The Managing Director’s Agenda

Global Policy

Spring Meetings 2022

The Global Economy Under Stress: Repercussions, Response, and Resilience
“Now, as the global community is tested again, the near universal membership of the IMF offers a proven platform for countries to strive together—to make the world economy work for everyone, especially the poorest.”

The world has changed dramatically since our Annual Meetings in October 2021. At that time, we were hoping to begin to emerge from the pandemic crisis. Now, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has placed another crisis on top of the pandemic. Beyond the devastating humanitarian impact, it is a massive setback to the global economy and poses a new and complex set of challenges for policymakers everywhere.

The recovery was already losing momentum before the war, partly due to Omicron-related disruptions. In January, we cut our global growth forecast to 4.4 percent for 2022. Since then, the outlook has deteriorated further, largely because of the war and the related sanctions. As a result, we are projecting a further downgrade for global growth this year and next.

The gravity of the economic fallout continues to unfold. Rapidly rising energy, food, and other commodity prices are hurting lower-income households globally. Tighter financial conditions are putting further pressure on highly indebted countries. The dangerous divergence between rich and poor countries—of which we have warned before—continues unabated. In economic terms, growth is down and inflation is up. In human terms, people’s incomes are down and hunger is up.

As well as the twin crises—pandemic and war—there is a growing risk of fragmentation of the world economy into geopolitical and economic blocs. Such a tectonic shift would place in jeopardy the human and economic gains made over the past several generations—and represent the most serious challenge to the rules-based system that has governed international and economic relations for the last 75 years.

This is a consequential moment for multilateralism. The actions we take now, as an international community, will determine our future in fundamental ways. Ending the war as soon as possible, restoring peace, and preventing further loss of human life are paramount. Tackling food insecurity and combatting inflation—both on the domestic front and across the region—will require urgent and comprehensive action. Countries affected directly by the war through trade, tourism, financial linkages, and refugee flows face additional challenges. These spillovers risk exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and adding to balance of payments pressures, at a time of rising interest rates and record-high debt levels.

While remaining anchored in the vision laid out in the Fall 2021 GPs, the global policy agenda that follows recalibrates priorities to meet the new reality we are facing. The IMF also continues to adjust to respond to the rapidly evolving needs of our membership. Our flexibility has been evident over the past two years of the COVID crisis: unprecedented emergency financing, a historic Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation, an innovative plan to end the pandemic. Now, as we face another crisis on top of a crisis, we will continue to step up and support our member countries in every way we can—with financial resources, policy advice, and capacity development—working in collaboration with our international partners. And of course, supported by our tremendous staff.

REPERCUSSIONS—WAR THREATENS THE GLOBAL RECOVERY

The war in Ukraine is creating major stresses for the global economy, weakening the post-pandemic recovery and putting macroeconomic stability at risk. Six months ago, we had expected, by now, to see some consolidation of the recovery. Instead, we have downgraded our global growth projections twice: first, due to the disruptive effects of the pandemic and new COVID-19 variants, and now to reflect the repercussions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and related sanctions. Food, energy, and other commodity prices have surged. Compounded by supply chain disruptions, this adds to inflationary pressures, posing energy and food security risks—and social pressures—for many members. Food insecurity is now a major concern. Emerging markets are likely to confront more volatile financial markets and capital flows. Countries affected directly by the war through trade, tourism, financial linkages, and refugee flows face additional challenges. These spillovers risk exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and adding to balance of payments pressures, at a time of rising interest rates and record-high debt levels.
Policymakers will need to resume their crisis management efforts, gearing policies toward safeguarding macroeconomic stability, while still battling the pandemic. This will require deftly balancing competing policy objectives: shoring up the recovery and containing inflation; supporting the vulnerable and rebuilding fiscal buffers, while maintaining financial stability and preserving social cohesion. Pronounced uncertainty, risks of intensifying spillovers from the war in Ukraine, and possible flare-ups of the pandemic further complicate those trade-offs. A central challenge will be to manage the effects of sharply higher food and energy prices. To prevent a food security crisis, it will be vital to keep trade open and refrain from restrictive practices. With tighter financial conditions, many emerging market and developing economies will have to carefully navigate risks from possible capital flow reversals and rising debt pressures. In an integrated and more shock-prone open and refrain from restrictive practices. With tighter financial conditions, many emerging market and developing economies will have to carefully navigate risks from possible capital flow reversals and rising debt pressures. In an integrated and more shock-prone.

The Fund is shifting gears to provide members with vital financing, real-time advice, and support in this stressed global environment. This requires continuously adapting and tailoring our approach—be it through a more intensive policy dialogue, financial assistance, or capacity development (CD). This will be critical for the countries hardest hit by the war, but also the most fragile and vulnerable economies, including small developing states.

- **Monetary** authorities face renewed inflationary shocks from the war in Ukraine, while needing to safeguard the recovery. Where the direct effects of the war are moderate, inflationary pressures are broad based, and labor markets are tightening, the rate-hiking cycle should continue. In countries where the adverse effects from the war are larger and inflation continues to rise, the pace of policy tightening should be carefully calibrated, while maintaining the credibility of inflation-targeting frameworks. Major central banks need to anticipate risks as they manage their tightening cycle, which could have severe consequences for vulnerable economies. A well communicated, data-dependent approach will be essential to safeguard credibility and minimize market volatility and spillovers.

- **Surveillance**. We are monitoring developments closely and engaging with our members to provide granular advice, with more attention on risk analysis and contingent advice, in line with our Comprehensive Surveillance Approach

- **Debt**. Our new debt sustainability framework for market-access countries and ongoing work on the Multipronged Approach to address debt vulnerabilities and debt transparency will help strengthen our assessment of debt-related risks, which is critical at the current juncture. To safeguard sustainability and avoid debt distress, we will work with the WB and other partners to strengthen implementation of the G20 Common Framework for debt treatments. We will encourage private creditor participation and explore options to improve debt restructuring processes for countries not yet covered.

- **Capacity Development**. To help countries develop and fine-tune policy tools, and better balance difficult trade-offs, we will further integrate CD with programs and surveillance, focusing on country-tailored CD. The Fund will continue to step up work on medium-term frameworks to build institutions for a more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive recovery. We are also increasing our CD on climate change and on enhancing cyber regulation and supervision, which will complement efforts to deepen surveillance. At the same time, we will improve our CD model by adopting blended delivery and expanding field presence, in coordination with our partners.

- **Financial sector and other policies** should be used judiciously to maintain financial stability and prevent a further buildup of vulnerabilities. It is critical to preserve the soundness of banking systems and strengthen supervision of nonbank financial institutions. Flexible exchange rates remain a buffer against shocks, while foreign exchange intervention may be needed to address disorderly market conditions, and capital flow management measures on outflows may be used if disruptive outflows lead to (imminent) crisis circumstances.

- **Pandemic efforts** should be reinforced. The rapid spread of COVID-19 variants is a stark reminder that the pandemic remains a risk to macroeconomic stability. The global community must redouble its efforts to fund and provide each country with equitable access to a comprehensive COVID-19 toolkit with enhanced in-country delivery. As COVID 19 will be with us for the long term, policies should transition to addressing both pandemic preparedness and global risk mitigation for infectious diseases more broadly.

In view of sharply higher demand for Fund concessional financing, it will be essential to secure additional pledges, including by re-channeling SDRs to close the gap in loan and subsidy resources for the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and replenish the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT). We are also counting on members’ support to operationalize the newly established Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST). By complementing our traditional lending tools and providing affordable longer-maturity financing to vulnerable members, this will help them address macro-critical risks stemming from structural challenges, such as from climate change and pandemic preparedness.

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**Spring Meetings 2022**
GLOBAL POLICY AGENDA

Amid the immediate stresses, the international community should not lose sight of the imperative to build a more resilient future. This requires transformational reforms to address the existential challenge of climate change, step up efforts to reduce inequality, and balance the opportunities and risks from digitalization. The Fund is implementing its new strategies to better support countries in these transformational efforts. The multidimensional and interconnected nature of today’s policy challenges underscores the importance of delivering our support in collaboration with our international partners.

- Climate: Resolve action by all countries is required to reduce global emissions and achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Rising energy prices and security concerns are bringing to the fore the vulnerability of the global energy system and the need to carefully manage the green transition. This may incentivize countries to accelerate their transition to renewables. In the near term, most countries will need to help vulnerable households manage rising energy prices. As price pressures abate, this is a good opportunity to accelerate implementation of carbon pricing or equivalent measures, which need to be at the core of any global mitigation strategy. This needs to be complemented by measures to ensure a just transition and green public investments, along with adequate transition and adaptation measures, and technology transfers and financing for low-income developing countries. In line with its climate strategy, the Fund is scaling up coverage of climate-related, macro-critical issues in our work, including Article IV consultations, Financial Sector Assessment Programs, and Climate Macroeconomic Assessments. These efforts will be complemented by the new G20 Data Gaps Initiative, which prioritizes climate-change data. The RST will help support members’ efforts to advance critical reforms in mitigation, adaptation, and transition.

- Inequality: The pandemic exacerbated preexisting inequalities, within and across countries. Current acute risks concerning food and nutrition insecurity, together with other spillovers from the war in Ukraine, could amplify wealth and social disparities, exacerbate social tensions, and set back years of progress. For food security and more broadly, lower tariffs and fewer barriers to trade can ease supply bottlenecks and allow for more efficient allocation of resources. Policies to remedy education losses and reskill the labor force will help address pandemic-induced scarring. The Fund is implementing its strategy on social spending and finalizing a gender strategy to better integrate these issues, where macro-critical, into our analysis and advice.

- Digitalization: The rapid proliferation of digital money brings new opportunities, but also risks to financial stability and potentially to the international monetary system (IMS). Geopolitical developments may accelerate the adoption of digital finance, from cryptocurrencies, to stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Legal and regulatory frameworks for crypto assets need to be enhanced, and coordination among central banks on CBDC design and interoperability should be strengthened. The Fund is deepening expertise on assessing the implications of crypto assets and CBDCs for macroeconomic stability and the IMS, aiming to develop principles to guide policies and foster global cooperation to mitigate risks.

NOW MORE THAN EVER, WE NEED GLOBAL COOPERATION.

Today’s economic challenges—from the pandemic and spillovers of war to climate change and digitalization—are truly global in nature. They require policy actions within and among countries, and support from the Fund and the broader international community.

These challenges also reveal economic and geopolitical fault lines in the global economic and financial system. This is a watershed moment for multilateralism. Risks of the global economy and multilateral system fragmenting have increased, including for the international monetary system. This, in turn, could further exacerbate deep divergences in economic prospects and long-term scarring caused by the pandemic.

The ability of the international community to cooperate and come together has served the global economy well. Over the past several decades, multilateralism has facilitated economic integration, leading to strong growth, poverty reduction, and welfare gains.

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**SURVEILLANCE**

- 62 Article IV consultations
- 4 Financial System Stability Assessments under the FSAP
- 4.7 million visitors to flagship publications, blogs, F&SD, and Country Focus web pages

**LENDING**

- $216 billion approved for 92 countries in total financial assistance since the pandemic
- 25 countries approved for debt service relief from the fifth tranche of the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT)
- PRGT and CCRT Fundraising
  - Target SDR 15.6 billion
  - Target SDR 7.3 billion
  - Target SDR 1.0 billion

**CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT**

- 1,436 virtual technical assistance visits
  - Direct CD Delivery in FY22*
  - Microlearning via YouTube**
  - IMF Online Learning**
  - 128,142 active users
  - 199 countries
  - 5 languages

**GLOBAL POLICY AGENDA**

- 662,400 views
- 207 videos
- 9,200 subscribers

**GROWTH TRUST FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS**

<table>
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<th>SDR 41.98</th>
<th>SDR 29.91</th>
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**TOTAL LENDING COMMITMENTS = SDR 217.91 BILLION**

**Note:** Includes working papers, policy papers, departmental papers, and staff notes.

**Note:** Since October 2021, CD=capacity development; LICs=low-income countries; * as of March 2022; ** as of January 2022.

**Note:** Since October 2021, FCS=fragile and conflict-affected states; * includes working papers, policy papers, departmental papers, and staff notes.

**Note:** As of March 31, 2022; FCL=Flexible Credit Line; PLL=Precautionary and Liquidity Line; RCF=Rapid Credit Facility; RFI=Rapid Financing Instrument; FCS=fragile and conflict-affected states; * includes working papers, policy papers, departmental papers, and staff notes.

**Note:** Since October 2021; o/w=of which.

**Note:** Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

**Note:** o/w Undrawn Balance

- (A) = (B)+(C) = (D)+(E)+(F) = (G)+(H)+(I) = (J) = (K) = (L) = (M) = (N) = (O) = (P) = (Q) = (R) = (S) = (T) = (U) = (V) = (W) = (X) = (Y) = (Z) =

**TOTAL COMPUTATIONS**

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