Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Playbook for Country Authorities

Version as of April 23, 2025

Disclaimer: This document presents a summary of the key steps, concepts, and processes observed in recent sovereign debt restructurings undertaken in the context of an IMF-supported program, in particular those restructurings undertaken under the Common Framework. It aims to provide country authorities considering a restructuring with a user-friendly summary document. It is based on the observed practice for a typical case of a country that has defaulted on its debt. It provides a general overview while recognizing that each case may have its own specificities and complexities. It is a non-binding document, which is not aimed to constrain how debtor countries and creditors would handle a specific case, under or outside the Common Framework, and is published as a GSDR Cochairs document. More details are provided in the Compendium of GSDR Common Understanding on Technical Issues. The IMF's Guidance Note on the Financing Assurances and Sovereign Arrears Policies and the Fund's Role in Debt Restructurings separately covers the IMF's role in more details.

Step 0: Before the launch of the restructuring

- The decision on whether to restructure, and whether to request an IMF-supported program and the support of the World Bank and other partners, rests solely with the debtor sovereign. When (and if) that decision takes place, the debtor country should initiate discussion with IMF and World Bank staff early.
- **Determination of the restructuring envelope.** The IMF staff develop the program macroframework scenario together with the debtor country's authorities, consistent with restoring debt sustainability and ensuring balance of payment (BOP) financing. The IMF staff (jointly with the World Bank staff for countries using the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries, LIC DSF) also prepare a pre-restructuring debt sustainability analysis (DSA), based on the macro-framework. The macro-framework and DSA are key to determine the debt restructuring that is needed to restore debt sustainability and close the BOP financing gap the "restructuring envelope". For a debt restructuring undertaken under the Common Framework (CF), "the need for debt treatment, and the restructuring envelope that is required, will be based on the IMF-World Bank DSA and the participating official creditors' collective assessment, and will be consistent with the parameters of an upper credit tranche IMF-supported program."
- Staff-level agreement (SLA) for an IMF-supported program. This includes the set of policy actions and the calibration of the program that will support the country's recovery. Negotiations with the World Bank (and potentially other partners) are usually also advancing in parallel.
- In parallel, the authorities should:
 - Mandate legal and financial advisors. Given the complexities of sovereign debt restructurings, it is essential to hire a law firm and a financial advisory firm with significant expertise in this area.
 - Advance the work on debt data to get a clear and detailed understanding of the country's public debt, including the breakdown between domestic and external debt and the creditor composition. The creditor composition for external debt typically

includes three broad categories: multilateral institutions; official bilateral creditors ("sovereign-to-sovereign"); and private creditors (bondholders and commercial banks). If not done already, the debtor country should start reconciling loan by loan data with its different creditors.

- Define with their advisors a restructuring strategy. This includes:
 - Choosing a mechanism to negotiate with official bilateral creditors. Depending on the creditor composition, and eligibility to the CF, the choice can include: the CF (i.e. all G20 and all Paris Club creditors having claims on the country), the Paris Club (PC)¹; a "PC+" format (i.e., the PC associating targeted additional creditors);; or separate negotiations with the different creditors. Experience shows that, for countries eligible to the CF, using it has helped significantly advance the process in a timely and orderly manner.
 - Defining the perimeter of debt to be restructured. This includes several considerations, some of which likely to involve discussions with creditors. Short-term debt (original maturity of one year or less) is generally excluded. A key choice is whether to include domestic debt, which is country specific and depends in particular on the impact on financial stability and growth.
 - Identifying the cut-off date. Having early clarity on the cutoff date is critical, as new financing provided after it are excluded from the restructuring. In recent restructuring cases, cutoff dates have been decided case-by-case by creditors, generally not later than the date of the SLA
 - Defining the broad contours of the efforts requested from the different groups of creditors, keeping in mind the critical importance of "comparability of treatment" (CoT) across creditor groups. The observed practice on CoT is that:
 - For CF-eligible countries, CoT between official and private creditors is
 - Assessed by official bilateral creditors using 3 criteria: The change in debt service over the IMF program; the debt reduction in net present value (NPV) terms (New NPV / Old NPV), using a 5 percent discount rate; and the change in duration of the treated claims.
 - Enforced by official bilateral creditors through claw-back clauses in restructuring agreements or similar mechanisms.

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¹ The Paris Club is a group of currently 22 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. South Africa is a prospective member.

- For other countries, similar approaches are used, with NPV calculations sometimes using two or more discount rates to ensure some sensitivity analysis.
- Private creditors may also include clauses in their own restructuring terms (e.g., most favored creditor clauses, reinstatement clauses).
- Start engaging with creditors, to the extent possible (see more details under Step 1 – very early engagement can precede SLA, which help gain time for the following steps, even if deeper technical discussion will require finalization of the SLA and the pre-restructuring DSA)

Step 1: From SLA to IMF program approval –2-3 months in the best case observed recently under the Common Framework

Things to do or to be aware of include:

- Having the IMF program in place rapidly is critical: it helps stabilize the economy early.
 However, moving from SLA to IMF program approval requires certain conditions this includes "financing assurances", from official bilateral creditors, which is their commitment to delivering a debt treatment consistent with restoring debt sustainability
- Engaging with the World Bank and other MDBs to maximize concessional financing
 through policy reforms supported by budget support operations. Indicative financing
 envelopes provided by MDBs are subject to their policies. In the case of the World Bank
 financing, budget support operations are conditional on the Bank's assessment of the adequacy
 of the macroeconomic policy framework and progress with the implementation of the agreed
 structural policies at each operation.
- Engaging early with official bilateral creditors is therefore essential. For countries eligible to the CF, this includes the rapid formation of an Official Creditor Committee (OCC). If the country is not in arrears to its official bilateral creditors, it can request a solution for the debt service during the negotiation which is not automatic, and would require a case-by-case approval by creditors.
- Engaging early with private creditors (bondholders and banks) also helps gain time in the overall process. Engaging in "good faith" with them is necessary to meet the condition of the "lending into arrears" policy of the IMF. An early meeting with all creditors (official or private) to explain the economic situation and the authorities' debt strategy can help.
- IMF and World Bank have a strong role to play in facilitating these early engagements. This
 includes their role in sharing information on the macroeconomic framework and debt sustainability
 analysis that underpin the IMF program.
- Being mindful of CoT considerations when engaging with the different creditor groups. This includes appropriate information sharing to support timely and orderly processes.

Step 2: From IMF program approval to the restructuring agreement in principle with official bilateral creditors –6 months in the best case observed recently under the Common Framework

Things to do or to be aware of include:


- Advancing the IMF program (typically, 1st review of program) involves the expectation of reaching an agreement in principle (AIP) with the official bilateral creditors. Typically, the AIP would include the key parameters of the restructuring of official bilateral debt, without necessarily covering more granular elements that can be finalized later.
- While not necessarily simultaneous, advancing the negotiation with private creditors in
 parallel helps accelerating the overall restructuring. Generally, negotiations with bondholders
 are coordinated through the formation of one (or several) bondholders committees, with collective
 action clauses ensuring strong coordination when the negotiation moves to implementation
 through an actual restructuring offer. Negotiation with individual commercial banks (restructuring
 of non-bonded commercial debt) may take more time. Being mindful of CoT considerations
 across the different creditor groups remains essential.
- Negotiations can entail various elements that facilitate agreement. In some cases, the use
 of state contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) can help bridge the gap with creditors'
 expectations. However, this should not be the norm and, when used, SCDIs should respect
 certain conditions.

Step 3: Finalizing the debt restructuring

Things to do or to be aware of include:

- On the official bilateral creditors side: For CF cases, finalizing the restructuring would include
 moving from the AIP to the signature of a "Memorandum of Understanding" with OCC members,
 subsequently followed by bilateral agreements with each creditor. Non-CF cases would involve
 similar steps.
- On the private creditor side: for bondholders, steps would typically include first an agreement in principle with the bondholders committee, followed a few weeks later by a bond exchange. This step can happen in the abovementioned Step 2, or in Step 3. Negotiations with individual commercial banks could either proceed in parallel, or follow a more sequenced approach, typically starting with the creditors having the larger claims. Finalization of the agreements with private creditors should be mindful of CoT considerations (see above). Agreements with official bilateral creditors typically include an assessment of the treatment provided by private creditors, and claw-back clauses that would be activated if CoT is not met.

Schematic presentation of the key steps



The timeline indicated here reflects the best case observed recently under the Common Framework and does not represent a commitment for future cases. Experience shows that timely processes depend on multiple factors, including actions that can be advanced early by the debtor country. In particular, the earlier the debtor country authorities engage the actions mentioned in step 0 and step 1, including the work on debt data, the definition of a robust restructuring strategy, and early engagement with creditors, with the help of the IMF and World Bank, the more likely timely processes can be met.