





Os desafios da **Desdolarização**

13 DE MAIO 2014 - HOTEL EPIC SANA

De-Dollarization: A Cross-Country Perspective Nicholas Staines, IMF









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Background

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Drivers of de-dollarization

Policies for de-dollarization





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Background



Types of dollarization



- **Unit of account**: use of FC for pricing & accounting.
- **Real dollarization**: use of FX rate to index G&S transactions.
- Transaction dollarization (currency substitution): use of FC as medium of exchange.
- Financial dollarization (asset substitution): use of FC as a store of value deposit or loan dollarization.
- **Capital flight:** an alternative to deposit dollarization.
- Focus on deposit dollarization.

Explaining deposit dollarization



- Currency substitution: FC held as store of value against inflation and FX depreciation.
- Portfolio motives: FC held as hedge against volatility driven by risk profile of returns, including interest rates.
- Market development: dollarization driven by market imperfections and also by externalities not addressed by regulatory framework:
 - Market/regulatory biases hiding costs of dollarization e.g. reserve requirements, deposit insurance, credit provisioning.
 - Poor financial intermediation, lack of domestic investments e.g. debt markets
- Institutional: weaknesses favoring dollarization credibility of FX rate peg and FX availability, political stability.
- **Capital flight:** an alternative to deposit dollarization

Pros and cons of dollarization

Pros

- Hedging: Allows hedging against inflation and FX risks and supports portfolio diversification.
- Policy anchor: Appeal of FX rate as anchor for monetary policy, forcing macro discipline.
- Financial deepening: Provides vehicle for domestic investment as alternative to capital flight, supporting financial deepening.

Cons


- Monetary policy: Reduces effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanism.
- **Fiscal**: Reduces seigniorage.
- Balance sheet risks: Exposes
 public and private sectors to FX
 rate changes when asset and
 liabilities are mis-matched –
 liquidity and solvency risks.
- Lender-of-last-resort: Complicates LoLR role to stabilize bank system.



Deposit dollarization - 2001




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
















Determinants of dollarization



Explaining dollarization levels



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Dependent variable: FX deposits/total deposits

Direction & statistical relevance

Currency substitution

Inflation rate

FX rate depreciation

Portfolio model

Domestic interest rate spread to US Real domestic interest rate

Market development

Broad money/GDP

GDP per capita

Access to FX financing External debt/GDP Export/GDP

Institutions

De jure FX peg **Political stability**









Forthcoming IMF study by team led by Mauro Mecagni.


- Annual data 2001-12: 42 countries, 16 in SSA (sample limited by data).
- Study does not consider administrative measures.
- Results as expected all factors significant.

Results – SSA and Angola

BNA

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Estimates are good fit for SSA & Angola (less so for World).




World – explaining variations



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Factor contributions relative to average across all periods & countries.



Currency substitution Portfolio model

Market development Access to FX





Residual Actual, adj.




World – explaining variations



- **Fundamentals** generally benign except in MENA
 - De-dollarization driven by market development.
 - □ Surprisingly, other factors played minor role.
 - Dollarization persisted despite global disinflation in 1990s.
 - Squeezing of interest rate spreads during crisis.
- **BUT** there are large residuals (unknown) pushing up dollarization especially SSA.

SSA – explaining variations SSA-only estimates





Fundamentals supported dedollarization


- Market development supportive.
- Adverse impact of portfolio considerations and access to FC (commodity exports).
- Inflation played little role because already moderate.

BUT: Dollarization rose because negative residual was reversed.

Angola – explaining variations SSA-only estimates



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It's inflation AND market development AND diversification

Dollarization in 2002 supported by high FC access (exports), inflation/FX depreciation, and institutions (FX regime, political).

 Fundamentals supported dedollarization - market development (financial deepening, growth), lower inflation/depreciation, and smaller role of exports (diversification).





Drivers of de-dollarization



Macro indicators of success



- □ 42 countries (8 in SSA) with high dollarization (> 30%) in 2001-03
- Only 11 de-dollarized more than 20% by 2012; 2 SSA AGO & MOZ
- Differences between un/successful countries:
 - Initially: inflation, political index.
 - After: inflation, fiscal consolidation (debt), politics.
 Indicators of successful de-dollarization
 Change from 2001-03 to 2004-12


	2001-03		2004-12 change from 01-03	
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Successful	Unsuccessful
Real GDP growth, percent	5	5 4	2	0
Inflation, percent	22	. 9	-14	0
Exchange rate depreciation, percent			-2	33
Current account balance, percent GDP	-5	-6	5	-2
Fiscal balance, percent GDP	-3	-3	4	0
Stock of public debt, percent GDP	60) 55	-26	-16
Stock of external debt, percent GDP	64	l 59	-23	-10
Democracy index	5	3	0	-2

Macro thresholds for success



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- Narrower focus on 17 candidates, of which 8 successful
- Results suggest thresholds for successful de-dollarization:
 inflation below 9% and fiscal deficit below 2% of GDP.







Policies for de-dollarization



Failure - forced de-dollarization



- Peru: Hyperinflation in 1980s pushed deposit dollarization above 60%. Forced de-dollarization in 1985 caused capital flight and financial disintermediation. Policy abandoned in 1990 leading to re-dollarization around 80%.
- Bolivia: Exports and external FC loans supported high dollarization in 1970s. BoP crisis in 1981 led to *forced dedollarization* in 1982, accentuating the economic crisis, hyperinflation and *capital flight*. Policy abandoned leading to re-dollarization around 90% that persisted despite macrostabilization starting in late 1980s.

Success - market de-dollarization



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- Peru: Dollarization eliminated in 2000s. *Macro* fiscal surpluses and disinflation to 2%, GIR buffer. FX market flexibility. *Prudential measures* – discriminatory LRR, remuneration and provisioning requirements, FX net exposure limits. *Debt* : Introduction of LT Gvt bonds, private debt market.
- Bolivia: Dollarization in 2000s reduced to 25%. *Macro* disinflation in 90s.
 Prudential: discriminatory LRR and credit provisioning, FC net exposure limits, FX financial transaction tax. *Debt* : issuance of LT Gvt bonds.
- Israel: Macro instability in 1980s (fiscal deficits and hyper-inflation) pushed dollarization to 90% (inc. indexed). *Macro* – 1990s fiscal stabilization and disinflation, but de-dollarization slow. *Prudential* – discriminatory LRR, restrictions on FC credit. *Debt:* issuance of Gvt non-indexed LT LC bonds.
- Poland: Macro instability in late 1980s (large fiscal deficits and hyper-inflation) pushed dollarization to 80%, that was almost eliminated in 1990s. *Macro* stabilization to address fiscal imbalances and disinflation. FX market flexibility. *Debt* : issuance of LC Gvt. debt.

Macroeconomic policies



- Most critical component of de-dollarization strategy is restoring confidence in value of the domestic currency.
- Cutting inflation and a stable exchange rate to preserve purchasing power and reduce risks of holding LC.
- Sustainable and credible fiscal policy reduces Government's need for inflationary central bank financing. Stronger fiscal balance encourages domestic LC and LT debt market.
- **Economic diversification helps reduces dollarization.**

Financial development



- Financial markets can be strengthened to reduce need and incentive for dollarization.
- Issuance of LT government LC bonds provides vehicle for domestic investment. Also promotes financial development by extending yield curve, providing benchmark for investors and LC credit.
- Well-functioning FX market backed by adequate reserves and market access reduces need for FC for precautionary reasons.
- Developing LC interbank market promotes financial development.
- Financial innovations hedging instruments and indexed LC bonds
 reduce need for FC to hedge against FX or inflation risk.

Prudential regulation



- Prudential measures can be used to make dollarization less attractive including internalizing cost of dollarization.
- **FC** exposure limits.
- Discriminatory bank reserve requirements and remuneration.
- Discriminatory deposit insurance.
- Constraints on FC credit.
- Bank provisioning for FC credit to reflect FX risks.
- Mandated use of LC and exclusion of FC for pricing & transactions.

Conclusions



Dollarization driven by mix of factors – not just inflation.

De-dollarization strategy requires mix of policies and sequencing – forced de-dollarization backfires.

AND Remember: investors' have the option of capital flight.





Obrigado

