## Session 3 — Conference report (Revised)

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---

### Introduction
- Judge Nyirenda opened the final session urging speakers to make full use of the opportunity and noting that final interventions leave lasting impressions.
- Session objective: gather insights on evolving and interrelated issues concerning organizational immunity, tribunal independence, and governance safeguards.

### Remarks by Judge Nassib G. Ziadé, President of the IMF Administrative Tribunal

#### Evolution of organizational immunity and national court scrutiny
- Historical position: several jurisdictions regarded organizational immunity as absolute, even where no internal mechanism for resolving staff disputes existed.
- Contemporary shift: national courts increasingly require effective internal dispute resolution mechanisms as a precondition for upholding immunity.
- Key legal influence: Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.
- Illustrative cases and developments:
  - Waite and Kennedy v. Germany and Beer and Regan v. Germany (1999): European Court of Human Rights held that availability of the European Space Agency’s internal Appeals Board was a material factor in concluding Article 6 rights were not disproportionately impaired, allowing immunity to be upheld.
  - Banque Africaine de développement v. M.A. Degboe (Paris Court of Appeal, 2003; affirmed by the French Court of Cassation): immunity denied where internal grievance committee was purely consultative and lacked tribunal attributes.
    - From Degboe, two cardinal principles:
      - An organization seeking to preserve immunity must provide a dispute-resolution mechanism possessing genuine judicial authority; a merely consultative body will not suffice.
      - National courts must be able to satisfy themselves that the internal mechanism meets minimum standards of access to justice.
  - Belgian case law (Brussels Court of Appeal, 2003; subsequent Brussels Labor Court decisions):
    - Lutchmaya v. Secrétariat général du Groupe des États d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (2003): held that absence of an adequate internal dispute-settlement mechanism undermines the right to a fair trial under Article 6.
    - Siedler v. Union de l’Europe occidentale (2003): denied immunity where Appeals Board failed to provide safeguards necessary for a fair trial.
    - Crown Council v. Chapman, NATO et al. (2005): upheld NATO’s immunity where its Appeals Board satisfied relevant requirements.
    - Court criteria for assessing a fair trial:
      - independence and impartiality of the appeals body;
      - judicial and adversarial character of proceedings;
      - authority to render binding, reasoned decisions based on law;
      - parties’ right to appear before it;
      - transparency of proceedings and judgments.
  - French Nouméa Court of Appeal and Court of Cassation (2014): denied immunity where no jurisdictional recourse with impartiality and equity guarantees existed.
  - Paris Court of Appeal decision concerning the European Space Agency (ESA) — 16 January 2024: reaffirmed that immunity cannot be invoked where it leaves individuals without any effective remedy; immunity lawful only when paired with a real avenue for justice (case under review by the French Court of Cassation).
  - Austrian Constitutional Court (2022): declined to uphold OPEC’s immunity because an adequate alternative avenue of justice was unavailable; led to establishment of OPEC’s Appeals Committee.
  - UN Human Rights Committee report (28 September 2024): reaffirmed that international organizations must provide reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution for staff; internal procedures need not replicate state judicial systems but must reflect objectivity, necessity, impartiality, and an absence of arbitrariness.

#### Risks of national court intrusion and implications for internal justice
- National court involvement in employment disputes is a concrete and growing challenge.
- Organizations risk losing immunity if they undermine tribunal independence or functioning through interference or inadequate procedural safeguards.
- Internal justice systems must manifest independence in both written law and practice to minimize such risks.

#### Selection and appointment of judges
- Appointment models vary:
  - governing bodies appoint tribunal members in most organizations;
  - some systems allow member states to propose candidates without internal input;
  - others rely on organizational committees with management, staff representatives, and external experts.
- External judicial involvement in appointments is exceptional; the Council of Europe Administrative Tribunal selects its Chair and Deputy Chair by the European Court of Human Rights.
- Alternative approach: balance institutional interests while introducing independent external elements.
  - World Bank practice: advisory committees including management representatives, the Staff Association, and an outside expert to identify suitable candidates.
  - United Nations reform (2008): General Assembly established the five-member Internal Justice Council to recommend candidates for appointment to the United Nations Dispute Tribunal and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal; composition balances institutional constituencies and independent legal expertise.
- Arrangements combining institutional representatives and independent external jurists can strengthen judicial selection integrity.

#### Length and renewability of judicial terms
- Competing considerations:
  - Non-renewable terms may enhance perceived independence.
  - Longer terms can help develop doctrine and jurisprudential continuity.
- Growing expert support for appointing judges for long but non-renewable terms.
- Some international administrative tribunals have recently incorporated non-renewability into their statutes.

#### Past and future employment with the organization
- Common statutory restrictions prohibit current staff from serving as tribunal judges; some statutes exclude former staff as well.
- Safeguards also restrict post-service employment with the organization via waiting periods.
- Stronger approach adopted since 2001 by the World Bank Administrative Tribunal and by the IMF Administrative Tribunal in 2009:
  - tribunal members are permanently ineligible for employment with the respective organizations following their judicial service.
- Judge Ziadé described permanent post-service ineligibility as a “healthy approach” to shield tribunals from real or apparent conflicts of interest.

#### Removal of tribunal members
- Removal mechanisms constitute a fundamental dimension of judicial independence.
- Safeguard: require involvement of other tribunal members before a judge may be removed.
- IMF Administrative Tribunal Statute example: Managing Director may terminate a member’s appointment only where the other members unanimously consider that judge “unsuited for further service.”
- Stronger protection example: Statute of the International Court of Justice — removal power rests exclusively with the other judges.
- World Bank Administrative Tribunal model: removal requires agreement of at least five of the Tribunal’s six other members (a very strong majority rather than unanimity); maintains determination in hands of tribunal majority to insulate removal from institutional interference.

#### Independence of the Registrar and Tribunal Secretariat
- Registrar position is hybrid: typically an organization staff member functioning under exclusive authority of the tribunal.
- Appointments often involve organizational leaders consulting the tribunal; Judge Ziadé argued that renewal of the registrar’s appointment should rest entirely with the tribunal.
- Registries must be protected from undue influence through exclusive tribunal control over personnel, administrative functions, and case management.
- Strongest safeguard: registrar elected solely by the tribunal.
  - Model adopted by: International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court (noting different functions).
  - Bank for International Settlements Administrative Tribunal Statute: provides election of Registrar solely by the tribunal.

#### Operational and structural autonomy
- Essential needs once tribunal is constituted:
  - security of tenure for judges;
  - tribunal’s sole authority over its secretariat;
  - confidentiality of deliberations;
  - autonomy over judicial processes;
  - adequate resources to perform functions.
- Genuine operational independence requires:
  - protection against overt attempts to influence judges or the tribunal;
  - institutional safeguards ensuring confidentiality of internal division of work;
  - tribunal’s sole responsibility for management of judicial activities;
  - sole control over secretariat, staff, and budget, while remaining subject, as appropriate, to ordinary auditing requirements.
- These arrangements ensure formal independence is respected in practical conditions.

### Remarks by Professor Peter Bekker

#### Functional necessity and the legal position of international organizations
- Functional necessity approach: legal status and immunities of intergovernmental organizations are linked to functions and purposes entrusted by member states; immunities exist to enable organizations to discharge mandates effectively.
- Principle of speciality: distinguishes international organizations from sovereign states possessing general competence.
- International Court of Justice (ICJ) support:
  - ICJ repeatedly affirmed the principle, including in its 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the use by a state of nuclear weapons in armed conflict and in its most recent advisory opinion reaffirming the role of inviolability and non-interference in safeguarding organizational independence.

#### Trends in national jurisprudence and challenges to immunity
- Two major trends in national courts:
  - European trend: balancing immunity against the human right to access to justice under Article 6 of the ECHR; courts assess whether internal dispute resolution mechanisms provide adequate alternatives.
  - Assimilation trend: treating organizational immunity like state immunity, exemplified by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Jam v. International Finance Corporation, which applied restrictive state immunity standards to international organizations.
    - Risk identified: assimilating organizational immunity to state immunity may undermine the speciality principle because international organizations are not sovereigns and have limited capacities and powers.
- ICJ caution: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State judgment (2012) cautioned against subjecting immunity to after-the-fact balancing exercises based on case circumstances; Professor Bekker suggested its reasoning casts doubt on conditioning organizational immunity on internal grievance mechanisms.
- Divergence across jurisdictions: courts in non-European jurisdictions, including Canada and the United States, have held that absence of an internal grievance mechanism does not automatically justify denying immunity.

#### Risks of national court interference and the role of internal justice
- Risk: national courts second-guessing organizational assessments of official activity or immunity claims could lead to inconsistent interpretations across jurisdictions.
- ICJ guidance: national courts may set aside an organization’s initial determination of an agent’s immunity or characterization of an activity as official only for “the most compelling reasons” (referring to Cumaraswamy advisory opinion, 1999, and subsequent reiterations).
- Policy emphasis: strengthen internal grievance mechanisms—including oral hearings and transparent processes—to pre-empt national court intrusion and to demonstrate that organizational immunity is deserved and justified.
- Conclusion: strengthening internal grievance mechanisms is essential to preserving tribunal independence and organizational immunity in an evolving judicial landscape.

### Remarks by Ms. Yan Liu, General Counsel and Director of the IMF Legal Department

#### Central themes
- Focus: importance of the IMF’s immunities for its institutional independence and the essential role played by the Administrative Tribunal in upholding the rule of law within the Fund.
- Context: conference celebrating the Tribunal’s 30th anniversary.

#### The role of immunities in safeguarding IMF functions
- Findings:
  - Privileges and immunities are foundational to the effective functioning of international organizations, including the IMF.
  - Reference to U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the Broadbent case nearly 50 years earlier: immunity from legal process prevents national courts from interfering with internal administration of international organizations.
  - Without immunity, fragmentation of legal approaches across member states would threaten operational coherence.
  - IMF member countries have granted the Fund absolute immunity from all forms of judicial process, including in employment matters.
  - “Immunity is not impunity.”
  - Regulation N-15 requires the establishment of appropriate procedures to address staff grievances.
- Implication:
  - Immunities protect institutional independence but require internal mechanisms to ensure accountability and remedies for staff.

#### The Tribunal’s role in ensuring accountability and upholding the rule of law
- Findings:
  - The IMF Administrative Tribunal is the pinnacle of the Fund’s internal dispute resolution system.
  - The Tribunal issues final and binding decisions that the institution is obligated to implement, ensuring management and the Executive Board operate within legality.
  - The Tribunal reviews individual employment disputes and regulatory decisions adopted by Management or the Executive Board, performing a quasi-constitutional function.
  - Tribunal decisions have clarified key principles in the Fund’s internal law, including the definition of fundamental conditions of employment and the permissible scope of Executive Board discretion.
  - After a Tribunal judgment requiring recalculations for the compensation decision in fiscal year 2022, Management fully complied by recalculating the figures and the Executive Board reconsidered the decision accordingly.
- Implication:
  - The Tribunal promotes legality, accountability, and institutional confidence in governance processes.

#### Selection of Tribunal members and safeguards for their independence
- Process and safeguards:
  - Selection begins with a public call for candidates and includes extensive outreach.
  - A panel composed of representatives from Human Resources, the Legal Department, and the Staff Association reviews applications, conducts interviews, and recommends candidates to Management.
  - Management consults with the Executive Board, which must approve the appointment of the Tribunal President.
  - Statutory safeguards:
    - judges must be completely independent;
    - cannot have prior or present employment relationships with the Fund;
    - are ineligible for future employment with the Fund after their service;
    - may be removed only by unanimous decision of the other members of the Tribunal.
  - In 2012, the Tribunal adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct containing procedural safeguards to reinforce judicial independence.
- Engagement:
  - Independence does not mean isolation; the Tribunal engages with staff and stakeholders through regular dialogue and outreach events.
- Institutional commitment:
  - The Fund affirmed its commitment to maintaining an independent and effective internal justice system and expressed appreciation to past and current judges for their service.

*Source: Remarks at the IMF Administrative Tribunal 30th anniversary conference (Session 3).*

### 1. Introduction

### imfat-30-conf-report-session-3-revised — 1. Introduction

### Introduction
- Judge Nyirenda opened the final session of the conference, urging speakers to make full use of the opportunity and noting that final interventions leave lasting impressions.
- The session aimed to gather insights on evolving and interrelated issues concerning organizational immunity, tribunal independence, and governance safeguards.

### Remarks by Judge Nassib G. Ziadé, President of the IMF Administrative Tribunal

- Judge Ziadé spoke in his personal capacity and observed that the conference topic has been repeatedly examined over the past two decades, yet it continues to attract sustained attention, including at the 45th anniversary colloquium of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal.

#### 2.1 Evolution of Organizational Immunity and National Court Scrutiny
- Historical position: several jurisdictions regarded organizational immunity as absolute, even where no internal mechanism for resolving staff disputes existed.
- Contemporary shift: national courts increasingly require effective internal dispute resolution mechanisms as a precondition for upholding immunity.
- Key legal influence: Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.
- Illustrative cases and developments:
  - Waite and Kennedy v. Germany and Beer and Regan v. Germany (1999): the European Court of Human Rights held that availability of the European Space Agency’s internal Appeals Board was a material factor in concluding Article 6 rights were not disproportionately impaired, allowing immunity to be upheld.
  - Banque Africaine de développement v. M.A. Degboe (Paris Court of Appeal, 2003; affirmed by the French Court of Cassation): immunity denied where internal grievance committee was purely consultative and lacked tribunal attributes.
    - From Degboe, two cardinal principles:
      - An organization seeking to preserve immunity must provide a dispute-resolution mechanism possessing genuine judicial authority; a merely consultative body will not suffice.
      - National courts must be able to satisfy themselves that the internal mechanism meets minimum standards of access to justice.
  - Belgian case law (Brussels Court of Appeal, 2003; subsequent Brussels Labor Court decisions):
    - Lutchmaya v. Secrétariat général du Groupe des États d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (2003): held that absence of an adequate internal dispute-settlement mechanism undermines the right to a fair trial under Article 6.
    - Siedler v. Union de l’Europe occidentale (2003): denied immunity where Appeals Board failed to provide safeguards necessary for a fair trial.
    - Crown Council v. Chapman, NATO et al. (2005): upheld NATO’s immunity where its Appeals Board satisfied relevant requirements.
    - Criteria listed by the Court for assessing a fair trial:
      - independence and impartiality of the appeals body;
      - judicial and adversarial character of proceedings;
      - authority to render binding, reasoned decisions based on law;
      - parties’ right to appear before it;
      - transparency of proceedings and judgments.
  - French Nouméa Court of Appeal and Court of Cassation (2014): denied immunity where no jurisdictional recourse with impartiality and equity guarantees existed.
  - Paris Court of Appeal decision concerning the European Space Agency (ESA) — 16 January 2024: reaffirmed that immunity cannot be invoked where it leaves individuals without any effective remedy; immunity lawful only when paired with a real avenue for justice (case under review by the French Court of Cassation).
  - Austrian Constitutional Court (2022): declined to uphold OPEC’s immunity because an adequate alternative avenue of justice was unavailable; led to establishment of OPEC’s Appeals Committee.
  - UN Human Rights Committee report (28 September 2024): reaffirmed that international organizations must provide reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution for staff; internal procedures need not replicate state judicial systems but must reflect objectivity, necessity, impartiality, and an absence of arbitrariness.

#### 2.2 Risks of National Court Intrusion and Implications for Internal Justice
- National court involvement in employment disputes is a concrete and growing challenge.
- Organizations risk losing immunity if they undermine tribunal independence or functioning through interference or inadequate procedural safeguards.
- Internal justice systems must manifest independence in both written law and practice to minimize such risks.

#### 2.3 Selection and Appointment of Judges
- Appointment models vary: in most organizations, governing bodies appoint tribunal members; some systems allow member states to propose candidates without internal input; others rely on organizational committees with management, staff representatives, and external experts.
- External judicial involvement in appointments is exceptional; the Council of Europe Administrative Tribunal selects its Chair and Deputy Chair by the European Court of Human Rights.
- Alternative approach: balance institutional interests while introducing independent external elements.
  - World Bank practice: advisory committees including management representatives, the Staff Association, and an outside expert to identify suitable candidates.
  - United Nations reform (2008): General Assembly established the five-member Internal Justice Council to recommend candidates for appointment to the United Nations Dispute Tribunal and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal; composition balances institutional constituencies and independent legal expertise.
- Arrangements combining institutional representatives and independent external jurists can strengthen judicial selection integrity.

#### 2.4 Length and Renewability of Judicial Terms
- Competing considerations:
  - Non-renewable terms may enhance perceived independence.
  - Longer terms can help develop doctrine and jurisprudential continuity.
- Growing expert support for appointing judges for long but non-renewable terms.
- Some international administrative tribunals have recently incorporated non-renewability into their statutes.

#### 2.5 Past and Future Employment with the Organization
- Common statutory restrictions prohibit current staff from serving as tribunal judges; some statutes exclude former staff as well.
- Safeguards also restrict post-service employment with the organization via waiting periods.
- Stronger approach adopted since 2001 by the World Bank Administrative Tribunal and by the IMF Administrative Tribunal in 2009:
  - tribunal members are permanently ineligible for employment with the respective organizations following their judicial service.
- Judge Ziadé described permanent post-service ineligibility as a “healthy approach” to shield tribunals from real or apparent conflicts of interest.

#### 2.6 Removal of Tribunal Members
- Removal mechanisms constitute a fundamental dimension of judicial independence.
- Safeguard: require involvement of other tribunal members before a judge may be removed.
- IMF Administrative Tribunal Statute example: Managing Director may terminate a member’s appointment only where the other members unanimously consider that judge “unsuited for further service.”
- Stronger protection example: Statute of the International Court of Justice — removal power rests exclusively with the other judges.
- World Bank Administrative Tribunal model: removal requires agreement of at least five of the Tribunal’s six other members (a very strong majority rather than unanimity); maintains determination in hands of tribunal majority to insulate removal from institutional interference.

#### 2.7 Independence of the Registrar and Tribunal Secretariat
- Registrar position is hybrid: typically an organization staff member functioning under exclusive authority of the tribunal.
- Appointments often involve organizational leaders consulting the tribunal; Judge Ziadé argued that renewal of the registrar’s appointment should rest entirely with the tribunal.
- Registries must be protected from undue influence through exclusive tribunal control over personnel, administrative functions, and case management.
- Strongest safeguard: registrar elected solely by the tribunal.
  - Model adopted by: International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court (noting different functions).
  - Bank for International Settlements Administrative Tribunal Statute: provides election of Registrar solely by the tribunal.

#### 2.8 Operational and Structural Autonomy
- Essential needs once tribunal is constituted:
  - security of tenure for judges;
  - tribunal’s sole authority over its secretariat;
  - confidentiality of deliberations;
  - autonomy over judicial processes;
  - adequate resources to perform functions.
- Genuine operational independence requires:
  - protection against overt attempts to influence judges or the tribunal;
  - institutional safeguards ensuring confidentiality of internal division of work;
  - tribunal’s sole responsibility for management of judicial activities;
  - sole control over secretariat, staff, and budget, while remaining subject, as appropriate, to ordinary auditing requirements.
- These arrangements ensure formal independence is respected in practical conditions.

### Remarks by Professor Peter Bekker

- Professor Bekker focused on legal foundations of organizational immunity and independence of international administrative tribunals, drawing on the second edition of his book, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations: A Functional Necessity Analysis of Their Legal Status and Immunities, published by Brill Nijhoff in 2025.

#### 3.1 Functional Necessity and the Legal Position of International Organizations
- Functional necessity approach: legal status and immunities of intergovernmental organizations are linked to functions and purposes entrusted by member states; immunities exist to enable organizations to discharge mandates effectively.
- Principle of speciality: distinguishes international organizations from sovereign states possessing general competence.
- International Court of Justice (ICJ) support:
  - ICJ repeatedly affirmed the principle, including in its 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the use by a state of nuclear weapons in armed conflict and in its most recent advisory opinion reaffirming the role of inviolability and non-interference in safeguarding organizational independence.

#### 3.2 Trends in National Jurisprudence and Challenges to Immunity
- Two major trends in national courts:
  - European trend: balancing immunity against the human right to access to justice under Article 6 of the ECHR; courts assess whether internal dispute resolution mechanisms provide adequate alternatives.
  - Assimilation trend: treating organizational immunity like state immunity, exemplified by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Jam v. International Finance Corporation, which applied restrictive state immunity standards to international organizations.
    - Risk identified: assimilating organizational immunity to state immunity may undermine the speciality principle because international organizations are not sovereigns and have limited capacities and powers.
- ICJ caution: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State judgment (2012) cautioned against subjecting immunity to after-the-fact balancing exercises based on case circumstances; Professor Bekker suggested its reasoning casts doubt on conditioning organizational immunity on internal grievance mechanisms.
- Divergence across jurisdictions: courts in non-European jurisdictions, including Canada and the United States, have held that absence of an internal grievance mechanism does not automatically justify denying immunity.

#### 3.3 Risks of National Court Interference and the Role of Internal Justice
- Risk: national courts second-guessing organizational assessments of official activity or immunity claims could lead to inconsistent interpretations across jurisdictions.
- ICJ guidance: national courts may set aside an organization’s initial determination of an agent’s immunity or characterization of an activity as official only for “the most compelling reasons” (referring to Cumaraswamy advisory opinion, 1999, and subsequent reiterations).
- Policy emphasis: strengthen internal grievance mechanisms—including oral hearings and transparent processes—to pre-empt national court intrusion and to demonstrate that organizational immunity is deserved and justified.
- Conclusion: strengthening internal grievance mechanisms is essential to preserving tribunal independence and organizational immunity in an evolving judicial landscape.

*Source: Remarks at the IMF Administrative Tribunal 30th anniversary conference (Session 3).*

### 4. Remarks by Ms. Yan Liu, General Counsel and Director of the IMF Legal Department

### Remarks by Ms. Yan Liu, General Counsel and Director of the IMF Legal Department

### Central themes
- Remarks focused on two central themes: the importance of the IMF’s immunities for its institutional independence and the essential role played by the Administrative Tribunal in upholding the rule of law within the Fund.
- Delivered in the context of the conference celebrating the Tribunal’s 30th anniversary.

### The role of immunities in safeguarding IMF functions
- Findings:
  - Privileges and immunities are foundational to the effective functioning of international organizations, including the IMF.
  - Reference to U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in the Broadbent case nearly 50 years earlier: immunity from legal process prevents national courts from interfering with internal administration of international organizations.
  - Without immunity, fragmentation of legal approaches across member states would threaten operational coherence.
  - IMF member countries have granted the Fund absolute immunity from all forms of judicial process, including in employment matters.
  - “Immunity is not impunity.”
  - Regulation N-15 requires the establishment of appropriate procedures to address staff grievances.
- Implication:
  - Immunities protect institutional independence but require internal mechanisms to ensure accountability and remedies for staff.

### The Tribunal’s role in ensuring accountability and upholding the rule of law
- Findings:
  - The IMF Administrative Tribunal is the pinnacle of the Fund’s internal dispute resolution system.
  - The Tribunal issues final and binding decisions that the institution is obligated to implement, ensuring management and the Executive Board operate within legality.
  - The Tribunal reviews individual employment disputes and regulatory decisions adopted by Management or the Executive Board, performing a quasi-constitutional function.
  - Tribunal decisions have clarified key principles in the Fund’s internal law, including the definition of fundamental conditions of employment and the permissible scope of Executive Board discretion.
  - After a Tribunal judgment requiring recalculations for the compensation decision in fiscal year 2022, Management fully complied by recalculating the figures and the Executive Board reconsidered the decision accordingly.
- Implication:
  - The Tribunal promotes legality, accountability, and institutional confidence in governance processes.

### Selection of Tribunal members and safeguards for their independence
- Process and safeguards:
  - Selection begins with a public call for candidates and includes extensive outreach.
  - A panel composed of representatives from Human Resources, the Legal Department, and the Staff Association reviews applications, conducts interviews, and recommends candidates to Management.
  - Management consults with the Executive Board, which must approve the appointment of the Tribunal President.
  - Statutory safeguards: judges must be completely independent; cannot have prior or present employment relationships with the Fund; are ineligible for future employment with the Fund after their service; may be removed only by unanimous decision of the other members of the Tribunal.
  - In 2012, the Tribunal adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct containing procedural safeguards to reinforce judicial independence.
- Engagement:
  - Independence does not mean isolation; the Tribunal engages with staff and stakeholders through regular dialogue and outreach events.
- Institutional commitment:
  - The Fund affirmed its commitment to maintaining an independent and effective internal justice system and expressed appreciation to past and current judges for their service.

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/imfat/imfat-conf/imfat-30-conf-report-session-3-revised.pdf_