## Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF — Part II (Annexes and Case Studies) ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF — Part II (Annexes and Case Studies)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/capacity-developement/mnrw/mte2015ii.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/capacity-developement/mnrw/mte2015ii.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/capacity-developement/mnrw/mte2015ii.pdf.json) --- ### Annex I — Case study countries: Kenya - Resource context and background - No oil or gas production yet; significant onshore oil discoveries during 2012 and 2013 and one offshore gas discovery in the Lamu Basin. - By May 2012, 45 exploration blocks had been allocated. - Major mineral sands deposits identified along the coast; production anticipated at Kwale; production of niobium and rare earths planned. - Existing mineral production limited to soda ash, some fluorspar, building materials, and small-scale gold. - Engagement, capacity, and institutional relations - Principal counterparts: Treasury (NT), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP), National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA); mining work mainly with NT and Ministry of Mining (MOM). - Cooperation: MEP cooperation described as "extremely good"; MOM cooperation described as "good". - Capacity constraints: MOM and the Petroleum Department of MEP particularly weak; NOCK has good capacity and regularly briefs the Minister. - EI Fiscal Regimes project (February 2013-July 2015; Budget: US$618,000) - Budget execution by October 2014: 88 percent. - Objectives: support design and implementation of petroleum and mining fiscal regimes; advise on fiscal issues for major gas project or transit pipelines. - Identified risks: ineffective interagency coordination; legislative delays; capacity limits to manage concurrent reforms; disputes over localization/share transfers. - Evaluation highlights (DAC scores and key outcomes) - Relevance: 5.9. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 6.3. - New Production Sharing Agreement (PSC) scheme implementing project technical notes. - Full draft of new income tax provisions for mining and petroleum completed; revised Income Tax legislation published in late 2014. - Mining Act 2014 enacted. - FARI model training and model transfer; NOCK actively operating the model. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 6.5; budget executed nearly 90 percent; project not extended. - Impact: 6.5; lay draft for revised PSC model prepared and in last stages of implementation. - Sustainability: 6.4; risk from potential adverse reactions by companies but consultations generally positive. - Government views - Officials praised IMF TA quality and responsiveness; valued roadmap sequencing, agendas in advance, and intensive interaction. - Desire for more FARI training time and regional advisors with resource expertise expressed. ### Annex I — Case study countries: Mongolia - Resource context and background - Resource-rich lower-middle income country; confirmed deposits: copper, coal, uranium, iron ore, gold; more limited petroleum potential. - Commercial operations: Oyu Tolgoi (copper and gold); coal expansion at Tavan Tolgoi. - Some oil production: some 14,000 b/d. - Share of mining in GDP: about 20 percent; mineral exports >90 percent of total exports. - Mining revenues in 2012-2013: about 6 percent of GDP, or about 16-17 percent of total central government revenue. - EITI compliant since 2010. - TTF engagement and budgets - Three projects supported under Modules 1, 2 and 3; aggregate endorsed budget as of October 2014: US$ 2,520,000 (excluding TTF management fee), or 12 percent of TTF's total direct TA endorsed budget. - Mongolia had the largest individual country budget in the TTF. - EI Fiscal Regimes project (October 2011 - March 2014; Budget: US$601,520) - Actual expenditure: 52 percent of budget; project terminated December 2013. - Initial objective: refine mining fiscal regimes to maintain wealth for future generations; mid-2012 objective shifted to "transparent management of mineral revenues consistent with PFM principles." - Identified risks: political and investor pressure for special deals; legislative delays; institutional differences (MOF vs MMRE); political pressure to spend resource wealth. - Evaluation highlights - Relevance: 6.0. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 3.2. - Achievements: New Petroleum Law prepared and passed in July 2014; modeling work on petroleum fiscal regimes; review of 21 PSAs and a model PSA provided; renegotiation of DTAs with review of 19 DTAs and Model DTA. - Failures: unable to achieve comprehensive mining fiscal regime reforms (CIT changes, Minerals Law amendments, Model Investment Agreement, benchmark royalty pricing, forecasting modeling). - Project terminated due to lack of progress, lack of commitment, and changed policy environment. - Impact: 4.2; positive outputs (DTAs renegotiation, Petroleum Law) but major mining fiscal objectives unmet. - Sustainability: 5.8; good prospects for sustainability of achieved reforms and capacity-building results. - EI Revenue Administration project (February 2012 - January 2014; Budget: US$806,965) - Objectives: strengthen MTA Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) administration of mining companies. - Relevance: 6.7. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 6.3. - Four areas fully achieved by mid-2014: organizational and staffing arrangements, tax compliance strategy, audit program, and information for tax administration. - Large taxpayers selected for LTO included some 200 large mining companies accounting for 40-45 percent of domestic collections. - Nearly 100 percent of large businesses filing on time; additional taxes assessed by audits increased by a factor of four from 2012. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 6.0; project delivered two HQ-led missions and 18 STX visits; budget increased twice by combined 95 percent; budget execution by October 2014: 64 percent. - Sustainability: 6.4; risks include staff rotation and retention of trained personnel. ### Annex I — Case study countries: Tanzania - Background and objectives - Rapid petroleum sector development following large offshore gas discoveries; existing PSAs silent on gas commercialization; upstream fiscal regime needed revision. - Project objective: reform the petroleum fiscal regime and build capacity of Tanzanian officials. - Identified risks - Interagency coordination issues among MOF, MEM, TPDC; difficulty in structural changes in TPDC/regulator; legislative delays; capacity constraints; elections and proposed new Constitution implications. - Evaluation highlights - Relevance: 6.1. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 3.2. - Early TA provided assessments, modeling, and technical notes; models handed over but uptake limited. - Limited engagement from MEM and TPDC initially; model PSA published in 2013 did not incorporate project recommendations. - Renewed engagement in 2014 produced full drafts of revised income tax and petroleum additional profit tax legislation; much work remained. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 4.5; budget execution by October 2014: 54 percent; project extended by one year to June 2015. - Impact: 4.2; raised MOF awareness on LNG issues; improved working relations after 2014 re-engagement. - Sustainability: 4.0; prospects uncertain pending institutional capacity strengthening and constitutional changes. ### Annex I — Case study countries: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - Sector significance and background - DRC: "the largest world producer of cobalt ore and a major copper producer." - Mining sector about 10 percent of GDP. - Central government revenues only 13-14 percent of GDP. - EITI candidate in 2007; EITI compliant in July 2014 after temporary suspension in April 2013. - EI Fiscal Regimes project (February 2012–January 2015; Budget: US$628,300) - Budget execution by October 2014: 44 percent; budget decreased by 30 percent in December 2014; project extended to June 2015. - Outputs: new draft Mining Code incorporating TA recommendations; cash-flow model based on FARI estimating revenue potential of six large mining projects (about 50 percent of copper production) and three gold projects; revenue forecasting model development limited by data constraints. - Evaluation highlights: - Relevance: 6.4. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 6.0. - Impact: 5.5; 2013 Finance Law increased mining profit tax rate following TA recommendations. - Sustainability: 5.5; depends on enactment and implementation of draft Mining Code and formalization of working groups and HR. - EI Revenue Administration project (October 2011–September 2014; Budget: US$574,740) - Budget execution as of October 2014: 62 percent; extended to June 2015; budget increased by 10 percent in December 2014. - Objectives: reduce fragmentation across DGI, DGRAD, Ministry of Mining; establish database; set up specialized EI audit team. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 4.2; subsequent progress included database establishment, improved data collection (partial), and audit training. - EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM project (January 2012–December 2013; Budget: US$498,005) - Budget execution by October 2014: 89 percent; project extended to December 2015. - Achievements: consolidated state budget prepared for first time; improved macro-fiscal forecasting including resource revenue modules; institutional drafting of macro-fiscal unit TOR but unit not yet set up. - Key statistics and figures: - Mining sector share: "about 10 percent of GDP." - Central government revenues: "13-14 percent of GDP." - EI Fiscal Regimes budget: "US$628,300." - EI Revenue Administration budget: "US$574,740." - EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM budget: "US$498,005." - Number of mining projects modeled: "six large mining projects" (about 50 percent of copper production) plus "three gold projects." - Local staff capable of using the forecasting model: "only three local staff." ### Annex I — Case study countries: Mozambique - Legislative reform and capacity building - EI legislation passed by Parliament in August 2014 incorporating many project recommendations, though not all advice was adopted. - FARI model ownership requires a trained team and clear coordination rules across line ministries. - Project design issues - Inclusion of Objective 2 (taxation of government securities) seen as unrelated to natural resource management. - EI Revenue Administration project (March 2013-March 2015; Budget: US$622,000) - Budget execution by October 2014: 35 percent; project extended to April 2016. - Relevance: 6.7. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 3.7; establishment of NR tax unit progressed, with eight staff appointed internally and twelve experts to be recruited externally by end-2014. - Impact: 4.5; foundation laid for NR tax administration but many activities not yet started. - Sustainability: 4.8; depends on MRA’s ability to attract and retain skilled staff. - EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM project and Statistics projects - Macro-Fiscal project: dates October 2012-April 2014 (extended to April 2016); Budget: US$512,902; budget decreased by 21 percent in December 2014; execution by October 2014: 27 percent. - Statistics for Managing Natural Resources project: dates November 2011-April 2015 (extended to April 2016); Budget: US$322,000; execution by October 2014: project still in work plan, launch delayed. ### Annex I — Case study countries: Sierra Leone - Resource context - Low-income country recovering from conflict; known reserves: diamonds, gold, bauxite, iron ore and rutile; oil discoveries (Venus, Mercury) not declared commercial. - Diamond production resumed in 2010; iron ore first shipped in 2012. - EI Fiscal Regimes project (June 2011-December 2013; Budget: US$1,012,496) - Budget execution by October 2014: 64 percent. - Outcomes: - Comprehensive Extractive Industries Revenue Act (EIRA) drafted by May 2012; new petroleum agreements in September 2012 reflecting proposed legislation. - Interagency Mineral Revenue Forecasting Unit established by May 2012; detailed models developed and installed for mining. - Ebola outbreak and parliamentary processes delayed enactment; completion dates revised to June 2015. - Evaluation scores: Relevance 6.5; Effectiveness on Outcomes 6.0; Impact 6.0; Sustainability 5.3 (fragility risks). - EI Revenue Administration project (June 2012-October 2015; Budget: US$599,065) - Objective: strengthen NRA Large Taxpayer Office and create specialized EI unit. - Relevance: 6.3. - Effectiveness on Outcomes: 3.3; slow progress due to legislative delays and capacity/integrity issues; an EI unit (head + three managers) later set up in line with TA recommendations. - Budget execution by October 2014: 35 percent; project extended due to Ebola outbreak. - EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM project (October 2011-April 2014; Budget: US$591,220) - By October 2014, budget execution: 80 percent; project extended to April 2016. - Key outputs: agreement on fiscal rule type, creation of stabilization and savings fund, draft PFM legislation; medium-term expenditure framework developed and included in annual budget law. ### Annex I — Case study countries: Peru, Timor-Leste, Uganda (selected highlights) - Peru - Project extensions: December 2013 and June 2014; budget increased by about 40 percent in June 2014. - Impact: 6.0; legislation enacted on new fiscal framework and fiscal rules; sustainability: 6.7. - Timor-Leste - EI Fiscal Regimes project (June 2011-April 2013; Budget: US$717,414): Relevance 6.3; Effectiveness on Outcomes 3.7; only ESI component remains active. - Petroleum Fund Management project (February 2013-February 2016; Budget: US$839,507): Effectiveness very limited (Effectiveness score: 1.7); Budget execution by October 2014: less than 17 percent. - Uganda - Large oil discoveries in Lake Albert Rift Basin (estimated 2 billion barrels); peak production possibly around 200,000 b/d with government oil revenues potentially around $5 billion per year. - EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM project (November 2012-April 2014; Budget: US$296,000): relevance and effectiveness mixed; budget execution by October 2014: 60 percent. ### Annex III — Research projects and workshops (selected outcomes) - SAVINGS AND CONSUMPTION GUIDELINES FOR OIL AND MINERAL PRODUCERS (Oct 2011 - Jun 2012; Budget: US$58,850) - Relevance: 5.5; Effectiveness of Outcomes: 4.0; two papers remained in draft as of December 2014 but drafts used in IMF policy paper Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries (2012) and TTF workshops. - MINING TAX ADMINISTRATION (Oct 2011 - Dec 2012; Budget: US$122,500) - Relevance: 6.0; Effectiveness: 6.0. - Result: "Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries, A Handbook" published as joint IMF–World Bank product (July 2014). - RESOURCE REVENUE DATABASE AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE STATISTICS (Jan 2012 - Aug 2013; Budget increased to US$64,000) - Draft standard template developed harmonized with GFSM 2001; draft presented to IMF Executive Board and posted Jan 2014 for consultation. - NATURAL RESOURCE ASSET AND LIABILITY HANDBOOK (Nov 2012 - Apr 2013; Budget increased to US$114,800) - "Sovereign Asset-Liability Management - Guidance for Resource-Rich Economies" completed April 2014 and circulated to IMF Executive Board; published June 2014. - FISCAL MANAGEMENT OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN EAST AFRICA (Workshop, Jan 2014; Budget increased to US$250,000) - Effectiveness of Outcomes: 6.5; participant satisfaction high; Ministers from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania attended. ### Annex IV — Survey results (selected aggregated findings) - Project Managers (response rate 46 percent; 16 responses) - High incidence of road maps/work plans: 93.3% reported a road map or work plan prepared. - Most frequent factors affecting implementation: Weak implementation capacity (35.7%); Lack of clearly defined work plan (21.4%); Poor ownership by authorities (21.4%); Overambitious outcomes (21.4%). - Views on modular design: generally favorable scoring for programmatic/modular approach in respondents who answered those items. - Experts (response rate 43 percent; 13 responses) - Mixed assessments of TA effectiveness: roughly half reported TA effective and half not. - Most-cited impediments to implementation: Interagency tensions (81.8%); Weak implementation capacity; Conflicting policy advice. - Overall efficiency rating average: 6.08 (Response Count 13). - Government Officials (response rate 23 percent; 7 responses) - Relevance rating average reported as 6.17 (Response Count 6). - Majority (66.7%) indicated IMF TTF TA should extend for longer periods to achieve impact. - Main implementation constraints cited: difficulty retaining capable staff, inadequate legal/regulatory framework, insufficient political support and funding. ### Annex V — Tables and expenditure figures (selected figures) - MNRW TA endorsed budgets and execution (Appendix Table entries summarize FY 2012–FY 2014 endorsed and actual expenditures; source data derived from MNRW TTF Annual Reports for FY 2012-14). - Example aggregate figures reported: - Mongolia aggregate endorsed budget as of October 2014: US$ 2,520,000 (excluding TTF management fee). - Sierra Leone EI Fiscal Regimes project budget: US$1,012,496. - Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund Management project budget: US$839,507. - DRC EI Fiscal Regimes project budget: US$628,300; EI Revenue Administration project budget: US$574,740; EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM project budget: US$498,005. - Reports include execution percentages by October 2014 for multiple projects (examples cited throughout country summaries). ### Annex VI & VII — Interview instruments and interviewees - Interview framework: 25 questions covering prior TA, work plans, sequencing, stakeholder participation, feasibility, risks, implementation, sustainability, coordination, and evaluation of modular approach. - Interviewees: comprehensive list including IMF FAD, MCM, STA staff; Steering Committee members; World Bank and U.S. Treasury OTA contacts; and numerous country-specific officials from Mongolia, Tanzania, Kenya, and others. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc., May 2015* ### Part II ### Part II ### Annexes and Contents Overview - ANNEX I. CASE STUDY COUNTRIES — Page 3 - ANNEX II. DESK REVIEW COUNTRIES — Page 24 - ANNEX III. RESEARCH PROJECTS AND WORKSHOPS — Page 87 - ANNEX IV. SURVEY RESULTS — Page 96 - ANNEX V. TABLES — Page 127 - ANNEX VI. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS — Page 129 - ANNEX VII. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES — Page 130 ### ANNEX I. CASE STUDY COUNTRIES ### ANNEX I. CASE STUDY COUNTRIES ### II.1 KENYA — Background and Resource Context - Kenya had no oil or gas production as yet but made significant onshore oil discoveries during 2012 and 2013 and one offshore gas discovery in the Lamu Basin. - By May 2012, 45 exploration blocks had been allocated to a range of companies. - Kenya is a potential site for major oil transportation and processing facilities because of oil developments in Uganda and South Sudan; such cross-border infrastructure requires international agreements and an appropriate policy framework. - Major mineral sands deposits (host for titanium ores) were identified along the coast, with significant production anticipated at Kwale; production of niobium and rare earths is planned. - Known but not yet proven deposits: coal, iron ore, manganese, gold, and other minerals. - Existing mineral production has been limited to soda ash, some fluorspar, building materials, and small-scale gold. - When eligible countries were first selected, Kenya had not been an EITI candidate and there was no evident serious resource potential. ### II.1 KENYA — Engagement, Capacity, and Institutional Relations - Principal government counterparts engaged: Treasury (NT), Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP), National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK), Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA); mining work mainly with National Treasury (NT) and Ministry of Mining (MOM). - Cooperation with MEP described as "extremely good"; cooperation with MOM described as "good". - NOCK has good capacity and a NOCK official regularly briefed the Minister of Energy and Petroleum on revisions to the PSAs. - Capacity constraints highlighted: - MOM and the Petroleum Department of MEP: particularly weak. - Project provided workshops, intensive advisory relations with MEP, NT, and KRA to deliver tools for future use. ### II.1 KENYA — EI Fiscal Regimes Project: Dates, Budget, Comments - Project dates: February 2013-July 2015 - Budget: US$618,000 - Comments: - Project endorsed by the SC in December 2012 and launched in February 2013. - Budget execution by October 2014 amounted to 88 percent. - Project aimed to complete during 2014 but some extension might be needed if milestones were missed or legislation impeded. - Project overlap anticipated with proposed module 3 project, particularly in use of models prepared in module 1. ### II.1 KENYA — Objectives and Identified Risks - Objectives: - Support Kenya in designing and implementing reforms to petroleum and mining fiscal regimes. - Advise on fiscal issues needed to enable a major gas project or transit pipelines. - Identified risks included: - Ineffective coordination between MOF, MOE, MME, KRA, and relevant state-owned companies. - Difficulties making structural institutional changes and moving proposed legislation through the National Assembly. - Coordination pressures with urgent negotiations over oil, gas and mineral projects. - Lack of capacity to manage parallel mining and petroleum reforms alongside general tax reforms. - Prolonged disputes over localization of shareholdings or transfers of interest. ### II.1 KENYA — Evaluation (DAC Criteria) and Key Outcomes - Relevance: 5.9 - Extractive industries had recently become important; Ministry of Finance requested IMF support at the 2012 Annual Meetings. - Kenya not on TTF eligible list and not an EITI candidate initially; project seen as complementary to East African TTF and FAD TA. - Government established an inter-agency committee chaired by the Investment Secretary, Ministry of Finance; development partners established an EI coordination group with IMF Resident Representative participation. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 6.3 - Outcomes largely achieved within original time frame and following project recommendations. - New Production Sharing Agreement (PSC) scheme implements details set out in project technical notes. - Legislation outcomes: - Full draft of new income tax provisions for mining and petroleum completed in collaboration with NT and KRA; revised Income Tax legislation published in late 2014. - Full review of the draft Mining Bill provided; NT adopted advice and legislation enacted in 2014. - Project provided comments to the new Petroleum Bill prepared with World Bank assistance. - Capacity building: - Trained officials on the FARI model and transferred petroleum FARI simulation models; NOCK actively operating the model. - Project had high profile at “Kenya Rising” conference (September 2013) and EAC workshop on fiscal management of oil and gas (January 2014). - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 6.4 - Launched with full diagnostic mission in February 2013 and held extensive cross-government, private sector, and civil society consultations. - Missions in July, September, October 2013; project manager visit January 2014; one-week mission November 2014 aimed at concluding project. - Active drafting assistance and frequent commentaries to assist draft legislation and new model PSC preparation. - Training on FARI modeling provided during February, July, September 2013 missions; week-long workshop in November 2013; workshop in November 2014. - FARI model take-up strong in agencies such as NOCK; FAD working on simpler FARI variant for weaker capacity agencies. - Two reports and an explanatory memorandum on the “pay-on-behalf” system produced: May 2013 report distinguishing short-run from medium-term measures; July 2013 technical notes including a roadmap. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 6.5 - Outcomes largely achieved within original budget and timing; formal timelines and milestone tracking used. - TA delivery forms: workshops, hands-on assistance, advisory relations, draft reviews, lateral communication channels, high-level dialogue, private company and CSO consultations. - Budget executed nearly 90 percent; project not extended; exception: MOM capacity building was inadequate during the project and improved only after March 2013 elections. - Efficiency of Reporting: 6.3 - Reporting assessed on timeliness, completeness, risk assessment, consistency, and modifications across SCR, PS, PP, PA, and OP documents. - Impact: 6.5 - Government program has followed project recommendations. - Key results: - Lay draft for a revised PSC model prepared and in last stages of implementation. - Enactment of the Mining Act 2014. - Publication of revised Income Tax legislation for EI. - FARI modeling capacity operational in government agencies; coordination with World Bank KEPTAP project expected to further take-up. - Sustainability: 6.4 - Project contributes to sustainable legislation and development of analytical and modeling skills. - Risk to sustainability: possible adverse reaction from mining or petroleum companies to reforms; consultations with companies were generally positive. ### II.1 KENYA — Views of Government Officials - Kenyan officials highly praised IMF TA quality and professional level. - Officials emphasized TA was demand driven and that IMF responded promptly and efficiently to urgent needs. - Officials appreciated joint sequencing of roadmap and milestones, clear work schedule, agendas in advance, and intensive frequent interaction that maintained momentum. - Technical staff valued FARI model training and customization to Kenyan conditions; inter-ministerial technical team formed (NT, KRA, MOM, MEP, NOCK, Ministry of Planning) to use FARI. - Some officials wanted more FARI training time and regional advisors with resource expertise (e.g., AFRITAC East). - Regional peer learning (Workshop 1 in Arusha) was well received; interest expressed in IMF regional workshops on FARI and revenue administration. - Other TA providers appreciated IMF cooperation and briefings. --- ### II.2 MONGOLIA — Background and Resource Context - Mongolia described as a resource-rich lower-middle income country transitioning from decades of central planning. - Large mineral deposits confirmed: copper, coal, uranium, iron ore, gold; more limited petroleum potential. - Commercial operations started at Oyu Tolgoi (copper and gold) and coal expansion at Tavan Tolgoi. - Some oil production: some 14,000 b/d. - Share of mining in GDP: about 20 percent. - Mineral exports represent more than 90 percent of total exports. - Mining revenues in 2012-2013 were about 6 percent of GDP, or about 16-17 percent of total central government revenue. - Mongolia became an EITI compliant country in 2010. ### II.2 MONGOLIA — TTF Technical Assistance Overview and Budgets - TTF supported three projects in Mongolia under Modules 1, 2 and 3. - Module 1 project on fiscal regimes launched October 2011; terminated and removed from Work Plan in December 2013. - Module 2 resource revenue administration project launched February 2012 and active. - Module 3 macro-fiscal and PFM project launched May 2013 and active. - Aggregate endorsed budget of three projects as of October 2014: US$ 2,520,000 (excluding TTF management fee), or 12 percent of the TTF's total direct TA endorsed budget. - Mongolia had the largest individual country budget in the TTF. ### II.2 MONGOLIA — EI Fiscal Regimes Project: Dates, Budget, Comments - Project dates: October 2011 - March 2014 - Budget: US$601,520 - Comments: - Project placed in reserve list March 2011 and activated shortly thereafter. - Project terminated in December 2013. - Actual expenditure on the project was 52 percent of budget. ### II.2 MONGOLIA — Background to the Project and Prior TA - Fiscal regimes for extractive industries had been changed frequently in the past, often weakening expected government revenues and lacking transparency. - By 2011 Mongolia urgently needed a standard framework for mining taxation and capacity to implement it. - Prior FAD TA: - 2007: strategic advice on Mining Tax Regime and a Stabilization Fund. - 2010: TA on Reform of Mineral Fiscal Regime, assessment and options. - IMF and World Bank provided TA in 2010 on design of a Fiscal Stability Law (FSL), a medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF), and a Fiscal Stability Fund. ### II.2 MONGOLIA — Objectives and Identified Risks - Initial objective: refine fiscal regimes for mining appropriate to Mongolia and maintain wealth for future generations. - Mid-2012 Project Assessment changed objective wording to "transparent management of mineral revenues consistent with PFM principles." - Identified risks: - Continued political and investor pressure to agree special deals. - Difficulty moving proposed legislation through Parliament. - Lack of complementary capacity to negotiate if necessary. - Difficulty sustaining political commitment to transparency and fiscal stability. - Political pressure to spend resource wealth currently. ### II.2 MONGOLIA — Evaluation (DAC Criteria) and Key Outcomes - Relevance: 6.0 - Minister of Finance requested TTF Module 1 TA at the 2011 IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings to rationalize mining fiscal regime and preserve generated wealth. - Project seen as complementary to other TA from U.S. Treasury OTA, World Bank, and ADB; IMF project funded by Japanese sub-account. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 3.2 - Early-phase emphasis shifted toward petroleum fiscal regimes at authorities' request; initial progress brisk on petroleum. - Achievements: - New Petroleum Law prepared with TA support and eventually passed in July 2014 (process took about two and a half years due to internal and parliamentary consensus needs and elections). - Modeling work analyzing current and proposed petroleum fiscal regimes completed during the first mission. - Evaluation of existing 21 PSAs and provision of a model PSA; authorities developing a model PSA expected to be sent to Cabinet soon. - Renegotiation of DTAs: project reviewed 19 DTAs; in 2012 government renegotiated four particularly costly DTAs; project developed a Model DTA. - TA provided potential solutions for taxation and regulation of foreign transfers of interest in Mongolian mines. - Initial capacity building via workshops on modeling and hands-on joint work; development of a revenue estimation and forecasting model for major mining projects began but only modest progress due to MOF not assigning adequate staff. - Failures relative to main objective: - Project unable to make headway on comprehensive mining fiscal regime reforms: changes to CIT, Minerals Law, development of a Model Investment Agreement (MIA), benchmark pricing for royalty payments, and modeling for forecasting were not achieved. - Amendments to CIT tabled but not adopted by Parliament by late 2014. - Institutional differences between MOF and Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy (MMRE) and political environment (New Investment Law enacted October 2013 with large tax incentives and tax stabilization) impeded progress. - Project terminated December 2013 due to lack of progress, lack of commitment, and changed policy environment. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.4 - Project involved two missions and four STX visits; concentrated activity early on with fast pace on petroleum, DTAs, and taxation of foreign transfers of interest. - Early continuity and hands-on approach contributed to timely results and capacity building. - Only TA report produced was the first mission's report on fiscal regimes for petroleum and mining; it was translated into Mongolian and remains in use by some officials. - Inter-agency differences of view were not explicitly identified as a risk in the project proposal; this contributed to later difficulties. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 5.2 - Efficiency affected by unsettled policy environment and shifting authority emphasis toward petroleum. - Hands-on approach and effective use of STXs were efficient early on. - Project terminated in December 2013, three months before original end-date; budget execution was 52 percent; termination judged efficient for TTF resource allocation given limited prospects for progress. - Efficiency of Reporting: 5.2 - Reporting assessed on timeliness, completeness, risk assessment, consistency, and modifications across standard documents. - Impact: 4.2 - Project did not achieve comprehensive mining fiscal regime reform as envisaged. - Positive impacts: - DTAs renegotiation helped protect Mongolian tax base. - Formulation and eventual passage of new Petroleum Law. - Capacity building effects visible years after TA: materials and analysis still used by officials for responsibilities, training new staff, and university teaching. - Sustainability: 5.8 - Good prospects for sustainability of achieved reforms and for sustained capacity-building results. ### II.2 MONGOLIA — EI Revenue Administration Project (note) - Project dates: February 2012 - January 2014 - Budget: US$806,965 - Comments: Project added to Work Plan in January 2012 and extended twice: to April 2014 in May 2012, and to April 2015 in December (project continuation details included in source). *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### 2013. The original budget was also increased twice, at the time of the project ### mte2015ii - 2013. The original budget was also increased twice, at the time of the project ### Background - In Mongolia, tax revenue is highly concentrated: some 400 enterprises have contributed, on average, about 60-70 percent of domestic tax revenue. - Among those enterprises, there are some 200 large mining companies. - Prior to the TTF project inception, the Mongolian Tax Administration (MTA) had created a Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) with a special organizational focus for mining companies, comprising: - a mining audit unit within the LTO's audit division, - a Mineral Resources Division, - taxpayer service staff to specialize in mining taxpayers. - Pre-TTF FAD revenue administration TA included a 2010 FAD diagnostic mission that proposed a strategy to increase LTO effectiveness; follow-up TA was requested and implemented with an assigned peripatetic tax administration expert in collaboration with the U.S. Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) and the World Bank. - A 2011 mission found a strong foundation for an effective LTO but noted the need to develop specialized administrative programs for mining companies. ### Objective - The project aimed at assisting the Mongolian Tax Administration to strengthen the administration of mining companies, which represent the backbone of Mongolia's tax base and account for a large share of the country's investment. ### Identification of risks - Unwillingness of natural resource institutions and other agencies to release information on mining companies (licenses, transactions, etc.) to the LTO. - Failure to enact changes to the mining provisions in the tax legislation. - Lack of continued political commitment to implement the IMF's recommendations. - Lack of continued close cooperation among donor agencies. ### Evaluation (DAC Criteria) — Relevance - Relevance score: 6.7 - Findings: - The project addresses country and government needs given the importance of mining revenues for public finances and the need to improve their administration and earlier diagnostics. - The project focused on enhancing the LTO's operational programs for mining companies by developing specialized administrative programs. - The project anticipated supporting implementation of expected changes in mining provisions in tax legislation. - The project built on substantial earlier IMF TA and had synergies with: - the TTF project on fiscal regimes under module 1, - FAD's large taxpayer project funded by Japan and implemented with the U.S. Treasury's OTA, - coordination with OTA and the World Bank (the World Bank financed computer equipment to be piloted at the LTO). - Process: - IMF staff visited Ulaanbaatar soon after the request to clarify authorities' objectives. - The first mission determined project sequencing with the authorities. ### Evaluation — Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives - Effectiveness score: 6.3 - Overall assessment: - Progress under the project has been substantial and major results obtained. - As of mid-2014, four areas had project objectives fully achieved: organizational and staffing arrangements, tax compliance strategy, audit program, and information for tax administration. - Progress on anticipated tax legislation changes depended on enactment of CIT amendments submitted to Parliament (not enacted as of late 2014). - Further improvements needed in taxpayer services and policy coordination among agencies. - Specific outcomes and results: - Functional responsibilities of the LTO's mining units implemented as proposed; staffing broadly appropriate. - Criteria for assigning large companies refined; large taxpayers selected for inclusion in the LTO, including some 200 large mining companies accounting for 40-45 percent of domestic collections. - The LTO formulated a mining sector compliance management strategy with a framework for risk assessment and mitigation; an important share of large mining companies has been risk assessed and categorized into risk groups. - LTO auditing capacity for mining companies strengthened substantially; extensive training provided to mining tax auditors. - Improved taxpayer services reduced compliance costs for mining companies. - Information sharing between agencies improved; MTA established better working relationships and exchange of information with mining and petroleum sectors and arranged agreements on exchange of information between the LTO and other agencies. - Institutional support: - Strong support from the Ministry of Finance and committed tax department management. ### Evaluation — Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes - Effectiveness score: 6.4 - Design and delivery: - The project uses a structured and sequenced approach with a high degree of continuity and intensive engagement. - Works under a sequenced action plan agreed with authorities, with milestones and start/finish dates for key deliverables. - Authorities established a Steering Committee and appointed counterpart teams to work with project-funded advisors; management monitors progress and quantitative indicators (e.g., percentage of tax returns filed by the due date). - Continuity and staffing: - A sizeable part of TA carried out by STXs supervised by FAD with planned visits agreed in advance and detailed action plans; FY 2014 delivered one HQ-led mission and nine STX visits. - The project has a lead large taxpayer advisor working closely with STXs; coordinates closely with OTA revenue administration experts. - Reporting and capacity development: - TA reports reviewing large taxpayer reforms include chapters on the administration of large mining companies with approximately year-intervals. - Hands-on STX visits have a training aspect; OTA downstream technical advisors provided complementary training. - Stakeholder engagement: - Consultations held with large mining companies to reduce compliance costs and improve taxpayer services; companies' views informed TA activities. - Risks realized and mitigations: - The only project proposal risk that materialized was the lack of enactment of changes to mining provisions in tax legislation (CIT amendments submitted to Parliament but not enacted by late 2014). - Mitigations included providing information on international practices for managing changes in tax legislation and establishing the Steering Committee and agreed action plan to sustain management commitment. - Human resources concern: - Staff rotation at the LTO is a concern; trained staff have been sought by accounting firms and other MTA parts; TA provided suggestions to address the problem. - Coordination: - Coordination with World Bank and OTA described as very good; TA providers consult frequently to ensure complementarity and avoid overlap. ### Evaluation — Efficiency of TA Delivery - Efficiency score: 6.0 - Project scale and timeline: - From launch in February 2012 to April 2014 the project delivered two HQ-led missions and 18 STX visits. - The project was extended twice, in total by 15 months from its original time frame of 24 months. - The budget was increased twice, by a combined 95 percent. - First extension and budget increase occurred shortly after project launch in 2012 following STX visits that revealed very low LTO capacity in mining tax administration. - Second budget increase and extension requested in December 2013 following a request from the Minister of Finance to extend the project. - Budget execution: - Budget execution by October 2014 stood at 64 percent; with six months remaining to the then-planned project end, final execution was likely to be below budget. - Delivery modality: - The continuity and intensive engagement modality was judged efficient in achieving substantial results and maintaining reform momentum across interconnected reform areas. ### Evaluation — Efficiency of Reporting - Efficiency of Reporting score: 5.9 - Assessment criteria included timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications across documentation reviewed (Steering Committee Reports, Project Summaries, Project Proposals, Project Assessments, One-Pagers). ### Impact - Impact score: 6.5 - Early evidence of favorable broader impact: - Nearly 100 percent of large businesses are filing on time. - The amount of additional taxes assessed by audits increased by a factor of four from 2012; results are broad based. - A first survey of large taxpayer perceptions (including large mining companies) revealed a good level of satisfaction with LTO services. ### Sustainability - Sustainability score: 6.4 - Positive factors for sustainability: - Degree of political support, strong ownership, and authorities' commitment to project objectives. - Integrated and sequenced approach reduced significant gaps. - Risks to sustainability: - Changes in senior and technical LTO staffing and potential loss of qualified personnel trained under the project; requires enhanced focus on human resources strategies and policies. ### Project administration and related MNRW TTF facts - Project dates (Module referenced earlier in document): May 2013 - May 2015 (for a related project in the document). - Budget (related project): US$635,500. - Comments on that related project: - The project was endorsed in December 2012 and launched in May 2013. - It was extended to April 2016 in December 2014. - Additional context on fiscal management TA in Mongolia: - The project aimed to reinforce the medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF), strengthen cash management capacity, and guide establishment of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). - By the time of project inception, internal formulation of draft SWF law had advanced, allowing TA to provide early assessment and advice. - Relevance score for that fiscal project: 6.3. - Following TA advice, the 2015 budget incorporated much improved analysis of fiscal risks and contingent liabilities. - As of October 2014, aggregate budget of early Tanzania projects was US$ 1,316,000 (excluding TTF management fee) — presented as context in the same document. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF (DevTech Systems, Inc.)* ### 2014. Budget execution by October 2014 was 54 percent. ### mte2015ii - 2014. Budget execution by October 2014 was 54 percent. ### Background and context - Tanzania was entering a period of rapid development of its petroleum sector following large recent offshore gas discoveries likely to result in major gas development. - Existing PSAs were silent on how gas was to be commercialized; the upstream fiscal regime, put in place more than 30 years ago, needed revision. - Separate negotiations produced each PSA, and terms varied. - Development of mid-stream and downstream infrastructure required a new regulatory and fiscal framework. - FAD provided extensive resource-related TA prior to the start of the TTF project, including TA on the mining fiscal regime in 2011 and an initial review of the PSA and income tax rules applying to the petroleum sector in 2012. ### Project objectives - Specific objective: reform the fiscal regime for the petroleum (oil and gas) sectors. - The project aimed to support Tanzania in undertaking a detailed review of the petroleum fiscal regime, with particular focus on fiscal issues that need to be addressed for a major gas development to proceed. - Other aspects of the petroleum fiscal regime would be addressed and, if necessary, build on previous work on the mining fiscal regime. - Capacity building of Tanzanian officials was a key focus. ### Identification of risks - Ineffective coordination between the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), and the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC). - Difficulty making necessary structural changes in TPDC/industry regulator. - Difficulty moving Government's proposed legislation through Parliament. - Difficulty coordinating reforms with urgent need for negotiations over LNG projects. - Lack of capacity for government staff to manage parallel reforms in mining and petroleum, as well as ongoing general tax reforms. ### Evaluation against DAC criteria — summary findings - Relevance: 6.1 - Urgent need to review fiscal regime given prospects for rapid gas sector development. - Ministry of Finance had limited capacity and required extensive support. - Formal request for assistance under the TTF for Modules 1, 2 and 3 was received from the Ministry of Finance in June 2012; request understood to be endorsed by MEM, TRA, and TPDC. - Need for coordination with other TA providers (Norway, World Bank/DFID) emphasized. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 3.2 - Early TA (October 2012; March 2013) provided assessments, recommendations, modeling, and technical notes. - Project proposed shift to generally applicable, biddable fiscal terms, streamlining PSAs, and greater reliance on overall economic results rather than daily production rates. - Models were developed and handed over to agencies but uptake was limited. - Engagement varied across agencies; MOF and some institutions receptive, MEM and TPDC less engaged initially. - Progress on gas policy and legislation slow; model PSA published in 2013 did not incorporate project recommendations. - Renewed interest and re-engagement in 2014 led to a September-October 2014 mission that reviewed the new model PSA and produced full drafts of revised income tax and petroleum additional profit tax legislation; much work remained to achieve full fiscal reform objectives. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 4.8 - Project phases: initial TA (late 2012/early 2013), a period of inactivity for over a year, resumed activity August 2014 with STX visit and September-October 2014 mission. - Factors affecting progress: policy fragmentation, inter-agency cooperation issues, limited sectorial engagement, lack of MOF capacity, proposed new Constitution, and approach of elections in 2015. - Coordination mechanism proposed but not implemented; sequencing and prioritization of recommendations needed. - TA provided detailed analysis, modeling, workshops, and tools; take-up of provided modeling tools was limited due to preference for existing Norwegian model and hesitation to adopt the FARI model. - By mid-2014 mitigation measures included focusing on receptive agencies and promoting simplification, standardization, transparency, and cross-agency cooperation. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 4.5 - Delivery affected by commitment issues, insufficient inter-agency cooperation, and weak capacity. - The project delivered three HQ-led missions and two STX visits (one in conjunction with a mission). - Budget execution by October 2014 was 54 percent. - Project initially planned for two years, extended by one year to June 2015. - The approach of elections created risk that important legislation and contract decisions might be deferred to a new administration. - Efficiency of Reporting: 6.1 - Documentation reviewed included Steering Committee Reports, Project Summaries, Project Proposals, Project Assessments, and One-Pagers. - Assessment criteria: timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications. - Impact: 4.2 - Delivered significant technical input: full drafts of revised tax legislation ready to move forward; contributions to review of new Model PSA; substantial analysis and modeling of the LNG project. - Raised awareness at the MOF about issues for a large LNG project and importance of stronger engagement. - Improved working relations with MEM and TPDC after 2014 re-engagement, though coordination difficulties among agencies remain. - Sustainability: 4.0 - Sustainable legislation and contracts are key; progress slow but prospects more encouraging. - Simplification of fiscal regimes could aid TRA work. - Institutional capacity building, particularly at MOF, and skill development required efforts from government and other TA providers. - A new constitution could have implications for EIs and legislation may need adaptation. ### Outputs and concrete deliverables - Initial and comprehensive TA reports with detailed analysis and modeling of large gas projects, and a wide range of reform needs and strategic decisions. - Models and model estimates were provided and handed over. - Technical memoranda prepared to address workshop and mission issues. - Full drafts of revised income tax and petroleum additional profit tax legislation produced in work with TRA and MOF. - Contributions to VAT treatment for EIs and review of the new Model PSA; a revised upstream and LNG contract model conveyed in a workshop. ### Project management, coordination, and capacity-building issues - Coordination across MOF, MEM, TPDC, TRA, and other TA providers was essential but uneven. - Capacity at MOF on resource-related fiscal issues remained very weak; lack of capacity hindered proactive MOF role. - Greater initial emphasis on prioritization and sequencing of recommendations would have been helpful. - Hands-on, focused activities and more intensive STX support could have enhanced capacity building and earlier progress, though at higher cost. - TA missions met with other TA providers and sought coordination; other providers appreciated IMF efforts to ensure TA coordination. ### EI Revenue Administration (separate project summary excerpt) - Project dates: March 2014 - February 2016 - Budget: US$481,000 - Budget status: project placed in reserves in December 2012, activated in June 2013, budget reduced by 40 percent in December 2014. - Budget execution by October 2014 was 14 percent. - Background: TRA's Large Taxpayer Department (LTD) responsible for around 400 large taxpayers, including 25 mining and petroleum companies; agency must prepare for anticipated increase in revenues from gas development. - Objectives: strengthen natural resource administration capacity, particularly within LTD of TRA. - Identified risks: lack of cooperation from other government agencies; lack of political commitment to implement IMF recommendations; internal resistance within TRA to set up specialist natural resources unit in LTD. - Relevance: 6.6 - TRA needs to strengthen management of existing resource-sector taxpayers and prepare for large increases in resource revenues. - New TRA management showed commitment; capacity is weak. - Coordination with Norad, Norwegian Tax Administration, OTA, and AFRITAC East planned; much follow-up planned as STX assignments. - Project focus areas: compliance management; capacity development; clarification of roles and responsibilities across government agencies; governance and transparency. ### Views of government officials (selected observations) - Officials appreciated IMF TA and found TA reports useful for internal deliberations and learning best practices. - Advice on the LNG project was considered to have considerable value added. - Officials requested more prioritization and sequencing of recommendations. - Desire for more interaction, continuity, and more intensive STX support; preference for more structured and frequent contact. - Workshops were appreciated but some felt they were too short; more thorough interactive discussion desired given capacity levels. - Many officials had gained experience with a revenue forecasting model provided by Norwegian TA and were hesitant to adopt the FARI model; workshops on FARI were seen as too short. - Some officials suggested AFRITAC East should have natural resource expertise to strengthen continuity and provide training and hands-on interaction. - Officials were highly appreciative of the workshop on fiscal management held in Arusha in January. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### 2014. They highlighted the quality of the presentations and the participation of international experts. Officials ### Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF — 2014 ### Andean Regional project: background and scope - Core eligible countries: Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. - Project dates: October 2011-February 2014. - Budget: US$623,150. - Project extensions: in December 2013, the project was extended to April 2014, and in June 2014 it was extended to June 2015. - As of October 2014, the budget had been executed by 60 percent. - March 2011 activities: projects for a module 3 for Bolivia and Peru (in reserves) and a module 4 for Peru (in reserves) were also endorsed; module 3 for Bolivia was dropped in November 2011 and module 3 for Peru was activated; module 4 for Peru was in the reserve list when the list was abolished in June 2013. - Regional context: the Andean region is rich in mineral resources, including oil and gas; Bolivia and Peru are mineral producers of world significance; all four countries are oil and gas producers, with gas of special importance to Peru and Bolivia. - Common policy challenges identified: encouraging new exploration and development while ensuring a major share of revenues accrue to the state; significant issues of fiscal decentralization anchored to distribution of resource revenues. ### Project objectives and identified risks - Principal objective: to commence with review of best practice at a regional level, and then develop targeted TA for countries indicating the strongest demand. - Specific aim: enhance capacity to design sustainable and transparent fiscal regimes for mining and petroleum in the Andean Region that yield the maximum for public use consistent with maintaining incentives to private investors. - Identified risks: continued political and investor pressure to agree to special deals; difficulties in moving government’s proposed legislation through Parliament; lack of complementary capacity to negotiate where necessary. ### Key outputs, activities, and outcomes - Country-level developments: - In Peru, mining tax legislation was signed into law in September 2011; prior to enactment the project completed a detailed analysis of the Peruvian fiscal regime for mining and provided recommendations on new regional royalties. - Colombia passed a tax reform in December 2012; some recommendations of the June 2012 mission on transfer pricing issues and capital gains taxes were incorporated into the new law; no changes were made to the overall fiscal regimes for petroleum and mining. - In Bolivia, a mission revised the Mining Code, a project of reform, and tax legislation and proposed changes to improve the effectiveness of the fiscal regime; the Project of reform is being analyzed by Congress and has not been approved. - No activity took place with Ecuador under the project. - Regional Conference: - A Regional Conference (about 70 delegates) in Lima in March 2014, organized in collaboration with the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru, brought together government officials from the four countries, staff from other development institutions, industry experts, and academics. - Conference goals: build technical capacity among participating government officials by providing practical tools to assess and evaluate fiscal regimes for extractive industries; provide a forum for exchange of views and experiences; international experts discussed economic principles and other considerations for design, implementation, and evaluation of fiscal regimes for EI. - IMF First Deputy Managing Director and the Peruvian Minister of Finance participated in a concluding round table. ### Evaluation scores and assessments (DAC Criteria) - Relevance: 5.2 - Rationale: project began with planned work in Peru given Peruvian authorities’ interest; Colombia requested TA at the 2011 IMF Annual Meetings; project intended to complement modules 2 and 3 and combine where appropriate with the module 3 work program in Peru. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 5.0 - Rationale: legislation enacted in Peru and Colombia and draft legislation prepared in Bolivia included recommendations provided by the project; one High Priority outcome (capacity development) was set aside, effectively changing project scope, but significant capacity input was delivered via the Regional Conference. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.4 - Observations: countries preferred exchanges of international practice via conferences and workshops rather than conventional mission format; project worked from HQ on Peru’s new regional royalties; missions produced TA reports for Colombia (June 2012) and Bolivia (December 2012). - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 5.2 - Rationale: working with several countries yielded economies of scale and effective peer learning; by October 2014, 60 percent of the budget had been executed with the Regional Conference utilizing about half of the budget; the project was extended twice to accommodate plans for a second regional conference targeted for the first quarter of 2015. - Efficiency of Reporting: 5.3 - Evaluation based on timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications in Steering Committee Reports, Project Summaries, Project Proposals, Project Assessments, and One-Pagers. - Impact: 5.3 - Outcomes: legislation enacted or drafted in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia reflected project recommendations; Regional Conference enhanced capacity through peer exchange and expert presentations; coordination with other TA and non-TTF providers yielded synergies. - Sustainability: 5.0 - Rationale: capacity is relatively strong in the Andean countries, supporting sustainability; technical conferences and workshops bolster technical capacity and senior-official awareness; staff developed strong relationships with government officials to mitigate political risk to sustainability. ### Delivery modalities and stakeholder preferences - Countries expressed preference for formats emphasizing exchange of knowledge about international practices: conferences, workshops, and regular interaction, rather than conventional mission formats. - FAD engagement: FAD discussed the project with officials of the four revenue authorities in April 2011 in Washington, D.C.; FAD had recent PFM, revenue administration, or tax policy work in each country; SECO provided PFM support in Peru. - Coordination: Bolivia is coordinated with the TPA-TTF; coordination with other TA providers and organizations was noted as providing synergies. ### Resource use and planning - Budget execution: as of October 2014, 60 percent executed; Regional Conference used about half of the budget. - Project timeline adjustments: extended in December 2013 to April 2014 and again in June 2014 by 14 months to June 2015 to allow for a second regional conference. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc., 2014.* ### 2010. The DRC is the largest world producer of cobalt ore and a major copper producer. The mining sector is ### mte2015ii - 2010. The DRC is the largest world producer of cobalt ore and a major copper producer. The mining sector is ### Background and sector significance - The DRC is "the largest world producer of cobalt ore and a major copper producer." - Mining sector accounts for "about 10 percent of GDP." - Projections for mining production have been "revised upward substantially" and the mining sector is expected to remain "the main driver of growth in the medium term." - The DRC became an EITI candidate country in 2007; after a temporary suspension in April 2013, the DRC became EITI compliant in July 2014. - Central government revenues are "only 13-14 percent of GDP," creating a revenue mobilization challenge. ### EI Fiscal Regimes (Project: February 2012–January 2015; Budget: US$628,300) - Project objective: strengthen the fiscal regime for mining, build capacity at the Ministry of Finance and other government agencies to design and administer mining taxes, monitor revenue performance, and assist macro-fiscal management; transparency element was dropped because covered by a World Bank/DFID project. - Project timeline and budget execution: - Project dates: "February 2012-January 2015." - Budget: "US$628,300." - Project was extended in the first half of FY 2015 to June 2015 (extension within six months). - Budget decreased by "30 percent" in December 2014. - By October 2014, budget execution was "44 percent." - Identified risks: - Absence of, weak, or unfavorable changes in political commitment. - Information not shared between government agencies (notably MOF and other ministries). - Human resources not invested in building capacity and using a mining fiscal revenue model. - Key outputs and tools: - A new draft Mining Code reflecting many TA recommendations was produced; the draft code "would improve the quality of the fiscal regime and has the potential to increase the revenue take substantially relative to the 2002 code." - A cash-flow model was designed based on FARI methodology, adapted to DRC needs; model used to estimate revenue potential of six large mining projects (accounting for "about 50 percent of copper production") and three gold projects. - A revenue forecasting model was developed but progress limited due to data constraints. - A workshop on transfer pricing was held in January 2013 (jointly with Module 2). - Progress and constraints: - Rapid initial progress to late 2012; second draft code produced January 2013; public consultations launched August 2013. - By March 2014 parliamentary session the draft code was expected for consideration, but encountered resistance from mining companies, producing a protracted stand-off. - Cooperation on data gathering improved but remains insufficient; further progress on forecasting depends on data improvements and Ministry of Finance dedicating resources. - Evaluation (DAC scores and summaries): - Relevance: "6.4" — objectives aligned with country needs and government priorities; authorities had launched Mining Code review before project start. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: "6.0" — significant progress in design quality of fiscal regime and revenue modeling; draft code lost momentum due to disagreements with mining companies. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: "5.7" — TA interventions effective; capacity building prioritized; model built jointly with officials in French workshops. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: "5.7" — original time frame 3 years realistic; project extended by 6 months; execution rate was "44 percent" as of October 2014; budget revised down by "30 percent" in December 2014. - Efficiency of Reporting: "5.3." - Impact: "5.5" — 2013 Finance Law increased the mining profit tax rate following TA recommendations; improved inter-agency cooperation and capacity development in revenue modeling. - Sustainability: "5.5" — dependent on enactment and implementation of the draft Mining Code and formalization of the ad-hoc working group and additional human resources. ### EI Revenue Administration (Project: October 2011–September 2014; Budget: US$574,740) - Project objective: strengthen natural resource revenue administration capacity of government institutions (DGI, DGRAD, Ministry of Mining Sector) for efficient collection of all EI revenues due to the government. - Project timeline and budget changes: - Project dates: "October 2011-September 2014." - Budget: "US$574,740." - Extended in December 2014 to June 2015. - Budget execution as of October 2014 was "62 percent." - Budget increased by "10 percent" in December 2014. - Background and challenges: - Resource revenue administration was fragmented across multiple ministries and administrations (Finance, Mines, Petroleum, Commerce; DGI, DGRAD, Customs). - Fragmentation and duplication led to difficulties in collecting, exchanging and disseminating data on mining and oil production and revenues. - Objectives and prioritized actions: - Establish a database to improve management of resource revenues. - Set up a specialized EI audit team within the LTO and strengthen capacity. - Transfer collections of tax and nontax revenues to the DGI. - Progress and constraints: - Initial progress slow; by mid-2013 limited circulation and processing of EI revenue information and limited audit strengthening; no decision on transfer of collection responsibilities. - Subsequent progress: resource database established; improvements in data collection and quality partial; capacity in specialized natural resource audit beginning via advanced audit training. - Payment through banks implemented; advances in filing procedures at LTO and collection procedures at DGRAD. - Integration of tax and nontax collection under DGI remained elusive due to concerns about DGRAD personnel and budget; no progress expected in combining collections into a single branch. - Emphasis placed on inter-agency cooperation to mitigate fragmentation. - Evaluation (DAC scores and summaries): - Relevance: "6.0." - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: "4.2" — initial modest progress; more recently measures implemented but gaps remain; political support and inter-agency cooperation limited. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: "5.4" — continuity of engagement via HQ missions and STX visits; database development assisted. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: "5.5" — project extended nine months with a "10 percent" budget increase in December 2014; delivered three HQ-led missions and seven STX visits. - Efficiency of Reporting: "4.7." - Impact: "5.0" — TA impacting systems and procedures; LTO and DGRAD implementing procedures to facilitate mining taxpayer compliance; transfer pricing workshop raised awareness on centralizing information. - Sustainability: "5.0" — reforms in audit, e-filing and e-payment seem sustainable given managerial and technical capacity; broader sustainability depends on strengthened cooperation among agencies. ### EI Macro-Fiscal and Public Financial Management (Project: January 2012–December 2013; Budget: US$498,005) - Project objective: assist Ministries of Finance and Budget in defining and implementing a strategy and action plan to strengthen macro-fiscal functions of the PFM system; achieve transparent formulation of the general budget through a three-year integrated medium-term macro-fiscal framework. - Project timeline and budget execution: - Project dates: "January 2012-December 2013." - Budget: "US$498,005." - Project was extended three times: to June 2014 (in December 2013), to December 2014 (extension within six months), and to December 2015 (in December 2014). - Budget execution as of October 2014 was "89 percent." - Background and problems addressed: - Fiscal institutions weak; partial coverage of fiscal operations in medium-term budget framework; weak revenue and foreign aid projections; no natural resource module; limited use of MTEF for annual budget formulation; limited macro-fiscal capacity; evolving fiscal decentralization; expected gradual increase in resource revenues raising efficient use and MDG concerns. - Key outputs and progress: - Recommended actions: set up a macro-fiscal unit within the Ministry of Budget (MOB); improve annual budget preparation using three-year rolling medium-term macro-fiscal frameworks; strengthen forecasting and expenditure planning; reinforce MOB budget formulation capacity. - Achievements by late 2014: - Annual medium-term fiscal strategy paper prepared beginning in 2013 using a simplified MTEF (quality needs improvement). - Macroeconomic and fiscal forecasting model improved by incorporating revised national accounts and new modules for resource revenue projections. - A specific strategy and action plan to strengthen annual budget formulation in a three-year MTFF was formulated and subsequently extended and updated. - Methodology for preparing the MTBF and MTEF advanced; communication with stakeholders occurred. - For the first time, a consolidated state budget (central government, provinces and territorial decentralized entities) was prepared and adopted by government using TA-supported methodology. - Remaining gaps: - TOR for a macro-fiscal unit in MOB drafted but unit not yet set up. - Institutional fragmentation and limited coordination particularly between MOF and MOB remain. - Capacity constraints: only "three" local staff across institutions capable of using the forecasting model. - Evaluation (DAC scores and summaries): - Relevance: "6.1." - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: "5.1" — good progress though delays occurred; about one-fifth of actions implemented by end of first year, accelerated thereafter. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: "5.0" — continuity through missions and STX visits; flexible response to authorities' request to prepare consolidated budget. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: "5.2" — project extended by a total of "two years" beyond original time frame; budget execution "89 percent" as of October 2014. - Efficiency of Reporting: "6.0." - Impact: "5.2" — medium-term fiscal strategy papers prepared since 2013; incorporation of resource modules into modeling; first consolidated state budget prepared. - Sustainability: "5.0" — depends on political support, capacity improvements, and inter-agency collaboration; continuation into 2015 expected to help sustainability. ### Key statistics and exact figures cited - Mining sector share of GDP: "about 10 percent of GDP." - Central government revenues: "13-14 percent of GDP." - EI Fiscal Regimes project budget: "US$628,300." - EI Fiscal Regimes budget execution (Oct 2014): "44 percent." - EI Fiscal Regimes budget reduction: "30 percent" (December 2014). - EI Revenue Administration project budget: "US$574,740." - EI Revenue Administration budget execution (Oct 2014): "62 percent." - EI Revenue Administration budget increase: "10 percent" (December 2014). - EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM project budget: "US$498,005." - EI Macro-Fiscal and PFM budget execution (Oct 2014): "89 percent." - Number of large mining projects modeled in DRC cash-flow model: "six large mining projects" accounting for "about 50 percent of copper production," plus "three gold projects." - Number of local staff capable of using the forecasting model (macro-fiscal work): "only three local staff." *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### 2013. The unit is responsible for core compliance activities; taxpayer services, risk assessment and audit case ### mte2015ii - 2013. The unit is responsible for core compliance activities; taxpayer services, risk assessment and audit case selection. ### NRU establishment, staffing, and mandate - The Natural Resource Unit (NRU) was created to handle core compliance activities, taxpayer services, risk assessment and audit case selection. - Initial staffing was four officers and was later raised to seven officers. - Staff background is described as "broadly as recommended by the TA" and staff are developing knowledge and skills. - The NRU has established formal working relationships with other government agencies involved in the natural resource sector to improve cooperation. - Agreements have been reached by the NRU and other agencies to facilitate information sharing. - The NRU operates to a wide-ranging work plan which, given its limited staffing, "requires greater prioritization." ### Progress, limitations, and organizational issues - Progress in other areas has been limited. - Assigning resource revenue collection responsibilities to a properly facilitated Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) depends on implementation of recommendations from parallel non-TTF FAD TA on general tax administration; these recommendations "so far have not gained traction." - The need to rationalize the organizational structure of resource revenue administration and collection responsibilities remains. - Some limited progress was made on: implementation of a self-assessment system, risk-based audit, a dispute resolution framework, and integrity standards. - A formal dispute resolution framework is in place, but "its performance needs to be improved." - An Internal Investigation Division was created in the Tax Department responsible for tax staff integrity and performance. ### Effectiveness on inputs, outputs, risk management, and processes - Overall score reported: 4.8. - Critical observations: - The initial Project Proposal would have benefited from a scoping mission or more extensive discussion with the authorities. - Project outcomes were "wide-ranging and ambitious" and could have been narrowed, prioritized more sharply, and sequenced given capacity constraints. - The project would have benefited from TA on fiscal regimes under Module 1 because the mining fiscal regime complicates administration. - TA activities and materials: - The first mission produced an Improvement Plan covering legal framework, organization, procedures, transparency and capacity building, with expected implementation dates; the Tax Department agreed with the diagnostic and recommendations. - The second mission updated the Improvement Plan and made further recommendations. - A joint mission with general tax administration TA focused on the NRU and other issues. - TA reports are described as "clear and comprehensive" and include road maps and Improvement Plans with timelines for deliverables. - STX visits in 2013-14 concentrated on staff capacity building and training. - Training provided through three STX visits; training materials included resource taxation guidance, risk review and audit manuals, and draft strategic plans for compliance and risk assessment. - Context and engagement: - TA took place in a context where higher level support focused on the need for increased collections and where management of mining taxation in the Tax Department was weak. - Engagement with the Tax Department "has gradually strengthened" over the course of the project. - A more continuous presence with additional focused activities and hands-on support could have accelerated progress. - Project coordination: - The project seeks synergies with administration of other large taxpayers and is closely coordinated with non-TTF FAD TA on general tax administration reforms (which provided recommendations on setting up a LTO). - Risks identified: - At project inception: political instability; unwillingness by relevant institutions to release information; continued political commitment to implement recommendations. - Risks not explicitly anticipated in the Project Proposal: weak capacity and difficulties in creating a LTO. - Mitigation: intensive training activities and specific recommendations to the newly-created NRU. ### Efficiency of TA delivery - Score reported: 4.3. - Observations: - TA delivery efficiency would have benefited from a more focused and prioritized definition of outcomes in the Project Proposal and from a parallel Module 1 project. - Without Module 1, the TA had to devote time and resources to analyzing the fiscal regime, reducing capacity to advance other outcomes. - Project intended commencement: FY 2012, but a delay in receiving the official request put back the start. - Delays and slower uptake of recommendations resulted in two project extensions; the project "is now expected to be about a year and a half longer than the original time frame." - Missions delivered: three HQ missions (the last joint with a non-TTF general tax administration mission) and three STX visits. - Greater continuity of engagement is cited as an efficient way to advance the agenda. - The project's budget was not changed; by October 2014 the execution rate was 60 percent. ### Efficiency of reporting - Score reported: 4.3. - Evaluation focused on documentation prepared for the Steering Committee (SCR, PS, PP, PA, OP) and assessed timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications. - The evaluation criteria clarified: - Timeliness = appropriateness of timing when information was provided to the SC. - Completeness = extent to which documents delivered required information for SC oversight. - Assessment of risks = identification and reporting of risks in documents. - Consistency = differences in information among documents. - Modifications = extent to which project modifications over time were reported and discussed. ### Impact - Score reported: 4.5. - Key impacts: - The creation of the NRU is "an important step toward strengthening resource revenue administration" and has raised awareness. - Establishment of formal working relationships between the NRU and other agencies "should contribute to improving inter-agency collaboration." ### Sustainability - Score reported: 4.8. - Sustainability factors: - Dependence on political and managerial support and continued capacity building. - Project recommendations emphasize institutional memory and an appropriate human resource policy to address sustainability. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### 2014. The project team was not given the opportunity to review the drafts before their submission to the COM. ### mte2015ii - 2014. The project team was not given the opportunity to review the drafts before their submission to the COM. ### Legislative reform and capacity building in Mozambique (general findings) - The EI legislation was passed by Parliament in August 2014; the new laws were built on the project’s recommendations and represent an improvement over the existing legislation, but they do not incorporate all advice provided. - Further work may be needed on capacity building and on developing an institutional framework for FARI model ownership. - For FARI model ownership, setting up a team of trained professionals and clear rules for coordination between line ministries is needed. ### Project design and scope issues - The project included an Objective 2, “Mozambique introduces further reforms on taxation of government securities,” to meet IMF program conditionality; Objective 2 does not belong in the project because it is not related to the management of natural resources. Objective 2 was not included in the project summary endorsed by the SC. ### Effectiveness on inputs, outputs, risk management, and processes (overall) - Score: 4.6 - TA delivery was uneven: initial planning meetings in Maputo in February 2012; two missions and several workshops April–July 2012 and two reports by September 2012; no mission activity until April 2013; three missions May–July 2013 and one report; no mission activity between August 2013 and June 2014. - After strong initial engagement, interaction between missions was weak. - TA team proposed revised fiscal terms for mining and petroleum, drafted fiscal laws, reviewed authorities’ drafts from headquarters, assisted during public consultation and draft laws’ revision; June 2014 STX visit addressed key outstanding issues. - Capacity building: workshops and training on modeling and analyzing mining and petroleum fiscal regimes delivered; petroleum and LNG models developed; several days of training provided to officials of AT, MIREM and national petroleum institute. - Risk assessment: project design/implementation may have underestimated dissent among government agencies on policy design; strong disagreement between MIREM and MOF/MRA, with MIREM focused on investment not revenues; tax policy rests with MRA and MOF involvement is limited. - Coordination: Mozambique exhibits good coordination among TA providers, but TA may be surpassing authorities’ capacity to administer, absorb, and implement it; instances of conflicting advice occurred despite coordination. ### Efficiency of TA delivery and reporting (overall) - Efficiency of TA Delivery score: 4.0 - Time frame was too ambitious; completion dates in the proposal were unrealistic and revised by more than 2 years. - Project extended first by six months and then by nine months; the latter extension to provide time for completion after formation of a new government in February 2015 and to allow handover of forecasting models to Module 3. - As of October 2014, execution of the budget amounted to 87 percent (for the project discussed in that section). - Authorities received 22 TA missions in 2013—coordination of mission visits needs improvement to avoid overlap; possibility of “too much of a good thing.” - Recommendation: use a more “hands on” approach to improve policy coordination among agencies. - Efficiency of Reporting score: 5.7 - Documentation reviewed included Steering Committee Reports (SCR), Project Summaries (PS), Project Proposals (PP), Project Assessments (PA), and One-Pagers (OP). - Evaluation based on timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications. ### Impact and sustainability (overall) - Impact score: 5.0 - Resulted in revised laws for mining and petroleum that incorporate best practices though some problem issues remain. - Coordination among agencies improved, facilitating implementation of revised legislation. - Introduced consultation modality regarding legislation, a mechanism not previously used in Mozambique, which may enhance sustainability. - Sustainability score: 4.5 - New government’s position and staff changes may affect sustainability. - Project extended to allow new government sufficient time for completion. - Problem areas in enacted legislation could result in changes; risk of granting concessions may not be eliminated. - High burden for mining and administrative complexity of certain adopted measures may threaten sustainability; outcomes will largely depend on reform implementation. ### EI REVENUE ADMINISTRATION (specific project) - Project dates: March 2013-March 2015 - Budget: US$622,000 - Comments: - Added to reserve list in December 2012 and activated on a lapse of time basis in March 2013. - Project extended to April 2016 to accommodate four planned STX visits due to recent changes in government. - By October 2014, execution of the budget amounted to 35 percent. - Background and objectives: - Aim: strengthen the Mozambique Revenue Authority (MRA) in administration of natural resource (NR) taxes through organizational improvements, staff capacity building, and enhanced cooperation with other authorities. - TA proposed to begin exploratorily to develop a TA program of priorities. - Identified risks: lack of human resources of sufficient quality and number; necessary organizational decisions not in place; IT support systems not available. - DAC evaluation: - Relevance: 6.7 - Project requested by Minister of Finance in December 2012; builds on Modules 1 and 3 recommendations. - Donor coordination via “Common Fund”; Norwegian “Tax for Development” and World Bank MAGTAP engaged in complementary activities. - Effectiveness on outcomes and objectives: 3.7 - March 2013 mission prepared work program to implement and develop NR unit within LTO; MRA decided initially to create NR unit at headquarters for later transfer to LTO. - Two STX visits and March–April 2014 mission supported establishment of NR tax unit. - MRA advised staffing would start April 2014 with operations commencing June 2014; by end-2014 eight staff appointed internally and twelve additional experts to be recruited externally on contracts. - Several recommended activities (improved procedures, formal automatic exchange of information, public information procedures, tax collection and taxpayer information) had not started; a plan with core activities and deadlines prepared. - Effectiveness on inputs, outputs, risk management, and processes: 5.4 - Activities commenced April 2013; first full mission June 2013; seminar and TA report produced; two STX visits and overlapping HQ staff visit March–April 2014 with second TA report prepared. - Efficiency on TA delivery: 4.7 - Strong engagement with MRA but organizational and staffing decisions were delayed by one year due to differences between MRA and project team. - Several TA providers supporting Mozambique on tax administration require enhanced coordination to avoid duplication/conflicts. - Budget execution by mid-project (year and a half into a two-year project) amounted to 35 percent. - Project extended by 13 months to April 2016 to allow new government time. - Efficiency on reporting: 6.2 (methodology as above) - Impact: 4.5 - Establishment and staffing steps for specialized NR tax unit laid foundation to strengthen NR tax administration. - Sustainability: 4.8 - Depends on MRA's ability to attract and retain staff with necessary skills; on operation of Unit at headquarters; on strengthening of LTO administration and MRA headquarters functions; and on timing/manner of transfer of Unit to LTO. - Other TA providers engaged in complementary training and capacity building. ### EI MACRO-FISCAL AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (Mozambique project) - Project dates: October 2012 to April 2014 (extended to April 2016) - Budget: US$512,902 (budget decreased by 21 percent in December 2014) - By October 2014, execution of the budget amounted to 27 percent. - Background and objectives: - Mozambique’s natural resource revenues expected to increase significantly over medium/long term requiring strengthened fiscal management and possible expanded infrastructure investment. - Project aimed to increase authorities’ awareness of macro-fiscal challenges and help develop capacity to design and implement action plan to reinforce medium-term fiscal framework and develop effective PFM systems for EI revenues and expenditures. - Identified risks: limited capacity to understand key concepts; lack of continued commitment to implement TA recommendations; inability to identify and retain adequate human resources. - DAC evaluation: - Relevance: 6.2 - Low-income country with strong macro management track record; need for strengthened macro-fiscal and PFM due to expected resource revenues. - AFRITAC South and World Bank providing complementary TA; PEFA assessment expected in 2013. - Effectiveness on outcomes and objectives: 3.3 - Initial mission November 2012 reviewed institutional framework for macro fiscal projections and advised on fiscal rules; recommended establishment of a fully-fledged macro-fiscal unit. - Authorities accepted idea but budgetary restrictions and other urgent demands delayed creation; political uncertainty with October 2014 elections also delayed implementation. - Two-year extension from April 2014 to April 2016 approved to allow new government time; authorities requested World Bank support to set up Macro Fiscal Unit (MFU); work started July 2014. - TOR to design organization circulated to project team. - Effectiveness on inputs, outputs, risk management, and processes: 4.8 - Only one mission under project; mission included intensive hands-on training and Excel-based toolkit; TA report drew from previous TTF and FAD work. - Delays in setting up MFU and limited absorption capacity led to postponement of planned FY2014 missions. - AFRITAC South helping with Public Investment Management; November 2013 Fiscal Transparency Code (FTC) mission; Mozambique volunteered to be first FTC pilot country in Africa. - Efficiency of TA delivery: 4.8 - Progress in first six months; subsequent postponements as authorities needed time to absorb recommendations. - Continuation hinged on establishment of MFU, which was delayed due to budgetary restrictions and priorities. - Extension of two years endorsed by SC in June 2014 to provide time for new government (took office February 2015). - By October 2014, budget execution 26 percent; budget decreased by over 20 percent in December 2014 with two-thirds of revised budget still available. - Efficiency of reporting: 5.5 - Impact: 5.5 - Increased authorities’ awareness of challenges and decision to establish MFU at MOF; process started summer 2014 with World Bank support. - Sustainability: 4.8 - If MFU established and staffed successfully, advice under project more likely to be implemented. ### STATISTICS FOR MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES (Mozambique project) - Project dates: November 2011-April 2015 (extended to April 2016) - Budget: US$322,000 - Comments: - Project put in reserve list April 2011; activated May 2012; launched November 2012; extended to April 2016 in December 2014. - By October 2014, project still in work plan; launch delayed. - Background and objectives: - Aim: assist authorities develop statistics describing economic activity relating to natural resources; prepare annual national accounts statistics describing production, income flows, and accumulation of nonfinancial assets to support policy development and revenue forecasting. - Identified risks: insufficient resources for data collection and compilation system; unwillingness of extraction companies/respondents to provide timely appropriate data. - DAC evaluation: - Relevance: 5.0 - Government committed to reforms and transparency; requests for assistance under modules 1, 3, and 5 from MOF and MIREM; AFRITAC South may provide support. - Effectiveness: NA - First mission planned Dec 2012, then June 2013; by December 2013 authorities had not expressed interest and implementation had not begun. - Staff proposed June 2014 that project be canceled because MNIS not interested; proposal withdrawn and project remained in Work Plan pending first mission in FY2015. - Following STA Management contacts, Ministry of Finance and MNIS expressed interest and first mission informally agreed for early 2015 due to mid-October 2014 general elections. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF — DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### 2014. Following a request of the Minister of Finance for further assistance on implementing ### mte2015ii - 2014. Following a request of the Minister of Finance for further assistance on implementing ### Peru: project implementation, timelines, and scope adjustments - A fifth mission was fielded in August 2014 following a request of the Minister of Finance for further assistance on implementing the recommendations of the March mission. - The project was extended twice: - First extension in December 2013: from June 2013 to June 2014. - Second extension in June 2014: to December 2014 to provide TA not envisaged under the original project. - Budget change: - An increase of about 40 percent of the budget was approved in June 2014 because the project had already used up the budget. - TA delivery forms were judged adequate to Peru’s circumstances, including existing capacity at the MEF and the BCRP. - Regional synergy: - A regional conference under the Andean Regional TTF in Lima in March 2014, co-sponsored by the MEF and attended by the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, contributed to enhanced results under both projects. - Area for improvement: - Objective 2 could have benefited from more active work such as preparing simulations of the effects of different formulas used in other countries or combinations of them, in line with authorities’ ongoing work. ### Peru: evaluation scores and assessment of reporting - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 5.8 - Efficiency of Reporting: 6.0 - Evaluation criteria for reporting included timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications. - Documents reviewed by evaluators included: Steering Committee Reports (SCR), Project Summaries (PS), Project Proposals (PP), Project Assessments (PA), and One-Pagers (OP). ### Peru: impact and sustainability - Impact: 6.0 - Results and inputs of the project: - Legislation enacted by Congress on a new fiscal framework and a new set of fiscal rules aimed at addressing limitations of the previous framework. - Project inputs into recommendations of the Committee of Experts that prepared final proposals on the fiscal framework and fiscal rules. - Effective coordination of work by MEF and BCRP on methodology and calculations on the indicator for the structural fiscal rule. - Theoretical and best practice inputs into scenarios of possible schemes for distributing mineral-related revenues to subnational governments. - Inputs for the MEF to prepare a comprehensive fiscal risk statement and a contingent liabilities report, including on PPPs. - Expected outcomes: - Improved transparency and credibility of the macro fiscal framework and the budget. - Sustainability: 6.7 - No major difficulties envisaged for sustainability because: - Risks have been properly identified. - No significant gaps have been created or left unaddressed. - Recommendations are theoretically and practically based on best practices. - Processes followed the right sequencing, creating strong ownership of reforms. - Existing technical capacity at the MEF and BCRP and authorities’ understanding of process dynamics provide a firm foundation. - Design issue note: - Design issues noted in project documentation with respect to the revised fiscal framework are not pursued further in documents reviewed, so it is unclear if they were resolved in regulations or remain pending. - One-pagers indicated no major sustainability difficulties. ### Sierra Leone: background and resource context - Country context: - Sierra Leone is a low-income country recovering from a long period of civil conflict, including conflicts over control of natural resources. - Known reserves: diamonds, gold, bauxite, iron ore and rutile. - Oil discoveries: Venus (discovered in 2009 by Anadarko) near an undelineated maritime boundary with Liberia; Mercury (further discovery). Neither discovery declared commercial yet. - Diamond production resumed in 2010; iron ore first shipped in 2012. ### Sierra Leone: EI Fiscal Regimes project overview - Project dates: June 2011-December 2013 - Budget: US$1,012,496 - Comments: - Project endorsed in the initial work plan. - Project proposal increased the budget proposed in the project summary by 70 percent, and was decreased by 25 percent in December 2012. - Project was extended to April 2014 and will remain open to June 2015 to provide further assistance if needed, as the Ebola epidemic prevented activity over the past six months. - Background and objectives: - Frequent changes in fiscal regimes for minerals and a history of special agreements with investors weakened fiscal revenue expectations; lack of transparency contributed to difficulties. - Main objective: provide assistance in developing a standard framework for taxation of mining and oil and build capacity to implement the framework. - Specific aims: refine fiscal regimes for mining and petroleum as appropriate to Sierra Leone circumstances, and strengthen capacity to manage minerals revenues effectively and transparently. - Identification of risks (project proposal): - Continued political or investor pressure to agree special deals. - Lack of complementary capacity to negotiate where necessary. - Inability to sustain political commitment to transparency, stability of the fiscal regime, and a cautious approach to use of revenues. ### Sierra Leone: EI Fiscal Regimes — evaluation (DAC criteria and findings) - Relevance: 6.5 - Country was a candidate in the EITI. - IMF consulted extensively with the World Bank prior to adding Sierra Leone to the list. - Sequencing aligned with country conditions; coordination among agencies was a priority. - Country urgently needed a standard fiscal framework and capacity to implement it. - No FAD TA since 2007, but interaction with FAD under IMF program permitted strong engagement prior to project launch. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 6.0 - Project was demand driven and results based. - Delays due to elections, parliamentary approval, and external shocks (Ebola epidemic). - Objective 1 (refined fiscal regimes): - Comprehensive new legislation (Extractive Industries Revenue Act, EIRA) drafted by May 2012. - September 2012: government reached new petroleum agreements with terms substantially conforming to proposed legislation. - Enactment delays: EIRA submitted to Parliament in December 2013 instead of originally envisaged September 2012 (oil) and April 2013 (mining). - Petroleum Directorate efforts to split EIRA into separate petroleum and mining bills may further delay enactment. - Completion date for outcomes under Objective 1 revised to June 2015 due to delays and Ebola outbreak. - Objective 2 (capacity to manage mineral revenues): - Comprehensive revenue forecasting framework in place by May 2012 with an inter-agency Mineral Revenue Forecasting Unit coordinated by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED). - Detailed models developed and installed for mining. - Simulation models for petroleum available but insufficient data for forecasting (no commercial discovery yet declared). - Adoption of a resource revenue management framework consistent with good PFM practice and fiscal transparency began under this project and was transferred to Module 3; completion dates revised from September 2012 and April 2013 to April 2014 to account for transfer to Module 3. - Further progress halted by Ebola outbreak; Parliament and Cabinet inactivity and inability to do in-country TA work. - Support may be needed to revive EIRA and modeling efforts after situation improves. - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.6 - Inputs delivered effectively and continuously after July 2011 launch: total of 4 HQ missions and 9 STX missions in an 18-month period; drafting and consultation work continued between missions. - Missions conducted with wide consultations and many workshop-format activities; civil society, industry, and development partner consultations held. - First two missions produced comprehensive TA reports; draft EIRA submitted in advance and revised during missions. - Drafts and reports reviewed by other advisers, Commonwealth Secretariat, and the Revenue Watch Institute. - Risks regarding capacity addressed effectively with Module 3 contributing to capacity building. - Interagency coordination risks surged during EIRA parliamentary discussions and may result in the bill being split. - FAD consulted closely with other TA providers (World Bank, Commonwealth Secretariat, African Center for Economic Transformation) to ensure complementarity. - Efficiency of TA delivery: 5.8 - Project achieved outcomes faster than anticipated and at lower cost. - Original budget increased by 70 percent for accelerated implementation, then reduced one year later to an amount about 30 percent above the original budget after streamlining. - By October 2014, 64 percent of activities had been executed. - TA delivery forms were effective where outcomes were under project and authorities’ control. - Prior to project start (July 2011), government had initiated review process for mineral agreements and enacted the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act in July 2011. - Authorities were prompt in responding and identified priorities clearly; interagency revenue forecasting unit established and adopted transferred model. - Efficiency of Reporting: 5.8 - Same reporting evaluation framework as noted for other projects: timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications; documents reviewed included SCR, PS, PP, PA, OP. - Impact: 6.0 - Project outcomes: - New generally applicable legislation on fiscal regimes submitted to Parliament and already used for terms of agreements in the 2012 licensing round. - Built capacity for officials to conduct policy analysis, forecasting and simulations for mining and oil revenues. - Interagency revenue forecasting unit established and coordinated by the Ministry of Finance; detailed models transferred. - Simulation models available for petroleum but forecasting limited by insufficient data (no commercial discovery declared). - Sierra Leone became a compliant country under EITI in April 2014. - Sustainability: 5.3 - Risks to sustainability: - Possibility that two key officials driving the process will be moved. - Continued efforts by the Petroleum Directorate to separate petroleum elements of the bill in Parliament. - Enforcement risk: sustainability depends on government strength to enforce EIRA and avoid diversion into special agreements. - Sierra Leone remains a fragile state; no guarantees for sustainability. - Positive factors: - Uniform fiscal framework of EIRA simpler and more transparent than previous multiplicity of agreements, which should promote sustainability. - All three FAD TTF projects contributed important capacity-building inputs. - Future resource discoveries or mining sector failures might strain the developed framework. ### Sierra Leone: EI Revenue Administration project overview - Project Dates: June 2012-October 2015 - Budget: US$599,065 - Comments: - Added to work plan in May 2012; launched in June 2012. - Extended to April 2016 due to the Ebola outbreak. - Background and objectives: - Legal framework for mining taxation suffered from weaknesses and a variety of special deals. - LTO needed re-organization and creation of a specialized unit to manage challenges from major new natural resource developments, improve coordination and information exchange with mining department, strengthen collection and accounting for natural resource revenues, and develop capacity to deal with large resource taxpayer administration. - Project objective: strengthen natural resource revenue administration, in particular implementation of the revised natural resource fiscal regime developed under Module 1, and develop more transparent accounting for natural resource revenues to support Module 3 work program. - Specifically sought to strengthen natural resource administration capacity, particularly in the LTO of the National Revenue Authority (NRA). - Identification of Risks: - Political instability. - Lack of cooperation from other institutions responsible for natural resource regulation. - Lack of political commitment to implement TA recommendations. ### Sierra Leone: EI Revenue Administration — evaluation (DAC criteria and findings) - Relevance: 6.3 - Project responded to a Financial Secretary request in August 2011. - A revenue administration expert accompanied the November 2011 Module 1 mission to produce a preliminary capacity assessment and draft project proposal. - NRA had made considerable progress from a low base due to modernization program and extensive TA, but still had a long way to go. - TA on Module 2 follows Modules 1 and 3, which set the stage for and are supported by Module 2. - Other TA providers: DFID and Crown Agents on tax administration reform (no special NR focus), Revenue Development Foundation (funded by GIZ) on integrating data collection/management between revenue authority and mining department, and World Bank focused on small and medium taxpayers. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 3.3 - Diagnostic mission concluded NRA capacity needed significant strengthening and a development plan specifically focused on EI revenue administration was needed. - Implementation started briskly in Q3 2012 but slowed when enactment of EIRA was put on hold due to November 2012 presidential elections. - By June 2013, EIRA draft still being prepared and NRA commissioners not appointed. - STX visit in July 2013 reported slow progress attributed to weak capacity and integrity issues. - Confirmation of acting Commissioner General renewed interest in establishing an EI unit at NRA. - December 2013 mission reviewed proposals; authorities initially proposed a structure fragmenting domestic tax operations, contrary to project recommendations; mission provided detailed advice. - Subsequently, an EI unit (head and three managers) was set up within NRA in line with project recommendations; unit focused on developing linkages with DTD, Petroleum Directorate, and National Minerals Authority. - Plans for FY2015 to support initial EI unit setup, including detailed action plan, are on hold due to Ebola outbreak. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.0 - Pre-project assessment, three missions, three STX visits delivered, and two TA reports prepared under the project. - Diagnostic mission developed strategy and action plan jointly with authorities, including phased capacity building and training workshops. - Delays in enacting EIRA resulted in slowdown of input delivery. - LEG provided background assistance from HQ with plans to prepare a Revenue Administration Act. - 2012 TA report provided timeline for implementation of key recommendations from September 2012 through December 2013 and a training program phased over 2013-2014. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### ANNEX II of the Report developed in great detail an Improvement Plan for the NRA EI. ### mte2015ii - ANNEX II Improvement Plan for the NRA EI (Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF) ### Efficiency of TA Delivery (NRA EI) - Efficiency score: 5.0 - Findings: - TA delivered in a well sequenced fashion through assessment and diagnostic missions, report preparation, and workshops. - Delivery constrained by capacity limitations at the NRA and delays in enactment of fiscal legislation required for implementation. - Disagreement over institutional setup for the EIU delayed implementation of a key recommendation. - Budget execution as of October 2014: 35 percent. - Project extended by six months in December 2014 to April 2016 due to the Ebola outbreak. ### Efficiency of Reporting (NRA EI) - Efficiency score: 5.8 - Evaluation scope: - Documentation reviewed included Steering Committee Reports (SCR), Project Summaries (PS), Project Proposals (PP), Project Assessments (PA), and One-Pagers (OP). - Assessment criteria: timeliness, completeness, assessment of risks, consistency, and reporting of modifications. ### Impact (NRA EI) - Impact score: 5.0 - Findings: - Establishment of an EI Unit in line with TA recommendations, despite initial authority preferences not aligned with best practices. - The Unit is a key first step to build NRA capacity to handle EIR effectively upon enactment of the EIRA Bill. - Project team provided detailed advice to moderate potential negative effects of alternative authority preferences. ### Sustainability (NRA EI) - Sustainability score: 4.5 - Risks to sustainability: - Ongoing capacity constraints within the NRA. - Continued delays in enactment of the fiscal regime and constraints from terms of existing agreements could threaten achieved results. --- ### EI Macro-Fiscal and Public Financial Management (Project summary) - Project dates: October 2011-April 2014 - Budget: US$591,220 - Comments: - Project endorsed in initial work plan; extended from April 2014 to October 2014 at June 2014 SC Meeting, and to April 2016 at December 2014 SC Meeting because of Ebola outbreak. - By October 2014, budget execution: 80 percent. - Background: - Budget characterized by an annual horizon; need for a medium term framework (MTF) to improve predictability, resource allocation, transparency, and accountability. - Since 2002, FAD provided wide-ranging PFM assistance; lack of capacity affected reform pace. - Authorities launched Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Strategy (IPFMRS) in mid-2009, implemented through donor-funded project. - FAD maintains a regional advisor funded by Japan in Accra, Ghana, responsible for coordinating and implementing PFM TA in Sierra Leone. - Objectives: - Develop a medium-term macro-fiscal framework including forecasting mineral and oil revenues. - Develop structure to fit government savings policy regarding budget surpluses from commodity prices. - Build capacity to implement these processes and incorporate framework into comprehensive PFM law. - Identified risks: - Inability to sustain political commitment to transparency, stability of fiscal regime, and cautious revenue use. - Inability to pass consistent laws/regulations to control use of natural resource wealth. - Inability to maintain specified savings and expenditure policies when commodity prices fall. ### Evaluation — DAC Criteria (EI Macro-Fiscal & PFM) - Relevance: 6.7 - Project requested by the Ministry of Finance to monitor and manage rapid mining sector developments; follows Module 1; reinforces PFM reforms. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 5.7 - Project time frame too ambitious; initial completion dates December 2012 and April 2013 revised. - Agreement reached on fiscal rule type, creation of stabilization and savings fund, and necessary PFM legal reforms. - Draft PFM legislation finalized for Cabinet approval end-2013. - February 2014 mission recommended splitting PFM Bill into PFM Act and a separate SWF Law. - Medium-term expenditure framework covering budget year and two indicative outer years developed and included in annual budget law. - Fiscal rule modeling needs further development to determine parameters based on revised revenue forecasts. - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.2 - Four HQ missions fielded between February 2012 and February 2014; four TA reports prepared; series of workshops conducted. - LEG provided drafting assistance; authorities disseminated first draft of PFM Act in August 2013 for stakeholder consultation. - Road map discussed and agreed with Minister of Finance; well-attended stakeholder workshop led by the Solicitor General held. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 5.8 - Outcomes and schedules were overly ambitious; reports lacked implementation tools; hands-on implementation support and in-between-mission engagement were limited. - Weak macro fiscal capacity at MOFED and conflicting advice from other TA providers may have been underestimated. - Ebola outbreak extension to April 2016; by October 2014, budget execution: 80 percent. - Drafting by Solicitor General’s Office occurred before MOFED finalized policy considerations and Cabinet approval, contributing to delays. - Coordination with Module 1 effective; revenue expert transfer from Module 1 to Module 3 was essential. - Efficiency of Reporting: 5.8 - Reporting evaluated on timeliness, completeness, risk assessment, consistency, and reporting of modifications using SCR, PS, PP, PA, and OP documents. - Impact: 5.5 - Increased awareness among senior policy officials on fiscal rules, managing natural resource revenues for macro stability, fiscal sustainability, and intergenerational transfers. - Advanced establishment of medium-term fiscal framework and contributed to MOFED capacity building in defining fiscal rules and operating SWFs. - Sustainability: 5.8 - PFM system capable of underpinning the fiscal rule; main issue is political interference. - PFM Act amendments and fiscal rules would lead to long-term sustainability, but legal framework gaps risk erosion of practices under future governments. --- ### Statistics for Managing Natural Resources (Project summary) - Project dates: November 2012-April 2015 - Budget: US$322,000 - Comments: - Approved in May 2012 SC Meeting; extended from April 2015 to April 2016 due to Ebola outbreak and to allow more time to collect mining data. - By October 2014, budget execution: 17 percent. - Background: - Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL) had some experience but needed support from administrative data providers and mining companies. - National Minerals Agency (NMA) established in 2012 to serve as technical interface and administer the Mines and Minerals Act of 2009; NMA favored the project. - Objectives: - Assist SSL to develop real sector statistics on mining resources (iron ore, gold, diamonds). - Prepare annual national accounts statistics describing production, income flows, nonfinancial assets, and financial assets/liabilities for policy development and revenue forecasting. - Identified risks: - Insufficient SSL resources (staff and financial) to collect, compile, and disseminate data regularly. - Unwillingness of extraction companies and respondents to provide timely data. - First TA report specified risks/assumptions: cooperation of authorities; availability of source data and TA; adequate survey funding; retention of trained staff for continuity. ### Evaluation — DAC Criteria (Statistics) - Relevance: 6.2 - Project implemented Module 1 recommendations and focused on mining resources to complement existing national accounts TA from DFID-funded module. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 4.3 - First mission defined scope, implementing agency, data channels, and detailed action plan. - SSL supported development of mining sector accounts; workload manageable with adequate training and TA. - July 2014 mission found some benchmark actions unimplemented and took over tasks to advance implementation. - Encouraging developments: NMA database implementation and inclusion of mining industries in SSL annual economic survey. - By end-2014, first estimates of iron ore production and generation of income accounts compiled; remaining mining industries work launched but not completed due to data delays and processing. - Capacity to compile real sector statistics remains weak; national accounts department needs reinforcement; artisanal mining expected to be weakest component. - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.8 - Two missions delivered; two TA reports prepared; April 2013 mission worked closely with SSL national accounts staff and main statistics providers. - Two-year work program prepared and agreed with authorities. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 5.2 - Delivery affected by weak implementation capacity and lack of SSL resources for surveys. - Delays in source data collection and processing delayed mining accounts compilation. - Follow-up and hands-on support recommended to ensure implementation of benchmark actions before missions. - Project extended to April 2016 because of Ebola outbreak; by October 2014, budget execution: 17 percent. - Efficiency of Reporting: 5.1 - Reporting assessed using SCR, PS, PP, PA, and OP documents on timeliness, completeness, risk assessment, consistency, and reporting of modifications. - Impact: 4.5 - Project framework established for mining accounts compilation; first estimates for iron ore production and generation of income accounts compiled; work on other mining industries initiated. - Sustainability: 5.8 - Mining accounts to be fully integrated and coherent with central annual accounts framework; SSL new series of annual national accounts will fully include mining accounts. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF* ### 2014. In April 2014 the new fiscal regime for mining was enacted through the passing of amendments to the ### Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF — 2014 mining fiscal regime and selected country project evaluations ### Mining fiscal regime enacted April 2014 - Enactment: - The new fiscal regime for mining was enacted through amendments to the Income Tax Act and the Mines and Minerals Act in April 2014. - Design and prerequisites: - The new regime largely follows pre-TTF IMF recommendations. - It provides a strong foundation for mining development conditional on: - elimination of high export duties on minerals, which "impose a high and uncompetitive royalty on mining (as assessed by a mission last October)"; - implementation details being put in place (ministerial orders that do not require parliamentary review were to be issued by July 2014 but were yet to be implemented). - Follow-up and capacity building: - By late 2014 the authorities had not yet had time to respond to, or implement, follow-up recommendations provided by the October 2014 mission. - Work envisaged on development of capacity for revenue forecasting and analysis of fiscal terms for mining projects was still pending. - Project evaluation scores (from the Mid-Term External Evaluation): - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.3 - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 5.7 - Project envisaged two legal STX visits and one HQ-led mission; only one STX visit was needed for draft legislation. - Project was extended by 16 months due to delays. - Budget execution through October 2014 was only 20 percent. - Efficiency of Reporting: 5.4 - Impact: 6.0 - The new fiscal regime was judged a major step forward provided export duties are eliminated and implementation issues resolved. - Sustainability: 5.8 - Considerable political support exists; sustainability might be affected by a fragile political environment. - Risks noted: - Pressures to agree special fiscal terms. - Availability of complementary technical support to complete mining project agreements. - Potential materialization of these risks as new investments arise. - An unanticipated risk materialized: a protracted delay in approval and enactment of draft legislation. ### Timor-Leste — petroleum-related projects and outcomes - Context and background: - Timor-Leste is highly petroleum dependent; a single successful petroleum project has delivered all petroleum revenues since 2004. - Around US$11 billion remains saved in a sovereign wealth fund. - EI Fiscal Regimes project: - Project dates: June 2011-April 2013 - Budget: US$717, 414 - Comments: - Initial budget US$513,579; increased by almost 80 percent in project proposal. - In December 2013 Module 3 work was terminated and the budget was reduced by 19 percent. - Module 1 work will continue; project extended to December 2015. - Objectives: - Capacity-building support to MOF and the Petroleum Fund Directorate (PFD) for macro-economic management and revenue forecasting. - Advise on petroleum fiscal regime ahead of a planned acreage release. - Strengthen macro-fiscal modeling capacity. - Identified risks: - Lack or loss of qualified personnel regarding ESI calculation. - Lack of capacity to absorb improved modeling tools. - Political pressures to spend petroleum revenues. - Evaluation DAC Criteria and findings: - Relevance: 6.3 - FAD had prior involvement in Petroleum Fund setup and ESI calculations. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 3.7 - Project divided into three components; only the ESI component remains active. - Support since 2011 for ESI calculations and training; 2015 expected to be last year of TTF support on ESI. - PA declined to participate in fiscal regime analysis, preventing progress on comparative fiscal regimes. - Macro-fiscal modeling component terminated in December 2013. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.2 - Fast initial engagement (three missions and two reports by April 2012); later activity focused on ESI. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 4.7 - Budget reduced by 19 percent after module 3 termination; as of October 2014 two-thirds of reduced budget had been spent. - Efficiency of Reporting: 5.4 - Impact: 3.0 - Capacity building occurred, but limited transfer due to many MOF functions performed by non-Timorese contractors. - Only one component (ESI) remains active; overall impact reduced. - Sustainability: 5.3 - Capacity improving but limited; one contractor in MOF handles ESI with no backup. - Petroleum Fund Management project: - Project dates: February 2013-February 2016 - Budget: US$839,507 - Background: - Petroleum Fund established in 2005; as of end-September 2012 assets amounted to US$11 billion, invested mostly in U.S. government bonds (77 percent). - PFL amended to expand investment universe. - Objectives: - Help develop and implement a new asset allocation strategy; assist CBTL to enhance expertise in managing a more complex fixed-income portfolio. - Identified risks: - Availability of staff at the PFD and CBTL with requisite skills. - Evaluation DAC Criteria and findings: - Relevance: 4.3 - Project continued work being funded by Norway; staff sought confirmation of authorities' commitment. - Effectiveness on Outcomes and Objectives: 1.7 - Scope too ambitious given limited capacity; defining investment directives is politically sensitive. - Little to no progress on outcomes; tangible result: two self-assessments on alignment with Santiago principles and one joint assessment. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 3.5 - Initial mission February 2013; no further engagement until January 2014; authorities postponed follow-up mission to 2015. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 4.0 - As of October 2014, 22 months into project, budget executed by less than 17 percent. - Efficiency of Reporting: 4.4 - Impact: 3.0 - No discernable significant impact; mission report raised awareness of issues for managing more complex portfolios. - Sustainability: 4.0 - Sustainability assessed against conservative starting point; further capacity and governance enhancements needed. ### Uganda — oil discoveries and multiple module evaluations - Context and background: - Estimated 2 billion barrels discovered in the Lake Albert Rift Basin; peak production expected around 200,000 barrels per day, potentially reached by 2017 and sustained for 10 to 20 years. - Government oil revenues could reach around $5 billion per year or over 20 percent of Uganda’s non-oil GDP and account for over one half of total government revenues. - EI Macro-Fiscal and Public Financial Management project: - Project dates: November 2012-April 2014 - Budget: US $296,000 - Comments: - Project originally placed in initial work plan with dates May 2011-October 2012. - In November 2011 macro-fiscal aspects were dropped; project extended in December 2014 to June 2015 to support preparation of a Charter of Fiscal Responsibility. - Background and objectives: - Draft policy document prepared May 2010; MOFPED prepared a draft Public Finance Act (PFA) submitted to Parliament in March 2012 and re-submitted in 2013. - Project aimed to strengthen fiscal and legal frameworks and institutional capacity to manage oil-sector revenues, develop PFM systems for EI revenues and related expenditures. - Identified risks: - Unwillingness of government and Parliament to amend/adopt revised PFA. - Non-availability of required staff. - Lack of accompanying capacity building. - Evaluation DAC Criteria and findings: - Relevance: 4.8 - No scoping mission took place; TA sequencing could have been improved. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 4.0 - Missions worked on finalizing the PFA Bill and TSA design. - March 2014 mission raised concerns related to lack of clarity on petroleum revenue management provisions. - Effectiveness on Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 4.7 - March 2013 mission (with AFRITAC East) designed TSA roadmap and reviewed cash management; June 2013 mission developed detailed TSA implementation plan; March 2014 mission reviewed PFA and provided draft Fiscal Responsibility Charter. - Efficiency of TA Delivery: 4.7 - TA delivery affected by conflicts with oil companies and lack of oil development policy; project start delayed and extended by 32 months beyond original completion date. - By October 2014 budget execution amounted to 60 percent (excluding FAD-provided TA outside TTF). - Efficiency of Reporting: 4.7 - Impact: 4.0 - Contributed to improvements and amendments to the PFA Bill and strengthened TSA establishment process; enactment of PFA Bill still pending with important shortcomings remaining. - Sustainability: 5.0 - Principles of fiscal management have been broadly discussed; senior MOFPED management is committed; further assistance required for implementation (Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, investment policy for petroleum funds). - Natural Resource Asset and Liability Management project (Module 4): - Project dates: May 2011-May 2013 - Budget: US$266,770 - Comments: - Project was placed in initial work plan; project proposal appears not to have been prepared; project terminated in June 2014. - Objectives: - Put in place asset allocation for oil-related revenues; develop investment guidelines and risk management framework; strengthen capacity to manage financial assets. - Identified risks: - Pressure to spend rather than save windfalls; lack of continued political commitment to implement recommendations. - Evaluation DAC Criteria and findings: - Relevance: 3.0 - Module 4 could commence after completion of Module 3; unclear demand from authorities. - Effectiveness: ND (Not Determined) - Project never launched; inactive due to uncertainties about petroleum development; SC approved termination in June 2014. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### ANNEX III. RESEARCH PROJECTS AND WORKSHOPS ### ANNEX III. RESEARCH PROJECTS AND WORKSHOPS ### IV.1.1 SAVINGS AND CONSUMPTION GUIDELINES FOR OIL AND MINERAL PRODUCERS - Project dates: October 2011 - June 2012 - Budget: US$58,850 - Comments: The project was placed in the original Work Plan in April 2011. It was extended twice, to July 2014 in June 2014, and to June 2015 in December 2014. - Objective: Provide practical policy guidance from analytical models and other academic work, to tackle some conceptual issues that will be critical for actual policy application. - Background: Initial contribution reviewed debates on how fast to save versus spend natural resource revenues; explored whether specific guidelines (e.g., permanent income measure) or absorptive capacity–linked spending were preferable. Linked to Workshop 1 (Fiscal Management of Oil and Natural Gas in East Africa, Arusha). - Evaluation (DAC Criteria): - Relevance: 5.5 - Targeted low-income and lower middle-income producers interested in fiscal frameworks; project to address design of an "optimal" fiscal framework and possible modification of permanent income hypothesis to allow front-loaded investment spending linked to PFM and absorption constraints. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 4.0 - Two papers commissioned from Oxford Center for Analysis of Resource-Rich Economies remained in draft after three rounds of IMF comments as of December 2014. - Draft materials were used in the IMF policy paper Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-Rich Developing Countries (2012) and in TTF Module 3 projects in Guinea, Mozambique and Sierra Leone; drafts used in Workshop 1 (Arusha, January 2014). - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 3.5 - Delivery of papers satisfactory to IMF staff proved difficult; successive drafts and rounds of comments revealed persistent differences of view and suggested inadequate interaction/supervision framework. - Project was partly overtaken by IMF 2012 policy paper requested by the IMF's Executive Board. - Efficiency: 3.0 - Original timeframe ambitious; project extended by three years; several rounds of review consumed IMF staff time not reflected in project expenditures; expenditure by October 2014 was insignificant. - Impact: 4.5 - Drafts provided inputs to IMF policy paper and TTF TA and workshop. - Sustainability: Too early to assess. ### IV.1.2 MINING TAX ADMINISTRATION - Project dates: October 2011 - December 2012 - Budget: US$122,500 - Comments: The project was placed in the original Work Plan in April 2011. It was extended to June 2014 in December 2013, and then to December 2014 during the first half of FY 2015 (extension within six months). - Objective: Publish research-based best practices adaptable to strengthen mining taxation administration in developing countries. - Background: Aimed to prepare a toolkit of good mining tax administration practices for developing countries, in collaboration with a World Bank project preparing a framework for strengthening mineral tax administration capacity in African governments and institutions. - Evaluation (DAC Criteria): - Relevance: 6.0 - Sought to produce a comprehensive toolkit useful for TTF TA in low-income and lower middle-income countries; addressed governance challenges in African mining sectors. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 6.0 - July 2014: Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries, A Handbook published as a joint IMF–World Bank product. - Handbook is a comprehensive best-practice guide covering resource revenue administration dimensions with synergies to Module 1 and Module 2; launched at a well-attended IMF event; an outreach program planned. - Planned regional workshop in West Africa did not take place. - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.0 - Collaboration with World Bank: initial fact-finding visits to three African countries; IMF staff and World Bank experts contributed to draft; comments received from EITI, members, stakeholders, private companies. - Review process was lengthy and thorough. - Efficiency: 4.5 - Project extended by 1.5 years; original timeframe ambitious given handbook scope and detailed review; budget expenditure as of October 2014 was 16 percent. - Impact and sustainability: Too early to assess. ### IV.1.3 RESOURCE REVENUE DATABASE AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE STATISTICS - Project dates: January 2012 - August 2013 - Budget: US$25,000 (budget increased by 156 percent to US$64,000 in December 2012) - Comments: Project placed in original Work Plan in April 2011. Project completed and removed from Work Plan in June 2014. - Objectives: Develop a draft standard template, harmonized with Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2001 classifications, for member countries to collect and report revenues from natural resources. - Background: Many countries lack standardized, comparable public information on government revenues from natural resources; template would contain GFSM 2001 categories and codes, disaggregated to identify resource revenues and check consistency with total revenues. - Evaluation (DAC Criteria): - Relevance: 4.5 - Template intended to facilitate analytically relevant, cross-country comparable resource revenue data; beneficial for TTF Modules 5 and 3 but not focused on TTF-eligible countries’ specific capacity constraints. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 4.5 - STA developed draft standard template; draft presented in paper circulated to IMF Executive Board and posted in January 2014 for consultation. - Paper surveys definitions of resource revenues, provides draft template with revenue categories and instructions, discusses data collection, and shows how EITI country reports can be converted with examples for four developing resource-rich countries. - Under a recently approved TTF global project, draft template will be field-tested in six countries; importance noted for including strong representation from TTF-eligible countries. - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 5.0 - Project start slow due to internal surveys and coordination between STA and FAD; an expert provided initial draft; draft uploaded for public comments between February and April 2014. - EITI Secretariat applied the draft to some reports and provided comments; Revenue Watch Institute, NGOs, private companies, and individuals also commented; revised draft prepared but not posted yet. - Efficiency: 5.0 - Project took slightly less than a year longer than anticipated due to slow start; budget was fully used. - Impact and sustainability: Too early to assess. ### IV.1.4 NATURAL RESOURCE ASSET AND LIABILITY HANDBOOK - Project dates: November 2012 - April 2013 - Budget: US$51,401 (budget increased by 123 percent to US$114,800; extended to end-2015 in June 2014) - Comments: Project placed in original Work Plan in April 2011. - Objective: Natural resource-rich countries use the Handbook as guidance on sovereign asset liability management (SALM). - Background: Aimed to assist resource-rich countries to enhance wealth management and adopt an integrated SALM approach. - Evaluation (DAC Criteria): - Relevance: 4.0 - Handbook intended to bundle and systematize experience for TA consistency; did not focus on specific asset-liability issues typical of TTF-eligible (low income and lower-middle income) countries with weak financial infrastructure and limited capacity. - MCM TA under Module 4 has focused on SWFs in Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, and planned work in Mongolia. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 4.0 - Sovereign Asset-Liability Management - Guidance for Resource-Rich Economies completed April 2014 and circulated to IMF Executive Board; published on IMF website in June 2014. - Policy advice mostly relevant to countries with strong analytical and asset management capacity; many TTF-eligible countries lack prerequisites (capacity, financial infrastructure, developed domestic capital markets). - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 4.0 - Project activated 1.5 years after placement on Work Plan; delays reflect evolving project objectives and components; inclusion in Work Plan may have been premature. - Efficiency: 4.0 - Ambitious completion date set once started; budget increased in June 2014 to add outreach; budget execution by October 2014 was 36 percent. - Impact and sustainability: Too early to assess. ### IV.1.5 FISCAL MANAGEMENT OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN EAST AFRICA - Project dates: September 2013 - April 2014 - Budget: US$100,000 (budget increased in June 2013 by 150 percent to US$250,000) - Comments: Workshop placed in original Work Plan in April 2011. Originally intended as a workshop on oil revenue management for new producers; modified in May 2012 following request from East African Community (EAC) Secretariat and endorsed by member governments. Budget increased in June 2013 by 150 percent to US$250,000. - Objective: Enhancement of knowledge and capacity of government officials on fiscal issues in management of natural resources. - Background: Oil and natural gas discoveries in East Africa raised expectations; regional frameworks needed to manage resource revenue; progress across countries uneven. - Evaluation (DAC Criteria): - Relevance: 6.0 - East African region increasingly significant for natural gas production; regional forum for exchange on fiscal management was relevant for prospective and early-stage producers. - Effectiveness of Outcomes and Objectives: 6.5 - Workshop co-hosted by EAC Secretariat, organized by FAD with AFR; held in Arusha, Tanzania in January 2014. - Targeted managerial-level officials from sector ministries, ministries of finance, revenue authorities, and national petroleum corporations; Ministers from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania attended. - Workshop drew on recent IMF analytical work and TA; focused sessions on fiscal issues of oil and gas; included country presentations and panels. - Participant satisfaction high (positive evaluation survey returns from 35 participants out of 61 non-IMF participants); officials from Kenya and Tanzania praised usefulness and relevance. - Effectiveness of Inputs, Outputs, Risk Management, and Processes: 4.0 - Original project scope on African producers narrowed in 2012 to East Africa; organization of the event judged very good by participants. - Efficiency: 4.0 - Launched 2.5 years after placement in Work Plan; postponed several times due to scope changes and IMF Executive Board discussions; initial budget too low and later increased; actual cost 35 percent below budget. - Impact: 6.0 - Very favorable per participant surveys and official assessments; facilitated strengthening contacts among regional officials. - Sustainability: Too early to assess. ### IV.2.1 CROSS-BORDER ISSUES IN RESOURCE TAXATION (workshop start) - Project dates: April 2012 - May 2012 - Budget: US$160,750 - Comments: The workshop was placed in the original Work Plan in April 2011. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### 2011. The project was extended twice, to September 2014 in June 2014, and ### Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF (DevTech Systems, Inc.) ### Project duration, budget execution, and objective - The project was extended twice: to September 2014 in June 2014, and to December 2015 in December 2014. - Expenses by October 2014 were 88 percent of budget. - Objective: Enhancement of knowledge and capacity of government officials on international fiscal issues in management of natural resources. ### Rationale and background on international issues - The international dimensions of the taxation of EIs pose major challenges for many resource-rich countries. - International issues arise from: - interaction of tax systems where there is international investment and from tax treaties; - geography (cross-border pipelines, off-shore discoveries where no delineated maritime boundary exists); - regional obligations under tax agreements. - These factors can have a direct impact on fiscal revenues. ### Evaluation of the international fiscal regimes seminar (Washington D.C., May 2012) - Evaluation DAC Criteria — Relevance: 5.5. - Target audience: senior government officials from sector ministries, ministries of finance and revenue authorities from twelve developing countries; academic and commercial experts; staff of other development institutions; IMF staff. - Workshop agenda: covered a broad range of issues to develop practical guidance for low and lower-middle income countries with resource production or potential. - Participant feedback and implementation notes: - Some participants praised the event as a significant success but noted excessive variability in presentation types. - Criticisms included some presentations being too theoretical relative to practical concerns of developing countries. - Suggested improvements: focus presentations on what developing countries could realistically do; more time for questions; fewer Q&A segments dominated by IMF staff; more time for country participant discussion; breakout sessions for advanced subjects. - Production of an edited volume based on the presentations, with contributions from external experts and IMF staff, remained in progress as of late 2014. - Other DAC Criteria: Not Demonstrated (ND) — the evaluation team did not have enough information to rate other criteria. ### Management of Natural Resource Wealth in Central Asia (planned project) - Project placement and budget: - Placed in the Work Plan in November 2011 with a budget of US$100,000. - A Project Summary was prepared; the evaluation team did not see a Project Proposal or Project Assessments. - Project status and rationale: - The project was not launched and was removed from the Work Plan in 2013. - The Project Summary indicated demand in Central Asian countries for learning about other countries' experiences in dealing with wealth management issues. - Under the lead of MCM, the project would have included STA, FAD, EUR, MCD and AFR. - A regional workshop was seen as a cost-efficient mechanism to engage participants in dialogue. - Timeline of inactivity and removal: - In May 2012 the project was reported as inactive; a Report to the SC indicated the workshop was expected in the latter half of FY 2013. - In December 2012 the workshop was again reported as inactive. - In June 2013 the Report to the SC indicated the project was not activated because the Turkmen authorities had withdrawn their initial request, and the secretariat proposed removing the project from the work program, which was endorsed. - The evaluation notes that if the project was demand driven by countries in the region, it is not clear why the workshop was removed from the Work Plan following withdrawal of one country's request. - Evaluation DAC Criteria: Not Demonstrated (ND) — the evaluation team does not have enough information to rate this project. ### Management of Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa (project implemented) - Project dates: October 2011 - (not specified). - Budget: US$100,000. - Budget execution: The project's budget was fully used; the budget was planned to cover only part of the cost of the workshop, with the remainder financed by the IMF. - Objective: Disseminate the latest analysis and experience in managing natural resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, where challenges also stem from weak capacity. - Background and intended content: - The conference aimed to present the IMF's latest analysis and thinking on macroeconomic management of natural resource revenue and expenditure; elaborate on modifying traditional models to integrate investment more flexibly; discuss tax policy, administration, and regulatory frameworks with focus on weak institutional settings; and exchange views with academics, regional policymakers, and stakeholders on new approaches to natural resource management. - Under the lead of AFR, the conference planned heavy involvement from other IMF departments. - Workshop outcomes and evaluation: - The workshop, held in Kinshasa in March 2012, set out to address: macroeconomic policies; operational aspects of fiscal policy; public investment; governance and transparency; governments getting a fair share of resource wealth; and management of resource revenue when capacity is weak. - Evaluation DAC Criteria — Relevance: 5.5. - The agenda showed that only three of the twenty presentations planned were to be made by officials from SSA. - The evaluation suggests allowing more presentations from regional policymakers (as at the Arusha workshop two years later) would have enhanced relevance for African participants. - The conference brought together policy makers from over 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. - Other DAC Criteria: Not Demonstrated (ND) — the evaluation team does not have enough information to rate other criteria. *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### ANNEX IV. SURVEY RESULTS ### ANNEX IV. SURVEY RESULTS ### Project Managers (Surveys to IMF Project Managers) - Response rate: 46 percent (16 responses out of 35 questionnaires sent out). - Scoping and diagnostic missions: - Was there a scoping mission to determine the country’s needs for TA under the project: 31.3% (5), 68.8% (11) answered (total 16). - If no, was there a diagnostic mission after the project was launched: 93.3% (14) Yes, 6.7% (1) No (answered question 15, 1 skipped). - Road map / work plan: - Was a road map or work plan prepared for the project? 93.3% (14) Yes, 6.7% (1) No (answered question 15, 1 skipped) [context indicates a high incidence of road maps/work plans]. - If yes, the road map or work plan was prepared: By the IMF in conjunction with the authorities: 21.4% (3); By the IMF: 71.4% (10); By the authorities: 7.1% (1) (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Relevance and effectiveness (selected items): - Could the relevance of this project have been improved? Response distribution: 26.7% (4) Yes, 53.3% (8) No, 20.0% (3) No opinion (answered question 15, 1 skipped). - How effective is/was this project? Could the effectiveness have been improved? Responses: 46.7% (7) No, 33.3% (5) Yes, 6.7% (1) No opinion, 13.3% (2) Not applicable (answered question 15, 1 skipped). - Guidance and assessment of objectives: - Guidance on HOW TO DEFINE objectives and outcomes — Rating distribution shows responses across 1–7 with an average reported as 5.33 (Response Count 14, 2 skipped). - Guidance on HOW TO ASSESS achievement of objectives and outcomes — average reported as 6.17 (Response Count 14, 2 skipped). - Outputs and implementation: - To what extent has the advice given been implemented — Rating average 4.73 (Response Count 13, 3 skipped). - Are the outputs sought being delivered — Rating average 4.50 (Response Count 14, 2 skipped). - To what extent did the outputs help reach consensus for change — Rating average 5.00 (Response Count 14, 2 skipped). - Processes, sequencing, and time frame: - Was the design of the project adequately sequenced with respect to TA provided under other modules under the TTF? Yes: 57.1% (8); No opinion: 0.0% (0); No: 42.9% (6) (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Was the original time frame for implementation adequate? Rating average reported as 4.93 (Response Count 14, 2 skipped). - Factors affecting implementation (up to four): - Most frequently marked factors affecting implementation: Weak implementation capacity (35.7% (5)); Lack of a clearly defined work plan (21.4% (3)); Poor ownership by the authorities (21.4% (3)); Overambitious outcomes and objectives (21.4% (3)); others listed include Inadequate time frame, Interagency tensions, Conflicting policy advice, Change in authorities, Gaps in TA, Lack of commitment at highest political level, High rotation of counterpart staff. - Conditionality and complementarity: - Was attainment of milestones or outcomes used as a condition for continuation of TA: Neither: 21.4% (3); Milestones only: 21.4% (3); Outcomes only: 35.7% (5); Both: 21.4% (3) (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Was the TTF TA complemented by other activities (research, workshops, RTACs)? Yes: 57.1% (8); No: 42.9% (6) (answered question 14, 2 skipped). If yes, RTAC training, RTAC advisor, regional workshops, global workshops, research project and other options were indicated in varying responses. - Efficiency and impact: - How efficiently was the project delivered? Rating average reported as 5.55 (Response Count 14, 2 skipped). - Could efficiency have been improved? Of those answering, 60.0% (3) Yes, 40.0% (2) No (answered question 5, 11 skipped on the follow-up item). - Could the project have used other TA delivery approaches to improve efficiency? Responses: 14.3% (2) Yes, 42.9% (6) No, 42.9% (6) No opinion (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Have there been impacts attributable to or towards which the project contributed? Response: Yes: 0.0% shown? (question formatting indicates mixed responses; rating average for impact reported as 5.88 (Response Count 8, 14 skipped) suggesting limited or mixed evidence and some responses indicating "Too early to assess"). - Sustainability and coordination: - To what extent are changes likely to be sustained? Rating average reported as 4.29 (Response Count 8, 14 skipped). - For completed or largely completed projects, are results expected to be sustained? Yes: 21.4% (3); No opinion: 7.1% (1); Not applicable: 64.3% (9); No: 7.1% (1) (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Coordination with TTF modules: Reasonably coordinated or well coordinated in many responses; Coordination with non‑TTF TA from FAD, LEG, MCM and STA: 64.3% (9) Reasonably coordinated, 21.4% (3) Well coordinated, 7.1% (1) Not well coordinated (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Capacity building: - Did project managers take explicit steps to ensure TA did not overlap with other TA providers? Yes: 92.9% (13), No: 7.1% (1) (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Did project managers take explicit steps to ensure TA complemented other providers? Yes: 92.9% (13), No: 7.1% (1) (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - Overall success in building capacity in recipient country (project managers’ view): Very good / good / modest contributions reported across responses; specific distribution shows 7.1% (1) Small contribution, 35.7% (5) Modest contribution, 14.3% (2) Good contribution, 14.3% (2) Very good contribution, variable contributions noted (answered question 14, 2 skipped). - MNRW‑TTF programmatic and modular assessments (selected items): - How would you evaluate the MNRW TTF’s programmatic approach and modular structure as an instrument to deliver TA? Rating responses clustered with average reported as 6.80 for extent did the project build on existing capacity (Response Count 5). - Is the modular design conducive to a more efficient use of resources than single TA projects? Rating average reported as 7.00 or 6.80 in some items (Response Count 5 and 11 in different prompts), indicating favorable views among respondents who answered. --- ### Experts (Surveys to Experts) - Response rate: 43 percent (13 responses out of 30 questionnaires sent out). - Coordination and effectiveness: - Does the TTF’s modular approach facilitate effective coordination with other TA providers? Distribution: 60.0% (3) Yes, 40.0% (2) Makes no difference (answered question 5, 11 skipped) — note these counts refer to a subset of respondents in the displayed table. - How effective was the TA in achieving outcomes and objectives? Responses: 46.2% (6) No, 46.2% (6) Yes, 7.7% (1) No opinion (answered question 13, 0 skipped) — indicating mixed assessments across experts. - Milestones and complementarity: - Were milestones defined to be achieved in implementation of TA provided? Yes: 100.0% (13) (answered question 13, 0 skipped). - Was the TA complemented by other activities (regional workshops, RTAC, research projects, global workshops)? Responses show a mix: 10.0% (1) RTAC training; other categories marked across 10 responses (10 answered, 3 skipped). - Outputs and implementation: - Were the outputs sought delivered? Rating average reported as 5.22 (Response Count 13, 0 skipped). - To what extent was the advice implemented? Rating average reported as 5.22 (Response Count 13, 0 skipped). - Were measures proposed to reduce interagency tension? Yes: 75.0% (3) of a subset; if yes, did authorities implement the advice — responses indicate implementation in many cases (Response Count 4, 9 skipped for that question subset). - Efficiency and factors affecting implementation: - Most-cited factors affecting implementation: Interagency tensions (81.8% (9) across listed choices), Weak implementation capacity, Conflicting policy advice from other TA providers, Inadequate sequencing of TA, Inadequate time frame, Gaps of TA — identified in various proportions by experts. - How efficiently was the TA delivered? Rating average reported as 6.08 (Response Count 13, 0 skipped). - Could efficiency have been improved? 71.4% (5) No, 28.6% (2) Yes (answered question 7, 6 skipped on that follow-up). - Impact and sustainability: - Were there impacts to which the TA contributed? Rating average reported as 5.73 (Response Count 13, 0 skipped). - To what extent are changes likely to be sustained? Rating average reported as 5.50 (Response Count 13, 0 skipped). - Could sustainability have been improved? All respondents who answered that follow-up (3 respondents) indicated Yes that sustainability could have been improved (Response Count 3, 10 skipped), with various degrees indicated. - Coordination and capacity-building outcomes: - Coordination with other modules under the TTF: 46.2%–69.2% across categories reported as Well coordinated or Reasonably coordinated depending on the coordination partner (non‑TTF TA, area departments, RTACs, other TA providers, country authorities’ own efforts) — specific distributions include, for example, Coordination with non‑TTF TA from FAD, LEG, MCM and STA: 58.3% (7) Well coordinated, 25.0% (3) Reasonably coordinated (Response Count 12, 1 skipped). - Were explicit steps taken to avoid overlap/ensure complementarity/bring in other TA providers? Yes responses: 84.6% (11) did steps to avoid overlap; 69.2% (9) did steps to ensure complementarity; 53.8% (7) took steps to bring in other TA providers (Response Count 13, 0 skipped). - Overall success in building capacity: Mixed but generally positive — 38.5% (5) Modest contribution, 53.8% (7) Good contribution, other categories showed varied responses (Response Count 13, 0 skipped). --- ### Government Officials (Surveys to Officials from Recipient Countries) - Response rate: 23 percent (7 responses out of 30 questionnaires sent out); survey results sections show answered counts typically 6 for many items. - Prior TA and relevance: - Did your institution/country receive IMF TA in the previous 3 years prior to TTF TA? Yes: 66.7% (4); No: 16.7% (1); Do not know: 16.7% (1) (answered question 6, 1 skipped). - How relevant was the IMF project to your institution/government objectives? Rating average reported as 6.17 (Response Count 6, 3 skipped). - Could the relevance have been improved? Distribution: 50.0% (3) Yes, 33.3% (2) No, 16.7% (1) No opinion (answered question 6, 1 skipped). - Effectiveness and preferences: - How effective was the IMF project in achieving objectives? Rating average reported as 5.50 (Response Count 2, 5 skipped) for a follow-up subset; other items show varied average ratings around 5–6 across TA delivery forms. - Could the effectiveness have been improved? Among those answering, 0.0% (0) Yes, 100.0% (2) No (answered question 2, 2 skipped) in one follow-up subset; elsewhere respondents indicated possibilities for minor improvements. - Risks and efficiency: - Top risk categories marked (up to four): Implementation capacity, Political support at highest level, Interagency tensions, Overambitious outcomes and objectives, Gaps in TA, Dealing with conflicting policy advice, Sustainability issues — specific selection percentages shown in survey tables across respondents. - How efficiently was the project delivered? Distribution: 50.0% (3) Good/efficient, 33.3% (2) Reasonable, 16.7% (1) Not efficient (answered question 6, 1 skipped). - Could efficiency have been improved? 0.0% (0) No, 100.0% (3) Yes among those who answered that follow-up (asked respondents indicated scope for improvement). - Impact and sustainability: - Were there impacts to which this IMF project contributed? Yes: 50.0% (3); No: 0.0% (0); Too early to assess: 33.3% (2); No opinion: 16.7% (1) (answered question 6, 1 skipped). - Do you expect the results to be sustained? Yes: 50.0% (2); No opinion: 50.0% (2); No and Too early to assess reported as 0.0% in one subset (Response Count 4, 3 skipped). - Should the IMF’s TTF TA extend for longer periods to achieve impact? Yes: 66.7% (4); No: 16.7% (1); No opinion: 16.7% (1) (answered question 6, 1 skipped). - Coordination and capacity: - Main concerns impacting ability to implement objectives: Difficulty retaining capable staff, Inadequacy of legal and regulatory framework, Insufficient support/political commitment, Insufficient funding, Coordination with other government entities, Lack/shortage of capable staff, Lack of IT/software/systems hardware. - How well coordinated was the IMF project with related activities? Mixed: some respondents marked Well coordinated or Reasonably coordinated for coordination with other IMF TA, advice from IMF area departments, and other TA providers; distribution examples include Coordination with other TA providers: 60.0% (3) Well coordinated, 40.0% (2) Reasonably coordinated (Response Count 5, 2 skipped). - Has the institution received conflicting policy advice from other TA providers? Frequency reported as: Frequently: 0.0% (0); Sometimes: 0.0% (0); Rarely: 100.0% (5) (answered question 5, 2 skipped). - Did the TTF take explicit steps to avoid overlap and to complement other TA providers? Responses indicate affirmative actions in most cases (answer counts vary by item; for example, steps taken to ensure TA did not overlap: Yes: 75.0% (3) among a small respondent subset). --- *Mid-Term External Evaluation of the MNRW TTF, DevTech Systems, Inc.* ### ANNEX V. TABLES ### ANNEX V. TABLES ### Expenditure shares (In percent of total annual TTF TA) - MNRW TA 1/48513025156810241046858212308-546075831186-470011391185852861022102419190100 - FAD4584302510001024963351771022-546056531186-4800113810947399945410241642486 - Module 1265116161000623589019060-54601360705-4280027752621188454623752739 - Module 257514090019841221387001608481380008612277217600445323 - Module 3135800401175920506350026850000034086350401444423 - MCM Module 426705680835012860012860100126712875680212211 - STA Module 500000644000644000006440006443 - MNRW TA 1/462915101007730-70100104-400100622855100 - FAD44291010926813-7075104-40010057212586 - Module 1251510656250-701862-3800242762339 - Module 2513001916500214233007612110023 - Module 313004172780035000001830223 - MCM Module 430508017001700000173011 - STA Module 500000800080000030003 - Note: Source data derived from the MNRW TTF Annual Reports for FY 2012-14. Annual amounts for FY 2013-14 calculated as the differences between the cumulative amounts reported in successive MNRW TTF Annual Reports. - 1/ Projects endorsed in FY12-FY14. Net endorsements (gross budget endorsements net of endorsed budget reductions). Excludes general project management and Trust Fund management fee. ### Appendix Table 1. MNRW TTF Endorsed TA Expenditures (In thousands of U.S. dollars unless otherwise stated) - FY 2012FY 2013FY 2014FY 2012 - FY 2014 - ExpenditureExecution of sharesendorsed budget (In percent of total annual TTF TA) (in percent of budget) - MNRW TA 1/1041531792031854192772217723230581600109285313309045682345341748800210042 - FAD10415317920318541915624177232294815938808531328714549203534174876739647 - Module 171047779161282119813017714916546166185195957252466834136038934952 - Module 210654001601974940069149962300112280211710019732544 - Module 322500187412520008360347819601187921223196038818072341 - MCM Module 4000000980098021200212031000310415 - STA Module 500000120001270007190001903 - MNRW TA 1/56294111006324681005235310100572949100 - FAD56294111006320689652283109357254996 - Module 138264169394655420236313284449 - Module 26300961600231620003610150025 - Module 312001022170032015604261520523 - MCM Module 400000030030700704004 - STA Module 500000000000000000000 - Note: Source data derived from the MNRW TTF Annual Reports for FY 2012-14. Annual amounts for FY 2013-14 calculated as the differences between the cumulative amounts reported in successive MNRW TTF Annual Reports. - 1/ Projects endorsed in FY12-FY14. Excludes general project management and Trust Fund management fee. - (In percent of total annual TTF TA expenditures) ### Appendix Table 2. MNRW TTF Actual TA Expenditures (In thousands of U.S. dollars unless otherwise stated) - FY 2012-FY 2014 - FY 2012FY 2013FY 2014FY 2012 - FY 2014 - (Numeric entries follow the same structure as Appendix Table 1 above for endorsed expenditures and execution ratios.) ### ANNEX VI. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS - 1. Did your institution receive TA from the IMF prior to the TA delivered under the TTF? - 2. Was a work plan prepared for the project? - 3. Main areas to be covered by the TA. - 4. Did the IMF customize/adapt the advice to the specific needs of the country? - 5. Was the design of the TA properly sequenced? - 6. Was the time frame adequate? - 7. To what extent did the project build on your institution/government’s preferences? - 8. Was the TA delivered according to the work plan? - 9. Did relevant government agencies participate at different stages of the activity? - 10. Did you or your staff have the opportunity to provide inputs for the IMF missions’ tasks and outputs? - 11. Were the TA's recommendations feasible, taking into account capacity requirements and administrative viability? - 12. Were the outcomes sought at the beginning of the TA achieved, and was there a results framework to measure the contribution of the TA? - 13. Were the project outcomes and objectives too ambitious? - 14. Please assess the effectiveness of the different forms of TA delivery and capacity building. - 15. Could the project have used other TA delivery form to improve efficiency? - 16. Was the advice received under this project clear, practical and easily implementable? - 17. What were the main risks present in the implementation of the project? - 18. What were the main strengths of the project’s design and implementation? - 19. What were the main weaknesses of this project's design and implementation? - 20. Do you expect the results of this IMF project to be sustained? - 21. How well was the project coordinated with related activities? - 22. Has your institution received conflicting policy advice from other TA providers? - 23. Is there a formal/informal inter-governmental coordinating instance on the TA being provided in your country? - 24. Overall, was the project successful in building capacity in your institution/country? - 25. How would you evaluate the MNRW TTF’s programmatic approach and modular structure as an instrument to deliver TA? ### ANNEX VII. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES - IMF Staff - Gerd Schwartz Deputy Director FAD - Philip Daniel Advisor FAD - Cemile Sencak Acting Division Chief FAD - Andrea Lemgruber Deputy Division Chief FAD - Shamsuddin Tareq Deputy Division Chief FAD - John Brondolo Senior Economist FAD - Ricardo Fenochietto Senior Economist FAD - Almudena Fernández TA Advisor FAD - Lesley Fisher TA Advisor FAD - Suzanne Flynn Senior Economist FAD - Patrick Fossat Senior Economist FAD - David Gentry TA Advisor FAD - Håvard Holterud TA Advisor FAD - Andrew Masters Senior Economist FAD - Peter Mullins TA Advisor FAD - Jean Pierre Nguenang Senior Economist FAD - Andrew Okello Senior Economist FAD - Patrick Petit Senior Economist FAD - Xavier Rame Senior Economist FAD - Grégoire Rota Graziosi Senior Economist FAD - Artur Swistak Senior Economist FAD - David Wentworth TA Advisor FAD - Benoit Wiest TA Advisor FAD - Christophe Waerzeggers Senior Counsel LEG - Luc Everaert Assistant Director MCM - Michael Papaioannou Deputy Division Chief MCM - Samar Maziad Senior Economist MCM - Robert Dippelsman Deputy Division Chief STA - Alberto Jiménez de Lucio Senior Economist STA - Maxime Bonkoungou Senior Economist STA - Marshall Reinsdorf Senior Economist STA - Adrienne Cheasty Deputy Director WHD - Xiangming Li Deputy Division Chief ICD - Masaharu Makino Sr. Technical Assistance Officer ICD - Constance Vigilance Sr. Technical Assistance Officer ICD - Steering Committee Members - Thomas Benninger Switzerland - Ishara Davey Australia - Rebekah Grindlay Australia - Jan Hijkoop Netherlands - Trond Kvarsvik Norway - Inmaculada Montero-Luque European Union - Other Institutions - Paulo de Sa Practice Manager, Energy and Extractives World Bank - Ekaterina Mikhaylova Lead Strategy Officer, World Bank - William Remington Associate Director, Revenue Advisory Program, OTA U.S. Treasury - Mongolia (selected officials) - Enkhtaivan Batbayar Head, Fiscal Revenue Division, Fiscal Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Finance - Batsengee Dorsjembed Head, General Budget Policy and Planning Division, Fiscal Policy Department, Ministry of Finance - Baajiikhuu Tuguldur Head, Sovereign Wealth Fund Division, Fiscal Policy and Debt Management Department, Ministry of Finance - Ms. Enkhzul Economist, Fiscal Revenue Division, Fiscal Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Finance - Bat-Ireedui Anar Specialist, Financing, Reporting and Accounting Division, Treasury, Ministry of Finance - Lkhagvabayar Enkh-Amgalan Specialist, Financing, Reporting and Accounting Division, Treasury, Ministry of Finance - Mergee Batkhuyag Specialist, Financing, Reporting and Accounting Division, Treasury, Ministry of Finance - B. Badral Director General, Tax Management and Cooperation Department, General Directorate of Tax - Tunrev Batmagnai Commissioner, Large Taxpayer Office - Byambadorj Davaademberel Head, Audit Division, Large Taxpayer Office - A. Purev Senior Specialist, Dept. of Strategic Policy and Planning, Ministry of Energy - Tsengemaa Amraa Deputy Chairman, Petroleum Authority of Mongolia - Ochir Enkhbayar Head, Contracting and Exploration Division, Petroleum Authority of Mongolia - Luvsandash Dashdorj Advisor to the President, Presidency - Taeyhun Lee Senior Country Economist, World Bank Office in Mongolia - Tanzania (selected officials and partners) - Shogholo Msangi Assistant Commissioner, Fiscal Policy, Ministry of Finance - Siraji Majura Policy Analysis Department, Fiscal Section, Ministry of Finance - Tsisilile Igogo Policy Analysis Department, Fiscal Section, Ministry of Finance - Rished Bade Commissioner General, Tanzania Revenue Authority - Neema Mrema Commissioner, Large Taxpayers' Department, Tanzania Revenue Authority - Mr. Habiemene Director, Compliance and Enforcement Department, Tanzania Revenue Authority - Mr. Mapinga Assistant Manager, Audit Natural Resources, Tanzania Revenue Authority - Dominic Rwekaza Chief Executive Officer, Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency - Michael Kambi Acting Director, Financial Audit and Analysis, Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency - Venance Bahati Manager, Tax Analysis and Audit, Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency - Julius Moshi Mineral Economist, Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency - James Andilile Acting Managing Director, Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation - Thomas Baunsgaard Resident Representative, IMF Office in Tanzania - Svein Olav Svoldal Country Economist, Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam - Thomas Allan Senior Economic Adviser, DFID Tanzania - Jacques Morisset Lead Economist, Africa Region, World Bank Office in Tanzania - Sukhwinder Singh Center Coordinator, AFRITAC East - Muyangwa Muyangwa Revenue Policy and Administration Advisor, AFRITAC East - Guy Anderson Public Financial Management Advisor, AFRITAC East - Amitabh Tripathy Public Financial Management Advisor, AFRITAC East - Fazeer Sheik Rahim Macro-Fiscal Advisor, AFRITAC East - Kenya (selected officials and partners) - Esther Koimett Investment Secretary, Treasury - Geoffery Mwau Economic Secretary, Treasury - Festus Kingori Treasury - Wilson Wasike Acting Head, Project Management and Resource Division, Economic Affairs Department, Treasury - Peter Odengo Senior Policy Analyst, Resource Mobilization Division, Economic Affairs Department, Treasury - Wario Adano Senior Policy Analyst, Resource Mobilization Division, Economic Affairs Department, Treasury - Pancrasius Nyaga Commissioner, Domestic Taxes Department, Large Taxpayers' Office, Kenya Revenue Authority - Ann Irungu Sr. Assistant Commissioner, Large Taxpayers' Office, Kenya Revenue Authority - Clement Migai Acting Assistant Manager, Extractive Industries, Large Taxpayers' Office, Kenya Revenue Authority - Joseph Njoroge Principal Secretary, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum - Hudson Andambi Senior Principal Superintending Geologist, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum - Martin Mungai Chief Accountant, National Oil Corporation of Kenya - Armando Morales Resident Representative, IMF Office in Kenya - John Mungai Delegation of the EU in Kenya - Robert Rudy Regional Integration and Strategy Expert, African Development Bank, East Africa Resource Centre - Tom Onyango Program Manager, Australian High Commission, Nairobi --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/capacity-developement/mnrw/mte2015ii.pdf_