The Zombie Lending Channel of Monetary Policy*
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ABSTRACT: We uncover a new channel—the zombie lending channel—in the transmission of monetary policy to nonfinancial corporates. This channel originates from the presence of unviable and unproductive (zombie) firms. We identify exogenous variation in monetary conditions around the world by exploiting the international transmission of US monetary policy shocks. We find that tighter monetary policy leads to more favorable credit conditions for zombie firms relative to other firms. Zombies are then able to cut investment and employment by relatively less. This is indicative of evergreening motives by lenders when interest rates rise: lenders face incentives to restructure existing loans of zombie firms to avoid the realization of losses on their balance sheets. Policies that strengthen banks’ balance sheets, that limit banks’ incentives to engage in risky behavior, and laws that allow an efficient resolution of weak firms, may help mitigate zombie lending practices when financial conditions tighten.

JEL Classification Numbers: C33, C36, D22, E22, E52, G18, G33

Keywords: Monetary policy; Corporate investment; Zombie firms; Zombie lending

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*The views in this paper represent only our own and should therefore not be reported as representing the views of the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board, or IMF management. We would like to thank Elif Arbatli-Saxegaard, Vassili Bazina, Martin Čiháč, Olivier De Jonghe, Thomas Drechsel, Philipp Engler, Miguel Faria-e-Castro, Cecilia Melo Fernandes, Mai Hakamada, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Klaas Muller, Fabián Valencia, Joris Wauters, Reserve Bank of Australia staff, and participants at several seminars and conferences for their suggestions and comments, including the IMF Macrofinancial seminar, the IMF RESMF seminar, the National Bank of Belgium Macroeconomic seminar, and the University of Maryland brownbag seminar.

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1 Introduction

The rise in the number of unviable and unproductive (zombie) firms raises an important question amid the tightening in global financial conditions: does the presence of zombie firms affect the transmission of monetary policy to nonfinancial firms? In other words, what is the differential response of zombie firms’ financial performance relative to nonzombies competing in the same industry and country to a tightening in financial conditions? This is our main research question, which is relevant from at least two angles. First, it is well-documented that zombie firms create congestion effects on other firms operating in the same industry (Caballero et al. 2008, McGowan et al. 2018, Acharya et al. 2019, Banerjee and Hofmann 2022, Albuquerque and Iyer 2023). A natural question is whether tighter financial conditions allow a better allocation of resources towards more profitable and viable firms. Second, monetary policy influences directly firms’ cost of capital and their investment decisions, a key driver of business cycle fluctuations.

The response of zombie firms to monetary policy shocks is non-trivial. On the one hand, the financial constraints channel of monetary policy would imply a stronger response of zombie firms, relative to other firms, to monetary policy shocks (Jeenas 2019, Bahaj et al. 2022, Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi 2023, Cloyne et al. 2023). This would be consistent with the fact that zombie firms rely more on bank debt for their funding: zombie firms would have less flexibility to find alternative sources of funding to finance their investment when the cost of funding goes up (Becker and Ivashina 2014, Ippolito et al. 2018). But, on the other hand, firms more dependent on bank loans may have more flexibility in renegotiating the terms of the loan—particularly important when financial frictions are high—while a renegotiation is more complex for bonds because of multiple investors (Berlin and Mester 1992, Hadlock and James 2002, Darmouni et al. 2022).

We add another conjecture based on the zombie literature. Banks’ incentives to ‘evergreen’ loans of zombie firms may be stronger when interest rates increase, as banks internalize a higher probability of zombie firms filing for bankruptcy when the cost of debt goes up. In this scenario, it is plausible that banks, especially weak banks, may decide to extend the original loan to zombies so as to avoid the realization of losses. This is the so-called zombie lending channel. Overall, given the competing forces at work, the response of zombie firms to monetary policy shocks remains an empirical question that we tackle in this paper.

1Recent work has found the share of zombie firms worldwide to have risen over time, especially since the GFC, reducing overall productivity, investment and employment in the economy (Altman et al. 2022, Banerjee and Hofmann 2022, Albuquerque and Iyer 2023).
To trace out the dynamics of monetary policy shocks on firms, we employ a panel data Local Projection Instrumental Variable (LP-IV) approach on Compustat quarterly balance sheet data on nonfinancial listed firms for 49 countries (23 EMs and 26 AEs) over 2000-2019. We resort to US monetary policy shocks to identify exogenous variation in monetary policy conditions around the world. US monetary policy has been shown to drive the global financial cycle, and is arguably exogenous to changes in economic conditions in the rest of the world (Rey 2013, Bruno and Shin 2015, Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2018, Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Bräuning and Ivashina 2020, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2020b, Cesa-Bianchi and Sokol 2022, Miranda-Agrippino and Nenova 2022).

Cross-border financial linkages in the international transmission of US monetary policy seem to have become more important due to growing globalization trends. To be sure, spillovers originating from US monetary policy via the financial channel, operating mainly through the risk-taking channel and portfolio rebalancing, tend in fact to dominate the trade and exchange rate channels from the Mundell-Fleming canonical model (Fleming 1962, Mundell 1963). This motivates our choice for focusing on the financial channel of unanticipated US interest rate changes, through which US monetary policy affects monetary conditions abroad, after controlling for other channels. A contractionary US monetary policy shock transmits to higher foreign interest rates along the yield curve and leads to lower prices of risky assets, as a result of changes in risk perceptions and portfolio rebalancing by investors.

In our empirical setting, we use US high-frequency monetary policy surprises as the external instrument for the country-specific monetary policy indicator, proxied with the local one-year sovereign bond yields (Gürkaynak et al. 2005, Gertler and Karadi 2015, Nakamura and Steinsson 2018). This first-stage IV is carried out separately for each country, instead of pooling the data across all countries, to allow the cost of borrowing in a given country to respond differentially to US monetary policy shocks. This is consistent with research documenting considerable differences in the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to foreign interest rates across countries (Kalemli-Özcan 2019, De Leo et al. 2023, Kearns et al. 2023). We use one-year bond yields as the monetary policy indicator, and not shorter rates (policy rate or money market rates), as the former also incorporates changes in risk premia. This allows longer-dated yields to reflect more accurately the underlying changes in a country’s borrowing costs, after controlling

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In our second-stage IV, we regress several firm balance sheet indicators on the country-specific predicted local bond yields from the first-stage regression. Our coefficient of interest is an interaction term between a dummy variable capturing zombie firms with the country-specific predicted bond yields. We saturate the specification with firm fixed effects to control for permanent differences between firms, and with country-sector-time fixed effects to control for all time-varying industry-specific shocks within each country that are orthogonal to monetary policy shocks. Adding these fixed effects allow us to estimate the difference in responses between zombie firms and nonzombie firms within the same country, industry and quarter.

Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that zombie firms are less responsive to monetary policy shocks relative to nonzombie firms. For instance, we find that the response of zombie firms’ investment growth at the peak, reached after roughly two years, is around 0.7 p.p. smaller relative to nonzombies, while the response of employment growth is almost 0.8 p.p. smaller. These responses are economically important. Our finding is surprising at face value: since zombie firms have weak balance sheets, we would expect these firms to actually be more responsive to monetary policy, in line with the literature (Jeenas 2019, Bräuning and Ivashina 2020, Bahaj et al. 2022, Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi 2023, Cloyne et al. 2023, Di Giovanni and Rogers 2023). This result suggests that the behavior of zombie firms is fundamentally different from the conventional response of financially constrained firms. We conjecture that our result is explained by the existence of evergreening incentives on the part of lenders—the zombie lending channel of monetary policy. Therefore, our hypothesis is that zombie firms are less responsive to monetary policy because of lenders’ zombie lending.

Second, we use a simple model from Faria-e-Castro et al. (2022) to rationalize our main finding that zombie firms are less responsive to monetary policy. In this model, we show that when interest rate increases, banks may have incentives to offer better credit conditions to zombie firms relative to other firms to prevent them from defaulting. While the evergreening motive may be stronger for weakly capitalized banks—who may have less room to absorb the losses in case a zombie firm defaults—our model suggests that zombie lending takes place
irrespective of concerns about bank capital. It is indeed possible that banks expect zombies to recover or to get market financing in the future, as zombies’ reputation grows with the length of their lending relationship (Hu and Varas 2021). The mechanism through which lending flows to zombie firms at the expense of other firms offers additional support for an important role played by zombie lending in mitigating the transmission of tighter monetary policy to zombie firms. We confirm this empirically; we find that credit conditions, debt and the cost of debt, tighten by less for zombies following a monetary policy shock.

Finally, we find that zombies’ financial performance in countries with higher regulatory capital buffers or lower nonperforming loans (NPLs), such as the United States, tend to experience a decline in investment growth relative to nonzombies following a tightening in monetary policy. We also find some evidence that macroprudential policies that target bank loans, and well-prepared insolvency regimes, may help mitigate zombie lending practices when financial conditions tighten. Overall, this suggests that a combination of a highly capitalized banking sector with an efficient resolution of financial distress in the bankruptcy code may help weaken banks’ incentives to keep zombie firms alive, thus mitigating the zombie lending channel.

Our results are robust along several dimensions. First, our baseline results hold when using longer-dated bond yields, such as the ten-year rate, as the monetary policy indicator. Second, we also find similar results when controlling for central bank information effects in US monetary policy to account for the possibility that monetary conditions abroad may respond differently depending on the source of the US tightening. Finally, our main result that zombie firms’ investment growth is less affected by a contractionary monetary policy shock remains robust to using the recent well-cited zombie definition that conditions zombies on weak growth opportunities and financial distress (Banerjee and Hofmann 2022). Overall, the robustness of our results reinforce the main narrative in this paper that zombie lending practices by lenders affect how monetary policy conditions transmit to the real economy.

2 Data and zombie firms

2.1 Data

Firm-level

We use quarterly balance sheet data from S&P Compustat North America, and Compustat
Global on nonfinancial listed firms for 49 countries, 23 EMs and 26 AEs, over 2000-2019. We exclude financial firms, namely banks, diversified financials, and insurance firms from our analysis. Following standard practice in the literature, we clean the data and make other adjustments to minimize measurement errors, and ensure the representativeness of the data. We deflate nominal variables with the respective country CPI deflator. Our final sample covers an unbalanced panel of unique 24,371 nonfinancial firms over 2000q1-2019q4, resulting in 812,627 firm-quarter observations. Figure A.1 in Appendix A shows that we have roughly twice as many firms in AEs than in EMs, reflecting greater financial market depth in AEs, but the coverage of EMs is still important. More details on the cleaning assumptions and variable definitions can be found in Appendix A.

Our main variables of interest to track how firms’ financial performance is affected by monetary policy shocks are as follows: (i) investment growth is captured with the log percentage change in the net capital stock, which refers to capital expenditures in physical capital, namely property, plant, and equipment; (ii) employment growth is measured as the year-on-year log percentage change in the total number of employees; (iii) debt growth takes the log percentage change in total debt (short and long); and (iv) the cost of debt is proxied with the implicit interest rate, computed as the four-quarter rolling sum of interest expenses divided by total debt.

Monetary policy shocks

To identify exogenous variation in monetary policy conditions around the world, we resort to US monetary policy shocks, which have been shown to drive the global financial cycle (Rey 2013). Our measure of US monetary policy surprises follows the high-frequency identification approach that identifies unexpected changes in the Fed policy rate (Gürkaynak et al. 2005, Gertler and Karadi 2015, Nakamura and Steinsson 2018). In particular, we extract the unexpected changes in three-month ahead contracts on Fed funds futures in a 30-minute window surrounding FOMC meetings (10 min before and 20 min after). We then transform these surprises into the quarterly frequency by summing up all daily surprises within the respective quarter.3

Given that these surprises may not capture the ‘true’ structural monetary policy shock—for instance due to monetary policy news outside of the FOMC announcement window, such as

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3The simple sum of surprises within each quarter makes sure that the constructed monetary policy shocks, as an external instrument, are uncorrelated with the same type of shocks in other periods. This meets the strict condition for instrument validity when employing local projection methods and instruments to identify the dynamic effects of an imperfectly observable structural shock, as pointed out by Stock and Watson (2018).
speeches by FOMC members—we use the one-year sovereign bond yield rate of each country as the monetary policy indicator. Using country-specific bond yields as the indicator in our setting allows us to assess how US monetary policy surprises transmit heterogeneously to country-specific borrowing costs. In Section 7 we use other US monetary policy surprises from the literature that also control for central bank information shocks (Jarociński and Karadi 2020, Bauer and Swanson 2023).

Country-level

In Section 6 we merge our dataset with aggregated country-level data to investigate how country-specific characteristics can mitigate or amplify zombie lending practices following a monetary policy tightening that we will discuss later. We focus on bank balance sheet indicators, macro-prudential policies, and insolvency frameworks. On bank indicators, we resort to banks’ NPLs and capital ratios (from the IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators), and capital buffers. To compute regulatory capital buffers, we subtract the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio (from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey) from the banks’ actual regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. Using regulatory capital buffers is preferable, as the level of capital ratios worldwide may differ widely, complicating the cross-country comparison. Capital buffers may also provide us with a more accurate picture of the underlying resilience of banks, i.e. how much capital banks have to absorb shocks before they breach the regulatory limit.

To capture macroprudential policies, we use the IMF’s integrated Macroprudential Policy (iMaPP) database, a comprehensive historical monthly database that combines information from various sources on several macroprudential policy measures in place, and changes in these measures, for 182 jurisdictions over 1990-2020 (Alam et al. 2019). The database covers 17 macroprudential instruments, and for each one of these measures it assigns the value of one for tightening actions, minus one for loosening actions, and zero for no change. These dummies are based on the effective date at which the policy enters into force. We follow Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) and sum up the dummy indices for each instrument-country pair by taking the beginning of the dataset in 1990 as the starting point. These cumulative indices will provide a better sense of the stringency of macroprudential actions over time. We group the macroprudential instruments into seven main categories as in Alam et al. (2019).4

4These categories are: Demand instruments include limits to the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and to the debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio; Supply – loans instruments impose limits to credit growth (LCG), loan loss
Finally, we measure the quality of insolvency regimes with the crisis preparedness indicator from Araujo et al. (2022). This indicator measures countries’ preparedness to handle a large-scale restructuring of corporates.\(^5\) Araujo et al. (2022) find that countries with greater corporate sector vulnerabilities also tend to have less-developed insolvency regimes. The indicator is time-invariant, giving us a snapshot of the legal and institutional status of each country in 2020-21.

2.2 Zombie firms

The existence of unproductive and unviable—zombie—firms is not a new phenomenon. It dates back to Japan’s lost decade in the late-1980s and 1990s, a period when lending to zombie firms played a key role in amplifying the economic stagnation by misallocating capital away from the most productive firms (Peek and Rosengren 2005, Caballero et al. 2008, Giannetti and Simonov 2013). Congestion effects materialized as the survival of zombie firms crowded out the profits of healthy firms that operated in the same industry. This had the effect of reducing overall productivity, investment and employment in the economy. Similar results have been found for a set of OECD countries over 1980-2017 (Banerjee and Hofmann 2022), and for selected European countries over 2003-13 (McGowan et al. 2018), and during the European sovereign debt crisis in the 2010s, a period when weak European banks ‘kicked the can down the road’ by evergreening zombie loans (Storz et al. 2017, Acharya et al. 2021, Schivardi et al. 2022, Blattner et al. 2023).

Recent research has shown that the share of zombie firms has been increasing over the last two decades, especially since the GFC (Altman et al. 2022, Banerjee and Hofmann 2022, Albuquerque and Iyer 2023). In this context, a scenario of higher global interest rates combined with the increase in the incidence of zombification raise questions about whether tighter financial conditions will allow a better allocation of resources towards more profitable and viable firms.

The literature has come up with several definitions to capture these unproductive and unviable zombie firms, ranging from a concept of subsidized interest rate from lenders (Caballero et al. 2008, Acharya et al. 2019), to old firms that do not generate enough operating revenues

\(^{5}\)The indicator covers five main areas of the insolvency and restructuring regimes for corporates: out-of-court restructuring, hybrid restructuring, reorganization, liquidation, and the institutional framework. We are able to match this indicator to 39 countries in our firm-level dataset.
to meet their interest payment obligations (McGowan et al. 2018), and combined with lack of growth opportunities (Banerjee and Hofmann 2022), and to firms with low profitability and high default risk (Altman et al. 2022, Schivardi et al. 2022).

In this paper, we follow Albuquerque and Iyer (2023), who identify zombie firms on a large set of listed and private firms worldwide. They use three balance sheet indicators to capture firms that are most likely in financial distress and are persistently unprofitable: zombie firms are firms whose interest coverage ratio (ICR) is below one, the leverage ratio is above the median firm in the same industry, and whose real sales growth are negative. All of these conditions need to be observed for at least two consecutive years. Moreover, this definition only allows zombie firms to exit the zombie status once at least one of the indicators is reversed for two years in a row. The two-year horizon in the entry to, and exit from, zombie status minimizes misclassification from cyclical fluctuations. The two indicators of financial distress, the ICR and leverage ratio, are relatively standard in the literature; but using negative real sales growth ensures that we define zombie firms as firms that are also persistently unprofitable. Albuquerque and Iyer (2023) show that this zombie definition strikes a good balance between being simple and easy to implement for both listed and private firms, but still being able to serve as a reasonable approximation of the universe of zombie firms relative to other definitions in the literature.

We do not use the zombie definition relying on subsidized interest rates, whereby lenders offer more favorable credit terms to zombie firms relative to high-rated firms in order to keep these zombie firms alive (Caballero et al. 2008, Acharya et al. 2019). Recent literature has found that this identification may be problematic for several reasons, as summarized in Albuquerque and Iyer (2023). Just to stress two potential shortcomings if we were to use it in our framework: (i) the low-interest rate environment, which characterized most of the period over the last two decades, would imply banks charging zero or even negative interest rates to zombie firms, which seems unlikely (Kulkarni et al. 2021, Banerjee and Hofmann 2022); and (ii) while it is plausible that banks may offer lower interest rates to zombies than what banks’ credit risk models would suggest (based on zombies’ balance sheets), it is still likely that banks would charge higher interest rates than those offered to high-rated firms (Kulkarni et al. 2021, Faria-e-Castro et al. 2022). We refer the reader to Albuquerque and Iyer (2023) for a longer discussion.

Figure 1, reproduced from Albuquerque and Iyer (2023), shows an upward trend in the share of listed zombie firms for a sample of 63 countries over the last 20 years. This is especially evident after the GFC, possibly motivated by a prolonged period of low interest rates, ample liquidity,
and search for yield behavior. After the temporary downward trend from 2016 to 2019, the share of zombie firms picked up again since the Covid-19 pandemic, presumably on account of the unprecedented policy support and easy financing conditions. Albuquerque and Iyer (2023) show that zombie shares vary widely across countries (Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A): zombification tends to be more prevalent in countries with a looser macroprudential stance, less-prepared corporate insolvency frameworks, weaker GDP growth, and a higher share of small firms. The paper also shows significant heterogeneity in the incidence of zombification across industries (Figure A.4): zombies tend to be more prevalent in nontradable industries, such as in real estate, energy sector, information technology, materials, and consumer discretionary. These industries tend to be more financially vulnerable, less productive, experience more debt booms, and face weaker growth opportunities (Albuquerque 2023, Müller and Verner 2023).

Figure 1: World share of listed zombie firms

Zombie firms are typically characterized by substantially weaker balance sheets than non-zombies within the same industry and country (Table 1). For instance, zombie firms exhibit lower TFP, are less profitable, invest less, hold limited liquid assets, tend to be smaller, are at a higher risk of default, and are more dependent on bank loans.\(^6\) Although zombie firms tend

\(^6\)Compustat does not provide data on the debt structure of firms (market versus bank loans), while the coverage of firms with this information is rather sparse in Capital IQ. We follow Crouzet (2021) by summing short-term notes payable ($cp$) and other long-term debt ($dlto$) to compute a proxy of bank loans. Crouzet (2021) shows that the bank loan share in total debt for US nonfinancial firms compares well with the aggregate share of loans for the nonfinancial corporate sector from the Flow of Funds data. It remains to be seen, however, whether

Notes: The blue bars refer to the unweighted percentage share of zombie firms, while the different lines refer to zombie shares weighted by total debt, total assets, or employment.
to be slightly younger, by almost two years, a typical zombie firm in our Compustat dataset is not ‘young’, as the unconditional mean of age for listed zombies is 33 years. This addresses potential concerns that our definition may be generating important false positives related to young start-ups with potential growth opportunities, especially in the tech industry: these firms may have initial high levels of leverage and low productivity but are not necessarily zombies. In addition, we checked in the data that only 8% of zombie firms are younger than ten years (or less than 2% are younger than five years).

Table 1: Characteristics of zombie firms

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zombie</td>
<td>-0.524***</td>
<td>-2.604***</td>
<td>-3.607***</td>
<td>-9.762***</td>
<td>-19.498***</td>
<td>18.244***</td>
<td>-2.519***</td>
<td>0.033</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,764,996</td>
<td>1,668,411</td>
<td>1,315,336</td>
<td>919,854</td>
<td>1,759,840</td>
<td>1,768,959</td>
<td>1,612,920</td>
<td>1,224,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.127</td>
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Notes: All regressions include country-industry-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by country-industry-quarter. Asterisks, *, **, and ***, denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

3 Empirical strategy: LP-IV approach

In this section, we describe our identification and empirical strategy. The goal of our empirical analysis is to estimate the dynamic causal effect of monetary policy shocks on a large sample of non-US nonfinancial firms’ financial performance, with a predominant focus on corporate investment. We are particularly interested in investigating the differential effects of monetary policy on zombie firms compared to nonzombie firms.

this loan share proxy is able to capture well the corporate debt structure outside of the United States. Because of this caveat, we do not use this loan share variable in our empirical framework.
3.1 Identification

We face two challenges in the identification of the effects of monetary policy shocks. The first one is a potential reverse causality issue: interest rates respond to the economy but can also affect it. We resort to US monetary policy shocks to identify exogenous variation in monetary policy conditions around the world, as US monetary policy drives the global financial cycle, and is arguably exogenous to changes in economic conditions in the rest of the world. Specifically, we follow the recent literature that uses a high-frequency identification of monetary policy surprises as proxies for the true monetary policy shocks (Gürkaynak et al. 2005, Gertler and Karadi 2015, Nakamura and Steinsson 2018). The idea is to isolate the interest rate surprises using the movement in three-month Fed Funds Futures within a 30-minutes window around FOMC policy announcements. The identifying assumption is that no other factors could drive both the private sector behavior and monetary policy decisions within this short interval.

To estimate the dynamic causal effects from the firm-level data, we use a panel data Local Projection Instrumental Variable (LP-IV) setup, following Jordà et al. (2020) and Cloyne et al. (2023). This specification flexibly estimates the impulse response functions on firm-level panel data using monetary policy surprises as instruments for a variable capturing the monetary policy indicator, rather than using the surprises directly in the estimation. We use the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yield as the relevant indicator of monetary policy. One advantage of the IV approach is that it does not require the high-frequency surprises to be the true monetary policy shocks. Instead, the surprises only need to be contemporaneously exogenous to the monetary policy indicator. Furthermore, as shown in Stock and Watson (2018), the LP-IV estimation automatically imposes the unit-effect normalization, allowing us to interpret the size of the shock in terms of the units of the endogenous variable, i.e. the monetary policy indicator.

Since US monetary policy can affect monetary policy conditions abroad through several channels, the second challenge involves the identification of the different channels in the international transmission of US monetary policy. According to the standard Mundell-Fleming model, the international transmission of monetary policy operates through two (offsetting) factors (Fleming 1962, Mundell 1963): contractionary US monetary policy reduces US domestic demand towards home and foreign goods (the demand-reducing channel), but it also causes a depreciation of the local currency against the US dollar. The latter makes a country’s exports more competitive, thus increasing a country’s foreign demand for its goods and services (the expenditure-switching channel). These channels are also sometimes referred to as the trade
channel and the exchange rate channel. Research has broadly found that the demand-reducing channel predominates over the expenditure-switching channel, so contractionary US monetary policy leads to negative spillovers to the rest of the world.

The Mundell-Fleming model is useful to understand how monetary policy in one country spills over to another country. But the increasing globalization and financialization of the world economy has brought to the fore the key role played by cross-border financial linkages in the international transmission of US monetary policy. In fact, US monetary policy spillovers to capital/financial flows via the financial system, operating mainly through risk-taking and portfolio rebalancing, have been shown to dominate over the traditional Mundell-Fleming channels (Borio and Zhu 2012, Rey 2013, Bruno and Shin 2015, Passari and Rey 2015, Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Bräuning and Ivashina 2020, Degasperi et al. 2020, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2020b, Kearns et al. 2023). For simplicity, we refer to this channel as the financial channel in the international transmission of US monetary policy shocks. Empirically, a contractionary US monetary policy shock transmits to higher foreign interest rates along the yield curve and causes the prices of risky assets to fall, as a result of changes in risk perceptions and portfolio rebalancing by investors. In a world with integrated financial markets, where economic agents rely on international markets for their funding, the co-movement in interest rates supports the predominant role of the financial channel in the transmission of US monetary policy to the rest of the world.

Against this background, we focus on the financial channel of unanticipated US interest rate changes, specifically by isolating the exogenous impact of US monetary policy on foreign interest rates, after controlling for other channels. We then study how the tightening in monetary conditions abroad driven by tighter US monetary policy affects firms’ financial performance. The financial channel of interest rate changes should be important for all nonfinancial firms in our sample, as changes in sovereign borrowing costs determine the prevailing local credit conditions at which all firms with external finance borrow from financial markets. By contrast, while the indirect effects of monetary policy through other channels may certainly be important, the direct effects of the exchange rate channel should be confined to firms with foreign-currency debt, while the trade channel should be more directly relevant for exporting firms.
3.2 First-stage regression

The first-stage specification is given by the following:

\[ R_{c,t} = \alpha_c + \delta_c S_t + \Gamma_c' X_{c,t-1} + u_{c,t}, \text{ for each } c \]  

(1)

where \( R_{c,t} \) denotes the one-year government bond yield in each country \( c \) at time \( t \), and \( S_t \) denotes the US monetary policy surprises, aggregated to each quarter \( t \) by summing up all daily surprises within the respective quarter. Controls \( X_{c,t-1} \) include four lags of real GDP growth, consumer price inflation, current account balance as a percentage of GDP, the real effective exchange rate, and US GDP growth. Although we focus on the financial channel (via changes in interest rates) through which US monetary policy transmits to foreign nonfinancial firms, the last two variables allow us to control for the other two main channels of monetary policy: the current account balance captures the trade channel, and the real effective exchange rate the exchange rate channel. Adding domestic and US GDP growth allows us to control for demand effects. We allow for fully heterogeneous coefficients across countries by running the first-stage regression separately for each country.\(^7\) We then collect the predicted value \( \hat{R}_{c,t} \) as the identified monetary policy shocks for each country. Running country-by-country regressions instead of pooling the data across countries is predicated on research showing that the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to foreign interest rates varies substantially across countries (Kalemli-Özcan 2019, De Leo et al. 2023, Kearns et al. 2023). For instance, Kearns et al. (2023) explain that differences in financial openness, speaking to the financial channel of US monetary policy, account for a large share of the heterogeneity in the responses of local interest rates to US monetary policy.

Before we move on to the second-stage regression, we discuss the choice of our monetary policy indicator, the one-year government bond yield. First, it is fairly standard in the literature studying the effects of monetary policy on the real economy (Gertler and Karadi 2015). In addition, it also has the advantage of capturing forward rate guidance. Second, using shorter rates, such as the central bank’s policy rate, the one- or three-month rates, may not accurately capture how a country’s monetary conditions actually respond to US monetary policy. The international spillovers of US monetary policy, to both AEs and EMs, seem indeed to be more

\(^7\)This approach is similar to a Bartik-type instrument, where all countries face a common shock from US monetary policy but the sensitivity of the response is allowed to be different across countries. The identification in our setting relies on the exogeneity of the monetary policy surprises instead of the exogeneity in the sensitivities.
important for longer-dated bond yields, as these also incorporate changes in risk premia, both
term premia and credit risk premia (Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Degasperi et al. 2020, De Leo et al.
2023, Kearns et al. 2023). In turn, shorter rates in the rest of the world do not typically
respond to US monetary policy news (Kearns et al. 2023), or actually decline as central banks
respond countercyclically to a contraction in economic activity (Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Degasperi
et al. 2020, De Leo et al. 2023). All in all, by focusing on one-year rates, we are able to
more accurately capture how local financial conditions or borrowing costs change due to US
contractionary monetary policy.

3.3 Second-stage regression

We employ an indirect IV approach instead of running the two-stage least squares (2SLS)
directly with firm-level data as controls. Specifically, our first-stage regressions project each
country’s interest rate on US monetary policy surprises, taking into account country-specific
controls. We then take the predicted country-specific interest rate and use it as the identified
monetary policy shock in the second-stage firm-level local projection regressions, also adding
firm fixed-effects and firm-level controls.

The advantage of using the indirect IV approach is the following. In a standard 2SLS
regression, all firm-level controls of the second-stage regression are automatically part of the
first-stage regression, leading to a weak-instrument issue. Since it is likely that US interest
rates will not be affected by foreign firms’ characteristics, it is presumably not necessary to add
firm-level controls in the first-stage regression. This will not affect the consistency and efficiency
of the estimators, as discussed in Baltagi (2011), pages 265-66. Our first-stage regression is thus
more in the spirit of the related literature using country-level data to identify monetary policy
shocks (Gürkaynak et al. 2005, Gertler and Karadi 2015, Nakamura and Steinsson 2018, Cloyne
et al. 2023). While it is well-known the weak instrument issue with micro data, our average
F-statistic in the first-stage specifications across all countries is fairly strong, of around 12.

The general expression of the second-stage regression, where we investigate the effects of

---

8On a related note, research points to a disconnect between monetary policy and short-term rates due to
changes in risk perceptions, the resulting increase in term premia, and the global nature of local banks’ funding
costs, especially for EMs. The transmission of domestic monetary policy to short-term interest rates is therefore
assessed to be imperfect (Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Degasperi et al. 2020, De Leo et al. 2023, Kearns et al. 2023). The
ability of the central bank to offset the tightening in financial conditions induced by US monetary policy may
therefore be limited.

9Our results are robust to using ten-year rates. We opted to use one-year rates due to the larger sample size.
monetary policy shocks on nonfinancial firms, is given by the following:

\[
\Delta_h Y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i^h + \alpha_t^h + \beta^h \hat{R}_{c,t} + \Gamma_h Z_{i,t-1} + \Theta_h X_{c,t-1} + e_i^h, \quad h = 1, 2, ..., 16
\]  

(2)

where the dependent variable \(\Delta_h Y_{i,t+h}\) is defined as the cumulative change from period \(h\) to \(t+h\), with \(h \in 0, 1, ..., 16\) quarters ahead, of selected balance sheet variables of firm \(i\). We use growth rates for investment, employment, and debt, defined as the cumulative percentage change in the logarithm of the respective variables: \(\Delta_h Y_{i,t+h} = (\log Y_{i,t+h} - \log Y_{i,t-1}) \times 100\). For the implicit interest rate, we take the change in the level. We add four lags of several firm-level variables \(Z_{i,t-1}\), including the lagged dependent variable, namely the log of total assets to proxy for firm size, the debt-to-asset ratio to control for leverage, and the net liquid asset position, computed as current assets net of current liabilities as a ratio of total assets. We also include the same set of country-level controls \(X_{c,t-1}\) as in the first-stage regression to avoid biasing the IV estimation (Baltagi 2011). We also include interaction terms of the zombie dummy with all controls to make sure our results are not driven by time-varying differences between zombie firms and nonzombies. We add firm fixed effects \(\alpha_i^h\) to control for permanent differences between firms that may affect how firms respond to monetary policy, and time fixed effects \(\alpha_t^h\) to capture unobserved global shocks.

Finally, we employ heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors following Montiel Olea and Plagborg-Møller (2021), who show that augmenting the specification with lags of the dependent variable renders a more robust inference, while also simplifying the calculation of standard errors by avoiding the residual serial correlation adjustment.

Our coefficient of interest is \(\beta^h\), which measures the average effect on foreign nonfinancial firms’ financial performance of an identified tightening in monetary policy, calibrated to increase country-specific borrowing costs \(\hat{R}_{c,t}\) by one-percentage point, or 100 basis points (bps).

4 Main results

4.1 Average effects

We first show the average effect on nonfinancial firms of a monetary policy shock that increases country-specific bond yields by 100 bps. Figure 2 shows the series of \(\beta^h\) from Equation (2). We find that monetary policy has important negative effects on nonfinancial firms. In particular,
corporate investment and employment contract immediately, although the responses of the latter are not statistically significant beyond the short term. The investment growth response reaches a trough of roughly one p.p. after four quarters, and then recovers slowly to the baseline. The magnitude of the decline falls within the estimated range reported in the literature using micro data (Li et al. 2020, Arbatli-Saxegaard et al. 2022, Di Giovanni and Rogers 2023).

Figure 2: Average effects of monetary policy shocks on nonfinancial firms

Consistent with the fall in investment, we estimate credit standards for nonfinancial firms to tighten. First, firm debt falls after the tightening in monetary policy, which may reflect a combination of tighter credit supply and lower credit demand (the debt-to-asset ratio also falls). Second, our proxy for the cost of debt—the implicit interest rate as measured with interest expenses divided by the stock of debt—increases over the short term.\footnote{We note that we do not measure the price of new loans, but rather the average interest rate a specific firm may be paying on the existing stock of debt. Using a concept of implicit interest rates comes with important
phenomena are in line with the bank credit channel of monetary policy, whereby higher interest rates lead to an overall contraction in credit supply in the economy (Bernanke and Gertler 1995, Kashyap and Stein 2000, Jiménez et al. 2012, Ippolito et al. 2018).

We find similar results when using the country-specific ten-year bond yields as the monetary policy indicator in the IV specification (Equations 1 and 2)—see Figure B.1 in Appendix B. The effects of monetary policy on investment, employment, and debt are somewhat stronger than in our baseline using one-year rates. This is in line with the notion from the US monetary policy spillovers literature that US monetary policy transmits mainly to the long-end of the yield curve, reflecting the repricing of risk and portfolio rebalancing by investors (Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Degasperi et al. 2020, De Leo et al. 2023, Kearns et al. 2023). By contrast, using country-specific short-term rates (three-month money market rates or treasury bill rates) as the monetary policy indicator leads to weaker and short-lived effects on firms’ financial performance (Figure B.2). The estimates are also subject to significant uncertainty. Our findings are, again, consistent with the same research showing that central banks’ policy rates or short-term rates may not accurately capture how a country’s borrowing costs respond to US monetary policy, as central banks may possibly want to partially offset the tightening in financial conditions driven by contractionary US monetary policy. In this context, using longer rates, including one-year rates as in our baseline, is preferable to properly account for changes in local monetary conditions after a US monetary policy shock.

On regional differences, we do not find any statistically significant difference in the average responses between AEs and EMs for most of the horizons (only after 3/4 years), as suggested by Figure B.3 in Appendix B. This is in line with recent findings in the literature showing that, despite the relevance of country-specific factors, the response of AEs and EMs to US monetary policy shocks may be more homogeneous than previously thought (Dedola et al. 2017, Degasperi et al. 2020, Arbatli-Saxegaard et al. 2022, Di Giovanni and Rogers 2023), and can potentially be larger for AEs, given that these economies are more integrated in the global capital markets (Kearns et al. 2023).\footnote{Using aggregated country-level data, Degasperi et al. (2020) find that countries with more open capital markets, irrespective of being AEs or EMs, are more sensitive to US monetary policy than countries with less open capital markets. But Dedola et al. (2017) do not find that these factors help to explain the cross-country heterogeneity in the responses to US monetary policy shocks.}

\footnote{Zooming in on regional effects, we find that monetary policy shocks seem to hit some regions more than others, particularly Asia and Pacific, and the Middle East and Central Asia, likely related to differences across countries or regions, such as the exchange rate regime, and the trade and financial exposure to the US dollar.}
Overall, our results confirm the findings in the literature using aggregated country-level data (Dedola et al. 2017, Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Degasperi et al. 2020, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2020b, Hoek et al. 2022, Bräuning and Sheremirov 2023) and firm-level data (Bräuning and Ivashina 2020, Li et al. 2020, Arbatli-Saxegaard et al. 2022, Di Giovanni and Rogers 2023) that US monetary policy shocks have important negative spillovers on firms’ financial performance worldwide. This is most likely the result of US monetary policy driving the global financial cycle, as identified in Rey (2013).

4.2 Differential effects of zombies versus nonzombies

We now turn explore the heterogeneity in the firms’ responses to monetary policy shocks; our main research question investigates the differential response of zombie firms relative to other firms. At face value, our prior would be that the risk-taking and bank lending channel would imply a stronger response of zombie firms to monetary policy shocks. Since lenders prioritize lending to projects with higher net present value (NPV), it follows that credit would be curtailed more for zombie firms as these firms are less productive (see Table 1). Zombie firms are also riskier and potentially more borrowing constrained, so the financial constraints channel would imply a stronger response of zombies to a monetary policy shock.

Furthermore, differences in the corporate debt structure of zombie firms, who rely more on bank debt than other firms, as we have seen in Table 1, may also imply a stronger response to monetary policy shocks; zombie firms may have less flexibility to find alternative sources of funding to finance their investment when the shock hits (Becker and Ivashina 2014, Ippolito et al. 2018, Crouzet 2021). Corporate bonds typically carry a lower interest rate than bank loans, have longer maturities, are issued at fixed rates, and are less exposed to cyclical fluctuations in credit supply (Becker and Ivashina 2014, Ippolito et al. 2018, Crouzet 2021, Holm-Hadulla and Thürwächter 2021).

But, on the other hand, this financial flexibility channel may work the other way around: banks’ informational advantage about borrowers may facilitate loan renegotiation (Berlin and Mester 1992, Darmouni et al. 2022, Hadlock and James 2002). In fact, this literature argues that bank loans tend to offer more flexibility in terms of renegotiating the terms of the loan, especially when financial frictions are high, while bonds are held by several investors, making a renegotiation more complex. According to this view, a contractionary monetary policy shock

would imply a weaker response of zombie firms relative to nonzombies.

We draw on the zombie literature to add another layer to the debate. Banks’ incentives to evergreen existing debt of zombie firms to keep them alive may be an important mechanism through which banks may shift lending to zombies at the expense of nonzombies (Peek and Rosengren 2005, Caballero et al. 2008, Faria-e-Castro et al. 2022, Albuquerque and Iyer 2023). We posit that the evergreening incentives may be stronger when interest rates increase, as banks internalize that the probability of zombie firms filing for bankruptcy increases as the cost of debt goes up. In this context, banks may decide to extend the original loan to zombies so as to avoid the realization of losses. This incentive may be stronger for weaker banks who may not have enough capital to absorb the losses from zombie lending.\textsuperscript{13} Against the background of different channels/theories, whether zombie firms are more or less responsive to monetary policy shocks remains an empirical question.

We modify the original equation on the average effects (Equation 2) by adding an interaction term between the (lagged) zombie dummy and the monetary policy indicator. Specifically, we run the following regression:

\[
\Delta_h Y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i^h + \alpha_{c,s,t}^h + \beta_h (Zom_{i,t-1} \times \bar{R}_{c,t}) + \Gamma'_h Z_{i,t-1} + e_{i,t},
\]

where we add country-sector-time fixed effects to control for all sources of shocks that may affect firms differently depending on time-varying country and industry shocks. Adding these fixed effects allow us to interpret our coefficient of interest $\beta_h$ as the differential response to monetary policy shocks of zombie firms relative to nonzombie firms within the same country, industry and quarter. Note that we cannot estimate anymore the average effect. Since in the previous section we have estimated a decline in firms’ financial performance (e.g. a decline in investment, employment, and debt growth) following, we interpret a positive (negative) coefficient as indicating that zombie firms are less (more) responsive to a tightening in monetary policy.

Figure 3 indicates that the responses of investment and employment of zombie firms are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that zombie firms are less responsive to the increase in interest rates compared to nonzombies. Recall that the average effects on investment

\textsuperscript{13}State ownership also seems to matter. Chari et al. (2022) find that state-owned banks in India typically lend more heavily to weak or zombie firms. Moreover, the authors also find that regulatory forbearance measures implemented by the Reserve Bank of India during the GFC encouraged government-owned banks to increase lending to zombie firms, which led to a significant credit misallocation.
and employment are negative (Figure 2), so a positive coefficient in Figure 3 means that zombie firms’ financial performance is less affected by higher interest rates relative to nonzombies. Specifically, we find that the response of zombie firms’ investment growth at the peak, reached after roughly 1.5 years, is around 0.7 p.p. smaller relative to nonzombies, while the response of employment growth is almost 0.8 p.p. smaller. These are economically important results. For instance, the mean sample difference of investment growth between zombie and nonzombies is 2.6 p.p.. A monetary policy shock calibrated to increase bond yields by 100 bps thus leads this gap to shrink by roughly 25 percent. Our results are not sensitive to using longer-dated yields (ten-year) as the monetary policy indicator (Figure B.5).14

Figure 3: Differential effect of monetary policy shocks on zombies versus nonzombies: investment and employment

Investment growth     Employment growth

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

At face value, this is a surprising result. For instance, the literature has found that financially constrained firms are more responsive to monetary policy shocks (Jeenas 2019, Bahaj et al. 2022, Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi 2023, Cloyne et al. 2023). Since zombie firms are riskier, unproductive, and with weaker balance sheets, one would expect zombie firms to respond in a similar fashion to financially constrained firms. We check in our data how financially constrained firms respond to monetary policy shocks, by replacing the zombie dummy in Equation (3) with another dummy capturing financially constrained firms. We use several proxies from the literature based on: the age of the firm (Gertler 1988, Bahaj et al. 2022, Cloyne et al. 2023),15

14Our results remain statistically significant when double-clustering standard errors by firm and time (Figure B.7 in Appendix B).
15We compute age of the firm from the year of foundation from Capital IQ. When the year of foundation is missing, we compute age from Compustat’s Initial Public Offering date (ipodate).
the firm size proxied by total assets (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994, Bernanke et al. 1999), leverage,
net liquid assets, and the probability of default in 12 months, a modified version of Merton’s
distance-to-default model taken from the National University of Singapore’s Credit Research
Initiative (NUS-CRI). Specifically, we use the median of the distribution of each proxy as a
cut-off point to construct a time-varying definition of financially constrained firms: firms are
financially constrained if their net liquid asset ratio, total assets, or age, are below the median.
In turn, firms are also defined as constrained if their 12-month probability of default, or debt-
to-asset ratio, are above the median.

We focus on the investment response. The response of zombies we have found before differs
materially from the response of traditional metrics of financial constraints (Figure 4). Although
some of the point estimates are surrounded by high uncertainty over longer horizons, our re-
sults are roughly in line with the literature finding that financially constrained firms are more
responsive to a tightening in monetary policy (Bräuning and Ivashina 2020, Li et al. 2020,
Arbatli-Saxegaard et al. 2022, Cloyne et al. 2023, Di Giovanni and Rogers 2023): firms with
limited net liquid assets, high probability of default, smaller, or younger, tend to be hardest
hit by higher interest rates. The only difference is when we use the debt-to-asset ratio as a
proxy of financial constraints: we find that high-leverage firms seem to react less to monetary
policy shocks relative to other firms, but the responses are not estimated precisely. In addition,
leverage alone may not capture well the firms’ resilience and access to credit (Kahle and Stulz
2013, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist 2016, Jeenas 2019).16

As an alternative indicator, we use a new definition trying to capture nonzombies in financial
distress. We define these firms in a similar way as our zombie definition, but only taking the two
indicators proxying default risk, not profitability: firms with an ICR below one and with leverage
above the median peers in the sector, both for two years in a row. By excluding the profitability
indicator (negative sales growth) we make sure that these firms are profitable, despite more likely
being in financial distress. We find that investment growth of these distressed firms is also more
responsive to monetary policy shocks—bottom right panel in Figure 4—suggesting that the
behavior of zombie firms, who are persistently unprofitable, is fundamentally different from the
conventional response of financially constrained/distressed firms.17

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16 Ottonello and Winberry (2020) also find that low-leverage firms respond more to US monetary policy shocks
because they face a flatter marginal cost of investment finance.

17 In this regard, we show further that the role of profitability, proxied with sales growth, plays indeed an
important role. We assess how each zombie indicator, an ICR below one, leverage above the median peers,
and negative sales growth, contributes to the differential effect we find for zombies relative to other firms. For
that effect, we define zombie firms in Equation (3) with one zombie indicator at a time. We indeed find that
Figure 4: Differential effect of monetary policy shocks on financially constrained firms

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses for financially constrained firms relative to other firms to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure 5 may shed some light on our main finding that zombie firms’ financial performance is less affected by monetary policy shocks than nonzombies. Running again Equation (3), we find a statistically significant and positive coefficient on debt growth, and a negative coefficient on the implicit interest rate of zombie firms relative to nonzombies. This suggests that credit standards tighten by less for zombies following a monetary policy shock. Recall that debt growth falls and interest rates increase for the average firm in the sample, which implies that debt growth falls by less for zombie firms, over 0.6 p.p., while the cost of debt rises by less, by roughly 0.25 p.p. relative to nonzombies. All in all, the fact that zombie firms may get more favorable credit conditions when financial conditions tighten, provides supporting evidence for the argument that bank engage in evergreening practices by shifting lending to zombies—the zombie lending channel of monetary policy. 18

At this point, it is necessary to clarify the apparent tension between our results, that zombie firms are less affected when interest rates increase, and the notion that low interest rates may lead to zombification. In fact, a prolonged period of low interest rates, ample liquidity, and search for yield that followed the GFC may partly explain the rise in the number of zombie firms worldwide (Altman et al. 2022, Banerjee and Hofmann 2022). We refrain from discussing the factors that contribute to zombification or the creation of zombies. What we have studied in the paper is how zombie firms respond to contractionary monetary policy shocks, but taking the existence of zombie firms as given. In this context, we focus on interest rate changes, not the level of interest rates, and irrespective of whether the interest rate increases are coming from a prolonged period of low interest rates.

We find that the existence of evergreening incentives on the part of lenders may imply more favorable credit conditions for zombie firms, which would help these firms stay afloat. In the next section we rationalize our empirical findings by relying on a simple model that indeed illustrates that evergreening incentives may explain why zombie firms are less affected by monetary policy shocks.

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18We get very similar results with the ten-year rate as the monetary policy indicator (Figure B.5), but not with the three-month rate (Figure B.6). This underscores the importance of using local interest rates that properly account for the transmission of US monetary policy (Kalemli-Özcan 2019, Degasperi et al. 2020, De Leo et al. 2023, Kearns et al. 2023).
5 Theoretical framework: evergreening model

In this section, we present a theoretical framework based on Faria-e-Castro et al. (2022) that shows that evergreening can arise as a normal feature of financial intermediation. With this model, we can shed more light on our empirical findings, i.e. on the role of zombie firms in the transmission of monetary policy. The loan contract follows a ‘Stackelberg’ model structure where the firm (the follower) determines the borrowing and investment amount based on the interest rate offered by the lender/bank (the leader), who makes optimal lending decisions considering the firm’s reaction.

In this model, the crucial factor in the relationship lending is the presence of existing debt between a firm and the lender from which it seeks to borrow. In this setting, a firm with debt will only borrow new debt from a lender with which it has already an ongoing relationship. In turn, when the firm has no outstanding debt, the lender offers a constant interest rate in a competitive lending market. But if the firm has pre-existing debt from the lender, then the lender’s optimal lending decision will take into account the firm’s default risk. This consideration leads to more favorable terms for firms that have higher levels of debt and lower levels of productivity, as these firms are more likely to default; doing so would generate losses to the lenders’ books. This phenomenon—whereby a lender rolls over pre-existing debt of highly leveraged and unproductive firms—is referred to as the ‘evergreening’ motive of lender-firm lending.
5.1 Environment

The economy in our model consists of two types of agents: firms and lenders. Firms are characterized by their pre-existing liabilities denoted by \( b \) and their productivity represented by \( z \). Lenders are risk-neutral entities with substantial financial resources and the ability to obtain funds from a saving market with infinite elasticity at a fixed interest rate \( R \). Furthermore, lenders differ in the amount of capital they possess, denoted by \( a \). The economic system unfolds over two periods, namely \( t = 0 \) and \( t = 1 \).

5.2 Firm problem

At the beginning of period 0, the firm is faced with a decision: whether to default on its existing debt and receive no value, or to continue its operations in the market by repaying the old debt and borrow new debt to invest in capital and produce, subject to a borrowing constraint. Continuing operations entail a continuation value denoted as \( V(z,b;Q) \), which is a function of the existing debt \( b \), productivity \( z \), and the price of new debt \( Q \) offered by the lender at time \( t = 0 \). In this setting, we assume firms to be price takers, and cannot negotiate the loan price with the lender. The firm will opt to default if and only if the value \( V(z,b;Q) \) is less than zero. Following Faria-e-Castro et al. (2022), we assume no default at \( t = 1 \).

If the firm chooses to remain in business, it faces the following profit-maximizing problem at \( t = 0 \):

\[
V(z,b;Q) = \max_{b',k' \geq 0} -b - k' + Qb' + \beta f [z(k')^\alpha - b']
\]

s.t. \( b' \leq \theta k' \)

In period 0, the firm begins by repaying its current debt level \( b \). It then proceeds to make optimal decisions regarding its investment and borrowing levels for the subsequent period, denoted as \( k' \) and \( b' \). These decisions are subject to a borrowing constraint at \( t = 0 \), specified as \( b' \leq \theta k' \).

In addition, the firm’s discount factor is represented by \( \beta f \).

Moving on to period 1, the firm employs a technology characterized by decreasing returns to scale, resulting in the production of output given by \( z(k')^\alpha \), where \( \alpha < 1 \). This formula reflects the firm’s ability to generate output based on the level of capital investment \( k' \) raised during the previous period.
With the assumption that borrowing constraints are binding, i.e. when \( Q \geq \beta f \), it follows that the firm will borrow up to the maximum extent allowed by the constraint, leading to the existence of a minimum price of debt denoted as \( Q^{\text{min}}(z,b) \). This threshold can be expressed explicitly as:

\[
Q^{\text{min}}(z,b) = \beta f + \frac{1}{\theta} - \frac{(\beta f \alpha z)^{1/\alpha}}{\theta} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha b} \right)^{1/\alpha}
\]

where the minimum price of debt, \( Q^{\text{min}}(z,b) \), is the threshold value below which the firm will default, meaning that it will choose not to continue operating and instead receive a zero value. Therefore, the firm defaults if and only if \( Q < Q^{\text{min}}(z,b) \). This relationship indicates the critical role that the price of debt plays in determining the firm’s decision to default or continue its operations. From the expression above, we see that \( Q^{\text{min}}(z,b) \) is increasing in \( b \) and decreasing in \( z \), i.e. high-debt and low-productivity firms (resembling our zombie firms in the empirical analysis) tend to default more.

5.3 Lender problem

We assume a continuum of lenders in the market who are risk-neutral and have access to an infinitely-elastic saving market with a constant risk-free interest rate \( R_k \). This means that lenders discount future values in period 1 at a rate of \( \beta_k \), defined as the inverse of \( R_k \). Furthermore, lenders differ in the amount of capital \( a \) they own, implying heterogeneity in the marginal utilities of lending, despite lenders sharing a common utility function denoted as \( u(.) \).

To allow for the possibility of firm default in period 0, we assume that \( \beta_k \) is lower than \( \beta f \) plus the inverse of the borrowing constraint parameter \( \theta \). This default condition ensures that the discount rate applied by lenders is lower than the discount rate used by firms plus the borrowing constraint parameter.

Competitive lending

If a lender does not have any lending relationship with a specific firm, then the lender has no incentive to offer a lending contract with a debt price lower than \( \beta_k \), provided that the firm will not default at this price. Assuming that the firm does not default in period 0, the firm can always borrow from a competitive lender at price \( Q = \beta_k \). In this case, the firm can operate at the following marginal product of capital (MPK):

\[
z\alpha(k')^{\alpha-1} = MPK = \frac{1 - \theta(\beta_k - \beta f)}{\beta f}
\]
where the price and quantity offered by the lender is independent of the firm state \((z,b)\).

**Relationship lending**

Relationship lending refers to a scenario where a lender holds a nonzero level of existing debt from a client firm. In this situation, the lender internalizes the potential impact from the firm’s default risk, as a possible default will lead to zero profits for the lender. We can express the lender’s problem under relationship lending as follows:

\[
W(z,b,a) = \max_{Q \geq \beta^k} \mathbb{I}[V(z,b;Q) \geq 0] \times [u(a+b) - Qb'(z;Q) + \beta^k b'(z;Q) - u(a)]
\]

where \(\mathbb{I}\) is an indicator function capturing no firm default at time \(t = 0\). We assume the price of debt \(Q\) to be always equal or higher than the inverse of the risk-free interest rate, represented by \(\beta^k = \frac{1}{R}\). If this condition is not satisfied, then the firm could always borrow from the competitive market. The lender’s willingness to establish and maintain a lending relationship with a particular firm is contingent on the condition that the firm’s net worth, denoted as \(W(z,b,a;Q)\), is greater than zero. Since \(W(z,b,a;Q)\) is decreasing in \(Q\), we can implicitly solve for another cutoff value of \(Q_{\text{max}}(z,b,a)\) that satisfies:

\[
Q_{\text{max}}(z,b,a) : W(z,b,a;Q_{\text{max}}) = 0
\]

where \(Q_{\text{max}}\) represents the highest price of debt that a lender is willing to offer within this relationship lending. Combining both markets, the competitive lending and the relationship lending, the lender’s optimal relationship lending policy should be consistent with the following:

\[
Q^*(z,b,a) = \begin{cases} 
\beta^k & \text{if } Q_{\text{min}}(z,b) \leq \beta^k \leq Q_{\text{max}}(z,b,a) \\
Q_{\text{min}}(z,b) & \text{if } \beta^k \leq Q_{\text{min}}(z,b) \leq Q_{\text{max}}(z,b,a) \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

Let \(\hat{b}(z)\) be the threshold value of existing debt such that the lender is willing to offer a more favorable debt price \((Q_{\text{min}}(z,\hat{b}(z)) = \beta^k)\), and \(\bar{b}(z,a)\) such that the lender is indifferent between evergreening this firm or forgoing previous debt \((Q_{\text{min}}(z,\bar{b}(z,a)) = Q_{\text{max}}(z,\bar{b}(z,a),a))\). We can verify that:

1. \(b(z) < \hat{b}(z,a), \forall z\);
2. \( Q^*(z,b,a) \) is increasing in \( b \), strictly if \( b \in [\bar{b}(z), \hat{b}(z,a)] \);

3. \( Q^*(z,b,a) \) is decreasing in \( z \), strictly if \( b \in [\bar{b}(z), \hat{b}(z,a)] \).

Figure 6 illustrates Properties 1 and 2 with respect to pre-existing debt \( b \), and for a given firm’s productivity \( z \). The figure depicts the relationship between the firm’s existing debt level \( b \), and the lender’s optimal lending decisions defined in three regions or nodes. The maximum price the lender is willing to offer \( Q^{\text{max}} \) is given by the dashed curve, while the minimum price \( Q^{\text{min}} \) below which the firm defaults is given by the solid curve.

When the firm carries a relatively low debt level, specifically \( b < \bar{b}(z) \), its default risk is considered to be low. Consequently, the lender does not have a strong incentive to offer a lending contract with a higher price in this scenario, offering a loan price equal to \( \beta^k \) (competitive lending market).

On the other hand, if the firm is heavily indebted such that \( b > \hat{b}(z,a) \), it is not profitable for the lender to continue extending credit to this firm since \( Q^{\text{max}} \) is below \( Q^{\text{min}} \). In these cases, the lender may find it more beneficial to let the firm default rather than provide further financial support. This is the default region.

Figure 6: Illustration of lender decisions within relationship lending by existing debt \( b \)

Firms with existing debt levels falling between \( \bar{b}(z) \) and \( \hat{b}(z,a) \) are considered prime candidates for evergreening. If the lender were to offer the competitive lending price \( \beta^k \), then the
firm would default since $\beta^k$ is below $Q^{\text{min}}$. The lender would have an incentive to offer more favorable lending terms, a higher loan price (lower interest rate), to firms falling in this region to prevent them from defaulting. The lender is thus willing to sacrifice some loan returns, with $Q^* > \beta^k$, but still make a profit, in order to ensure the repayment of the existing debt. This is the evergreening region.

As described in Property 3, another important determinant of the lender’s optimal lending decision is the firm’s productivity. Figure 7 provides some insights into the lender’s optimal lending decision based on the firm’s productivity $z$ and existing debt level $b$. The figure depicts a three-dimensional plot showing the lender’s debt price $Q$ for the $(b, z)$ pair.

Firms located in the dark blue area are characterized by high levels of debt and low productivity, and tend to default more often. In this region, there is no lending relationship as lenders do not find it profitable to evergreen the loans of these firms.

Firms situated in the green area, which corresponds to high productivity or low existing debt levels, can operate under a competitive debt price of $Q = \beta^k$. As a result, these firms do not require special considerations or preferential lending terms from the lender.

Figure 7: Lender’s optimal debt price by firm productivity and existing debt level

The middle area, colors ranging from light orange to yellow, represents firms that heavily rely on relationship lending to sustain their operations. The shade of color in this region indicates
the favorability of the lending contract and the corresponding debt price. Firms closer to the yellow coloration experience more favorable lending terms and higher debt prices (lower interest rates). These firms falling in the middle area are relatively more indebted and less productive, aligning well with our definition of zombie firms.

5.4 The role of bank capital

In our model, bank capital determines whether a lender is inclined to maintain a relationship lending arrangement with a firm. The level of bank capital directly influences the marginal benefit derived from recovering previous debt, implying a decrease in the maximum debt price $Q_{\text{max}}$ as bank capital $a$ increases. Consequently, lenders with higher levels of bank capital are less willing to support firms with high levels of outstanding debt. On the other hand, lenders with lower bank capital may be more inclined to extend relationship lending to firms with higher levels of indebtedness, as these lenders may not have enough capital to absorb the losses from a scenario of firms defaulting.

Although the model posits that evergreening motives may be stronger for weakly capitalized banks, we would like to clarify that zombie lending takes place in our model irrespective of concerns about bank capital. For instance, banks may gamble for zombie firms’ resurrection, hoping that these firms recover or obtain market financing in the future, as zombies’ reputation grows with the length of their lending relationship (Hu and Varas 2021). In fact, Hu and Varas (2021) show theoretically that by rolling over bad loans, banks allow zombie firms to remain in business, which in turn increases zombie firms’ reputation, thus allowing zombies to access market financing in the future.

5.5 The role of relationship lending in the monetary policy transmission

We now simulate how a change in borrowing costs driven by contractionary monetary policy may affect lenders’ lending decision, akin to our empirical specification. For this purpose, we adjust the risk-free interest rate $R$, by simulating an increase from $R_1$ to $R_2$. This change is equivalent to a decrease in the lenders’ effective discount factor, implying a shift from $\beta^k_1$ to $\beta^k_2$, as depicted in Figure 8.

While the minimum debt price $Q_{\text{min}}$ remains unaffected by the change in the discount factor $\beta^k$, the contractionary monetary policy causes a downward movement of the $Q_{\text{max}}$ curve and
the $\beta^k$ horizontal line. Consequently, the levels of $\hat{b}(z)$, the threshold debt level below which the lender does not offer higher debt prices, and $\bar{b}(z,a)$, the threshold debt level beyond which the lender chooses not to evergreen the firm, decrease.

In this contractionary monetary policy scenario, more firms find themselves relying on relationship lending to survive, particularly those with lower existing debt levels. Simultaneously, more heavily indebted firms opt to default at the given interest rate, as the cost of maintaining the lending relationship becomes less favorable under the higher risk-free interest rate.

In this context, firms that engage in relationship lending are less affected by the contractionary monetary policy as their effective debt price $Q^* = Q_{\text{min}}^*$ remains unchanged, implying no passthrough of higher rates to these firms. This is valid as long as these firms were already in a relationship lending arrangement prior to the policy change. In contrast, firms that rely on competitive lending rates experience a higher interest rate resulting from the policy change, as the $Q_{\text{min}}^*$ for these firms is lower than the competitive loan price $\beta^k_2$. In other words, at the prevailing market interest rate, these firms will not default thus lenders offer the competitive lending loan price.

Figure 8: Lender’s optimal debt price decision under contractionary monetary policy

Overall, relationship lending tends to dampen the transmission of monetary policy to zombie firms’ investment, as illustrated in Figure 9. When we map the increase in interest rates to the
firms’ investment growth, we find that the investment of firms engaged in relationship lending remains relatively stable despite the tightening in monetary policy. By contrast, we show that firms relying on competitive lending rates exhibit a decrease in investment due to the increase in interest rates. Although this is a simple model, showing extreme cases of interest rate passthrough (no passthrough or full passthrough), it helps us nevertheless understand why high-debt and low-productivity firms, akin to our zombie firms in the empirical part, tend to be less responsive to monetary policy shocks.

Figure 9: Response of firm investment under contractionary monetary policy

6 Role of policies in mitigating the zombie lending channel of monetary policy

We have seen empirically and theoretically that in the presence of higher interest rates, banks may have stronger incentives to offer better credit conditions to zombie firms to prevent them from defaulting. This translates into a lower passthrough of higher interest rates to the cost of debt of zombies, and a smaller fall in credit supply toward zombies relative to other firms. The evergreening motive thus rationalizes our empirical findings: more favorable credit conditions relative to nonzombies allows zombie firms to mitigate some of the tightening in monetary policy.
Against this background, the survival of zombie firms may create important negative spillover effects to nonzombies. The literature has documented that these spillover or congestion effects can assume different forms along the intensive and extensive margins, with the overall effect of reducing productivity growth in the economy (Caballero et al. 2008, McGowan et al. 2018, Acharya et al. 2019, Banerjee and Hofmann 2022, Albuquerque and Iyer 2023). For instance, on the intensive margin, zombie firms may distort the competition in the markets in which they operate, ultimately depressing market prices for nonzombies’ products, and raising market wages. This would discourage healthy firms from investing further, potentially leading to higher exit rates of healthy firms (extensive margin). In addition, higher wages and lower market prices caused by the presence of zombie firms may prevent new firms from entering because the new entrants would need to clear a higher productivity threshold.

In this section, we follow closely Albuquerque and Iyer (2023), who find that policies that target banks’ incentives to engage in risky behavior may discourage evergreening practices, and therefore mitigate the negative effects from zombie firms on the real economy. We investigate the role that banks’ capital buffers, NPLs, macroprudential policies, and insolvency regimes may have in mitigating the differential effect of zombies’ financial performance relative to nonzombies in the aftermath of an increase in borrowing costs. The literature has found that stronger banks (Storz et al. 2017, Acharya et al. 2019, Andrews and Petroulakis 2019, Albuquerque and Iyer 2023, Blattner et al. 2023), tighter macroprudential policies (Albuquerque and Iyer 2023), and well-prepared insolvency regimes (Andrews and Petroulakis 2019, Kulkarni et al. 2021, Becker and Ivashina 2022) help to tackle zombification. In this section we expand this literature by also investigating if zombie lending can be mitigated by these policies when interest rates increase.

We expand our Equation 3 by adding a triple interaction between the monetary policy indicator, the zombie dummy, and selected policy indicators (while also adding an interaction term between the zombie dummy and the policy indicator). We focus on investment growth as the proxy for firms’ financial performance:

\[
\Delta_h Inv_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i^h + \alpha_{c,s,t}^h + \beta_1^h(Zom_{i,t-1} \times \hat{R}_{c,t}) + \beta_2^h(Zom_{i,t-1} \times Policy_{c,t-1} \times \hat{R}_{c,t}) \\
+ \beta_3^h(Zom_{i,t-1} \times Policy_{c,t-1}) + \Gamma'_h Z_{i,t-1} + e_{i,t}^h, \quad (4)
\]

where our main coefficient of interest is \( \beta_2 \), which measures the additional differential effect of tighter monetary policy on zombies’ investment growth relative to nonzombies in countries.
with a given policy indicator above the median (against countries below the median). The policy variable $\text{Policy}_{c,t-1}$ takes the following indicators: (i) banks’ regulatory capital buffers, given by banks’ actual regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets minus the minimum required risk-based regulatory capital ratio; (ii) banks’ NPLs as a ratio of total loans; (iii) the stance of macroprudential policies computed from the Alam et al. (2019); (iv) and the quality of insolvency regimes from Araujo et al. (2022), which measures how well countries are prepared to handle a large-scale restructuring of corporates.\footnote{The insolvency regime indicator is time-invariant.} We transform each of these indicators into a binary variable, capturing countries above and below the median sample values for each quarter. Given the positive $\beta_1^h$ that we have found in Section 4.2, a positive (negative) $\beta_2^h$ suggests that countries with the specific $\text{Policy}_{c,t-1}$ above the median sample tend to have stronger (weaker) evergreening motives relative to countries that stand below the median of that indicator.\footnote{Our specification is somewhat different from the congestion effects specification, first introduced by Caballero et al. (2008); our specification would involve quadruple interaction terms which are very cumbersome to estimate. We thus take our baseline regression with the differential effect of monetary policy on zombies versus nonzombies as the starting point (Equation 3). We see a link between our specification and the one from Caballero et al. (2008). With Equation (4) we will be able to assess how zombies’ financial performance is affected relative to other firms in countries with stronger regulatory frameworks. If the policies we study here were to help reduce zombies’ performance, then it is likely that nonzombies operating in the same industry would benefit as a result (lower congestion effects à la Caballero et al. (2008).}

Our results show that countries with higher regulatory capital buffers or lower NPLs tend to experience a decline in zombies’ investment growth relative to nonzombies (Figure 10).\footnote{We flip the coefficient on NPLs to make it easier to compare it with the coefficient on capital buffers. This way, an increase in $\text{Policy}_{c,t-1}$ can be interpreted as an improvement in banks’ balance sheets.} We get relatively similar results if we were to use instead capital buffers or NPLs as a continuous variable in Equation (4)—see Figure B.8 in Appendix B. This is suggestive evidence in line with our theoretical underpinning in Section 5 that banks with higher bank capital (or lower NPLs) are more bound to writing-off zombie loans and absorb the losses.

On macroprudential policies, we do not find supporting evidence that overall macroprudential policies may help mitigate zombie lending practices (Figure B.9 in Appendix B). But we should bear in mind that the overall macroprudential index contains several different measures—including limits to FX positions, and capital and liquidity surcharges aimed at systemically important financial institutions—which may do very little in curbing zombie lending. We therefore unpack this index and find that countries with more macroprudential measures targeting loans ($\text{Loan} - \text{targeted}$) seem to be particularly associated with lower zombie lending. Within this component, we also find some evidence, albeit with larger parameter uncertainty,
that measures that impose limits to credit growth, loan loss provisions, loan restrictions, and to the loan-to-deposit ratio, may help tackle zombie lending (Supply – loans).

Finally, we also find a role for insolvency regimes in mitigating the negative effects of zombies, including laws that focus on enhancing out-of-court restructuring (Figure B.10 in Appendix B). In particular, we find some evidence that zombie firms’ investment growth in countries with well-prepared insolvency regimes tends to decline relative to nonzombies over the medium term. The fact that we only find statistical evidence after three years suggests that, although insolvency regimes may matter to minimize zombie lending, this only materializes over longer horizons as presumably it takes time to restructure firms.

Although the results in this section may not necessarily imply a causal link running from tighter policies or more-developed insolvency regimes to zombies’ lower investment growth, the inclusion of a rich set of controls and country-industry-time fixed effects should be able to minimize confounding factors. In this context, our results suggest that policies that strengthen banks’ balance sheets, that limit banks’ incentives to engage in risky behavior, and laws that allow an efficient resolution of weak firms, may help mitigate zombie lending when financial conditions tighten. This chimes with the literature that has focused on strengthening bank supervision and regulation to break banks’ evergreening incentives (Giannetti and Simonov 2013, Acharya et al. 2021, Schivardi et al. 2022, Blattner et al. 2023, Bonfim et al. 2023).
7 Extensions and robustness checks

We check the sensitivity of our baseline results to different monetary policy shocks and zombie definitions, and extend our results to US firms and euro area firms. First, we investigate whether the source of the monetary policy shock may play a role in determining the sign and extent of the global spillovers. Recent literature has identified an information effect of monetary policy, whereby financial market participants may react differently to interest rate increases if they are predicated on inflationary concerns or on stronger growth prospects (Stavrakeva and Tang 2019, Degasperi et al. 2020, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey 2020a, Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco 2021, Jarociński 2022, Ciminelli et al. 2022, Pinchetti and Szczepaniak 2023). For instance, there is evidence that a tightening in US monetary policy stemming from higher growth prospects is associated with moderate or even opposite spillovers to EME’s asset prices and capital flows (Ciminelli et al. 2022, Hoek et al. 2022, Pinchetti and Szczepaniak 2023).

To test how our results are affected by central bank information effects—in the baseline we use monetary policy shocks that do not control for the source of the tightening shock—we resort to the poor man’s sign restrictions monetary policy shock series from Jarociński and Karadi (2020). These shocks strip out central bank information shocks. In addition, we also use the orthogonalized monetary policy shock series from Bauer and Swanson (2023) that also control for information shocks. Illustrating the case for investment growth, we show in Figures B.11 and B.12 in Appendix B that our main results, both the average firm response and the differential response of zombies relative to nonzombies, remain highly robust to controlling for information shocks. This suggests that a US monetary policy shock—irrespective of controlling for the Fed’s information component—that spills over to the rest of the world through changes in local interest rates will affect less zombie firms’ financial performance than nonzombies, possibly due to the evergreening incentives we have explored in the paper.

Second, we check how US monetary policy shocks transmit to US zombie firms relative to nonzombies. To do this, we follow the same LP-IV method as in the baseline, but using the US one-year government bond yield in the first stage, and adding US domestic-specific controls (real GDP growth, CPI inflation, and the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) excess bond premium). While the differential responses of employment, debt, and interest rates are not precisely estimated, we find that investment growth of zombie firms falls more relative to nonzombies (Figure 22). But using a New Keynesian DSGE model, Ahmed et al. (2021) show that not all EMEs may benefit from higher US interest rates induced by stronger US domestic demand: country-specific vulnerabilities play a significant role.
B.13). This is indicative of a stronger effect of monetary policy shocks on zombie firms, a result that contrasts with our main baseline findings for firms outside of the United States. One possible explanation for this phenomenon may be linked to our previous findings on the role of higher regulatory capital buffers, tight macroprudential measures on loans, and well-developed insolvency regimes, on all of which the US economy ranks high. Our results are also consistent with Favara et al. (2022), who argue that zombie lending is not a prominent feature of the US economy, as zombie firms exit the market through bankruptcy; an efficient resolution of financial distress in the US bankruptcy code may thus weaken banks’ incentives to keep zombie firms alive.

Third, we replicate our results to euro area firms, by instead using ECB monetary policy shocks. This allows us to extend our analysis by focusing on the potentially most relevant (domestic) monetary policy shocks for euro area countries. We use the high-frequency monetary policy shocks from Jarociński and Karadi (2020), constructed from monetary surprises around ECB monetary policy announcements. In line with our main baseline results, we find that zombie firms’ financial performance in the euro area is less responsive to ECB monetary policy shocks (Figure B.14). This suggests that zombie lending plays an important role in the euro area (Storz et al. 2017, McGowan et al. 2018, Andrews and Petroulakis 2019, Acharya et al. 2021, Schivardi et al. 2022, Blattner et al. 2023). Although it is beyond the scope of the paper to compare our findings in detail between the euro area and the United States, we note that bankruptcy laws in the euro area are typically less creditor-friendly than in the United States; this makes it more difficult for a swift resolution and restructuring of unproductive and unviable firms in the euro area. In addition, euro area firms rely considerably more on bank loans than on market financing to finance their businesses, adding pressure on banks to engage in evergreening practices. These two factors may explain why zombie lending seems to be more prevalent in euro area countries than in the United States, despite similar zombie shares (Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A).

Finally, we use two alternative zombie definitions used in the literature to check the sensitivity of our results. The first measure is based on a concept of subsidized interest rates, first defined in Caballero et al. (2008), and modified slightly by Acharya et al. (2019). Zombie firms are defined as firms with the three-year median ICR implied rating of BB or lower, and the ratio of interest expenses lower than highly-rated peers, i.e., AAA-rated firms. Since ratings

---

23 These shocks control for information shocks, but as we have seen in Figure B.11, our baseline results are independent of the central bank information component.
are not available for all firms, we infer them from the ICR as in Acharya et al. (2019). The second measure comes from Banerjee and Hofmann (2022), who define zombie firms based on an ICR below one, and a Tobin’s q below the median firm in the industry, over a two-year period. Similarly to our paper, Banerjee and Hofmann (2022) only allow zombie firms to exit the zombie status when one of the two indicators is reversed for at least two years after a firm is defined as zombie.

Illustrating the case for investment growth, we find that our baseline result—zombie firms’ investment growth is less impacted by a contractionary monetary policy shock—remains robust to using the Banerjee and Hofmann (2022) definition, although the responses are estimated less precisely (Figure B.15). By contrast, using the Acharya et al. (2019) definition yields the opposite result. But using a concept of subsidized interest rates to define zombie firms, with zombies receiving more favorable financing conditions relative to high-rated firms in order to survive, may come with several shortcomings, as we discussed in Section 2.2. For instance, banks may have incentives to capitalize interest payments by evergreening new loans to cover payments on the old loan, but still charging high interest rates on the new loan. In addition, the low-interest rate environment of the last two decades makes it unlikely that lenders would charge interest rates at rates close to zero, or even negative, to weak (zombie) firms. In this context, we believe that using the subsidized interest rate concept may not capture accurately several ‘actual’ zombie firms, so we take our results on the right panel of Figure B.15 with a pinch of salt.

8 Conclusion

In this paper we have found that zombie firms are less responsive to monetary policy shocks compared to other firms. We identify exogenous variation in monetary conditions for a large set of countries by exploiting the international transmission of US monetary policy shocks. Using granular balance sheet data on nonfinancial firms, we find that contractionary monetary policy leads to more favorable credit conditions for zombie firms relative to healthier firms. This allows zombies to cut investment and employment by relatively less than nonprofitable operating in the same industry and country.

While this result seems counterintuitive at face value, we rationalize our findings through

\[BB\text{-}rated \text{ firms or lower have a three-year ICR below the first quartile of the median industry, while AAA-rated firms are firms in the upper quartile of the industry ICR distribution.}\]
a simple model with evergreening incentives faced by banks; when interest rates rise, lenders, especially those with lower capital, may have stronger incentives to offer more favorable credit conditions to zombie firms at the expense of other firms, so as to prevent zombie firms from defaulting.

Overall, zombie lending plays an important role in mitigating the transmission of monetary policy shocks to zombie firms. The flip side, however, is that other, more productive and viable firms, may be hardest hit, with detrimental effects on the aggregate productivity growth of the real economy. This calls for policies that strengthen banks’ balance sheets, that limit banks’ incentives to engage in risky behavior, including via stronger prudential supervision, and laws that allow an efficient resolution of weak firms.
Appendix A: Sample selection and zombie firms

We use quarterly data on nonfinancial listed corporations for 49 countries, 23 EMs and 26 AEs, from S&P Compustat North America and Compustat Global. Our final sample covers an unbalanced panel of 24,371 nonfinancial firms over 2000q1-2019q4, a total of 812,627 firm-quarter observations. We exclude financial firms (banks, diversified financials, and insurance firms) from our analysis: GICS codes ranging from 4010 to 4030. Following Albuquerque and Iyer (2023), we make the following adjustments to the sample:

- we convert non-USD to USD for key variables in levels: we use (i) end-of-period exchange rates for stock balance sheet data; and (ii) quarterly average exchange rates for income statement and cash flow data, and for financial market data
- drop observations for missing assets and liabilities
- replace negative values for assets and liabilities with zeros
- drop observations if capital stock or total debt are missing
- drop observations when acquisitions are larger than five percent of total assets to exclude potential mergers and acquisitions
- drop firms with total debt larger than 100 percent of total assets
- drop firms with fewer than three years of data on the leverage ratio, the capital stock, the ICR, and sales
- drop observations for countries with fewer than five firms for each quarter
- winsorize key variables at the 2.5/97.5 percentiles at the country level
- drop countries with fewer than eight years of data on the leverage ratio, the capital stock, and the ICR from 2000 onwards
- compute zombie firms for industries with at least three firms per country-quarter pair
- drop countries with fewer than 12 years of data on zombie shares
- we take four-quarter rolling sums of flow variables—EBIT, sales, interest expenses—before computing ratios when the denominator is a stock variable: e.g. the implicit interest rate
- deflate nominal variables with the respective country CPI deflator
<table>
<thead>
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<th><strong>Variable</strong></th>
<th><strong>Definition</strong></th>
<th><strong>Source</strong></th>
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<tr>
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<td>Compustat</td>
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<td>Employment (^b)</td>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Compustat</td>
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<td>Total debt (book value)</td>
<td>DLCQ + DLTTQ</td>
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<td>Short-term debt (book value)</td>
<td>DLCQ</td>
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<td>Net current assets</td>
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<td>Debt ratio</td>
<td>(DLCQ + DLTTQ) / ATQ</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
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<td>Loan share (^b)</td>
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<td>Capital IQ</td>
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<td>PRCQQ</td>
<td>NUS-CRI</td>
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\(^a\) Transformation from year-to-date to quarterly. \(^b\) Annual data interpolated to quarterly.

Figure A.1: Number of firms

Notes: Number of distinct firms over 2000-19.
Figure A.2: Average share of listed zombie firms by country

Notes: Average zombie shares for listed firms over the 2000-2021 period.

Figure A.3: Share of listed zombie firms in 2021

Notes: Dark (light) blue colors refer to the first (second) quartiles of the country zombie shares in 2021, and orange (red) colors to the third (fourth) quartiles.
Appendix B: Figures

Figure B.1: Average effects of monetary policy shocks on nonfinancial firms: ten-year yields

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific ten-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.2: Average effects of monetary policy shocks on nonfinancial firms: three-month interest rates

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific three-month interest rates by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.3: Average effects of monetary policy shocks on nonfinancial firms’ investment: regional effects

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses of investment growth to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. Top-left panel refers to the differential effects on AEs relative to EMs. The blue line on the remaining panels is the average point estimate for each region. The dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.4: Differential effect on investment growth of monetary policy shocks on zombies versus nonzombies: one indicator at a time

ICR below 1
Leverage above median peers
Negative sales growth

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses of investment growth for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. Each panel defines zombie firms based only on one indicator. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

Figure B.5: Differential effect of monetary policy shocks on zombies versus nonzombies: ten-year bond yields

Investment growth
Employment growth
Debt growth
Interest rate change

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific ten-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.6: Differential effect of monetary policy shocks on zombies versus nonzombies: three-month interest rates

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific three-month interest rates by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.7: Differential effect of monetary policy shocks on zombies versus nonzombies: double-clustering of standard errors

**Notes:** Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.8: Effect of monetary policy shocks on investment growth of zombies versus nonzombies: marginal effects of an improvement in selected bank indicators

Notes: Cumulative marginal effects of a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps on the responses of investment growth for zombie firms relative to nonzombies when bank capital buffers (NPLs) increase (decrease) by one-standard deviation. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

Figure B.9: Effect of monetary policy shocks on investment growth of zombies versus nonzombies: marginal effects in countries with tighter macroprudential policies

Notes: Cumulative marginal effects on investment growth of a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate for zombies versus nonzombies in countries that stand above the median sample of selected macroprudential indices. The dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.10: Effect of monetary policy shocks on investment growth of zombies versus nonzombies: marginal effects in countries with well-prepared insolvency regimes

Notes: Cumulative marginal effects on investment growth of a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate for zombies versus nonzombies in countries that stand above the median sample of the Araujo et al. (2022) crisis preparedness indicator. The dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

Figure B.11: US monetary policy shocks on zombies vs nonzombies: Jarociński and Karadi (2020) shocks

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses of investment growth to a US monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.12: US monetary policy shocks on zombies vs nonzombies: Bauer and Swanson (2023) shocks

Average effect

Zombies vs nonzombies

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses of investment growth to a US monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

Figure B.13: Differential effect of US monetary policy on zombies vs nonzombies: US firms

Investment growth

Employment growth

Debt growth

Interest rate change

Notes: Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a US monetary policy shock that increases the one-year US treasury bond yield by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
Figure B.14: Differential effect of ECB monetary policy shocks on EA zombies vs nonzombies

- **Investment growth**
  - Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a euro area monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

- **Employment growth**
  - Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a euro area monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

- **Debt growth**
  - Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a euro area monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

- **Interest rate change**
  - Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a euro area monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

**Notes:** Cumulative impulse responses for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a euro area monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

Figure B.15: Differential effect on investment growth of monetary policy shocks on zombies vs nonzombies: alternative zombie definitions

- **Banerjee and Hofmann (2022)**
  - Cumulative impulse responses on investment growth for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

- **Acharya et al. (2019)**
  - Cumulative impulse responses on investment growth for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.

**Notes:** Cumulative impulse responses on investment growth for zombie firms relative to nonzombies to a monetary policy shock that increases the country-specific one-year sovereign bond yields by 100 bps. The blue line is the average point estimate, and the dark (light) grey area refers to the 68 (90) percent confidence bands.
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The Zombie Lending Channel of Monetary Policy
Working Paper No. WP/2023/192