CHILE

PROPOSAL FOR AN ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE SHORT-TERM LIQUIDITY LINE—PRESS RELEASE; STAFF REPORT; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR CHILE

In the context of the Proposal for an Arrangement Under the Short-Term Liquidity Line, the following documents have been released and are included in this package:

- A Press Release including a statement by the Chair of the Executive Board.

- The Staff Report prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board’s consideration on May 20, 2022, following discussions that ended on March 25, 2022, with the officials of Chile on economic developments and policies underpinning the IMF arrangement under the Short-Term Liquidity Line. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on May 5, 2022.

- A Supplementary Information updating information on recent developments.

- A Statement by the Executive Director for Chile.

The IMF’s transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities’ policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents.

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Chile Receives IMF´s First Short-term Liquidity Line

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

• The Chilean authorities have accepted an offer of a Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL) arrangement amounting to about US$3.5 billion (145 percent of quota, the maximum amount under this arrangement) and notified the IMF of their decision to exit the Flexible Credit Line (FCL). The SLL will support Chile’s economic resilience by providing a backstop for potential, moderate, short-term liquidity needs.

• This is the first SLL arrangement ever approved by the Fund. The facility, which was created in 2020, is a revolving and renewable backstop for members with very strong fundamentals and policy track records. Qualification criteria for support under the SLL are the same as for support under the FCL.

• Following a swift and wide-ranging policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Chile’s recovery is well-entrenched, macroeconomic policies have been recalibrated, and the authorities built comfortable liquidity buffers, allowing Chile to successfully transition to the SLL.

Washington, DC – May 20, 2022: Chile accepted today the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) offer of a one-year Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL) arrangement, amounting to about US$3.5 billion (145 percent of quota, or the equivalent of SDR 2.529 billion, the maximum amount under this arrangement). The authorities also notified the Fund on their decision to exit the current two-year Flexible Credit Line (FCL) arrangement (see Press Release No. 20/227).

This is the first ever arrangement under the SLL, which was established on April 21, 2020 (see Press Release No. 20/180).1 The facility is designed to be a liquidity backstop for members with very strong policy frameworks and fundamentals that face potential, moderate, short-term balance of payments needs. Recipients can draw from the liquidity line at any time that balance of payment needs arise. Disbursements are not phased nor tied to compliance with policy targets as in regular IMF-supported programs. As envisaged under the SLL policy, the Chilean authorities plan to treat the SLL as precautionary.

Following a swift and wide-ranging policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Chile’s economic recovery is well-entrenched. The authorities have successfully recalibrated macroeconomic policies and built comfortable liquidity buffers, while maintaining macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability. The SLL will complement existing buffers,

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1 The Fund extends an offer of an SLL arrangement to those members that qualify. The IMF’s Board approves the extension of the offer. The arrangement becomes effective once the Fund confirms receipt of the member’s signed written communication, including the acceptance of the offer and policy commitments. For more information about the SLL process, please see Press Release No. 20/180 and Policy Paper No. 20/025.
support resilience, and provide a confidence signal on Chile’s very strong fundamentals and policies.

Chile qualifies for the SLL given its very strong economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks, a sustained track record of implementing very strong policies, and the authorities’ commitment to maintain very strong policies in the future. Qualification criteria for the SLL are the same as those for the FCL, which facilitates the transition between the two facilities.

Following the Executive Board’s discussion on Chile, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

“I am delighted that Chile has accepted the Fund’s offer of an SLL, becoming the first user of this special and innovative instrument.

“Chile has very strong fundamentals and policy frameworks, and a sustained track record of implementing policies that have supported the country’s resilience in the face of large shocks. The very strong policy frameworks are anchored in a long-standing structural fiscal balance rule, credible inflation-targeting with a free-floating exchange rate, and a sound financial system supported by effective regulation and supervision.

“Following an impressive vaccination campaign and an effective and well-coordinated policy response, the Chilean economy has rapidly recovered from the fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic. The progress made in recalibrating macroeconomic policies and building comfortable liquidity buffers facilitates the successful transition to the SLL, which will further support Chile’s external resilience by providing a revolving liquidity backstop in foreign exchange.”

For more information on the IMF’s Short-term Liquidity Line visit:

CHILE

PROPOSAL FOR AN ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE SHORT-TERM LIQUIDITY LINE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context: The Chilean economy has rapidly recovered from the fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic, thanks to an impressive vaccination campaign and effective policy support. The authorities will continue leveraging on Chile’s very strong fundamentals and policy frameworks to safeguard the recovery, preserve macroeconomic stability, and boost inclusive and green growth.

Risks: Risks and uncertainty have abated since the onset of Covid-19 but remain elevated. External risks include an escalation of the war in Ukraine; an adverse turn of the pandemic; and sharply tighter global financial conditions. Domestic risks include social discontent stemming from high energy and food prices, unmet social demands, or the uncertain outcome of the constitutional reform. Low public debt, a sustained track record of very strong policies, and very strong institutional policy frameworks support Chile’s resilience and capacity to respond to shocks.

Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL): In May 2021, the Executive Board concluded the mid-term review of Chile’s two-year Flexible Credit Line (FCL) arrangement of SDR 17.443 billion (1,000 percent of quota, around US$24 billion) on the back of very strong fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks. Considering the speedy recovery, the ongoing unwinding of the extraordinary Covid-19 stimulus, and the build-up of foreign exchange (FX) liquidity buffers, the authorities wish to exit the FCL. In staff’s view, Chile meets the qualification criteria to access SLL resources (which are identical to the FCL criteria). Staff recommends that the Executive Board extends an SLL “offer” for SDR 2.529 billion (145 percent of quota, around US$3.5 billion) to support the authorities’ exit strategy and the country’s external resilience. The last Article IV was concluded in April 2021. The 2022 Article IV is planned for the fall, following the conclusion of the constitutional reform process.

Process: If the Executive Board approves the SLL arrangement, such approval will be contingent on receiving written communication from the authorities stating that they wish to avail themselves of the SLL arrangement and upon notification of the cancelation of the existing FCL arrangement. The SLL arrangement would enter into effect when the Fund confirms receipt of the authorities’ written communication, which would allow purchases (if needed) over its 12-month duration.
CONTEXT

1. **Chile maintains very strong economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks, with a sustained track record of implementing very strong policies.** Monetary policy is anchored in a highly credible inflation-targeting framework, accompanied by a free-floating exchange rate regime. The financial system is resilient and functions well within a sound regulatory framework. Fiscal policy has been guided by a structural fiscal balance rule since 2001, which allowed Chile to build ample fiscal space during commodity price booms. Chile has remained resilient even on the face of very large shocks, such as the 2019 social unrest and the Covid-19 pandemic. After taking office in March, President Boric’s administration is embarking on a far-reaching reform agenda to tackle inequality, improve social services, and foster a green economy, while committing to preserving macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability.

2. **An SLL arrangement would complement the authorities’ strategy to exit the FCL and support external resilience.** The 2020 FCL arrangement served the country well by providing an important buffer against tail risks. Since its approval, the authorities were explicit in their intention to treat the arrangement as precautionary and exit after two years, conditional on economic and financial developments. The economic recovery is firmly established, and risks and uncertainty, while still elevated, have diminished since the onset of the pandemic. Moreover, the authorities have built adequate reserve buffers and secured access to FX liquidity lines. An SLL arrangement would complement the authorities’ plans to exit the FCL and support external resilience by providing predictable liquidity support to address potential, moderate, short-term balance of payment needs stemming from pressures on the capital account.

3. **Staff conducted a fact-finding mission in March to assess qualification.** The most recent Article IV consultation was concluded in April 2021, when the Executive Board provided a very positive assessment of Chile’s policies. The 2022 Article IV is tentatively planned for the fall, following the conclusion of the constitutional reform process.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

4. **Chile implemented an impressive Covid-19 vaccination campaign, helping limit the health toll from the pandemic.** As of end-March, 91 percent of the population had received two doses of the Covid-19 vaccine, and 77 percent of the population had received a booster shot (with a second booster available for the elderly since February). Covid-19 cases peaked in mid-February with the emergence of the Omicron variant, but have fallen quickly since then, while the use of ICU beds remains well below past peaks. Compared with mid-2021, when the country was in strict lockdown, mobility restrictions have significantly eased.

5. **The economic recovery is firmly established.** Following a decline of 6.1 percent in 2020, GDP rebounded by 11.7 percent in 2021, buoyed by a large, effective, and well-coordinated policy

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response (Box 1), widespread vaccination, and high copper prices. Economic activity surpassed the
pre-pandemic and pre-social unrest levels by mid-2021, and staff estimates that the output gap
moved into positive territory in 2021. The recovery in the labor market is proceeding but at a slower
pace, with employment about 4 percent below its pre-pandemic level in February.

6. **The current account deficit widened alongside the sizable pandemic response.** The
current account deficit widened from 1.9 percent of GDP in 2020 to 6.7 percent in 2021.2 The large
2021 current account deficit reflected the surge in the consumption of imported durable goods
following the Covid-19 stimulus measures, in particular the exceptional pension fund withdrawals
and large fiscal transfers. The continued fall in tourism revenues due to travel restrictions
contributed as well. The income balance also worsened in recent years on the back of large
repatriation of dividends from mining companies amid high copper prices.

7. **Chile’s financial sector remained resilient amid domestic uncertainty.** In line with trends
in other emerging market economies (EMs), non-resident portfolio outflows were substantial at the
onset of the Covid-19 shock, exceeding those during past episodes of stress. However, flows have
swiftly recovered since mid-2020. Compared to other EMs and LA5 countries,3 Chile experienced a
larger increase in longer-term yields in peso-denominated sovereign bonds during 2021, linked to
domestic uncertainty. With the conclusion of the elections at end-2021, uncertainty subsided, the
stock market recovered, spreads compressed, and long-term yields declined. In recent months, the
peso yield curve has inverted, as markets expect lower policy rates once inflation returns to target.

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2 Newly released external (and national) accounts resulted in substantial revisions to the current account deficit in recent years, reflecting new sources of information, methodological updates, and rebasing to 2018.

3 The LA5 group comprises Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
Box 1. Stimulus Measures in Response to COVID-19

To mitigate the fallout from the pandemic, the authorities deployed a broad set of fiscal, monetary, and financial stimulus measures. The measures helped to safeguard health, protected incomes and jobs, supported credit to the economy. They demonstrated strong coordination between the Chilean Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh), and the Financial Market Regulator (CMF). In addition, congress approved three rounds of pension withdrawals, for a cumulative of about 20 percent of 2020 GDP, which boosted consumption and supported the recovery. However, pension withdrawals were poorly targeted and weakened the pension system.

- The MoF implemented a multi-year fiscal package of about 18 percent of GDP, including 7.9 percent of GDP in transfers to the most vulnerable.
- The BCCh cut the policy rate to 0.5 percent in March 2020, conducted unconventional monetary policy via asset purchases, and expanded its liquidity facilities.
- The CMF implemented policies to facilitate the flow of credit to businesses and households and the issuance and placement of securities.

These measures were temporary, and the authorities are successfully removing them in light of the strong recovery, while continuing to target support to the most vulnerable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chile: Fiscal Measures in Response to COVID-19</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total size of the stimulus package</strong></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. On budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which: transfers to most vulnerable (IFE)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Off budget</strong></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Finance and IMF staff calculations.

1 For further details, see Chile – 2021 Article IV Consultation – IMF Country Report 21/83.

8. The free-floating exchange rate continued to play its role as a shock absorber.

The BCCh has allowed the exchange rate to adjust without discretionary intervention since 2002, except for temporary and small FX interventions during the 2019 social unrest (US$2.5 billion in the spot market and US$4.5 billion in the forwards market) to prevent disorderly market conditions. The NEER appreciated by 12 percent from the onset of the pandemic until 2021Q1, but the trend reversed by end-2021. In early 2022, the NEER appreciated again as uncertainty declined after the elections.
9. **In response to inflationary pressures, the BCCh appropriately tightened monetary policy consistent with the firmly established inflation targeting framework.** Buoyant domestic demand, pandemic-related supply constraints and currency depreciation, resulted in the build-up of significant inflationary pressures. Headline (core) inflation reached 9.4 (7.4) percent in March. Two-year ahead inflation expectations edged up to 3.7 percent, but inflation expectations over longer horizons remain firmly anchored at the 3 percent target. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the rise in global food and fuel prices are adding to prevailing inflationary pressures. The BCCh was a first mover globally in the tightening cycle, quickly raising the policy rate from a low of 0.5 percent in July 2021 to 7 percent in March (substantially above the estimated neutral rate of 3.5 percent). The BCCh has communicated its intention to continue tightening as needed to ensure inflation returns to the 3 percent target. In line with its long-standing policy, the BCCh remains committed to a free-floating exchange rate, resorting to intervention only to prevent disorderly market conditions.

10. **The BCCh built adequate international reserve buffers, complemented with FX liquidity lines.** In January 2021, the BCCh announced a program to gradually accumulate US$12 billion over 15 months. In October 2021, the program was suspended in light of financial market developments and the level of reserves already achieved, which was deemed sufficient by the BCCh. Cumulative purchases totaled US$7.4 billion, while the SDR general allocation further boosted reserves by about US$1.8 billion. Reserves stood at US$48.3 billion in March. A bilateral swap facility with the PBOC (US$7.9 billion) and a liquidity line with FLAR (US$1.25 billion) complement reserve buffers. The BCCH is also a subscriber of the FED’s FIMA repo facility, which allows the temporary exchange of U.S. Treasury securities held with the FED for U.S. dollars.

11. **The authorities are closely monitoring financial sector vulnerabilities, while further strengthening the already sound regulatory framework.** Banks’ capital adequacy ratio stood at 14.9 percent at end-2021, above the regulatory minimum, and non-performing loan (NPL) ratios

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4 The BCCh is also smoothly unwinding the unconventional liquidity measures. The stock of acquired assets has been gradually decreasing since June 2021 upon their expiration.

5 SDRs allocated to Chile amounted to US$2.4 billion, of which US$0.6 billion were used as a capital contribution to the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) and the remainder was kept in international reserves.

6 For additional details on the PBOC swap facility, see IMF Country Report No. 21/92.

7 This facility provides, at a backstop rate, an alternative temporary source of U.S. dollars for foreign official holders of Treasury securities other than open market sales of securities.
were low at 1.3 percent in February. Stress tests by the CMF show that provisions would be sufficient to cover potential losses, including from Covid-19 related government-guaranteed loans (FOGAPE). Banks’ return on equity recovered to 20.4 percent at end-2021, and credit growth has also picked up. The restructuring of CMF, which put the supervision of insurance, securities, and banks under the same umbrella, has further strengthened financial sector supervision. In addition, the implementation of Basel III standards that began in December 2021 will improve banks’ capital buffers and enhance financial sector resilience.

12. Following a sizable Covid-19 response, the government is embarking on needed structural fiscal consolidation guided by the fiscal rule. The new government has committed to upholding the fiscal consolidation in the 2022 budget, which targets a reduction in the structural fiscal deficit to 3.9 percent of GDP in 2022 (from 11.4 percent in 2021), underpinned by the expiration of the Covid-19 stimulus measures. Within the budget envelope, the authorities are continuing to target support to the most vulnerable (Box 2). Gross debt reached 36.3 percent of GDP by end-2021, which remains low by international standards. Medium-term fiscal consolidation plans, guided by the fiscal rule, will gradually reduce the structural deficit to below 1 percent of GDP and stabilize gross public debt below 45 percent of GDP, while replenishing the sovereign wealth fund.

13. The new administration envisions far-reaching reforms to improve the lives of Chileans within a sustainable macroeconomic framework. The new government aspires to improve social services, tackle inequality, and transition to a green economy. A forthcoming ambitious tax reform, centered on streamlining exemptions; fostering compliance; and raising mining royalties, the carbon tax, and the progressivity of direct personal taxation (including through a new wealth tax); aims to mobilize permanent revenues to finance social spending needs. Reforms of social protection systems would complement the recent approval of a universal basic pension, enhance the role of public service provision, and improve quality and access. Advancing the climate agenda, deepening capital markets, and boosting productivity are also key priorities.

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8 The decline benefited from the use of pension withdrawals by households to cancel debt, as regulatory forbearance expired in mid-2021.

9 On May 3 the new administration published its first quarterly fiscal report, which affirmed its intention to pursue a fiscal consolidation that would stabilize the gross public debt ratio below 45 percent of GDP. Staff’s baseline projections currently assume that debt stabilizes below that level with some margin, pending further information on the government’s expenditure and tax reform plans.

10 The government plans to submit the tax reform to congress by mid-year, aiming to gradually raise about 4 percent of GDP over the next few years. Potential revenue gains are not included in the projections.
14. **With the necessary removal of macroeconomic stimulus, growth is expected to decelerate in 2022 and over the medium term.** GDP growth is projected to decline to 1.5 percent in 2022 and 0.5 percent in 2023 —closing the output gap from above— and then converge to its potential rate of 2.5 percent over the medium term. The labor market is envisaged to continue healing, with employment reaching its pre-pandemic level in the near term. Inflation is expected to peak by mid-2022 and converge to target in 2024. The current account deficit is projected to narrow with the unwinding of the extraordinary stimulus and the softening of domestic demand, returning to values consistent with its historical average by the end of the forecast period.

15. **Risks and uncertainty have declined since the onset of the pandemic but remain elevated.** External risks relate to a possible escalation of sanctions and ensuing deglobalization resulting from the war in Ukraine. While Chile would benefit from high copper prices, rising global food and energy prices, or further supply chain disruptions would add to inflationary pressures. Risks also stem from the possible de-anchoring of inflation expectations in advanced economies leading to an abrupt tightening of global financial conditions, selloffs of risky assets, and capital outflows; or the possible appearance of more lethal and highly contagious Covid-19 variants, which could result in subpar and volatile growth. Domestic risks include social discontent over high food and energy prices, the pace and content of reforms, or the still uncertain outcome of the ongoing constitutional reform (Box 3).

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**Box 2. 2022 Inclusive Recovery Plan**

The government’s Inclusive Recovery Plan targets support to the most vulnerable within the 2022 budget envelope. The 2022 budget returns real spending to its pre-pandemic level. The Plan allocates about 1.3 percent of GDP of reserve funds already included in the budget. The funds are roughly equally split among three main areas:

- **Employment sectors of the economy still affected by the pandemic.** The Plan extends employment subsidies for formal employment introduced during the pandemic (IFE Laboral) until September and increases access to childcare and subsidies for working mothers with small children. It also includes measures to support tourism, culture, and entertainment sectors, whose recovery is lagging.

- **Households affected by high energy prices and new lockdowns.** The Plan aims to mitigate the impact of high energy prices on households, including by smoothing energy price increases for fuel and gas (through the MEPCO mechanism) and freezing public transport tariffs for the rest of the year. The Plan also increases the aid for students and the coverage of centers for the elderly, and intends to institutionalize the activation of universal cash transfers (IFE) in case of new lockdowns.

- **Medium and small-sized enterprises (SMEs).** The Plan considers temporary subsidies for SMEs to alleviate the impact of the planned increase of 14.3 percent in the minimum wage, and measures to facilitate the flow of credit through FOGAPE, the economic development agency (CORFO), and the startup accelerator (SERCOTEC).

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1 Some measures require legislative changes.
QUALIFICATION

16. In staff’s assessment, Chile meets the qualification criteria for an SLL. The external position is sustainable, the sovereign has access to international markets at favorable rates, and official reserves are adequate. The BCCh remains highly credible and, since July 2021, has embarked in a rapid tightening cycle to ensure the convergence of inflation to target. As evidenced by the 2021 FSAP, the financial sector functions well overall, banks are sufficiently capitalized, and the regulatory framework is sound. Public debt is sustainable and anchored by a strong fiscal framework guided by a structural fiscal balance rule.

17. Sustainable external position. In the 2021 Article IV Consultation, Chile’s external position was assessed as moderately stronger than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. Staff continues to assess the external position as sustainable. The 2021 current account deficit increased mainly due to the transitory Covid-19 stimulus measures but is projected to decline to its historical average with the ongoing tightening of macroeconomic policies.

Moreover, Chile’s net international investment position compares favorably to most EMs and improved considerably from -12 percent of GDP in 2020 to -4.9 percent of GDP in 2021. External debt decreased to 72 percent of GDP in 2021 and is robust to standard shocks (Annex 1). On average, the real effective exchange rate appreciated by about 3 percent in 2021. However, these

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11 See IMF Country Report No. 21/83. Per the 2018 FCL Operational Guidance Note, the core indicator for staff’s assessment of external sustainability requires the member’s external position to have been assessed, in the most recent Board document (Article IV or ESR), as “broadly consistent”, “moderately stronger (weaker)”, “stronger”, or “substantially stronger” than implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.

12 Chile’s external position improved, notwithstanding the liquidation of external assets from pension funds to enable the pension withdrawals, due to valuation effects and new inflows into the pension system.
masks a sharp depreciation of about 12 percent since April 2021 until end-2021, driven by domestic uncertainty.

18. Capital account position dominated by private flows. Capital flows to Chile are predominantly private and nearly 90 percent of Chile’s external debt is owed to private creditors. Private flows continue to account for the bulk of total (FDI, portfolio, and other) flows (74 percent of asset flows and 89 percent of liability flows on average over the last three years). The absolute value of general government plus central bank liability flows reached 36 percent of the total in 2021, which is unusually high but explained by the large repatriation of foreign assets to meet pandemic-related needs.

19. Track record of steady sovereign access to international capital markets at favorable terms. Chile has enjoyed uninterrupted access to international capital markets for several decades. It maintains investment grade status according to the three major rating agencies and is consistently among the highest-rated EMs. Sovereign bond spreads remained relatively stable over the past 18 months, after correcting from a sharp deterioration at the onset of the pandemic, and are consistently below those from other EMs (EMBIG and five-year CDS spreads stood at 157 and 70 bps

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13 For this particular indicator, the 2018 FCL Operational Guidance Note states that public flows should account for less than half of a member’s direct, portfolio, and other asset and liability flows, on average in the past three years. In addition to the composition of recent capital flows, an assessment of the international investment position is also relevant.

14 See IMF Country Report No. 21/83 for further details.

at end-March, respectively). The central government issued external debt in each of the past five
years, with a cumulative amount equivalent to about 1,500 percent of Chile’s Fund quota (well above
the 50 percent of quota requirement).

20. **Relatively comfortable international reserve position.** Gross international reserves are adequate, at about 91 percent of the Fund’s reserve adequacy metric (ARA) at end-2021. Although somewhat below the recommended 100 percent ARA metric, staff assesses reserves are adequate due to several mitigating factors. First, in mature market economies, reserves act mainly as a second line of defense against potential FX funding needs of the financial sector, and Chile’s reserves amply cover estimated potential short-term banks’ needs. Second, if counted as reserves, the central government’s usable liquid external assets (about US$20 billion in February, including US$6.4 billion in the sovereign wealth fund), would correspond to approximately 28 percent of the ARA metric. Third, standard benchmarks show that Chile compares favorably to other commodity-intensive mature market economies. Fourth, the authorities are strongly committed to the free-floating exchange rate regime, further reducing the need for reserves. Finally, reserves are complemented with several FX liquidity lines, as described in paragraph 10.

21. **Sustainable public debt position and sound public finances.** The authorities remain firmly committed to debt sustainability and fiscal responsibility. Gradual fiscal consolidation guided by the fiscal rule is expected to rebuild buffers and stabilize gross public debt below 45 percent of GDP, which is low by international standards. Public debt is mostly denominated in domestic currency, with an average maturity above ten years. Liquidity risks are mitigated by the sovereign wealth fund and the large

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17 Although banks’ external debt was US$29.7 billion at end-2021, a sizable portion is covered by the liquid segment of banks’ US$30.1 billion in foreign assets. By regulation, banks’ short FX positions due in thirty days cannot exceed long positions by more than the bank’s capital. In the non-bank part of the financial system, institutional investors (i.e., pension funds) have a positive net foreign asset position.

18 Reserve coverage of prospective imports is more than twice the standard benchmark at six months, while coverage of broad money and short-term external debt (remaining maturity) exceed benchmarks at 24.2 and 143 percent, respectively.
domestic banking sector, with abundant room to absorb sovereign issuances in case of an abrupt tightening of global financial conditions. Staff assesses Chile’s public debt to be sustainable with high probability, and a public debt sustainability analysis shows the debt trajectory is robust to standard shocks (Annex 2). The government’s intent to introduce a debt anchor and provide more predictability to medium-term fiscal paths will further enhance the strong fiscal framework. The 2021 Fiscal Transparency Evaluation concluded that Chile has strong fiscal institutions and sound fiscal transparency practices. ¹⁹

22. **Low and stable inflation in the context of a sound monetary and exchange rate policy framework.** Chile maintains a highly credible inflation-targeting regime with a free-floating exchange rate system. In the past five years, monthly (y/y) inflation averaged 3 percent. Medium-term inflation expectations have remained anchored over the past decade, reflecting a well-functioning framework with adequate policy guidance. In response to the recent spike in inflation, the BCCh demonstrated resolve to quickly tighten monetary policy and tackle inflationary pressures. The BCCh maintains a small negative equity, which does not compromise policy solvency nor require immediate recapitalization. The 2021 Transparency Review underscored BCCh’s high standards of policy analysis, conduct, and independence. ²⁰

23. **Sound financial system and the absence of solvency problems that may threaten systemic stability.** The solvency stress tests from the 2021 FSAP concluded that the banking sector is sufficiently capitalized, and solvency risks are low. Although a few individual banks would fall below the requirement under the adverse scenario, the implementation Basel III will strengthen banks’ capital positions. The banking system appears resilient to both sizeable funding risks and climate-related risks. Systemic risk arising from non-financial sector external debt is low. Stress tests in fixed income mutual funds suggest the need for enhancing liquidity management practices, while pension funds are equipped with sound liquidity management.

24. **Effective financial sector supervision.** The 2021 FSAP assessed the banking supervisory framework as robust and the CMF to be capably staffed with expertise in monitoring individual risks. In parallel, a regional peer assessment against the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standard by GAFILAT (FATF Latin America’s regional body) highlighted strengths and considerable progress in the implementation of AMT/CFT prevention systems.

¹⁹ See IMF Country Report No. 21/241 for further details.
²⁰ See IMF Country Report No. 21/113 for further details.
25. **Data transparency and integrity.** Since March 2020, Chile is an adherent to the Fund’s Special Data Dissemination Standard Plus—the highest tier of the IMF’s Data Standards Initiatives.

26. **Institutional strength and track record of strong policies.** Chile has a sustained track record of implementing very strong policies. Fiscal and monetary policies have been strongly countercyclical, anchored in very strong institutional frameworks. The free-floating exchange rate regime has been allowed to work as a shock absorber. In the recent period, the authorities’ response to the pandemic was effective and well-coordinated, making appropriate use of Chile’s hard-won policy space. The ongoing removal of macroeconomic stimulus, while targeting support to the most vulnerable, will help contain inflationary pressures, rebuild buffers, and mitigate risks. The new administration is committed to maintaining very strong macroeconomic policies.

**RATIONALE FOR SLL PROPOSAL AND ACCESS CONSIDERATIONS**

27. **An SLL arrangement would appropriately support Chile’s external resilience.** Against the speedy recovery, the ongoing removal of the extraordinary Covid-19 stimulus, and the build-up of adequate FX liquidity buffers, the authorities wish to exit the FCL. Although risks and uncertainty have diminished since the onset of the pandemic, Chile continues to be exposed to shocks, including volatility in international capital markets that could potentially inflict pressure on the capital account. An SLL would complement existing buffers, make available predictable FX liquidity support on advantageous terms, and provide a confidence signal on Chile’s very strong fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks.

28. **An SLL arrangement with revolving access of 145 percent of quota (SDR 2.529 billion; about US$3.5 billion) would cover most moderate, potential, short-term balance of payment needs.** Access of 145 percent of quota would cover balance of payment needs resulting from capital outflow shocks up to the 75th percentile of past outflow episodes. Given the build-up of FX liquidity buffers and the effective role of the flexible exchange rate as a shock absorber, the BCCh foresees drawing on the SLL only under exceptional circumstances.

![Chile: Net Portfolio Flows](chart1.png)

Chile: Exchange Rate Stress Index

Sources: STA BOP database, national authorities, and IMF staff calculations.

![Chile: Exchange Rate Stress Index](chart2.png)

21 For a full explanation of this special balance of payment need, see Policy Paper No. 20/025.
SAFEGUARDS

29. **Chile’s capacity to repay the Fund remains strong.** As envisaged under the SLL policy, the authorities plan to treat the proposed SLL arrangement as precautionary. Even if Chile were to draw all the resources available under the proposed SLL, its capacity to repay the Fund would remain manageable. In the event of a full purchase of the SLL resources, total external debt would increase moderately to 70 percent of GDP in 2023 and then decrease over the medium term. The peak stock of Fund credit in percent of GDP (1 percent), gross international reserves (6.9 percent), total external debt stock (1.5 percent), as well as peak debt service to the Fund in percent of GDP (1 percent) and exports of goods and services (2.9 percent) are all below typical exceptional access cases. Moreover, Chile has a good track record of meeting its obligations to the Fund. Several factors further mitigate risks to the Fund, including Chile’s adequate buffers, very strong policies and policy frameworks, and proven resilience.

30. **SLL safeguards procedures are underway.** In preparation for the proposed SLL arrangement, the BCCh has provided the authorization for an update of the safeguards procedures to be conducted by Fund staff in relation to the proposed arrangement. Safeguards procedures will be conducted based on a review of the most recently completed external audit of BCCh annual financial statements. A similar procedure was carried out for Chile’s FCL arrangement based on staff’s review of the 2019 audit results and discussions with the BCCh and its external auditors. No significant issues emerged.

STAFF APPRAISAL

31. **Staff considers that Chile meets the qualification criteria for access to SLL resources.** Chile has very strong fundamentals and policy frameworks, and a sustained track record of implementing very strong policies that have supported the country’s resilience in the face of large shocks. The authorities remain committed to maintaining very strong policies in the future. Staff considers that Chile meets all the qualification criteria for an SLL (which are identical to the FCL).

32. **Staff recommends that the Board extends an SLL “offer” to Chile for 145 percent of quota (SDR 2.529 billion).** Although risks and uncertainty have declined since the onset of the pandemic, they remain elevated. The SLL would complement the authorities’ strategy to exit the FCL and support external resilience. An SLL is an appropriate instrument, as it would provide access to FX liquidity to counter potential, moderate, short-term balance of payment needs related to capital account pressures. If the Executive Board approves the SLL arrangement, such approval will be contingent on receiving written communication from the authorities stating that they wish to avail themselves of the SLL arrangement, and upon notification to the Fund by the authorities of the cancelation of the existing FCL arrangement. Funds from the new SLL arrangement could be accessed at any point during the next 12 months following effectiveness of the SLL.
Figure 1. Chile: Peak Fund Exposure and Debt Service Ratios for Recent Exceptional Access Cases 1/ 2/
(Exceptional Access cases since September 2008)

Sources: Finance Department and IMF staff estimates.
1/ Estimates as reported in relevant staff reports on the request of SBAs or arrangements under the EFF approved since September 2008. Also includes ratios reported in relevant staff reports of FCL arrangements for Mexico (2019 and 2021), Colombia (2020), Peru (2020), and Chile (2020).
2/ Asterisks indicate PRGT-eligible countries at the time of the program. In Panel F, Georgia’s debt service to the Fund includes one from PRGF loan.
3/ Excluding arrangements with members belonging to the euro area at the time of the approval of the arrangement: Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.
4/ For arrangements of which total external debt (or debt service) ratio is not available, public external debt ratio is shown instead.
Figure 2. Chile: COVID-19 Developments

COVID-19 cases fell sharply after surging in February...

New COVID-19 Cases
(Per one million inhabitants; 7 day moving average)

New COVID-19 Deaths
(Per one million inhabitants; 7 day moving average)

Chile remains a regional leader in testing...

New COVID-19 Tests
(Per one thousand inhabitants; 7 day moving average)

Total COVID-19 Vaccinations
(Per one hundred inhabitants)

Economic activity has recovered past pre-pandemic levels...

Economic Activity Index
(In yoy percent change)

Google Mobility Index 1/
(In percent change from baseline; 7 day moving average)

...as well as in vaccinations.

...in part aided by the easing of mobility restrictions.

Sources: Our World in Data COVID-19 dataset, Haver, Google Community Mobility Reports, national authorities, and IMF staff calculations.
1/ Baseline is the median value, for the corresponding day of the week, during the 5-week period of January 3–February 6, 2020.
Figure 3. Chile: Financial Comparison with LA5 and Other EMEs 1/

Chile’s equity index has only recently recovered to its pre-pandemic levels... ...while the peso outperformed peer currencies.

Domestic Equity Indices 2/
Jan 03, 2020 = 100

Local Currency per US Dollar Indices 3/
Jan 03, 2020 = 100

After increasing acutely in early 2020, EMBI spreads have stabilized at levels slightly above those seen pre-pandemic...

EMBIG Spreads 4/
Difference in spreads (basis points) relative to Jan 03, 2020

...as have CDS spreads.

CDS Spreads
Difference in spreads (basis points) relative to Jan 03, 2020

Domestic currency bond yields are still below the average of emerging market peers...

Domestic Currency Sovereign Bond Yields 5/
Yield to Maturity

...although they have rapidly increased since the the start of the pandemic.

Domestic Currency Sovereign Bond Yields 5/
Difference in yields (expressed in basis points) relative to Jan 03, 2020

Sources: Haver Analytics and Bloomberg LLP.
1/ Selected sample of emerging market countries including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
2/ National benchmark share price indices.
3/ Index is equal to 100 in the first business day of 2020. As a result, percentage changes in the index cannot be interpreted as percentage changes of the underlying exchange rate.
4/ Mexico’s EMBIG includes Sovereign and Quasi.
5/ 10 year government bond or closest available maturity.
Chile experienced portfolio outflows during past episodes of stress...

Chile: Portfolio Flows
(In percent of IMF quota, red line indicates 145% of quota)

...while international reserves increased notably over the past 2 years.

Chile: International Reserves
(In US$ billions)

Sources: IMF BOP database and IMF staff calculations.

Sources: EPFR and IMF staff calculations.
Economic activity grew 11.8% yoy S.A. in 2021Q4, led by growth in services.

...while consumption and investment recovered from their sharp falls in 2020...

...with private consumption reflecting growth in services and nondurable goods...

Non-mining IMACEC grew 8.3% in February, as mining IMACEC growth fell to -1.5%

...while business confidence began to recover in 2022Q1.

Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Ministry of Finance, Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.

1/ IMACEC is a monthly economic activity indicator.
Figure 6. Chile: External Sector

External demand grew 2.2% in 2021Q4 after a sharp recovery in 2020Q2.

External Demand Growth from Trading Partners 1/
(In percent)

...as a fall in net income and services outweighed a small trade surplus.

Current Account Decomposition
(In millions of US dollars)

Net IIP continues on an increasing trend, reaching 5.0% of annualized GDP in 2021Q4.

Balance of Payments and IIP
(In percent of quarterly GDP)

...while the current account in Q4 remained negative at -9.3% of GDP.

Savings, Investment, and the Current Account
(In percent of GDP)

The peso depreciated more than the currencies of other commodity exporters, converging to the LA6 average.

Real Effective Exchange Rate
(Index avg. 1996=100)

...while gross international reserves remain close to the ARA metric.

Gross Reserves and Reserve Adequacy Metric 5/
(In billions of U.S. dollars)

Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.
1/ Calculated as average real GDP growth of trading partners, weighted by their respective share in Chilean exports.
2/ LA6 includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
3/ Commodity exporters includes Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
4/ As a percent of annualized quarterly GDP.
5/ Assessing Reserve Adequacy, IMF.
Banks’ profitability stood at 20.4% in December 2021...

While capital ratios are lower than in other countries, they are expected to increase in line with Basel III.

...and non-performing loans have remained low.

Credit growth mostly recovered from the sharp drop in 2021H1, reaching a growth rate of 8.4% in February...

Total mutual funds assets fell as medium and long term fixed income funds decreased.

Sources: Comision Para el Mercado Financiero (CMF), Central Bank of Chile, IMF Financial Soundness Indicators 2015, and IMF staff calculations.

1/Includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
### Table 1. Chile: Selected Social and Economic Indicators 1/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (2020), in billions of pesos</th>
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<th>Quota in millions of SDRs</th>
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<td>Unemployment rate (annual average)</td>
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<td>Inflation (End of period, %)</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<td>Inflation (average, %)</td>
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<td>of which, FX-denominated debt</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>of which, share of FX-denominated debt</td>
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<td>Current account (in billions of U.S. dollars)</td>
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<td>272,635</td>
<td>285,737</td>
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<td>(percentage change)</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
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<td>(percentage change)</td>
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Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Ministry of Finance, Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations and projections.

1/ The annual numbers occasionally show a small discrepancy with the authorities’ published figures, as they are calculated as the sum of the quarterly series seasonally-adjusted by staff.
2/ Investment is defined as gross fixed capital formation plus changes in inventories.
3/ Contribution to growth.
4/ Includes liabilities of the central government, the Central Bank of Chile and public enterprises. Excludes Recognition Bonds.
### Table 2. Chile: Summary Operations of the Central Government
(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)

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**Memorandum Items**

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<td>315.9</td>
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</table>

Sources: Ministry of Finance and IMF staff calculations and projections.

1/ The Fiscal Impulse is defined as the negative of the annual change of the structural non-mining primary balance.

2/ Includes liabilities of the central government, the central bank of Chile and non-financial public enterprises. Excludes Recognition Bonds.

3/ Includes the central government and municipality governments.
### Table 3. Chile: Balance of Payments 1/

(In US$ billions, unless otherwise specified)

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2/ Excluding change in reserves.

#### Memorandum Items

- **Copper price (WEO; U.S. cents per pound):**
  - 2019: 273
  - 2020: 280
  - 2021: 423
  - 2022: 458
  - 2023: 456
  - 2024: 450
  - 2025: 442
  - 2026: 437
  - 2027: 435

- **Volume of copper exports (2004=100):**
  - 2019: 104
  - 2020: 106
  - 2021: 102
  - 2022: 105
  - 2023: 109
  - 2024: 113
  - 2025: 117
  - 2026: 120
  - 2027: 124

Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations and projections.

1/ The annual numbers occasionally show a small discrepancy with the authorities published figures, as they are calculated as the sum of the quarterly series seasonally-adjusted by staff.

2/ Excluding change in reserves.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 4. Chile: Monetary Survey</th>
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<td>(In billions of pesos, unless otherwise specified)</td>
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<td><strong>Central Bank</strong></td>
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<td>Net international reserves</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net international reserves (in millions of US$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net credit to general government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net claims on banks and financial corporations</td>
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<td>Credit to the private sector</td>
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<td>Other items (net)</td>
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<td>Currency</td>
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<td>Required reserves</td>
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<td><strong>Other Depository Institutions</strong></td>
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<td>Net foreign assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign assets (in millions of US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net domestic assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net credit to general government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit to the private sector</td>
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<td>Other items (net)</td>
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<td>Liabilities to the private sector</td>
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<td>Demand deposits</td>
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<td>Quasi-money</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Banking System</strong></td>
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<td>Net foreign assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net domestic assets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net credit to general government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit to the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other items (net)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liabilities to the private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Money</td>
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<td>Quasi-money</td>
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<td><strong>Memorandum Items</strong></td>
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<td>Monetary base (Annual percentage change)</td>
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<td>Liabilities to the private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit to the private sector (banking system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In percent of GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities to the private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit to the private sector (banking system)</td>
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Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Haver, and IMF staff calculations.
Table 5. Chile: Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework 1/  

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<th>National Accounts</th>
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<td>Total domestic demand</td>
<td>0.9 -9.5</td>
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<td>Consumption</td>
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<td>Private</td>
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<td>Public</td>
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<td>Investment 2/</td>
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<td>Fixed</td>
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<td>Potential growth</td>
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<td>Output gap (percent)</td>
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<td>Consumer prices</td>
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<td>Consumer prices (average)</td>
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<td>Nominal GDP growth</td>
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<td>Potential growth</td>
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<td>Output gap (percent)</td>
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<th>Balance of Payments</th>
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<td>Current account</td>
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<td>Trade balance</td>
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<td>Financial account balance</td>
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<td>Of which, foreign direct investment (net)</td>
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<td>Change in reserves assets</td>
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<td>Reers and omissions</td>
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<td>REER (in percent y/y = appreciation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total export volume</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total import volume</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terms of trade</td>
<td>-1.8 11.6</td>
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<td>Export prices</td>
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<td>Copper export price</td>
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<td>Import prices</td>
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<table>
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<th>External Debt</th>
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<td>Gross external debt</td>
<td>66.7 77.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>6.2 8.9</td>
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<td>Private</td>
<td>60.5 69.0</td>
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<td>Gross int. reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars)</td>
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<td>Public</td>
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<td>Private</td>
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<td>National saving</td>
<td>19.8 19.9</td>
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<td>Private</td>
<td>20.3 25.1</td>
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<td>Central government debt net of treasury assets</td>
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<td>Labor force</td>
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<td>Employment</td>
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<td>Unemployment rate (in percent)</td>
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Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Ministry of Finance, National Statistics Institute, Haver Analytics, and IMF staff calculations and projections.  
1/ The annual numbers occasionally show a small discrepancy with the authorities published figures, as they are calculated as the sum of the quarterly series seasonally-adjusted by staff.  
2/ Investment is defined as gross fixed capital formation + changes in inventories.  
3/ Contribution to growths.
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<td>Exports of goods, U.S. dollars (annual percentage change)</td>
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<td>28.9</td>
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<td>Imports of goods, U.S. dollars (annual percentage change)</td>
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<td>-16.4</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
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<td>REER (annual percent change, period average)</td>
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<td>Gross official reserves (percent of GDP)</td>
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<td>IMF reserve adequacy metric (percent of GDP) 4/</td>
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<td>15.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total external debt (percent of GDP)</strong></td>
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<td>65.6</td>
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<td>66.7</td>
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<td>Total external debt to exports of goods and services</td>
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<td>236.1</td>
<td>221.2</td>
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<td>Stock market index (in U.S. dollars; period average) 5/</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>1409</td>
<td>1731</td>
<td>1869</td>
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<td>Sovereign long-term foreign currency debt rating (end of period)</td>
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<td>Fitch ratings</td>
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</table>

Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Haver Analytics, WEO, and IMF staff calculations.
1/ The annual numbers occasionally show a small discrepancy with the authorities published figures, as they are calculated as the sum of the quarterly series seasonally-adjusted by staff.
2/ Gold valued at end-period market prices.
3/ Includes amortization of medium/long-term debt due during the following year.
5/ Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (Dec/1987 = 100).
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<td>Total assets (in billions of Chilean pesos)</td>
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<td>211,687</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>51.1</td>
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<td>Liquid Assets to Total Assets</td>
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<td>14.2</td>
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<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
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</table>

Sources: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators, Moody’s Investor Service and IMF staff calculations.
1/ As of September 2021.
### Annex I. External Debt Sustainability Analysis

External debt decreased to 72 percent of GDP in 2021, partly due to exchange rate valuation effects and higher growth, and is projected to further decline towards 60 percent of GDP by 2027. External debt remains sustainable under a wide range of adverse scenarios, including shocks to interest rates, growth, and the exchange rate. The non-financial corporate sector appears highly leveraged, but most debt is FDI-related (with parent companies) and has foreign exchange hedging or long maturity.

#### Table 1. Chile: External Debt Sustainability Framework

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<tbody>
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<td>1 Baseline: External debt</td>
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<td>66.7</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
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<td>2 Change in external debt</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9)</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>4 Current account deficit, excluding interest payments</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Balance of goods and services</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Exports</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Imports</td>
<td>-27.6</td>
<td>-28.5</td>
<td>-28.6</td>
<td>-27.0</td>
<td>-32.2</td>
<td>-36.4</td>
<td>-32.3</td>
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<td>-28.4</td>
<td>-27.8</td>
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<td>8 Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative)</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Automatic debt dynamics 1/</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-14.1</td>
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<td>-0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Contribution from nominal interest rate</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Contribution from real GDP growth</td>
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<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
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<td>-1.1</td>
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<td>-1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>12 Contribution from price and exchange rate changes 2/</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>13 Residual, incl. change in gross foreign assets (2-3)/</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
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<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent)**

|                      | 221.2             | 208.9             | 240.4       | 246.4 | 227.8 | 220.2 | 200.4 | 200.7       | 201.8 | 202.8 | 204.5 |       |

**Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars) 4/**

|                      | 37.3              | 66.7              | 71.9        | 53.8  | 67.8  |

**Scenario with key variables at their historical averages 5/**

|                      | 36.9              | 34.3              | 32.5        | 31.1  | 30.0  |

---

1/ Defined as \( \frac{r - g - r(1+g) + ea(1+r)}{1+g+r+gr} \) times previous period debt stock, with \( r \) = nominal effective interest rate on external debt, \( g \) = change in domestic GDP deflator in US dollar terms, \( ea \) = nominal appreciation (increase in dollar value of domestic currency), and \( a \) = share of domestic-currency denominated debt in total external debt.

2/ The contribution from price and exchange rate changes is defined as \( \frac{-r(1+g) + ea(1+r)}{1+g+r+gr} \) times previous period debt stock / increases with an appreciating domestic currency (e > 0) and rising inflation (based on GDP deflator).

3/ For projection, line includes the impact of price and exchange rate changes.

4/ Defined as current account deficit, plus amortization on medium- and long-term debt, plus short-term debt at end of previous period.

5/ The key variables include real GDP growth, nominal interest rate, dollar deflator growth, and both non-interest current account and non-debt inflows in percent of GDP.

6/ Long-run constant balance that stabilizes the debt ratio assuming that key variables (real GDP growth, nominal interest rate, dollar deflator growth, and non-debt inflows in percent of GDP) remain at their levels of the last projection year.
Figure 1. Chile: External Debt Sustainability: Bound Tests 1/ 2/
(External debt in percent of GDP)

Sources: International Monetary Fund, Country desk data, and staff estimates.
1/ Shaded areas represent actual data. Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks. Figures in the boxes represent average projections for the respective variables in the baseline and scenario being presented. Ten-year historical average for the variable is also shown.
2/ For historical scenarios, the historical averages are calculated over the ten-year period, and the information is used to project debt dynamics five years ahead.
3/ Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance.
4/ One-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2021.
Annex II. Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis

Public sector debt is sustainable under a wide range of plausible shock scenarios. Medium-term structural fiscal consolidation plans, guided by the structural fiscal balance rule, are fully consistent with fiscal sustainability. The authorities are aiming for an ambitious tax reform, not included in baseline scenario, to finance demands for higher social spending.

**Figure 1. Chile: Baseline Scenario**

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<th>Debt, Economic and Market Indicators</th>
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<th>Projections</th>
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<td>32.6</td>
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<td>Public gross financing needs</td>
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<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth (in percent)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation GDP deflator, in percent</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal GDP growth (in percent)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective interest rate (in percent)</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
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**Contribution to Changes in Public Debt**

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<th>Change in gross public sector debt</th>
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<th>Projections</th>
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<td>Identified debt-creating flows</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary (non-interest) revenue and grants</td>
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<td>15.6</td>
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<td>Primary (nominal) expenditure</td>
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<td>Interest rate/growth differential</td>
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<td>Of which: real interest rate</td>
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<td>-1.3</td>
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<td>Of which: real GDP growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exchange rate depreciation</td>
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<td>-0.3</td>
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**Debt-Creating Flows**

- Primary deficit
- Real GDP growth
- Real interest rate
- Exchange rate depreciation

Source: IMF staff.
1/ Public sector is defined as central government.
2/ Based on available data.
3/ EMBG.
4/ Defined as interest payments divided by debt stock (excluding guarantees) at the end of previous year.
5/ EMBG.
6/ Defined as [(r - ρ)(1 + g)] - g = a[1+g]/[(1+g) - ρ] times previous period debt ratio, with r = interest rate; ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator; g = real GDP growth rate; a = share of foreign currency denominated debt; and ρ = nominal exchange rate depreciation (measured by increase in local currency value of U.S. dollar).
7/ The real interest rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as r = 1+g and the real growth contribution as -g.
8/ The exchange rate contribution is derived from the numerator in footnote 5 as a[1+g].
9/ Includes debt changes and interest revenues (if any). For projections, includes exchange rate changes during the projection period.
10/ Assumes that key variables (real GDP growth, real interest rate, and other identified debt-creating flows) remain at the level of the last projection year.
Figure 2. Chile: Composition of Public Debt and Alternative Scenarios

**Composition of Public Debt**
- By Maturity (in percent of GDP)
  - Medium and long-term
  - Short-term

**By Currency (in percent of GDP)**
- Local currency-denominated
- Foreign currency-denominated

**Alternative Scenarios**
- Baseline
- Historical
- Constant Primary Balance

**Gross Nominal Public Debt** (in percent of GDP)

**Public Gross Financing Needs** (in percent of GDP)

**Underlying Assumptions** (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline Scenario</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2026</th>
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<td>Real GDP growth</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Balance</td>
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<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
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<td>Primary Balance</td>
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<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective interest rate</td>
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<td>Primary Balance</td>
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<td>Effective interest rate</td>
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Source: IMF staff.
Figure 3. Chile: Macro-Fiscal Stress Tests

Macro-Fiscal Stress Tests

Gross Nominal Public Debt (in percent of GDP)

Gross Nominal Public Debt (in percent of Revenue)

Public Gross Financing Needs (in percent of GDP)

Additional Stress Tests

Gross Nominal Public Debt (in percent of GDP)

Gross Nominal Public Debt (in percent of Revenue)

Public Gross Financing Needs (in percent of GDP)

Underlying Assumptions (in percent)

Primary Balance Shock

Real GDP growth
1.5 0.5 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.5
Inflation 6.0 4.9 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.7
Primary balance -1.3 -1.6 -1.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
Effective interest rate 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 3.1

Real Interest Rate Shock

Real GDP growth
1.5 0.5 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.5
Inflation 6.0 4.9 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.7
Primary balance -1.3 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Effective interest rate 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.6 3.1

Combined Shock

Real GDP growth
1.5 -3.9 -2.7 2.2 2.5 2.5
Inflation 6.0 3.8 2.0 2.8 2.6 2.7
Primary balance -1.3 -1.7 -2.7 0.0 0.0 0.2
Effective interest rate 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.7 4.3 5.4

Real GDP Growth Shock

Real GDP growth
1.5 -3.9 -2.7 2.2 2.5 2.5
Inflation 6.0 3.8 2.0 2.8 2.6 2.7
Primary balance -1.3 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Effective interest rate 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.3

Real Exchange Rate Shock

Real GDP growth
1.5 -3.9 -2.7 2.2 2.5 2.5
Inflation 6.0 3.8 2.0 2.8 2.6 2.7
Primary balance -1.3 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Effective interest rate 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.3

Contingent Liability Shock

Real GDP growth
1.5 -3.9 -2.7 2.2 2.5 2.5
Inflation 6.0 3.8 2.0 2.8 2.6 2.7
Primary balance -1.3 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Effective interest rate 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.3

Source: IMF staff.
Figure 4. Chile: Risk Assessment

Heat Map

Evolution of Predictive Densities of Gross Nominal Public Debt
(in percent of GDP)

Symmetric Distribution

Restricted (Asymmetric) Distribution

Debt Profile Vulnerabilities
(Indicators vis-à-vis risk assessment benchmarks, in 2021)

--- Lower early warning

--- Upper early warning

Source: IMF staff.

1/ The cell is highlighted in green if debt burden benchmark of 70% is not exceeded under the specific shock or baseline, yellow if exceeded under specific shock but not baseline, red if benchmark is exceeded under baseline, while if stress test is not relevant.

2/ The cell is highlighted in green if gross financing needs benchmark of 15% is not exceeded under the specific shock or baseline, yellow if exceeded under specific shock but not baseline, red if benchmark is exceeded under baseline, while if stress test is not relevant.

3/ The cell is highlighted in green if country value is less than the lower risk assessment benchmark, red if country value exceed the upper risk assessment benchmark, yellow if country value is between the lower and upper risk assessment benchmarks. If data are unavailable or indicator is not relevant, cell is white. Lower and upper risk-assessment benchmarks are:

EMBIG
In basis points: 4/

External Financing Requirement
(in percent of GDP: 5/)

Annual Change in Short-Term Public Debt
(in percent of total)

Public Debt Held by Non-Residents
(in percent of total)

Public Debt in Foreign Currency
(in percent of total)

200 and 600 basis points for bond spreads; 5 and 15 percent of GDP for external financing requirement; 3.5 and 1 percent for change in the share of short-term debt; 15 and 45 percent for the public debt held by non-residents; and 20 and 90 percent for the share of foreign-currency denominated debt.

4/ EMBIG: an average over the last 3 months, 10-Nov-21 through 09-Feb-22.

5/ External financing requirement is defined as the sum of current account deficit, amortization of medium and long-term total external debt, and short-term total external debt at the end of previous period.
The information below has become available following the issuance of the staff report. It does not alter the thrust of the staff appraisal.

1. The government announced fiscal targets for the next four years that are fully consistent with debt sustainability. In line with recommendations by the OECD and the Autonomous Fiscal Council, the government presented structural fiscal targets spanning the four years of the new administration based on a medium-term debt anchor. Gradual medium-term consolidation will lower the structural fiscal deficit to under 0.5 percent of GDP, stabilizing gross public debt below 45 percent of GDP (which the authorities and staff assess to be a prudent level of debt).

2. The Central Bank of Chile continues to show its resolve to tame inflationary pressures. Hikes in global food and fuel prices, exchange rate depreciation, and global supply chain disruptions have continued to exacerbate domestic inflationary pressures. Headline (core) inflation rose to 10.5 (8.3) percent in April, while two-year ahead inflation expectations remain above the 3 percent target. The BCCh raised the policy rate by 125bps on May 5th to 8.25 percent, around the upper bound of the policy rate corridor of the March Monetary Policy Report.
Written Communication

Santiago, May 20th, 2022

Ms. Kristalina Georgieva
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431

Dear Ms. Georgieva,

The Central Bank of Chile would like to thank the IMF’s Executive Board for the decision adopted on May 20th 2022, and hereby confirms its intention to avail itself of the 12-month Short-term Liquidity Line arrangement with access in the amount equivalent to SDR 2.529 billion (145 percent of quota, about US$3.5 billion). We hereby also notify the cancellation of the current Flexible Credit Line arrangement upon effectiveness of the SLL arrangement.

The Central Bank of Chile can confirm that, within the scope of its legal powers contained in its Basic Constitutional Act, it will take actions necessary to respond appropriately to shocks and is committed to maintaining its very strong policies during the course of the arrangement. This is consistent with its legal mandate to look after the stability of the currency and the normal functioning of internal and external payments. For these purposes, the Central Bank of Chile has power to regulate the amount of currency and credit in circulation, the performance of credit transactions and foreign exchange, as well as the issuance of regulatory provisions regarding monetary, credit, financing and foreign exchange matters.

Separately, the Minister of Finance, on behalf of the Government of Chile, hereby confirms its commitment to maintain during the arrangement its current very strong policies.

We consent to the IMF’s publication of this letter and the related staff report.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Rosanna Costa C.
Governor
Central Bank of Chile

/s/

Mario Marcel C.
Minister of Finance
Republic of Chile
On behalf of the Chilean authorities, I would like to thank IMF Management, the Executive Board, and staff for their continued support for Chile, and especially the mission team for their open and constructive dialogue with the authorities during their recent staff visit to the country.

The authorities acknowledge staff’s assessment that Chile continues to meet the qualification criteria to access the Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL), which is identical to the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and would like to avail themselves of the SLL arrangement (up to 145 percent of quota) to strengthen their external liquidity position and support their exit strategy from the FCL.

The recovery of the Chilean economy from the pandemic fallout is well-entrenched. Chile entered the crisis with a healthy economy, a solid fiscal position, and a sound financial system. The policy response to the pandemic was swift and comprehensive, anchored in a very strong policy and institutional framework, and significant buffers bolstered by access to the FCL. Economic activity rebounded vigorously last year, supported by macroeconomic policies, widespread vaccination, and improved terms-of-trade. The flip side saw a widening of the Current Account deficit and increased inflationary pressures on the back of a combination of domestic and external drivers.

In this context, Chile’s monetary and fiscal policies have been recalibrated to ensure medium-term macroeconomic resiliency and sustainability. From mid-2021, the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) began to tighten monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations and curb excess demand that built up during the pandemic. The financial authorities have withdrawn all extraordinary measures and resumed their agenda to implement Basel III and strengthen buffers in the financial system. The fiscal authorities have phased-out the extraordinary protection programs implemented during the pandemic and have announced a multi-year consolidation path to anchor public debt below a prudent ceiling and restore fiscal buffers, while continuing to provide targeted support to the most vulnerable. The new government is committed to advance on structural reforms to achieve a more inclusive, dynamic, and greener economy, while maintaining macroeconomic stability and fiscal responsibility.

Access to the SLL would provide an additional layer of support as Chile exits the FCL agreement, as originally planned. Since the initial request, the authorities have treated the FCL as a precautionary and temporary arrangement. At the height of uncertainty related to the pandemic, access to the FCL provided a useful buffer against extreme external risks which, together with a comfortable reserve position and other policy buffers, strengthened confidence and expanded policy space to respond to the fallout of the pandemic. In addition, even though external risks are still significant, the recovery of the Chilean economy has taken hold and macroeconomic policies have been recalibrated towards a more neutral position. Access to the SLL would complement other measures adopted by the CBC to strengthen its international liquidity position. As it has been the case with the FCL, the CBC would treat access to the SLL as a precautionary arrangement.
**Recent developments and economic outlook**

Chile, as many other countries, is facing a more challenging global landscape. World inflation has continued to rise, and central banks have intensified the withdrawal of their monetary stimuli. This has taken place against a backdrop of high commodity and food prices in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the disruption of global supply chains, recently affected by COVID-19 lockdowns in China. The global growth outlook for this year has been adjusted downwards, while global financial conditions have tightened, and the dollar has appreciated internationally.

The Chilean economy is projected to grow below potential in 2022-23. The worsening of the external scenario and the tightening of domestic macroeconomic policies will negatively affect growth. GDP is expected to grow between 1.0 and 2.0 percent in 2022, and somewhat below 0.5 percent in 2023. Private consumption and fixed investment are expected to decline in 2022-2023 as pent-up demand fades, extraordinary liquidity balances built up during the pandemic are reduced, and credit conditions tighten. It is projected that by 2024, economic activity will resume growth rates in line with its potential, that is, between 2.25 and 3.25 percent. Recent data suggests the economy is already on a correction path from last year's record demand growth. In the labor market, job creation has slowed since the end of last year, while labor supply remains tight.

Headline and core inflation measures have risen in recent months and are currently above the 3 percent inflation target. The rise in inflation has been driven by a combination of internal and external factors, some of them transitory and others more persistent. Domestic inflationary pressures have been driven by supply-demand imbalances and labor market mismatches. Rising international energy and food prices, exchange rate depreciation, and ongoing problems affecting global supply chains have added to domestic price pressures. Inflation expectations derived from the surveys remain above 3 percent in the two-year horizon. The dynamics of indexation and the increase in inflation expectations can prolong the inflationary shock.

**Monetary policy, exchange rate, and external buffers**

Since 1999, the CBC, an autonomous and accountable institution, has conducted monetary policy through a fully-fledged inflation targeting and free-floating regime. In response to the recent surge in inflation, the CBC has rapidly adjusted the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) to a restrictive level, tightening domestic financial and credit conditions. Resolving the supply-demand imbalances that accumulated during the pandemic is vital to ensure sustained price stability. Inflation is expected to start declining later in the year and to converge to the 3 percent target within the two-year horizon. The CBC will continue to carefully monitor inflationary developments and risks, making sure that inflation expectations remain anchored, and inflation is projected to converge to the target within the two-year monetary policy horizon.

The peso is a free-floating currency, and the flexible exchange rate plays a useful role as a shock absorber. Over the past year, the nominal (and real) exchange rate has flexibly adjusted to changes in domestic and external conditions. Since 1999, active foreign exchange (FX) interventions have been rare and limited to curb disorderly market conditions as those observed in late 2019 in the wake of the social unrest. The CBC has not actively intervened in the FX market in the last two years. The accumulation of
reserves in 2021 was carried out through a pre-announced program of fixed-amount auctions. The exposure of local agents to FX risk is limited, and the pass-through of currency fluctuations to inflation expectations, in contrast to headline inflation, is low.

**Chile’s international reserve position is comfortable, but access to the SLL would provide an extra layer of support as the country exits the FCL.** Gross international reserves at 51.3 billion US dollars are assessed as adequate, according to the reserve adequacy metric (ARA) at end-2021. It is important to complement the analysis considering the role of international reserves in market economies with a mature free-floating currency and the additional buffer provided by the central government’s liquid external assets. Furthermore, in the last two years, the CBC has taken several steps to strengthen its external liquidity position, including a reserve accumulation program, the 2021 SDR allocation to Chile, a Bilateral Swap Agreement with the People’s Bank of China, participation in the FIMA Repo Facility of the NY Federal Reserve, and access to a liquidity line from the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR). These measures have built additional buffers to prepare for a smooth and timely exit from the FCL in May 2022. Access to the SLL resources (up to 145 percent of quota) would provide an additional layer of external liquidity, which, as has been the case with the FCL, the authorities would treat as a precautionary instrument, subject to the evolution of external risks.

**Financial sector**

The financial sector in Chile remains liquid, solvent and well capitalized, supported by effective supervision and regulation. The authorities have resumed the agenda of regulatory reforms to strengthen the financial system. The process of phasing in new Basel III regulations, including systemic bank capital charges, a countercyclical capital buffer, a capital conservation buffer, and new Tier 1 capital instruments, is already underway and is scheduled to be completed in 2025. In addition, the authorities are taking steps to implement the recommendations from the December 2021 FSAP.

**Fiscal policy and public debt**

Since the early 2000s, Chile’s fiscal policy has been guided by a structural rule and complemented by a sovereign stabilization fund, underpinned by the Fiscal Responsibility Law and the Autonomous Fiscal Council (CFA). The consistent implementation of this framework over time has contributed to containing public debt and accumulating significant liquidity buffers. Chile entered the pandemic crisis with a very strong fiscal position that allowed to deliver a comprehensive multi-year support package amounting to 18 ppt of GDP to protect lives and livelihoods. As the recovery has taken hold and the health situation has improved, extraordinary support measures have been withdrawn. The government has introduced some temporary and targeted programs to facilitate the transition of those firms and workers that are still lagging in the recovery and to cushion the impact of the recent increase in energy costs. These measures have been financed through reprioritizations within the fiscal budget approved for 2022.

Within the framework of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, the government has formally announced a multi-year fiscal consolidation plan during its term. After reaching 7.7 percent of GDP, the fiscal deficit is expected to decline to 1.7 ppt of GDP in 2022, as extraordinary support programs related to the
pandemic are phased out, while revenues are bolstered by high levels of activity, demand, and copper prices. The structural fiscal deficit, which adjusts the impact on revenues of the cyclical position of the economy and the international price of copper, will decline from 10.8 ppt to 3.3 ppt of GDP. Public debt is projected to reach 38.3 percent of GDP by the end-2022. Going forward, the multi-year fiscal consolidation plan contemplates a reduction of the structural deficit at a pace of 0.75 ppt of GDP per year, converging to 0.3 ppt by 2026. The path of fiscal consolidation has been explicitly designed to stabilize public debt below 45 percent of GDP.

**Structural and social reforms**

The government will present a new long-term fiscal deal for the transition to a more inclusive, dynamic, and greener economy. The authorities plan to introduce reforms to increase revenues and social security contributions to levels closer to the average for OECD countries. Proposals will focus on increasing the progressivity of personal taxes, including income and wealth taxes, and reducing opportunities for tax evasion and elusion. Mining royalties and carbon taxes will also be part of the new fiscal deal. The mobilization of additional resources will make it possible to strengthen the social safety net, raise the quality of public services, improve pensions, increase public investment, and achieve a fair and inclusive transition to a low-carbon economy, while maintaining macroeconomic stability and fiscal responsibility.

The Constitutional Convention will present a new draft constitution next July and a national referendum will be held in September. After some initial delay due to the pandemic, the constitutional reform process is proceeding according to schedule and will culminate in a national referendum next September. A new constitution will require subsequent legislative changes that will occur over time.