

Monetary Policy Transmission in Emerging Markets: Proverbial Concerns, Novel Evidence

Ariadne Checo
IMF

Francesco Grigoli
IMF

Damiano Sandri
BIS and CEPR

IMF Advances in Monetary Economics
September 19, 2024

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF, the BIS, their Executive Boards, or their management.

Motivation

- Major advancements in the analysis of MP transmission in AEs
 - ▶ Credible identification approaches: narrative approach (C. Romer and D. Romer, [1994](#)), HFI (Kuttner, [2001](#); Cochrane and Piazzesi, [2002](#))

Motivation

- Major advancements in the analysis of MP transmission in AEs
 - ▶ Credible identification approaches: narrative approach (C. Romer and D. Romer, [1994](#)), HFI (Kuttner, [2001](#); Cochrane and Piazzesi, [2002](#))
- Much less progress in EMs
 - ▶ Narrative and HFI hard to replicate in EMs
 - ▶ Diverse MP communication strategies, less developed futures markets, govt yields also influenced by liquidity conditions and risk premia

Motivation

- Major advancements in the analysis of MP transmission in AEs
 - ▶ Credible identification approaches: narrative approach (C. Romer and D. Romer, 1994), HFI (Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002)
 - Much less progress in EMs
 - ▶ Narrative and HFI hard to replicate in EMs
 - ▶ Diverse MP communication strategies, less developed futures markets, govt yields also influenced by liquidity conditions and risk premia
 - Proverbial concerns about the effectiveness of MP in EMs
 - ▶ Limited financial development, currency mismatches, lower institutional credibility (Frankel, 2010)
 - ▶ Sensitivity to global financial shocks, even under flexible exchange rates (Hélène Rey, 2015; Dedola, Rivolta, and Stracca, 2017; Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019; Kalemli-Özcan, 2019; Miranda-Agrippino and Hélène Rey, 2020)
 - ▶ EMs' bond yields rise after US MP tightening despite EMs' loosening (Degasperi, Hong, and Ricco, 2020; De Leo, Gopinath, and Kalemli-Özcan, 2022)
- ⇒ Yet, EMs handled the post-COVID inflation surge better than expected

Motivation

- Major advancements in the analysis of MP transmission in AEs
 - ▶ Credible identification approaches: narrative approach (C. Romer and D. Romer, 1994), HFI (Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002)
- Much less progress in EMs
 - ▶ Narrative and HFI hard to replicate in EMs
 - ▶ Diverse MP communication strategies, less developed futures markets, govt yields also influenced by liquidity conditions and risk premia
- Proverbial concerns about the effectiveness of MP in EMs
 - ▶ Limited financial development, currency mismatches, lower institutional credibility (Frankel, 2010)
 - ▶ Sensitivity to global financial shocks, even under flexible exchange rates (Hélène Rey, 2015; Dedola, Rivolta, and Stracca, 2017; Iacoviello and Navarro, 2019; Kalemli-Özcan, 2019; Miranda-Agrippino and Hélène Rey, 2020)
 - ▶ EMs' bond yields rise after US MP tightening despite EMs' loosening (Degasperi, Hong, and Ricco, 2020; De Leo, Gopinath, and Kalemli-Özcan, 2022)
 - ⇒ Yet, EMs handled the post-COVID inflation surge better than expected
- Do these concerns imply **impaired transmission**? Not necessarily

Contribution

1. We construct **new MP shocks** for 18 EMs over 1999–2022
 - ▶ We use analysts' forecasts of policy rate decisions from Bloomberg
 - ▶ Identification assumption → analysts (like investors) construct forecasts by incorporating the endogenous reaction of MP to economic conditions
 - ▶ Key feature → **analysts can update forecasts up to MP meeting**

⇒ Forecast errors, $FE_{a,c,t} = i_{c,t} - f_{a,c,t}$, reflect MP surprises (\sim HFI), and we orthogonalize them wrt macro and financial variables

Contribution

1. We construct **new MP shocks** for 18 EMs over 1999–2022
 - ▶ We use analysts' forecasts of policy rate decisions from Bloomberg
 - ▶ Identification assumption → analysts (like investors) construct forecasts by incorporating the endogenous reaction of MP to economic conditions
 - ▶ Key feature → **analysts can update forecasts up to MP meeting**
 - ⇒ Forecast errors, $FE_{a,c,t} = i_{c,t} - f_{a,c,t}$, reflect MP surprises (\sim HFI), and we orthogonalize them wrt macro and financial variables
2. We use these shocks to **assess MP transmission in EMs** to
 - ▶ Financial markets
 - ▶ Macroeconomic aggregates
 - ▶ Firm-level outcomes

Related literature

- We build on a large literature using HFI in AEs to study transmission to
 - ▶ Financial markets
(Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005; Hanson and Stein, 2015; Gilchrist, López-Salido, and Zakrajšek, 2015; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018; Andrade and Ferroni, 2021; Swanson, 2021)
 - ▶ Macroeconomic conditions
(Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Jarociński and Karadi, 2020; Miranda Agrippino and Ricco, 2021; Bauer and Swanson, 2023)
 - ▶ Firms
(Ottonello and Winberry, 2020; Jeenas, 2019; Cloyne et al., 2023; Caglio, Darst, and Kalemli-Özcan, 2021)
- And contribute to a slim literature on EMs using
 - ▶ Taylor-rule residuals for a panel
(Brandão-Marques et al., 2021; Deb et al., 2023)
 - ▶ Bloomberg forecast for Chile
(Aruoba et al., 2021)
 - ▶ Changes in forward exchange rate premium for 5 EMs
(Witheridge, 2024)


Presentation outline

- 1 Construction of monetary policy shocks
- 2 MP transmission to financial markets
- 3 MP transmission to macroeconomic conditions
- 4 MP transmission to firm-level outcomes


Analysts' forecasts of policy rate decisions

- Bloomberg analysts' forecasts for 18 EMs starting in 1999
 - ▶ 58,321 policy rate forecasts for 2,522 MP meetings
- Critical that forecasts **incorporate relevant info up to MP decision**
 - ▶ Virtually all forecasts are recorded within 2 weeks prior to the meeting
 - ▶ If analysts submitted their forecast at random times → forecast errors should decline as later submission would leverage more info
 - ▶ Instead, forecasts errors *do not* decline as the meeting approaches

Forecast submissions (percent)



Absolute forecast errors (basis points)




Validation of monetary policy surprises

- For each MP meeting, we construct an associated MP surprise

$$mps_{t,c} = \frac{\sum_a FE_{t,c,a}}{N_{t,c}}$$

where $FE_{t,c,a}$ are analysts' forecast errors


- Forecast-based MP surprises tightly correlate with HF shocks in the US (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018)




Validation of monetary policy surprises

- Movements in government yields and other key variables are larger in correspondence of MP meetings
- No autocorrelation in monetary policy surprises

Kernel density, 1y govt bond yield



Correlogram of mps , Brazil



From monetary policy *surprises* to *shocks*

- Following Bauer and Swanson (2023), we orthogonalize mps using info prior to the meeting to remove any residual predictability
- We orthogonalize the mps with respect to
 - ▶ Prices: inflation, expected inflation, commodity inflation, wage growth
 - ▶ Real variables: IP, expected IP, unemployment rate
 - ▶ Financial variables: exchange rate, expected exchange rate, stock prices
- We detect modest predictability, average R^2 is 0.08
 - ▶ Forecasters tend to under-estimate MP countercyclicality
- We refer to the orthogonalized MP surprises mps^\perp as **MP shocks**

Presentation outline

- 1 Construction of monetary policy shocks
- 2 MP transmission to financial markets
- 3 MP transmission to macroeconomic conditions
- 4 MP transmission to firm-level outcomes

Econometric approach: financial market impact

- We assess the impact of MP shocks on financial markets using event-study regressions (Cook and Hahn, 1989; Kuttner, 2001)


$$y_{c,t+h} - y_{c,t-1} = \alpha_c^h + \beta^h mps_{c,t}^\perp + \varepsilon_{c,t}^h$$

where

- ▶ $y_{c,t}$ is a financial variable in country c at time t
 - ▶ $mps_{c,t}^\perp$ are MP shocks
- Analysis is based on daily data

Financial market responses to a 1pp MP shock

- MP shocks have **large and persistent effects on bond yields**
- They also tend to reduce spreads, appreciate the ER, and lower stock prices but effects are short-lived



Presentation outline

- 1 Construction of monetary policy shocks
- 2 MP transmission to financial markets
- 3 MP transmission to macroeconomic conditions**
- 4 MP transmission to firm-level outcomes

Econometric approach: macroeconomic impact

- We assess the impact of MP shocks on macroeconomic conditions using local projections on monthly data







$$Y_{c,t+h} - Y_{c,t-1} = \alpha_c^h + \beta^h I_{c,t} + A^h(L)\Delta Y_{c,t-1} + B^h(L)P_{c,t-1} + \tau_t^h + \epsilon_{c,t}^h$$

where

- ▶ $Y_{c,t}$ includes 1-year bond yields, IP, unemployment, PPI, CPI, and exchange rate
 - ▶ $I_{c,t} = mps_{c,t}^\perp$ in baseline estimates
 - ▶ $P_{c,t-1}$ includes pandemic-related variables (infections, lockdowns, and policy support measures)
 - ▶ Time fixed effects τ_t^h critical to control for global shocks
- Results are robust to using our MP shocks as external instruments for movements in 1-year bonds (Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Stock and Watson, 2018; Bauer and Swanson, 2023)

Macroeconomic responses to a MP shock

- A MP tightening that increases 1-year yields by 1pp leads to a 2pp contraction in IP and a more persistent increase in unemployment
- CPI and PPI drop by 4 and 6pp, respectively; and the exchange rate appreciates



Presentation outline

- 1 Construction of monetary policy shocks
- 2 MP transmission to financial markets
- 3 MP transmission to macroeconomic conditions
- 4 MP transmission to firm-level outcomes

Econometric approach: firm-level impact

- We assess the impact of MP shocks on 9,423 publicly listed firms, allowing for heterogeneity based on firms' financial characteristics


$$y_{f,t+h} - y_{f,t-1} = \alpha_f^h + (\beta^h + \gamma^h F_f) I_{c,t} + \phi^h F_f + A^h(L) \Delta y_{f,t-1} + B^h(L) X_{c,t-1} + \tau_{s,t}^h + \epsilon_{f,t}^h$$

where

- ▶ $y_{f,t}$ is firms' sales, fixed capital, or employment
 - ▶ F_f is firms' leverage, liquidity or dividend dummy
 - ▶ $I_{c,t} = mps_{c,t}^\perp$
 - ▶ $X_{c,t-1}$ includes country-level controls
 - ▶ $\tau_{s,t}^h$ are sector-time fixed effects
- Results are robust to using time-varying F_f or rescaled by country levels
 - Analysis is based on quarterly data


Average firm-level responses to a MP shock

- Consider first the average impact of MP across firms
- In line with theoretical priors, MP tightening triggers
 - ▶ Swift contraction in investment
 - ▶ More delayed reduction in sales and employment



Heterogeneous response to a MP shock

- MP policy has **stronger effects on financially constrained firms**, as reflected in higher leverage and lack of dividend payments



Conclusion

- **Novel MP shocks for EMs** based on analysts' forecasts of MP decisions
 - ▶ Analysts incorporate information up to the MP meeting
 - ▶ Analysts tend to underestimate MP countercyclicality
- MP transmission **operates similarly to AEs**
 - ▶ Strong and persistent effect on bond yields
 - ▶ Negative impact on IP and inflation
 - ⇒ Lags and quantitative effects in line with evidence from the US
 - ▶ Stronger impact on financially constrained firms
- **Encouraging evidence** about the effectiveness of MP transmission in EMs
 - ▶ A large literature shows that global financial shocks can affect financial conditions in EMs, casting doubts of the effectiveness of MP
 - ▶ We find that MP retains traction on domestic conditions to lean against global financial shocks