## IMF Central Bank Transparency Code — Executive Summary and Key Provisions

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### Mandate, development, and timeline
- The Executive Board decided on April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI) to replace the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT).
- Directors requested the CBT should:
  - remove overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards;
  - expand transparency standards to a broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - reorient transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
- Staff sought Board endorsement of the proposed CBT and engaged the Board multiple times, including:
  - staff presentation on November 20, 2019;
  - an informal meeting on March 4, 2020;
  - two virtual iLab sessions on May 5 and May 7, 2020.

### Structure and scope of the CBT
- The CBT is voluntary, modular, outcome-focused, risk-based, and proportional; it is not intended as a central bank governance framework.
- Document components:
  - central bank transparency principles;
  - central bank transparency practices (range of practices: core, expanded, comprehensive);
  - a glossary;
  - an annex with selected transparency-related principles from financial policy standards for information only.
- Application and exclusions:
  - Applies only to central banks; shared functions with other agencies require separate transparency by those agencies.
  - When part of a monetary union, the CBT should be applied at the union level and at national central banks for delegated/retained functions.
  - CBT will not assess micro-prudential supervision, securities regulation, resolution, or FMI responsibilities; selected excerpts from those standards are provided in the Annex for informational purposes only and will not be used for CBT assessments.

### Key features — the 5-pillar framework
- The CBT’s 5 pillars:
  - Pillar I. Transparency in governance (institutional issues).
  - Pillar II. Transparency in policies (economics of policy decisions).
  - Pillar III. Transparency in operations (implementation of policy decisions).
  - Pillar IV. Transparency in outcome (reporting outcomes to stakeholders to facilitate accountability).
  - Pillar V. Transparency in official relations (interaction with government, domestic agencies, and international relations/commitments).
- The CBT provides a range of illustrative practices showing how principles could be implemented, reflecting diverse legal frameworks, governance arrangements, and levels of economic and financial development.
- The CBT explicitly removes overlap with financial policies covered by other international standards; selected principles from those standards are presented in an Annex for information only.

### Rationale and context
- The CBT responds to:
  - expanded mandates, functions, powers and policy tools of central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - use of unconventional measures including quantitative easing, forward guidance, lender and market‑maker of last resort operations;
  - central bank roles in the global response to the COVID-19 epidemic requiring close coordination with ministries of finance.
- Enhanced transparency is framed as necessary to maintain public trust and policy effectiveness given the evolution and scale of central bank actions.

### Balancing transparency and confidentiality
- The CBT qualifies transparency requirements for legitimate confidentiality needs, notably:
  - market-sensitive information;
  - financial stability considerations;
  - personal data.
- Pillar I requires articulation of a clear confidentiality policy explaining and justifying disclosure choices and legal obligations.
- The CBT emphasizes that absence of disclosure of specific information (for instance, on individual microprudential supervision cases) does not necessarily imply lack of transparency.

### Uses of the CBT for the IMF and member central banks
- Central bank uses:
  - map existing transparency frameworks and make informed choices on transparency arrangements;
  - diagnostic tool in capacity development to delineate transparency benchmarks and plan, implement, and monitor reforms.
- IMF uses:
  - Technical Assistance (TA);
  - Financial Sector Stability Reviews (FSSR);
  - Surveillance—Article IV Consultations and Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP);
  - Use of Fund Resources (UFR);
  - the Fund’s Good Governance Framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance.
- When applied to a member, the CBT can highlight strengths/weaknesses and support a prioritized transparency action plan monitorable through Article IV, FSAPs, and UFR.

### Consultation, advisory input, and stakeholder engagement
- High-Level Advisory Panel (AP) convened in late summer 2019 and met through October and December 2019, and March 2020 (the HQ March 16, 2020 meeting replaced by conference calls during the week of March 23, 2020 due to the Covid-19 epidemic).
- Advisory Panel membership:
  - Ms. Aziz, Zeti Akthar — Former Governor, Bank Negara Malaysia
  - Mr. Blinder, Alan — Academic, Princeton University
  - Mr. De Gregorio, José — Former Governor, Central Bank of Chile
  - Mr. El Okdah, Farouk — Former Governor, Central Bank of Egypt
  - Ms. Geraats, Petra — Academic, Cambridge University
  - Mr. Ndulu, Benno — Former Governor, Central Bank of Tanzania
  - Mr. Praet, Peter — Former ECB Executive Board Member
  - Mr. Reddy, Y.V. — Former Governor, Reserve Bank of India
  - Mr. Shirakawa, Masaaki — Former Governor, Bank of Japan
  - Mr. Tarullo, Daniel — Former Governor, US Federal Reserve
- AP key issues raised and staff actions:
  - Nuanced balance between transparency and confidentiality → added confidentiality language in introduction.
  - Focus on transparency requirements vs. governance aspects → deleted remaining governance aspects from CBT.
  - Transparency of autonomy, risk management, audit, financial stability, human capital, code-of-ethics, external accountability → added/strengthened corresponding CBT text and practices.

### External consultation outcomes and participation statistics
- Exposure Draft circulated in late January 2020 to central banks/monetary unions and standard-setters (BIS, World Bank, BCBS, IAIS, IOSCO, FATF).
- Participation and feedback:
  - Staff received formal responses from 75 organizations in total.
  - This included 73 central banks and monetary unions, and 2 international organizations.
  - The European response included 15 eurozone countries that did not submit separate comments; the ECB coordinated a response on behalf of those national central banks.
  - Around 8 percent of central bank respondents provided CBT-based assessments of certain elements of their current transparency practices.
  - Most comments sought clarification, including on terminology.
- Major themes from external feedback and staff responses included: voluntariness of CBT, legal framework constraints, independence/autonomy clarifications, risk management disclosure concerns, expansion of code-of-conduct practices, and refined confidentiality approach. Staff revised relevant practices and engaged Directors to reflect respondent input.

### Policy rationale and anticipated benefits
- Expected benefits:
  - Eliminate overlap with international financial standards adopted since MFPT.
  - Improve effectiveness of Fund work by expanding transparency criteria to activities central banks undertook since 2008.
  - Facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic and financial risks, creating cost-effectiveness.
  - Contribute to policy effectiveness and accountability by improving communication with stakeholders, reducing uncertainty, anchoring expectations, and supporting better policy choices.

### Pilot assessments and next steps
- Staff proposal for pilot reviews:
  - conduct several voluntary CBT reviews over the next two years in collaboration with authorities;
  - ensure participants reflect IMF membership diversity (regions, income levels, exchange rate regimes);
  - report outcomes to the Board in aggregate analysis;
  - use outcomes to develop a guidance note and template for future voluntary applications in FSAP, Article IV, or UFR contexts.
- Staff objective: conduct four to six reviews in the pilot phase.
- Current status at time of the proposal:
  - Staff had not yet approached any central bank for pilot reviews.
  - Six central banks from various regions used the CBT Exposure Draft to gauge existing transparency practices.
  - One emerging market central bank indicated it had established an internal working group to map transparency practices as part of strategic planning.

### Selected operational and thematic transparency expectations (high‑level excerpts)
- Monetary policy (Pillar II / Pillar IV outcomes):
  - disclose objectives, policy framework, instruments, meeting calendar, voting procedures, supporting analysis, progress toward objectives, volumes and interest rates of operations, and operational target achieved.
- Foreign exchange management and reserves:
  - disclose policy objectives, operational framework, instruments, composition of reserve assets, short-term liabilities, drains, and audited financial statements showing amount, composition, profit/loss, and risks.
  - in expanded practice, publish aggregate intervention volumes and reserve outcomes with predefined time lags (expanded practice: monthly reporting with lag not more than a month).
- Macroprudential policy and stress testing:
  - disclose objectives, decision-making process, instruments, key indicators, supporting analysis, stress testing methods and assumptions, coverage of stress tests, and how results are used; expanded practice can include participant names and full model details where compatible with data protection.
- Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA):
  - core disclosure: scope and objectives while preserving necessary confidentiality; disclose forms of liquidity support, eligibility, decision-making process, and disclosure policy; outcome disclosure once confidentiality no longer required.
- Financial integrity (AML/CFT) and consumer protection:
  - disclose AML/CFT supervisory policies, control frameworks, audit results presented to the Board, remediation steps; publish consumer protection policies and outcomes and annual reports.

*Source: International Monetary Fund, The Central Bank Transparency Code—Staff Proposal, Executive Summary and related sections.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### imf-central-bank-transparency-code - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction and mandate
- The Executive Board decided on April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI) to revise and update the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT).
- Directors requested that the CBT should:
  - remove overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards;
  - expand transparency standards to a broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - reorient transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
- Staff is seeking Board endorsement of the proposed CBT.

### Staff proposal and structure
- The staff proposal builds on the Board-approved CBT 5-pillar framework and consists of:
  - central bank transparency principles;
  - central bank transparency practices;
  - a glossary;
  - an annex with relevant transparency-related principles from financial policy standards.
- The CBT is voluntary and modular, allowing proportional application that takes into account country-specific circumstances.
- The CBT is not intended to serve as a central bank governance framework.

### Key features of the CBT (5-pillar framework)
- The CBT’s 5-pillar framework covers governance, policies, operations, outcome, and official relations:
  - Pillar I. Transparency in governance, covering institutional issues.
  - Pillar II. Transparency in policies, focusing on the economics of the central bank policy decisions.
  - Pillar III. Transparency in operations, highlighting how policy decisions are implemented.
  - Pillar IV. Transparency in outcome, focusing on how the outcome of central bank policies and other actions are reported to stakeholders to facilitate accountability.
  - Pillar V. Transparency in official relations, covering central bank interaction with the government and other domestic agencies, and international relations and commitments.
- The CBT provides a range of practices showing how principles could be implemented, reflecting diverse legal frameworks, governance arrangements, and levels of economic and financial development.
- The CBT removes overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards; selected transparency-related principles from those standards are presented in a separate Annex for information only and will not be used for assessing CBT compliance.

### Rationale and context
- The CBT responds to:
  - expanded mandates, functions, powers and policy tools of central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - use of unconventional measures including quantitative easing, forward guidance, lender and market-maker of last resort operations;
  - the ongoing global response to the COVID-19 epidemic, where central banks have taken active roles including unconventional measures that required close coordination with ministries of finance.
- Enhanced transparency is presented as necessary to maintain public trust and policy effectiveness given the evolution and scale of central bank actions.

### Balancing transparency and confidentiality
- The CBT recognizes legitimate confidentiality needs and qualifies transparency requirements with respect to:
  - market-sensitive information;
  - financial stability considerations;
  - personal data.
- In Pillar I, the principle of confidentiality calls for articulation of a clear confidentiality policy that explains and justifies choices on disclosure of sensitive information, including legal and other obligations.
- The CBT emphasizes that absence of disclosure of specific information (for instance, on individual microprudential supervision cases) does not necessarily imply lack of transparency.

### Uses of the CBT for the IMF and member central banks
- The CBT could be used by central banks to map their transparency frameworks and make informed choices on transparency arrangements.
- The CBT can serve as a diagnostic tool in capacity development, enabling delineation of transparency benchmarks and graduated assessment of central banks’ transparency practices to plan, implement, and monitor reform efforts.
- The CBT will support IMF activities including:
  - Technical Assistance (TA);
  - Financial Sector Stability Reviews (FSSR);
  - Surveillance—Article IV Consultations and Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP);
  - Use of Fund Resources (UFR);
  - the Fund’s Good Governance Framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance.
- When applied to a member country, the CBT framework can highlight strengths and weaknesses of central bank transparency practices and support prioritization of recommendations through a transparency action plan that could be monitored in the context of Article IV surveillance, FSAPs, and Use-of-Fund Resources.

### Consultation process and stakeholder input
- Extensive stakeholder consultations informed the CBT, including feedback from:
  - a High-Level Advisory Panel consisting of eminent former central bank governors and academics;
  - central banks and monetary unions;
  - international organizations and standard setters.
- The High-Level Advisory Panel was convened in late summer of 2019 and met through a series of virtual meetings and conference calls in October and December 2019, and in March 2020.
- Stakeholder suggestions, notably on balancing transparency and confidentiality, helped improve the CBT’s flexibility to reflect diverse legal and structural backgrounds across jurisdictions.

### Key drafting considerations
- Factors considered in drafting the CBT included:
  - the contribution of central bank transparency to increased policy effectiveness and enhanced accountability;
  - the balance between transparency and legitimate confidentiality needs;
  - recent monetary policy practices that altered norms underpinning traditional transparency principles, including unconventional measures and expanded balance sheets;
  - broadening of mandates, functions, and powers—de jure and de facto—of central banks, including macroprudential oversight, crisis management, resolution authority, and other objectives (e.g., financial integrity and consumer protection);
  - the need for the CBT to be practical and flexible to cover diverse central banking environments;
  - the Fund’s approach to governance issues and the April 2018 Board-approved framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance.

*Source: International Monetary Fund, The Central Bank Transparency Code—Staff Proposal, Executive Summary, June 4, 2020.*

### Box 1. Central Bank Transparency Code—Advisory Panel

### Box 1. Central Bank Transparency Code—Advisory Panel

### Advisory Panel membership
- Ms. Aziz, Zeti Akthar — Former Governor, Bank Negara Malaysia
- Mr. Blinder, Alan — Academic, Princeton University
- Mr. De Gregorio, José — Former Governor, Central Bank of Chile
- Mr. El Okdah, Farouk — Former Governor, Central Bank of Egypt
- Ms. Geraats, Petra — Academic, Cambridge University
- Mr. Ndulu, Benno — Former Governor, Central Bank of Tanzania
- Mr. Praet, Peter — Former ECB Executive Board Member
- Mr. Reddy, Y.V. — Former Governor, Reserve Bank of India
- Mr. Shirakawa, Masaaki — Former Governor, Bank of Japan
- Mr. Tarullo, Daniel — Former Governor, US Federal Reserve

### Advisory Panel contributions and key issues raised
- The Advisory Panel (AP) provided advice and insights that shaped the development and drafting of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT).
- Key issues raised by the AP included:
  - Further nuancing the balance between transparency and confidentiality.
  - Ensuring a clear focus on transparency requirements versus governance aspects.
  - Finetuning issues relating to transparency of central bank autonomy, risk management and audit, financial stability and stress testing, and inter-agency cooperation.
  - Incorporating transparency of human capital management and code-of-ethics.
  - Clarifying the approach to external accountability by further strengthening the descriptions of practices under Pillar IV.
- Actions taken in response to AP input:
  - Added language in the CBT’s introduction on confidentiality.
  - Deleted remaining governance aspects from the CBT.
  - Added explicit references to human capital management.
  - Strengthened presentation of anti-corruption measures and internal code-of-conduct.
  - Clarified and consolidated discussions on external accountability in Pillar IV.
  - Adjusted relevant transparency practices accordingly.

### Advisory Panel meetings and timeline
- The last AP meeting was planned to be held at HQ on March 16, 2020; due to the Covid-19 epidemic, the HQ meeting was replaced by a series of conference calls that took place during the week of March 23, 2020.
- The AP’s inputs were taken into account in subsequent drafts and consultations.

### Executive Board engagement
- Staff engaged the Executive Board on the CBT several times, including:
  - Staff presentation on November 20, 2019, to discuss staff’s approach, the CBT’s high-level principles, and the consultation process.
  - Informal meeting-to-engage on March 4, 2020, to discuss the CBT Exposure Draft.
  - Two virtual iLab sessions on May 5 and 7, 2020, to discuss staff’s response to central banks’ comments on the CBT Exposure Draft.
- Directors highlighted issues that staff addressed:
  - Clarifying the voluntary nature of the CBT and its application in Fund surveillance and capacity building; noting adoption is dependent on country-specific situations.
  - Refining the balance between transparency and confidentiality.
  - Removing any remaining references to central bank governance aspects.
  - Finetuning descriptions of risk management, audit, and financial stability.
  - Ensuring consistency of legal language throughout the CBT.
- Staff responses:
  - Explicitly noted the CBT is voluntary.
  - Expanded examples of CBT application.
  - Conducted a review by the IMF’s Legal Department.
  - Incorporated suggested changes, taking AP input into account.

### Consultation with central banks and relevant international organizations
- The CBT Exposure Draft was circulated in late January 2020 to central banks and monetary unions worldwide and to the Bank for International Settlements, the World Bank, and financial policy standard-setters: Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
- Participation and responses:
  - Staff received formal responses via the online CBT feedback form and other interactions from 75 organizations in total.
  - This included 73 central banks and monetary unions, and 2 international organizations.
  - The European response included 15 eurozone countries that did not submit separate comments; the ECB indicated its response was coordinated with and on behalf of those national central banks.
  - Around 8 percent of central bank respondents provided CBT-based assessments of certain elements of their current transparency practices.
  - Most comments were intended for clarification, including on terminology.

### Major themes from external feedback and staff responses
- Broader-relevant comments and related staff actions:
  - Nature of the CBT: Clarify voluntary nature and address concerns about using CBT practices to rank central banks. Staff included aspects relating to the nature of the CBT in the CBT’s introduction.
  - Legal framework: Note domestic legal frameworks that may require transparency (e.g., Freedom of Information laws) or confidentiality, and recognize specifics for central banks in a currency union. Staff included the role of the legal framework in the CBT introduction.
  - Independence/Autonomy: Clarify difference between independence and autonomy; expand clarifications of goal and instrument autonomy; enhance components of financial autonomy.
  - Risk management: Clarify coverage for compliance and strategic risk; address concerns about exposing central banks to risks by disclosing mitigation strategies.
  - Code of conduct: Expand good and advanced practices; include transparency on presence of Ethics Officers and on use, protection, and preservation of information; mechanisms for preventing conflicts of interest.
  - Confidentiality: Further clarify approach to confidentiality, including links to legal framework.
  - Decision-making process: Further clarify practices for policy decision making and disclosure of supporting analysis to ensure achievement of policy objectives and prevent excessive speculation.
  - Foreign exchange management: Clarify transparency practices regarding timing and scale of foreign exchange management and interventions.
  - Foreign exchange reserve management: Note disclosure of composition of reserve assets, short-term liabilities, and drains should follow related codes of conduct (International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity (IRFCL); Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER); and Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS)).
  - Financial integrity: Clarify AML/CFT components relating to “internal activities” of central banks themselves versus their role as AML/CFT supervisor.
- Staff revised relevant transparency practices and shared changes with Directors to ensure central bank comments had been carefully considered.

### Summary, policy rationale, and anticipated benefits
- The paper contains a staff proposal for the IMF Central Bank Transparency Code in response to the Executive Board decision on April 29, 2019, building on the 2017 RSCI.
- Expected benefits and rationale:
  - The CBT eliminates overlap with international financial standards adopted since the MFPT was created.
  - Improves effectiveness of Fund work by expanding transparency criteria to the broader set of activities undertaken by central banks since the 2008 financial crisis.
  - Creates cost-effectiveness by facilitating risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic and financial risks.
  - Contributes to central bank policy effectiveness and accountability by facilitating more effective communication between central banks and stakeholders, reducing uncertainty, anchoring public expectations, and contributing to better policy choices and enhanced accountability.

### Pilot assessments and next steps
- Staff proposal for pilot reviews:
  - Staff proposes to carry out several CBT reviews on a voluntary basis over the next two years, in collaboration with authorities.
  - Participating countries will be reflective of IMF membership, cover diversity of regions, income levels, and exchange rate regimes.
  - Outcomes will be reported to the Board in aggregate analysis.
  - Outcomes will be used to develop a guidance note and template for future voluntary applications of the CBT in FSAP, AIV, or UFR discussions.
  - Staff are looking forward to conduct four to six reviews in the pilot phase.
- Current status:
  - Staff has not yet approached any central bank for pilot reviews.
  - Six central banks from various regions have used the CBT Exposure Draft to gauge their existing transparency practices.
  - One emerging market central bank indicated it has established an internal working group to map its transparency practices for all its functions as part of strategic planning.

### Issues for discussion for Directors
- Do Directors agree with staff’s CBT proposal as attached to the paper?
- Do Directors agree that staff carry out CBT pilot reviews, in consultation with the authorities and on a voluntary basis, and report the outcome to the Board?

*International Monetary Fund*

### Introduction

### Introduction

### Importance of central bank transparency
- Transparency is important for effective monetary and financial policies because it guides the decisions of economic agents and stabilizes market expectations and conduct, boosting policy effectiveness.
- Transparency is key to ensuring public accountability of central banks and their autonomy/independence, which underpins operational effectiveness.
- Transparency is one of the sound principles of monetary policy.

### Changing central banking landscape and rationale for an update
- The 2008 financial crisis, reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic, heightened the importance of central bank transparency and broadened central bank mandates, functions, and powers—both de jure and de facto.
- Central banks have:
  - expanded their balance sheets significantly and often used unconventional monetary policies to support price stability objectives;
  - increasingly been given a financial stability mandate that informs monetary policy actions and decisions;
  - broadened financial stability functions to encompass macroprudential oversight, crisis management, and resolution;
  - in some cases, assumed responsibility for areas such as anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision and consumer protection.
- An update of the 1999 IMF “Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies” (MFPT) was needed because of:
  - advances in international standards for financial policies since 1999;
  - monetary policy practices of many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - the broadening of mandates, functions, and powers of central banks in recent years;
  - the 2017 IMF “Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative” recommendation to gear the Fund’s transparency guidance toward facilitating the implementation of policy objectives;
  - the Fund’s enhanced approach to good governance issues.

### Endorsement and scope of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT)
- On April 29, 2019, the Executive Board of the IMF endorsed a staff proposal to replace the 1999 MFPT with a new Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT).
- The CBT is a comprehensive set of principles and practices that apply to all central banks, regardless of mandates, governance frameworks, and institutional arrangements.
- The CBT’s framework comprises five pillars covering transparency in governance, policies, operations, outcome, and official relations.

### Key objectives and features of the CBT
- The CBT is geared toward facilitating the implementation of policy objectives to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks, not merely disclosure of operational processes.
- The CBT recognizes diverse circumstances and levels of economic and financial development; assessments are intended to be outcome-focused, modular, risk-based, and proportional.
- The CBT enables central banks to:
  - assess existing transparency frameworks;
  - map transparency against a range of practices and make informed choices given domestic legal frameworks;
  - facilitate dialogue with stakeholders about governance, policy, operations, outcome, and official relations;
  - reduce uncertainty about mandates, confidentiality policies, stakeholder interactions, and operations.
- The CBT emphasizes that transparency helps explain what the central bank does, how it does it, and what the results are, thereby supporting accountability and feedback into policy choices.

### Balance between transparency and confidentiality
- The CBT recognizes that transparency cannot be indiscriminate or excessive; many central bank activities have a legitimate need for confidentiality.
- Confidentiality is particularly pertinent for market-sensitive information, financial stability considerations, and personal data—especially in areas such as foreign exchange interventions, reserve management, supervisory decisions on individual institutions, and emergency liquidity assistance.
- The CBT adopts a two-pronged approach:
  - Transparency requirements throughout the CBT are qualified for market-sensitive information, financial stability considerations, and personal data.
  - Central banks should articulate a clear confidentiality policy to explain and justify choices on disclosure of sensitive information and those required by legal and other obligations.

### Legal framework and diversity of practices
- The degree of a central bank’s transparency is shaped by its legal framework; domestic laws may restrict or require transparency (for example, personal data protection, commercial secrecy, or “freedom of information” laws).
- Obligations from membership in a currency union or other international official requirements may create additional information-sharing obligations.
- The CBT recognizes diversity in transparency practices across jurisdictions due to different legal, structural, and cultural backgrounds and accommodates these differences.

### Scope, application, and exclusions
- The CBT is voluntary and intended to help central banks assess transparency frameworks and facilitate informed stakeholder dialogue.
- The CBT stresses transparency of central banks’ legal frameworks as they shape transparency choices.
- The CBT applies only to central banks. If a central bank shares a function with other agencies, the transparency of those other agencies is not subject to the CBT.
- When part of a monetary union, the CBT should be applied at the level of the monetary union and at each national central bank for delegated and retained functions.
- The CBT will not assess central bank functions like micro-prudential supervision (banking or insurance), securities regulation, resolution, or financial market infrastructure responsibilities; these areas already have established international standards. Selected excerpts from those standards related to transparency are included in the Annex for informational purposes only and are not to be used for CBT assessments.

### The CBT’s five-pillar framework
- Pillar I. Transparency in governance (institutional issues).
- Pillar II. Transparency in policies (framework and decision-making process).
- Pillar III. Transparency in operations (how policy decisions are implemented).
- Pillar IV. Transparency in outcome (reporting the outcome of central bank policies and other actions to stakeholders to facilitate accountability).
- Pillar V. Transparency in official relations (interactions with government and other domestic agencies, and international relations and commitments).

### Organization of the CBT document
- The CBT presents principles in section A.
- Section B provides descriptions of a range of practices, broken down by principle.
- Section C contains key definitions in a Glossary.
- The Annex contains selected transparency-related principles from international financial policy standards for informational purposes only.

*Source: IMF — Central Bank Transparency Code (Introduction)*

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY STANDARDS ................. 93

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY STANDARDS

### Acronyms
- AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism  
- BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  
- BCP Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision  
- CBT IMF Central Bank Transparency Code  
- CCP Central Counterparty Clearing House  
- CSD Central Securities Depository  
- CPSS Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems  
- EC Essential Criterion  
- ELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance  
- EN Explanatory Notes  
- FMI Financial Market Infrastructures  
- FS Financial Stability  
- FSB Financial Stability Board  
- IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors  
- ICP Insurance Core Principles  
- IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions  
- KA Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions  
- ML/TF Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing  
- PFMI Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures  
- SSS Securities Settlement System  
- TR Trade Repositories

### A. Central Bank Transparency Principles — General and Structure
- General Principle on Central Bank Transparency:  
  - Central banks disclose governance, policies, operations, and outcomes of policies and operations, and official relations with government, domestic, foreign, and international agencies and other institutions, taking legitimate confidentiality needs into account; disclosure strengthens accountability and is a prerequisite for autonomy.
- Structure: Principles organized into Pillars I–IV covering Governance, Policies, Operations, and Outcome.

### Pillar I — Central Bank Governance
- 1.1. Legal Structure:  
  - The central bank discloses its legal framework to the public in a manner that is clear and easily accessible.  
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
- 1.2. Mandate:  
  - The central bank discloses its mandate—including objectives, functions, and legally defined powers—in a manner that is clear and easily accessible to the public.  
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
- 1.3. Autonomy:  
  - The central bank discloses its autonomy—as defined in relevant legislation or regulations—allowing it to reveal extent, forms, and conditions of autonomy in a clear and easily accessible manner.  
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
  - 1.3.1. Institutional/Operational Autonomy:  
    - Clarity on whether the central bank is prohibited from seeking or taking instructions from any private or public body.  
    - Extent of autonomy across mandate elements is clearly disclosed.  
    - Governing law clarifies whether goal or instrument autonomy exists concerning various objectives.
  - 1.3.2. Functional Autonomy:  
    - Clarity on whether the central bank can perform duties without prior government approval.
  - 1.3.3. Personal Autonomy:  
    - Clarity on security of tenure for members of decision-making bodies, including eligibility and disqualification criteria, appointment procedure, dismissal criteria and procedure, remuneration, and duration of tenure.
  - 1.3.4. Financial Autonomy:  
    - Disclosure of financial resources available to fulfill mandate and the nature of those resources, including capital, rules governing recapitalization, budget, reserves, provisions, profit distribution mechanism, monetary financing, and applicable accounting standards.
- 1.4. Decision-Making Arrangement:  
  - Disclosure of organizational structure or allocation of responsibilities to decision-making bodies: policy making, day-to-day management, and internal oversight.  
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
- 1.5. Risk Management:  
  - Disclosure of principal risks (financial, operational, legal) and the framework to manage them, including risk governance structure and risk strategy.
  - 1.5.1. Risk Exposure: Principal risks disclosed.  
  - 1.5.2. Risk Framework: Process for identifying financial and nonfinancial risks, overall risk strategy, and accompanying risk governance structure disclosed.
- 1.6. Accountability Framework:  
  - Disclosure of accountability framework providing transparency and reporting mechanisms to internal decision-making bodies, political institutions, and the public.
  - 1.6.1. Arrangements: Identification of (i) internal and external audit arrangements and compliance; (ii) reporting to an audit committee or Board with oversight; and (iii) external publication of audited financial statements and annual reports.
  - 1.6.2. Tools:  
    - Independently Audited Financial Statements: Auditing and accounting standards and compliance frameworks disclosed to allow public assessment of financial performance, use of resources, and transactions with government and stakeholders.  
    - Internal Audit: Information on internal audit function, framework, compliance, and scope disclosed.  
    - Audit Committee: Clarity on existence of internal oversight body reporting to the Board and which activities are published.
  - 1.6.3. Anti-corruption Measures and Internal Code of Conduct: Disclosure of applicability of domestic anti-corruption legislation and measures to decision-makers, staff, and agents; disclosure of internal Code of Conduct with additional central bank–specific requirements.
  - 1.6.4. Human Capital Management: Disclosure of policies and practices concerning governance and management of human capital.
- 1.7. Communication:  
  - Disclosure of means and methods of communication and forms of disclosure to stakeholders.
  - 1.7.1. Arrangement: Organizational structure, responsibilities, and processes relevant for communication disclosed.
  - 1.7.2. Strategy/Tools: Objectives, target audiences, channels, and tools of communication policy disclosed.
- 1.8. Confidentiality:  
  - Disclosure of policy on confidentiality or secrecy of central bank information, including reasons underlying choices on disclosure or non-disclosure of sensitive information.  
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).

### Pillar II — Central Bank Policies
- 2.1. Monetary Policy:  
  - Central bank publicly and clearly discloses objectives, policy framework, and instruments of monetary policy.
  - 2.1.1. Objectives and Framework: Monetary policy framework and strategy disclosed.
  - 2.1.2. Policy Decisions: Monetary policy decisions disclosed in a timely manner with explanation of how decisions foster objectives; process for taking decisions disclosed including meeting calendar and voting procedures.
  - 2.1.3. Supporting Analysis: Relevant economic information and supporting analysis that inform decisions disclosed.
- 2.2. Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration:  
  - Central bank clarifies its role in determining and implementing policy, discloses objectives, legal and institutional frameworks, policy decisions, and decision-making process.
  - 2.2.1. Objectives and Framework: Policy objectives, legal and institutional frameworks, and strategy disclosed; clarity on delegation of functions and modalities where applicable.
  - 2.2.2. Policy Decisions: New actions or changes publicly announced, explained, and disclosed in a timely manner; decision process disclosed.
  - 2.2.3. Supporting Analysis: Supporting analysis and intended outcomes that inform policy decisions disclosed in a timely manner.
- 2.3. Foreign Exchange Management:  
  - Clear and public disclosure of foreign exchange policy objectives (including hierarchy), operational framework, and instruments of intervention.
  - 2.3.1. Objectives and Framework: Policy objectives and legal, operational, and institutional frameworks disclosed, consistent with chosen regime.
  - 2.3.2. Policy Decisions: Decision-making process and rationale for instruments disclosed; potential impact explained timely.
  - 2.3.3. Supporting Analysis: Assumptions, transmission channels, analysis backing interventions, and ex-post evaluation of economic impact disclosed.
- 2.4. Foreign Exchange Reserve Management:  
  - Disclosure of policy objectives, key considerations, oversight allocation, and potential impact.
  - 2.4.1. Objectives and Framework: Broad investment objectives, operative models, oversight allocation, and institutional framework disclosed.
  - 2.4.2. Policy Decisions: Key elements of policy formulation, related risk exposures, instruments, decision-making hierarchy, and oversight allocation disclosed.
  - 2.4.3. Supporting Analysis: Key assumptions and assessment process related to policy decisions disclosed.
- 2.5. Macroprudential:  
  - Objectives, decision-making process, instruments, indicators, and supporting analysis for macroprudential policy clearly communicated.
  - 2.5.1. Objectives and Framework: Macroprudential framework, objectives, instruments, and strategy disclosed.
  - 2.5.2. Policy Decisions: Macroprudential policy decisions publicly announced in a timely manner with decision-making process disclosed.
  - 2.5.3. Supporting Analysis: Key indicators and analyses used to assess need for measures disclosed; rationale and expected transmission channels explained.
- 2.6. Microprudential Supervision:  
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, and IOSCO (see Annex).
- 2.7. Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA):  
  - Disclosure of scope and objectives of ELA while maintaining necessary confidentiality to preserve financial stability and support monetary policy implementation.
- 2.8. Resolution:  
  - Selected principles from KA (see Annex).
- 2.9. Financial Market Infrastructures:  
  - Selected principles from PFMI (see Annex).
- 2.10. Financial Integrity:  
  - Disclosure of policies and powers for AML/CFT supervision and description of internal control framework for activities or services that may give rise to ML/TF risk.
- 2.11. Consumer Protection:  
  - Disclosure of policies relating to consumer protection, conducted solely or jointly with other agencies.

### Pillar III — Central Bank Operations
- 3.1. Monetary Policy Operations:  
  - Disclosure of operational framework with a well-defined operational target, objectives, instruments, collateral, and access criteria.
  - 3.1.1. Instruments: Monetary policy instruments disclosed.
  - 3.1.2. Coverage: (i) Types of instruments (open market operations, standing facilities, other facilities, reserve requirements, and direct instruments of monetary control); (ii) characteristics of each instrument; (iii) collateral framework disclosed.
  - 3.1.3. Access: Monetary policy counterparties’ framework disclosed.
- 3.2. Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration Operations:  
  - Disclosure of implementation instruments and scope of operations and actions.
  - 3.2.1. Instruments: Instruments for implementing the policy and circumstances of use clearly defined and disclosed.
  - 3.2.2. Coverage: Information about persons (entities and individuals), transactions, and other aspects of the foreign exchange system the central bank can regulate, license, approve, monitor, and sanction; and foreign exchange transactions it can perform disclosed.
- 3.3. Foreign Exchange Management Operations:  
  - Disclosure of implementation in terms of instruments, markets, size, and mode of access.
  - 3.3.1. Instruments: Set of instruments used for foreign exchange management, key considerations, eligibility criteria of counterparties, and mode of access disclosed.
  - 3.3.2. Coverage: Markets and agents targeted by the policy disclosed.
- 3.4. Foreign Exchange Reserve Management Operations:  
  - General principles governing reserve management operations disclosed, including relationships with counterparties and service providers.
  - 3.4.1. Instruments: Broad selection criteria for eligible asset classes, composition of instruments, investment horizon and constraints disclosed.
  - 3.4.2. Coverage: Criteria to select eligible market counterparties and service providers and eligible markets disclosed.
  - 3.4.3. Assessment: Criteria to assess adequacy and liquidity parameters disclosed regularly at predetermined times.
- 3.5. Financial Stability Assessments and Stress Testing:  
  - Periodic disclosure of assessment of domestic financial stability and transparency about methods used, including stress testing framework.
  - 3.5.1. Financial Stability Assessments: Periodic public assessment of risk to financial stability, including new and emerging vulnerabilities.
  - 3.5.2. Macroprudential Stress Testing Methods: Disclosure of methods and key assumptions of stress testing framework.
  - 3.5.3. Stress Testing Coverage: Disclosure of coverage of stress testing exercises.
  - 3.5.4. Central Bank Use of Stress Test Results: Clarity on ways stress test results are used.
- 3.6. Macroprudential Policy Implementation:  
  - Disclosure of implementation, including design of instruments and enforcement arrangements.
  - 3.6.1. Instruments: Precise design and objectives of macroprudential instruments and scope of entities and financial instruments subject to constraints disclosed.
  - 3.6.2. Enforcement: Enforcement mechanisms and responsibilities for all entities and financial instruments subject to macroprudential constraints disclosed.
- 3.7. Microprudential Supervision:  
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, and IOSCO (see Annex).
- 3.8. Emergency Liquidity Assistance:  
  - The central bank may disclose any ongoing provision of ELA (including bilateral and market-wide support) and its conditions and parameters once confidentiality is no longer required.
- 3.9. Resolution:  
  - Selected principles from KA (see Annex).
- 3.10. Financial Market Infrastructures:  
  - Selected principles from PFMI (see Annex).
- 3.11. Financial Integrity Operations:  
  - Disclosure of AML/CFT supervisory processes and details about resources allocated to internal AML/CFT controls.
- 3.12. Consumer Protection Operations:  
  - Disclosure of operations relating to consumer protection conducted solely or jointly with other agencies.

### Pillar IV — Central Bank Outcome
- Pillar IV is identified as Central Bank Outcome; detailed elements of disclosure under Pillar IV are part of the Code’s structure (Pillars I–IV), with Pillars I–III specifying governance, policies, and operations that underpin outcomes.

*International Monetary Fund — The Central Bank Transparency Code, Annex I: Selected Principles from International Financial Policy Standards*

### 4.1 Monetary Policy: The central bank is transparent about the outcome of its monetary policy

### 4.1 Monetary Policy: The central bank is transparent about the outcome of its monetary policy conduct.

### 4.1 Monetary Policy — transparency dimensions and requirements
- 4.1.1. Governance Actions: The accountability of the central bank on monetary policy is clear as to whom accountability is owed and how it is discharged.
- 4.1.2. Policies: The central bank discloses progress toward achieving its monetary policy objective(s) as well as prospects for achieving them.
- 4.1.3. Operations: The central bank discloses the volumes and interest rates of the operations, as well as the level of the operational target achieved.

### 4.2 Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration — disclosure of outcomes and implementation
- 4.2. The central bank discloses the outcome of its policy implementation.
- 4.2.1. Governance Actions: The central bank discloses information about to whom its accountability on the policy is owed and how it is discharged.
- 4.2.2. Policies: The central bank discloses on a regular basis information about the results in achieving the policy objectives.
- 4.2.3. Implementation: The central bank discloses on a regular basis information about the results of the policy implementation.

### 4.3 Foreign Exchange Management — committee accountability and operational disclosure
- 4.3. The central bank discloses how its governing committee is accountable for undertaking and reporting on foreign exchange interventions.
- 4.3.1. Governance Actions: The central bank discloses its decision-making structure and how it is accountable for Foreign Exchange Management.
- 4.3.2. Policies: The central bank discloses the role of Foreign Exchange Management toward achieving its policy objective(s) as well as its interaction with broader monetary policy objectives.
- 4.3.3. Operations: The central bank discloses the results of its market operations, the volume of activity, and the direction of interventions on its website at a predefined time lag.

### 4.4 Foreign Exchange Reserve Management — governance, reporting, and financial clarity
- 4.4. The central bank discloses any changes to the general principles of internal governance and provides clarity on the outcomes of its policy decisions about foreign exchange reserve management.
- 4.4.1. Governance Actions: The central bank publicly discloses the general principles of internal governance to ensure the integrity of its policy formulation and operations.
- 4.4.2. Reporting on Implementation: The central bank discloses data relating to the level and composition of reserve assets, short-term liabilities, and drains that can lead to demand on reserves at a predefined frequency.
- 4.4.3. Financial Results: There is clarity in audited financial statements on the amount, composition, profit/loss, and risks arising from foreign exchange reserves.

### 4.5 Macroprudential Policy — disclosure of outcomes, evaluations, and accountability
- 4.5. The central bank discloses outcomes and evaluations of its macroprudential policy actions and its accountability for such actions.
- 4.5.1. Governance Actions: The accountability of the central bank on macroprudential policies is clear as to whom accountability is owed and how it is discharged.
- 4.5.2. Policies: The central bank discloses ex-post evaluations of its macroprudential policies.

### 4.6–4.11 Selected functional areas — principles and disclosure expectations
- 4.6. Microprudential Supervision: Selected principles from BCP, ICP, and IOSCO (see Annex).
- 4.7. Emergency Liquidity Assistance: The Emergency Liquidity Assistance framework allows for appropriate disclosure of the provision of liquidity support, terms and conditions, and amounts provided, while maintaining confidentiality as long as required.
- 4.8. Resolution: Selected principles from KA (see Annex).
- 4.9. Financial Market Infrastructures: Selected principles from PFMI (see Annex).
- 4.10. Financial Integrity: The central bank discloses the outcome of its Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism supervisory actions as well as details about the oversight of its internal Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism controls.
- 4.11. Consumer Protection: There is clarity about the results and implications of consumer protection policies and operations conducted solely or jointly with other agencies.

### Pillar V — Central Bank Official Relations: disclosure of relationships and outcomes
- 5.1. Government: The central bank discloses its relationship with the government, including exchange of information, coordination of policies, and financial aspects such as rules on profit distribution, clearly distinguishing the different roles and modalities this can take.
  - 5.1.1. The institutional relationship between the central bank and the government/its agencies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
  - 5.1.2. The central bank publicly discloses its policies and terms and conditions governing financial transactions with the government, including fiscal agent role, current account management, deposit taking, advances, guarantees, loans and credit arrangements to the public sector, and agency services.
  - 5.1.3. The instruments used in interaction between the central bank and the government/its agencies are clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
  - 5.1.4. The central bank discloses publicly on a regular basis the outcome of its interaction (including operations) with the government/its agencies.
- 5.2. Domestic Financial Agencies: Disclosure of relationships, cooperation, and outcomes relevant to the mandate and functions.
  - 5.2.1. The relationship with domestic financial agencies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed, including cooperation and (co-)decision-making modalities and arrangements for information sharing.
  - 5.2.2. The policies and instruments used in interaction with domestic financial agencies, and the outcome of the interaction are transparent.
  - 5.2.3. With respect to macroprudential policy, the central bank discloses its role, responsibility, and actions—and those of any other authority it collaborates with; the central bank also discloses any advice it receives.
  - 5.2.4. With respect to financial stability, all arrangements to restore or maintain financial stability are clearly disclosed, including arrangements on data sharing, liquidity support, and responsibilities by stage.
- 5.3. Foreign Agencies: Disclosure of dealings with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and relevant foreign agencies.
  - 5.3.1. The relationship for exchange of information and coordination of actions and policies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
  - 5.3.2. The central bank publicly discloses its policies, terms, and conditions governing interaction with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and relevant foreign agencies.
  - 5.3.3. The instruments used in the interaction are clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
  - 5.3.4. The central bank discloses publicly on a regular basis the outcome of its relationship with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies.
- 5.4. Other Relations: The central bank discloses its involvement with private or semi-public institutions.
  - 5.4.1. The central bank discloses its investments in and ownership of subsidiaries and joint ventures with private, semi-public, or public entities.

*THE CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY CODE, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### Introduction of or

### imf-central-bank-transparency-code - Introduction of or

### Macroprudential Policy (Sections 2.5.3; 3.6)
- 2.5.3. Supporting Analysis
  - The central bank discloses the key indicators and analyses used to assess the need for macroprudential measures.
  - It explains the rationale and the expected transmission channels of policy instruments in achieving their objectives.
  - The central bank publishes statements (e.g., a Financial Stability Report) analyzing financial stability issues and discloses how macroprudential tools are expected to mitigate the risk.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank periodically publishes indicators (such as early warning indicators or stress test results) and explains how they relate to the need for macroprudential policy action.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The central bank publishes ex post evaluations of policy actions that examine whether tools had the intended effects.
- 3.6. Macroprudential Policy — Design and Enforcement
  - The central bank discloses the design and scope of application of macroprudential tools, including the types of financial institutions and financial instruments subject to constraints.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank provides clear and accessible statements (in addition to official documents) that disclose key design features and how they may affect market participants.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The central bank consults the public before enacting major changes to the design of macroprudential tools.
  - Enforcement: The central bank discloses which agencies enforce macroprudential regulations and both incentive mechanisms and penalties.

### Financial Stability Assessments and Stress Testing (3.5)
- 3.5.1. Financial Stability Assessments
  - The central bank periodically provides to the public its assessment of risks to financial stability, including new and emerging sources of vulnerability.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank regularly publishes a comprehensive assessment of the main risks to financial stability.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The central bank discloses the methods and underlying data used for such assessments, to the extent compatible with data protection rules.
- 3.5.2. Macroprudential Stress Testing Methods
  - The central bank discloses methods and key assumptions of the stress testing framework and discloses results on an aggregated basis.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank discloses main information on the design of the macroeconomic stress scenario and the risks covered, along with underlying assumptions.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The central bank discloses information on: (i) the type of exercise (bottom-up, top-down, or a combination of both); (ii) the design of the macroeconomic stress scenario, including details on its estimation, plausibility, and time horizon; (iii) the risks covered and detailed information on the models used; (iv) evolution of financial statements over the stress test horizon; (v) the full set of assumptions; and (vi) the regulatory framework considered.
- 3.5.3. Stress Testing Coverage
  - The central bank discloses the type of institutions covered in the stress testing (banks, pension funds, insurance companies, or others) and the number of institutions.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The central bank discloses the names of institutions participating in the stress test.
- 3.5.4. Central Bank Use of Stress Test Results
  - The central bank discloses the main purpose of the stress test.
  - The central bank discloses whether and how aggregate and individual stress testing results may affect policy decisions and other dealings with financial institutions.

### Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) (2.7; 3.8; 4.7)
- Core disclosure principles
  - The central bank discloses the scope and objectives of emergency liquidity assistance while maintaining necessary confidentiality to preserve financial stability and support monetary policy.
  - The central bank discloses the basic features of its ELA mechanism that allow discretionary bilateral or market-wide emergency liquidity support, subject to limits that do not impair financial stability or confidentiality.
  - The level of transparency must not diminish the central bank’s discretion/freedom to decide on a case-by-case basis if liquidity support is provided, and in which form and under which conditions.
- In addition to core practices:
  - The central bank discloses different forms/operations in which liquidity support may be provided, distinguishing between bilateral and market-wide support; clarifies institutional eligibility, decision-making process, involvement of other agencies, and disclosure policy.
- In addition to expanded practices:
  - The central bank discloses general rules, parameters, and conditions for each form of liquidity support, including (i) institutional eligibility; (ii) conditionality; (iii) supervisory intrusion and legal powers; and (iv) financial parameters (applied interest rate, eligible collateral, maturity, and currency).
- Outcome disclosure (Pillar IV, 4.7)
  - The ELA framework provides details on previous support and outcomes while maintaining confidentiality as long as required.
  - For market-wide liquidity support, the framework discloses the amount, conditions, and types of entities that received support.
  - For bilateral liquidity support, information about provision is disclosed only after the financial stability risk has passed and confidentiality requirements no longer apply.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The framework discloses how liquidity support measures impact other parts of the financial system and the economy, including interactions with market functioning, supervision, macroprudential regulation, and cross-border effects.

### Monetary Policy Operations and Transparency (Pillar III — 3.1)
- 3.1.1. Instruments
  - The central bank discloses its monetary policy instruments.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The operational target is clearly defined and disclosed.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The operational target and the link between the operational framework and monetary policy objectives is disclosed.
  - The role of reserve requirements is disclosed.
- 3.1.2. Coverage
  - The central bank discloses the terms and conditions of monetary operations and reserve requirements; eligible collateral is defined and published.
  - The reserve requirements’ ratio, remuneration, and averaging provision (if any) are published.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank discloses terms and conditions that explain how the level of reserve requirements is determined.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - Detailed regulations on monetary operations and reserve requirements are published and regularly updated, including detailed characteristics (maturity, interest rate, auctioning method, collateral and haircuts, etc.).
- 3.1.3. Access
  - The central bank discloses categories of monetary policy counterparties and respective access rights.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank discloses eligibility criteria and terms and conditions for participation.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The list of eligible institutions, counterparties of monetary operations, and their respective access rights is published and regularly updated.
- Operational outcome transparency (4.1.3)
  - The level of the operational target is published and disclosed daily.
  - Outstanding volumes and interest rates of each instrument and aggregated bank balances at the central bank (bank reserves) are published; auction results and realized autonomous liquidity factors are published frequently and in a timely manner on the central bank’s website.

### Cross-Border Financial Flows, Foreign Exchange Administration and Management (3.2; 3.3; 3.4; Pillar IV outcomes 4.2–4.4)
- 3.2 Cross-Border Financial Flows and FX Administration
  - The central bank discloses instruments it can use to implement policy, including the regulatory framework, licenses/approvals, reports, monitoring and enforcement instruments, and types of foreign exchange transactions it can perform.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank discloses a brief description of each regulatory instrument (objective and scope).
  - Coverage: The regulatory framework clearly defines and discloses types of activities, persons, and transactions the central bank can regulate/license/approve/perform/monitor/sanction; reporting requirements; monitoring instruments; and sanctions.
  - In addition to core and expanded practices:
    - The central bank discloses detailed licensing/approval requirements, procedures, and sanctions, and provides Q&As to explain granting of licenses/approvals and access to instruments.
- 3.3 Foreign Exchange Management
  - The central bank discloses instruments used for foreign exchange management, counterparties, eligibility criteria, access, and rationale for choice of instruments.
  - In addition to core/expanded practices:
    - The central bank publishes regulations, sanction rules, and mode of access for counterparties on its website.
  - Coverage: The central bank discloses markets and agents targeted by policy (spot, derivatives), rules governing modes of operations, and eligibility criteria.
- 3.4 Foreign Exchange Reserve Management
  - 3.4.1. Instruments: The central bank discloses broad criteria on selection of reserve assets and limited risk disclosures.
    - In addition to core practices: composition of eligible reserve assets and risk disclosures by asset class.
    - In addition to expanded practices: composition and disclosures on risk exposure (by group and instruments) at a defined frequency and time lag.
  - 3.4.2. Coverage: The central bank discloses broad criteria to select eligible counterparties and service providers; in addition it discloses rules and procedures for selection and, in expanded practice, aggregated exposures at a defined frequency and time lag.
  - 3.4.3. Assessment: The annual report contains a general assessment of reserve adequacy, liquidity, and limited risk exposure specific to reserve management; in expanded practice the central bank conducts annual liquidity stress tests and publishes a reserve adequacy assessment and a risk statement with a defined time lag.
- Pillar IV — Outcomes for cross-border/FX/reserves (4.2–4.4)
  - 4.2 Cross-Border Financial Flows and FX Administration — Governance & Implementation
    - The central bank discloses the designated public authority to which it is accountable and the frequency/manner of reporting.
    - The central bank discloses whether it delegated functions to other entities and whether those entities report separately.
    - The central bank discloses on a regular basis: regulatory framework changes, types/number of licenses/approvals, inspections, sanctions, and types/volume of cross-border flows and FX transactions (on an aggregate basis).
  - 4.3 Foreign Exchange Management — Operations and Reporting
    - The central bank discloses governance structure and responsibilities for FX management.
    - Policy analysis backing intervention decisions is disclosed.
    - The central bank publishes aggregated data on interventions (purchases and sales) with a predefined time lag; in expanded practice the aggregate volume and instruments bought or sold are reported monthly with a predefined lag of not more than a month.
  - 4.4 Foreign Exchange Reserve Management — Reporting and Financial Results
    - The central bank publishes information about the level of foreign exchange reserve assets and liabilities according to a predefined schedule.
    - In expanded practice the central bank publishes outcomes as per reserve data template and the Special Data Dissemination Standard.

### Financial Integrity / AML-CFT (2.10; 3.11; 4.10)
- 2.10 and 3.11 Financial Integrity — Disclosure of AML/CFT frameworks
  - The central bank discloses its policies and powers for AML/CFT supervision and a description of its control framework relating to activities/services that may give rise to ML/TF risk.
  - The central bank discloses an overview of AML/CFT supervisory policies, guidance, and supervisory powers.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank discloses whether revisions of supervisory policies and guidance are in consultation with the private sector.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The central bank discloses how it ensures consideration of private sector feedback on implementation.
  - The central bank discloses its internal AML/CFT control framework relating to its activities or services that give rise to ML/TF risk.
  - The AML/CFT internal control policies are audited by an independent party, preferably an independent and reputable third party, and the results are presented to the Board; confirmation that the results were presented to the Board is published.
  - The central bank discloses how it ensures timely remediation of identified weaknesses; confirmation that all results have been addressed is published.
- 3.11.1 Processes and 3.11.2 Controls
  - The central bank discloses general information on its approach to off-site and on-site AML/CFT supervisory activities and human and technical resources allocated.
  - In addition to core practices:
    - The central bank discloses statistical information on completion rates of off-site and on-site AML/CFT supervisory activities and internal control activities.
  - In addition to expanded practices:
    - The central bank maintains and discloses up-to-date information on names of financial institutions it supervises for AML/CFT and publishes findings of an independent audit of internal controls, presented to the Board.

### Consumer Protection (2.11; 3.12; 4.11)
- 2.11 Core disclosures
  - The central bank publishes consumer protection policies, including disclosure measures and transparency of financial institutions, fair treatment and business conduct, data protection and privacy usage of customer data, ombudsman arrangements (where applicable), and practices in information-sharing and dispute resolution mechanisms.
- 3.12 and 4.11 Outcomes and Reporting
  - The central bank discloses consumer protection measures taken against financial institutions and publishes statistics on measures taken by an ombudsman or other official.
  - The central bank publishes an annual report on outcomes of consumer protection operations, including any appearances before designated public authorities.

### Governance, Accountability, and Publication Practices (Pillars I–V)
- Governance and accountability
  - The central bank discloses responsibilities of governing bodies, reporting obligations to designated public authorities, and interactions with those authorities on monetary, macroprudential, and other policies.
  - Legislation, agreements, or Memorandums of Understanding specifying macroprudential objectives and responsibilities of governing bodies are disclosed.
- Publication practices and timing
  - The central bank publishes operational and policy information with predefined schedules and time lags (e.g., daily disclosure of operational target, monthly reporting of interventions with a lag not more than a month).
  - The central bank provides Q&As and accessible explanations for licensing, approvals, and use of policy instruments in expanded practices.

*International Monetary Fund*

### Section 5.1 covers the central bank’s cashier, depositary, fiscal agent, credit, advisory, debt management, and cooperat

### imf-central-bank-transparency-code - Section 5.1 covers the central bank’s cashier, depositary, fiscal agent, credit, advisory, debt management, and cooperat

### Scope of Section 5.1
- Section 5.1 covers the central bank’s cashier, depositary, fiscal agent, credit, advisory, debt management, and cooperation functions for the government (including ministries and other governmental agencies, such as tax and customs authorities) and other public sector institutions.
- Emphasis on disclosure of legal frameworks, instruments, procedures, and outcomes for interactions (including financial transactions) between the central bank and government or governmental agencies.

### Disclosure principles and practices (general)
- "The central bank discloses to the public, on a regular basis, policies, instruments used in interactions (including financial transactions) between the central bank and the government, and the outcomes of such interactions."
- "The central bank discloses on a regular basis information about its interactions with governmental agencies (e.g., with customs authorities in the context of information sharing) and the outcomes of such interactions. The relevant legal framework, instruments for sharing responsibilities, and delegated powers are disclosed."
- The legal framework should contain:
  - "procedures for the approval and reporting/accountability on the exercise of the central bank’s functions with respect to the government, as well as the main terms and conditions governing those functions."
  - "a clear mechanism for the establishment of the terms and conditions of the central bank’s functions with respect to the government."
  - "conditions of the central bank’s functions and policies with respect to the government, as contained in a regulation or agreement."

### Specific principles (numbered)
- 5.1.2. "The central bank publicly discloses its policies and terms and conditions governing financial transactions with the government, including its fiscal agent role, the management of the current account, deposit taking, advances, guarantees, loans and credit arrangements to the public sector, as well as agency services performed on behalf of the government."
- 5.1.3. "The instruments used in interaction (including the financial transactions) between the central bank and the government/its agencies are clearly defined and publicly disclosed."
- 5.1.4. "The central bank discloses publicly on a regular basis the outcome of its interaction (including operations) with the government/its agencies."

### Linkages to other sections and comparative expectations
- Section 5.2 (Domestic Financial Agencies):
  - Principle: "The central bank discloses its relationships with domestic financial agencies as relevant to the pursuit of its mandate and the execution of its functions."
  - 5.2.1. "The relationship between the central bank and relevant domestic financial agencies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed, including cooperation and (co-) decision-making modalities and arrangements for the formal/informal sharing of information."
  - 5.2.2. "The policies and instruments used in the interaction of the central bank with domestic financial agencies, and the outcome of the interaction are transparent."
  - 5.2.3. With respect to financial stability: "all arrangements to restore or maintain financial stability are clearly disclosed, including arrangements on data sharing, liquidity support, and who is responsible for which type of decision or action at what stage."
- Section 5.3 (Foreign Agencies):
  - Principle: "The central bank discloses its dealings with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies, including the nature of the involvement or interactions, and any obligations and commitments that may arise from these relationships."
  - The central bank should disclose relationships, policies, instruments, outcomes, and agreements with foreign agencies; and "information on international or bilateral relations and (mandatory) obligations arising from such relations."
- Section 5.4 (Other Relations):
  - "The central bank discloses its involvement with private or semi-public institutions."
  - "The central bank discloses its investments in and ownership of subsidiaries, and joint ventures with private, semi-public, or public entities."

### Glossary entries relevant to Section 5.1 (selected terms as used across the Code)
- "Disclose (disclosed, publicly available, publicly disclosed, clearly disclosed)": Publication of the legal framework and policy decisions (regulatory framework) in official gazettes and posting them on the central bank’s website; for other documents/information, publication in printed or electronic mass media as well as posting on the central bank’s website. The legal framework, policy decisions, and other documents/information should be easily accessible.
- "Easily accessible": The general public and other users can easily find the legal framework, policy decisions (regulatory framework), and other documents/information navigating through the central bank’s website or other forms of widely used communication (daily newspaper, etc.).
- "Functions (tasks)": The activities that the central bank undertakes to achieve its objectives.
- "Legal Framework": Legal instruments governing the central bank, including the constitution, relevant treaties, central bank law, and other relevant laws, as well as relevant regulations and other applicable forms of legal instruments.
- "Fiscal agent role" and related operational terms are addressed through the Code’s principles on disclosure, instruments, outcomes, and legal provisions.

*The Central Bank Transparency Code, International Monetary Fund.*

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY STANDARDS

### Purpose and scope
- The Annex presents transparency-related principles from international financial policy standards for information purposes only, reflecting selections by IMF staff of relevant transparency-related texts.
- The excerpts do not represent an interpretation, assessment, or guidance for the relevant financial policy standards by the IMF, its Executive Board, its Management, or any of its staff or affiliated agents. Any interpretation or guidance is the prerogative of the respective international standard-setter.
- The transparency issues in the Annex will not be assessed in the context of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT); instead, they will be assessed by respective assessors in banking, insurance, securities, resolution, and financial market infrastructure when they undertake assessments in their entirety or when preparing technical notes.
- The Annex does not contain a description of maturity of practices (e.g., core, expanded, or comprehensive) on transparency of banking, insurance, securities sectors supervisors, resolution authorities, and FMI overseers.

### International standards relied upon by the Central Bank Transparency Code
- The CBT relies on relevant international standards in microprudential supervision, resolution, and financial market infrastructures, specifically:
  - Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.
  - International Association of Insurance Supervisors’ (IAIS) Insurance Core Principles and Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups.
  - International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.
  - Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.
  - Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and IOSCO’s (CPMI-IOSCO) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure.

### Statement of principles and methodology differences across standards
- Banking (BCP):
  - The Basel Core Principles state the core principles, essential criteria, and additional criteria in a single BCBS document.
  - “Core principles” are a framework of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices and are considered universally applicable.
  - “Essential criteria” are elements that should be present to demonstrate compliance with a Principle.
  - “Additional criteria” may be particularly relevant to supervision of more sophisticated banking organizations; countries with such institutions should aim to achieve them.
- Insurance (ICP):
  - Insurance Core Principles include principle statements, standards, and guidance in one IAIS document.
  - “Principle statements” set out essential elements required to protect policyholders, promote fair, safe, and stable insurance markets, and contribute to financial stability.
  - “Standards” set out key high-level requirements fundamental to implementing the principle statement and should be met to demonstrate observance.
  - “Guidance” facilitates understanding and application of the principle statement or standards and does not represent requirements.
- Securities (IOSCO):
  - IOSCO sets out the Principles (P) in one document and the methodology in another.
  - The principles are based on three objectives: protecting investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; and reducing systemic risk.
  - The methodology provides IOSCO’s interpretation of principles and guidance on conducting self-assessments or third-party assessments of implementation.
- Resolution (FSB):
  - The FSB’s Key Attributes (KA) set out core elements necessary for an effective resolution regime.
  - The “Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector” sets out a methodology to guide assessment of compliance with the Key Attributes and proposes a set of essential criteria (EC) for assessment.
  - The methodology includes explanatory notes (EN) that provide examples, explanations, cross-references to other KAs, and specific definitions not included in the definitions of key terms.
- Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) (CPMI-IOSCO):
  - IOSCO’s Payments and Market Infrastructures provides Principles (P) in one document and disclosure frameworks and assessment methodology in another.
  - The principles document has two sections: one defining FMI requirements related to safety, soundness, and efficiency, and another addressing responsibilities and roles of authorities regulating, supervising, and overseeing FMI.

### Clarification on use and assessment
- The Annex is not to be used for assessing compliance with the CBT.
- Banking, insurance, securities sector supervisors, resolution authorities, and FMI overseers will address transparency issues in their respective full assessments or technical notes rather than via the CBT assessment.

### Additional documentation and reference materials (standards and assessment methodologies referenced)
- Key standards and documents referenced by the Annex include:
  - “Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems; Financial Regulation and Supervision.” Financial Stability Board, 2020.
  - “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012.
  - “The Basel Framework.” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2020.
  - “Insurance Core Principles and Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups.” International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2019.
  - “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.” International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2017.
  - “Methodology for assessing implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.” International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2017.
  - “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.” Financial Stability Board, 2014.
  - “Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector.” Financial Stability Board.

*Source: ANNEX I, Central Bank Transparency Code, International Monetary Fund.*

### 2016. Available at https://www.fsb.org/2016/10/key-attributes-assessment-methodology-for-

### THE CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY CODE

### Overview and referenced standards
- References cited include:
  - “Public Disclosures on Resolution Planning and Resolvability - Discussion Paper for Public Consultation.” Financial Stability Board, 2019.
  - “Principles on Bail-in Execution.” Financial Stability Board, 2018.
  - “Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies.” Financial Stability Board, 2013.
  - “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI).” CPMI-IOSCO, 2012.
  - Financial Sector Assessment Program, IMF/World Bank, 2020.
- The Code organizes transparency guidance across sectors (banking, insurance, securities) and maps international standards (BCBS Core Principles, IAIS Insurance Core Principles, IOSCO Objectives and Principles) into five Pillars: I—Governance, II—Policies, III—Operations, IV—Outcome, V—Official relations.
- Sector and principle cross-references and Exact Criteria (EC) or numbered ICP/BCP/P items are used throughout (for example, BCP1 EC1, ICP2.8.2, P2).

### Pillar I — Transparency in Governance
- Legal framework, mandate, legal protection:
  - BCP1: An effective system of banking supervision has clear responsibilities and objectives and a suitable legal framework to authorize banks, conduct ongoing supervision, address compliance and undertake timely corrective actions.
  - BCP1 EC1: Responsibilities and objectives of each authority involved in banking supervision are clearly defined in legislation and publicly disclosed; frameworks avoid regulatory and supervisory gaps where more than one authority exists.
  - BCP2: Supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy, adequate resources, and legal protection.
  - BCP2 EC9: Laws provide protection to the supervisor and its staff against lawsuits for actions or omissions in good faith; staff are adequately protected against costs of defending their actions or omissions.
- Insurance sector governance:
  - ICP1: Each authority responsible for insurance supervision, its powers and objectives are clearly defined.
  - ICP1.0.1: Publicly defined objectives foster transparency and allow stakeholders to form expectations and assess performance.
  - ICP1.1 and ICP1.2: Primary legislation must clearly define authority and objectives, including at least to protect policyholders, promote a fair, safe and stable insurance market, and contribute to financial stability.
  - ICP2 and ICP2.0.4: Supervisor is operationally independent, accountable, transparent, and discloses supervisory requirements and processes consistent with confidentiality.
  - ICP2.2: Legislation provides legal protection from actions for the supervisor and staff; staff are protected against costs of defense.
- Securities regulator principles:
  - P1: Responsibilities of the Regulator should be clear and objectively stated; preferably in law.
  - P3: Regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers.

### Pillar I — Autonomy and Decision-making arrangements
- Banking independence and appointment processes:
  - BCP2 EC1: Operational independence, accountability and governance of the supervisor are prescribed in legislation and publicly disclosed; no government or industry interference; full discretion to take supervisory actions.
  - BCP2 EC2: Appointment and removal process of head(s) is transparent; appointed for a minimum term; removal only for reasons specified in law or incapacity or misconduct; reasons for removal are publicly disclosed.
  - BCP2 EC6: Supervisor has adequate resources and is financed in a manner that does not undermine autonomy.
- Insurance independence and governance:
  - ICP2.1: Supervisor is operationally independent and free from undue government or industry interference.
  - ICP2.1.1–ICP2.1.3: Operational independence includes discretion to allocate resources; financing should not undermine independence; institutional relationships and accountability frameworks should be defined in legislation.
  - ICP2.1.5: Governing body composition should be sufficiently diverse to prevent industry or government control.
  - ICP2.3 and ICP2.3.1–ICP2.3.3: Procedures for appointment/dismissal should be transparent, codified in legislation, disclose appointing authority, term length, dismissal reasons, and general criteria for appointment including qualifications and remuneration mechanisms.

### Pillar I — Communication and confidentiality
- Cooperation and confidentiality frameworks:
  - BCP3: Laws, regulations or arrangements provide framework for cooperation with domestic authorities and foreign supervisors, reflecting need to protect confidential information.
  - ICP2.0.4 and ICP2.7: Transparency reinforces accountability; supervisory requirements and processes should be publicly disclosed consistent with confidentiality; supervisor, its staff and third parties are required by legislation to protect confidential information.
  - ICP2.8.1: Supervisor should publish information about itself and the insurance sector, including supervisory measures taken in relation to problem or failed insurers, subject to confidentiality and not prejudicing other cases.
  - IOSCO P2: Confidential and commercially sensitive information must be respected; safeguards to protect such information must be in place.

### Pillar II — Transparency in Policies
- Policy formulation, consultation, and publication:
  - BCP1 EC4: Banking laws, regulations and prudential standards are updated as necessary and are subject to public consultation, as appropriate.
  - BCP5 EC2: Laws or regulations give the licensing authority power to set criteria for licensing banks.
  - ICP2.9 and ICP2.9.1–ICP2.9.4: Supervisor publishes requirements, policies and supervisory procedures; consults publicly on significant changes; regularly reviews instruments and ensures availability to the public; encourages stakeholder participation; where development is outside supervisor’s control, supervisor participates in consultations and keeps public informed.
  - IOSCO P4: Regulator should adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes that are consistently applied, comprehensible, transparent, fair and equitable; include public consultation and public disclosure of important operational policies.

### Pillar III — Transparency in Operations
- Instruments, licensing, corrective measures:
  - BCP1 EC6: Supervisor has powers to (a) take or require timely corrective action, (b) impose a range of sanctions, (c) revoke bank licenses, (d) cooperate to achieve orderly resolution and trigger resolution where appropriate.
  - ICP2.8.1: Supervisor should publish information about objectives, goals, prior year activities, resources, and data and analysis about the insurance sector; supervisory measures taken in relation to problem or failed insurers, subject to confidentiality.
  - ICP4 Licensing: Licensing requirements and procedures must be clear, objective, public, and consistently applied.
  - ICP10: Supervisor requires and enforces preventive and corrective measures and imposes sanctions that are timely, necessary, and based on clear, objective, consistent, and publicly disclosed general criteria.
  - ICP10.0.4: Additional parts of the framework on preventive measures and sanctions can be released publicly where beneficial.

### Pillar III — Coverage and Access
- Public lists and sector data:
  - BCP4 EC5: Supervisor or licensing authority publishes a current list of licensed banks, including branches of foreign banks, accessible to the public.
  - ICP4.7 and ICP4.7.1–ICP4.7.2: Supervisor publishes complete list of licensed insurance legal entities and scope of licenses; if license conditions or restrictions impact the public, supervisor should publish them or require the entity to disclose them.
  - BCP28 EC5: Supervisor publishes information on the banking system in aggregate to facilitate public understanding and market discipline.
  - ICP24.5 and ICP24.5.1–ICP24.5.2: Supervisor publishes relevant data and statistics on the insurance sector; may provide sufficiently detailed data directly or via others, ensuring accuracy, completeness, frequency and timeliness.

### Pillar IV — Transparency in Outcome
- Accountability, reporting, and performance disclosure:
  - BCP2 EC1 and BCP2 EC3: Operational independence, accountability and governance prescribed in legislation and publicly disclosed; supervisor publishes its objectives and is accountable through a transparent framework for discharge of duties.
  - ICP2.8 and ICP2.8.1: Supervisor is transparent to the public, supervised entities and government about how it exercises responsibilities; should publish objectives, goals, prior activities, resources, sector data, and supervisory measures, subject to confidentiality.
  - ICP2.8.2: Supervisor should seek to publish a report at least annually containing the elements listed above as well as its audited financial statements.
  - IOSCO P2: Accountability implies appropriate scrutiny and review, including periodic public reporting on performance and transparency in process and conduct.

### Pillar V — Transparency in Official Relations
- Government relations and inter-agency cooperation:
  - ICP2.1.3: Institutional relationships and accountability frameworks between supervisor and government should be clearly defined in legislation, specifying circumstances and processes for sharing information, consultation or approval; daily operations should not be subject to consultation or approval by government; in exceptional circumstances supervisor may consult government where supervisory decisions have major socio-economic implications.
  - BCP3: Laws, regulations or arrangements provide framework for cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic authorities and foreign supervisors, reflecting need to protect confidential information.
  - ICP25: Supervisor cooperates and coordinates with involved supervisors and relevant authorities to ensure effective supervision of insurers operating cross-border.
  - IOSCO ¶14: Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when and how they will share both public and non-public information with domestic and foreign counterparts.

### Resolution (selected extract)
- KA 2 Resolution authority:
  - Where multiple resolution authorities exist within a jurisdiction their respective mandates, roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined and coordinated.

*International Monetary Fund — THE CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY CODE*

### 2.2 Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities

### 2.2 Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities

### Lead authority and domestic coordination
- The resolution regime of the jurisdiction should identify a lead authority that coordinates the resolution of legal entities within that jurisdiction when different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities of the same group within a single jurisdiction.
- KA 2 Resolution authority
  - 2.1 Where there are multiple resolution authorities within a jurisdiction their respective mandates, roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined and coordinated.
  - EC2.1 The legal framework clearly identifies one or more resolution authorities and provides it or them with a clear mandate. Where there are multiple resolution authorities or where multiple authorities are involved in a resolution process, the resolution regime provides for the identification of a lead authority; sets out clear arrangements to coordinate the resolution of affiliated legal entities, or the resolution of a single bank, within that jurisdiction; and provides for a clear allocation of objectives, functions and powers of those authorities.
  - 2.2 Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities of the same group within a single jurisdiction, the resolution regime of that jurisdiction should identify a lead authority that coordinates the resolution of the legal entities within that jurisdiction.

### Legal mandate, powers, and protections for resolution authorities
- EC2.1 The legal framework clearly identifies one or more resolution authorities and provides it or them with a clear mandate.
- EC2.6 Legal protection and indemnification
  - EC2.6 The legal framework provides legal protection through statute for the resolution authority, its head, members of the governing body and its staff and any agents against liability for actions taken or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith and acting within the scope of their powers, including actions taken in support of foreign resolution proceedings; including indemnification against any costs of defending any such actions.
- EN3(e) Powers of the resolution authority
  - Where the EC refer to powers of the resolution authority to take specific resolution actions, those powers should be clearly set out in the legal framework applicable to the authority.

### Operational independence, accountability, and resourcing
- KA 2 Resolution authority
  - 2.5 The resolution authority should have operational independence consistent with its statutory responsibilities, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate resources and be subject to rigorous evaluation and accountability mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of any resolution measures. It should have the expertise, resources and the operational capacity to implement resolution measures with respect to large and complex firms.
  - EC2.3 The resolution authority is, by law and in practice, operationally independent in the performance of its statutory responsibilities.
  - EC2.4 The resolution authority is accountable through a transparent framework for the discharge of its duties in relation to its statutory responsibilities.
  - EN2(d) Operational Independence — Appropriate safeguards could include transparent appointment procedures; statutory constraints that would prevent the head of the resolution authority being removed during his or her term of office for reasons other than those specified in law; and public disclosure of the reason(s) for that early dismissal.
  - EN2(e) Accountability — Procedures for reviewing and evaluating actions that the resolution authority takes in carrying out its statutory responsibilities may be satisfied by procedures for internal review by management or a function within the resolution authority. Provision for review of the effectiveness of the resolution authority in meeting its statutory objectives by an appropriate external body would strengthen accountability. The resolution authority should also publish periodic reports on its resolution actions and policies relating to its mandate and its statutory objectives at sufficiently frequent intervals to keep stakeholders and the public adequately informed about the authority’s resolution activities. Public reports may include case-specific reports that are released once the resolution of a bank has concluded, assessing the outcome of the resolution and the effectiveness with which the resolution was carried out by reference to the statutory objectives. The resolution authority should however not be required to disclose publicly the operational resolution plans or results of resolvability assessments of individual banks.

### Powers, entry into resolution, and safeguards
- KA 3 Resolution powers
  - 3.1 There should be clear standards or suitable indicators of non-viability to help guide decisions on whether firms meet the conditions for entry into resolution.
  - EC3.1 The legal framework includes clear criteria that provide for timely and early entry into resolution before a bank is balance sheet insolvent, when a bank is no longer viable or when it is likely to be no longer viable and, in either case, has no reasonable prospect of return to viability.
  - EN3(c) Quantitative or qualitative criteria to assess non-viability — the conditions for entry into resolution or exercise of resolution powers should be clear and transparent and set out in law.
  - EN3(f)(iii) Exercisable without shareholder or creditor consent — In order to ensure legal certainty and transparency to shareholders and creditors, the powers to override any requirement for consent should be clear.
  - EN3(r) Regulatory requirements for bridge institutions — The legal framework should be transparent as to what capital and other regulatory requirements, if any, will apply to bridge institutions.
- KA 5 Safeguards
  - 5.1 Resolution powers should be exercised in a way that respects the hierarchy of claims while providing flexibility to depart from the general principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors of the same class, with transparency about the reasons for such departures, if necessary to contain the potential systemic impact of a firm’s failure or to maximize the value for the benefit of all creditors as a whole.
- KA 4 Set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of client assets
  - 4.1 The legal framework governing set-off rights, contractual netting and collateralization agreements and the segregation of client assets should be clear, transparent and enforceable during a crisis or resolution of firms, and should not hamper the effective implementation of resolution measures.
  - EN4(a) Prohibition or Temporary stay of early termination rights — Where the legal framework includes both kinds of provision, it should be clear in advance, for any type of such contract, which provision would apply to those early termination rights in a resolution of the financial institution under the domestic regime.

### Access, funding, and cross-border cooperation
- KA 2 Resolution authority — Access
  - 2.7 The resolution authority should have unimpeded access to firms where that is material for the purposes of resolution planning and the preparation and implementation of resolution measures.
  - EC2.7 Under the legal framework, the resolution authority has unimpeded access to the domestic premises of banks where necessary for the purposes of resolution planning and the preparation and implementation of resolution measures.
- KA 6 Funding of firms in resolution
  - EN6(b) Use of deposit insurance funds for resolution — Where a deposit insurance fund can be used in resolution, there should be transparent rules and policies on the use of such funds, including clarity on the extent of the contribution that may be made.
- KA 7 Legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation
  - 7.4 The treatment of creditors and ranking in insolvency should be transparent and properly disclosed to depositors, insurance policy holders and other creditors.
  - 7.5 Jurisdictions should provide for transparent and expedited processes to give effect to foreign resolution measures, either by way of a mutual recognition process or by taking measures under the domestic resolution regime that support and are consistent with the resolution measures taken by the foreign home resolution authority.
  - 7.6 The resolution authority should have the capacity in law, subject to adequate confidentiality requirements and protections for sensitive data, to share information.

### Coverage and clarity of scope
- KA 1 Scope
  - 1.1 The regime should be clear and transparent as to the financial institutions (hereinafter “firms”) within its scope.
  - EC1.1 The scope of application of the resolution regime and the circumstances in which it applies are clearly defined in the legal framework.

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/data/cbt/landing-page/imf-central-bank-transparency-code.pdf_