 3,047 | 3,439 |
| Amortizations | -1,812 | -1,705 | -3,530 | -3,835 | -1,711 | -2,532 | -2,925 | -3,788 | -3,746 |
| Loans | 0 | -278 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -1,460 | -1,396 | -877 | -185 | -829 | -200 | -607 | -150 | 0 |
| Foreign | 1,092 | 962 | 822 | 1,149 | -222 | 74 | 40 | 337 | -79 |
| Disbursements | 3,055 | 2,992 | 4,015 | 2,597 | 3,204 | 2,690 | 2,871 | 1,854 | 2,625 |
| Of which: Budget support under the program | 514 | 425 | 1,078 | 1,464 | 1,192 | 1,466 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Amortizations | -1,963 | -2,030 | -3,193 | -1,448 | -3,426 | -2,616 | -2,831 | -1,517 | -2,704 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -1,837 | -1,867 | -2,302 | -2,117 | -2,286 | -2,245 | -2,441 | -2,332 | -2,459 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 37.4 | 55.0 | 39.3 | 55.0 | 42.9 | 45.7 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 1,100 | 1,726 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,948 | 1,753 | 2,491 | 2,351 | 2,969 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 36,070 | 35,626 | 41,938 | 42,982 | 46,330 | 49,286 | 47,602 | 50,967 | 51,558 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 36,047 | 35,533 | 41,850 | 42,865 | 46,228 | 49,148 | 47,488 | 50,823 | 51,410 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 34,864 | 34,436 | 39,879 | 41,420 | 43,226 | 47,238 | 43,764 | 48,875 | 49,759 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.

² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.

⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2b. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 19.8 | 20.0 | 20.9 | 17.6 | 21.5 | 18.8 | 21.7 | 19.7 | 19.7 |
| Taxes | 18.5 | 18.6 | 19.8 | 16.4 | 20.5 | 17.7 | 20.6 | 18.5 | 18.6 |
| Oil | 12.4 | 12.1 | 13.4 | 9.7 | 12.9 | 10.3 | 12.6 | 10.7 | 10.6 |
| Non-oil | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 8.0 |
| Social contributions | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Grants | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other revenue | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Expenditure | 18.8 | 19.2 | 20.0 | 21.1 | 19.9 | 20.5 | 19.8 | 19.7 | 18.8 |
| Expense | 15.9 | 15.8 | 17.0 | 18.3 | 16.7 | 17.5 | 16.6 | 16.4 | 15.4 |
| Compensation of employees | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.4 | 6.3 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.3 |
| Use of goods and services | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Interest | 5.4 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 7.0 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.1 |
| Domestic | 2.4 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
| Foreign | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 |
| Subsidies | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Other expense | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Net investment in nonfinancial assets | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | -3.6 | 1.6 | -1.6 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 0.1 | -2.2 | -2.9 | -7.0 | -0.1 | -3.5 | -1.0 | -1.1 | 0.3 |
| Domestic | 0.7 | -2.1 | -2.1 | -6.5 | -0.1 | -2.4 | -1.0 | 0.0 | -0.4 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 0.0 | -2.1 | -2.5 | -7.2 | -1.0 | -2.4 | -1.0 | 0.0 | -0.4 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Foreign | -0.6 | -0.1 | -0.8 | -0.4 | -0.1 | -1.1 | 0.0 | -1.1 | 0.7 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -0.9 | -2.6 | -3.7 | -3.4 | -1.7 | -1.8 | -2.9 | -1.1 | -0.6 |
| Domestic | -4.3 | -5.5 | -5.7 | -6.7 | -1.3 | -2.0 | -3.0 | -1.7 | -0.5 |
| Debt securities | 0.2 | -0.4 | -3.6 | -6.2 | 0.4 | -1.6 | -1.9 | -1.4 | -0.5 |
| Disbursements | 5.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 5.8 | 5.8 |
| Amortizations | -5.6 | -5.2 | -8.6 | -11.0 | -3.5 | -5.8 | -5.3 | -7.3 | -6.3 |
| Loans | 0.0 | -0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -4.5 | -4.3 | -2.1 | -0.5 | -1.7 | -0.5 | -1.1 | -0.3 | 0.0 |
| Foreign debt securities | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 3.3 | -0.5 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | -0.1 |
| Disbursements | 9.4 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 7.4 | 6.6 | 6.1 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 4.4 |
| Of which: Budget support under the program | 1.6 | 1.3 | 2.6 | 4.2 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Eurobonds | 4.4 | 4.2 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Project loans and other | 3.5 | 3.6 | 5.9 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 4.4 |
| Financing to be identified | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Amortizations | -6.0 | -6.2 | -7.8 | -4.1 | -7.0 | -6.0 | -5.1 | -2.9 | -4.6 |
| Other accounts payable | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -5.6 | -5.7 | -5.6 | -6.0 | -4.7 | -5.1 | -4.4 | -4.5 | -4.1 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 37.4 | 55.0 | 39.3 | 55.0 | 42.9 | 45.7 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 3.4 | 5.3 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5.0 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 110.9 | 109.2 | 102.0 | 122.8 | 95.1 | 112.5 | 86.0 | 97.5 | 86.8 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 110.8 | 108.9 | 101.7 | 122.5 | 94.9 | 112.2 | 85.8 | 97.3 | 86.6 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 107.2 | 105.6 | 97.0 | 118.4 | 88.7 | 107.8 | 79.1 | 93.5 | 83.8 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2c. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23
(Percent of non-oil GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 28.5 | 28.7 | 30.2 | 22.9 | 27.3 | 24.9 | 30.8 | 26.3 | 26.2 |
| Taxes | 26.6 | 26.7 | 28.7 | 21.3 | 25.6 | 23.4 | 29.3 | 24.8 | 24.7 |
| Oil | 17.9 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 12.7 | 15.5 | 13.7 | 17.9 | 14.3 | 14.0 |
| Non-oil | 8.7 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 8.7 | 10.1 | 9.7 | 11.4 | 10.5 | 10.6 |
| Social contributions | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Grants | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other revenue | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Expenditure | 27.1 | 27.6 | 29.0 | 27.5 | 26.9 | 27.1 | 28.2 | 26.3 | 24.9 |
| Expense | 23.0 | 22.6 | 24.6 | 23.8 | 22.4 | 23.1 | 23.6 | 21.9 | 20.4 |
| Compensation of employees | 8.6 | 8.8 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.1 |
| Use of goods and services | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Interest | 7.7 | 7.5 | 9.6 | 9.1 | 7.3 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 7.9 | 6.8 |
| Domestic | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 2.2 |
| Foreign | 4.2 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 3.7 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 4.6 |
| Subsidies | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Other expense | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets | 4.1 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.5 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.2 | -4.7 | 0.4 | -2.2 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 1.3 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 0.1 | -3.1 | -4.2 | -9.1 | -0.2 | -4.6 | -1.5 | -1.5 | 0.4 |
| Domestic | 0.9 | -3.0 | -3.0 | -8.5 | 0.0 | -3.2 | -1.4 | 0.0 | -0.6 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 0.0 | -3.0 | -3.6 | -9.3 | 0.0 | -3.2 | -1.4 | 0.0 | -0.6 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Foreign | -0.8 | -0.1 | -1.1 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -1.4 | -0.1 | -1.5 | 1.0 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -1.3 | -3.7 | -5.3 | -4.4 | -0.6 | -2.4 | -4.1 | -1.4 | -0.9 |
| Domestic | -6.2 | -7.9 | -8.2 | -8.7 | -1.0 | -2.7 | -4.2 | -2.3 | -0.7 |
| Debt securities | 0.3 | -0.5 | -5.2 | -8.0 | 1.3 | -2.1 | -2.7 | -1.9 | -0.7 |
| Disbursements | 8.4 | 7.0 | 7.3 | 6.3 | 9.1 | 5.6 | 4.9 | 7.8 | 7.7 |
| Amortizations | -8.0 | -7.5 | -12.4 | -14.3 | -7.8 | -7.6 | -7.5 | -9.7 | -8.4 |
| Loans | 0.0 | -1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -6.5 | -6.1 | -3.1 | -0.7 | -2.3 | -0.6 | -1.6 | -0.4 | 0.0 |
| Foreign | 4.8 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 4.3 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.9 | -0.2 |
| Disbursements | 13.5 | 13.2 | 14.1 | 9.7 | 6.3 | 8.1 | 7.4 | 4.7 | 5.9 |
| Of which: Budget support under the program | 2.3 | 1.9 | 3.8 | 5.5 | 2.5 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Amortizations | -8.7 | -8.9 | -11.2 | -5.4 | -5.8 | -7.9 | -7.3 | -3.9 | -6.1 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -8.1 | -8.2 | -8.1 | -7.9 | -7.3 | -6.8 | -6.3 | -6.0 | -5.5 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 37.4 | 59.0 | 39.3 | 55.0 | 42.9 | 45.7 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 4.9 | 7.6 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 6.4 | 6.0 | 6.7 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 159.9 | 156.8 | 147.7 | 160.0 | 107.0 | 148.7 | 122.3 | 130.3 | 115.5 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 159.8 | 156.4 | 147.4 | 159.6 | 106.7 | 148.3 | 122.0 | 129.9 | 115.2 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 154.5 | 151.5 | 140.5 | 154.2 | 102.7 | 143.4 | 112.4 | 125.0 | 111.5 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.

² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.

⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2d. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23
Debt Reprofiting Recorded as Exceptional Financing
 (Billions of Kwanzas, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 6,426 | 6,529 | 8,576 | 6,145 | 10,466 | 8,248 | 11,996 | 10,283 | 11,705 |
| Taxes | 6,009 | 6,058 | 8,156 | 5,734 | 9,966 | 7,741 | 11,420 | 9,685 | 11,022 |
| Oil | 4,036 | 3,952 | 5,508 | 3,403 | 6,305 | 4,529 | 6,976 | 5,582 | 6,272 |
| Non-oil | 1,973 | 2,105 | 2,649 | 2,331 | 3,660 | 3,212 | 4,444 | 4,103 | 4,750 |
| Social contributions | 231 | 311 | 281 | 245 | 335 | 302 | 386 | 357 | 407 |
| Grants | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other revenue | 186 | 157 | 138 | 166 | 165 | 205 | 190 | 242 | 276 |
| Expenditure | 6,103 | 6,271 | 8,241 | 7,548 | 9,686 | 8,890 | 10,970 | 10,080 | 10,830 |
| Expense | 5,183 | 5,144 | 6,975 | 6,548 | 8,152 | 7,575 | 9,171 | 8,356 | 8,811 |
| Compensation of employees | 1,936 | 1,999 | 2,203 | 2,218 | 2,649 | 2,651 | 3,059 | 2,916 | 3,150 |
| Use of goods and services | 740 | 844 | 1,186 | 1,001 | 1,404 | 1,309 | 1,596 | 1,560 | 1,773 |
| Interest | 1,743 | 1,703 | 2,718 | 2,585 | 3,035 | 2,778 | 3,283 | 2,865 | 2,733 |
| Domestic | 791 | 795 | 1,219 | 1,045 | 1,389 | 1,140 | 1,432 | 1,134 | 986 |
| Foreign | 952 | 908 | 1,498 | 1,539 | 1,645 | 1,638 | 1,851 | 1,731 | 1,748 |
| Subsidies | 159 | 79 | 253 | 242 | 202 | 182 | 230 | 217 | 246 |
| Other expense | 605 | 519 | 615 | 502 | 861 | 655 | 1,003 | 797 | 908 |
| Net investment in nonfinancial assets | 920 | 1,127 | 1,266 | 1,001 | 1,534 | 1,315 | 1,799 | 1,724 | 2,019 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 324 | 258 | 336 | -1,403 | 779 | -642 | 1,026 | 203 | 876 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0 | 137 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 27 | -713 | -1,181 | -2,446 | -58 | -1,530 | -574 | -571 | 183 |
| Domestic | 214 | -686 | -861 | -2,290 | -32 | -1,061 | -552 | 0 | -256 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 9 | -686 | -1,011 | -2,510 | -507 | -1,061 | -552 | 0 | -256 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 205 | 0 | 150 | 220 | 475 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Foreign | -187 | -27 | -320 | -157 | -25 | -469 | -22 | -571 | 439 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -296 | -834 | -1,517 | -2,608 | -837 | -2,301 | -1,600 | -1,979 | -1,001 |
| Domestic | -1,388 | -1,796 | -2,339 | -2,341 | -615 | -884 | -1,640 | -891 | -307 |
| Debt securities | 72 | -122 | -1,462 | -2,156 | 214 | -684 | -1,033 | -741 | -307 |
| Disbursements | 1,884 | 1,583 | 2,068 | 1,679 | 1,925 | 1,848 | 1,893 | 3,047 | 3,439 |
| Amortizations | -1,812 | -1,705 | -3,530 | -3,835 | -1,711 | -2,532 | -2,925 | -3,788 | -3,746 |
| Loans | 0 | -278 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -1,460 | -1,396 | -877 | -185 | -829 | -200 | -607 | -150 | 0 |
| Foreign | 1,092 | 962 | 822 | -266 | -222 | -1,417 | 40 | -1,088 | -694 |
| Disbursements | 3,055 | 2,992 | 4,015 | 2,597 | 3,204 | 2,690 | 2,871 | 1,854 | 2,625 |
| Amortizations | -1,963 | -2,030 | -3,193 | -2,864 | -3,426 | -4,107 | -2,831 | -2,942 | -3,320 |
| Exceptional financing (+: increase) | | | | | | | | | |
| Debt reprofiling | ... | ... | ... | 1,565 | ... | 1,413 | ... | 1,205 | 308 |
| Foreign interest | ... | ... | ... | 149 | ... | -78 | ... | -220 | -308 |
| Foreign amortization | ... | ... | ... | 1,416 | ... | 1,491 | ... | 1,425 | 616 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -1,837 | -1,867 | -2,302 | -2,117 | -2,286 | -2,245 | -2,441 | -2,332 | -2,459 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 37.4 | 55.0 | 39.3 | 55.0 | 42.9 | 45.7 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 1,100 | 1,726 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,948 | 1,753 | 2,491 | 2,351 | 2,969 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 36,070 | 35,626 | 41,938 | 42,982 | 46,330 | 49,286 | 47,602 | 50,967 | 51,558 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 36,047 | 35,533 | 41,850 | 42,865 | 46,228 | 49,148 | 47,488 | 50,823 | 51,410 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 34,864 | 34,436 | 39,879 | 41,420 | 43,226 | 47,238 | 43,764 | 48,875 | 49,759 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.

² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.

⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 3. Angola: Monetary Accounts, 2019–23
(End of period; billions of Kwanzas, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Monetary Survey | | | | | | | | | |
| Net foreign assets | 6,186 | 7,120 | 7,789 | 7,077 | 8,937 | 8,111 | 10,295 | 9,415 | 10,547 |
| Net domestic assets | 3,439 | 3,099 | 3,916 | 3,594 | 5,759 | 4,490 | 6,206 | 5,588 | 6,371 |
| Claims on central government (net) | 1,583 | 2,448 | 764 | 2,929 | 1,349 | 2,779 | 820 | 2,684 | 2,155 |
| Claims on other financial corporations | 15 | 11 | 19 | 13 | 23 | 17 | 27 | 20 | 22 |
| Claims on other public sector | 115 | 152 | 144 | 180 | 172 | 222 | 198 | 262 | 299 |
| Claims on private sector | 4,678 | 4,524 | 6,024 | 4,802 | 7,361 | 6,020 | 8,392 | 7,284 | 8,579 |
| Other items (net) ¹ | -2,952 | -4,036 | -3,036 | -4,330 | -3,147 | -4,547 | -3,231 | -4,661 | -4,684 |
| Broad money (M3) | 9,626 | 10,219 | 11,705 | 10,671 | 14,696 | 12,601 | 16,501 | 15,003 | 16,918 |
| Money and quasi-money (M2) | 9,616 | 10,214 | 11,696 | 10,666 | 14,687 | 12,597 | 16,492 | 14,998 | 16,913 |
| Money | 3,374 | 3,206 | 4,094 | 3,445 | 5,138 | 4,146 | 5,772 | 5,043 | 5,799 |
| Currency outside banks | 363 | 419 | 415 | 427 | 514 | 500 | 584 | 628 | 726 |
| Demand deposits, local currency | 3,011 | 2,787 | 3,679 | 3,018 | 4,624 | 3,646 | 5,188 | 4,415 | 5,074 |
| Quasi-money | 1,824 | 1,647 | 2,228 | 1,783 | 2,801 | 2,154 | 3,142 | 2,608 | 2,997 |
| Time and savings deposits, local currency | 1,824 | 1,647 | 2,228 | 1,783 | 2,801 | 2,154 | 3,142 | 2,608 | 2,997 |
| Foreign currency deposits | 4,418 | 5,361 | 5,374 | 5,438 | 6,748 | 6,297 | 7,577 | 7,347 | 8,116 |
| Money management instruments and other liabilities | 9 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 5 |
| Monetary Authorities | | | | | | | | | |
| Net foreign assets | 4,961 | 5,687 | 6,311 | 5,258 | 7,285 | 5,967 | 8,545 | 7,167 | 8,232 |
| Net international reserves | 4,582 | 5,450 | 5,854 | 4,957 | 6,773 | 5,613 | 8,004 | 6,795 | 7,850 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities | 379 | 237 | 457 | 300 | 511 | 354 | 541 | 371 | 382 |
| Net domestic assets | -2,885 | -3,400 | -3,697 | -2,919 | -4,189 | -3,273 | -5,027 | -4,035 | -4,705 |
| Claims on other depository corporations | 367 | 340 | 451 | 415 | 514 | 496 | 555 | 546 | 590 |
| Claims on central government (net) | -1,618 | -1,012 | -1,158 | 146 | -887 | 858 | -438 | 822 | 876 |
| Claims on private sector | 58 | 49 | 72 | 58 | 86 | 72 | 99 | 85 | 96 |
| Other items (net) ¹ | -1,691 | -2,777 | -3,062 | -3,539 | -3,903 | -4,699 | -5,243 | -5,488 | -6,268 |
| Reserve money | 2,076 | 2,287 | 2,614 | 2,339 | 3,096 | 2,694 | 3,518 | 3,132 | 3,527 |
| Currency outside banks | 485 | 540 | 554 | 551 | 686 | 644 | 780 | 810 | 935 |
| Commercial bank deposits | 1,591 | 1,747 | 2,060 | 1,788 | 2,410 | 2,051 | 2,738 | 2,322 | 2,592 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal gross domestic product (percent change) | 21.5 | 21.8 | 26.4 | 7.3 | 18.4 | 25.2 | 13.6 | 19.2 | 13.6 |
| Reserve money (percent change) | 21.5 | 33.8 | 25.9 | 2.3 | 18.4 | 15.2 | 13.6 | 16.2 | 12.6 |
| Broad money (M3) (percent change) | 22.6 | 30.1 | 21.6 | 4.4 | 25.6 | 18.1 | 12.3 | 19.1 | 12.8 |
| Money and quasi-money (M2) (percent change) | 22.6 | 30.2 | 21.6 | 4.4 | 25.6 | 18.1 | 12.3 | 19.1 | 12.8 |
| Claims on private sector (percent change) | 25.8 | 25.9 | 28.8 | 6.2 | 22.2 | 25.4 | 14.0 | 21.0 | 17.8 |
| Claims on central government (percent change; net) | -36.1 | -8.3 | -51.7 | 19.7 | 76.6 | -5.1 | -39.3 | -3.4 | -19.7 |
| Money multiplier (M2/reserve money) | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.8 |
| Velocity (GDP/M2) | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Velocity (non-oil GDP/M2) | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| Credit to the private sector (percent of GDP) | 14.4 | 13.9 | 14.6 | 13.7 | 15.1 | 13.7 | 15.2 | 13.9 | 14.4 |
| Foreign currency deposits (share of total deposits) | 47.7 | 54.7 | 47.6 | 53.1 | 47.6 | 52.1 | 47.6 | 51.1 | 50.1 |
| Credit to the private sector in foreign currency (share of total credit) | 31.8 | 27.4 | 29.8 | 32.8 | 27.3 | 30.8 | 25.3 | 26.7 | 23.3 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Including exchange rate valuation.

Table 4a. Angola: Balance of Payments, 2019–23
(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|---|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Current account | 2,900 | 5,132 | 375 | -1,255 | 340 | -947 | 438 | -711 | -291 |
| Trade balance | 20,070 | 20,593 | 17,421 | 9,586 | 17,824 | 11,290 | 18,597 | 13,225 | 14,836 |
| Exports, f.o.b. | 35,300 | 34,726 | 31,317 | 19,776 | 32,032 | 22,049 | 33,068 | 24,735 | 26,858 |
| Crude oil | 32,456 | 31,396 | 28,845 | 17,532 | 29,109 | 19,422 | 29,611 | 21,588 | 23,345 |
| Gas and oil derivatives | 1,493 | 1,309 | 1,003 | 728 | 1,253 | 878 | 1,253 | 959 | 1,020 |
| Diamonds | 1,130 | 1,130 | 1,200 | 1,247 | 1,308 | 1,388 | 1,628 | 1,612 | 1,698 |
| Other | 221 | 891 | 269 | 269 | 361 | 361 | 576 | 576 | 795 |
| Imports, f.o.b. | 15,230 | 14,133 | 13,896 | 10,191 | 14,207 | 10,760 | 14,471 | 11,510 | 12,021 |
| Services (net) | -9,507 | -7,718 | -9,865 | -5,545 | -10,367 | -6,497 | -10,878 | -7,742 | -8,573 |
| Credit | 597 | 455 | 561 | 401 | 533 | 353 | 556 | 373 | 394 |
| Debit | 10,104 | 8,172 | 10,426 | 5,946 | 10,900 | 6,850 | 11,434 | 8,114 | 8,967 |
| Primary income (net) | -7,278 | -7,516 | -6,855 | -5,044 | -6,778 | -5,469 | -6,926 | -5,899 | -6,229 |
| Credit | 459 | 693 | 480 | 636 | 501 | 680 | 524 | 713 | 742 |
| Debit | 7,737 | 8,209 | 7,335 | 5,680 | 7,279 | 6,149 | 7,449 | 6,612 | 6,971 |
| Secondary income (net) | -385 | -227 | -326 | -252 | -339 | -271 | -355 | -295 | -326 |
| General Government | -16 | -17 | -11 | 6 | -11 | 3 | -12 | -1 | -4 |
| Others | -369 | -373 | -315 | -257 | -328 | -274 | -343 | -295 | -322 |
| Of which: Personal transfers | -327 | -331 | -280 | -228 | -291 | -243 | -304 | -262 | -286 |
| Capital account | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Financial account | 5,265 | 5,472 | 1,726 | 4,412 | 1,872 | 1,502 | -759 | -1,377 | -614 |
| Direct investment | 554 | 1,749 | -85 | -1,175 | -811 | -1,695 | -1,787 | -2,272 | -3,034 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets | 5 | -2,349 | 4 | -195 | 4 | -217 | 4 | -241 | -260 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities | -549 | -4,098 | 90 | 980 | 816 | 1,478 | 1,791 | 2,031 | 2,774 |
| Portfolio investment | -3,153 | -1,676 | -1,653 | 265 | -153 | 265 | -2,153 | 265 | 265 |
| Other investment | 7,864 | 5,399 | 3,464 | 5,322 | 2,836 | 2,933 | 3,180 | 631 | 2,155 |
| Trade credits and advances | -1,959 | -1,871 | -1,781 | -1,150 | -1,822 | -1,269 | -1,863 | -1,411 | -1,519 |
| Currency and deposits | 7,267 | 4,632 | 2,793 | 5,407 | 2,248 | 1,986 | 2,864 | 1,738 | 2,217 |
| Loans | 2,555 | 2,638 | 2,451 | 1,064 | 2,411 | 2,215 | 2,179 | 303 | 1,457 |
| Medium and long-term loans | 1,101 | 1,184 | 1,447 | 60 | 1,707 | 1,511 | 1,475 | -401 | 753 |
| Of which: Central Government (net) | 2,283 | 2,253 | 1,943 | 556 | 2,285 | 2,089 | 1,941 | 76 | 876 |
| Short-term loans | 1,454 | 1,454 | 1,004 | 1,004 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 |
| Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Errors and omissions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall balance | -2,362 | -338 | -1,349 | -5,665 | -1,530 | -2,448 | 1,200 | 668 | 324 |
| Financing | 2,362 | 338 | 1,349 | 5,665 | 1,530 | 2,448 | -1,200 | -668 | -324 |
| Net international reserves authorities (- = increase) | 1,199 | -656 | -559 | 3,202 | -350 | 318 | -1,200 | -1,200 | -1,098 |
| Exceptional financing | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 2,463 | 1,879 | 2,130 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Financing gap | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 2,463 | 1,879 | 2,130 | 0 | 0 | -98 |
| IMF | 499 | 495 | 1,123 | 1,463 | 1,129 | 1,465 | 0 | 0 | -98 |
| Other IFIs | 665 | 500 | 785 | 1,000 | 750 | 665 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Current account (percent of GDP) | 3.3 | 5.7 | 0.5 | -2.0 | 0.4 | -1.4 | 0.5 | -1.0 | -0.4 |
| Goods and services balance (percent of GDP) | 12.0 | 14.4 | 10.0 | 6.5 | 9.5 | 7.3 | 9.4 | 7.8 | 8.1 |
| Trade balance (percent of GDP) | 22.7 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 15.5 | 22.6 | 17.2 | 22.6 | 18.7 | 19.2 |
| Capital and financial account (percent of GDP) | 3.2 | 7.6 | 3.8 | -3.2 | 3.3 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| Overall balance (percent of GDP) | -2.7 | -0.4 | -1.8 | -9.2 | -1.9 | -3.7 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -13.4 | -14.8 | -11.3 | -43.0 | 2.3 | 11.5 | 3.2 | 12.2 | 8.6 |
| Of which: Oil and gas exports (percent change) | -14.3 | -14.1 | -12.1 | -44.2 | 1.7 | 11.2 | 1.7 | 11.1 | 8.1 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -3.7 | -10.5 | -8.8 | -27.9 | 2.2 | 5.6 | 1.9 | 7.0 | 4.4 |
| Terms of trade (percent change) | -14.1 | -11.2 | -12.5 | -41.3 | 2.1 | 11.3 | 5.7 | 3.0 | 8.3 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 39.9 | 38.8 | 41.4 | 32.0 | 40.7 | 33.5 | 40.2 | 35.0 | 34.7 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 17.2 | 15.8 | 18.4 | 16.5 | 18.1 | 16.4 | 17.6 | 16.3 | 15.5 |
| Gross international reserves | | | | | | | | | |
| Millions of U.S. dollars | 15,470 | 17,321 | 17,152 | 15,582 | 18,631 | 16,729 | 19,831 | 17,929 | 18,929 |
| Months of next year's imports | 7.6 | 12.9 | 8.2 | 10.6 | 8.6 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 10.3 | 10.3 |
| Official exchange rate (average, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 368 | 365 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Table 4b. Angola: Balance of Payments, 2019–23
Debt Reprofiting Recorded as Exceptional Financing
(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|---|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Current account | 2,900 | 5,132 | 375 | -1,505 | 340 | -832 | 438 | -412 | 109 |
| Trade balance | 20,070 | 20,593 | 17,421 | 9,586 | 17,824 | 11,290 | 18,597 | 13,225 | 14,836 |
| Exports, f.o.b. | 35,300 | 34,726 | 31,317 | 19,776 | 32,032 | 22,049 | 33,068 | 24,735 | 26,858 |
| Crude oil | 32,456 | 31,396 | 28,845 | 17,532 | 29,109 | 19,422 | 29,611 | 21,588 | 23,345 |
| Gas and oil derivatives | 1,493 | 1,309 | 1,003 | 728 | 1,253 | 878 | 1,253 | 959 | 1,020 |
| Diamonds | 1,130 | 1,130 | 1,200 | 1,247 | 1,308 | 1,388 | 1,628 | 1,612 | 1,698 |
| Other | 221 | 891 | 269 | 269 | 361 | 361 | 576 | 576 | 795 |
| Imports, f.o.b. | 15,230 | 14,133 | 13,896 | 10,191 | 14,207 | 10,760 | 14,471 | 11,510 | 12,021 |
| Services (net) | -9,507 | -7,718 | -9,865 | -5,545 | -10,367 | -6,497 | -10,878 | -7,742 | -8,573 |
| Credit | 597 | 455 | 561 | 401 | 533 | 353 | 556 | 373 | 394 |
| Debit | 10,104 | 8,172 | 10,426 | 5,946 | 10,900 | 6,850 | 11,434 | 8,114 | 8,967 |
| Primary income (net) | -7,278 | -7,516 | -6,855 | -5,294 | -6,778 | -5,353 | -6,926 | -5,601 | -5,828 |
| Credit | 459 | 693 | 480 | 636 | 501 | 680 | 524 | 713 | 742 |
| Debit | 7,737 | 8,209 | 7,335 | 5,930 | 7,279 | 6,033 | 7,449 | 6,314 | 6,570 |
| Secondary income (net) | -385 | -227 | -326 | -252 | -339 | -271 | -355 | -295 | -326 |
| General Government | -16 | -17 | -11 | 6 | -11 | 3 | -12 | -1 | -4 |
| Others | -369 | -373 | -315 | -257 | -328 | -274 | -343 | -295 | -322 |
| Of which: Personal transfers | -327 | -331 | -280 | -228 | -291 | -243 | -304 | -262 | -286 |
| Capital account | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Financial account | 5,265 | 5,472 | 1,726 | 6,800 | 1,872 | 3,736 | -759 | 552 | 188 |
| Direct investment | 554 | 1,749 | -85 | -1,175 | -811 | -1,695 | -1,787 | -2,272 | -3,034 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets | 5 | -2,349 | 4 | -195 | 4 | -217 | 4 | -241 | -260 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities | -549 | -4,098 | 90 | 980 | 816 | 1,478 | 1,791 | 2,031 | 2,774 |
| Portfolio investment | -3,153 | -1,676 | -1,653 | 265 | -153 | 265 | -2,153 | 265 | 265 |
| Other investment | 7,864 | 5,399 | 3,464 | 7,710 | 2,836 | 5,166 | 3,180 | 2,560 | 2,958 |
| Trade credits and advances | -1,959 | -1,871 | -1,781 | -1,150 | -1,822 | -1,269 | -1,863 | -1,411 | -1,519 |
| Currency and deposits | 7,267 | 4,632 | 2,793 | 5,407 | 2,248 | 1,986 | 2,864 | 1,738 | 2,217 |
| Loans | 2,555 | 2,638 | 2,451 | 3,452 | 2,411 | 4,449 | 2,179 | 2,232 | 2,259 |
| Medium and long-term loans | 1,101 | 1,184 | 1,447 | 2,448 | 1,707 | 3,745 | 1,475 | 1,528 | 1,555 |
| Of which: Central Government (net) | 2,283 | 2,253 | 1,943 | 2,944 | 2,285 | 4,323 | 1,941 | 2,004 | 1,678 |
| Short-term loans | 1,454 | 1,454 | 1,004 | 1,004 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 |
| Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Errors and omissions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall balance | -2,362 | -338 | -1,349 | -8,303 | -1,530 | -4,566 | 1,200 | -962 | -77 |
| Financing | 2,362 | 338 | 1,349 | 8,303 | 1,530 | 4,566 | -1,200 | 962 | 77 |
| Net international reserves authorities (- = increase) | 1,199 | -656 | -559 | 3,202 | -350 | 318 | -1,200 | -1,200 | -1,098 |
| Exceptional financing | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 5,101 | 1,879 | 4,248 | ... | 1,630 | 401 |
| Financing gap | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 2,463 | 1,879 | 2,130 | ... | 0 | 0 |
| IMF | 499 | 495 | 1,123 | 1,463 | 1,129 | 1,465 | ... | 0 | -98 |
| Other IFIs | 665 | 500 | 785 | 1,000 | 750 | 665 | ... | 0 | 98 |
| Debt reprofiling | ... | ... | ... | 2,638 | ... | 2,118 | ... | 1,630 | 401 |
| Foreign interest | ... | ... | ... | 250 | ... | -116 | ... | -298 | -401 |
| Foreign amortization | ... | ... | ... | 2,388 | ... | 2,234 | ... | 1,929 | 802 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Current account (percent of GDP) | 3.3 | 5.7 | 0.5 | -2.0 | 0.4 | -1.4 | 0.5 | -1.0 | -0.4 |
| Goods and services balance (percent of GDP) | 12.0 | 14.4 | 10.0 | 6.5 | 9.5 | 7.3 | 9.4 | 7.8 | 8.1 |
| Trade balance (percent of GDP) | 22.7 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 15.5 | 22.6 | 17.2 | 22.6 | 18.7 | 19.2 |
| Capital and financial account (percent of GDP) | 3.2 | 7.6 | 3.8 | -3.2 | 3.3 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 2.0 |
| Overall balance (percent of GDP) | -2.7 | -0.4 | -1.8 | -9.2 | -1.9 | -3.7 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -13.4 | -14.8 | -11.3 | -43.0 | 2.3 | 11.5 | 3.2 | 12.2 | 8.6 |
| Of which: Oil and gas exports (percent change) | -14.3 | -14.1 | -12.1 | -44.2 | 1.7 | 11.2 | 1.7 | 11.1 | 8.1 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -3.7 | -10.5 | -8.8 | -27.9 | 2.2 | 5.6 | 1.9 | 7.0 | 4.4 |
| Terms of trade (percent change) | -14.1 | -11.2 | -12.5 | -41.3 | 2.1 | 11.3 | 5.7 | 3.0 | 8.3 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 39.9 | 38.8 | 41.4 | 32.0 | 40.7 | 33.5 | 40.2 | 35.0 | 34.7 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 17.2 | 15.8 | 18.4 | 16.5 | 18.1 | 16.4 | 17.6 | 16.3 | 15.5 |
| Gross international reserves | | | | | | | | | |
| Millions of U.S. dollars | 15,470 | 17,321 | 17,152 | 15,582 | 18,631 | 16,729 | 19,831 | 17,929 | 18,929 |
| Months of next year's imports | 7.6 | 12.9 | 8.2 | 10.6 | 8.6 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 10.3 | 10.3 |
| Official exchange rate (average, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 368 | 365 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Table 5. Angola: Public Debt, 2019–25
(Percent of GDP)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Projections | | |
| Total public debt¹ | 110.9 | 109.2 | 102.0 | 122.8 | 95.1 | 112.5 | 86.0 | 97.5 | 86.8 | 77.0 | 69.7 |
| Short-term | 2.3 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 0.3 | 1.6 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| Medium and long-term | 108.5 | 108.4 | 101.6 | 120.9 | 94.8 | 110.9 | 85.6 | 96.2 | 85.2 | 75.6 | 68.7 |
| Domestic | 34.4 | 33.0 | 26.5 | 28.9 | 23.9 | 23.4 | 19.6 | 18.6 | 16.1 | 14.1 | 12.3 |
| Short-term | 2.2 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.9 |
| Medium and long-term | 32.2 | 32.3 | 26.3 | 27.1 | 23.8 | 22.0 | 19.4 | 17.4 | 14.5 | 12.8 | 11.3 |
| External | 76.5 | 76.2 | 75.5 | 94.0 | 71.2 | 89.1 | 66.4 | 78.9 | 70.8 | 62.9 | 57.5 |
| Short-term | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Medium and long-term | 76.3 | 76.1 | 75.3 | 93.8 | 71.0 | 88.9 | 66.2 | 78.8 | 70.6 | 62.8 | 57.4 |
| <i>Of which: Sonangol</i> | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.1 | 7.3 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 3.2 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

Table 6. Angola: Financial Soundness Indicators, September 2018–September 2019

(Percent)

| | Sep-18 | Oct-18 | Nov-18 | Dec-18 | Jan-19 | Feb-19 | Mar-19 | Apr-19 | May-19 | Jun-19 | Jul-19 | Aug-19 | Sep-19 |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Capital Adequacy | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Regulatory capital/Risk-weighted assets | 23.4 | 27.0 | 27.5 | 24.2 | 29.0 | 30.1 | 31.4 | 31.1 | 24.3 | 27.3 | 27.5 | 27.7 | 27.9 |
| Core Capital (Tier 1)/Risk-weighted assets | 18.3 | 21.1 | 21.5 | 21.7 | 22.7 | 23.9 | 24.8 | 24.6 | 20.6 | 22.4 | 22.5 | 23.0 | 23.6 |
| Asset Quality | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Foreign Currency Credit/Total Credit | 27.9 | 28.2 | 28.6 | 28.1 | 27.1 | 27.3 | 28.0 | 27.7 | 27.5 | 28.9 | 28.9 | 28.9 | 29.2 |
| Nonperforming loans (NPLs) to gross loans | 27.7 | 27.1 | 26.7 | 28.3 | 28.1 | 27.8 | 28.4 | 28.5 | 29.4 | 35.5 | 35.5 | 35.4 | 34.6 |
| (NPLs - Provisions for NPLs)/Core Capital | 18.7 | 16.7 | 15.2 | 19.9 | 14.8 | 12.9 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 3.0 | -13.4 | -13.1 | -13.0 | -13.7 |
| Distribution of Credit by Sector | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Claims on the private sector/Gross domestic assets | 30.2 | 29.9 | 29.7 | 30.2 | 29.7 | 29.2 | 28.8 | 29.1 | 29.2 | 27.7 | 27.6 | 27.3 | 27.5 |
| Claims on the government/Gross domestic assets | 40.4 | 40.3 | 39.7 | 39.9 | 39.2 | 39.8 | 39.3 | 38.5 | 38.6 | 34.3 | 34.6 | 33.7 | 34.2 |
| Earnings and Profitability | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Return on Assets (ROA) | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.8 |
| Return on Equity (ROE) | 24.5 | 25.3 | 24.8 | 26.6 | 4.9 | 6.3 | 4.6 | 6.4 | 8.4 | 2.6 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 6.3 |
| Total Costs/Total Income | 99.5 | 99.5 | 99.6 | 99.6 | 99.5 | 99.7 | 99.9 | 99.9 | 99.9 | 102.6 | 98.1 | 93.7 | 86.8 |
| Interest Rate on Loans - Interest Rate on Demand Deposits (Spread) | 28.0 | 28.5 | 26.9 | 27.3 | 19.5 | 23.8 | 24.1 | 23.0 | 22.0 | 19.9 | 21.2 | 21.1 | 19.1 |
| Interest Rate on Savings | 4.4 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 6.3 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.5 |
| Liquidity | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liquid Assets/Total Assets | 20.5 | 21.2 | 21.9 | 22.2 | 21.8 | 22.2 | 23.1 | 24.5 | 22.8 | 24.4 | 24.1 | 23.5 | 24.3 |
| Liquid Assets/Short-term Liabilities | 27.5 | 28.4 | 29.2 | 28.6 | 29.0 | 29.6 | 29.8 | 31.3 | 29.1 | 30.8 | 30.2 | 29.5 | 30.4 |
| Total Credit/Total Deposits | 47.1 | 46.7 | 45.4 | 44.2 | 45.3 | 44.6 | 43.5 | 43.8 | 44.1 | 44.1 | 44.4 | 43.2 | 44.0 |
| Foreign Currency Liabilities/Total Liabilities | 44.8 | 46.5 | 46.5 | 46.1 | 46.6 | 45.7 | 45.7 | 45.6 | 45.8 | 45.7 | 46.1 | 46.5 | 47.6 |
| Sensitivity and Changes to Market¹ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net open position in foreign exchange to capital ² | 55.3 | 36.0 | 33.5 | 36.5 | 28.9 | 29.4 | 29.3 | 29.0 | 32.2 | 30.6 | 14.2 | 23.1 | 28.4 |
| Number of reporting banks during the period | 29 | 29 | 29 | 27 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

¹ Based on the information provided by the Department of Supervision of Financial Institutions of Banco Nacional de Angola.² Positive numbers indicate a long position in U.S. dollars.

Table 7. Angola: Fiscal Financing Needs and Sources, 2019–25

(Billions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Projections | | | |
| Financing Needs¹ (A) | 13.4 | 14.1 | 12.9 | 12.0 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 8.7 |
| Primary deficit (cash basis) | -6.2 | -5.9 | -5.5 | -2.2 | -6.3 | -3.2 | -4.2 | -4.7 | -4.9 | -5.1 |
| Debt service | 14.9 | 16.0 | 16.5 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 11.9 | 11.4 | 12.4 | 12.0 | 13.6 |
| External debt service | 7.9 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 5.1 | 8.3 | 6.4 | 4.7 | 6.2 | 6.7 | 8.7 |
| Principal | 5.3 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 2.6 | 5.6 | 3.9 | 2.1 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 6.0 |
| Interest | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| Domestic debt service | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 5.4 | 4.9 |
| Principal | 4.8 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 2.8 | 3.8 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| Interest | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| Recapitalizations | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Domestic arrears clearance | 4.1 | 3.9 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| External arrears clearance | ... | ... | ... | 0.0 | ... | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Sonangol reimbursement ² | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Financing Sources (B) | 12.2 | 12.6 | 9.8 | 9.5 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 8.7 |
| External debt disbursements | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.2 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 5.4 |
| Domestic debt disbursements | 5.1 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 3.3 |
| Privatization | 0.0 | ... | ... | 0.1 | ... | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Deposits withdrawals (+) ³ | 0.9 | 2.1 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 0.5 | -0.3 | -0.1 | 0.0 |
| FSDEA asset sales | ... | ... | ... | 1.5 | ... | 1.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Financing Gap (A-B) | 1.2 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Program financing ⁴ | 1.2 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Memorandum Items : | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total cash balances ⁵ | 1.6 | 0.1 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| External debt rollover rate (in percent) ⁶ | 87 | 84 | 63 | 40 | 40 | 28 | 42 | 43 | 40 | 54 |
| Domestic debt rollover rate (in percent) ⁷ | 38 | 35 | 35 | 26 | 39 | 46 | 59 | 73 | 72 | 66 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ To be filled with new issuances. These financing needs may differ from the DSA's standardized gross financing needs.² Repayment to Sonangol of debt related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).³ This excludes FSDEA and cash transactions related to privatization receipts and arrears clearance starting in 2020.⁴ For past reviews, this includes balances transferred from escrow accounts to the Treasury's single account (including withdrawals from FSDEA). Starting from the Third Review, these have been reclassified and reflected in deposit withdrawals to ensure better comparability with the balance of payments.⁵ Domestic usable cash reserves, in months of total annual expenditure.⁶ Ratio of disbursements (excl. program financing) to external debt service.⁷ Ratio of domestic securities issuance (excl. government securities issued for recapitalizations and arrears clearance) to domestic debt service (excl. repayment of BNA advances).

Table 8. Angola: External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2019–25

(Millions of U.S. dollars)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 | | 2024 | | 2025 |
|--|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Gross financing requirements | 5,625 | 3,318 | 7,959 | 5,575 | 6,442 | 5,780 | 4,952 | 3,456 | 5,499 | 4,648 | 5,375 | 4,673 | 5,525 |
| Current account deficit | -2,900 | -5,132 | -375 | 1,217 | -340 | 906 | -438 | 664 | -1,056 | 241 | -1,542 | -284 | -628 |
| External debt amortization | 8,525 | 8,449 | 8,334 | 4,358 | 6,782 | 4,875 | 5,390 | 2,792 | 6,362 | 4,223 | 6,611 | 4,711 | 5,598 |
| Government | 5,334 | 5,512 | 5,874 | 2,557 | 5,535 | 3,926 | 4,205 | 2,054 | 4,889 | 3,523 | 5,243 | 4,127 | 6,035 |
| Sonangol | 1,561 | 1,508 | 1,781 | 1,781 | 1,299 | 1,299 | 1,312 | 1,301 | 1,565 | 1,554 | 1,590 | 1,579 | 900 |
| Banks | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 |
| Central Bank | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Other private (net) | 1,307 | 1,107 | 356 | -303 | -375 | -674 | -451 | -886 | -417 | -1,177 | -546 | -1,318 | -1,660 |
| IMF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 192 | 184 | 306 | 246 | 554 |
| Gross sources of financing | 2,847 | 3,974 | 6,732 | 2,373 | 5,493 | 5,463 | 4,840 | 4,656 | 3,934 | 5,746 | 3,785 | 5,919 | 7,079 |
| Capital account (net) | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Foreign direct investment (net) | -554 | -1,749 | 85 | 1,136 | 811 | 1,652 | 1,787 | 2,224 | 2,412 | 2,982 | 2,445 | 3,091 | 3,099 |
| External borrowing | 6,502 | 6,407 | 6,030 | 4,174 | 5,047 | 3,658 | 3,914 | 3,628 | 4,012 | 4,197 | 3,780 | 4,016 | 4,510 |
| Government ¹ | 4,136 | 4,207 | 3,980 | 2,124 | 3,297 | 1,908 | 2,264 | 1,978 | 2,462 | 2,647 | 2,430 | 2,666 | 3,160 |
| Sonangol | 1,666 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,300 | 1,300 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 1,100 | 1,100 | 900 | 900 | 900 |
| Banks | 700 | 700 | 550 | 550 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| Central bank | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| External debt securities - Eurobonds | 3,000 | 3,000 | 1,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,000 | 0 | 2,000 | 0 | 2,000 | 0 | 1,500 |
| Foreign deposits (net) | -7,267 | -4,680 | -2,793 | -5,401 | -2,248 | -1,979 | -2,864 | -1,730 | -4,493 | -2,209 | -4,442 | -1,955 | -2,788 |
| IMF | 499 | 495 | 1,123 | 1,463 | 1,129 | 1,465 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| World Bank and AfDB ² | 665 | 500 | 785 | 1,000 | 750 | 665 | 0 | 532 | 0 | 773 | 0 | 764 | 756 |
| Change in reserves (+ = increase) | -1,217 | 656 | 553 | -3,202 | 350 | -318 | 1,200 | 1,200 | 0 | 1,098 | 0 | 1,246 | 1,554 |
| Memorandum Items: | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Collateralized external debt stock | 15,611 | 17,154 | 16,739 | 16,880 | 16,153 | 17,491 | 15,302 | 19,173 | 12,810 | 20,653 | 10,099 | 19,419 | 18,504 |

Sources: Angolan Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ The bulk of which is project financing.² Includes only budget support operations.

Table 9. Angola: Indicators of IMF Credit, 2019–28

(Units as indicated)

| | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Actual | | | | Projections | | | | | |
| Existing and prospective Fund arrangements | | | | | (Millions of SDRs) | | | | | |
| Disbursements | 358.0 | 1,070.2 | 1,070.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Stock of existing and prospective Fund credit | 1,073.0 | 2,143.2 | 3,213.4 | 3,213.4 | 3,079.3 | 2,900.5 | 2,498.7 | 1,963.1 | 1,427.6 | 892.0 |
| Obligations | 0.9 | 15.4 | 51.5 | 70.6 | 204.0 | 244.8 | 473.8 | 589.4 | 567.7 | 549.8 |
| Principal (repayment/repurchase) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 134.1 | 178.8 | 401.8 | 535.6 | 535.6 | 535.6 |
| Charges and interest | 0.9 | 15.4 | 51.5 | 70.6 | 69.9 | 66.0 | 72.0 | 53.9 | 32.1 | 14.2 |
| Obligations, relative to key variables | | | | | (Percent) | | | | | |
| Quota | 0.1 | 2.1 | 7.0 | 9.5 | 27.6 | 33.1 | 64.0 | 79.6 | 76.7 | 74.3 |
| Gross domestic product | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Gross international reserves | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.0 |
| Unencumbered gross international reserves ¹ | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.1 |
| Export of goods and services | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Unencumbered exports of goods and services ¹ | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| Central Government revenues | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.3 |
| Unencumbered Central Government revenues ¹ | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 3.5 |
| External debt service | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 2.1 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 7.7 | 10.6 | 9.8 | 7.3 |
| Non-collateralized external debt service | 0.0 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 2.7 | 6.6 | 8.5 | 10.6 | 15.7 | 11.3 | 7.9 |
| Fund credit outstanding, relative to key variables | | | | | (Percent) | | | | | |
| Quota | 145.0 | 289.6 | 434.2 | 434.2 | 416.1 | 391.9 | 337.6 | 265.3 | 192.9 | 120.5 |
| Gross domestic product | 1.7 | 4.7 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 5.5 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 1.1 |
| Gross international reserves | 8.5 | 18.8 | 26.3 | 24.6 | 22.3 | 20.0 | 16.0 | 11.8 | 8.2 | 4.8 |
| Unencumbered gross international reserves ¹ | 10.8 | 21.3 | 28.4 | 26.2 | 24.9 | 23.3 | 18.0 | 13.2 | 8.6 | 5.0 |
| External debt | 2.9 | 5.5 | 8.2 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 7.6 | 6.6 | 5.3 | 4.0 | 2.7 |
| Non-collateralized external debt ² | 4.3 | 8.0 | 12.1 | 12.6 | 12.8 | 12.1 | 10.3 | 7.8 | 6.0 | 4.0 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | (Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) | | | | | |
| Quota (millions of SDRs) | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 | 740.1 |
| Gross domestic product | 89,417 | 61,797 | 65,774 | 70,725 | 77,356 | 84,239 | 90,904 | 97,153 | 102,629 | 108,483 |
| Gross international reserves | 17,321 | 15,582 | 16,729 | 17,929 | 18,929 | 19,929 | 21,506 | 22,984 | 24,280 | 25,664 |
| Exports of goods and services | 35,180 | 20,177 | 22,402 | 25,107 | 27,252 | 29,082 | 34,176 | 36,525 | 38,584 | 40,784 |
| Central Government revenues | 17,896 | 10,852 | 12,381 | 13,920 | 15,250 | 16,276 | 19,127 | 20,442 | 21,594 | 22,826 |
| External debt service | 8,001 | 5,012 | 6,503 | 4,696 | 6,200 | 6,796 | 8,459 | 7,671 | 8,064 | 10,515 |
| Total external debt ³ | 51,574 | 53,453 | 53,819 | 54,244 | 53,728 | 52,474 | 51,863 | 51,439 | 49,324 | 46,303 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff projections.

¹ Subtracting collateralized external debt service.² Subtracting collateralized external debt.³ Including Sonangol, TAAG, and public guarantees.

Table 10. Angola: Access and Phasing Under the Extended Arrangement, 2018–21

(Units as indicated)

| | | Original Program | | | Revised Program | | |
|-------------------------|--|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| Availability Date | Conditions ¹ | Purchase | | | Purchase | | |
| | | Millions of SDRs | Millions of U.S. dollars | Percent of Quota | Millions of SDRs | Millions of U.S. dollars | Percent of Quota |
| December 7, 2018 | Board approval of the Extended Arrangement | 715 | 991 | 97 | 715 | 991 | 97 |
| March 29, 2019 | Observance of end-December 2018 performance criteria, completion of first review | 179 | 249 | 24 | 179 | 249 | 24 |
| September 30, 2019 | Observance of end-June 2019 performance criteria, completion of second review | 179 | 249 | 24 | 179 | 249 | 24 |
| March 31, 2020 | Observance of end-December 2019 performance criteria, completion of third review | 400 | 547 | 54 | 731.7 | 1,000 | 99 |
| October 30, 2020 | Observance of end-June 2020 performance criteria, completion of fourth review | 400 | 547 | 54 | 338.5 | 463 | 46 |
| April 30, 2021 | Observance of end-December 2020 performance criteria, completion of fifth review | 400 | 548 | 54 | 535.1 | 732 | 72 |
| November 1, 2021 | Observance of end-June 2021 performance criteria, completion of sixth review | 400 | 548 | 54 | 535.1 | 732 | 72 |
| Total | | 2,673 | 3,678 | 361 | 3,213.4 | 4,417 | 434 |
| Memorandum item: | | | | | | | |
| | Angola's quota | 740.1 | | | 740.1 | | |

Source: IMF.

¹ Observance of performance criteria includes both periodic and continuous performance criteria.

Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix¹

| Potential Deviations from Baseline | | | | |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|---|
| Source of Risks | Relative Likelihood | Time Horizon | Impact on Angola | Policy Responses |
| <p>Prolonged Covid-19 outbreak. Containment measures remain in place (in some places intensify or need to be re-introduced) through early 2021. Longer containment and uncertainties about the intensity and the duration of the outbreak reduce supply (including through global value chains' disruption) and domestic and external demand. Deteriorating economic fundamentals and the associated decline in risk appetite result in a second wave of financial tightening (amplified as hidden fragilities are unmasked) and in debt service and refinancing difficulties for corporates and households. Rising bankruptcies translate into financial institutions' losses, forcing them to cut credit, with further adverse implications for growth. Concerns about public debt sustainability mount, and EMs and frontier economies experience a greater number of sudden stops.</p> | High | Short Term/ Medium Term | High | Accommodate essential health spending and combine well-paced, growth-friendly spending adjustments that protect social spending and public investment with additional financing from international financial institutions (IFIs) and the donor community given limited scope for fiscal easing; let the exchange rate adjust to changes in global conditions; and persevere with structural reforms to diversify the economy. |
| <p>Widespread social discontent and political instability. Social tensions erupt due to dissatisfaction with the policy response to the epidemic and the economic fallout, including massive unemployment, higher incidence of poverty and shortages of essentials. Beyond immediate economic disruption and adverse confidence effects, the resulting political instability complicates adjustment following Covid-19. Intensified geopolitical tensions and security risks (e.g., in response to pandemic) cause socio-economic and political disruption, disorderly migration, and lower confidence.</p> | Medium | Short Term | Medium | Accelerate the roll out of the cash-transfer program. Target fiscal measures to the most affected sectors and households with the aim of alleviating liquidity constraints while ensuring transparency and accountability in managing spending related to COVID-19; proactively seek additional financing from IFIs and the donor community given limited fiscal buffers. |
| <p>More protectionism. Pandemic-prompted protectionist actions (e.g., export controls) stay in place and deteriorating economic conditions re-ignite broader protectionist measures.</p> | High | Short Term | Medium | Reach out proactively to main trade partners to protect exports. Speed up structural reforms to enhance external competitiveness and economic diversification, including greater trade and financial integration in SADC and AfCFTA. |

¹ The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff). The relative likelihood is the staff's subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline ("low" is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, "medium" a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and "high" a probability between 30 and 50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly. Conjectural risks are especially relevant over shorter horizons (up to 2 years) given the current baseline. Structural risks (omitted from this streamlined version) remain salient over shorter and longer horizons (up to 3 years). **April 2, 2020 edition of the RAM.**

| Source of Risks | Relative Likelihood | Time Horizon | Impact on Angola | Policy Responses |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|---|
| Oversupply in the oil market. Supply increases following the breakdown of the OPEC+ agreement together with demand shocks mean that energy prices remain at depressed levels. Uncertainty about future production contribute to continued high price volatility. | High | Short Term | Medium | Maintain exchange rate flexibility; adopt a steadfast fiscal policy response, including by mobilizing non-oil tax revenues and adjusting public spending and improving its efficiency; and accelerate reforms to diversify the economy. |
| Stronger-than-expected decline in crude oil production, which would reduce growth, oil tax revenues, and availability of foreign exchange. | Medium | Short Term/ Medium Term | High | Streamline administrative procedures to attract investment to the oil sector; move expeditiously with Sonangol's restructuring; mobilize additional non-oil fiscal revenues; and accelerate reforms to diversify the economy. |
| Potential negative spillovers on the financial sector from the transition to a more flexible exchange rate. The capital position of some banks may be vulnerable to further exchange rate depreciation. | Medium | Short Term/ Medium Term | Low | Address gaps in prudential regulations; assess potential fiscal contingent liabilities from weak banks; proceed with public bank restructuring. |
| Shocks to the public debt trajectory, including further decline in oil prices, low economic growth, and materialization of contingent liabilities. | High | Short Term/ Medium Term | High | Re-calibrate monetary and fiscal policy to a proper response to the shock; continue to strengthen public debt management, state-owned enterprise oversight, and transparency of public debt statistics; and reprofile selected official debt service over an extended period. |
| Possibility that reform fatigue could arise, given pervasive hardships. | Medium | Medium Term | Medium | Scale up of cash transfers to protect the most vulnerable from the side effects of reforms; and continue well-focused technical assistance by the IMF and other development partners to mitigate implementation risks and mitigate side effects of reforms. |

Annex II. Technical Assistance

| Area | Tech. Ass. Provider | Timeline |
|--|--------------------------|------------------|
| Tax Policy and Revenue Administration | | |
| Informality and international transfer pricing | IMF (FAD) | February 2020 |
| Excise tax | IMF (FAD) | January 2020 |
| VAT refunds | IMF (FAD) | Nov.–Dec. 2019 |
| Building capacity in the implementation and monitoring of the multi-year reform plan | IMF (AFRITAC South) | November 2019 |
| Transfer pricing | IMF (FAD) | October 2019 |
| VAT strategy | IMF (FAD) | Sept. –Oct. 2019 |
| Tax policy diagnostic assessment | IMF (FAD) | July 2019 |
| Enhancing AGT capacity to manage reforms | IMF (AFRITAC South) | July 2019 |
| IT upgrade to enable effective administration of VAT | IMF (AFRITAC South) | June 2019 |
| Expenditure Policy and Expenditure Administration | | |
| Expenditure management procedures and capacity building | IMF (AFRITAC South) | April 19 |
| Energy subsidy reform and social safety net | World Bank | 2019–21 |
| Social safety net system: targeting, registration, payments | World Bank | 2019–21 |
| Pilot child cash-transfer program | UNICEF | Ongoing |
| Electricity tariff reform | World Bank | 2021 |
| Financial Programming and Policies (FPP1.0) | IMF (ICD) | January 2020 |
| Public Financial Management | | |
| Fiscal decentralization and PFM at subnational level | World Bank | Ongoing |
| Fiscal Reporting | IMF (FAD) | March 19–Jan. 20 |
| Improving Cash Management to prevent arrears incurrences | IMF (AFRITAC South) | January 2020 |
| Public investment management assessment (PIMA) | IMF (FAD) | December 2019 |
| Information requirements for fiscal execution reports | IMF (FAD, AFRITAC) | November 2019 |
| Fiscal responsibility law | IMF (FAD, LEG) | October 2019 |
| PFM diagnostic | IMF (FAD) | April 2019 |
| Medium- and long-term debt strategy | IMF (MCM) and World Bank | April 2019 |
| SOE Reform | | |
| SOE reform, privatization, and PPPs | World Bank | 2019–21 |
| Corporate governance, financial performance: SOE diagnostic | World Bank | 2020 |
| Capital Markets | | |
| Development of capital markets | IMF (MCM) | 2020 |
| Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies, and Central Bank Governance | | |
| Monetary policy implementation and operations | IMF (MCM) | 2020 |

| Area | Tech. Ass. Provider | Timeline |
|---|---------------------|----------|
| BNA Law | IMF (LEG) | 2020 |
| Foreign operations and FX policy implementation | IMF (MCM) | 2019–20 |
| Financial Sector Stability | | |
| AML/CFT framework | IMF (LEG) | 2019–20 |
| Banking sector restructuring | IMF (MCM) | 2020 |
| Risk assessment of illicit financial flows | World Bank | Ongoing |
| Financial inclusion, supervision, and stability | World Bank | 2022 |
| Economic and Social Statistics | | |
| Government finance and debt statistics | IMF (STA) | 2019–20 |
| National accounts, and external and monetary statistics | IMF (STA) and W.B. | 2019–21 |
| Economic census | World Bank | 2019–20 |
| Consumer Price Index (CPI) | IMF (STA) | 2020 |
| Angola Poverty Assessment | World Bank | 2020 |
| Angola Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Sector Diagnostic | World Bank | 2020 |
| Macroframework and Financial Programming | IMF (ICD/AFR) | 2020–21 |
| Business Climate | | |
| Payments systems | World Bank | 2020 |
| Business environment reform (tax admin. and trade facilitation) | World Bank | 2022 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; European Union (EU); UNICEF; World Bank; and IMF.

Annex III. Debt Sustainability Analysis Update

The collapse in oil prices in early 2020 and the ensuing exchange rate depreciation have led to a further increase in Angola's already very high public debt, creating serious challenges for debt sustainability. In response, the authorities have undertaken strong fiscal retrenchment, both in the near and the medium terms, and have secured significant reprofiling of debt service. Public debt is expected to peak at 123 percent of GDP at end-2020, in large part reflecting the one-off impact of real exchange rate depreciation, as well as lower growth. Under the program, it is projected to steadily decline to 70 percent of GDP by 2025, close to the authorities' medium-term target, driven by the envisaged structural fiscal consolidation, and supported by the large share of oil revenues, which provides a natural medium-term hedge to the initial exchange rate shock. At the same time, debt reprofiling helps assure financing in 2020 and reduces gross financing needs (GFNs) to more manageable levels from 2021 onwards. Notwithstanding, debt dynamics remain highly vulnerable to further shocks, and further debt relief may be needed if downside risks materialize.

A. Public Debt Sustainability Analysis

1. Public debt perimeter. For the purposes of this Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), the public debt perimeter covers the domestic and external debt of the Central Government; the external debt of the state-owned oil company, Sonangol, and the state-owned airline, TAAG; public guarantees; and reported external liabilities of other state entities, including external arrears.

2. Macro-fiscal and financing assumptions. The main macro-fiscal assumptions underpinning the DSA are based on the companion Staff Report (SR) baseline scenario for the Third Review: (i) adherence to the authorities proposed supplementary budget in 2020, underpinned by additional fiscal measures in 2020, to mitigate a deteriorated external environment; (ii) non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD) retrenchment in 2021, with the impact of structural revenue measures committed to by the authorities, carrying over into the medium term; (iii) more restrictive public sector support in 2020–21, including for bank recapitalization and Sonangol reimbursement; (iv) privatization receipts in 2020–21; and (v) steadfast implementation of the structural reform agenda. In addition, the current baseline framework reflects updates to the global macroeconomic assumptions and official statistics from Angola, which include: (i) continued recession in 2020, a recovery in 2021, and sustained growth in the medium term; and (ii) a lower oil production than envisaged in the Second Review of the EFF in 2020 and the medium term.

3. The main assumptions on budget financing and debt rollover include the following.

- *Financing gap:* Lower oil revenues give rise to a fiscal financing gap (SR Text Table, ¶122), which is assumed to be filled by additional spending cuts (SR Table 2b), the proposed augmentation of IMF access, continued budget support from international financial institutions and bilateral partners, and debt reprofiling. Specifically:
- In the wake of uncertainty and global health concerns, international market conditions have deteriorated sharply increasing the cost of financing. Specifically, EMBIG sovereign spreads have increased sharply reaching 1,073 basis points at end-June 2020, implying

temporary loss of international capital market access. Accordingly, the authorities have requested IMF access augmentation up to the ceiling of normal access (from 361 percent of quota to 434.4 percent, corresponding to an additional US\$748 million) to cover part of the projected financing gap—of which US\$373 million will be disbursed in 2020.

- Angola is expected to benefit from budget support from other development partners in 2020, with about US\$600 million from the World Bank, US\$400 million from the AfDB (of which, US\$165million, already disbursed, represents funds originally planned to be disbursed in 2019), and US\$100 million from a bilateral official development agency.
- The authorities are committed to progressively aligning government security yields with market rates to support domestic rollover rates.
- *Financing needs.* GFNs will peak in 2020 and exceed the MAC-DSA’s high-risk benchmark for emerging economies¹ (hereafter the “high-risk benchmark;” Text Table 1), but fiscal financing is assured. The authorities took decisive action to pre-pay a collateralized official bilateral credit line in December 2019. As part of the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (G20DSSI), Angola is expected to benefit from a reprofiling of all principal and interest coming due between June 1 and December 31, 2020 from official creditors (“debt service suspension”).² In addition, the authorities have received assurances from their large creditors to defer selected principal payments to well beyond the end of the program (Text Table 2 and Box 1).

Text Table 1. Angola: Fiscal Financing Needs and Sources, 2020–30
(Percent of GDP)

| | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| Financing Needs¹ | 19.9 | 13.8 | 10.5 | 9.9 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 10.8 | 8.9 | 9.0 |
| GFN as in the DSA | 18.7 | 13.4 | 10.2 | 9.9 | 8.4 | 9.4 | 5.7 | 6.8 | 10.7 | 8.8 | 8.9 |
| Overall deficit | 3.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 | -1.0 | -1.3 | -1.5 | -1.8 | -2.0 | -2.0 | -1.9 | -2.1 |
| Debt amortization | 15.1 | 11.7 | 10.2 | 10.9 | 9.7 | 11.0 | 7.5 | 8.8 | 12.7 | 10.7 | 11.1 |
| Domestic | 11.0 | 5.8 | 7.3 | 6.3 | 5.0 | 4.3 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 4.7 | 3.0 | 3.4 |
| External | 4.1 | 6.0 | 2.9 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 6.6 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 7.9 | 7.7 | 7.7 |
| Existing debt | 4.1 | 6.0 | 2.7 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 4.7 |
| New debt | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.0 |
| Recapitalizations | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Clearance of payments arrears | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Clearance of external debt payments arrears | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Sonangol reimbursement ² | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Financing Sources | 19.9 | 13.8 | 10.5 | 9.9 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 10.8 | 8.9 | 9.0 |
| Domestic deposit drawdown ³ | 7.0 | 2.3 | -0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Foreign deposit drawdown (escrow) | 0.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | -0.7 | -0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 |
| Privatization proceeds | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Debt issuance | 12.3 | 10.4 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 10.7 | 8.8 | 8.5 |
| Domestic | 4.8 | 4.2 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 4.6 | 3.6 | 1.6 | 3.5 | 6.0 | 4.5 | 5.0 |
| Treasury bills | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.5 |
| Treasury bonds | 3.0 | 2.8 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 1.4 | 3.1 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 3.5 |
| Tbond in local currency (2-year) | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Tbond in local currency (3-year) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 2.7 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.2 |
| Tbonds indexed to foreign currency | 0.2 | 0.5 | 2.4 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| External | 7.4 | 6.1 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 6.0 | 4.8 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 3.4 |
| Of which: Eurobond | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 0.8 |
| Of which: Budget support under the program | 4.2 | 3.3 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

Sources: Angola authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ To be filled with new issuances. These financing needs may differ from the DSA’s standardized gross financing needs.

² Repayment of past expenses related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Including estimated balances that could be transferred from escrow accounts and FSDEA to the Treasury single account.

¹ DSA for market-access countries (MACs): <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/050913.pdf>.

² Amounts reprofiled would be given a one-year grace period for payments, followed by three years of repayment.

Text Table 2. Angola: Central Government External Debt Service, 2020-2021
(Millions of U.S. dollars)

| | 2020 | 2021 |
|--|--------------|--------------|
| External debt service, with reprofiling | 5,067 | 6,375 |
| Principal | 2,642 | 3,862 |
| Interest payments and commissions | 2,425 | 2,513 |
| Scheduled external debt service | 7,705 | 8,493 |
| Principal on Central Government debt | 5,031 | 6,096 |
| Interest payments and commissions | 2,675 | 2,397 |
| <i>of which: on existing Central Government debt</i> | 2,577 | 2,170 |
| Domestic debt service | 4,943 | 1,492 |
| Principal | 0 | 0 |
| Interest payments and commissions | 4,943 | 1,492 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff calculations and estimates.

- Medium term (2021–25).* Fiscal retrenchment is expected to continue (SR Table 7) and international market access is expected to resume gradually in the post-program period. The baseline scenario assumes issuance of US\$1.5 billion of Eurobonds in 2025 to roll over the bullet repayment falling due that year. It envisages continued external financing from secure existing credit lines and plausible multilateral borrowing. The baseline scenario assumes the rollover of about US\$5.1 billion in dollar-denominated domestic debt coming due in 2022–23. It also assumes a gradual lengthening of domestic bond maturities, a key priority of the authorities. The authorities are working on supportive policies that would induce a reduction in the banking system’s exposure to the *Banco Nacional de Angola* (BNA) in order to provide space to support an increase in maturity of Treasury bonds that banks can hold.
- Long term (2026–30).* The framework was extended to 2030 in order to verify that debt relief results in durably sustainable debt dynamics beyond the grace and IMF repayment periods. The assumptions underlying the framework are conservative. This is especially the case for (i) the oil-price assumption, which is some 12 percent lower than the recent *World Economic Outlook Update* (WEO) projections for 2020–21; (ii) domestic financing assumptions: continued gradual lengthening of domestic bond maturities, judged to be well within what the banking system can absorb; (iii) and external financing, stemming most from secure existing credit lines. In addition, growth is projected to decelerate from 2024 on, and no additional fiscal revenue measures are built into the framework.
- Sonangol.* The baseline scenario assumes that the Treasury suspends reimbursing Sonangol from 2020 onwards for past quasi-fiscal National Urbanization and Housing Plan-related (PNUH) expenses. During the program, Sonangol expects to meet its financing needs with its own cash flow and asset sales, complemented by moderate new borrowing. The baseline scenario continues to assume conservative external borrowing by Sonangol, amounting to

US\$1.5 billion in 2020, and a cumulative US\$5.4 billion in 2021–25. Reflecting this, Sonangol's external debt ratio is projected to increase from 6.6 percent of GDP in 2019 to 7.5 percent of GDP in 2020 and then to decline steadily, reaching 3.3 percent by 2025.

- **TAAG.** The authorities intend to issue a central government guarantee of about US\$105 million in 2020Q3 for the purchase of small planes, but will delay disbursements on the associated credit line. The baseline scenario assumes no other borrowing by TAAG given subdued economic activity in the aftermath of COVID-19.
- **Other systemically relevant state-owned enterprises (SOEs).** The baseline scenario does not include prospective borrowing by other large SOEs that currently are not included in the debt perimeter, including Angola Telecom, ENDE, Endiama, ENSA, EPAL, Prodel, and RNT. The authorities report estimated borrowing of about 8 percent of GDP in 2019–22, likely requiring State guarantees.
- **Guarantees.** The baseline scenario includes prospective loans by the AfDB to the private sector with sovereign guarantees. The Government has also sought loans from international banks to support private sector development that may involve sovereign guarantees.³ These will be incorporated in the baseline scenario, once loans are contracted and guarantees are issued. The program includes ceilings (*indicative targets*) on new guarantees by the State.
- **Privatization.** The baseline scenario includes conservative assumptions of privatization receipts (net of costs) amounting to US\$75 million and US\$100 million in 2020 and 2021, respectively.
- **Clearance of external arrears:** The baseline scenario assumes the gradual clearance of external arrears to a one private entity (beginning in 2024) and continued clearance of arrears to another private entity (including a one-off payment in 2025).

Box 1. Angola: Debt Reprofilng Operations

The authorities have requested debt service relief under the G20DSSI, have reached agreements on reprofiling selected debt with two of their large creditors, and are in discussions with them to finalize the operational modalities of these agreements.

- The authorities sent letters of request to the Paris Club Secretariat; the World Bank; the IMF; and relevant G20 countries.

³ Loans from Afreximbank and Deutsche Bank in the amount of US\$2.7 billion aim at supporting private-sector projects in the next 3–4 years. These loans will be intermediated by local banks and backed by State guarantees.

Box 1. Angola: Debt Reprofiting Operations (concluded)

- They continue engaging with their large creditors to finalize agreements on selected and voluntary reprofiling of debt service. The authorities signed an agreement with a large creditor in June 2020 on debt reprofiling. The agreement includes (i) a three-year deferral of principal payments; (ii) repayment of deferred principal falling due in 2020H2–2023H1 for the largest facility to be repaid over seven years after the grace period, with some additional modest relief of principal in 2024–25; (iii) for two smaller facilities, the original schedule of principal payment is moved three years into the future; (iv) interest payments falling due during the deferral period is to be serviced by drawing down the associated escrow account, which will be replenished gradually after the initial three year deferral period; and (v) no penalty for the reprofiling. An agreement with a second large creditor is being worked out with a similar reprofiling of principal payments. Interest payments on these loans are expected to be paid normally in the absence of associated escrow accounts. The authorities have secured concrete and credible financing assurances from these creditors. As a next step, they are working to finalize the debt reprofiling agreement. Discussions with regard to the reprofiling of another large official creditor are ongoing, with the aim of securing a reprofiling that would deliver outcomes consistent with program parameters.

In addition to supporting a steadily declining debt-to-GDP ratio, the debt reprofiling operations bring annual GFNs to more manageable levels throughout 2021–25 (average of 10.3 percent) and provide a moratorium in the next three years with a cumulative debt flow relief of US\$6.7 billion. The agreed reprofiling package lowers GFNs further, to an annual average of 8.3 percent of GDP in 2026–30. The annual average GFN during 2021–30 is 9.3 percent.

4. The forecast record for Angola’s key macroeconomic variables—growth, primary balance, and inflation—shows a relatively large median error, compared with other program countries. This reflects, in part, the large volatility in oil production and prices, swings in agricultural production owing to erratic weather conditions, and limited economic diversification. The MAC-DSA realism module continues to characterize Angola’s fiscal adjustment as optimistic, compared to those in other IMF arrangements. However, this adjustment was largely frontloaded in 2018–19, and would have been largely completed absent the recent crisis confronting Angola.

5. Public debt is projected to rise from 109 percent of GDP in 2019 to 123 percent of GDP in 2020. The projections for 2020 mostly reflect the depreciation of the exchange rate and the collapse in oil prices in the wake of the COVID-19 shock (Text Table 3). Public debt is expected to decline to 113 percent of GDP in 2021, reflecting the beginning of recovery in growth and strong fiscal measures.


Text Table 3. Angola: Public Debt, 2019–21
(Percent of GDP)

| Breakdown | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | 3rd Rev. | 2nd Rev. | 3rd Rev. | 2nd Rev. | 3rd Rev. |
| Domestic debt | 34.1 | 32.9 | 26.2 | 28.9 | 23.6 | 24.0 |
| <i>Of which: FX Linked/Denominated</i> | 19.7 | 19.4 | 11.8 | 14.3 | 8.9 | 10.9 |
| External debt | 75.9 | 75.6 | 74.5 | 92.4 | 69.9 | 86.6 |
| Central Government | 69.0 | 68.7 | 68.2 | 84.8 | 63.9 | 79.4 |
| Sonangol and TAAG | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.3 | 7.6 | 6.0 | 7.2 |
| Guarantees | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 |
| Total public debt | 110.9 | 109.2 | 102.0 | 122.8 | 95.1 | 112.5 |


Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff calculations and projections.

6. The public debt ratio is projected to remain elevated over the projection horizon and would take slightly longer to converge toward the medium-term anchor than previously projected (Text Figure 1).

The structural adjustment in the NOPFD assumed in the baseline scenario coupled with debt reprofiling would help reverse the upward trend in the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2021 and bring it close to the medium-term anchor by 2025. The rebound in growth, coupled with sustained recovery in the medium term—supported by structural reforms to unlock key impediments to growth in Angola, such as strengthened business climate and governance—would complement the fiscal consolidation that is already in the baseline scenario and reduce debt significantly by 2025.



7. Notwithstanding the debt reprofiling and strong fiscal consolidation, total debt service will remain large and warrants careful management. It is projected to exceed 100 percent of fiscal revenues in 2020, but this ratio will decline somewhat thereafter (Text Figure 2). The revenue forecasts underpinning this outlook are predicated on strong structural revenue measures in 2021, in line with the authorities' MEFP commitments, along the lines suggested by FAD technical assistance, with conservative initial yields, which can be expected to increase in the post-program period (SR Text Table in ¶7). The gains from the gradual phasing out of oil-collateralized debt envisaged under the program will increase the authorities' flexibility in managing their oil revenues. At the same time, GFNs are projected to remain contained from 2021 on, falling comfortably below the standard 15 percent of GDP threshold.



8. Angola's debt profile will remain subject to significant vulnerabilities, including exposure to currency risk (over four-fifths of Angola's debt is denominated in, or indexed to foreign currency, although the large share of oil revenues provides a strong medium-term hedge to exchange rate shocks); exposure to interest rate risk; and narrow creditor base, especially in the domestic market.

9. The baseline debt path is vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks, as noted below.

- *Growth shock.* If projected real GDP growth rates are lowered by one standard deviation, the debt ratio would remain significantly above the high-risk benchmark over the projection horizon.
- *Real exchange rate shock.* A 30-percent, one-time real depreciation of the Kwanza would increase the debt ratio to about 137 percent of GDP and debt would remain significantly above the high-risk benchmark over the projection horizon. Although further exchange rate depreciation would improve the Kwanza value of oil revenues—a factor not considered in this standardized shock scenario—it would also increase the interest bill.
- *Combined shock.* A combination of various macro-fiscal shocks—growth, inflation, primary balance, exchange rate, and a 200-basis-point increase in the effective interest rate—would increase the debt ratio to 164 percent of GDP, and GFNs above the high-risk benchmark. Under such a severe stress scenario, it is likely that Angola would no longer be able to service its debt.
- *Contingent-liability (CL) shocks.* The baseline scenario includes amounts equivalent to 0.7 percent of GDP for bank recapitalization in 2020. Under this scenario, both debt and GFN ratios would exceed the high-risk benchmarks in 2020, but fall below it in the ensuing years. The materialization of large borrowing or CL risks from non-financial SOEs could pose further threat to debt sustainability. CL risks should be mitigated under the program, including through adherence to prudent borrowing strategy; moderate issuance of sovereign guarantees; restructuring of Sonangol; and SOE privatization.
- *Oil-price shock.* To reflect the risk from Angola’s high dependence on oil, a customized scenario featuring a two-year drop (averaging 30 percent) in the projected price of the Angolan oil basket is considered for 2020–21. Under this scenario, the debt-to-revenue ratio would peak at about 736 percent and the debt-to-GDP ratio would remain above the high-risk benchmark over the entire projection horizon.

10. Angola’s public debt is highly vulnerable to downside risks. The asymmetric fan chart shows that in the case of systematically unfavorable macroeconomic shocks (e.g., fiscal and exchange rate shocks), the debt trajectory would exceed the high-risk benchmark with high likelihood.

11. The exposure of Angola’s public debt to significant vulnerabilities is summarized by the heat map. This shows that debt and GFNs breach their high-risk benchmarks in both the baseline and stress test scenarios. The heat map also flags risks stemming from market sentiment (this is a change from the last review in part because of the sharp rise in sovereign spreads), investor base, and currency composition.

B. External Debt Sustainability Analysis

12. The debt coverage in the external DSA includes external debt of the Central Government, Sonangol, TAAG, and public guarantees of debt denominated in foreign currency. No information is available on private sector external debt. The authorities continue to make efforts to collect private sector debt data, including with the help of IMF technical assistance.

13. Angola's public external debt is projected to peak in 2020 and decline in the medium term. The path of Angola's external debt is projected to peak at 94 percent of GDP in 2020 and gradually converge to 58 percent of GDP in 2025. The drivers of the deteriorated external debt path are the same as those for public debt. The share of external debt in total debt would decline to represent about half of total debt in the medium term.


14. External financing requirements are projected to increase in 2020, but improve toward the end of the program. They would peak at about 10 percent of GDP in 2020, largely reflecting a sharp decline in oil prices and production, and decline to about 6 percent in 2022 before rising and stabilizing at about 7 percent of GDP in 2023–25, as the principal and interest payment deferrals underpinning debt reprofiling expire and higher debt service obligations roll in.

15. Angola's external debt remains vulnerable to shocks, especially to unfavorable current account developments and large exchange rate depreciation. Absent countervailing policy actions, external debt would peak at 155 percent of GDP in response to a 30 percent depreciation in the real effective exchange rate. It is also vulnerable to further declines in oil prices and growth, tighter financing conditions, and materialization of contingent liabilities from the financial sector.

C. Bottom Line Assessment

16. Angola's public debt is sustainable with substantial reprofiling of interest and principal payments and strong fiscal adjustment underpinned by structural non-oil revenue measures, although high risks remain. On this basis, following its 2020 peak, the debt ratio is projected to decline steadily toward the authorities' medium-term target. At the same time, an improved overall fiscal balance and the envisaged debt reprofiling are projected to keep GFNs contained in the medium term. However, in view of numerous sources of vulnerability, decisive action will be needed to safeguard debt sustainability if risks materialize.

Figure 1. Angola: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)—Risk Assessment



Source: IMF staff.

1/ The cell is highlighted in green if debt burden benchmark of 70% is not exceeded under the specific shock or baseline, yellow if exceeded under specific shock but not baseline, red if benchmark is exceeded under baseline, white if stress test is not relevant.

2/ The cell is highlighted in green if gross financing needs benchmark of 15% is not exceeded under the specific shock or baseline, yellow if exceeded under specific shock but not baseline, red if benchmark is exceeded under baseline, white if stress test is not relevant.

3/ The cell is highlighted in green if country value is less than the lower risk-assessment benchmark, red if country value exceeds the upper risk-assessment benchmark, yellow if country value is between the lower and upper risk-assessment benchmarks. If data are unavailable or indicator is not relevant, cell is white.


Lower and upper risk-assessment benchmarks are:

200 and 600 basis points for bond spreads; 5 and 15 percent of GDP for external financing requirement; 0.5 and 1 percent for change in the share of short-term debt; 15 and 45 percent for the public debt held by non-residents; and 20 and 60 percent for the share of foreign-currency denominated debt.

4/ EMBIG, an average over the last 3 months, 01-Apr-20 through 30-Jun-20.

5/ External financing requirement is defined as the sum of current account deficit, amortization of medium and long-term total external debt, and short-term total external debt at the end of previous period.

Figure 2. Angola: Public DSA—Realism of Baseline Assumptions



Source : IMF Staff.

1/ Plotted distribution includes program countries, percentile rank refers to all countries.

2/ Projections made in the spring WEO vintage of the preceding year.

3/ Not applicable for Angola, as it meets neither the positive output gap criterion nor the private credit growth criterion.

4/ Data cover annual observations from 1990 to 2011 for advanced and emerging economies with debt greater than 60 percent of GDP. Percent of sample on vertical axis.

Figure 2. Angola: Public DSA—Realism of Baseline Assumptions (concluded)





Figure 3. Angola: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)—Baseline Scenario
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| Debt, Economic and Market Indicators ^{1/} | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------|------|-------|-------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | Actual | | | Projections | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2009-2017 ^{2/} | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
| Total Nominal gross public debt | 47.2 | 89.0 | 109.2 | 122.8 | 112.5 | 97.5 | 86.8 | 77.0 | 69.7 | 64.0 | 57.6 | 52.0 | 46.7 | 41.1 |
| Debt of Central Government and Sonangol* | 38.1 | 89.0 | 108.9 | 122.5 | 112.2 | 97.3 | 86.6 | 76.8 | 69.5 | 63.8 | 57.5 | 51.8 | 46.5 | 40.9 |
| Public gross financing needs | 11.9 | 15.6 | 10.9 | 18.7 | 13.4 | 10.2 | 9.9 | 8.4 | 9.4 | 5.7 | 6.8 | 10.7 | 8.8 | 8.9 |
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 2.9 | -1.2 | -0.9 | -4.0 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Inflation (GDP deflator, in percent) | 11.2 | 33.8 | 22.9 | 11.8 | 21.4 | 15.7 | 9.3 | 6.9 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 4.9 | 4.5 |
| Nominal GDP growth (in percent) | 14.4 | 32.2 | 21.8 | 7.3 | 25.2 | 19.2 | 13.6 | 11.0 | 9.0 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 8.9 | 8.5 | 8.2 |
| Effective interest rate (in percent) ^{4/} | 4.1 | 8.6 | 7.2 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.7 | 7.1 |

| Contribution to Changes in Public Debt | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|--|------|
| | Actual | | | Projections | | | | | | | | | | cumulative | debt-stabilizing primary balance ^{9/} | |
| | 2009-2017 ^{2/} | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | | | 2030 |
| Change in gross public sector debt | 4.2 | 19.7 | 20.2 | 13.6 | -10.4 | -14.9 | -10.7 | -9.8 | -7.3 | -5.7 | -6.4 | -5.6 | -5.3 | -5.6 | -68.1 | |
| Identified debt-creating flows | 1.3 | 9.0 | 9.0 | -10.3 | -25.4 | -18.0 | -13.0 | -10.2 | -7.9 | -7.7 | -7.3 | -6.6 | -6.0 | -5.6 | -118.1 | |
| Primary deficit | -0.3 | -6.7 | -6.0 | -3.4 | -4.9 | -5.9 | -6.1 | -5.8 | -5.6 | -5.5 | -5.4 | -5.2 | -5.1 | -5.2 | -58.0 | -2.3 |
| Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants | 32.6 | 21.9 | 20.0 | 17.6 | 18.8 | 19.7 | 19.7 | 19.3 | 18.9 | 18.7 | 18.6 | 18.3 | 18.1 | 18.0 | 205.7 | |
| Primary (noninterest) expenditure | 32.3 | 15.2 | 14.0 | 14.2 | 13.9 | 13.8 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 13.3 | 13.2 | 13.2 | 13.1 | 13.0 | 12.8 | 147.8 | |
| Automatic debt dynamics ^{5/} | -1.5 | 14.4 | 17.1 | -0.4 | -18.1 | -12.1 | -6.5 | -4.0 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -1.9 | -1.4 | -0.9 | -0.5 | -50.3 | |
| Interest rate/growth differential ^{6/} | -3.9 | -12.3 | -10.7 | -0.4 | -18.1 | -12.1 | -6.5 | -4.0 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -1.9 | -1.4 | -0.9 | -0.5 | -50.3 | |
| Of which: real interest rate | -3.1 | -12.9 | -11.3 | -4.5 | -15.0 | -9.3 | -3.1 | -1.0 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.0 | -31.0 | |
| Of which: real GDP growth | -0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 4.1 | -3.1 | -2.9 | -3.4 | -3.0 | -2.1 | -2.0 | -1.9 | -1.8 | -1.7 | -1.5 | -19.4 | |
| Exchange rate depreciation ^{7/} | 2.4 | 26.8 | 27.8 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.0 | |
| Other identified debt-creating flows | 3.1 | 1.3 | -2.1 | -6.5 | -2.4 | 0.0 | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -9.8 | |
| Domestic cash and deposits (negative) | 1.0 | 0.4 | -2.1 | -7.2 | -2.4 | 0.0 | -0.4 | -0.3 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -10.4 | |
| Contingent liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 2.1 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | |
| Residual, including asset changes ^{8/} | 2.9 | 10.7 | 11.2 | 23.9 | 15.1 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 50.0 | |

As of June 30, 2020

| | | |
|--------------------------|-----|----------|
| Sovereign Spreads | | |
| EMBIG (bp) ^{3/} | | 1073 |
| 5Y CDS (bp) | | 2655 |
| Ratings | | |
| Moody's | B3 | Local B3 |
| S&P's | CCC | CCC |
| Fitch | B- | B- |



Source: IMF staff.

^{1/} Public sector is defined as the Central government plus public companies and includes public guarantees, defined as CG guarantees to SOEs and private firms.

^{2/} Based on available data.

^{3/} EMBIG.

^{4/} Defined as interest payments divided by debt stock (excluding guarantees) at the end of previous year.

^{5/} Derived as $[r - \pi(1+g) - g + ae(1+r)] / (1+g + \pi + g\pi)$ times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate; π = growth rate of GDP deflator; g = real GDP growth rate; a = share of foreign-currency denominated debt; and e = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).


^{6/} The real interest rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as $r - \pi(1+g)$ and the real growth contribution as $-g$.

^{7/} The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as $ae(1+r)$.

^{8/} Includes changes in the stock of guarantees, asset changes, and interest revenues (if any). For projections, includes exchange rate changes during the projection period.

^{9/} Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.

Figure 4. Angola: Public DSA—Composition of Public Debt and Alternate Scenarios



Source: IMF staff.

Figure 5. Angola: Public DSA—Stress Tests





Figure 6. Angola: External Debt Sustainability: Bound Tests ^{1/2/}

(External debt in percent of GDP)



Sources: International Monetary Fund, Country desk data, and staff estimates.
 1/ Shaded areas represent actual data. Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks. Figures in the boxes represent average projections for the respective variables in the baseline and scenario being presented. Ten-year historical average for the variable is also shown.
 2/ For historical scenarios, the historical averages are calculated over the ten-year period, and the information is used to project debt dynamics five years ahead.
 3/ Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance.
 4/ One-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2021.

Table 1. Angola: External Debt Sustainability Framework, 2015–25

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)


| | Actual | | | | | Projections | | | | | | Debt-stabilizing non-interest current account 6/ 1.9 |
|--|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---|
| | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
| Baseline: External debt | 35.1 | 45.0 | 38.2 | 56.8 | 76.2 | 94.0 | 89.1 | 78.9 | 70.8 | 62.9 | 57.5 | |
| Change in external debt | 10.2 | 9.9 | -6.8 | 18.6 | 19.4 | 17.7 | -4.9 | -10.2 | -8.2 | -7.9 | -5.4 | |
| Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9) | 27.4 | 5.6 | -14.9 | 0.4 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 1.0 | |
| Current account deficit, excluding interest payments | 9.2 | 3.5 | -0.9 | -11.1 | -11.2 | -2.1 | -2.8 | -2.9 | -3.2 | -3.5 | -3.6 | |
| Deficit in balance of goods and services | 3.4 | -0.9 | -6.0 | -17.9 | -19.0 | -7.1 | -7.9 | -7.9 | -8.2 | -8.4 | -8.1 | |
| Exports | 33.4 | 28.4 | 29.2 | 47.7 | 52.0 | 35.3 | 36.9 | 36.4 | 35.7 | 34.7 | 33.5 | |
| Imports | 36.8 | 27.5 | 23.1 | 29.8 | 33.0 | 28.2 | 29.0 | 28.4 | 27.5 | 26.3 | 25.4 | |
| Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative) | 8.7 | -0.5 | -7.2 | -6.6 | -2.6 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.4 | |
| Automatic debt dynamics 1/ | 9.5 | 2.6 | -6.8 | 18.1 | 19.7 | 7.9 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.2 | |
| Contribution from nominal interest rate | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 2.9 | |
| Contribution from real GDP growth | -0.3 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 3.6 | -2.8 | -2.4 | -2.8 | -2.5 | -1.7 | |
| Contribution from price and exchange rate changes 2/ | 9.1 | 0.2 | -8.3 | 14.9 | 15.4 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | |
| Residual, incl. change in gross foreign assets (2-3) 3/ | -17.2 | 4.3 | 8.1 | 18.2 | 13.6 | 10.0 | -6.3 | -12.0 | -9.5 | -8.8 | -6.4 | |
| External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent) | 105.1 | 158.7 | 131.1 | 119.1 | 146.6 | 266.3 | 241.6 | 217.1 | 198.0 | 181.3 | 171.3 | |
| Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars) 4/ | 12.9 | 7.3 | 4.4 | -1.6 | 0.5 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 4.4 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 6.6 | |
| in percent of GDP | 12.5 | 7.4 | 3.6 | -1.8 | 0.7 | 10.4 | 10.7 | 6.3 | 7.5 | 6.7 | 7.3 | |
| Scenario with key variables at their historical averages 5/ | | | | | | 94.0 | 82.1 | 69.7 | 55.3 | 40.7 | 27.4 | -3.6 |
| Key Macroeconomic Assumptions Underlying Baseline | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 0.9 | -2.6 | -0.2 | -1.2 | -0.9 | -4.0 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 3.0 | |
| GDP deflator in US dollars (change in percent) | -26.7 | -0.7 | 22.6 | -28.1 | -21.3 | -11.9 | 3.0 | 10.3 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 4.8 | |
| Nominal external interest rate (in percent) | 2.3 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | |
| Growth of exports (US dollar terms, in percent) | -43.4 | -17.8 | 25.8 | 16.3 | -15.0 | -42.6 | 11.0 | 12.1 | 8.5 | 6.7 | 4.4 | |
| Growth of imports (US dollar terms, in percent) | -29.1 | -27.8 | 3.1 | -8.4 | -13.8 | -27.7 | 9.1 | 11.4 | 7.0 | 5.2 | 4.1 | |
| Current account balance, excluding interest payments | -9.2 | -3.5 | 0.9 | 11.1 | 11.2 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.6 | |
| Net non-debt creating capital inflows | -8.7 | 0.5 | 7.2 | 6.6 | 2.6 | -2.0 | -2.7 | -3.2 | -3.9 | -3.7 | -3.4 | |
| 1/ Derived as $[r - g - r(1+g) + ea(1+r)] / (1+g+r+gr)$ times previous period debt stock, with r = nominal effective interest rate on external debt; r = change in domestic GDP deflator in US dollar terms, g = real GDP growth rate, e = nominal appreciation (increase in dollar value of domestic currency), and a = share of domestic-currency denominated debt in total external debt. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2/ The contribution from price and exchange rate changes is defined as $[-r(1+g) + ea(1+r)] / (1+g+r+gr)$ times previous period debt stock. r increases with an appreciating domestic currency ($e > 0$) and rising inflation (based on GDP deflator) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3/ For projection, line includes the impact of price and exchange rate changes. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4/ Defined as current account deficit, plus amortization on medium- and long-term debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5/ The key variables include real GDP growth; nominal interest rate; dollar deflator growth; and both non-interest current account and non-debt inflows in percent of GDP. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6/ Long-run, constant balance that stabilizes the debt ratio assuming that key variables (real GDP growth, nominal interest rate, dollar deflator growth, and non-debt inflows in percent of GDP) remain at their levels of the last projection year. | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Annex IV. External Sector Assessment

Since the start of the program, Angola has made significant progress in bringing its external position closer to equilibrium: the large overvaluation that was built during the fixed exchange rate period has been eliminated; net external liabilities remain manageable; and foreign exchange (FX) reserve adequacy has been improving. The transition to a more flexible exchange rate regime has been a major factor in this regard and is providing a substantial buffer against external shocks. On the basis of standard methodologies, the external position is assessed to be substantially stronger than warranted by fundamentals for 2019, with an estimated Kwanza undervaluation of over 15 percent. The COVID-19 shock and the collapse in oil prices are a source of major uncertainty going forward, but the new exchange rate regime should play an important stabilizing role.¹

1. Angola's current account (CA) remained in substantial surplus in 2019.

Despite adverse oil sector developments—an 8 percent decline in oil prices and a 6½ percent decline in oil production—the trade balance (as a share of GDP) was little changed relative to 2018, as imports also remained subdued, mainly reflecting the shock-absorbing role of the exchange rate. From a longer-term perspective, the strengthening of the CA in recent years mainly reflects the rebound in oil prices from their 2015–17 slump, along with a steady narrowing of the services deficit—consistent with declining oil production (Text Figure 1).




2. Capital flows pose limited vulnerabilities. Although temporary loss of market access limits external financing, under the baseline scenario Angola is not envisaged to tap the Eurobond market over the next four years. Regarding other types of capital flows, portfolio equity and private portfolio debt flows are limited, with the bulk of financial flows representing long-maturity public sector placements abroad, project-related financing, and banking sector activities for facilitating international trade.

¹ Prepared by Ioannis Halikias.

3. The sharp fluctuations in the real effective exchange rate (REER) in recent years largely mirror shifts in exchange rate policy (Text Figure 2). A number of subperiods can be distinguished in this regard.²

- Through *end-2017*, Angola pursued a de facto fixed exchange rate to the dollar. The peg was supported by heavy intervention, which resulted in large reserve losses, with oil prices declining from 2015 onward. In addition to intervention, the authorities relied on extensive FX rationing via a “priority list.” As a result, the exchange rate had become substantially overvalued by end-2017.
- Faced with depleted reserves, the peg was abandoned at the *start of 2018*. Through the first three quarters of that year, the Kwanza was allowed to depreciate rapidly, with the priority list streamlined and ultimately abandoned. As a result of increased exchange rate flexibility and reduced intervention, staff’s assessment at the time of the Extended Fund Facility program request was that the Kwanza’s overvaluation had been largely corrected by end-2018, with ‘EBA-lite’ methodologies suggesting an exchange rate broadly in line with fundamentals (*IMF Country Report No. 18/370*).

- Starting in the *fourth quarter of 2018* and through the *first half of 2019*, exchange rate policy shifted again. Nominal exchange rate adjustment became more restrained, with heavy intervention resulting in a substantial miss of the end-June 2019 performance criterion on net international reserves (NIRs). The pause in



REER depreciation (and slight appreciation), at a time when lower oil prices implied a depreciating equilibrium exchange rate, entailed the progressive re-emergence of a substantial Kwanza overvaluation, as reflected in the widening of the official-parallel market premium from 20 percent to over 40 percent.

- The start of the *fourth quarter of 2019* witnessed another major shift in the exchange rate regime. The Kwanza was allowed to float—with much-reduced intervention—guided by the adoption, with IMF staff support, of an FX intervention budget consistent with the program’s

² Annex IV provides complementary information on exchange rate developments.

NIR targets. As a result, the Kwanza depreciated sharply in October, before eventually stabilizing around its market-clearing level, as reflected by the narrowing of the official-parallel market premium to under 20 percent.

- With the collapse in world oil prices in *March 2020*, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the REER started depreciating sharply again, a trend consistent with a depreciated equilibrium exchange rate.


4. NIRs rose to US\$11.3 billion at end-2019, equivalent to 8½ months of prospective imports of goods and services. This reflected robust policy performance under the program, adverse oil sector developments notwithstanding, but also one-off factors—notably bringing forward a US\$1.5 billion Eurobond issue. The NIR increase brought gross international reserves (GIRs) to

US\$17.3 billion, or 98 percent of the IMF’s Assessing Reserves Adequacy (ARA) metric (Text Figure 3). Continued policy adjustment under the program, along with the proposed access augmentation, financing from other international financial institutions, also supported by debt reprofiling by the G20 and Angola’s large creditors, are projected to bring GIRs to just under 110 percent of the ARA metric by the end of the program—albeit somewhat below the 120 percent threshold viewed as relevant for large commodity exporters.

5. Despite the GIR buildup, Angola’s net international investment position (NIIP) deteriorated somewhat (as a share of GDP), falling to -35 percent of GDP by end-2019 (Text Figure 4). This deterioration fully reflects a denominator effect—the NIIP actually narrowed in U.S. dollar terms. The 2019 trends in the NIIP were once again dominated by rising sovereign external debt, reflecting continued Eurobond


Text Figure 3. Angola: International Reserve Adequacy, 2017–21

(Percent of ARA metric)



Text Figure 4. Angola: Net International Investment Position, 2005–19

(Percent of GDP)



issuance. Overall, IMF staff continues to view Angola's vulnerabilities as manageable, with limited risk of capital flow reversals. Portfolio equity and private portfolio debt flows are limited, with the bulk of financial flows representing long-maturity public sector placements abroad, project-related financing, and banking sector activities for facilitating international trade. With no Eurobond issuance envisaged in the coming years, Angola's NIIP is projected to stabilize and its composition to improve, with foreign direct investment representing a growing share of external liabilities.

6. Following the shift to a more flexible exchange rate regime, Angola's external position is assessed to be stronger than warranted by fundamentals. Based on the balance of payments outturns for 2019, EBA-lite calculations suggest that the overvaluation, which had re-emerged by mid-2019, had been corrected by end-year, with the Kwanza being currently moderately undervalued. This could result from the overshooting of the exchange rate in the wake of the mid-October 2019 exchange rate liberalization. Specifically, the EBA-lite current account methodology points to an undervaluation of a little over 15 percent (Text Table 1), and a similar picture emerges from the REER methodology (Text Table 2).

Text Table 1. Angola: Current Account Methodology, 2019
(Percent)

| | |
|--|--------------|
| CA-Actual | 5.8 |
| Cyclical Contributions (from model) | 1.4 |
| Cyclically adjusted CA | 4.4 |
| CA-Norm | -0.9 |
| Cyclically adjusted CA Norm | -2.3 |
| Multilaterally Consistent Cyclically adjusted CA Norm | -1.8 |
| CA-Gap | 6.2 |
| of/which Policy gap | 1.66 |
| Elasticity | -0.37 |
| REER Gap | -16.9 |
| CA-Fitted | 1.3 |
| Residual | 4.5 |
| Natural Disasters and Conflicts | 0.6 |

Source: Angolan authorities and staff calculations.

Text Table 2. Angola: EBA-Lite—REER Methodology

(Units as indicated)

| | |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| Ln(REER) Actual | 4.69 |
| Ln(REER) Fitted | 4.85 |
| Ln(REER) Norm | 4.85 |
| Residual | -0.16 |
| REER Gap | -15.7% |
| Policy Gap | 1% |
| Natural Disasters and Conflicts | -1.2% |

Source: Angolan authorities and staff calculations.


7. Looking ahead, the recent collapse in oil prices, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, brings in a new period of uncertainty. Although the current account is projected to switch to a deficit and GIRs to decline in 2020, the more flexible exchange rate is expected to perform its shock-absorbing role. So far, exchange rate developments since the oil-price slump appear consistent with the depreciated equilibrium exchange rate: by April 2020, the REER depreciation reached almost 35 percent year-on-year, and the official-parallel market spread has been within a 6–30 percent range, suggesting that the Kwanza has remained close to market perceptions of the new equilibrium. Nonetheless, the recent extreme volatility in oil prices and overall risks to the macro- and policy frameworks warrant close monitoring.

Annex V. Transition to a Market-Clearing Exchange Rate

This annex focuses on the transition of Angola's exchange rate regime from a pegged toward a market-clearing exchange rate. The transition, reviewed during May 2016–June 2020, involved three phases featuring increasing exchange rate flexibility. The annex offers recommendations for completing the reform.¹


A. From Fixed toward Market-Clearing Exchange Rate

1. Fixed exchange rate. From May 2016 to December 2017, the Kwanza was pegged to the U.S. at Kz 165.9 per US\$1 (Text Figure 1). Defending the peg in a context of persistent external imbalances, following the decline in oil prices in 2014, came at the expense of shrinking foreign exchange (FX) reserves and substantial real appreciation. The resulting currency overvaluation led to loss of external competitiveness and a sizable spread between the official and the parallel exchange rates, peaking at 255 percent in mid-May 2016. The peg led to financial repression in FX markets.



¹ Prepared by Artemisia Gove and Carlos de Resende.

2. Crawling peg (January 2018–October 2019).² Faced with rapid depletion of international reserves, the central bank (*Banco Nacional de Angola*, BNA) abandoned the peg in January 2018. In practice, however, excluding two days of rapid depreciation—10.7 percent on January 10 and 11.6 percent a week later—the exchange rate depreciated within a *de facto* crawling peg, by an average of 0.2 percent a day.³ The BNA controlled the official exchange rate by imposing limitations to FX auctions. Those included the use of maximum bid limits at auctions and restrictions on banks’ participation.⁴ The BNA issued a notice announcing the cessation of direct forex sales, at the end of September 2018, which was accompanied by a *de jure* removal of the ‘priority list’ (i.e., privileged access to FX). Between January 2, 2018 and October 10, 2019, the Kwanza depreciated by 136 percent against the U.S. dollar in nominal terms, while the REER depreciated by 40 percent. As a result (i) the weekly pace of loss in international reserves declined from US\$134 million during the peg to US\$39 million; and (ii) the official–parallel exchange rate spread narrowed from 151 percent in December 2017 to 26 percent in mid-October 2019. The liberalization also led to a reduction in the backlog of unmet FX demand (Text Figures 2–3). However, progress during the period was uneven, with occasional relapses.




² In this Annex, we estimate exchange rate evolutions using *direct quotation*, that is the number of Kwanzas per U.S. dollar. This is what most economic agents use in Angola. Under this approach, an increase in the number of Kwanzas per U.S. dollar denotes a *depreciation*. The only exception to this approach is when the Annex discusses Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) evolution—in that instance, we use the IMF’s method of *indirect quotation*.

³ Of 429 workdays, between January 18, 2018 and October 10, 2019, the daily depreciation of the Kwanza exceeded 2 percent only once; on seven occasions, it exceeded 1.5 percent; and on 22 occasions, 1 percent.

⁴ Through *Instruction No. 19/2018 of December 3* and *Directive No.06/DCC/DMA/2019*, the BNA announced the procedures to be followed by banks wishing to participate in FX auctions.

Text Figure 3. Angola: Selected Foreign Exchange Market Indicators, 2016–20



Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

3. Floating exchange rate. Beginning in mid-October 2019, the BNA removed important restrictions to FX auctions in two steps. First, it eliminated the +/- 2 percent cap on banks' resale margin on accepted bids. Second, it removed the 2 percent resale cap on top of the weighted-average price of successful bids.⁵ Initially, this resulted in a fast depreciation of the Kwanza, including a brief period of overshooting in late 2019, followed by a temporary correction. In October 2019, the Kwanza depreciated by 31.4 percent. From November on, the monthly depreciation rate slowed to a single digit. The official-parallel market spread narrowed to an all-time low of 6 percent in mid-April 2020. In January 2020, the BNA partially opened the capital and financial account. It eliminated the licensing for capital inflows by foreign investors, and capital outflows linked to investments. Licensing was also eliminated for the sale of investments in securities traded on a regulated market and for the sale of investment in which the buyer is a non-resident foreign exchange trader. At the same time, the BNA authorized oil companies to sell FX directly to commercial banks with which they had a business partnership, ending a long period of monopoly by the BNA as the sole supplier of FX (often on behalf of the Treasury). The BNA introduced an electronic trading platform on April 1, 2020, where all banks are required to participate. Starting in June 2020, the BNA FX auctions began to be conducted on this platform. All FX operations above US\$500,000 must take place on the platform, and all transactions above US\$50,000 must be

⁵ The first step had little effect, because the second restriction exposed banks to a risk of loss if their successful bid turned out to be 2 percent higher than the weighted average bid.

registered, even if not carried out on the platform. In late June, diamond companies were also allowed to trade on the platform. The platform has increased transparency, making an important step in the transition to a market-determined exchange.

Lessons from Transitioning to Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes

International experience shows that countries that have successfully transitioned to a flexible exchange rate regime often followed a gradual path and implemented risk-mitigating policies.

4. **Operational requirements.** In addition to sound macroeconomic and structural policies,⁶ Duttagupta, Fernandez, and Karacadag (2004) propose a framework, endorsed by the IMF's Executive Board, which points to some operational requirements for successful transition to a floating regime, including (i) developing a deep and liquid FX market for price discovery; (ii) formulating intervention policies consistent with the new exchange rate regime; (iii) establishing an appropriate nominal anchor in the context of an appropriate monetary policy framework; and (iv) establishing adequate systems to review and manage exchange rate risks; and (v) building the capacity of market participants to manage those risks (IMF, 2004a and 2004b).

5. **Nominal anchor.** IMF (2004a) notes that many countries moving to a flexible exchange rate regime have favored an inflation targeting framework over monetary targeting. The IMF's Executive Board recognized that inflation targeting could be appropriate for developing countries with a flexible exchange rate and sufficient institutional capacity. The paper notes that a weak relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation often undermines the effectiveness of monetary targeting as an effective anchor, but there are examples of countries, which have used monetary targeting effectively in moving from pegged to floating regimes—Mozambique (currently having a de jure flexible exchange rate regime) has been an example.⁷

6. **Speed of transition.** Robe and Vravra (2007) reviewed the experience of six countries in transition toward a flexible exchange rate regime.⁸ Fast exits involved a one-step move from different types of pegs—a de facto crawling peg in Brazil (1999); a horizontal band in the Czech Republic (1997); and a crawling band in Uruguay (2002). Gradual exits involved a step-by-step move to a full float through increasingly more flexible pegs. The authors showed that countries that moved gradually to a flexible regime generally took time to establish the elements that would mitigate concerns about floating (e.g., credibility, loss of competitiveness from appreciation, pass-through to inflation, balance sheet effects). The authors exposed Chile and Israel as examples of

⁶ Including fiscal discipline, monetary policy credibility, and robust financial supervision.

⁷ In April 2018, Mozambique moved to an interest-rate-based regime, in preparation for an inflation-targeting regime.


⁸ The authors analyzed the transition in six countries—three of them implemented gradual and orderly transitions; three moved fast, under market pressure, involving the collapse of the previous peg.

those countries, with slow transition to a more flexible regime, and argued that the gradual move helped these countries deepen their FX markets.

7. Challenges during transition. Challenges in the transition to a flexible exchange rate, whether the transition is gradual or rapid, include (i) difficulties in assessing readiness and the appropriate time to move; (ii) credibility issues; (iii) finding the right role for the central bank during and after the transition; and (4) determining a proper strategy for communication and transparency.

C. Challenges for Angola in Moving to a Market-Clearing Exchange Rate

8. Exchange rate passthrough to domestic prices. Since abandoning the fixed peg, there has been relatively low exchange rate passthrough to domestic prices in Angola (Text Figure 4). In the periods when the official–parallel exchange rate spread was high and the official rate was managed, agents were also operating on the parallel market. When the official rate was allowed to move, the passthrough had already taken place, and thus the remaining passthrough was low. In the presence of volatile oil prices, the challenge is to maintain an appropriately tight monetary policy to keep the passthrough low.



9. Given Angola's dependence on oil exports, a market-clearing exchange rate has important implications for inflation dynamics, since the nominal exchange rate ceases to work as the anchor for the economy. For instance, when oil prices decline, Angola's external accounts are

significantly affected through the decline in the dollar value of oil exports, which triggers downward pressures on the real exchange rate. This in turn will induce a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which has become more flexible and thus can respond to the shock. The nominal depreciation then may feed into higher inflation (e.g., through import prices). If higher inflation is accompanied by monetary accommodation, unanchored inflationary expectations will increase the precautionary demand for foreign exchange, put pressure on the exchange rate, and a vicious circle may be launched. This underscores the need for policies to keep inflation in check, especially in the wake of an oil-price slump.

D. Recommendations for a Market-Determined Exchange Rate

10. There is a need to develop an FX intervention plan. The BNA's stated goal is to fully retire from FX market operations—except for reserve management purposes—and let all operators, including the Treasury, carry out FX transactions on the FX electronic platform. When this happens, the reform will be completed, as the current market-clearing floating exchange rate regime will morph into a market-determined regime. A prerequisite for this is to achieve unmitigated FX price discovery. The BNA has to develop a plan to reach that stage and announce its intervention modalities, which should be strictly limited to occasional 'smoothing' of excessive volatility and reserve management.⁹ Transparency in intervention policies can help build confidence in the process. Disclosing information on actual interventions, with a time lag, can also help market transparency and strengthen central bank accountability.

11. There is a need for forward-looking market analysis. To better understand the domestic market, it is important to develop analytical tools and market intelligence (information about market behavior and possibly some assessments of likely future exchange rate developments, at least over a short-term horizon) to assess the fundamental drivers of the exchange rate. Market intelligence should be used to supplement any model-based analysis. The BNA also needs to plan for disorderly market conditions.

12. The choice of an appropriate monetary policy framework is crucial. A supportive monetary framework and the development of the capacity to implement it are essential in preserving monetary credibility under a floating exchange rate regime. The adoption of consistent monetary and fiscal policies is critical and supports the gradual strengthening of monetary credibility and inflation control within a more flexible exchange rate regime.

⁹ According to Duttagupta et al. (2006), "Central banks should be selective in their interventions and parsimonious in their use of foreign reserves. The difficulty of detecting exchange rate misalignments and disorderly markets means that decisions on the timing and amount of intervention are subjective and may be off the mark."

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Annex VI. Banking Sector Assessment and Reform

The central bank completed asset quality reviews (AQRs) in December 2019 for 13 domestic banks, comprising 93 percent of total banking system assets. This independent asset valuation exercise identified 7 banks with capital shortfalls. The AQRs provide a foundation for the authorities to lay out the future strategy for public banks. This strategy will include addressing negative equity positions; restructuring balance sheets; resolving nonperforming loans (NPLs); and returning concerned banks to compliance with capital requirements and achieving long-term viability. The AQRs also identified shortfalls in banks' risk-management practices.¹

A. Approach and Methodology

1. The terms of reference for the exercise were developed by the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA) in consultation with IMF staff. The agreed methodology set out how data were to be collected and assessed for quality, assets were to be valued, and risk-management practices assessed. Standardized 'challenger' models were developed and used to assess appropriateness of provisions for granular portfolios and following minimum sampling criteria for review of individual large assets in each bank portfolio (Box 1).

| Box 1. Angola: Portfolios for Testing | |
|---|--|
| Portfolio | Minimum Assessment |
| Securities and investments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assets whose gross book value per issuer exceeds 2.5 percent of Bank's Regulatory Own Funds (BROFs). |
| Loans | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimum coverage of 60 percent of the overall exposure (equity and off-balance sheet exposure), net of impairments and/or provisions. Customers whose total carrying amount of loans and/or off-balance sheet exposures, net of impairments and/or provisions, is greater than 2.5 percent of BROFs. Minimum selection of the 20 largest global exposures (equity and off-balance-sheet exposures), net of impairments and/or provisions, per individual borrower. |
| Assets held for sale and assets not for own use | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assets whose gross book value exceeds 2.5 percent of BROFs. Minimum selection of the 5 largest assets of this nature. |
| Other tangible assets | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assets whose gross book value of the exposure to a specific counterparty exceeds 2.5 percent of the BROFs. Minimum selection of the 5 largest assets of this nature. |
| Deferred tax assets | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assets whose gross book value exceeds 2.5 percent of BROFs at the reference date. |
| Other assets with credit risk | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assets whose gross book value of the exposure to a specific counterparty exceeds 2.5 percent of the BROFs. |

¹ Prepared by Dermot Monaghan and Miguel Otero Fernandez.

2. Credibility and reliability were two key objectives. These were achieved through the employment of independent auditors and review of banks' data quality. The assessment was overseen by the BNA, with the help of reputable international auditors. Data quality issues were assessed by the auditors using standardized templates produced by the lead auditor and the BNA for loan portfolios, securities and investments, and investments in banks and other tangible assets.

3. The methodology applied prudent point-in-time estimates of banks' assets, assuming that public debt remains on a sustainable path. The assessment incorporated the following standard adjustments to loans and securities.

- Discounts of 40–100 percent were applied to the estimated value of real estate collateral. This market is currently illiquid and there is anecdotal evidence of up to a 66 percent drop from peak on average (using a rental-yield approach); the use of a sale-price approach suggests less of a drop, but very low transaction volumes were recorded in recent years.
- Assets subject to individual assessment were re-valued using three broad macroeconomic scenarios (base/favorable/adverse) as per IFRS 9 standards, and the BNA subsequently applied a 70/10/20 percent weighting to them respectively to arrive at a definitive assessment of capital needs.
- IFRS 9 expected-credit-loss rules were applied, meaning banks must hold capital against a one-year probability of default for securities. This includes a local sovereign default, which is equivalent to 1.65 percent of nominal value. This charge is non-negligible in capital terms, given the large concentrations of this illiquid debt on most banks' balance sheets. Provisions on local sovereign exposure would be substantially larger and would have a systemic impact if a lifetime expected-credit-loss approach were to be applied. This risk was not considered on the basis that a key objective of the IMF program is to maintain public debt levels on a sustainable path and hence the sovereign is currently considered a 'Stage 1' asset by banks from an accounting perspective.

B. Findings and Results

4. Text Table 1 summarizes the adjustments made to BROFs, following completion of the assessments.

5. The AQRs identified that seven banks required a total of US\$2.4 billion (3.7 percent of 2020 GDP) to meet minimum regulatory capital requirements (Text Table 2). Two public banks represent 96 percent of this total. The capital shortfalls identified in five other banks were relatively small and four had already recapitalized by end-2019. Further adjustments were needed after completing the AQRs to account for asset quality changes to end-2019 and the need for a capital buffer above the minimum regulatory requirement.

Text Table 1. Angola: Adjustments to Bank Accounts Below
(Units as indicated)

| Bank | Total Adjustments Reported by Auditors (US\$ millions, on December 31, 2019) | | | | | | Asset Quality Changes from December 2018 to September 2019 | Total adjustments after AQR | Change in Bank's Regulatory Own Funds after AQR |
|----------|---|-------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--|-----------------------------------|---|
| | Cash and Deposits (ECL) | Securities and investments | | Loans | | Other adjustments | | | |
| | | Fair Value | Amortized Cost | Individual Assessment | Collective Analysis | | | | |
| 13 banks | -83 | -72 | -838 | -990 | -474 | -1,078 | -40 | -3,575 | -93,13% |

Source: BNA.

Text Table 2. Angola: Highlights of Asset Quality Reviews
(Units as indicated)

| Bank | Capital Adequacy Ratio | | Capital Shortfall (USD \$m) | Recap as percent of Sep-2019 Own Funds |
|------------------|------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|---|
| | Pre-AQR | Post-AQR | | |
| Bank A | 11.2% | -132.8% | 1,831 | 2,899% |
| Bank B | 20.8% | -22.5% | 435 | 91% |
| Five other banks | 15.3% | 6.1% | 103 | 22% |
| Total | | | 2,369 | |

Source: BNA.

6. The AQRs also identified some issues with credit-risk management. Six private banks were found to have material exposure to related parties (exposure greater than 30 percent of total credit granted and/or greater than 20 percent of BROFs). Banks' credit-risk policies and procedures were also found to have material shortfalls that require significant improvements to credit-risk management. Details are provided in Text Table 3.

Text Table 3. Angola: Credit Risk Themes
(Percent)

| Credit Risk Theme | Red | Amber | Green |
|---|-----|-------|-------|
| A. Credit granting process | 31% | 50% | 19% |
| B. Credit risk monitoring process | 31% | 30% | 39% |
| C. Credit recovery and restructuring process | 30% | 45% | 25% |
| D. Process of registration and valuation of credit collateral | 32% | 38% | 30% |
| E. Process of registration and valuation of real estate received in | 12% | 24% | 64% |
| F. Process relating to monitoring and impairment tests on: | | | |
| Financial assets under IFRS 9 | 5% | 33% | 62% |
| Non-current assets held for sale ("NCADV") | 11% | 46% | 43% |
| Other tangible assets | 15% | 40% | 45% |
| Investments in credit institutions ("IC's") | 15% | 38% | 46% |
| G. Process for classifying and measuring financial assets according to agreement with IFRS 9, including the methodologies for calculating impairment (excluding the credit granted) | 9% | 53% | 38% |

Source: BNA.

C. AQR Implications and Next Steps

7. The authorities are preparing a strategy for the future of public banks.² This is a time-bound action plan that is expected to address the two troubled public banks, including by recognizing losses upfront; restructuring them within limited fiscal space while preserving deposits and financial stability; and preparing operational plans to dispose of real estate owned and to tackle the high NPL levels.

8. Credit-risk management issues can be addressed as part of on-going bank supervision alongside some supportive structural reforms. The AQRs provide detailed bank-level qualitative findings that will enable targeted supervisory engagement. The BNA has committed to use the AQR findings to update the asset classification and provisioning rules by end-September 2020, and banks will be expected to comply with new guidance on effective credit-risk management practices by end-December 2020. The authorities have committed to prepare an action plan, in consultation with the World Bank, to strengthen credit infrastructure, including adoption of international valuation standards for securities and collateral held by banks; deployment and strengthening of national registries for ownership of immovable and moveable assets; strengthening of the central credit register; and enhancing insolvency and enforcement frameworks.

² The 2019 strategic plan for one bank has been superseded by the large losses identified in its AQR.

Appendix I. Letter of Intent

Luanda, July 17, 2020

Madame Kristalina Georgieva
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, DC 20431
USA

Dear Madame Georgieva:

The attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) and Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) update the MEFP and TMU of November 2, 2019. The MEFP reports on recent economic developments, reviews progress in implementing Angola's economic program, and sets out macroeconomic and structural policies that we plan to implement going forward.

Despite the external shock that hit Angola—increased health and human costs associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, and a sudden stop of global economic activity that depressed oil demand and lowered oil prices—the overarching objectives of our program remain the same: reducing fiscal vulnerabilities; strengthening debt sustainability; reducing inflation; completing the transition to a flexible exchange rate regime; ensuring financial sector stability; strengthening the anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism framework and governance in general; and improving the business climate. All these actions are necessary to promote economic diversification and foster strong, inclusive, and private-sector-led economic growth. Despite daunting challenges, our program performance remains adequate. We met all end-December 2019 quantitative and continuous performance criteria (PCs), except that on non-accumulation of external debt arrears; end-March 2020 indicative targets (ITs) and end-June 2020 PCs on net international reserves (NIRs), reserve money (RM), and central bank claims on the Central Government were met; and, based on preliminary data, we believe remaining end-March 2020 ITs were also met. We continue to make progress in implementing structural benchmarks (SBs). To support our efforts considering the more challenging external environment, jointly with the completion of the Third Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (hereafter the “arrangement”), we request an augmentation in the amount of SDR 540.1 million (72 percent of quota), with partial rephasing in 2020. We have secured appropriate financing assurances for the arrangement through end-July 2021.

We also request (i) a waiver of non-observance of the PC on non-accumulation of external debt arrears; (ii) modifications of the PCs and ITs on NIRs, RM, and non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD);

(iii) modifications of ITs on the stock of debt contracted or guaranteed by the Central Government and Sonangol on disbursements of oil-collateralized external debt by the Central Government and on the non-accumulation of domestic payments arrears; and (iv) a waiver of applicability of the end-June 2020 PC on NOPFD. These modifications to program PCs and ITs are required by the deteriorated external economic environment and the external shock affecting our country and aim at adjusting our fiscal and monetary policies, supporting NIR management, aligning external disbursements with the pace of project execution, and protecting public debt sustainability.

We trust that the policies and measures set forth in the attached MEFP are appropriate to deliver on the broad objectives of our National Development Plan for 2018–22, namely stabilizing the economy and laying the ground for the major structural reforms needed to diversify it and ensure strong and inclusive growth to the benefit of the Angolan people. In the face of increased uncertainty caused by the external shock, we stand ready to take additional measures, as appropriate, to achieve these objectives. We will abide by IMF policies by consulting with IMF staff before adopting such measures, or in advance of revisions to the policies contained in this MEFP, or before adopting new measures that would deviate from the goals of the program. Moreover, we will continue to provide IMF staff all information and relevant data requested to timely monitor progress in implementing the MEFP and achieving the program’s objectives, as outlined in the TMU.

As before, IMF resources will be used for budget support and will be maintained in government accounts at the *Banco Nacional de Angola* (BNA). The Ministry of Finance and the BNA signed a memorandum of understanding that clarifies the responsibilities of each party to this agreement.

We authorize the IMF to publish this letter, the MEFP and its attachments, the TMU, and the accompanying staff report. We will simultaneously publish these documents in Angola.

Please accept the assurances of our highest consideration and esteem.

/s/

Manuel José Nunes Júnior
State Minister for Economic Coordination

/s/

Vera Daves de Sousa
Minister
Ministry of Finance

/s/

José de Lima Massano
Governor
Banco Nacional de Angola

Attachments: I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies
II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding

Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies

I. BACKGROUND, RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, AND OUTLOOK

1. The external environment has significantly deteriorated since the conclusion of the Second Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (hereafter the “arrangement”). A triple shock has hit Angola: (i) a health crisis in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic; (ii) a collapse in international oil prices since February 2020; and (iii) a slump in demand for oil, resulting from a depressed global economy. The anticipated effect of the shock on Angola has been quickly reflected in the sharp increase in the yields of Angolan Eurobonds, indicating a temporary loss of access to international capital markets. Despite this challenging environment, we remain committed to the program and are working to adjust our policies to provide an appropriate and timely response.

2. Angola has been hit hard by a strong terms-of-trade shock, which will delay growth recovery.

- *Economic activity will contract in 2020, as a result of the triple external shock.* Real GDP is projected to decline in 2020, driven by lower oil production and oil prices, and the decline in business activities resulting from the COVID-19 outbreak.
- *Disinflation continued in 2019, but it will be interrupted this year.* After declining to 16.9 percent at end-2019, inflation is projected to peak at 22.2 percent at end-2020, mainly because of the expected exchange rate depreciation resulting from the external shock.
- *Fiscal consolidation continued in 2019.* The non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD) at end-December outperformed the performance criterion (PC), reflecting expenditure restraint, specifically in transfers and subsidies, and buoyant non-oil revenues, bolstered, in part, by revenue measures, including the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) in October 2019. Notwithstanding these efforts, the public debt ratio reached 109 percent of GDP at end-December 2019, mostly because of the rapid exchange rate depreciation in 2019Q4.
- *The external position underwent substantial adjustment in 2019 following the floating of the Kwanza, but it is projected to weaken substantially in 2020 owing to the collapse of oil prices.* The major real exchange adjustment following the floating of the Kwanza in 2019Q4 eliminated the currency’s overvaluation that had emerged in the course of last year. Improved competitiveness helped mitigate the impact of the substantial fall in oil and gas prices relative to 2018, with the current account remaining in substantial surplus. These developments in the current account, together with the bringing forward of part of our planned Eurobond issuance into 2019, allowed a buildup of gross international reserves to US\$17.3 billion (equivalent to about 10 months of prospective imports of goods and services) by end-year. The collapse of global oil prices, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, will weigh heavily on the external position in 2020. The current account balance is projected to swing to a deficit, only partly mitigated by lower imports. The balance of

payments (BOP) will be supported by projected net foreign direct investment inflows to domestic oil companies from overseas parents and the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (G20DSSI). The brunt of the adjustment will be borne by the exchange rate, although part of the BOP deterioration will be accommodated by net international reserve (NIR) decumulation. However, gross reserves are projected to remain at a relatively comfortable level at end-2020, equivalent to some 10½ months of prospective imports of goods and services.

- *Monetary policy will be geared toward achieving inflation objectives, while balancing the need to respond to the external shock.* The central bank (*Banco Nacional de Angola, BNA*) increased the reserve requirement ratio in 2019Q4 to reduce excessive liquidity, support the transition to a market-clearing exchange rate regime, and limit the depreciation pressures on the Kwanza. Further tightening will be temporarily delayed in order to mitigate potential liquidity shortages that may result from the external shock. To restart the disinflation process, monetary policy tightening will resume after the risks stemming from the external shock subside, including through increases in the BNA policy rates to positive levels in real terms.
- *The banking sector has demonstrated resilience but is vulnerable to shocks.* Asset quality reviews (AQRs) identified that, despite sizable exchange rate depreciation and challenging reserve requirements, most private banks have adequate capital and liquidity positions. However, the AQRs identified issues with two public banks that could weigh on financial stability, including high nonperforming loans (NPLs), weak liquidity positions, and possible exposure to further currency depreciation.

3. Despite the deteriorated external environment, we keep our focus on our overarching economic objectives. We have not lost sight of our program’s goals of reducing debt vulnerability, resuming the disinflation process, consolidating the flexible exchange rate regime, and supporting economic diversification. We are implementing a robust set of macro-critical policies. We have adopted additional non-oil revenue measures and are boosting health expenditures; we let the market-clearing exchange rate work as a shock absorber, supported by an appropriate monetary policy, to mitigate depreciation pressures on the Kwanza; and we are continuing to implement the structural reforms that will lead to sustainable and inclusive growth.

II. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS FOR 2020–21

A. Overview

4. The Government’s economic policies continue to aim at creating the conditions for strong and inclusive growth after the crisis. Despite the current crisis, the strategy, to which we committed at the onset of the program, remains valid and rests on two pillars (i) adopting sound policies to promote macroeconomic and financial stability; and (ii) implementing structural reforms to lessen the dependence on oil, promote economic diversification, and reduce vulnerabilities. Macroeconomic and financial policies continue to be guided by our National Development Plan for 2018–22 (NDP18–22).

5. We reaffirm our main macroeconomic goals, while pursuing a realistic timeframe to reach them.

- Growth.* We project growth to recover in 2021, both in the oil and non-oil sectors, and reach about 3.2 percent. The recovery will be driven by normalization of both oil production, following the expiration of the temporary production cuts resulting from OPEC+ commitments, and aggregate demand, following the end of the COVID-19 crisis. It will be supported by structural reforms.
- Inflation.* Our goal is to reduce annual inflation to a single digit by 2023 through (i) continued prudent fiscal policy; and (ii) a strengthened credibility based on our reserve money (RM) targeting policy framework and a market-clearing exchange rate. Through its nexus with the exchange rate, lower inflation will help to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio on a downward path.
- Fiscal sector.* Notwithstanding the economic headwinds, we remain committed to implementing new fiscal measures to restore fiscal and debt sustainability. Specifically, we introduced revenue and expenditure measures in order to mitigate the impact of the sharp fall in oil prices and economic growth, and to provide some fiscal space for COVID-19-related healthcare spending. In addition, we commit to publishing on the Ministry of Finance's website the results of an audit of crisis-related spending (including ex post validation of delivery) by the Court of Audit soon after year-end. Our fiscal consolidation efforts will continue to reduce the NOPFD in percent of GDP after 2020.
- Exchange rate regime.* Since 2019Q4, we have been transitioning toward a market-clearing exchange rate regime. We have taken steps to further develop the domestic foreign exchange (FX) interbank market by introducing on April 1, 2020 a transparent FX trading platform for transactions between oil companies and commercial banks. The access to this platform was extended to the operations of the diamond sector at end-June and will be extended, at a later stage, to the Treasury. This reform will lay the ground for the BNA to reduce gradually its role as the main FX supplier. The more flexible exchange rate has been cushioning the Angolan economy against external real shocks, contributing to a more efficient allocation of FX resources, improving competitiveness, and fostering economic diversification.
- Monetary policy and financial sector.* To reduce inflation toward our objective, we will continue to enhance the credibility of our nominal anchor by adhering to the RM targets set in the context of the program (PC) and support the increased autonomy of the central bank provided in the forthcoming amended, new BNA Law (missed end-March SB; proposed reset date of September 2020). Strengthening our financial system will require addressing banking sector vulnerabilities, including NPLs, constraints on correspondent banking relationships, and gaps in legal instruments.

B. Fiscal Policy

6. Our fiscal policy aims at restoring fiscal and debt sustainability in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Recent adverse developments have overtaken some key assumptions and oil revenue projections in the 2020 budget. Accordingly, we adopted emergency revenue and expenditure measures in April, and we submitted a supplementary budget in July to the National Assembly, with an oil reference price reduced from US\$55/bbl (current budget) to US\$33/bbl. Notwithstanding the economic slowdown, the NOPFD (in local currency) in 2020 would be smaller relative to the Second Review. Nonetheless, the program remains financed with additional measures being taken. Moreover, elevated downside risks call for identification of contingency measures that will be taken if the ongoing headwinds become more protracted or deeper than expected. Specifically, we will implement such measures, in consultation with IMF staff, if Brent prices were to fall under US\$25/bbl in a prolonged manner.

7. The proposed consolidation is broad based, encompassing both revenue and expenditure measures. We adopted a package of revenue measures, including raising the withholding rates for non-resident service providers; increasing the personal income tax (PIT) rates for higher income brackets, while raising the threshold for lower brackets to improve the progressivity of PIT; lowering the threshold for property tax exemption; and expanding the tax on automobiles to include all types of vehicles. Revenue and expenditure measures in the supplementary budget are as follows:

- *Non-oil revenue.* We are implementing non-oil revenue measures to bolster yield from the VAT (net of reimbursements), excise taxes, and PIT. Specifically, we reduced the amount of VAT remitted to the refund account. We introduced additional excise taxes on imported luxury cars and other revenue enhancing measures, such as increasing rates for cigarettes.
- *Wage bill.* We issued a Presidential decree to freeze hiring (except for essential social services) and practice attrition-based employment reduction, in order to achieve the wage ceiling of Kz 2.218 trillion in 2020.
- *Goods and services.* We are containing payments on goods and services, mostly through a freeze on non-priority expenses, such as travel, hotel, and real estate related spending, while creating space for higher COVID-19-related spending.
- *Transfers and subsidies.* Transfers and subsidies will be kept under tight control, while targeted social spending floors will be preserved. We are committed to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of delivery of transfers, including subsidies, and intend to recoup substantial savings over and above the initial 2020 budget.
- *Capital expenditure.* We are reducing non-essential capital expenditure, including transport equipment purchases and real estate purchases (such as a freeze on the ongoing efforts to shift from rental to purchase of real estate for government offices in Angola and overseas).

- *Arrears clearance.* Despite the tight cash position in 2020, we remain committed to the clearance of domestic payments arrears. We will continue with the repayment schedule of such arrears as per the revised indicative targets (ITs).
- 8. We will buttress fiscal and debt sustainability by structural reforms.** To achieve our medium-term central government public debt target of 60 percent of GDP, we will continue non-oil revenue mobilization and limit growth in current expenditure, while preserving priority public investment and scaling up the cash-transfer program for the most vulnerable. These reforms aim at broadening the revenue base; improving spending efficiency; strengthening debt management; eliminating arrears; enhancing fiscal discipline; and improving transparency and governance.
- *Non-oil revenue.* Building on tax reforms introduced in 2019 and 2020, we will continue to mobilize non-oil revenue through expanding the base of VAT; increasing the rates and progressivity of the PIT; reforming investment incentives for the corporate income tax (CIT); strengthening transfer pricing rules; improving property registration; and starting to integrate the informal sector. These reforms will be part of the 2021 budget. Ongoing revenue administration technical assistance (TA) from the IMF will help strengthen core tax administration functions, improve revenue administration management and governance, and improve tax policy design.
 - *Subsidy reform.* After finishing the first phase of the subsidy reform in 2019, we started the pilot cash-transfer program in May 2020, with a view to reaching several hundreds of thousands of low-income households by end-2020. In all, the program targets 1.6 million households nationwide. After the COVID-19 crisis abates, we intend to launch the second phase of subsidy reform in 2021, by starting to raise public transportation tariffs and the prices of gasoline and diesel, with an ultimate objective of introducing an automatic fuel-pricing mechanism. We will evaluate the program of special subsidies for the purchase of fuel products by enterprises in the agriculture and fishing sectors in late 2020.
 - *External debt payments arrears.* We continue to work on legacy arrears to the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Following our outreach, we received feedback from one successor State and are verifying its claim. We are working to resolve ongoing challenges in servicing debt payments to private creditors. We adopted a new AML/CFT Law in January 2020 to enhance transparency of ownership of legal persons in line with FATF standards. We set up an independent third-party escrow account in a sound bank in Angola where we will deposit any debt service payments that are rejected by intermediary financial institutions for the purposes of meeting our external debt payments obligations. We are continuing to hold discussions to address underlying problems with counterparties in executing our external debt payments. In addition, we are also working with one creditor to change the financial arrangements to address payment challenges in servicing this debt.
 - *Payments arrears.* We eliminated the majority of arrears recorded in the Integrated Financial Management System (SIGFE) accumulated up to 2017 by end-March (structural benchmark, SB), with a small amount unsettled mainly due to technical and legal issues. We cleared more than 60 percent of non-SIGFE arrears accumulated up to end-2017 by end-March (SB).

We will complete the verification and clearance of all non-SIGFE arrears by end-September 2021, owing to capacity constraints under the crisis. By end-March, we verified and cleared 60 percent of all payments arrears accumulated by the Central Government in 2018 and recorded in SIGFE, but missed the end-June SB on completing the verification. The net accumulation of payments arrears reached Kz 225 billion at end-2019; Kz 120 billion at end-March 2020; and Kz 81 billion at end-June 2020, all below the program ceiling of Kz 250 billion (ITs). This was achieved by better monitoring of the physical and financial execution of expenditure with corrective measures, better budget control and compliance with rules for recording in SIGFE, and stronger sanctions for budget unit officers of the Ministry of Finance and other line ministries who breach these rules. After adjusting SIGFE to allow the electronic recording, consultation, and certification of all claims, and the recording and monitoring of the residency of all new supplier contracts in September 2019, we started publishing detailed quarterly reports in Q4 2019 on the stock of all outstanding arrears, amounts paid, payment modalities (e.g., cash, Government securities), and average payment periods from the accrual date or invoice, within six weeks of the end of each quarter.

- *Medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) and public financial management (PFM) legislation.* To promote a more efficient allocation of public resources, the Government will adopt an MTFF, which will be consistent with the deficit ceilings of the fiscal rule defined by a forthcoming Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL). We submitted the draft FRL to the National Assembly in July (end-March SB), mainly because of COVID-19 caused operational delays. We completed a pilot MTFF in June, to be revised after the supplementary budget is approved by the National Assembly, to anchor the 2021 budget proposal. Consistent with the draft FRL, we will not start capitalization of a fiscal stabilization fund before the budget generates surpluses and Central Government debt is below the target defined in the FRL.
- *Public investment management.* To improve the quality of our public investment management, and in line with the guidelines of the NDP18–22 and recommendations from the Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) completed in December 2019, large investment projects (*projectos estruturantes*) will be subject to ex ante evaluations, rigorous implementation, and close monitoring by an appropriate project management office and the line ministry, and ex post evaluations. For all projects above Kz 10 billion undertaken from January 2021, we will publish an initial project appraisal report by the line ministry, after review by the Ministry of Finance, including risk assessment (new SB). We will publish summaries of the appraisal and supporting documents for major projects, and regularly review and update cost estimates and selection criteria to rank projects based on their importance and readiness. We will secure proper budget or external financing before starting any new public investment projects. These same principles will be applied to all projects under the Integrated Municipal Intervention Plan (PIIM), which are included in our annual budgets. We will continue to improve the legislative framework and the governance of public-private partnerships to reduce contingent liabilities and other fiscal risks and ensure transparency and accountability. We will not reallocate capital expenditure to current expenditure. However, on an exceptional basis, up to 7 percent of capital expenditure could be reallocated to current expenditure.

- *Fiscal transparency and accountability.* We remain committed to improving the quality and timeliness of government statistics and increasing transparency in government operations. We published the end-year fiscal report for 2019 (full year and fourth quarter) in June 2020 to support the pilot-MTFF and the 2021 budget proposal. We will continue to publish detailed in-year quarterly fiscal reports, in line with IMF staff recommendations. We will enforce sanctions to senior officials for spending decisions above the approved budget ceilings.

C. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

9. We will continue to strengthen our RM target policy framework to achieve price stability. We will set our monetary policy consistently with the quantitative RM targets under the program (PCs). Meeting these targets provides a strong signal that the BNA is committed to establishing a credible nominal anchor, which will help mitigate pressures on the exchange rate and reduce inflation. To that end, we will use a range of instruments, including open-market operations at market interest rates, to sterilize shocks to money aggregates that may compromise the RM targets; and policy rates, as needed. Intra-year direct lending by the BNA to the Government will be restricted to 10 percent of the previous year's fiscal revenues, as defined in Article 29 of the BNA Law, while respecting related PCs. Any such advances will be settled solely in cash before the end of each calendar year.

10. We continue to work on amending the BNA Law to strengthen the BNA's mandate, autonomy, and governance. Working closely with IMF staff, by end-September 2020 we will submit amendments to the BNA Law (missed SB; proposed reset date) to the Council of Ministers. The amended Law will clearly define the BNA's mandate; set a clear primary policy objective; strengthen governance arrangements; legally protect BNA staff from undue influence from third parties; ensure the BNA's financial, functional, and personal autonomy; clearly distinguish between emergency liquidity assistance and monetary policy operations; adopt international good practices; and strengthen the solvency support frameworks—among other goals outlined in the 2019 Safeguards Assessment Report for Angola. We have taken steps to strengthen our internal audit function. We are committed to (i) promptly implementing the IMF's Safeguards Assessments Policy recommendations, including by completing the rebalancing of our foreign reserves asset portfolio, to align it with our new investment policy; and (ii) the process of eliminating illiquid holdings with external managers. We commit to the timely publication of our annual audited financial statements and to providing IMF staff with our external auditor's management letters, as required under the IMF's Safeguards Assessments Policy.

11. We continue the transition of our exchange rate regime toward full flexibility. Following the decisive measures taken in October 2019, which removed several restrictions to price-formation and banks' participation in FX auctions, we have achieved a market-clearing exchange rate regime. We continue to hold FX auctions at least once a week, typically on the same day of the week. To help the predictability of FX auctions, the BNA will announce monthly indicative amounts to be auctioned for the following three months. In December 2019, we issued a legally binding instruction that requires banks to eliminate any informal restrictions on foreign exchange deposit

withdrawals or, in case they decline to grant access to clients' FX deposits, to provide a written explanation for the denial (SB). Banks are fined for non-compliance. Since January 2020, oil companies are allowed to sell FX to the banks they have business relations with. Since April 2020, such transactions have started to be transferred gradually to the FX trading platform.

12. The impact of the COVID-19 shock has forced us to delay the rebuilding of the BNA's NIRs. We met both the end-December 2019 and end-June PCs and the end-March 2020 IT on NIRs. However, temporary loss of market access and much lower oil prices than envisaged during the Second Review render the IT for end-September and the PC for end-December 2020 unattainable. We therefore request recalibrating these targets, in line with the adjustors embedded in the program. We will continue to implement a monthly FX intervention budget, agreed with IMF staff, which is consistent with the proposed revised future NIRs targets.

13. We will eliminate exchange restrictions (ERs) and multiple currency practices (MCPs) progressively. To that end, by end-September, we will prepare a plan, with a clear timeline. In October 2019, we eliminated the application of the 0.1 percent stamp tax on foreign exchange operations that was giving rise to an exchange rate restriction and an MCP (ER, Article VIII, 2a and MCP, Article VIII, 3) by amending Presidential Decree No. 3/14, of October 21, 2014 (SB). We will eliminate the special tax of 10 percent on transfers to non-residents under contracts for foreign TA or management services (ER, Article VIII, 2a) by end-March 2021.

D. Financial Sector Policies

14. We remain committed to strengthening financial sector stability. We continue to monitor closely banks where AQRs have identified high exposures to FX, credit, liquidity, and market risks. We are revising the Financial Institutions Law in line with good practices and advice from IMF and World Bank staff (missed end-March SB; proposed reset date of end-September 2020) to ensure that we have effective corrective action (i.e., escalated supervisory intervention as a bank deteriorates), and recovery planning and resolution frameworks for weak banks. We created a deposit guarantee fund and strengthened coordination arrangements between the BNA and the Ministry of Finance, including on contingency planning.

15. We completed AQRs for thirteen banks comprising 93 percent of the banking system's total assets. The BNA formally communicated the capital impact to individual banks in December 2019 and requested them to incorporate the findings into their 2019 financial statements. Capital shortfalls were identified in seven banks, which were instructed to prepare capital management plans by February 2020, setting out how they will return to full compliance with regulatory capital requirements by end-June 2020 (SB). Four private banks were recapitalized by the deadline and recapitalization of the fifth is imminent, while two public banks were granted an extension.

16. We are reducing the role of the State in the banking sector and taking steps to safeguard financial stability. There are currently four banks owned or controlled by the State and three banks in which the State is a significant shareholder, directly or indirectly (e.g., through Sonangol). We have analyzed the State's future role in the financial sector and, in discussion with

IMF staff, we have updated our strategy (end-February 2020 SB) to incorporate the results of the AQRs. The strategy, of which key elements will be announced, includes upfront loss recognition with existing capital bearing losses before any fresh capital is provided; a time-bound action plan to recapitalize and restructure the two largest public banks using a least-cost approach and within fiscal space; viability analysis of each bank; operational plans to dispose of real estate assets and to tackle NPLs; and strengthening of governance and risk management. The BNA and the Government will agree on the action plan for the public banks and commence their restructuring process by end-July 2020.

17. We continue to strengthen *Recredit's* mandate, autonomy, and effectiveness.

Legislation was enacted to restrict *Recredit's* mandate to purchasing NPLs from one large public bank (BPC) only; introduce a ten-year sunset clause; and establish that assets can be transferred to *Recredit* only at fair value and based on comprehensive due diligence. We have strengthened *Recredit's* mandate, autonomy, governance, and operating arrangements by requiring it to pursue actions that maximize value recovery for taxpayers through assessing recovery value under various options, while using international valuation standards. The *Recredit* Presidential Decree will be amended by end-August 2020 (SB, reset) to require independent business reviews of the main debtor groups upon *Recredit's* request. Accountability will be improved by requiring *Recredit* to publish a business plan and annual performance reports. Independence has been strengthened by updating the articles of association that remove the approval requirement from the Ministry of Finance for operational decisions; limiting the oversight committee's role to monitoring performance against the business plan; and replacing the representative of the bankers' association with an independent expert. *Recredit* has prepared strategic and business plans in June 2020, which include scaling up its NPL recovery operations to facilitate BPC's restructuring, including through outsourcing to independent experts.

18. Improving oversight of banks' viability, corporate governance, and risk management are priorities.

The BNA will continue to enforce prudential norms in banks, including reserve, capital, liquidity, and provisioning requirements and will also ascertain the credibility of their restructuring plans that aim at achieving viability. We will submit amendments to the Financial Institutions Law to the National Assembly by end-September 2020, which will be adopted as a priority (missed end-March SB, proposed reset date). These amendments will introduce more rigorous fit and proper requirements for bank owners, Board members, and managers. By end-September 2020, the BNA will complement this by (i) issuing guidelines on effective bank Boards; (ii) issuing guidelines on effective credit-risk management practices; and (iii) updating asset classification and provisioning rules. Banks will be expected to be compliant with the new guidance by end-December 2020.

19. We will further develop infrastructure to promote sound credit-risk management standards.

In consultation with the World Bank, we will prepare an action plan by end-September 2020, with appropriate timelines. This will include, inter alia, adoption of international valuation standards for securities and collateral held by banks; deployment and strengthening of national registries for ownership of immovable and moveable assets; strengthening of the central credit register; development of the system of postcodes; and enhancement of the insolvency and

enforcement frameworks. Due consideration will be given to strengthening professional capacity for asset valuation, credit-risk management, and insolvency.

20. We have strengthened our AML/CFT framework. The National Assembly unanimously approved a new AML/CFT law, which came into force in January (Law No.5/20 of January 27, 2020). Other complementary legal and regulatory amendments were implemented by end-June 2020 (missed end-March SB; completed with delay), following the enactment of the Law—e.g., revised BNA Notices to financial and other institutions. Going forward, we will focus on the effective implementation of the revised AML/CFT framework.

E. Public Debt Management

21. Improving debt profile and management remains a priority. We will update our Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy for 2020–22 to reflect the significant changes in domestic and international financial markets in the wake of the COVID-19 shock. We successfully extinguished a large collateralized credit arrangement with an official bilateral creditor in December 2019, thereby reducing the stock of our collateralized debt. We have engaged closely with our large creditors and have taken significant steps to reprofile selected near-to-medium term debt service obligations, consistent with program parameters, including securing agreements with two of them, whereas an agreement with a third creditor is being worked out. We have also requested debt relief under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (G20DSSI) for 2020, and we commit to spend the freed resources on COVID-19-related health or economic relief and to closely monitor such spending. We will also disclose debt by public sector borrowing entities (per GFSM 2014) to the IMF and the World Bank no later than September 1, 2020. We continue to implement measures to deepen the domestic debt market, including by bringing rates on government securities closer to market rates. We are seeking additional financing from the IMF, the World Bank and other international financial institutions. Since the approval of the arrangement, we have not contracted any new oil-collateralized debt (PC) and have kept disbursements under existing oil-collateralized credit facilities below the agreed ceilings (ITs). We continue to follow a prudent borrowing strategy for our public investment projects, restricting implementation to priority projects under a tight and secured financing envelope, while prioritizing concessional financing, and refraining from contracting new debt to finance non-priority investments and/or projects that do not meet project selection criteria. We will implement the recommendations of IMF and World Bank staff to improve the profile of our public debt and strengthen the domestic creditor base. We will continue to abide by the ceilings for issuance of debt guarantees by the State (IT). To the extent that unforeseen risks to achieving the medium-term debt target materialize, we will act to mitigate those risks, including by seeking additional debt relief from a wider group of creditors.

F. Structural Reforms

22. We are striving to build essential infrastructure in Angola. In addition to ongoing projects in energy and potable water distribution, supported by the World Bank, we are also working with the African Development Bank on a project to strengthen the electricity transmission infrastructure, including the implementation of over 300 km of power transmission lines. At the end

of February 2020, we submitted the Insolvency Law and the Secured Transactions and Registry Law to the National Assembly, which will introduce a robust regime to reinforce security and certainty in the constitution of guarantees on movable property.

23. State-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms continue to advance. Following the Government's privatization program (PROPRIV) for 2019–22, which sets guidelines for the privatization process, including eligible SOEs, privatization timetable and modalities, and a communication strategy, we launched public tenders for 40 SOEs by end-June 2020 and were able to privatize 14 companies for a total sale price of US\$53 million. We plan to launch public tenders for up to 40 assets in the remainder of this year, with total expected net sale of up to US\$125 million. Privatization receipts will be fully disclosed to the Ministry of Finance and incorporated in the budget when assets are owned directly by the State. Under Sonangol's "Regeneration Program," 9 non-core assets were put up for sale between September 2019 and June 2020, and 5 were sold with a total price of US\$17 million. Sonangol will launch public offerings for another 4 non-core assets by end-2020. In December 2019, arrears accumulated in 2016–18 between Sonangol and the State electricity producer PRODEL were identified and an agreement was reached on a progressive clearance plan, involving debt securities, tax compensation, and cash payment. The arrears for 2019 were agreed in January 2020. All such arrears between Sonangol and PRODEL will be settled by end-August 2020 by tax compensation. To help enforce our laws on SOE transparency, the 12 largest SOEs (by assets) published their audited 2019 annual reports on the SOE oversight institute's (IGAPE) webpage by end-June and the remaining 3 will publish them by end-August, and the external audits by end-September—both deadlines were extended because of the ongoing state of calamity.

G. Governance

24. Governance reforms and corruption fight are progressing apace. We are in discussions with the United Nations (UN) to open an agency in Angola to fight drugs, crimes, corruption, and terrorism (UNODC) in 2020, further expanding our cooperation with UN to enhance governance and transparency on commercial transactions within the Southern African Development Community. By end-2020, in order to enhance internal control and governance in SOEs, we will submit a revised SOE Law to the National Assembly, incorporating good international practices, to curb corruption (proposed new SB). The revised SOE Law, secondary regulations, and SOE policies will include: (i) enhanced functions for the Government to act as an informed owner, by improving aggregate annual reporting and performance monitoring systems; (ii) strengthened professionalism of SOEs, by providing for corporate governance requirements for SOEs in line with OECD international standards; (iii) tighter controls, by strengthening fiscal risk oversight, internal and external audit functions, and disclosure practices of SOEs. By June 2020, we awarded 41 of 60 eligible proposals of public investment contracts (i.e., 68 percent), through open and competitive public tenders. We will ensure that by end-December at least 45 percent of the eligible contracts will be awarded through similar procedures, that is, public tenders limited to pre-qualified participants (SB). To further improve the efficiency and transparency of the public procurement process, we are enhancing the efficiency of our electronic tender platform and training more staff, and plan to provide incentives to encourage more voluntary participation in public tenders. To enhance the use of public tenders for

procurement, by end-June, 308 Budget Units (of 593 existing units) published their Annual Purchase Plans on the Public Purchases' Portal.

H. Program Monitoring

25. The program will be monitored through semi-annual reviews. The complete schedule of reviews is presented in the companion staff report's Table 10, with agreed PCs, ITs, and SBs shown below in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be based on PCs at end-June 2020, end-December 2020, and end-June 2021, respectively.

Table 1a. Angola: Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets Under the Extended Arrangement, September 2019–June 2021

| | 2019 | | | | | 2020 | | | | | | | | 2021 | | | | |
|--|-----------|----------|----------------------|--------|----------------|----------|----------|--------------------|----------------------|----------|--------------------|----------------|----------|----------------------|----------|----------|----------------------|----------|
| | September | | December | | | March | | | June | | | September | | December | | March | June | |
| | | | Performance Criteria | | | | | | Performance Criteria | | | | | Performance Criteria | | | Performance Criteria | |
| | Actual | 2nd Rev. | Adjusted | Actual | Status | 2nd Rev. | Adjusted | Preliminary Actual | 2nd Rev. | Adjusted | Preliminary Actual | Status | 2nd Rev. | Proposed | 2nd Rev. | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed |
| Performance Criteria: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net international reserves of the Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA), floor (millions of U.S. dollars) ¹ | 10,016 | 9,441 | 9,432 | 12,034 | Met | 9,581 | 9,383 | 10,569 | 9,790 | 8,258 | 10,641 | Met | 9,948 | 8,247 | 10,000 | 8,085 | 8,001 | 7,916 |
| BNA claims on the Central Government, cumulative ceiling (billions of kwanzas) | 148 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Met | 150 | 150 | 150 | 250 | 250 | 101.6 | Met | 300 | 300 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 250 |
| Reserve money, ceiling (billions of kwanzas) ² | ... | 1,748 | 2,030 | 1,870 | Met | 1,739 | 2,037 | 1,922 | 1,774 | 2,311 | 2,035 | Met | 1,792 | 2,062 | 1,908 | 2,086 | 2,130 | 2,187 |
| Non-oil primary fiscal deficit of the Central Government, cumulative ceiling (billions of kwanzas) ^{3,4} | 1,280 | 1,992 | 1,992 | 1,922 | Met | 461 | 461 | 426 | 1,033 | 1,033 | ... | ... | 1,568 | 1,568 | 2,384 | 2,384 | 576 | 1,083 |
| Non-accumulation of external debt payments arrears by the Central Government and the BNA, continuous ceiling (millions of U.S. dollars) ⁵ | 30 | 0 | 0 | 46 | Not Met | 0 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 52 | Not Met | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| New oil-collateralized external debt contracted by or on behalf of the Central Government, the BNA, and Sonangol, continuous ceiling (U.S. dollars) ⁶ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Met | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Met | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Indicative Targets: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Stock of Central Government debt and debt of Sonangol, ceiling (billions of kwanzas) | 28,109 | 36,047 | 36,047 | 35,533 | Met | 41,879 | 41,879 | 35,020 | 41,879 | 42,994 | ... | ... | 41,879 | 42,994 | 41,879 | 42,994 | 51,212 | 51,212 |
| Social spending, cumulative floor (billions of kwanzas) ^{3,7} | 1,172 | 1,100 | 1,100 | 1,727 | Met | 311 | 311 | 407 | 622 | 622 | ... | ... | 1,031 | 1,031 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 446 | 892 |
| Net accumulation in the stock of payments arrears by the Central Government, ceiling (billions of kwanzas) | -76 | 250 | 250 | -33 | Met | 250 | 250 | 120 | 250 | 250 | 81 | Met | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 |
| Disbursements of oil-collateralized external debt by the Central Government, cumulative ceiling (millions of U.S. dollars) ³ | 17 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 24 | Met | 200 | 200 | 0 | 400 | 400 | 0 | Met | 600 | 600 | 1,160 | 1,160 | 219 | 438 |
| Authorizations by the Ministry of Finance for the issuance of debt guarantees by the Central Government, annual ceiling (U.S. million dollars) | 0 | 30 | 30 | 0 | Met | 300 | 300 | 0 | 300 | 300 | 0 | Met | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Evaluated at program exchange rates as defined in the Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU), differently from the figures in Table 1 of the Staff Report.² Quarterly average of daily balances; bank reserves in foreign currency are converted using program exchange rates as defined in the TMU; not directly comparable to figures in Table 3 of the Staff Report.³ Cumulative from January 1.⁴ Includes clearance of payments arrears in cash.⁵ Accumulation of new arrears since previous test date.⁶ Excluding debt contracted to finance oil-extraction equipment.⁷ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services.

Table 1b. Angola: Standard Continuous Performance Criteria

- Not to impose new or intensify existing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.
- Not to introduce new or intensify existing multiple currency practices.
- Not to conclude bilateral payments agreement that are inconsistent with the IMF's Articles of Agreement (Article VIII).
- Not to impose new or intensify existing import restrictions for balance of payments reasons.

Table 2. Angola: Structural Benchmarks Under the Extended Arrangement, December 2019–March 2021

| Structural Benchmarks | Objective | Date | Status | Observations |
|--|---|-------------------|--------------------|---|
| I. Fiscal policy and public institution reforms | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-oil revenues. Submit a package of measures to the National Assembly to mobilize non-oil revenue, mainly through personal income tax and property tax reforms, in line with IMF staff recommendations. | <i>Strengthen non-oil revenues</i> | End-December 2019 | Met | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PFM law. Submit PFM legislation to the National Assembly, in line with IMF staff advice. | <i>Strengthen fiscal policy design and implementation</i> | End-March 2020 | Not Met | Implemented in July. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payments arrears. Complete verification and settlement of at least 50 percent of verified payment arrears accumulated by the Central Government up to end-2017 and not recorded in SIGFE, as well as all arrears recorded in SIGFE. | <i>Normalize supplier relations and reduce debt burden</i> | End-March 2020 | Met | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payments arrears. Complete the verification and settlement of all payments arrears accumulated by the Central Government in 2018 and recorded in SIGFE. | <i>Normalize supplier relations and reduce debt burden</i> | End-June 2020 | Not met | Reset: End-December 2020. More time needed due to capacity constraints under the crisis. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public procurement. Award, through open tenders, at least 45 percent of the public contracts related to expenditure on public investment projects, which are not financed by external project loans and whose value exceeds Kz 182 million, the minimum threshold legally required for open tenders (Law of Public Contracts, No. 9/16). | <i>Enhance public procurement transparency and competition</i> | End-December 2020 | In progress | |
| II. Financial sector reforms | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Banking sector restructuring/recapitalization. Complete Asset Quality Reviews for the 12 largest banks conducted by external experts in collaboration with the BNA. | <i>Promote financial stability</i> | End-December 2019 | Met | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Role of the State in the banking sector. Finalize a strategy for the State's future involvement in the banking sector. | <i>Promote financial stability</i> | End-February 2020 | Not met | Delayed. To be re-assessed and adjusted as part of Fourth Review. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial Institutions Law. Adopt amendments to the Financial Institutions Law, in line with IMF staff advice, to ensure that the authorities have an effective recovery planning and enhanced corrective actions, and resolution framework for weak banks. | <i>Promote financial stability and BNA governance and autonomy</i> | End-March 2020 | Not met | Reset: End-September 2020. More time needed due to capacity constraints under the crisis. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BNA Law. Submit an amendment to the BNA Law to the Council of Ministers to define, <i>inter alia</i>, a precise mandate to focus on price stability; limit monetary financing of the Government; increase operational autonomy; strengthen oversight over executive management; and improve governance, in line with IMF recommendations. | <i>Strengthen the monetary policy framework</i> | End-March 2020 | Not met | Reset: End-September 2020. More time needed due to capacity constraints under the crisis. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AML/CFT. Enact a revised AML/CFT law and other related legal and regulatory amendments, in line with FATF standards. | <i>Strengthen AML/CFT framework</i> | End-March 2020 | Not met | The new Law was promulgated in January 2020, but complementary measures were still needed by end-March 2020, which were adopted in June 2020. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Banking sector restructuring/recapitalization. Complete the banking sector recapitalization process, by requiring banks to return to compliance with regulatory capital rules. | <i>Promote financial stability</i> | End-June 2020 | Not met | Delayed. To be re-assessed and adjusted as part of the Fourth Review. |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening of Recredit. Ensure proper governance arrangements and operational procedures (including asset valuation and workout) are implemented at Recredit to maximize recoveries and minimize fiscal cost: make additional changes in a Presidential Decree. | <i>Maximize value recovery and minimize potential fiscal liabilities</i> | End-July 2020 | Reset | Reset: End-August 2020 |
| III. Exchange rate policies | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign exchange deposits. Eliminate the informal restrictions on foreign exchange deposit withdrawals. | <i>Minimize financial stability risks</i> | End-December 2019 | Met | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple Currency Practice (MCP). Amend the Presidential Decree No. 3/14, of October 21, 2014, to remove the stamp tax on foreign exchange operations that gives rise to an exchange rate restriction and a MCP. | <i>Promote a well-functioning FX market</i> | End-March 2020 | Met | |
| Proposed New Structural Benchmarks | | | | |
| I. Fiscal policy and public institution reforms | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish initial project appraisal report for all new public investment projects above Kz 10 billion undertaken from January 2021. | <i>Strengthen accountability</i> | End-March 2021 | | |
| II. Structural reforms | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance reforms. Submit a revised State Owned Enterprises (SOE) Law to the National Assembly, which enhances internal and external audit functions. | <i>Strengthen enterprises internal control and improve business environment</i> | End-December 2020 | | |

Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding

1. This Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) sets out the understandings between the Angolan authorities and International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff regarding the definition of performance criteria (PCs); indicative targets (ITs); memorandum items; associated adjusters; and data reporting requirements for the duration of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (hereafter the “arrangement”). Where these targets and items are numeric, their unadjusted number values are stated in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP, Table 1a). The values against which compliance with the arrangement will be assessed will be adjusted up or down according to the adjusters specified in this TMU. Structural benchmarks (SBs) are described in MEFP Table 2. Reviews under the arrangement will assess PCs and ITs on specified test dates. Specifically, the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth reviews will assess PCs and ITs at end-December 2019, end-June 2020, end-December 2020, and end-June 2021 test dates, respectively (MEFP, Table 1a).

2. Arrangement exchange rates. For the purposes of the arrangement, the exchange rate of the Angolan Kwanza (AOA) to the U.S. dollar is set at AOA 295 per US\$1 for the duration of the arrangement. The exchange rates of the other currencies per U.S. dollar are tabulated in Text Table 1. Setting arrangement’s accounting exchanges rate does not imply that there is a target exchange rate for policy purposes—it simply allows comparability across different test dates.

| Text Table 1. Exchange Rates per U.S. Dollar | | | | | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| AOA | EUR | GBP | CNY | ZAR | SDR |
| 295.00000 | 1.15760 | 1.30410 | 0.14531 | 0.07050 | 1.39525 |

I. QUANTITATIVE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

A. Net International Reserves of the Banco Nacional de Angola (*Floor*)

Definition

3. Net international reserves (NIRs) of the *Banco Nacional de Angola* (BNA) are defined as the U.S. dollar value of official reserve assets of the BNA minus reserve liabilities of the BNA. Non-dollar denominated foreign assets and liabilities will be converted into U.S. dollars at the International Financial Statistics exchange rates on September 28, 2018, with the exception of monetary gold, which will be valued at the market price at each test date (Text Table 1).

- Official reserve assets are defined as readily available claims on nonresidents denominated in foreign convertible currencies. They include the BNA’s holdings of monetary gold, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), foreign currency cash, foreign currency securities, deposits abroad, and the country’s reserve position at the IMF. Excluded from foreign assets are any assets that are pledged, collateralized, or otherwise encumbered,

including guarantees for third-party external liabilities, claims on residents including commercial banks, claims in foreign exchange arising from derivatives in foreign currencies vis-à-vis the domestic currency (such as futures, forwards, swaps, and options), precious metals other than gold, assets in nonconvertible currencies, assets held with unrated correspondent banks, and illiquid assets.

- Reserve liabilities are defined as all short-term foreign exchange liabilities of the BNA to nonresidents, with an original maturity of up to and including one year, commitments to sell foreign exchange arising from derivatives (such as futures, forwards, swaps, and options), and all credit outstanding from the IMF.
- Disbursements from the IMF received by the Central Government under the arrangement are excluded from the computation of NIRs.

Adjustors

4. The floor on NIRs will be adjusted relative to the arrangement's assumptions given in Text Table 2.

| Cumulative flows from the beginning of the year | 2019 | | 2020 | | | | 2021 | | | |
|---|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|------|
| | December | | March | | June | September | December | March | June | |
| | 2nd Rev. | Actual | 2nd Rev. | Actual | 2nd Rev. | Prelim. | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed | |
| Adjustors from the EFF Third Review: | | | | | | | | | | |
| Brent oil price, U.S. dollars per barrel | 64.0 | 62.7 | 62.3 | 50.5 | 60.8 | 29.4 | 42.5 | 42.9 | 43.1 | 43.4 |
| Disbursements from multilaterals (except the IMF) and Eurobonds | 3,777 | 3,615 | 40 | 40 | 1580 | 445 | 485 | 1,160 | 40 | 80 |
| Disbursements from multilaterals (except the IMF) | 777 | 615 | 40 | 40 | 80 | 445 | 485 | 1,160 | 40 | 80 |
| Disbursements from Eurobonds | 3,000 | 3,000 | 0 | 0 | 1500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Debt service to multilaterals, except the IMF, and Eurobonds | 576 | 586 | 9 | 7 | 437 | 439 | 455 | 888 | 22 | 458 |
| Debt service to multilaterals, except the IMF | 0 | 135 | 9 | 7 | 88 | 87 | 102 | 183 | 22 | 105 |
| Debt service to Eurobonds | 576 | 451 | 0 | 0 | 349 | 353 | 353 | 705 | 0 | 353 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; WEO; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

- a. Upward by:

- US\$200 million, on a quarterly basis, for each US\$1 per barrel that the average Brent crude oil price in the corresponding quarter exceeded the arrangement's assumption in Text Table 2.
- The shortfall in external debt service of the Central Government with multilateral institutions, excluding the IMF, as well as with Eurobonds, relative to the baseline projection reported in Text Table 2.
- The excess in disbursements for budget support received by the Central Government from multilateral institutions, excluding the IMF, as well as proceeds from Eurobonds, relative to the baseline projection reported in Text Table 2.

b. Downward by:

- US\$200 million, on a quarterly basis, for each US\$1 per barrel that the average Brent crude oil price in the corresponding quarter fell below the arrangement's assumption in Text Table 2. This adjustor's lower limit is US\$400 million for 2020Q2, US\$600 million for 2020Q3, and US\$800 million for 2020Q4, cumulatively. Similarly, in 2021, the adjustor's lower limit is US\$200 million for 2021Q1 and US\$400 million for 2021Q2.
- The excess in external debt service of the Central Government with multilateral institutions, excluding the IMF, as well as with Eurobonds, relative to the baseline projection reported in Text Table 2.
- The shortfall in disbursements for budget support received by the Central Government from multilateral institutions, excluding the IMF, as well as proceeds from Eurobonds, relative to the baseline projection reported in Text Table 2.

B. Banco Nacional de Angola Claims on the Central Government (Cumulative Ceiling)

Definition

5. BNA claims on the Central Government are defined as the cumulative change, from the beginning of the calendar year, in the stock of all outstanding claims on the Central Government held by the BNA, less revaluation gains/losses. Revaluation gains/losses are defined as changes in domestic currency terms of the value of BNA's claims because of a change in the exchange rate. These claims include loans, securities, shares, financial derivatives, settlement accounts, advances, and arrears.

C. Average Adjusted Reserve Money (Ceiling)

Definition

6. Reserve money (RM) is defined as the sum of currency in circulation outside the BNA (includes cash in vaults), balances of commercial banks' overnight deposits, and banks' correspondent accounts (includes required reserves in local and foreign currency) at the BNA. RM excludes balances in deposit auctions and commercial banks' term deposits at the BNA. For each quarter, average adjusted reserve money is calculated as the quarterly average of daily data recorded in the balance sheets of the BNA (BNA Survey). For the purposes of measuring the banks' reserves in foreign currency, the exchange rates will be as in Text Table 1. For 2019Q4, the average adjusted reserve money thus defined amounted to Kz 1,922 billion.

Adjustors

7. In the event of a change in the reserve requirement ratio in local currency (rr_{LC}) and in foreign currency (rr_{FC}), the reserve money ceiling will be adjusted according to the formula:

$$\text{Revised RM ceiling} = \text{Arrangements' RM ceiling} + \text{banks' correspondent accounts (bank reserves) in local currency} \times (\text{new rr}_{LC}/\text{old rr}_{LC} - 1) + \text{banks' correspondent accounts (bank reserves) in foreign currency} \times (\text{new rr}_{FC}/\text{old rr}_{FC} - 1)$$

8. For the calculation of the adjustors, the banks' correspondent accounts are evaluated as the quarterly average of daily balances, in Kwanzas, using the exchange rate in Text Table 1. The RM ceiling will be adjusted relative to the following assumptions (Text Table 3):

Text Table 3. Angola: Reserve Money Targets and Components (Baseline Scenario), 2019–21
(Units as indicated)

| Quarterly average of daily balances (Stocks in U.S. dollars converted at 295 Kz/USD) | 2019 | | | 2020 | | | | | | | | 2021 | | | |
|---|------------|----------|--------|------------|----------|--------|------------|----------|--------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| | December | | | March | | | June | | | September | December | March | June | September | December |
| | 2nd Review | Adjusted | Actual | 2nd Review | Adjusted | Actual | 2nd Review | Adjusted | Actual | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed |
| Reserve Money Ceiling (Billions of Kwanzas) | 1,748 | 2,030 | 1,870 | 1,739 | 2,037 | 1,922 | 1,774 | 2,311 | 2,035 | 2,062 | 2,086 | 2,130 | 2,187 | 2,226 | 2,298 |
| Currency in Circulation | 451 | 524 | 479 | 431 | 505 | 479 | 440 | 573 | 489 | 511 | 517 | 529 | 543 | 553 | 571 |
| Bank's Accounts (Reserves) in Kwanzas | 877 | 1,018 | 958 | 863 | 1,010 | 1,012 | 880 | 1,146 | 1,133 | 1,023 | 1,035 | 1,058 | 1,087 | 1,106 | 1,142 |
| Bank's Accounts (Reserves) in Foreign Currency | 421 | 488 | 433 | 445 | 521 | 431 | 454 | 591 | 413 | 527 | 534 | 543 | 557 | 567 | 585 |
| Reserve Requirement Ratios (Percent) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Domestic Currency | 17 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 |
| Foreign Currency | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |

Sources: Angolan Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

D. Non-Oil Primary Fiscal Deficit of the Central Government (Cumulative Ceiling)

Definition

9. The non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD) of the Central Government is defined as the non-oil primary expenditure of the Central Government plus clearance of external and domestic payments arrears in cash, as defined below, less Central Government non-oil revenue.

- The Central Government covers the entities of the Central and Local Administrations, Public Institutes, Autonomous Services and Funds, and Social Security.
- Non-oil primary expenditure of the Central Government is defined as total expenditure of the Central Government, less payment of interest on domestic and external debt, and Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis's (ANPG) oil-related expenditure on behalf of the Government, all measured on a cash basis.
- For the purpose of this PC, payments arrears are defined as all external and domestic

non-debt¹ contractual obligations of the Central Government that remain unpaid within 90 days after the due date specified in the contract or after the delivery date,² which include, but are not limited to, payment obligations from procurement contracts for goods and services, and statutory obligations for payment (e.g., civil service wages, and other entitlements); and that are related to transactions that were authorized inside or outside the Integrated Financial Management System (SIGFE) up to December 31, 2017.

- Clearance of payments arrears in cash is the cash component of the repayments of arrears that were accumulated up to December 31, 2017, as defined above, and for which a repayment timetable is set out in paragraph 8 of the MEFP.
- Central Government non-oil revenue is defined as Central Government total revenue, less oil revenue, both measured on a cash basis. Central Government oil revenue is the sum of proceeds from the tax on petroleum production (IPP), tax on petroleum income (IRP), tax on petroleum transactions (ITP), total revenue from the concessionaire (i.e., without netting out ANPG's oil-related expenditure on behalf of the Central Government), and any applicable charges on oil and gas, all measured on a cash basis.
- The PC for the NOPFD of the Central Government is calculated as the cumulative deficit since the start of the calendar year, based on the projected exchange rates for the arrangement period, and measured in Kwanzas.

10. To improve monitoring of spending on public investment projects that are financed by external project loans, in every calendar quarter the Ministry of Finance will provide the total value in U.S. dollars of invoices that have been approved by the Ministry, breaking down into invoices for which (i) external disbursements have been confirmed by external lenders; and (ii) those that have not (Table 1).

11. The NOPFD PCs and corresponding ITs will be adjusted (asymmetrically) for the Kz/USD exchange rate depreciation in excess of the program's baseline. Specifically, the PCs and ITs will be adjusted upward by a cumulative Kz 4 billion per quarter for every 1 percentage point depreciation of the cumulative average Kz/USD exchange rate (since the start of the year) by the end of the quarter in excess of the program's baseline (Text Table 4). The adjustor will be capped at a cumulative Kz 100 billion per quarter (Text Table 4).

| Text Table 4. Cumulative Average Kwanza per U. S. Dollar Exchange Rates, 2020–21 (Units as indicated) | | | | |
|---|----------------|---------------|------------|-----------|
| | September 2020 | December 2020 | March 2021 | June 2021 |
| AOA/USD | 553.43 | 566.26 | 625.27 | 638.90 |
| Cap units | 300 | 400 | 100 | 200 |

¹ That is, excluding debt obligations, as defined in paragraph 15 of this TMU.

² This definition follows the Law No. 12/13, issued on December 11, 2013.

E. Non-Accumulation of External Debt Payments Arrears by the Central Government and the *Banco Nacional de Angola* (Continuous Ceiling)

Definition

12. External debt payments arrears are defined as total external debt service obligations (principal and interest) of the Central Government and the BNA falling due after the date of arrangement approval that have not been paid by the time they are due, taking into account the grace periods specified in contractual agreements. Debt is defined in Paragraph 17 of this TMU and excludes contracts providing for payment on delivery. External debt payments arrears are defined on a residency basis. Arrears resulting from the nonpayment of external debt service for which a clearance framework has been agreed or a restructuring agreement is sought are excluded from this PC. External debt obligations, which the Central Government and the BNA cannot pay or settle based on their contractual terms solely because of the transfer of funds being rejected owing to intermediary financial institutions' compliance policies and which have been paid into an independent third-party escrow account (which specifies that the escrowed funds may be used only to satisfy external debt obligations) by the contractual due date, taking into account any contractual grace period, will not give rise to arrears for purposes of this PC.

13. The PC on the non-accumulation of external debt payments arrears will apply on a continuous basis throughout the arrangement.

F. New External Oil-Collateralized Debt Contracted by or on behalf of the Central Government, the *Banco Nacional de Angola*, and Sonangol (Continuous Ceiling)

Definition

14. Oil-collateralized debt is external debt, which involves creating a security interest, charge or lien over oil, oil receivables, or the proceeds of the sale of oil. The use of a collection account (e.g., for oil receivables or the proceeds of the sale of oil) where no charge or lien is created over such account is excluded from this definition. Prefinancing refers to debt contracted against future oil sales. A debt is contracted on behalf of the Central Government, the BNA, or Sonangol when the borrowing entity is wholly owned and/or controlled by the Central Government, the BNA, and/or Sonangol.

15. Disbursements under oil-collateralized debt contracted before the approval of the arrangement is excluded from this PC and are monitored under the ITs relating to such disbursements (Paragraphs 21–22 of this TMU). New oil-collateralized debt contracted by or on behalf of the Central Government, the BNA, or Sonangol is excluded from this PC where such debt is used for financing of oil-extraction equipment, as evidenced by the financing documents.

16. The contracting of new oil-collateralized debt (including prefinancing) by or on behalf of the Central Government, the BNA, or Sonangol, on a gross basis, is subject to a continuous zero ceiling under the arrangement.

II. INDICATIVE TARGETS

A. Stock of Debt Contracted or Guaranteed by the Central Government or Sonangol (*Ceiling*)

Definition

17. Public debt is defined as domestic and external debt contracted or guaranteed by the Central Government, including debt related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH) owed by the Central Government to Sonangol, and external debt contracted by Sonangol. Cross-holding of claims by entities within this debt perimeter, including PNUH-related debt, are netted out for computing this IT. External debt is determined according to the residency criterion. The term “debt”³ will be understood to mean a current, i.e., not contingent liability, created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services and which requires the obligor to make one or more payments in the form of assets (including currency) or services, at some future point(s) in time; these payments will discharge the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract. Debts can take several forms; the primary ones being as follows:

- i. Loans, i.e., advances of money, to the obligor by the lender made on the basis of an undertaking that the obligor will repay the funds in the future (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans and buyers’ credits) and temporary exchanges of assets that are equivalent to fully collateralized loans under which the obligor is required to repay the funds and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral from the buyer in the future (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements);
- ii. Suppliers’ credits, i.e., contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until sometime after the date on which the goods are delivered or services are provided; and
- iii. Leases, i.e., arrangements under which property is provided which the lessee has the right to use for one or more specified period(s) of time that are usually shorter than the total expected service life of the property. For the purpose of the arrangement, the debt is the present value (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the period of the agreement excluding those payments that cover the operation, repair, or maintenance of the property.

B. Central Government Social Expenditure (*Cumulative Floor*)

³ As defined in the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in IMF Arrangements, Decision No. 15688-(14/107).

Definition

18. Social expenditure is defined as the Central Government's spending on the following functions for a given calendar year and as specified in the General State Budget (OGE) as the "social sector": education (budget line 04); health (budget line 05); social protection (budget line 06); and housing and community services (budget line 07). This IT is set in Kwanzas.

C. Net-Accumulation of Payments Arrears by the Central Government (Cumulative Ceiling)

Definition

19. For the purpose of this IT, payments arrears are defined as all external and domestic non-debt contractual obligations of the Central Government that remain unpaid within 90 days after the due date specified in the contract or after the delivery date,⁴ and which meet the following criteria: (i) include, but are not limited to, payment obligations from procurement contracts for goods and services, and statutory obligations for payment (e.g., civil service wages, and other entitlements); and (ii) are recorded in SIGFE. The due date is the deadline by which payment must be made under the applicable contract, taking into account the grace periods specified in the contract. After rescheduling by agreement with the creditor, the obligation rescheduled is not considered in arrears anymore.

20. The IT on the non-accumulation of payments arrears is calculated as the net change in the stock of payments arrears, as defined above and reported between the date of arrangement approval and each test date under the arrangement. This measurement will exclude all claims related to transactions that have been authorized outside SIGFE, such as those defined in paragraph 9 of this TMU and which will be reported separately.

D. Disbursements of Oil-Collateralized External Debt to the Central Government (Cumulative Ceiling)

Definition

21. This ceiling refers to disbursements of oil-collateralized external debt to the Central Government from credit lines that have been contracted before the start of the arrangement, as defined in paragraph 15 of this TMU.

22. This IT will be monitored on a quarterly basis (Table 1).

E. Issuance by the State of Debt Guarantees (Annual Ceiling)

Definition

⁴ This definition follows the Law No. 12/13, issued on December 11, 2013.

- 23.** This IT ceiling covers all debt guarantees issued by the Central Government, irrespective of their purpose, currency, and beneficiary.
- 24.** This IT is defined for each calendar year and will be identical to the annual ceiling for issuance of debt guarantees approved in the annual Budget Law.
- 25.** For the purpose of this IT, debt is defined as in paragraph 17 of this TMU.
- 26.** This IT will be monitored quarterly, based on the amounts approved by the Ministry of Finance for guarantee issuances.

III. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

- 27.** To ensure adequate monitoring of economic variables and reforms, the authorities will provide the data and information specified in Table 1.

Table 1. Angola: Data Reporting Requirements

| Reporting Agency | Data | Frequency | Timing | Observation |
|------------------|--|-----------|--|---|
| BNA | Stock of the NIRs | Daily | No later than one week after the end of each day | |
| BNA | Exchange rates (official and parallel) | Daily | No later than one day after the end of each day | |
| BNA | Decomposition of daily variation of NIRs stock into foreign exchange sales/purchase | Weekly | No later than one week after the end of each week | |
| BNA | Any off-balance sheet position denominated or payable in foreign currency | Weekly | No later than one week after the end of each week | |
| BNA | Exports and imports (nominal values,) | Quarterly | No later than 6 weeks after the end of each quarter | |
| BNA | Balance of payments | Quarterly | No later than 3 months after the end of the relevant quarter | |
| BNA | BNA Survey | Daily | No later than one week after the end of each week | Should include stock of bank reserves in foreign currency, evaluated at (fixed) exchange rates under the arrangement. |
| BNA | Bank reserves in foreign currency | Daily | No later than one week after the end of each week | Denominated in foreign currency, for each relevant currency. |
| BNA | BNA claims on the Central Government | Monthly | No later than 6 weeks after the end of month | |
| BNA | Stock and flows of bank claims on the Central Government | Monthly | No later than 6 weeks after the end of each month | |
| BNA | Accumulation of external debt service arrears by the BNA | Monthly | No later than 6 weeks after the end of each month | |
| BNA, | Stock and the change in Central Government deposits at the BNA and banks and change in balances of escrow accounts | Monthly | No later than 6 weeks after the end of each month | Change in deposits broken down by currency (U.S. dollar and Kwanza), and stock and change in balances of escrow accounts, broken down by beneficiary country. |

Table 1. Angola: Data Reporting Requirements (continued)

| Reporting Agency | Data | Frequency | Timing | Observation |
|------------------|---|-----------|---|--|
| BNA | Bank-by-bank financial data, including balance sheets, income statements, NPLs, broken down by currency (U.S. dollars and Kwanzas) and financial soundness indicators | Annually | No later than 4 weeks after the end of the year | However, for the 13 banks participating in the AQRs, the data submission will be quarterly, and no later than 4 weeks after the end of each quarter. |
| MINFIN | Accumulation of external debt service arrears by the Central Government | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | |
| MINFIN | Oil revenue by category | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Oil revenue, including from the concessionaire (100 percent), from other oil tax (IRP, IPP, ITP), and identifying the average oil price (US\$/barrel) and crude oil exports (barrels). |
| MINFIN | Non-oil revenue by category | Monthly | No later than 2 weeks after the end of each month | Non-oil revenue (revenue from income taxes, property taxes, taxes on goods and services, taxes on international trade, and other taxes); social contributions; grants; other current revenues; and revenue from capital income. |
| MINFIN | Expenditure by category | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Wages; goods and services (non-oil related and Sonangol's expenditure on behalf of the Central Government); domestic and external interest payment; current transfers (subsidies—including price subsidies, donations, social benefits, and other transfers) and; capital expenditure, broken down between public investment program (PIP) and others, and between domestically and externally financed. |
| MINFIN | Domestic borrowing and debt service (principal and interest) | Monthly | No later than 2 weeks after the end of each month | Including Treasury bonds (broken down by instrument: OT-NR, OT-TXC, OT-ME, OT-INBT), Treasury bills (Fundada, and ARO whose disbursements should be recorded at price paid), and loans (<i>contratos de financiamento de mútuo</i>). |
| MINFIN | External borrowing and debt service (principal and interest) as recorded in the DMFAS system | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Broken down by creditor type (multilateral, bilateral, commercial, suppliers, and Eurobonds) and divided by public investment projects and budget support under the arrangement. Borrowing and debt service of collateralized debt broken down by creditor. |
| MINFIN | Total value of invoices in U.S. dollars related to spending on public investment projections that are financed by external project loans and that have been validated by MINFIN | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Broken down by invoices for which external disbursements have been confirmed by external lenders and invoices that have not. |

Table 1. Angola: Data Reporting Requirements (continued)

| Reporting Agency | Data | Frequency | Timing | Observation |
|----------------------------|---|-----------|---|---|
| MINFIN | Stock of domestic debt of the Central Government | Monthly | No later than 2 weeks after the end of each month | Domestic debt broken down by instrument type (treasury bonds: OT-NR, OT-TXC, OT-ME, OT-INBT; treasury bills: Fundada and ARO; and loans: <i>contratos de financiamento de mútuo</i>). |
| MINFIN Sonangol TAAG | Stock of external debt of the Central Government, Sonangol and TAAG | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | External debt broken down by creditor type: multilateral, bilateral, commercial, suppliers, and Eurobonds. Stock of collateralized external debt broken down by creditor. |
| MINFIN Sonangol TAAG | Debt service projection, quarterly for 2018–21 and annually from 2022 onwards | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Principal amortizations and interest payments of domestic debt, both broken down by instrument type (Treasury bonds: OT-NR, OT-TXC, OT-ME, OT-INBT; Treasury bills: Fundada and ARO; and loans: <i>contratos de financiamento de mútuo</i>); and of external debt both broken down by creditor type (multilateral, bilateral, commercial, suppliers, and Eurobonds), and by collateralized credit lines. |
| MINFIN Sonangol | Stock of public guarantees | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Public guarantees broken down by currency, and identifying the amounts, beneficiary, guarantor, and maturity date of the underlying loan. |
| MINFIN | Issuance of new guarantees | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Guarantees issuances approved by the Ministry of Finance as defined in paragraphs 21–24 of this TMU. |
| MINFIN Sonangol | Contracting and/or disbursements of new collateralized debt by or on behalf of the Central Government, the BNA, and Sonangol | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | |
| MINFIN | Stock, new accumulation, and clearance of payments arrears | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Clearly identifying the stock and clearance of payments arrears originating outside and inside SIGFE. |
| MINFIN | Bonds issued in settlement of payment arrears, and for recapitalizations | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | |
| MINFIN | Bonds issued in settlement of loans by the BNA to the Central Government | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | The authorities should meet the corresponding PC and hence report zero issuances. |
| MINFIN | Recapitalizations | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Broken down by beneficiary and instrument (cash, bonds, and other means). |
| MINFIN | Stock and the change in balances of escrow and reserve accounts | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Broken down by beneficiary creditor. |
| MINFIN | Stock and the change in balances of the escrow set up in a sound bank operating in Angola to receive rejected debt service payments | Quarterly | No later than 4 weeks after the end of each quarter | Broken down by flows—disaggregated by new deposits and withdrawals—and stock (the balance in the account) |

Table 1. Angola: Data Reporting Requirements (concluded)

| Reporting Agency | Data | Frequency | Timing | Observation |
|------------------|---|-----------|---|--|
| MINFIN | Stock of domestic debt of the Central Government | Monthly | No later than 2 weeks after the end of each month | Domestic debt broken down by instrument type (treasury bonds: OT-NR, OT-TXC, OT-ME, OT-INBT; treasury bills: Fundada and ARO; and loans: contratos de financiamento de mútuo). |
| MINFIN | Social spending | Quarterly | No later than 8 weeks after the end of each quarter | Broken down by category. |
| MINFIN | Quarterly reviews of the BPC's restructuring plan | Quarterly | No later than 6 weeks after the end of each quarter | |
| MINIFIN | Production and exports of oil and natural gas | Monthly | No later than 2 weeks after the end of each month | Oil and gas production should be measured in monthly (average) barrels per day and exports measured in U.S. dollars. |
| MINIFIN | Actual selling prices of oil and natural gas | Monthly | No later than 2 weeks after the end of each month | For oil prices, it should be reported for all Angola brand fields. For natural gas, the average selling price. |



ANGOLA

September 9, 2020

THIRD REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED FUND FACILITY, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION AND REPHASING OF ACCESS, WAIVERS OF NONOBSERVANCE OF PERFORMANCE CRITERION AND APPLICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE CRITERION, MODIFICATIONS OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND COMPLETION OF FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW— SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, AND SUPPLEMENTARY LETTER OF INTENT

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Prepared by the Angola Team of the African Department.

This supplement provides (i) an update on program performance; (ii) an updated macroframework, which reflects, inter alia, new developments in the outlook for international oil prices and in debt relief; (iii) a justification for continued support for the proposed access augmentation; and (iv) an overview of other developments since the issuance of the staff report. The updated information and framework do not alter the thrust of the staff appraisal.

REVISIONS TO THE MACROFRAMEWORK

A. Non-Oil Primary Fiscal Deficit

1. **There is no clear evidence that the end-June 2020 performance criterion (PC) on the non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD) was not met and, therefore, the authorities request a waiver of applicability.** Given serious administrative capacity limitations in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, staff continues to work with the authorities to verify the data related to the PC and to come to an assessment on this PC.

B. International Oil-Price Outlook

2. **Oil-price projections for Angola were revised upward relative to the staff report to reflect recent developments in global oil markets.**¹ The annual revisions, covering 2020–30, are consistent with the IMF’s Brent price projections of August 17, 2020, and continue to incorporate a discount for Angola’s reference price as a matter of prudence (Text Table 1).

Text Table 1. Projections for Oil Prices, 2019–30
(U.S. dollars per barrel)

| Year | Brent Price | | Angola Price | |
|------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|------------|
| | Staff Report ¹ | Supplement ² | Staff Report | Supplement |
| 2019 | 64.0 | 64.0 | 65.2 | 65.2 |
| 2020 | 41.3 | 42.8 | 37.4 | 39.8 |
| 2021 | 43.2 | 47.5 | 39.3 | 44.9 |
| 2022 | 45.2 | 49.1 | 42.9 | 46.9 |
| 2023 | 46.9 | 50.4 | 45.7 | 48.5 |
| 2024 | 48.5 | 51.5 | 47.9 | 50.0 |
| 2025 | 50.0 | 52.5 | 50.2 | 51.4 |
| 2026 | 53.0 | 54.4 | 52.0 | 53.3 |
| 2027 | 54.9 | 56.4 | 53.9 | 55.3 |
| 2028 | 56.9 | 58.5 | 55.9 | 57.4 |
| 2029 | 58.9 | 60.6 | 57.9 | 59.5 |
| 2030 | 61.0 | 62.8 | 60.0 | 61.7 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

² For 2020–25, updated GAS assumptions as of August 17, 2020; for 2026–30, same percentage increases as in the staff report.

¹ For convenience’s sake, references to the “staff report” refer the companion staff report, EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020. This supplement is an integral part of that staff report.

C. Debt Sustainability

3. The revised framework assumes a somewhat different debt relief package, but it preserves debt sustainability (Figure 1). Although the authorities reached agreements on substantial debt relief with two of Angola's large creditors, debt relief negotiations with a third large official creditor have yielded a different result from the assumption made in the staff report. The new baseline scenario, presented in the revised framework (Tables 1–9), now projects that all debt service payments until-end December 2020 for loans from that creditor will be rescheduled under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (G20DSSI). With the authorities sending a formal letter of request to that creditor since the issuance of the staff report, as part of the G20DSSI, this agreement has been activated.

4. The higher oil prices lead to narrower overall fiscal deficits and improved debt dynamics relative to the staff report, despite a smaller debt relief. The NOPFDs in 2020–30 remain broadly unchanged compared to the staff report. However, the revised oil-price projections have a positive impact on revenue, improving the overall fiscal balances and debt dynamics (Text Table 2). Projected debt reduction, measured as a percentage of GDP, is now faster in the coming decade and in 2025 is quite close to the authorities' medium-term debt objective of 65 percent of GDP.

Text Table 2. Angola: Fiscal Balance and Public Debt, 2020–30
(Percent of GDP)

| | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Overall Deficit | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff Report ¹ | -3.6 | -1.6 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
| Supplement ² | -2.8 | -0.1 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
| Public Debt | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff Report ¹ | 122.8 | 112.5 | 97.5 | 86.8 | 77.0 | 69.7 | 64.0 | 57.6 | 52.0 | 46.7 | 41.1 |
| Supplement ² | 120.3 | 107.5 | 93.8 | 83.7 | 74.3 | 67.2 | 61.6 | 55.1 | 49.2 | 43.7 | 37.8 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

² Using revised-oil price projections and debt relief assumptions.

5. Under the new baseline scenario, Angola's fiscal gross financing needs (GFNs) are reduced notably. The combined effect of the revisions to the framework lead to GFNs, which, on average, are lower by 1½ percent and 1 percent of GDP in 2021–25 and 2026–30, respectively (Text Table 3 and Figure 1).

Text Table 3. Angola: Gross Financing Needs, 2021–30
(Percent of GDP)

| | 2021–30 | 2021–25 | 2026–30 |
|---------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| Staff Report ¹ | 9.2 | 10.3 | 8.2 |
| Supplement ² | 8.0 | 8.7 | 7.3 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

² Using revised oil-price projections and debt relief assumptions.

6. As a result, debt servicing capacity is stronger than in the staff report. Lower GFNs are offset by reduced issuance of both domestic and foreign debt and lesser reliance on drawdowns of Treasury deposits at the central bank and commercial banks. Specifically, there is lower issuance of T-bills and T-bonds across the board, with the exception of 2026, when the Eurobond issuance assumed in the staff report is eliminated; lower issuance of Eurobonds in 2025 and 2028–30; and smaller drawdowns of Treasury deposits at the central bank and commercial banks until 2025, and even some partial replenishment of deposits in 2022 and after 2025 (Text Table 4).

7. Under the revised framework, fiscal financing gaps remain closed, while keeping the outcomes in line with program parameters and preserving Angola's debt sustainability. The lower debt ratios (Text Table 2) and gross financing needs (Text Table 4) relative to the staff report continue to allow staff to support the authorities' request to complete the Third Review under the Extended Fund Facility.

Text Table 4. Angola: Financing Assumptions, 2020–30
(Percent of GDP)

| | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Issuance of T-bills (in Kz billions)¹ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff Report ² | 614 | 623 | 638 | 898 | 836 | 682 | 159 | 322 | 1,272 | 693 | 1,656 |
| Supplement ³ | 365 | 271 | 250 | 338 | 278 | 233 | 241 | 268 | 587 | 534 | 764 |
| Issuance of T-bonds (in Kz billions)⁴ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff Report ² | 1,035 | 1,225 | 2,410 | 2,540 | 2,201 | 1,900 | 1,100 | 2,650 | 4,350 | 3,850 | 3,850 |
| Supplement ³ | 1,035 | 1,150 | 2,260 | 2,540 | 2,001 | 1,700 | 1,350 | 2,350 | 4,350 | 3,850 | 3,850 |
| Eurobonds (in US\$ millions) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff Report ² | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,500 | 1,200 | 0 | 1,750 | 1,750 | 1,000 |
| Supplement ³ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,350 | 0 | 0 | 1,575 | 675 | 750 |
| Drawdowns from Deposits (in US\$ millions)⁵ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Staff Report ² | 2,601 | 1,471 | 0 | 329 | 268 | 45 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Supplement ³ | 2,601 | 911 | -311 | 68 | 83 | 45 | -169 | -168 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ Less than one-year maturity.

² EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

³ For 2020–25, updated GAS assumptions as of August 17, 2020; for 2026–30, same percentage increases as in the staff report.

⁴ Changes relative to the staff report are concentrated in 2-year and 3-year T-bonds.

⁵ Includes Treasury deposits at the central bank (BNA) and commercial banks.

8. Although debt is sustainable, significant vulnerabilities remain. Debt dynamics are highly sensitive to further oil-price volatility. Other areas of vulnerability include exposure to currency risk, exposure to interest-rate risk, and a narrow creditor base, especially in the domestic market.

D. External Sector

9. The revised oil-price projections also have a positive impact on the projected current accounts (CAs) and net international reserves (NIRs). Relative to the staff report, the CA balance is projected to improve cumulatively by almost US\$1.5 billion in 2020–21 on the back of higher oil exports. Even though the CA improvement is partially offset by lower projected net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows—resulting from lower transfers from overseas parent oil companies, which are historically negatively correlated with oil prices—and by larger amortization payments due to the smaller debt relief, the expected reduction in NIRs is now smaller than in the staff report. However, and despite the recent increase in oil prices, NIRs remain substantially below those of the Second Review baseline scenario, and the cap to the

Text Table 5. Angola: Cumulative Balance of Payments, 2020–21
(US\$ millions)

| | 2nd Review | Staff Report ¹ | Supplement ² | Difference | |
|--------------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| | | | | Supp - 2nd Rev. | Supp - SR |
| CA | 715 | -2,202 | -1,202 | -1,917 | 1,000 |
| FDI | 896 | 2,870 | 1,939 | 1,042 | -931 |
| Portfolio | 1,806 | -530 | -530 | -2,335 | 0 |
| Trade credit | 3,602 | 2,418 | 2,640 | -962 | 222 |
| Deposits | -5,041 | -7,393 | -7,380 | -2,339 | 13 |
| MLT Loans | -3,154 | -1,571 | -1,690 | 1,465 | -118 |
| ST Loans | -1,708 | -1,708 | -1,708 | 0 | 0 |
| NIR increase | 909 | -3,520 | -3,334 | -4,243 | 186 |
| GIR (end-2021) | 18,631 | 16,729 | 16,914 | -1,717 | 185 |
| Months of imports) | 8.6 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 1.6 | 0 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

² Using revised oil-price projections and debt relief assumptions.

relevant program adjustor is still binding.² Accordingly, it is proposed to keep the December 2020 and June 2021 NIR quantitative PCs as specified in the MEFP (Text Table 5).

10. The updated oil-price projections require that Text Table 2 in the Technical Memorandum of Understanding be revised. The revision was agreed with the authorities, who signed-off on the revised table—see supplementary Letter of Intent.

E. Monetary Sector

11. The modifications to the outlook do not warrant a major change in the monetary policy stance in the near term. The temporary interruption of the gradual tightening initiated in 2019Q4 in favor of a more accommodative stance in 2020, followed by renewed tightening in 2021, remains appropriate. The net effect of the larger stocks of NIRs and greater expansion of credit to the Central Government on money aggregates is overall slightly expansionary in 2020–21 relative to the staff report. The expansion of credit to the Government induces a modest crowding out of credit to the private sector relative to the staff report (Text Table 6).

Text Table 6. Angola: Monetary Sector, 2020–21

(Average percent change, unless stated otherwise)

| | 2020 | 2021 |
|--|-------|-------|
| Reserve money | | |
| Staff Report ¹ | 2.3 | 15.2 |
| Supplement ² | 2.2 | 19.5 |
| Net claims on Central government | | |
| Staff Report ¹ | 19.7 | -5.1 |
| Supplement ² | 12.2 | 8.5 |
| NIR (US\$ millions) | | |
| Staff Report ¹ | 8,100 | 7,782 |
| Supplement ² | 8,100 | 7,968 |
| Credit to the private sector (percent of GDP) | | |
| Staff Report ¹ | 13.7 | 13.7 |
| Supplement ² | 13.7 | 13.6 |
| Velocity (GDP/M2) | | |
| Staff Report ¹ | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| Supplement ² | 3.3 | 3.5 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

² Using revised oil-price projections and debt relief assumptions.

PROPOSED ACCESS AUGMENTATION

12. The widening of the external financing gaps since the Second Review continue to support the case for the proposed access augmentation (Text Table 5). The higher cumulative balance of payments (BOP) gap over the remainder of the program is mainly driven by a substantial worsening of the CA, reflecting the lower oil-price path, lower portfolio inflows (no Eurobond issuance in the wake of temporary loss of market access), and larger deposit outflows (in response to stronger Kwanza depreciation). These BOP shortfalls are only partially offset by higher net FDI inflows from overseas parent oil companies and lower medium- and long-term amortization (reflecting debt relief). The wider external gap since the Second Review is to be partly accommodated by a drawdown

² The proposed modifications to the PCs for NIRs, relative to the Second Review, were calibrated by applying the adjustors to the deviation of the revised macroframework from that of the Second Review. The oil-price component of the adjustor includes a cap to downward oil-price shocks, set at a cumulative US\$200 million per quarter (TMU, ¶14b). This cap was binding under the oil-price baseline scenario of the staff report and remains binding under the baseline scenario in this supplement, despite the upward oil-price revision. The other components of the adjustor (external disbursements and debt service on Eurobonds and program financing) are virtually identical to those in the staff report.

of international reserves, with the remainder filled by the proposed access augmentation. Further depletion of international reserves would not be prudent—at 106.5 percent of the ARA metric by

end-2021, reserves already fall short of levels considered appropriate for commodity exporters (i.e., over 120 percent).

13. Directing the access augmentation toward budget support remains justified by the GFNs during the program period, which are still substantially larger than at the time of the Second Review. Specifically, average public GFNs in 2020–21 are still estimated to be some 2¼ percent of GDP larger than the Second Review projections (Text Table 7).

14. The proposed augmentation would also help with

containing liquidity pressures on the Treasury. In the staff report, the wider financing gaps were filled in large part by almost fully running down the Treasury’s deposits at the central bank and liquid assets of the Sovereign Wealth Fund, leaving the financing of the budget highly vulnerable to shocks. With higher oil prices, the augmentation would allow somewhat lower drawdowns of Treasury deposits, which would, however, continue to be low: by end-2021, they would amount to less than ½ month of annual spending (Text Table 8).

Text Table 7. Angola: Gross Financing Needs, 2020–21

(Percent of GDP)

| | 2020 | 2021 |
|---------------------------|------|------|
| 2nd Review | 15.5 | 8.9 |
| Staff Report ¹ | 18.7 | 13.4 |
| Supplement ² | 17.7 | 11.2 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

² Using revised oil-price projections and debt relief assumptions.

Table 8. Angola: Treasury Deposits at the Central Bank, End-2021

| | US\$ million | Months of spending |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------------|
| 2nd Review | 2,441 | 3.0 |
| Staff Report ¹ | 121 | 0.1 |
| Supplement ² | 500 | 0.4 |

Source: IMF Staff estimates and projections.

¹ EBS/20/128, dated July 20, 2020.

² Using revised oil-price projections and debt relief assumptions.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

15. The National Assembly adopted a supplementary budget for 2020. Approved on July 28, 2020, the supplementary budget is consistent with the program’s PC for the NOPFD for end-2020 and incorporates additional non-oil revenue measures to those discussed in the staff report. Specifically, it includes measures to reduce tax arrears, remove selected value-added tax exemptions, increase import duties,³ and raise export tariffs on selected national products. To accommodate higher essential spending and support households and businesses within a tight spending envelope, the supplementary budget rebalances resources from low-priority expenditure to health, education, and agriculture.

16. Adoption of the draft Central Bank (Banco Nacional de Angola, BNA) and Financial Institutions Laws (FIL) has been progressing.

- BNA management has agreed to incorporate the latest drafting suggestions from IMF staff in the draft Central Bank Law to reflect international good practices regarding the BNA’s mandate, governance structure, and autonomy. These suggestions include a clear price

³ This increase is implemented for revenue considerations.

stability objective; an improved procedure for the appointment and dismissal of Board members; an appropriate framework for lending to financial institutions; limited lending to Government; prohibition to conduct quasi-fiscal activities; and revised provisions regarding BNA's capital, profits and losses, reserves, and profit distribution. The draft BNA Law is expected to be sent to the Council of Ministers soon.


- The draft FIL, with a new bank resolution framework, was approved by the Council of Ministers on August 14, 2020 and IMF staff recommendations have been inserted into it, including provisions to (i) safeguard the use of public funds, including a loss imposition requirement to the holders of capital instruments and the holders of other subordinated claims; (ii) mitigate risks involved in the asset-management tool; and (iii) strengthen the powers of the BNA to prevent contagion from troubled banks or to maximize value for all creditors as a whole when transferring assets and liabilities.

Figure 1. Angola: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)—Baseline Scenario
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| Debt, Economic and Market Indicators ^{1/} | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------|------|-------|-------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | Actual | | | Projections | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 2009-2017 ^{2/} | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
| Total Nominal gross public debt | 47.2 | 89.0 | 109.2 | 120.3 | 107.5 | 93.8 | 83.7 | 74.3 | 67.2 | 61.6 | 55.1 | 49.2 | 43.7 | 37.8 |
| Debt of Central Government and Sonangol* | 38.1 | 89.0 | 108.9 | 120.0 | 107.2 | 93.5 | 83.4 | 74.1 | 67.0 | 61.4 | 54.9 | 49.1 | 43.5 | 37.6 |
| Public gross financing needs | 11.9 | 15.6 | 10.9 | 17.7 | 11.2 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 7.0 | 8.3 | 4.7 | 6.2 | 9.8 | 7.7 | 7.9 |
| Real GDP growth (in percent) | 2.9 | -1.2 | -0.9 | -4.0 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
| Inflation (GDP deflator, in percent) | 11.2 | 33.8 | 22.9 | 13.4 | 23.7 | 14.5 | 8.6 | 6.4 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 4.9 | 4.5 |
| Nominal GDP growth (in percent) | 14.4 | 32.2 | 21.8 | 8.9 | 27.7 | 17.9 | 12.8 | 10.5 | 8.5 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 8.9 | 8.5 | 8.2 |
| Effective interest rate (in percent) ^{4/} | 4.1 | 8.6 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 6.9 |

| As of September 02, 2020 | | |
|--------------------------|-----|------|
| Sovereign Spreads | | |
| EMBIG (bp) 3/ | | 1031 |
| 5Y CDS (bp) | | 999 |
| Ratings Foreign Local | | |
| Moody's | B3 | B3 |
| S&P's | CCC | CCC |
| Fitch | B- | B- |

| Contribution to Changes in Public Debt | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------------|--|------|
| | Actual | | | Projections | | | | | | | | | | cumulative | debt-stabilizing primary balance ^{9/} | |
| | 2009-2017 ^{2/} | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | | | 2030 |
| Change in gross public sector debt | 4.2 | 19.7 | 20.2 | 11.1 | -12.8 | -13.8 | -10.1 | -9.4 | -7.1 | -5.7 | -6.5 | -5.9 | -5.6 | -5.9 | -71.4 | |
| Identified debt-creating flows | 1.3 | 9.0 | 9.0 | -12.5 | -27.3 | -16.8 | -12.3 | -9.7 | -7.7 | -7.6 | -7.3 | -6.8 | -6.2 | -5.9 | -120.1 | |
| Primary deficit | -0.3 | -6.7 | -6.0 | -4.0 | -6.0 | -6.6 | -6.6 | -6.2 | -5.8 | -5.7 | -5.6 | -5.4 | -5.3 | -5.4 | -62.6 | |
| Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants | 32.6 | 21.9 | 20.0 | 17.9 | 19.7 | 20.2 | 20.1 | 19.6 | 19.0 | 18.9 | 18.7 | 18.4 | 18.3 | 18.1 | 209.0 | |
| Primary (noninterest) expenditure | 32.3 | 15.2 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 13.7 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 13.4 | 13.2 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 13.0 | 13.0 | 12.8 | 146.4 | |
| Automatic debt dynamics ^{5/} | -1.5 | 14.4 | 17.1 | -2.1 | -19.8 | -10.6 | -5.6 | -3.4 | -1.8 | -2.1 | -1.9 | -1.4 | -0.9 | -0.5 | -50.1 | |
| Interest rate/growth differential ^{6/} | -3.9 | -12.3 | -10.7 | -2.1 | -19.8 | -10.6 | -5.6 | -3.4 | -1.8 | -2.1 | -1.9 | -1.4 | -0.9 | -0.5 | -50.1 | |
| Of which: real interest rate | -3.1 | -12.9 | -11.3 | -6.1 | -16.8 | -7.8 | -2.3 | -0.6 | 0.2 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.9 | -31.8 | |
| Of which: real GDP growth | -0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 4.0 | -3.0 | -2.7 | -3.3 | -2.9 | -2.0 | -2.0 | -1.8 | -1.7 | -1.6 | -1.4 | -18.3 | |
| Exchange rate depreciation ^{7/} | 2.4 | 26.8 | 27.8 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 0.0 | |
| Other identified debt-creating flows | 3.1 | 1.3 | -2.1 | -6.4 | -1.4 | 0.4 | -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -7.4 | |
| Domestic cash and deposits (negative) | 1.0 | 0.4 | -2.1 | -7.1 | -1.4 | 0.4 | -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | -8.0 | |
| Contingent liabilities | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 2.1 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | |
| Residual, including asset changes ^{8/} | 2.9 | 10.7 | 11.2 | 23.6 | 14.6 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 48.7 | |



Source: IMF staff.

1/ Public sector is defined as the Central government plus public companies and includes public guarantees, defined as CG guarantees to SOEs and private firms.

2/ Based on available data.

3/ EMBIG.

4/ Defined as interest payments divided by debt stock (excluding guarantees) at the end of previous year.

5/ Derived as $(r - \pi(1+g) - g + ae(1+r))/(1+g+\pi+gn)$ times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate, π = growth rate of GDP deflator, g = real GDP growth rate, a = share of foreign-currency denominated debt, and e = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).

6/ The real interest rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as $r - \pi(1+g)$ and the real growth contribution as $-g$.

7/ The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as $ae(1+r)$.

8/ Includes changes in the stock of guarantees, asset changes, and interest revenues (if any). For projections, includes exchange rate changes during the projection period.

9/ Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.

Table 1. Angola: Main Economic Indicators, 2019–23
(Units as indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 | |
|--|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Est. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. |
| Real economy (percent change, except where otherwise indicated) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Real gross domestic product | -1.1 | -0.9 | 1.2 | -4.0 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.9 |
| Oil sector | -5.0 | -6.6 | 1.3 | -6.8 | 2.5 | 6.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| Non-oil sector | 0.6 | 1.4 | 1.1 | -2.8 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 5.0 | 4.8 |
| Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) | 21.5 | 21.8 | 26.4 | 8.9 | 18.4 | 27.7 | 13.6 | 17.9 | 10.5 | 12.8 |
| Oil sector | 28.5 | 27.5 | 27.7 | -12.5 | 16.7 | 40.9 | 10.5 | 17.6 | 6.5 | 9.3 |
| Non-oil sector | 18.6 | 19.5 | 25.8 | 18.2 | 19.2 | 23.4 | 15.0 | 18.0 | 12.2 | 14.1 |
| GDP deflator | 22.8 | 22.9 | 25.0 | 13.4 | 15.2 | 23.7 | 10.1 | 14.5 | 6.3 | 8.6 |
| Non-oil GDP deflator | 18.0 | 17.8 | 24.5 | 21.6 | 15.7 | 20.6 | 10.7 | 14.0 | 6.9 | 8.9 |
| Consumer prices (annual average) | 17.2 | 17.1 | 23.9 | 21.0 | 15.7 | 20.6 | 10.7 | 14.0 | 6.9 | 8.9 |
| Consumer prices (end of period) | 17.5 | 16.9 | 23.0 | 22.2 | 14.0 | 19.6 | 8.0 | 10.0 | 6.0 | 8.0 |
| Gross domestic product (billions of kwanzas) | 32,537 | 32,622 | 41,131 | 35,518 | 48,712 | 45,349 | 55,358 | 53,459 | 61,197 | 60,322 |
| Oil gross domestic product (billions of kwanzas) | 9,978 | 9,899 | 12,744 | 8,658 | 14,872 | 12,202 | 16,432 | 14,345 | 17,504 | 15,683 |
| Non-oil gross domestic product (billions of kwanzas) | 22,558 | 22,723 | 28,387 | 26,861 | 33,840 | 33,147 | 38,926 | 39,114 | 43,693 | 44,639 |
| Gross domestic product (billions of U.S. dollars) | 88.4 | 89.4 | 75.7 | 62.7 | 78.7 | 68.1 | 82.2 | 72.4 | 86.7 | 78.6 |
| Gross domestic product per capita (U.S. dollars) | 2,934 | 2,968 | 2,439 | 2,021 | 2,462 | 2,130 | 2,498 | 2,198 | 2,556 | 2,318 |
| Central government (percent of GDP) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total revenue | 19.8 | 20.0 | 20.9 | 17.9 | 21.5 | 19.7 | 21.7 | 20.2 | 21.5 | 20.1 |
| Of which: Oil-related | 12.4 | 12.1 | 13.4 | 10.2 | 12.9 | 11.4 | 12.6 | 11.4 | 12.2 | 11.1 |
| Of which: Non-oil tax | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 8.0 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 7.9 |
| Total expenditure | 18.8 | 19.2 | 20.0 | 20.7 | 19.9 | 19.8 | 19.8 | 19.3 | 19.1 | 18.5 |
| Current expenditure | 15.9 | 15.8 | 17.0 | 17.9 | 16.7 | 16.8 | 16.6 | 16.0 | 15.8 | 15.1 |
| Capital spending | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Overall fiscal balance | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | -2.8 | 1.6 | -0.1 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 1.7 |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -5.6 | -5.7 | -5.6 | -5.9 | -4.7 | -5.0 | -4.4 | -4.4 | -4.3 | -4.1 |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance (percent of non-oil GDP) | -8.1 | -8.2 | -8.1 | -7.9 | -6.8 | -6.9 | -6.3 | -6.0 | -6.0 | -5.5 |
| Money and credit (end of period, percent change) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Broad money (M2) | 22.6 | 30.2 | 21.6 | 4.2 | 25.6 | 22.5 | 12.3 | 12.8 | 8.1 | 12.5 |
| Percent of GDP | 29.6 | 31.3 | 28.5 | 30.0 | 30.2 | 28.7 | 29.8 | 27.5 | 29.2 | 27.4 |
| Velocity (GDP/M2) | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| Velocity (non-oil GDP/M2) | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| Credit to the private sector (annual percent change) | 25.8 | 25.9 | 28.8 | 7.6 | 22.2 | 26.4 | 14.0 | 25.2 | 17.5 | 15.2 |
| Balance of payments | | | | | | | | | | |
| Trade balance (percent of GDP) | 22.7 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 16.7 | 22.6 | 19.9 | 22.6 | 20.9 | 22.7 | 20.7 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (percent of GDP) | 39.9 | 38.8 | 41.4 | 33.4 | 40.7 | 36.6 | 40.2 | 37.0 | 39.3 | 36.1 |
| Of which: Oil and gas exports (percent of GDP) | 38.4 | 36.6 | 39.4 | 31.0 | 38.6 | 34.1 | 37.5 | 34.0 | 36.2 | 33.0 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percent of GDP) | 17.2 | 15.8 | 18.4 | 16.7 | 18.1 | 16.7 | 17.6 | 16.1 | 16.6 | 15.5 |
| Terms of trade (percent change) | -14.1 | -11.2 | -12.5 | -37.8 | 2.1 | 18.9 | 5.7 | -1.4 | 2.6 | 5.7 |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP) | 3.3 | 5.7 | 0.5 | -1.3 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.9 |
| Gross international reserves (end of period, millions of U.S. dollars) | 15,470 | 17,321 | 17,152 | 15,582 | 18,631 | 16,914 | 19,831 | 18,114 | 20,831 | 19,114 |
| Gross international reserves (months of next year's imports) | 7.6 | 12.4 | 8.2 | 9.9 | 8.6 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 9.3 | 10.3 |
| Net international reserves (end of period, millions of U.S. dollars) | 9,447 | 11,302 | 10,006 | 8,100 | 10,356 | 7,968 | 11,556 | 9,168 | 11,556 | 10,266 |
| Exchange rate | | | | | | | | | | |
| Official exchange rate (average, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 368 | 365 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| Official exchange rate (end of period, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 485 | 482 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| Public debt (percent of GDP) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Public sector debt (gross) ¹ | 110.9 | 109.2 | 102.0 | 120.3 | 95.1 | 107.5 | 86.0 | 93.8 | 77.4 | 83.7 |
| Of which: Central Government debt and Sonangol ² | 110.8 | 108.9 | 101.7 | 120.0 | 94.9 | 107.2 | 85.8 | 93.5 | 77.2 | 83.4 |
| Of which: Central Government debt ³ | 107.2 | 105.6 | 97.0 | 116.4 | 88.7 | 103.9 | 79.1 | 90.9 | 71.4 | 80.7 |
| Oil | | | | | | | | | | |
| Oil and gas production (millions of barrels per day) | 1,517 | 1,493 | 1,537 | 1,392 | 1,575 | 1,477 | 1,600 | 1,500 | 1,625 | 1,524 |
| Oil and gas exports (billions of U.S. dollars) | 33.9 | 32.7 | 29.8 | 19.4 | 30.4 | 23.2 | 30.9 | 24.6 | 31.4 | 25.9 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 39.8 | 55.0 | 44.9 | 55.0 | 46.9 | 55.0 | 48.5 |
| Brent oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.4 | 64.0 | 60.5 | 42.8 | 58.0 | 47.5 | 57.3 | 49.1 | 57.4 | 50.4 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

² Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2a. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23
(Billions of Kwanzas, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 6,426 | 6,529 | 8,576 | 6,367 | 10,466 | 8,924 | 11,996 | 10,825 | 12,130 |
| Taxes | 6,009 | 6,058 | 8,156 | 5,955 | 9,966 | 8,417 | 11,420 | 10,227 | 11,447 |
| Oil | 4,036 | 3,952 | 5,508 | 3,620 | 6,305 | 5,175 | 6,976 | 6,093 | 6,670 |
| Non-oil | 1,973 | 2,105 | 2,649 | 2,335 | 3,660 | 3,242 | 4,444 | 4,134 | 4,777 |
| Social contributions | 231 | 311 | 281 | 245 | 335 | 302 | 386 | 357 | 407 |
| Grants | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other revenue | 186 | 157 | 138 | 166 | 165 | 205 | 190 | 242 | 276 |
| Expenditure | 6,103 | 6,271 | 8,241 | 7,364 | 9,686 | 8,983 | 10,970 | 10,301 | 11,131 |
| Expense | 5,183 | 5,144 | 6,975 | 6,363 | 8,152 | 7,622 | 9,171 | 8,537 | 9,081 |
| Compensation of employees | 1,936 | 1,999 | 2,203 | 2,218 | 2,649 | 2,651 | 3,059 | 2,916 | 3,150 |
| Use of goods and services | 740 | 844 | 1,186 | 1,001 | 1,404 | 1,336 | 1,596 | 1,575 | 1,778 |
| Interest | 1,743 | 1,703 | 2,718 | 2,400 | 3,035 | 2,791 | 3,283 | 3,026 | 2,995 |
| Domestic | 791 | 795 | 1,219 | 1,045 | 1,389 | 1,071 | 1,432 | 1,051 | 911 |
| Foreign | 952 | 908 | 1,498 | 1,355 | 1,645 | 1,720 | 1,851 | 1,976 | 2,084 |
| Subsidies | 159 | 79 | 253 | 242 | 202 | 188 | 230 | 222 | 250 |
| Other expense | 605 | 519 | 615 | 502 | 861 | 655 | 1,003 | 797 | 908 |
| Net investment in nonfinancial assets | 920 | 1,127 | 1,266 | 1,001 | 1,534 | 1,360 | 1,799 | 1,764 | 2,051 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 324 | 258 | 336 | -997 | 779 | -58 | 1,026 | 524 | 999 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0 | 137 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 27 | -713 | -1,181 | -2,446 | -58 | -1,126 | -574 | -336 | 386 |
| Domestic | 214 | -686 | -861 | -2,290 | -32 | -657 | -552 | 235 | -53 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 9 | -686 | -1,011 | -2,510 | -507 | -657 | -552 | 235 | -53 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 205 | 0 | 150 | 220 | 475 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Foreign | -187 | -27 | -320 | -157 | -25 | -469 | -22 | -571 | 439 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -296 | -834 | -1,517 | -1,449 | -837 | -1,068 | -1,600 | -860 | -613 |
| Domestic | -1,388 | -1,796 | -2,339 | -2,590 | -615 | -1,063 | -1,640 | -1,075 | -405 |
| Debt securities | 72 | -122 | -1,462 | -2,405 | 214 | -863 | -1,033 | -925 | -405 |
| Disbursements | 1,884 | 1,583 | 2,068 | 1,430 | 1,925 | 1,420 | 1,893 | 2,510 | 2,878 |
| Amortizations | -1,812 | -1,705 | -3,530 | -3,835 | -1,711 | -2,283 | -2,925 | -3,435 | -3,283 |
| Loans | 0 | -278 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -1,460 | -1,396 | -877 | -185 | -829 | -200 | -607 | -150 | 0 |
| Foreign | 1,092 | 962 | 822 | 1,141 | -222 | -5 | 40 | 215 | -208 |
| Disbursements | 3,055 | 2,992 | 4,015 | 2,589 | 3,204 | 2,729 | 2,871 | 1,888 | 2,653 |
| Of which: Budget support under the program | 514 | 425 | 1,078 | 1,456 | 1,192 | 1,466 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Amortizations | -1,963 | -2,030 | -3,193 | -1,448 | -3,426 | -2,734 | -2,831 | -1,673 | -2,861 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -1,837 | -1,867 | -2,302 | -2,113 | -2,286 | -2,274 | -2,441 | -2,344 | -2,460 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 39.8 | 55.0 | 44.9 | 55.0 | 46.9 | 48.5 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 1,100 | 1,726 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,948 | 1,814 | 2,491 | 2,406 | 3,016 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 36,070 | 35,626 | 41,938 | 42,725 | 46,330 | 48,762 | 47,602 | 50,130 | 50,485 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 36,047 | 35,533 | 41,850 | 42,608 | 46,228 | 48,624 | 47,488 | 49,985 | 50,336 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 34,864 | 34,436 | 39,879 | 41,162 | 43,226 | 46,714 | 43,764 | 48,037 | 48,685 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.

² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.

⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2b. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23

(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 19.8 | 20.0 | 20.9 | 17.9 | 21.5 | 19.7 | 21.7 | 20.2 | 20.1 |
| Taxes | 18.5 | 18.6 | 19.8 | 16.8 | 20.5 | 18.6 | 20.6 | 19.1 | 19.0 |
| Oil | 12.4 | 12.1 | 13.4 | 10.2 | 12.9 | 11.4 | 12.6 | 11.4 | 11.1 |
| Non-oil | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 8.0 | 7.7 | 7.9 |
| Social contributions | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Grants | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other revenue | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Expenditure | 18.8 | 19.2 | 20.0 | 20.7 | 19.9 | 19.8 | 19.8 | 19.3 | 18.5 |
| Expense | 15.9 | 15.8 | 17.0 | 17.9 | 16.7 | 16.8 | 16.6 | 16.0 | 15.1 |
| Compensation of employees | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.4 | 6.2 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.2 |
| Use of goods and services | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| Interest | 5.4 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 6.8 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.0 |
| Domestic | 2.4 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| Foreign | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 |
| Subsidies | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Other expense | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Net investment in nonfinancial assets | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | -2.8 | 1.6 | -0.1 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.7 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 0.1 | -2.2 | -2.9 | -6.9 | -0.1 | -2.5 | -1.0 | -0.6 | 0.6 |
| Domestic | 0.7 | -2.1 | -2.1 | -6.4 | -0.1 | -1.4 | -1.0 | 0.4 | -0.1 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 0.0 | -2.1 | -2.5 | -7.1 | -1.0 | -1.4 | -1.0 | 0.4 | -0.1 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Foreign | -0.6 | -0.1 | -0.8 | -0.4 | -0.1 | -1.0 | 0.0 | -1.1 | 0.7 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -0.9 | -2.6 | -3.7 | -4.1 | -1.7 | -2.4 | -2.9 | -1.6 | -1.0 |
| Domestic | -4.3 | -5.5 | -5.7 | -7.3 | -1.3 | -2.3 | -3.0 | -2.0 | -0.7 |
| Debt securities | 0.2 | -0.4 | -3.6 | -6.8 | 0.4 | -1.9 | -1.9 | -1.7 | -0.7 |
| Disbursements | 5.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 4.7 | 4.8 |
| Amortizations | -5.6 | -5.2 | -8.6 | -10.8 | -3.5 | -5.0 | -5.3 | -6.4 | -5.4 |
| Loans | 0.0 | -0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -4.5 | -4.3 | -2.1 | -0.5 | -1.7 | -0.4 | -1.1 | -0.3 | 0.0 |
| Foreign debt securities | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 3.2 | -0.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | -0.3 |
| Disbursements | 9.4 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 7.3 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 4.4 |
| Of which: Budget support under the program | 1.6 | 1.3 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 2.4 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Eurobonds | 4.4 | 4.2 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Project loans and other | 3.5 | 3.6 | 5.9 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 4.4 |
| Financing to be identified | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Amortizations | -6.0 | -6.2 | -7.8 | -4.1 | -7.0 | -6.0 | -5.1 | -3.1 | -4.7 |
| Other accounts payable | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -5.6 | -5.7 | -5.6 | -5.9 | -4.7 | -5.0 | -4.4 | -4.4 | -4.1 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 39.8 | 55.0 | 44.9 | 55.0 | 46.9 | 48.5 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 3.4 | 5.3 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5.0 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 110.9 | 109.2 | 102.0 | 120.3 | 95.1 | 107.5 | 86.0 | 93.8 | 83.7 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 110.8 | 108.9 | 101.7 | 120.0 | 94.9 | 107.2 | 85.8 | 93.5 | 83.4 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 107.2 | 105.6 | 97.0 | 115.9 | 88.7 | 103.0 | 79.1 | 89.9 | 80.7 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2c. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23
(Percent of non-oil GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 28.5 | 28.7 | 30.2 | 23.7 | 27.3 | 26.9 | 30.8 | 27.7 | 27.2 |
| Taxes | 26.6 | 26.7 | 28.7 | 22.2 | 25.6 | 25.4 | 29.3 | 26.1 | 25.6 |
| Oil | 17.9 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 13.5 | 15.5 | 15.6 | 17.9 | 15.6 | 14.9 |
| Non-oil | 8.7 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 8.7 | 10.1 | 9.8 | 11.4 | 10.6 | 10.7 |
| Social contributions | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Grants | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other revenue | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Expenditure | 27.1 | 27.6 | 29.0 | 27.4 | 26.9 | 27.1 | 28.2 | 26.3 | 24.9 |
| Expense | 23.0 | 22.6 | 24.6 | 23.7 | 22.4 | 23.0 | 23.6 | 21.8 | 20.3 |
| Compensation of employees | 8.6 | 8.8 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.1 |
| Use of goods and services | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.0 |
| Interest | 7.7 | 7.5 | 9.6 | 8.9 | 7.3 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 7.7 | 6.7 |
| Domestic | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 2.0 |
| Foreign | 4.2 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 3.7 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 4.7 |
| Subsidies | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Other expense | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets | 4.1 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.2 | -3.7 | 0.4 | -0.2 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 2.2 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 0.1 | -3.1 | -4.2 | -9.1 | -0.2 | -3.4 | -1.5 | -0.9 | 0.9 |
| Domestic | 0.9 | -3.0 | -3.0 | -8.5 | 0.0 | -2.0 | -1.4 | 0.6 | -0.1 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 0.0 | -3.0 | -3.6 | -9.3 | 0.0 | -2.0 | -1.4 | 0.6 | -0.1 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Foreign | -0.8 | -0.1 | -1.1 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -1.4 | -0.1 | -1.5 | 1.0 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -1.3 | -3.7 | -5.3 | -5.4 | -0.6 | -3.2 | -4.1 | -2.2 | -1.4 |
| Domestic | -6.2 | -7.9 | -8.2 | -9.6 | -1.0 | -3.2 | -4.2 | -2.7 | -0.9 |
| Debt securities | 0.3 | -0.5 | -5.2 | -9.0 | 1.3 | -2.6 | -2.7 | -2.4 | -0.9 |
| Disbursements | 8.4 | 7.0 | 7.3 | 5.3 | 9.1 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 6.4 | 6.4 |
| Amortizations | -8.0 | -7.5 | -12.4 | -14.3 | -7.8 | -6.9 | -7.5 | -8.8 | -7.4 |
| Loans | 0.0 | -1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -6.5 | -6.1 | -3.1 | -0.7 | -2.3 | -0.6 | -1.6 | -0.4 | 0.0 |
| Foreign | 4.8 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 4.2 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | -0.5 |
| Disbursements | 13.5 | 13.2 | 14.1 | 9.6 | 6.3 | 8.2 | 7.4 | 4.8 | 5.9 |
| Of which: Budget support under the program | 2.3 | 1.9 | 3.8 | 5.4 | 2.5 | 4.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Amortizations | -8.7 | -8.9 | -11.2 | -5.4 | -5.8 | -8.2 | -7.3 | -4.3 | -6.4 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -8.1 | -8.2 | -8.1 | -7.9 | -7.3 | -6.9 | -6.3 | -6.0 | -5.5 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 39.8 | 59.0 | 44.9 | 55.0 | 46.9 | 48.5 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 4.9 | 7.6 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.8 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 159.9 | 156.8 | 147.7 | 159.1 | 107.0 | 147.1 | 122.3 | 128.2 | 113.1 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 159.8 | 156.4 | 147.4 | 158.6 | 106.7 | 146.7 | 122.0 | 127.8 | 112.8 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 154.5 | 151.5 | 140.5 | 153.2 | 102.7 | 141.9 | 112.4 | 122.8 | 109.1 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.

² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.

⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 2d. Angola: Statement of Central Government Operations, 2019–23

Debt Relief Recorded as Exceptional Financing
(Billions of Kwanzas, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Revenue | 6,426 | 6,529 | 8,576 | 6,367 | 10,466 | 8,924 | 11,996 | 10,825 | 12,130 |
| Taxes | 6,009 | 6,058 | 8,156 | 5,955 | 9,966 | 8,417 | 11,420 | 10,227 | 11,447 |
| Oil | 4,036 | 3,952 | 5,508 | 3,620 | 6,305 | 5,175 | 6,976 | 6,093 | 6,670 |
| Non-oil | 1,973 | 2,105 | 2,649 | 2,335 | 3,660 | 3,242 | 4,444 | 4,134 | 4,777 |
| Social contributions | 231 | 311 | 281 | 245 | 335 | 302 | 386 | 357 | 407 |
| Grants | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other revenue | 186 | 157 | 138 | 166 | 165 | 205 | 190 | 242 | 276 |
| Expenditure | 6,103 | 6,271 | 8,241 | 6,322 | 9,686 | 7,610 | 10,970 | 8,994 | 10,402 |
| Expense | 5,183 | 5,144 | 6,975 | 5,321 | 8,152 | 6,250 | 9,171 | 7,230 | 8,351 |
| Compensation of employees | 1,936 | 1,999 | 2,203 | 2,218 | 2,649 | 2,651 | 3,059 | 2,916 | 3,150 |
| Use of goods and services | 740 | 844 | 1,186 | 1,001 | 1,404 | 1,336 | 1,596 | 1,575 | 1,778 |
| Interest | 1,743 | 1,703 | 2,718 | 1,359 | 3,035 | 1,419 | 3,283 | 1,719 | 2,265 |
| Domestic | 791 | 795 | 1,219 | 1,045 | 1,389 | 1,071 | 1,432 | 1,051 | 911 |
| Foreign | 952 | 147 | 1,498 | 313 | 1,645 | 347 | 1,851 | 668 | 1,355 |
| Subsidies | 159 | 79 | 253 | 242 | 202 | 188 | 230 | 222 | 250 |
| Other expense | 605 | 519 | 615 | 502 | 861 | 655 | 1,003 | 797 | 908 |
| Net investment in nonfinancial assets | 920 | 1,127 | 1,266 | 1,001 | 1,534 | 1,360 | 1,799 | 1,764 | 2,051 |
| Net lending (+) / Net borrowing (-) | 324 | 258 | 336 | 44 | 779 | 1,314 | 1,026 | 1,831 | 1,728 |
| Statistical discrepancy | 0 | 137 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets (+: increase) | 27 | -713 | -1,181 | -2,446 | -58 | -1,126 | -574 | -336 | 386 |
| Domestic | 214 | -686 | -861 | -2,290 | -32 | -657 | -552 | 235 | -53 |
| Cash and deposits ¹ | 9 | -686 | -1,011 | -2,510 | -507 | -657 | -552 | 235 | -53 |
| Equity and investment fund shares | 205 | 0 | 150 | 220 | 475 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts receivable | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Foreign | -187 | -27 | -320 | -157 | -25 | -469 | -22 | -571 | 439 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities (+: increase) | -296 | -834 | -1,517 | -2,073 | -837 | 1,666 | -1,600 | 704 | 1,916 |
| Domestic | -1,388 | -1,796 | -2,339 | -2,590 | -615 | -1,063 | -1,640 | -1,075 | -405 |
| Debt securities | 72 | -122 | -1,462 | -2,405 | 214 | -863 | -1,033 | -925 | -405 |
| Disbursements | 1,884 | 1,583 | 2,068 | 1,430 | 1,925 | 1,420 | 1,893 | 2,510 | 2,878 |
| Amortizations | -1,812 | -1,705 | -3,530 | -3,835 | -1,711 | -2,283 | -2,925 | -3,435 | -3,283 |
| Loans | 0 | -278 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other accounts payable ² | -1,460 | -1,396 | -877 | -185 | -829 | -200 | -607 | -150 | 0 |
| Foreign | 1,092 | 962 | 822 | 518 | -222 | 2,729 | 40 | 1,779 | 2,321 |
| Disbursements | 3,055 | 2,992 | 4,015 | 2,589 | 3,204 | 2,729 | 2,871 | 1,888 | 2,653 |
| Amortizations | -1,963 | -2,677 | -3,193 | -2,071 | -3,426 | 0 | -2,831 | -109 | -332 |
| Exceptional financing (+: increase) | | | | | | | | | |
| Debt reprofiling | ... | ... | ... | -418 | ... | -4,106 | ... | -2,871 | -3,258 |
| Foreign interest | ... | ... | ... | -1,042 | ... | -1,373 | ... | -1,308 | -729 |
| Foreign amortization | ... | ... | ... | 623 | ... | -2,734 | ... | -1,564 | -2,529 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-oil primary fiscal balance | -1,837 | -1,867 | -2,302 | -2,113 | -2,286 | -2,274 | -2,441 | -2,344 | -2,460 |
| Angola oil price (average, U.S. dollars per barrel) | 64.0 | 65.2 | 55.0 | 39.8 | 55.0 | 44.9 | 55.0 | 46.9 | 48.5 |
| Social expenditures ³ | 1,100 | 1,726 | 1,440 | 1,440 | 1,948 | 1,814 | 2,491 | 2,406 | 3,016 |
| Public sector debt (gross) ⁴ | 36,070 | 35,626 | 41,938 | 42,725 | 46,330 | 48,762 | 47,602 | 50,130 | 50,485 |
| Of which: Central Government and Sonangol ⁵ | 36,047 | 35,533 | 41,850 | 42,608 | 46,228 | 48,624 | 47,488 | 49,985 | 50,336 |
| Of which: Central Government ⁶ | 34,864 | 34,436 | 39,879 | 41,162 | 43,226 | 46,714 | 43,764 | 48,037 | 48,685 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Historical figures may include valuation effects related to foreign-currency denominated deposits. Projections for 2020-23 include deposit withdrawals from FSDEA.

² Includes repayment of debt owed to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

³ Spending on education, health, social protection, and housing and community services. For 2020 onwards are projected floors.

⁴ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

⁵ Includes debt guaranteed and excludes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

⁶ Excludes debt guaranteed and includes debt owed by the Central Government to Sonangol related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).

Table 3. Angola: Monetary Accounts, 2019–23
(End of period; billions of Kwanzas, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Monetary Survey | | | | | | | | | |
| Net foreign assets | 6,186 | 7,120 | 7,789 | 7,077 | 8,937 | 8,245 | 10,295 | 9,556 | 10,691 |
| Net domestic assets | 3,439 | 3,099 | 3,916 | 3,567 | 5,759 | 4,792 | 6,206 | 5,148 | 5,853 |
| Claims on central government (net) | 1,583 | 2,448 | 764 | 2,746 | 1,349 | 2,980 | 820 | 1,768 | 1,287 |
| Claims on other financial corporations | 15 | 11 | 19 | 13 | 23 | 17 | 27 | 20 | 22 |
| Claims on other public sector | 115 | 152 | 144 | 180 | 172 | 222 | 198 | 262 | 299 |
| Claims on private sector | 4,678 | 4,524 | 6,024 | 4,866 | 7,361 | 6,150 | 8,392 | 7,698 | 8,867 |
| Other items (net) ¹ | -2,952 | -4,036 | -3,036 | -4,238 | -3,147 | -4,577 | -3,231 | -4,600 | -4,623 |
| Broad money (M3) | 9,626 | 10,219 | 11,705 | 10,644 | 14,696 | 13,037 | 16,501 | 14,703 | 16,544 |
| Money and quasi-money (M2) | 9,616 | 10,214 | 11,696 | 10,640 | 14,687 | 13,032 | 16,492 | 14,698 | 16,539 |
| Money | 3,374 | 3,206 | 4,094 | 3,437 | 5,138 | 4,290 | 5,772 | 4,940 | 5,669 |
| Currency outside banks | 363 | 419 | 415 | 427 | 514 | 520 | 584 | 610 | 703 |
| Demand deposits, local currency | 3,011 | 2,787 | 3,679 | 3,010 | 4,624 | 3,771 | 5,188 | 4,330 | 4,966 |
| Quasi-money | 1,824 | 1,647 | 2,228 | 1,778 | 2,801 | 2,227 | 3,142 | 2,558 | 2,934 |
| Time and savings deposits, local currency | 1,824 | 1,647 | 2,228 | 1,778 | 2,801 | 2,227 | 3,142 | 2,558 | 2,934 |
| Foreign currency deposits | 4,418 | 5,361 | 5,374 | 5,425 | 6,748 | 6,514 | 7,577 | 7,201 | 7,937 |
| Money management instruments and other liabilities | 9 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 5 |
| Monetary Authorities | | | | | | | | | |
| Net foreign assets | 4,961 | 5,687 | 6,311 | 5,258 | 7,285 | 6,101 | 8,545 | 7,307 | 8,377 |
| Net international reserves | 4,582 | 5,450 | 5,854 | 4,958 | 6,773 | 5,747 | 8,004 | 6,936 | 7,994 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities | 379 | 237 | 457 | 300 | 511 | 354 | 541 | 371 | 382 |
| Net domestic assets | -2,885 | -3,400 | -3,697 | -2,921 | -4,189 | -3,309 | -5,027 | -4,231 | -4,921 |
| Claims on other depository corporations | 367 | 340 | 451 | 415 | 514 | 496 | 555 | 546 | 590 |
| Claims on central government (net) | -1,618 | -1,012 | -1,158 | 146 | -887 | 585 | -438 | 301 | 278 |
| Claims on private sector | 58 | 49 | 72 | 58 | 86 | 72 | 99 | 85 | 96 |
| Other items (net) ¹ | -1,691 | -2,777 | -3,062 | -3,540 | -3,903 | -4,462 | -5,243 | -5,162 | -5,885 |
| Reserve money | 2,076 | 2,287 | 2,614 | 2,337 | 3,096 | 2,792 | 3,518 | 3,076 | 3,456 |
| Currency outside banks | 485 | 540 | 554 | 550 | 686 | 670 | 780 | 786 | 906 |
| Commercial bank deposits | 1,591 | 1,747 | 2,060 | 1,787 | 2,410 | 2,122 | 2,738 | 2,290 | 2,550 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Nominal gross domestic product (percent change) | 21.5 | 21.8 | 26.4 | 8.9 | 18.4 | 27.7 | 13.6 | 17.9 | 12.8 |
| Reserve money (percent change) | 21.5 | 33.8 | 25.9 | 2.2 | 18.4 | 19.5 | 13.6 | 10.2 | 12.4 |
| Broad money (M3) (percent change) | 22.6 | 30.1 | 21.6 | 4.2 | 25.6 | 22.5 | 12.3 | 12.8 | 12.5 |
| Money and quasi-money (M2) (percent change) | 22.6 | 30.2 | 21.6 | 4.2 | 25.6 | 22.5 | 12.3 | 12.8 | 12.5 |
| Claims on private sector (percent change) | 25.8 | 25.9 | 28.8 | 7.6 | 22.2 | 26.4 | 14.0 | 25.2 | 15.2 |
| Claims on central government (percent change; net) | -36.1 | -8.3 | -51.7 | 12.2 | 76.6 | 8.5 | -39.3 | -40.7 | -27.2 |
| Money multiplier (M2/reserve money) | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.8 |
| Velocity (GDP/M2) | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| Velocity (non-oil GDP/M2) | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Credit to the private sector (percent of GDP) | 14.4 | 13.9 | 14.6 | 13.7 | 15.1 | 13.6 | 15.2 | 14.4 | 14.7 |
| Foreign currency deposits (share of total deposits) | 47.7 | 54.7 | 47.6 | 53.1 | 47.6 | 52.1 | 47.6 | 51.1 | 50.1 |
| Credit to the private sector in foreign currency (share of total credit) | 31.8 | 27.4 | 29.8 | 32.3 | 27.3 | 30.2 | 25.3 | 25.3 | 22.6 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Including exchange rate valuation.

Table 4a. Angola: Balance of Payments, 2019–23
(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|---|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Current account | 2,900 | 5,132 | 375 | -817 | 340 | 77 | 438 | 626 | 683 |
| Trade balance | 20,070 | 20,593 | 17,421 | 10,445 | 17,824 | 13,580 | 18,597 | 15,115 | 16,246 |
| Exports, f.o.b. | 35,300 | 34,726 | 31,317 | 20,944 | 32,032 | 24,947 | 33,068 | 26,798 | 28,405 |
| Crude oil | 32,456 | 31,396 | 28,845 | 18,653 | 29,109 | 22,195 | 29,611 | 23,564 | 24,828 |
| Gas and oil derivatives | 1,493 | 1,309 | 1,003 | 775 | 1,253 | 1,003 | 1,253 | 1,047 | 1,085 |
| Diamonds | 1,130 | 1,130 | 1,200 | 1,247 | 1,308 | 1,388 | 1,628 | 1,612 | 1,698 |
| Other | 221 | 891 | 269 | 269 | 361 | 361 | 576 | 576 | 795 |
| Imports, f.o.b. | 15,230 | 14,133 | 13,896 | 10,499 | 14,207 | 11,367 | 14,471 | 11,683 | 12,159 |
| Services (net) | -9,507 | -7,718 | -9,865 | -5,818 | -10,367 | -7,233 | -10,878 | -7,889 | -8,691 |
| Credit | 597 | 455 | 561 | 401 | 533 | 355 | 556 | 379 | 398 |
| Debit | 10,104 | 8,172 | 10,426 | 6,218 | 10,900 | 7,588 | 11,434 | 8,268 | 9,089 |
| Primary income (net) | -7,278 | -7,516 | -6,855 | -5,187 | -6,778 | -5,984 | -6,926 | -6,295 | -6,539 |
| Credit | 459 | 693 | 480 | 636 | 501 | 680 | 524 | 713 | 742 |
| Debit | 7,737 | 8,209 | 7,335 | 5,823 | 7,279 | 6,664 | 7,449 | 7,008 | 7,281 |
| Secondary income (net) | -385 | -227 | -326 | -257 | -339 | -285 | -355 | -305 | -334 |
| General Government | -16 | -17 | -11 | 4 | -11 | -2 | -12 | -4 | -6 |
| Others | -369 | -373 | -315 | -261 | -328 | -284 | -343 | -301 | -328 |
| <i>Of which: Personal transfers</i> | -327 | -331 | -280 | -232 | -291 | -252 | -304 | -268 | -291 |
| Capital account | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Financial account | 5,265 | 5,472 | 1,726 | 4,849 | 1,872 | 2,341 | -759 | -40 | 361 |
| Direct investment | 554 | 1,749 | -85 | -647 | -811 | -823 | -1,787 | -1,299 | -1,829 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets | 5 | -2,349 | 4 | -208 | 4 | -248 | 4 | -263 | -277 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities | -549 | -4,098 | 90 | 439 | 816 | 576 | 1,791 | 1,036 | 1,552 |
| Portfolio investment | -3,153 | -1,676 | -1,653 | 265 | -153 | 265 | -2,153 | 265 | 265 |
| Other investment | 7,864 | 5,399 | 3,464 | 5,231 | 2,836 | 2,900 | 3,180 | 994 | 1,925 |
| Trade credits and advances | -1,959 | -1,871 | -1,781 | -1,210 | -1,822 | -1,417 | -1,863 | -1,498 | -1,584 |
| Currency and deposits | 7,267 | 4,632 | 2,793 | 5,376 | 2,248 | 1,983 | 2,864 | 2,024 | 1,885 |
| Loans | 2,555 | 2,638 | 2,451 | 1,064 | 2,411 | 2,333 | 2,179 | 468 | 1,625 |
| Medium and long-term loans | 1,101 | 1,184 | 1,447 | 60 | 1,707 | 1,629 | 1,475 | -236 | 921 |
| <i>Of which: Central Government (net)</i> | 2,283 | 2,253 | 1,943 | 556 | 2,285 | 2,207 | 1,941 | 241 | 1,044 |
| Short-term loans | 1,454 | 1,454 | 1,004 | 1,004 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 |
| Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Errors and omissions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall balance | -2,362 | -338 | -1,349 | -5,664 | -1,530 | -2,262 | 1,200 | 668 | 324 |
| Financing | 2,362 | 338 | 1,349 | 5,664 | 1,530 | 2,262 | -1,200 | -668 | -324 |
| Net international reserves authorities (- = increase) | 1,199 | -656 | -559 | 3,202 | -350 | 132 | -1,200 | -1,200 | -1,098 |
| Exceptional financing | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 2,462 | 1,879 | 2,130 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Financing gap | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 2,462 | 1,879 | 2,130 | 0 | 0 | -98 |
| IMF | 499 | 495 | 1,123 | 1,462 | 1,129 | 1,465 | 0 | 0 | -98 |
| Other IFIs | 665 | 500 | 785 | 1,000 | 750 | 665 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Current account (percent of GDP) | 3.3 | 5.7 | 0.5 | -1.3 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Goods and services balance (percent of GDP) | 12.0 | 14.4 | 10.0 | 7.4 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 9.6 |
| Trade balance (percent of GDP) | 22.7 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 16.7 | 22.6 | 19.9 | 22.6 | 20.9 | 20.7 |
| Capital and financial account (percent of GDP) | 3.2 | 7.6 | 3.8 | -2.5 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Overall balance (percent of GDP) | -2.7 | -0.4 | -1.8 | -9.0 | -1.9 | -3.3 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -13.4 | -14.8 | -11.3 | -39.7 | 2.3 | 19.1 | 3.2 | 7.4 | 6.0 |
| <i>Of which: Oil and gas exports (percent change)</i> | -14.3 | -14.1 | -12.1 | -40.6 | 1.7 | 19.4 | 1.7 | 6.1 | 5.3 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -3.7 | -10.5 | -8.8 | -25.7 | 2.2 | 8.3 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 4.1 |
| Terms of trade (percent change) | -14.1 | -11.2 | -12.5 | -37.8 | 2.1 | 18.9 | 5.7 | -1.4 | 5.7 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 39.9 | 38.8 | 41.4 | 33.4 | 40.7 | 36.6 | 40.2 | 37.0 | 36.1 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 17.2 | 15.8 | 18.4 | 16.7 | 18.1 | 16.7 | 17.6 | 16.1 | 15.5 |
| Gross international reserves | | | | | | | | | |
| Millions of U.S. dollars | 15,470 | 17,321 | 17,152 | 15,582 | 18,631 | 16,914 | 19,831 | 18,114 | 19,114 |
| Months of next year's imports | 7.6 | 12.4 | 8.2 | 9.9 | 8.6 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 10.3 |
| Official exchange rate (average, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 368 | 365 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Table 4b. Angola: Balance of Payments, 2019–23
Debt Relief Recorded as Exceptional Financing
(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 |
|---|---------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Proj. |
| Current account | 2,900 | 5,132 | 375 | -1,127 | 340 | 193 | 438 | 945 | 1,106 |
| Trade balance | 20,070 | 20,593 | 17,421 | 10,445 | 17,824 | 13,580 | 18,597 | 15,115 | 16,246 |
| Exports, f.o.b. | 35,300 | 34,726 | 31,317 | 20,944 | 32,032 | 24,947 | 33,068 | 26,798 | 28,405 |
| Crude oil | 32,456 | 31,396 | 28,845 | 18,653 | 29,109 | 22,195 | 29,611 | 23,564 | 24,828 |
| Gas and oil derivatives | 1,493 | 1,309 | 1,003 | 775 | 1,253 | 1,003 | 1,253 | 1,047 | 1,085 |
| Diamonds | 1,130 | 1,130 | 1,200 | 1,247 | 1,308 | 1,388 | 1,628 | 1,612 | 1,698 |
| Other | 221 | 891 | 269 | 269 | 361 | 361 | 576 | 576 | 795 |
| Imports, f.o.b. | 15,230 | 14,133 | 13,896 | 10,499 | 14,207 | 11,367 | 14,471 | 11,683 | 12,159 |
| Services (net) | -9,507 | -7,718 | -9,865 | -5,818 | -10,367 | -7,233 | -10,878 | -7,889 | -8,691 |
| Credit | 597 | 455 | 561 | 401 | 533 | 355 | 556 | 379 | 398 |
| Debit | 10,104 | 8,172 | 10,426 | 6,218 | 10,900 | 7,588 | 11,434 | 8,268 | 9,089 |
| Primary income (net) | -7,278 | -7,516 | -6,855 | -5,498 | -6,778 | -5,869 | -6,926 | -5,975 | -6,116 |
| Credit | 459 | 693 | 480 | 636 | 501 | 680 | 524 | 713 | 742 |
| Debit | 7,737 | 8,209 | 7,335 | 6,134 | 7,279 | 6,549 | 7,449 | 6,689 | 6,858 |
| Secondary income (net) | -385 | -227 | -326 | -257 | -339 | -285 | -355 | -305 | -334 |
| General Government | -16 | -17 | -11 | 4 | -11 | -2 | -12 | -4 | -6 |
| Others | -369 | -373 | -315 | -261 | -328 | -284 | -343 | -301 | -328 |
| Of which: Personal transfers | -327 | -331 | -280 | -232 | -291 | -252 | -304 | -268 | -291 |
| Capital account | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Financial account | 5,265 | 5,472 | 1,726 | 7,237 | 1,872 | 4,394 | -759 | 1,678 | 964 |
| Direct investment | 554 | 1,749 | -85 | -647 | -811 | -823 | -1,787 | -1,299 | -1,829 |
| Net acquisition of financial assets | 5 | -2,349 | 4 | -208 | 4 | -248 | 4 | -263 | -277 |
| Net incurrence of liabilities | -549 | -4,098 | 90 | 439 | 816 | 576 | 1,791 | 1,036 | 1,552 |
| Portfolio investment | -3,153 | -1,676 | -1,653 | 265 | -153 | 265 | -2,153 | 265 | 265 |
| Other investment | 7,864 | 5,399 | 3,464 | 7,619 | 2,836 | 4,953 | 3,180 | 2,712 | 2,528 |
| Trade credits and advances | -1,959 | -1,871 | -1,781 | -1,210 | -1,822 | -1,417 | -1,863 | -1,498 | -1,584 |
| Currency and deposits | 7,267 | 4,632 | 2,793 | 5,376 | 2,248 | 1,983 | 2,864 | 2,024 | 1,885 |
| Loans | 2,555 | 2,638 | 2,451 | 3,452 | 2,411 | 4,386 | 2,179 | 2,186 | 2,228 |
| Medium and long-term loans | 1,101 | 1,184 | 1,447 | 2,448 | 1,707 | 3,682 | 1,475 | 1,482 | 1,524 |
| Of which: Central Government (net) | 2,283 | 2,253 | 1,943 | 2,944 | 2,285 | 4,260 | 1,941 | 1,959 | 1,647 |
| Of which: Other sectors (net) ² | -105 | 8 | 281 | 281 | -1 | -1 | 112 | 101 | 454 |
| Short-term loans | 1,454 | 1,454 | 1,004 | 1,004 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 |
| Others | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Errors and omissions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Overall balance | -2,362 | -338 | -1,349 | -8,363 | -1,530 | -4,199 | 1,200 | -730 | 145 |
| Financing | 2,362 | 338 | 1,349 | 8,363 | 1,530 | 4,199 | -1,200 | 730 | -145 |
| Net international reserves authorities (- = increase) | 1,199 | -656 | -559 | 3,202 | -350 | 132 | -1,200 | -1,200 | -1,098 |
| Exceptional financing | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 5,161 | 1,879 | 4,067 | ... | 1,398 | 180 |
| Financing gap | 1,164 | 995 | 1,908 | 2,462 | 1,879 | 2,130 | ... | 0 | 0 |
| IMF | 499 | 495 | 1,123 | 1,462 | 1,129 | 1,465 | ... | 0 | -98 |
| Other IFIs | 665 | 500 | 785 | 1,000 | 750 | 665 | ... | 0 | 98 |
| Debt reprofiling | ... | ... | ... | 2,699 | ... | 1,937 | ... | 1,398 | 180 |
| Foreign interest | ... | ... | ... | 310 | ... | -116 | ... | -319 | -423 |
| Foreign amortization | ... | ... | ... | 2,388 | ... | 2,053 | ... | 1,718 | 603 |
| Memorandum items: | | | | | | | | | |
| Current account (percent of GDP) | 3.3 | 5.7 | 0.5 | -1.3 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Goods and services balance (percent of GDP) | 12.0 | 14.4 | 10.0 | 7.4 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 9.4 | 10.0 | 9.6 |
| Trade balance (percent of GDP) | 22.7 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 16.7 | 22.6 | 19.9 | 22.6 | 20.9 | 20.7 |
| Capital and financial account (percent of GDP) | 3.2 | 7.6 | 3.8 | -2.5 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Overall balance (percent of GDP) | -2.7 | -0.4 | -1.8 | -9.0 | -1.9 | -3.3 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -13.4 | -14.8 | -11.3 | -39.7 | 2.3 | 19.1 | 3.2 | 7.4 | 6.0 |
| Of which: Oil and gas exports (percent change) | -14.3 | -14.1 | -12.1 | -40.6 | 1.7 | 19.4 | 1.7 | 6.1 | 5.3 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (percent change) | -3.7 | -10.5 | -8.8 | -25.7 | 2.2 | 8.3 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 4.1 |
| Terms of trade (percent change) | -14.1 | -11.2 | -12.5 | -37.8 | 2.1 | 18.9 | 5.7 | -1.4 | 5.7 |
| Exports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 39.9 | 38.8 | 41.4 | 33.4 | 40.7 | 36.6 | 40.2 | 37.0 | 36.1 |
| Imports of goods, f.o.b. (share of GDP) | 17.2 | 15.8 | 18.4 | 16.7 | 18.1 | 16.7 | 17.6 | 16.1 | 15.5 |
| Gross international reserves | | | | | | | | | |
| Millions of U.S. dollars | 15,470 | 17,321 | 17,152 | 15,582 | 18,631 | 16,914 | 19,831 | 18,114 | 19,114 |
| Months of next year's imports | 7.6 | 12.4 | 8.2 | 9.9 | 8.6 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 10.3 |
| Official exchange rate (average, kwanzas per U.S. dollar) | 368 | 365 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

Table 5. Angola: Public Debt, 2019–25
(Percent of GDP)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Projections | | |
| Total public debt¹ | 110.9 | 109.2 | 102.0 | 120.3 | 95.1 | 107.5 | 86.0 | 93.8 | 83.7 | 74.3 | 67.2 |
| Short-term | 2.3 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Medium and long-term | 108.5 | 108.4 | 101.6 | 119.1 | 94.8 | 106.7 | 85.6 | 93.1 | 83.0 | 73.8 | 66.8 |
| Domestic | 34.4 | 33.0 | 26.5 | 27.7 | 23.9 | 21.6 | 19.6 | 17.0 | 14.6 | 12.8 | 11.0 |
| Short-term | 2.2 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Medium and long-term | 32.2 | 32.3 | 26.3 | 26.7 | 23.8 | 21.0 | 19.4 | 16.6 | 14.1 | 12.4 | 10.7 |
| External | 76.5 | 76.2 | 75.5 | 92.5 | 71.2 | 85.9 | 66.4 | 76.7 | 69.1 | 61.5 | 56.2 |
| Short-term | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Medium and long-term | 76.3 | 76.1 | 75.3 | 92.4 | 71.0 | 85.7 | 66.2 | 76.6 | 68.9 | 61.4 | 56.1 |
| <i>Of which: Sonangol</i> | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.1 | 7.2 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 3.2 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Includes debt of the Central Government, external debt of state oil company Sonangol and state airline company TAAG, and guaranteed debt.

Table 6. Angola: Financial Soundness Indicators, June 2019–June 2020

(Percent)

| | Jun-19 | Jul-19 | Aug-19 | Sep-19 | Jan-20 | Feb-20 | Mar-20 | Apr-20 | May-20 | Jun-20 |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Capital Adequacy | | | | | | | | | | |
| Regulatory capital/Risk-weighted assets | 27.3 | 27.5 | 27.7 | 27.9 | 22.9 | 22.7 | 23.0 | 22.6 | 21.6 | 28.7 |
| Core Capital (Tier 1)/Risk-weighted assets | 22.4 | 22.5 | 23.0 | 23.6 | 18.2 | 18.1 | 18.6 | 18.4 | 17.6 | 24.9 |
| Asset Quality | | | | | | | | | | |
| Foreign Currency Credit/Total Credit | 28.9 | 28.9 | 28.9 | 29.2 | 30.6 | 30.3 | 30.9 | 32.8 | 33.3 | 34.2 |
| Nonperforming loans (NPLs) to gross loans | 35.5 | 35.5 | 35.4 | 34.6 | 32.6 | 33.2 | 35.8 | 34.9 | 34.5 | 22.3 |
| (NPLs - Provisions for NPLs)/Core Capital | -13.4 | -13.1 | -13.0 | -13.7 | -26.8 | -28.2 | -20.5 | -25.6 | -28.2 | -22.0 |
| Distribution of Credit by Sector | | | | | | | | | | |
| Claims on the private sector/Gross domestic assets | 27.7 | 27.6 | 27.3 | 27.5 | 26.8 | 26.0 | 25.9 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Claims on the government/Gross domestic assets | 34.3 | 34.6 | 33.7 | 34.2 | 34.1 | 33.2 | 34.3 | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. |
| Earnings and Profitability | | | | | | | | | | |
| Return on Assets (ROA) | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 3.1 | 0.9 | 1.0 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 0.8 |
| Return on Equity (ROE) | 2.6 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 6.3 | 32.5 | 9.8 | 10.4 | -1.9 | 0.7 | 8.4 |
| Total Costs/Total Income | 102.6 | 98.1 | 93.7 | 86.8 | 55.2 | 77.1 | 82.9 | 97.7 | 96.7 | 90.9 |
| Interest Rate on Loans - Interest Rate on Demand Deposits (Spread) | 19.9 | 21.2 | 21.1 | 19.1 | 20.3 | 20.3 | 19.9 | 21.2 | 20.4 | 19.8 |
| Interest Rate on Savings | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 8.1 | 2.4 | 13.2 | 4.5 | 6.1 | 10.0 |
| Liquidity | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liquid Assets/Total Assets | 24.4 | 24.1 | 23.5 | 24.3 | 26.0 | 27.2 | 29.4 | 27.1 | 26.3 | 26.4 |
| Liquid Assets/Short-term Liabilities | 30.8 | 30.2 | 29.5 | 30.4 | 31.9 | 33.1 | 35.2 | 32.3 | 31.4 | 32.6 |
| Total Credit/Total Deposits | 44.1 | 44.4 | 43.2 | 44.0 | 42.3 | 41.7 | 44.9 | 41.0 | 40.8 | 34.8 |
| Foreign Currency Liabilities/Total Liabilities | 45.7 | 46.1 | 46.5 | 47.6 | 53.9 | 53.6 | 53.1 | 55.5 | 55.8 | 54.9 |
| Sensitivity and Changes to Market¹ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net open position in foreign exchange to capital ² | 30.6 | 14.2 | 23.1 | 28.4 | 18.5 | 20.8 | 16.5 | 28.0 | 22.3 | 52.9 |
| Number of reporting banks during the period | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

¹ Based on the information provided by the Department of Supervision of Financial Institutions of Banco Nacional de Angola.² Positive numbers indicate a long position in U.S. dollars.

Table 7. Angola: Fiscal Financing Needs and Sources, 2019–25

(Billions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)

| | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | 2nd Rev. | Prel. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | 2nd Rev. | Proj. | Projections | | | |
| Financing Needs¹ (A) | 13.4 | 14.1 | 12.9 | 11.5 | 9.2 | 7.8 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 6.1 | 7.7 |
| Primary deficit (cash basis) | -6.2 | -5.9 | -5.5 | -2.6 | -6.3 | -4.1 | -4.8 | -5.2 | -5.3 | -5.3 |
| Debt service | 14.9 | 16.0 | 16.5 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 11.7 | 11.0 | 11.9 | 11.3 | 12.9 |
| External debt service | 7.9 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 5.0 | 8.3 | 6.6 | 4.9 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 8.8 |
| Principal | 5.3 | 6.0 | 5.7 | 2.6 | 5.6 | 4.0 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 6.1 |
| Interest | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Domestic debt service | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 6.1 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 4.1 |
| Principal | 4.8 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 3.3 | 3.2 |
| Interest | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 0.9 |
| Recapitalizations | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Domestic arrears clearance | 4.1 | 3.9 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| External arrears clearance | ... | ... | ... | 0.0 | N/A | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Sonangol reimbursement ² | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Financing Sources (B) | 12.2 | 12.6 | 9.8 | 9.1 | 6.5 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 6.1 | 7.7 |
| External debt disbursements | 6.2 | 6.1 | 5.2 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 5.3 |
| Domestic debt disbursements | 5.1 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 2.4 |
| Privatization | 0.0 | ... | ... | 0.1 | N/A | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Deposits withdrawals (+) ³ | 0.9 | 2.1 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.2 | -0.6 | -0.2 | 0.0 |
| FSDEA asset sales | | | | 1.5 | | 1.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Financing Gap (A-B) | 1.2 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Program financing ⁴ | 1.2 | 1.5 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CHECK program financing | | | | 2.5 | | 2.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Memorandum Items : | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total cash balances incl. escrow accounts ⁵ | 1.6 | 0.1 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| External debt rollover rate (in percent) ⁶ | 87 | 84 | 63 | 40 | 40 | 28 | 41 | 42 | 39 | 52 |
| Domestic debt rollover rate (in percent) ⁷ | 38 | 35 | 35 | 23 | 39 | 36 | 53 | 69 | 67 | 59 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ To be filled with new issuances. These financing needs may differ from the DSA's standardized GFN.² Repayment to Sonangol of debt related to the National Urbanization and Housing Plan (PNUH).³ This excludes FSDEA and cash transactions related to privatization receipts and arrears clearance starting 2020.⁴ For past reviews, this includes balances transferred from escrow accounts to the Treasury's single account (including withdrawals from FSDEA). Starting from the Third 2020 review, these have been reclassified and reflected in deposit withdrawals to ensure better comparability with the balance of payments.⁵ In months of total annual expenditure, including valuation changes, and excluding balances in escrow accounts.⁶ Ratio of disbursements (excl. program financing) to external debt service.⁷ Ratio of disbursements (excl. BNA advance, and government securities issued for recapitalizations and arrears clearance) to domestic debt service (excl. bonds issued to repay BNA advance).

Table 8. Angola: External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2019–25

(Millions of U.S. dollars)

| | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|--|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | Prel. | | | Proj. | | | |
| Gross financing requirements | 3,366 | 5,096 | 4,821 | 2,284 | 3,855 | 4,190 | 5,210 |
| Current account deficit | -5,132 | 817 | -77 | -626 | -683 | -902 | -968 |
| External debt amortization | 8,498 | 4,279 | 4,899 | 2,909 | 4,354 | 4,845 | 5,624 |
| Government | 5,512 | 2,557 | 4,103 | 2,265 | 3,727 | 4,317 | 6,097 |
| Sonangol | 1,508 | 1,781 | 1,299 | 1,301 | 1,554 | 1,579 | 900 |
| Banks | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 | 323 |
| Central Bank | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other private (net) ¹ | 1,155 | -382 | -827 | -979 | -1,250 | -1,373 | -1,696 |
| IMF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 184 | 246 | 554 |
| Gross sources of financing | 4,022 | 1,894 | 4,689 | 3,484 | 4,953 | 5,497 | 6,764 |
| Capital account (net) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Foreign direct investment (net) | -1,749 | 647 | 823 | 1,299 | 1,829 | 2,382 | 2,966 |
| External borrowing | 6,407 | 4,160 | 3,717 | 3,674 | 4,233 | 4,043 | 4,526 |
| Government ² | 4,207 | 2,110 | 1,967 | 2,024 | 2,683 | 2,693 | 3,176 |
| Sonangol | 1,500 | 1,500 | 1,300 | 1,200 | 1,100 | 900 | 900 |
| Banks | 700 | 550 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| Central bank | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| External debt securities - Eurobond | 3,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,350 |
| Foreign deposits (net) | -4,632 | -5,376 | -1,983 | -2,024 | -1,885 | -1,694 | -2,836 |
| IMF | 495 | 1,462 | 1,465 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| World Bank and AfDB ³ | 500 | 1,000 | 665 | 532 | 773 | 764 | 756 |
| Change in reserves (+ = increase) | 656 | -3,202 | -132 | 1,200 | 1,098 | 1,307 | 1,554 |
| Memorandum Items: | | | | | | | |
| Collateralized external debt stock | 17,154 | 16,880 | 17,400 | 19,021 | 20,395 | 19,053 | 18,052 |

Sources: Angolan Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

¹ Includes the counterpart for the Eurobond in 2018.² The bulk of which is project financing from China.³ Includes only budget support operations.

Table 9. Angola: Indicators of IMF Credit, 2018–28

(Units as indicated)

| | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---------|---------|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Actual | Actual | Projections | | | | | | | | |
| Existing and prospective Fund arrangements | | | (Millions of SDRs) | | | | | | | | |
| Disbursements | 715.0 | 358.0 | 1,070.0 | 1,070.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Stock of existing and prospective Fund credit | 715.0 | 1,073.0 | 2,143.0 | 3,213.0 | 3,213.0 | 3,078.9 | 2,900.1 | 2,498.3 | 1,962.8 | 1,427.3 | 891.8 |
| Obligations | 3.6 | 0.9 | 13.9 | 52.0 | 71.3 | 204.6 | 245.2 | 474.7 | 590.2 | 568.4 | 550.1 |
| Principal (repayment/repurchase) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 134.1 | 178.8 | 401.8 | 535.5 | 535.5 | 535.5 |
| Charges and interest | 3.6 | 0.9 | 13.9 | 52.0 | 71.3 | 70.5 | 66.4 | 72.9 | 54.7 | 32.9 | 14.6 |
| Obligations, relative to key variables | | | (Percent) | | | | | | | | |
| Quota | 0.5 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 7.0 | 9.6 | 27.6 | 33.1 | 64.1 | 79.7 | 76.8 | 74.3 |
| Gross domestic product | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Gross international reserves | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.0 |
| Unencumbered gross international reserves ¹ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.1 |
| Export of goods and services | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
| Unencumbered exports of goods and services ¹ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
| Central Government revenues | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.3 |
| Unencumbered Central Government revenues ¹ | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 3.4 |
| External debt service | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 7.7 | 10.8 | 10.0 | 7.5 |
| Non-collateralized external debt service | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 2.6 | 6.4 | 8.3 | 10.7 | 16.3 | 11.7 | 8.2 |
| Fund Credit Outstanding, relative to key variables | | | (Percent) | | | | | | | | |
| Quota | 96.6 | 145.0 | 289.6 | 434.1 | 434.1 | 416.0 | 391.8 | 337.6 | 265.2 | 192.9 | 120.5 |
| Gross domestic product | 0.9 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 6.1 | 5.4 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 1.1 |
| Gross international reserves | 6.1 | 8.5 | 18.8 | 26.0 | 24.3 | 22.1 | 19.8 | 16.0 | 11.8 | 8.1 | 4.8 |
| Unencumbered gross international reserves ¹ | 8.1 | 10.8 | 21.3 | 28.2 | 26.0 | 24.8 | 23.3 | 17.9 | 13.2 | 8.5 | 5.0 |
| External debt | 2.0 | 2.9 | 5.5 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 7.9 | 7.7 | 6.8 | 5.5 | 4.2 | 2.8 |
| Non-collateralized external debt ² | 3.3 | 4.3 | 8.0 | 12.1 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 12.2 | 10.5 | 8.2 | 6.2 | 4.2 |
| Memorandum items: | | | (Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) | | | | | | | | |
| Quota (millions of SDRs) | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 | 740 |
| Gross domestic product | 105,902 | 89,417 | 62,724 | 68,072 | 72,364 | 78,587 | 85,129 | 91,453 | 97,690 | 103,185 | 109,056 |
| Gross international reserves | 16,170 | 17,321 | 15,582 | 16,914 | 18,114 | 19,114 | 20,114 | 21,608 | 23,082 | 24,380 | 25,767 |
| Exports of goods and services | 41,389 | 35,180 | 21,345 | 25,302 | 27,177 | 28,803 | 30,198 | 35,142 | 37,539 | 39,650 | 41,906 |
| Central Government revenues | 23,175 | 17,896 | 11,243 | 13,396 | 14,653 | 15,803 | 16,670 | 19,399 | 20,723 | 21,888 | 23,134 |
| External debt service | 8,067 | 8,001 | 4,950 | 6,685 | 4,939 | 6,442 | 7,027 | 8,529 | 7,571 | 7,898 | 10,153 |
| Total external debt ³ | 49,278 | 51,574 | 53,453 | 53,695 | 53,955 | 53,272 | 51,794 | 50,987 | 49,412 | 47,354 | 44,402 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; and IMF staff projections.

¹ Subtracting collateralized external debt service.² Subtracting collateralized external debt.³ Including Sonangol, TAAG, and public guarantees.

Appendix I. Supplementary Letter of Intent

Luanda, September 7, 2020

Madame Kristalina Georgieva
 Managing Director
 International Monetary Fund
 Washington, DC 20431
 USA

Dear Madame Georgieva:

This Letter of Intent (LOI) supplements that signed on July 17, 2020 and related Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) and Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). In order to reflect recent developments and updated projections regarding oil prices, we request a further revision of the adjustor applied to the performance criteria (PCs) on net international reserves (NIRs), although the NIR PC targets themselves remain unchanged relative to the previous LOI. Accordingly, Text Table 2 in TMU ¶4 in the July LOI is to be replaced by the table below.

| Text Table 2 (revised). Angola: NIR Adjustors (Baseline Scenario), 2019–21 | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|--------|----------|-----------|----------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| (Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cumulative flows from the beginning of the year | 2019 | | 2020 | | | | | 2021 | | |
| | December | March | June | September | December | March | June | | | |
| | 2nd Rev. | Actual | 2nd Rev. | Actual | 2nd Rev. | Prelim. | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed | Proposed |
| Adjustors from the EFF Third Review: | | | | | | | | | | |
| Brent oil price, U.S. dollars per barrel | 64.0 | 62.7 | 62.3 | 50.5 | 60.8 | 31.4 | 43.4 | 45.7 | 46.5 | 47.4 |
| Disbursements from multilaterals (except the IMF) and Eurobond | 3,777 | 3,615 | 40 | 40 | 1580 | 445 | 485 | 1,160 | 40 | 80 |
| Disbursements from multilaterals (except the IMF) | 777 | 615 | 40 | 40 | 80 | 445 | 485 | 1,160 | 40 | 80 |
| Disbursements from Eurobonds | 3,000 | 3,000 | 0 | 0 | 1500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Debt service to multilaterals, except the IMF, and Eurobonds | 576 | 586 | 9 | 7 | 437 | 434 | 449 | 882 | 20 | 455 |
| Debt service to multilaterals, except the IMF | 0 | 135 | 9 | 7 | 88 | 82 | 97 | 176 | 20 | 102 |
| Debt service to Eurobonds | 576 | 451 | 0 | 0 | 349 | 353 | 353 | 705 | 0 | 353 |

Sources: Angolan authorities; WEO; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

We also report that we believe that there is no clear evidence that the end-June PC on the non-oil primary fiscal deficit was not met. Owing to the reduced administrative capacity in the wake of COVID-19, we experienced delays in data collection and processing, so that the data on the

performance under the PC is yet to be confirmed. Therefore, we request a waiver of applicability on this PC.

All other policy commitments contained in the July LOI remain valid.

Please accept the assurances of our highest consideration and esteem.

/s/

Vera Daves de Sousa
Minister
Ministry of Finance

/s/

José de Lima Massano
Governor
Banco Nacional de Angola

**Statement by Mr. Mahlinza, Executive Director for Angola,
and Mr. Essuvi, Advisor to the Executive Director
July 30, 2020**

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Our Angolan authorities thank staff for their constructive engagement during the negotiation of the third review under the EFF arrangement. They also thank Management for their continued support during these unprecedented times. They view the Fund's financial support under the EFF as instrumental to bolster their efforts to restoring macroeconomic stability.
2. The Angolan economy is facing significant economic challenges, compounded by the triple COVID induced external shock including the economic and health crises, the oil price collapse, and the OPEC+ determined limits on oil production. Reflecting the negative repercussions of these exogenous shocks, economic activity has contracted into the worst recession in decades. Despite these challenges, the authorities have remained steadfast in the implementation of the EFF program objective including stabilizing the economy, guided by the National Development Plan 2018-2022. The main objectives of the NDP include stabilizing the economy, accelerating human capital development, invigorating public sector reform, and supporting economic diversification to promoting sustainable and inclusive growth.
3. To further enhance macroeconomic stability and mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the authorities request Executive Directors' support towards the completion of the third review under the EFF arrangement. They further request augmentation and rephasing of the program.

II. PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

4. Notwithstanding the difficult circumstances, the authorities' program performance remains broadly on track. All end-December 2019 and end-March 2020 performance criteria (PC) and indicative targets (IT) were met, except the PCs on the non-

accumulation of external arrears. The authorities have continued to make progress on the implementation of structural benchmarks, albeit with delays. The deterioration in the external economic environment has, however, necessitated modification of PCs and ITs.

5. The PC on non-accumulation of external arrears was missed, mainly due to processing challenges faced by the correspondent bank owing to AML/CFT concerns. The authorities have, however, taken remedial action including the establishment of an escrow account created in a domestic bank to hold the rejected external payments. In addition, the recently approved AML/CFT law will help strengthen financial integrity.
6. The Angolan authorities therefore request: (i) a waiver for the non-observance of the PC on non-accumulation of external debt arrears; (ii) modifications of PCs and ITs on the floor on net international reserves, reserve money and the non-oil primary fiscal deficit (NOPFD); (iii) modifications to the IT on the stock of debt contracted or guaranteed by the Central Government and Sonangol; and (iv) a waiver of applicability of end-June 2020 PC on the NOPFD.
7. To meet the urgent financing needs created by the COVID-19 pandemic shock, the authorities request the augmentation of the program in the amount of SDR 540.1 million, equally distributed over the remainder of the program (72 percent of quota) with some partial rephasing in 2020.

III.IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

8. Since the first COVID-19 case was reported on March 21, the caseload has increased to 950 as of July 28, including 41 fatalities. The continued increase in daily average cases has put pressure on the already weak health system. Nevertheless, the authorities acted promptly to declare a state of emergency, followed by a state of calamity thus suspending international flights, applying restrictions on movement between provinces, and closing borders and non-essential businesses. At the same time, they increased testing capacity.
9. Implementation of the containment measures alongside the decline in oil production and prices has taken a toll on economic activity. As a result, growth is projected to contract to -4.0 percent in 2020 compared to a slight recovery of 1.2 percent in the pre-COVID-19 projections, making it the deepest contraction in three decades. Given the lower revenues and increased healthcare related expenditures, the overall fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 3.6 percent of GDP from a surplus of 0.8 percent in 2019. The adverse terms of trade shock and lower oil exports will negatively affect the current account, resulting in the depletion of the gross international reserves from 12.9 to 10.6 months of prospective import cover. Despite the continuation of fiscal retrenchment and negative output gap, inflation is expected to pick up from 16.9 percent to 22.2 percent, driven by the exchange rate depreciation and a moderately accommodative monetary policy.
10. The overall medium-term outlook remains favorable supported by the authorities' strong commitment to their reform agenda, improved global financial conditions and renewed business confidence. Economic growth is projected to recover to 3.2 percent in 2021.

Nevertheless, this recovery is subject to downside risks emanating from a protracted COVID-19 pandemic, lower-than-anticipated international oil prices, mounting trade tensions, and geopolitical uncertainty.

IV. POLICY RESPONSE

Fiscal and Debt Management

11. To address fiscal pressures arising from the decline in oil-related revenues and elevated healthcare expenditures to address the COVID-19 crisis, the National Assembly (NA) approved a revised 2020 budget on July 28, with a conservative oil price of US\$33 per barrel (from US\$ 55 of the original budget). The revised budget aims to keep the economy afloat while continuing the essential reforms in the midst of the crisis. The budget builds on fiscal measures implemented to mitigate the immediate impact of the pandemic on vulnerable households and businesses. These measures include inter-alia, a 12 months VAT tax credit for imported capital and intermediate goods used in the production of identified products; deferral of social security contributions; and an extension of the corporate income tax deadline. This fiscal stimulus package also includes the introduction of the pilot social safety net program.
12. On the expenditure side, the authorities have implemented containment measures to enhance spending controls and efficiency. These include the reduction of the number of ministries from 28 to 21, a 30 percent freeze on goods and services spending, and suspension of non-priority capital expenditure.
13. To prepare for the recovery, the NA approved a non-oil revenue package which include inter alia: the reduction of the corporate tax to 25 percent; an increase in the personal income tax progressivity; introduction of an environmental tax; and increased withholding rate for services provided by non-residents. These measures will enter into force once the pandemic abates.
14. The authorities acknowledge that public debt has deteriorated further, following the external shock. This was exacerbated by the sharp depreciation of the Kwanza that occurred in the last quarter of 2019, following the adoption of a more flexible exchange rate regime. Nonetheless, the authorities remain committed to the implementation of the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy. They have continued to negotiate debt rescheduling with their main creditors to ensure medium term debt sustainability. At the same time, they are pursuing debt relief under the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (G20 DSSI) for 2020. They have scaled back the issuance of Treasury bonds indexed to or denominated in foreign currency. Moreover, they are committed to a prudent borrowing strategy while prioritizing concessional financing and refraining from contracting new debt to finance non-priority investments. They will seek debt relief from a wider group of creditors, should downside risks materialize. Concurrently, the authorities will sustain efforts to deepen the domestic debt market.

Monetary, Exchange Rate and Financial Sector policies

15. The Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA) has maintained an accommodative monetary policy stance. Further, as part of the crisis mitigation measures, the BNA introduced several measures to support liquidity and credit, including (i) cutting the 7-day permanent liquidity absorption rate from 10 to 7 percent; (ii) establishment of a Kz 100 billion credit line to support the purchase of government securities and bonds held by non-financial enterprises; and provision of additional liquidity support to banks equivalent to 0.5 percent of GDP.
16. The authorities have continued to make progress in exchange rate reforms, following the transition to a market-clearing exchange rate in mid-October 2019. As part of the process to liberalize the foreign exchange market, the BNA has adopted the Bloomberg electronic foreign currency trading platform “FXGO”. As soon as the registration and licensing of the main players in the foreign exchange market is completed, the BNA will discontinue the foreign currency sales auctions, with future interventions limited to smoothening of disorderly market conditions. In parallel, the authorities have continued to improve the regulatory environment for foreign exchange transactions including the introduction of new regulations to eliminate informal restrictions by banks on withdrawal of FX deposits as well as reduction of the operational costs of over-the-counter FX sales.
17. The authorities continue to make efforts to safeguard financial sector stability. To this end, they completed the Asset Quality Review (AQR) in December 2019. Despite having identified the need to recapitalize seven banks, 96 percent of the system’s capital needs are concentrated in three banks. Five of the seven banks have concluded their capitalization process. Regarding the BPC, the authorities are proceeding with the restructuring plan. In addition, the process of strengthening Recredit’s autonomy and governance was concluded, including restricting its mandate to purchasing NPLs from BPC only.

V. STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND GOVERNANCE

18. The authorities are determined to pursue their structural reform agenda. Once the pandemic subsides, they plan to remove fuel subsidies and increase public transport tariffs to ensure cost recovery. They also look forward to implementing the recommendations of Public Investment Management Assessment mission, conducted in January 2020.
19. To promote private sector-led growth and economic diversification, in line with the guideposts of the NDP18–22, the authorities submitted a new Private Investment Law to the NA aimed to streamline Foreign Direct Investment procedures. They also continued to work closely with the World Bank to reduce the costs of doing business. Furthermore, the draft Law on the Recovery of Enterprises and Insolvency, and related regulations, geared towards strengthening the system of credit guarantees and improving the efficiency of the insolvency system is expected to be approved in the 2020Q3.
20. The Government Privatization Program (PROPRIV) for 2019–22 aimed at privatizing 195 SOEs including Sonangol’s non-core assets, remains on course. By April 2020 more than 14 SOEs had been privatized through public tenders and 40 more are expected to be

privatized by end-2020. Privatization receipts will be used primarily for infrastructure financing, strengthening viable SOEs to be privatized, and repayments of central government debt.

21. The authorities remain committed to strengthening governance and fighting corruption. They have intensified corruption investigations, resulting in increased charges and lawsuits against former government officials, including high level trials for misappropriation, fraud and embezzlement. Further, the National Assets Recovery Service, a special agency created by the Attorney General's Office to recover assets financed illegally through public funds, has recovered assets, and froze bank accounts linked to individuals related to the Luanda Leaks scandal. The authorities are also in discussions with the United Nations to open an agency in Angola to fight drugs, crimes, corruption and terrorism. At the same time, they are working on revisions to the SOE law to enhance internal controls and governance. Furthermore, to enhance the transparency of public procurement, budget units started to publish their annual purchase plan on the Public Purchase's Portal within the National Service for Public Procurement.

VI. CONCLUSION

22. The authorities remain firmly committed to their reform agenda aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability and enhancing sustainable and inclusive growth. They are determined to continue implementing appropriate fiscal, monetary, and structural policies to set the economy on a higher growth path. They appreciate the continued Fund engagement and policy advice and look forward to the Executive Directors' support towards completion of the third review under the EFF arrangement.