## TAMON ASONUMA — Section 1

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---

### Current position and affiliations
- Economist, Systemic Issues Division, Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 12/2015-present
- Contact details and web site listed by the author (professional contact information not repeated here)

### Education and formal training
- Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2011 (defense – Oct. 2010). Dissertation Title: Essays on Emerging Economies. Dissertation Committee: Laurence Kotlikoff, Adrien Verdelhan and Francois Gourio.
- M.A., Economics, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, 2005
- B.A., Economics, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, 2003

### Research fields and methods
- Primary fields of interest: International Finance, Macroeconomics, Public Finance
- Computational and empirical tools: STATA, MATLAB, GAUSS, EVIEWS, TSP, LaTEX
- Languages for research dissemination: English (fluent), Japanese (native), French (basic)

### Key published findings (select)
- Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive v.s. Post-default (Journal of European Economic Association, Vol.14 (1), pp.175-214, 2016; with Christoph Trebesch)
  - Empirical findings:
    - Preemptive restructurings are frequent: "38% of all deals 1978 -2010".
    - Preemptive restructurings have low haircuts.
    - Preemptive restructurings are quick to negotiate.
    - Preemptive restructurings see lower output losses.
  - Model and interpretation:
    - A quantitative sovereign debt model incorporating preemptive and post-default renegotiations improves fit with the data.
    - The model explains sovereign optimal choice: preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex-ante; defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks.
  - Empirical evidence supports the model’s predictions.

- Sovereign Debt Restructurings and the Short-term Debt Curse; Serial Default and Debt (with Dirk Niepelt and Romain Ranciere)
  - Empirical findings:
    - Creditors holding short-maturity securities suffer significantly more, in present value terms, than creditors holding long-maturity securities during recent sovereign debt restructuring episodes.
    - A new stylized fact: the sovereign yield curve becomes systematically inverted as countries approach sovereign default or restructuring.
  - Model interpretation:
    - A simple model of sovereign debt shows that model-implied differential NPV haircuts between short- and long-term creditors can explain observed sovereign yield curve dynamics.

- Serial Default and Debt Renegotiation (submitted)
  - Empirical stylized fact:
    - Emerging countries that defaulted in the past are more likely to default again than non-defaulters with the same debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - Model results:
    - A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with explicit renegotiation dynamics generates an equilibrium where the probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults.
    - The model accords with the observed trend that countries accepting less than a 100 percent recovery rate on defaulted debt tend to pay a higher return on subsequently issued debt than defaulting countries that agree to full recovery.

- Sovereign Defaults, External Debt and Exchange Rate Dynamics (submitted)
  - Empirical observation:
    - Emerging countries experience exchange rate depreciations around defaults.
  - Model and mechanism:
    - A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with bond issuances in local and foreign currencies endogenously determines exchange rate and default risk.
    - Quantitative analysis replicates the link between exchange rate depreciation and default probability around defaults.
    - In pre-default periods, exchange rate depreciation originated by lower tradable goods income interacting with a large share of foreign currency–denominated debt can trigger default.

### Working papers, in-progress topics, and policy-relevant contributions
- Submitted/under review papers (select titles and dates as given):
  - “Sovereign Default and the Term Structure of Haircuts,” 2015 (with Dirk Niepelt and Romain Ranciere)
  - “Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Delays in Renegotiations and Risk Averse Creditors,” 2016 submitted (with Hyungseok Joo)
  - “Serial Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings,” 2016, submitted (IMF Working Paper WP/16/66)
  - “Sovereign Defaults, External Debt and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics,” 2016, submitted (IMF Working Paper WP/16/37)
  - “Is Banks’ Home Bias Good or Bad for Debt Sustainability?” 2015 (with Said Bakhache and Heiko Hesse), submitted (IMF Working Paper WP/15/44)
- IMF policy and Board contributions (select):
  - “The Fund’s Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt – Further Considerations,” January 2016
  - “Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors,” December 2015
  - “From Banking to Sovereign Stress: Implications for Public Debt,” January 2015
  - “Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” October 2014
  - “Sovereign Debt Restructuring - Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund's Legal and Policy Framework,” April 2013

- Ongoing work in progress (select topics)
  - Sovereign debt restructuring strategy and sequencing: ex-ante optimal restructuring strategies; preemptive vs post-default asymmetries and trade dynamics; official vs private debt restructuring
  - Domestic sovereign debt restructuring and interactions with financial sector stability
  - Growth uncertainty and fiscal space; political risks and debt crisis resolution; contagion and sovereign default
  - Dynamic adjustments of exchange rate regimes (stable basket-peg vs floating) and monetary policy choices under high public debt

### Teaching, seminars, and dissemination
- Teaching roles: instructor and guest lecturer across universities and programs (examples include Boston University, Keio University, George Washington University, NEXI, and GRIPS) with multiple semesters and short courses listed from 2005–2016.
- Seminar and conference presentations: invited and scheduled seminars at central banks and academic institutions (examples include Fed Philadelphia, World Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, De Nederlandsche Bank, Banco de Espana) and participation at AEA, Econometric Society meetings, Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, and other conferences (years and venues listed through 2017 events).

### Dynamic Effect of Change in Exchange Rate System -From the Fixed Exchange Rate Regime to the Basket-peg or Floating Regime (with Naoyuki Yoshino and Sahoko Kaji)
- Methodology:
  - Analysis based on "a stochastic dynamic small open-economy model."
  - Attempt to compute "dynamic effect of shifts of exchange rate system from the dollar-peg to the basket-peg or floating" and obtain "transition paths for the shifts."

- Main findings:
  - "We find that countries are better off shifting to the basket-peg or floating regime than maintaining the dollar-peg regime, in the long-run perspective."
  - "Because of welfare costs associated with volatility in nominal interest rates, the longer transition period of adjustments, the more benefits a country would gain from suddenly shifting to the basket-peg from the dollar-peg regime rather than with adjusting gradually."
  - "Focusing on sudden shift to target regimes, our numerical analysis using Thai data shows that countries will be better off shifting to the basket-peg rather than floating."

- Implicit scenarios analyzed:
  - Shift from dollar-peg to basket-peg.
  - Shift from dollar-peg to floating.
  - Gradual adjustment versus sudden shift (transition path length variation).
  - Numerical scenario calibrated to Thai data.

*Source: Tamon Asonuma, International Monetary Fund (July 2016).*

### Section 1

### TAMON ASONUMA — Section 1

### Current position and affiliations
- Economist, Systemic Issues Division, Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 12/2015-present
- Contact details and web site listed by the author (professional contact information not repeated here)

### Education and formal training
- Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2011 (defense – Oct. 2010). Dissertation Title: Essays on Emerging Economies. Dissertation Committee: Laurence Kotlikoff, Adrien Verdelhan and Francois Gourio.
- M.A., Economics, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, 2005
- B.A., Economics, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, 2003

### Research fields and methods
- Primary fields of interest: International Finance, Macroeconomics, Public Finance
- Computational and empirical tools: STATA, MATLAB, GAUSS, EVIEWS, TSP, LaTEX
- Languages for research dissemination: English (fluent), Japanese (native), French (basic)

### Key published findings (select)
- Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive v.s. Post-default (Journal of European Economic Association, Vol.14 (1), pp.175-214, 2016; with Christoph Trebesch)
  - Empirical findings:
    - Preemptive restructurings are frequent: "38% of all deals 1978 -2010".
    - Preemptive restructurings have low haircuts.
    - Preemptive restructurings are quick to negotiate.
    - Preemptive restructurings see lower output losses.
  - Model and interpretation:
    - A quantitative sovereign debt model incorporating preemptive and post-default renegotiations improves fit with the data.
    - The model explains sovereign optimal choice: preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex-ante; defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks.
  - Empirical evidence supports the model’s predictions.

- Sovereign Debt Restructurings and the Short-term Debt Curse; Serial Default and Debt (with Dirk Niepelt and Romain Ranciere)
  - Empirical findings:
    - Creditors holding short-maturity securities suffer significantly more, in present value terms, than creditors holding long-maturity securities during recent sovereign debt restructuring episodes.
    - A new stylized fact: the sovereign yield curve becomes systematically inverted as countries approach sovereign default or restructuring.
  - Model interpretation:
    - A simple model of sovereign debt shows that model-implied differential NPV haircuts between short- and long-term creditors can explain observed sovereign yield curve dynamics.

- Serial Default and Debt Renegotiation (submitted)
  - Empirical stylized fact:
    - Emerging countries that defaulted in the past are more likely to default again than non-defaulters with the same debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - Model results:
    - A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with explicit renegotiation dynamics generates an equilibrium where the probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults.
    - The model accords with the observed trend that countries accepting less than a 100 percent recovery rate on defaulted debt tend to pay a higher return on subsequently issued debt than defaulting countries that agree to full recovery.

- Sovereign Defaults, External Debt and Exchange Rate Dynamics (submitted)
  - Empirical observation:
    - Emerging countries experience exchange rate depreciations around defaults.
  - Model and mechanism:
    - A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with bond issuances in local and foreign currencies endogenously determines exchange rate and default risk.
    - Quantitative analysis replicates the link between exchange rate depreciation and default probability around defaults.
    - In pre-default periods, exchange rate depreciation originated by lower tradable goods income interacting with a large share of foreign currency–denominated debt can trigger default.

### Working papers, in-progress topics, and policy-relevant contributions
- Submitted/under review papers (select titles and dates as given):
  - “Sovereign Default and the Term Structure of Haircuts,” 2015 (with Dirk Niepelt and Romain Ranciere)
  - “Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Delays in Renegotiations and Risk Averse Creditors,” 2016 submitted (with Hyungseok Joo)
  - “Serial Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings,” 2016, submitted (IMF Working Paper WP/16/66)
  - “Sovereign Defaults, External Debt and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics,” 2016, submitted (IMF Working Paper WP/16/37)
  - “Is Banks’ Home Bias Good or Bad for Debt Sustainability?” 2015 (with Said Bakhache and Heiko Hesse), submitted (IMF Working Paper WP/15/44)
- IMF policy and Board contributions (select):
  - “The Fund’s Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt – Further Considerations,” January 2016
  - “Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors,” December 2015
  - “From Banking to Sovereign Stress: Implications for Public Debt,” January 2015
  - “Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,” October 2014
  - “Sovereign Debt Restructuring - Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund's Legal and Policy Framework,” April 2013

- Ongoing work in progress (select topics)
  - Sovereign debt restructuring strategy and sequencing: ex-ante optimal restructuring strategies; preemptive vs post-default asymmetries and trade dynamics; official vs private debt restructuring
  - Domestic sovereign debt restructuring and interactions with financial sector stability
  - Growth uncertainty and fiscal space; political risks and debt crisis resolution; contagion and sovereign default
  - Dynamic adjustments of exchange rate regimes (stable basket-peg vs floating) and monetary policy choices under high public debt

### Teaching, seminars, and dissemination
- Teaching roles: instructor and guest lecturer across universities and programs (examples include Boston University, Keio University, George Washington University, NEXI, and GRIPS) with multiple semesters and short courses listed from 2005–2016.
- Seminar and conference presentations: invited and scheduled seminars at central banks and academic institutions (examples include Fed Philadelphia, World Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, De Nederlandsche Bank, Banco de Espana) and participation at AEA, Econometric Society meetings, Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, and other conferences (years and venues listed through 2017 events).

*Source: Tamon Asonuma, International Monetary Fund (July 2016).*

### Section 2

### Dynamic Effect of Change in Exchange Rate System -From the Fixed Exchange Rate Regime to the Basket-peg or Floating Regime

### Methodology
- Analysis based on "a stochastic dynamic small open-economy model."
- Attempt to compute "dynamic effect of shifts of exchange rate system from the dollar-peg to the basket-peg or floating" and obtain "transition paths for the shifts."

### Main findings
- "We find that countries are better off shifting to the basket-peg or floating regime than maintaining the dollar-peg regime, in the long-run perspective."
- "Because of welfare costs associated with volatility in nominal interest rates, the longer transition period of adjustments, the more benefits a country would gain from suddenly shifting to the basket-peg from the dollar-peg regime rather than with adjusting gradually."
- "Focusing on sudden shift to target regimes, our numerical analysis using Thai data shows that countries will be better off shifting to the basket-peg rather than floating."

### Implicit scenarios analyzed
- Shift from dollar-peg to basket-peg.
- Shift from dollar-peg to floating.
- Gradual adjustment versus sudden shift (transition path length variation).
- Numerical scenario calibrated to Thai data.

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/cv/pdfs/tamon-asonuma.pdf_