## j2001-2 ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [j2001-2](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/imfat/j2001-2.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/imfat/j2001-2.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/imfat/j2001-2.pdf.json) --- ### Case overview and procedural history - Administrative Tribunal met on November 19 and 20, 2001; Tribunal composed of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, President, and Judges Nisuke Ando and Michel Gentot, Associate Judges. - Applicant: Mr. “P”, retired IMF staff (service from January 16, 1982 until disability retirement effective August 1, 1998). - Intervenor: Ms. “Q”, former spouse, requested Administration Committee to give effect to a Maryland divorce judgment awarding her 28% of Applicant’s pension. - Administration Committee withheld the disputed pension portion and placed it in escrow under SRP Section 11.3 and Committee Rules on the ground of a bona fide dispute as to efficacy, finality or meaning of the Maryland Judgment. - Key procedural timeline: - Mr. “P” filed Application with Administrative Tribunal on February 28, 2001. - Respondent filed Answer on May 10, 2001; Applicant filed Reply on May 21, 2001; Respondent’s Rejoinder filed on June 20, 2001. - Ms. “Q”’s Application for Intervention submitted April 10, 2001; admitted June 26, 2001. - Tribunal issued decision November 20, 2001 (judgment and orders described below). ### Factual and domestic proceedings summary - Marriage and residence: - Mr. “P” married Ms. “Q” on July 25, 1989; both Egyptian nationals. - The couple resided in Maryland together for more than eight years; Ms. “Q” established separate residence in Maryland on September 23, 1997; Mr. “P” left U.S. for Egypt in July 1998. - Maryland court proceedings: - Ms. “Q” filed Complaint for Limited Divorce on September 30, 1997. - Domestic Relations Master hearing January 21, 1998. - March 3, 1998 Order: alimony pendente lite of $2000 per month. - June 24, 1998 Motion for Injunctive Relief by Ms. “Q”; July 15, 1998 Contempt Order: body attachment and imprisonment for 179 days unless purged. - Merits divorce trial held January 24, 2000; Mr. “P” did not appear or was unrepresented. - Montgomery County Circuit Court entered Judgment of Absolute Divorce March 2, 2000, awarding Ms. “Q”: - monetary award $95,016.50; - continuing share of ongoing pension entitlement equal to 50% of the marital portion (56%) of all monies due under the IMF retirement annuity (i.e., 28% of total pension), plus proportionate share of cost of living supplements; - entitlement to 100% of survivor benefits attributable to portion earned during the marriage; - adjudged arrears of pendente lite alimony $38,000.00 through January 24, 2000; - attorney’s fees $27,000.00 to be paid by Defendant; - total judgment entered in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant $160,016.50. ### SRP Section 11.3, Administration Committee Rules, and IMF policy context - SRP Section 11.3 (1999 Revision) and Rules of the Administration Committee: - Permit a participant or retired participant to direct that benefits be paid to spouse/former spouse for support or division of marital property; where no timely direction, spouse/former spouse may request Committee to give effect to court order and request treated as if a participant’s direction. - Committee may withhold, in whole or in part, payments pending consideration or resolution of dispute. - Rule 1(b): participant given at least thirty (30) working days to consent or object to a request. - Rule 1(c): Committee may suspend activation where ambiguity or bona fide dispute exists about efficacy, finality or meaning of order or decree. - Rule 2: presumption-of-validity criteria (A)–(D): notification and opportunity to be heard; rendered by court of competent jurisdiction; product of fair proceedings; final and binding; and absence of conflict with other valid court orders or decrees. - Rule 3 and SRP text explicitly reference division of marital property as within Section 11.3’s scope. - IMF internal policy drivers: - U.S. Diplomatic Note (July 8, 1998) and Secretary of State letter urging international organizations to take voluntary steps to ensure enforcement of court-ordered child- and spouse-support payments. - Staff Bulletin No. 99/11 (May 4, 1999): Fund will respond to court orders for information and, at request of spouse/former spouse, give effect to wage garnishment/withholding orders with procedural protections (written notice, at least ten working days to object, criteria for adequacy). - Staff Bulletin No. 99/12 (June 9, 1999): revised SRP Section 11.3 and attached Rules specifically addressing retirees outside court jurisdiction; procedures apply to retirees as well as active staff. - Code of Conduct (July 1998) emphasizes obligations of staff to comply with court-mandated spousal or child support obligations. ### Conflict-of-laws and Egyptian law implications - Egyptian conflict-of-law rules (Civil Code Arts. 10–15): - Effects of marriage and consequences of termination governed by law of nationality (Egyptian law here). - Egyptian law mandates a total patrimonial separation of assets between spouses during marriage and thereafter; patrimonial regime precludes spouse’s claim to participant’s pension under Egyptian law. - “First revocable divorce” under Egyptian law: - husband may restore marital relationship within a two-month period; after two months the divorce is final; - the Egyptian procedure allows divorce by declaration before a religious notary without court proceedings; such declaration is not a divorce judgment and does not require service in the sense used in adversary proceedings. - Egyptian attorney advised that a U.S. Court judgment for division of property would not be enforceable in Egypt if deemed inconsistent with Egypt’s public policy. - U.S. and Maryland law principles: - Maryland’s divisible divorce doctrine (Family Law §8-212 and §11-105) permits Maryland courts to exercise powers over property and alimony after a foreign divorce if one party was domiciled in Maryland when foreign proceeding commenced and the foreign court lacked or did not exercise personal jurisdiction over the domiciliary or property at issue. - U.S. Supreme Court precedent Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), supports domiciliary state’s authority to enforce support orders despite an ex parte foreign divorce. ### Jurisdiction and standing: Tribunal admission of Intervenor - Article II, Section 1(b) of Tribunal Statute permits adjudication by the Tribunal of “an enrollee in, or beneficiary under, any retirement or other benefit plan maintained by the Fund” challenging an administrative act under such plan. - SRP Section 11.3 uses the term “designee” and refers to “benefit payable to the spouse or former spouse”; the term “beneficiary” not defined elsewhere in SRP. - Administration Committee Rules permit “any person claiming any rights or benefits under the Plan” to submit Requests; Ms. “Q” submitted such a Request. - Tribunal concluded Ms. “Q” is a person who “has a right under the Plan” for purposes of Article II, Section 1 and admitted her Application for Intervention under Rule XIV, para. 3, permitting her to participate as a party and to file responsive pleadings. ### Tribunal’s scope of review and applicable legal standards - Article III of the Statute: Tribunal applies internal law of the Fund and generally recognized principles of international administrative law. - Jurisdiction ratione materiæ limited to challenges to legality of administrative acts (individual or regulatory) under Fund internal law. - Remedial authority (Article XIV): - Tribunal may prescribe rescission of an individual decision and other corrective measures; - Compensation caps: amount shall not exceed the equivalent of three hundred percent (300%) of the current or last annual salary, except in exceptional cases with reasons; - Tribunal may annul regulatory decisions and order costs, including counsel fees, where appropriate. - Tribunal’s review focused on: - Legality of the Administration Committee’s individual decision to withhold and escrow pension payments. - Legality and consistency of SRP Section 11.3 and the Rules under it with the Articles of Agreement and Fund internal law. ### Findings on application of SRP Section 11.3 and Administration Committee decision - SRP Section 11.3 explicitly covers orders for division of marital property as well as support; textual provisions preserved in decision include numerical limits: - spouse/former spouse benefit shall not exceed (1) 50 percent of portion attributable to eligible service during marriage; and (2) 66 2/3 percent when child support included, subject to (1). - On the factual record the Tribunal treated both the Maryland Judgment and the Egyptian divorce as valid under their respective municipal laws in the absence of successful appeals. - The Administration Committee’s decision to withhold and place disputed payments in escrow was based on its determination that a bona fide dispute existed under Rule 1(c) as assessed against Rule 2 factors (A)–(D). - Tribunal’s substantive conclusion: - While the Committee’s cautious approach and neutrality rationale were understandable, the Committee erred in finding a bona fide dispute sufficient to suspend activation and escrow in the circumstances of this case. - The Maryland Judgment conformed to Rule 2 criteria and the Maryland court’s exercise of powers under Maryland law (including divisible divorce principles and Estin precedent) supported giving effect to the Maryland Judgment under SRP procedures. - The Egyptian declaration did not address division of marital property and under Egyptian conflict rules would not give rise to enforceable property-division rights against IMF assets in Egypt. ### Orders, remedies, and costs - Tribunal’s unanimous orders: - Rescission of the Administration Committee’s decision placing the disputed portion of Applicant’s pension in escrow. - Respondent directed to pay to the Intervenor the amount now held in escrow, including interest. - Respondent directed to pay to the Intervenor in future the proportion “28%” of the pension of the Applicant as requested by the Intervenor. - Costs: - Tribunal ruled the Applicant, the Fund and the Intervenor shall bear their own legal costs; discretionary award of costs under Article XIV, Section 4 was not applied. *Source: Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund, j2001-2.* ### Introduction ### Introduction ### Case overview - The Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund met on November 19 and 20, 2001, to adjudge the case brought against the International Monetary Fund by Mr. “P”, a retiree of the Fund. - The Tribunal was composed of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, President, and Judges Nisuke Ando and Michel Gentot, Associate Judges. - Applicant Mr. “P” contests the Administration Committee of the Staff Retirement Plan’s decision to withhold a portion of his pension payments pursuant to Section 11.3 of the SRP and the corresponding Rules of the Administration Committee. - Applicant’s former spouse Ms. “Q” requested the Committee to give effect to a Maryland divorce judgment awarding her 28% of Applicant’s pension. - The Administration Committee determined, under its Rules, that the disputed portion of the pension payments would be withheld and placed in escrow on the ground that there was a bona fide dispute as to the efficacy, finality or meaning of the Maryland Judgment. ### Procedural history before the Tribunal - Mr. “P” filed an Application with the Administrative Tribunal on February 28, 2001; deficiencies in the Application under Rule VII, paras. 1, 2(c) and 3 were corrected within the time permitted and the Application is considered filed on the original date. - The Application was transmitted to Respondent on March 26, 2001; a summary of the Application was issued internally on March 28, 2001 pursuant to Rule XIV, para. 4. - Respondent filed its Answer on May 10, 2001; Applicant filed a Reply on May 21, 2001; Respondent’s Rejoinder was filed on June 20, 2001. - On April 10, 2001, Ms. “Q” submitted an Application for Intervention pursuant to Rule XIV; she was given fifteen days to correct deficiencies and the supplemented Application for Intervention was transmitted on April 20, 2001. - Mr. “P” and the Fund were each accorded thirty days to present views on admissibility of the Intervention; both filed comments opposing admissibility. - On June 26, 2001, the President of the Administrative Tribunal, in consultation with the other members, decided to grant the Application for Intervention; Ms. “Q” was notified and, as an intervenor, was given thirty days to file a responsive pleading, which was filed on July 24, 2001. - Under Rule XVII, paras. 3 and 4, the President issued Requests for Information on July 9, 2001, to each party; responses were received on July 20, 24 and 25, 2001. - Applicant requested on July 12, 2001, under Rule XI, to file an additional pleading; the President granted acceptance of the additional pleading on July 25, 2001. - On July 25, 2001, the President called on all three parties to submit simultaneous Additional Statements within fifteen days. - The Tribunal decided not to hold oral proceedings as they were not necessary for disposition of the case. ### Factual background - Mr. “P” is an Egyptian national who was a staff member of the International Monetary Fund from January 16, 1982 until his disability retirement took effect on August 1, 1998. - Mr. “P” married Ms. “Q” on July 25, 1989; both are Egyptian nationals. The marriage took place in Paris under authority of the Egyptian consul and was registered with Egyptian civil authorities. On the marriage certificate, Mr. “P”’s residential address is listed as “Washington USA” and Ms. “Q”’s as an address in Egypt. - The couple resided in Maryland together for more than eight years until Ms. “Q” established a separate residence in Maryland on September 23, 1997. Mr. “P” continued to live in Maryland until leaving the United States for Egypt in July 1998. ### Proceedings in the Montgomery County Circuit Court (Maryland) - On September 30, 1997, Ms. “Q” filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. - Mr. “P” filed his Answer on October 28, 1997; a hearing before a Domestic Relations Master occurred on January 21, 1998. - On March 3, 1998, the court entered an Order requiring Mr. “P” to pay alimony pendente lite of $2000 per month to Ms. “Q”. - Mr. “P” participated in Alternative Dispute Resolution on May 22, 1998 and submitted a Pre-Trial Statement on May 27, 1998. The merits trial was set for January 1999. - On June 24, 1998, Ms. “Q” filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief asserting that Mr. “P” had applied for disability retirement and intended to return to Egypt; the Motion sought an order directing the Staff Retirement Plan that $2000 per month of any disability or other retirement be paid to Ms. “Q”. - At the June 25, 1998 hearing, Mr. “P” stated his intention to remain within the court’s jurisdiction and that he was paying support. - The Court entered an Order requiring Mr. “P” to sign a direction (to be held in the Court’s files) that $2000 per month of any disability or other retirement be paid to Ms. “Q”. - Mr. “P” refused to comply and on July 8 filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; on July 9 Ms. “Q” filed an Emergency Motion for Contempt. - On July 15, 1998, the Court entered a Contempt Order ordering that a body attachment issue and that Mr. “P” be imprisoned at the Montgomery County Detention Center for a period of 179 days or until he purged himself of contempt by directing in writing to the Secretary of the Administration Committee that $2,000 per month of any disability or other retirement be paid to Ms. “Q”. ### Mr. “P”’s disability retirement and Egyptian divorce - The Pension Committee of the Staff Retirement Plan approved Mr. “P”’s application for disability retirement effective August 1, 1998. - On July 22, 1998, Mr. “P” appeared before a religious notary in Egypt and obtained a “first revocable divorce” from Ms. “Q”; the divorce certificate records that Ms. “Q” was “absent from the sitting” and made no provision for property division or support. - The divorce was registered with the local Civil Registration Office in Egypt on July 25, 1998. - Under SRP Section 4.3(b), a disability pension is equal to the normal pension that would be payable if the normal retirement date had fallen on the date of disability retirement, using highest average remuneration and eligible service at time of disability retirement, but in no event less than the smaller of: - (i) 50 percent of such highest average gross remuneration; or - (ii) the normal pension that the participant would have received if he had remained a participant until his normal retirement date without change in such highest average remuneration. ### First IMF Administrative Tribunal case and subsequent developments - On July 28, 1998, Ms. “Q” brought the Maryland Court’s Orders to the Administration Committee’s attention; Mr. “P” informed the Fund of the Egyptian divorce. - On July 29, 1998, the Administration Committee decided to withhold and place in escrow the disputed portion of pension payments on the ground that there existed a dispute under Section 9.10 of the SRP. - SRP Section 9.10 provides that the Employer may defer making payment or withhold payment if there is any dispute or doubt concerning the identity or rights of any person or persons entitled to payments, until such dispute is settled or doubts satisfied by arbitration, court of competent jurisdiction, or written stipulation binding on all parties concerned. - On November 20, 1998, Mr. “P” filed an application with the IMF Administrative Tribunal contesting the Administration Committee’s decision. - On March 19, 1999, the Administration Committee reversed its decision to withhold a portion of Mr. “P”’s pension payment on the basis of then applicable SRP provisions (subsequently amended). - The Administrative Tribunal issued Order No. 1999-2 (Mr. “P”, Applicant v. International Monetary Fund, Respondent) (Mootness of Application) (August 12, 1999), treating the then-pending Application as moot. ### Further Maryland proceedings - A merits divorce trial in Montgomery County Circuit Court was held on January 24, 2000; Mr. “P” neither appeared nor was represented at the trial. - The Tribunal record is silent as to what notice Mr. “P” may have had of that trial; Mr. “P” has not contended that he was without notice of the continuing proceedings in Maryland. - The Family Division Master noted that the Defendant submitted to the Court, in connection with an earlier motion, a copy of what appears to be a certificate of “a first revocable divorce” registered by a religious notary of the Maadi First Division, affiliated to the Maadi Court, Cairo, Egypt. *Source: Administrative Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund, Introduction (j2001-2).* ### 26. The Maryland Court expressly considered and rejected Mr. “P”’s argument that the ### j2001-2 - 26. The Maryland Court expressly considered and rejected Mr. “P”’s argument that the ### Maryland court jurisdiction and Family Division Master findings - The Maryland Court expressly rejected Mr. “P”’s argument that the foreign divorce divested it of jurisdiction to grant a final divorce and division of marital property, noting: - The instant action was filed in 1997. - The Defendant was properly served while both parties resided in the State of Maryland. - The Defendant participated in Maryland proceedings until July 1998 when he left the United States. - The Plaintiff continued to be domiciled in the State of Maryland throughout. - Under these facts, the Court continued to have jurisdiction to grant a final divorce and all applicable relief concerning disposition of marital property. - Even if a valid final divorce had been obtained by the Defendant abroad, the Court would continue to have authority to enter appropriate orders concerning disposition of marital property under Family Law Article 8-212, Annotated Code of Maryland, and to resolve continuing questions of alimony under Section 11-105, Family Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland. - Family Division Master findings (copied to Mr. “P” at his address in Egypt) included: - Mr. “P” had been in arrears of his alimony payments from July 1998 onward. - 56 per cent of his pension entitlement was acquired during his marriage to Ms. “Q”. ### Montgomery County Circuit Court Judgment of Absolute Divorce (March 2, 2000) - The Court entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce granting relief to Ms. “Q” including: - A monetary award in the amount of $95,016.50. - A continuing share of the Defendant’s ongoing pension entitlement in the amount of 50% of the marital portion (56%) of all monies due the Defendant under his retirement annuity from the International Monetary Fund, plus a proportionate share of all cost of living supplements. - Entitlement to 100% of all survivor benefits under the Defendant’s pension attributable to the portion of the pension earned during the marriage. - Adjudged arrears of pendente lite alimony in the amount of $38,000.00 through January 24, 2000. - Reasonable necessary costs of attorney’s fees in the amount of $27,000.00 to be paid by the Defendant. - Judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff against the Defendant in the amount of $160,016.50, representing the amounts awarded. ### Administrative context: SRP Section 11.3 and Administration Committee review channels - The March 2, 2000 Judgment of Absolute Divorce formed the basis for Ms. “Q”’s March 9, 2000 Request to the Administration Committee of the Staff Retirement Plan (SRP); the Committee’s decision on that Request is the decision contested before the Administrative Tribunal. - The case of Mr. “P” (No. 2) v. IMF was the first to reach the Administrative Tribunal through the channels of administrative review established in 1999 by the Administration Committee of the SRP. - Administration Committee Rules of Procedure (notified by Staff Bulletin No. 99/17 (June 23, 1999)) are to be read together with: - the Fund’s Articles of Agreement; - the SRP and the rules made thereunder; and - the Statute and Rules of Procedure of the Administrative Tribunal. - Key procedural provisions: - Any person claiming rights or benefits under the Plan may submit a Request for a Decision concerning the administration, application, or interpretation of the Plan in his individual case. - After a Decision is rendered by the Committee, it is transmitted to the Requestor and to any other party identified and accepted by the Committee as having an interest. - Rule VIII permits review of Committee Decisions within ninety days, either upon request or at the Committee’s initiative; an Application for Review may be submitted by the original Requestor or by any other person claiming rights or benefits under the Plan. - The Administration Committee must notify the applicant for review of the results within three months of the application for review. - Rule X establishes exhaustion requirements for filing with the Administrative Tribunal (for Requests submitted to the Committee): - Administrative review is exhausted for the Tribunal when: - (a) three months have elapsed since an Application for review was submitted and results have not been notified; or - (b) the Committee has notified the Applicant of the results of any review or its decision to decline to review; or - (c) the conditions in Article V, Section 3(c) of the Statute have been met. - For Requests referred to the Pension Committee, review is not exhausted until a decision has been made by the Pension Committee and notified to the Requestor; if referred back, Rule X, paragraph 1 applies. ### Statute of the Administrative Tribunal—Article V (exhaustion of administrative review) - Article V provisions summarized: - An application may be filed with the Tribunal only after the applicant has exhausted all available channels of administrative review. - Where channels include procedures for staff complaints and grievances involving consistency with personnel regulations (Section 2), administrative review is exhausted when: - a. three months have elapsed since a recommendation to the Managing Director and no decision granting the requested relief has been received; - b. a decision denying the relief has been notified; or - c. two months have elapsed since a decision stating relief would be granted and the necessary measures have not actually been taken. - Where available channels do not include the procedure described in Section 2 (Section 3), a channel is exhausted when: - a. three months have elapsed since the request for review was made and no decision granting relief has been notified; - b. a decision denying the relief has been notified; or - c. two months have elapsed since a decision stating relief would be granted and necessary measures have not been taken. - All channels are exhausted when the Managing Director and the applicant have agreed to submit the dispute directly to the Tribunal. ### Administration Committee Rules Under Section 11.3 of the SRP (1999 Rules) and application in this case - The 1999 Rules Under Section 11.3 provide for a spouse or former spouse of an SRP participant (or retired participant) to request the Administration Committee to give effect to a court order requiring spouse or child support payments or division of marital property from SRP benefits. - Under these Rules: - If the SRP participant fails to make a direction to the Plan pursuant to the court order within thirty working days of its issuance, the spouse or former spouse may submit a Request directly to the Administration Committee to give effect to that order. - The participant is notified of the Request and permitted thirty working days to consent or object to the Request. - In Mr. “P”’s case: - The relevant court order (Maryland Judgment of Absolute Divorce) was dated February 11, 2000 and entered by the Clerk on March 2, 2000. - That order provided, in relevant part, that Ms. “Q” shall be entitled to a continuing share of Mr. “P”’s ongoing pension entitlement in the amount of 50% of the marital portion (56%) of all monies due the Defendant under his retirement annuity from the International Monetary Fund, plus a proportionate share of all cost of living supplements. - Timeline of administrative actions: - March 9, 2000: Ms. “Q” submitted her Request to the Administration Committee under Section 11.3. - April 10, 2000: The Secretary of the Administration Committee notified Mr. “P”, through counsel, permitting thirty working days to file consent or objection. - May 15, 2000: Mr. “P”, by counsel, opposed the Request. - June 15, 2000: Ms. “Q”’s counsel filed a Response to Mr. “P”’s May 15, 2000 submission. - July 10, 2001: Mr. “P”’s counsel replied thereto. - Administration Committee consultation and Decision: - The Committee examined both parties’ arguments, consulted with an Egyptian lawyer about the validity of the Egyptian divorce, and consulted the Fund’s Legal Department regarding the regularity of the Maryland Judgment. - July 27, 2000 Decision (letter to Mr. “P”’s attorney, copied to parties) stated in pertinent part: - The Committee will not resolve questions where there is a bona fide dispute about the efficacy, finality or meaning of an order or decree and may suspend activation of a request and associated payment until such dispute or ambiguity is settled. - Under Section 11.3 of the SRP and the Rules, the Committee may withhold payments pending resolution of a dispute and deposit such payments in the Bank-Fund Staff Federal Credit Union in an interest bearing account until entitlement is resolved. - Accordingly, the Committee decided to withhold from Mr. [“P”]’s early retirement pension the payments claimed by Ms. [“Q”] (28%) and to deposit such payments in escrow until entitlement is resolved. - The Committee encouraged the parties to reach a mutual agreement upon which it could act. ### Review, appeal, and Administrative Tribunal application - September 27, 2000: Mr. “P” filed an Application for Review of the Administration Committee’s Decision pursuant to Rule VIII of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure (no right of review within the Section 11.3 Rules). - Filing the Application for Review was a necessary predicate to exhaustion of administrative review for admissibility before the Administrative Tribunal. - Ms. “Q” took no action to request review of the Committee Decision. - November 30, 2000: The Administration Committee informed Mr. “P” that it found no basis to reverse its July 27, 2000 Decision and that withholding would continue “...until this matter has been resolved by the agreement of parties, or otherwise.” - The Committee’s letter informed Mr. “P” of his right to file an Application with the Administrative Tribunal within three months of notification. - February 28, 2001: Mr. “P” filed his Application in the Administrative Tribunal. ### Applicant’s principal contentions (summary) - On the merits, Applicant contended: 1. The Rules of the Administration Committee of the SRP under §11.3 do not authorize the escrow of pension payments in the circumstances of this case. 2. Rule 1(b) of the Rules of the Administration Committee presumes a foreseeable conclusion to the controversy between the parties, and therefore is not applicable here. 3. The Egyptian divorce, granted prior to the Maryland Judgment of Absolute Divorce, was final and legal and entitled to recognition under principles of comity applied by Maryland courts; therefore the Maryland court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its Judgment of February 11, 2000, as no valid marriage existed at that time. 4. Under Maryland law, the Egyptian divorce is presumed valid absent evidence to the contrary. There can be no showing that the Egyptian divorce, involving two Egyptian nationals, was invalid for lack of jurisdiction, violation of due process, or otherwise offending public policy. Ms. “Q” was served in the Egyptian divorce action at her domicile in Egypt and her abode in Maryland; her attorney also received service on her behalf at her office in Maryland. *Report and Recommendations of the Family Division Master; Administration Committee Decisions and Rules; Statute of the Administrative Tribunal (International Monetary Fund).* ### 5. Under Egyptian conflict-of-law rules (Egyptian Civil Code, Arts. 12 and 13), the ### j2001-2 - 5. Under Egyptian conflict-of-law rules (Egyptian Civil Code, Arts. 12 and 13), the ### Conflict of laws and patrimonial effects - Under Egyptian conflict-of-law rules (Egyptian Civil Code, Arts. 12 and 13), the effects of the marriage, including the patrimonial effects, and the consequences of its termination are subject to the law of nationality, i.e. Egyptian law. - Egyptian law mandates a total patrimonial separation of assets between the spouses throughout the marriage and thereafter; accordingly, Ms. “Q” could not be entitled to claim any rights to Mr. “P”’s pension under Egyptian law. ### Applicant’s contentions opposing admissibility of the Application for Intervention - The Applicant for Intervention lacks standing to intervene: that Ms. “Q” has a right that may be affected by the Judgment to be given by the Tribunal is an insufficient basis for intervention. - Rights Ms. “Q” claims by virtue of the Maryland Court’s Judgment of Absolute Divorce are legal claims to be resolved by the courts, not the International Monetary Fund. - The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. §288 et seq., provide the IMF and its assets immunity from judicial process; any remedy for Ms. “Q”, if any, must be found under an express waiver of immunity by the Fund. ### Respondent’s principal contentions — merits (summary of Answer and Rejoinder) - The Administration Committee of the SRP acted properly and in accordance with its Rules in deciding to withhold and place in escrow a portion of Applicant’s pension benefits. - The Committee properly decided that a bona fide dispute existed as to the application, interpretation, effectiveness, finality or validity of the court order it was asked to enforce. - The Administration Committee obtained an opinion from Egyptian legal counsel advising that the Egyptian divorce was valid under Egyptian law, and relied upon the Fund’s Legal Department that the Maryland Judgment was in order and consistent with the Plan’s provisions and Rules. - The legality of the Committee’s action would be subject to challenge only if it could be shown that the Committee improperly determined that a bona fide dispute existed. - Section 11.3 of the SRP and the Administration Committee’s Rules thereunder are valid and legal; they balance the Fund’s interest in equitable treatment of staff of different nationalities with its interest in ensuring staff not use the organization’s immunities to avoid personal legal obligations. - Placing disputed amounts in escrow is intended to protect the rights of both parties, who must resolve the dispute between themselves or through the courts. - As an international organization, the Fund may not favor the legal system of one member country over another; there are no universally accepted principles for resolving conflicts such as the present case. - The underlying conflict of laws issue is not appropriate for resolution by the Administration Committee of the SRP and need not be reached by the Administrative Tribunal. ### Respondent’s contentions opposing admissibility of the Application for Intervention - Ms. “Q” is not a staff member; nor is she an enrollee in, or beneficiary under, the SRP. Therefore she is not a person to whom the Tribunal is open under Article II, Section 1 of the Statute and is not in the class of persons permitted to intervene under Rule XIV of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. - Section 11.3 of the SRP provides that “[a] direction or accepted request or payment incident thereto shall not convey to any person an interest in the Retirement Fund of the Plan or give any elective rights under the Plan to such person.” (Section 11.3.) Hence Ms. “Q” has no beneficial interest in or rights under the Plan; she is in the position of a creditor vis-à-vis Mr. “P”. - While denying the Application for Intervention, the Fund suggested Ms. “Q” should be allowed to submit her views as amicus curiae pursuant to Rule XV. ### Intervenor’s principal contentions — merits - The Maryland Judgment entitling Ms. “Q” to a portion of Mr. “P”’s pension is valid and should be given effect immediately. - The Maryland Court properly rejected comity arguments and found it retained jurisdiction to grant a final divorce and to order relief concerning disposition of marital property; the action was filed in 1997 and Mr. “P” participated until he left the country in July 1998; Ms. “Q” remained domiciled in Maryland throughout. - Even if a final divorce had been obtained abroad by Mr. “P”, under Maryland Family Law §8-212 and §11-1105 the Maryland Court would continue to have authority to enter orders concerning disposition of marital property and support. - The Maryland Court properly obtained jurisdiction over Mr. “P” because he actively participated in litigation until July 1998, thereby submitting himself to the Court’s jurisdiction. - The Egyptian divorce would not be binding under principles of comity because there was no personal jurisdiction over Ms. “Q” in the Egyptian action: Ms. “Q” has no domicile in Egypt and did not receive service in Maryland or via her counsel; the Egyptian divorce offends the public policy of Maryland. - The Egyptian action did not exercise jurisdiction over Ms. “Q” or any property of the parties, including the IMF pension, and does not purport to deal with support or marital property issues; therefore it is not in conflict with the Maryland Judgment. - Prior to his marriage to Ms. “Q”, Mr. “P” was divorced by decree of a Virginia court from his first wife, who was also an Egyptian national. ### Intervenor’s contentions in support of admissibility of her Application for Intervention - Ms. “Q” has a right which may be affected by the Judgment to be given by the Tribunal. - Ms. “Q” is a person to whom the Tribunal is open under Article II, Section 1 of the Statute, because by order of the Maryland Court she is a beneficiary of a portion of monthly pension payments from the Fund’s SRP. ### Tribunal’s procedural decision on the Application for Intervention and jurisdictional questions - During the pendency of the proceedings the President of the Administrative Tribunal, pursuant to Rule XIV, para. 3 of the Rules of Procedure, and in consultation with other members, decided to admit the Application for Intervention filed by Ms. “Q”. - Intervention is governed by Article X of the Tribunal’s Statute and Rule XIV of the Rules of Procedure. Article X, Section 2(b) provides for “intervention by persons to whom the Tribunal is open under Section 1 of Article II, whose rights may be affected by the judgment.” Two statutory requirements for intervention are: (1) the intervenor must be a person within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personæ; and (2) the intervenor must have a right that may be affected by the judgment to be given by the Tribunal. These requirements are reaffirmed in Rule XIV, para. 1. - Requirements for intervention are distinct from those for amicus curiæ (Rule XV). An intervenor, once admitted, thereafter participates as a party; an amicus curiæ does not. - It was not disputed that Ms. “Q”, having brought the Request in the Administration Committee to give effect to the Maryland Judgment, has interests that may be affected by the Tribunal’s judgment; the admissibility issue turned on whether Ms. “Q” fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personæ. - Article II, Section 1 of the Statute prescribes the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personæ: - “The Tribunal shall be competent to pass judgment upon any application: a. by a member of the staff challenging the legality of an administrative act adversely affecting him; or b. by an enrollee in, or beneficiary under, any retirement or other benefit plan maintained by the Fund as employer challenging the legality of an administrative act concerning or arising under any such plan which adversely affects the applicant.” - The Fund argued Ms. “Q” did not have standing under Article II, Section 1 because she was neither a staff member nor an enrollee or beneficiary under the SRP; Section 11.3 of the SRP states a direction or accepted request does not convey an interest in the Retirement Fund or give elective rights under the Plan. - Mr. “P” argued Ms. “Q” lacked standing because having a right that may be affected by the Tribunal’s Judgment is an insufficient basis for intervention; any interest of Ms. “Q” should be resolved by the courts and any remedy would require an express waiver of immunity by the IMF. - The Tribunal earlier examined its jurisdiction ratione personæ in Estate of Mr. “D”, IMFAT Judgment No. 2001-1 (March 30, 2001), exercising jurisdiction over a successor in interest to a non-staff enrollee in the Fund’s Medical Benefits Plan; the Tribunal relied on the Commentary on the Statute indicating Section 1(b) allows individuals who are not staff but who have rights under these plans to bring claims concerning decisions under or with respect to the plan. - The Tribunal distinguished Estate of Mr. “D” from Mr. “A”, IMFAT Judgment No. 1999-1 (August 12, 1999), where contractual employees were held excluded from jurisdiction ratione personæ by express statutory drafting and legislative history. *Source: International Monetary Fund Administrative Tribunal documents.* ### 59. The question raised by the present case was whether there is any language in the SRP ### j2001-2 - 59. The question raised by the present case was whether there is any language in the SRP ### Jurisdictional issue: whether SRP Section 11.3 precludes Tribunal jurisdiction over an intervenor - The Fund argued Section 11.3 of the SRP should be read to exclude from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personæ persons such as Ms. “Q” because Section 11.3 states that acceptance of a Request to give effect to a domestic relations order does “not convey to any person an interest in the Retirement Fund of the Plan or give any elective rights under the Plan to such person.” - The text of Section 11.3: - uses the term “designee” for a person receiving benefits under a direction or accepted request; - refers to the “benefit payable to the spouse or former spouse” (emphasis supplied). - The term “beneficiary” is not defined anywhere within the SRP Plan document (see SRP, Article I – Definitions). - The absence of “elective rights” under the Plan (e.g., election of an early retirement pension (Section 4.2), a reduced pension with a pension to a survivor (Section 4.6), or commutation of a portion of the pension to a lump sum payment (Section 15.1)) does not preclude person from being a “beneficiary” because such elective rights are generally reserved to SRP participants (or retired participants). One exception noted: election of the currency of payment is available to a survivor as well as to a retired participant (SRP, Section 16.3). - The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal, and its Commentary, distinguish “elective rights” from “rights” under the Plan generally; Article II, Section 1(b) of the Statute permits adjudication by the Administrative Tribunal of individuals who “have rights under these [benefit] plans” (as emphasized in Estate of Mr. “D”). - Section 11.3 grants rights under the Plan to persons such as the Applicant for Intervention to request the Administration Committee to give effect to applicable domestic relations orders. - The Administration Committee has created an administrative review procedure open to “any person claiming any rights or benefits under the Plan” (Administration Committee Rules of Procedure, Rule II (1)), which Ms. “Q” initiated by requesting the Administration Committee to give effect to the Maryland Judgment. - The President of the Administrative Tribunal, in consultation with the Associate Judges, concluded that Ms. “Q” was a person who has a right under the Plan, as stated in SRP Section 11.3: a “spouse or former spouse of a participant or retired participant who is a party to the court order or decree [to] request that the Administration Committee give effect to such court order or decree and treat the request in the same manner as if it were a direction from a participant or a retired participant.” (SRP, Section 11.3.) - The Tribunal emphasized that Article II, Section (1)(b) jurisdiction ratione personæ is narrow and limits jurisdiction ratione materiæ to challenges to administrative acts taken under the applicable benefit plan and adversely affecting the applicant. - Conclusion: consistent with the Statute’s legislative history and the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, the Applicant for Intervention was, for purposes of Article II, Section 1 of the Tribunal’s Statute, a beneficiary under a Fund benefit plan for the purpose of challenging the legality of the Administration Committee’s Decision on her Request to give effect to the Maryland order. Ms. “Q”’s Application for Intervention was granted. ### Implementation of Rule XIV, para. 3: intervenor participation as a party - Granting the Application for Intervention required implementing Rule XIV, para. 3 that the intervenor “participate in the proceedings as a party.” - Significance of participation as a party: - enables adjudication with finality of the intervenor’s rights vis-à-vis the administrative act of the Fund (the contested Decision of the Administration Committee); - gives the intervenor the opportunity to exchange pleadings with other parties, receiving notice of Applicant’s and Respondent’s arguments and an opportunity to respond. - Procedural posture and pleadings: - The Rules of Procedure contain no provision to suspend the exchange of pleadings on the merits while an application for intervention is pending; at the conclusion of submissions on admissibility there remained one pleading on the merits to be filed: Respondent’s Rejoinder. - The Application for Intervention contained factual presentation and legal argumentation not limited to admissibility; accordingly, it could be regarded as analogous to Applicant’s Application and Respondent’s Answer. - Because Ms. “Q” had not had an opportunity for a responsive pleading analogous to the Reply of Applicant and the Rejoinder of Respondent, she was given thirty days from notification of admissibility of the Application for Intervention to file such a pleading addressing the merits filed by Applicant and Respondent. - The President later called upon the parties to submit Additional Statements under Rule XI in the exceptional circumstances of the case. ### The Fund’s internal law on giving effect to domestic relations orders and related developments - The case arises under the Fund’s revised policy, adopted in 1999, of giving effect, upon request of a spouse or former spouse of an SRP participant or retired participant, to a court order requiring spouse or child support payments or the division of marital property from SRP benefits otherwise payable to the participant. - Evolution of Fund policy has been influenced by adverse publicity about non-compliance by international civil servants with domestic relations orders and by the response of the United States Government. ### IMF immunity from judicial process and legal framework - Article IX of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides the Fund with status, immunities, and privileges to enable it to fulfill its functions; relevant provisions include: - Section 2: the Fund shall possess full juridical personality with capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of property, and to institute legal proceedings. - Section 3: “The Fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” - Sections 4–7 and 10 set out immunity from other action, inviolability of archives, freedom of assets from restrictions, privilege for communications, and members’ obligations to implement these principles in their territories. - The Fund is a Specialized Agency under the United Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies; Article VI, Section 23 of that Convention provides that “Each specialized agency shall co-operate at all times with the appropriate authorities of member States to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations and prevent the occurrence of any abuses in connexion with the privileges, immunities and facilities mentioned in this article.” - In the United States, the IMF’s privileges and immunities are codified by the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 et seq. (“IOIA”): - Section 288a provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract,” and that property and assets of international organizations “shall be immune from search ... and from confiscation,” and that archives are inviolable. - U.S. case law: the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has upheld immunity of international organizations under the IOIA in wage garnishment actions, Atkinson v. Inter-American Development Bank, 156 F. 3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1988). - Section 9.1 of the SRP states that all contributions, assets, funds, and income of the Plan are the property of the IMF and that “No person shall have any interest in or right to any part of the Retirement Fund or of the earnings thereof or any rights in, or to, or under the Plan, or any part of the assets thereof, except as and to the extent expressly provided in the Plan.” (SRP, Section 9.1.) - Because the IMF’s immunities protect both the Organization and its retirement fund from judicial process, the Fund has taken alternative measures to provide mechanisms for giving effect to domestic relations orders while preserving its immunities. ### 1995 amendment to SRP Section 11.3 and Administration Committee Rules - From June 1, 1995, the Plan was amended to permit a participant or retired participant to make an irrevocable instruction to have the Plan pay a part of his or her pension benefits to a former spouse to satisfy marital obligations of divorce or legal separation, provided the sum represents an amount needed to meet alimony or support obligations, or to effect a division of assets relating to divorce or legal separation (Staff Bulletin No. 95/4 (March 16, 1995)). - In May 1996, Rules of the Administration Committee under the amended Section 11.3 were notified to staff; these Rules clarified: - activation of a direction to the Plan was contingent on review of the applicable court order by the Fund’s Legal Department to determine that it was “in order ... and not inconsistent with the provisions of the Plan and the [Administration Committee’s] Rules.” (Rule 1(a), 1995 Rules of the Administration Committee under Section 11.3 of the Staff Retirement Plan); - the Administration Committee may suspend activation of the direction and associated payments pending resolution of disputes between parties where there is ambiguity or bona fide dispute about efficacy, finality, or meaning of an order or decree (Rule 1(b), 1995 Rules). - Mr. “P”’s first case before the Administrative Tribunal arose under the 1995 amendment and associated Rules. ### Code of Conduct (1998) - In July 1998, the Fund issued a Code of Conduct governing staff both in the workplace and externally; the Code explicitly states it is a violation for a member of the staff to fail to comply with court-mandated spousal or child support obligations. *Source: IMF Administrative Tribunal decision excerpts and SRP provisions as provided by the IMF.* ### 8. The Fund respects the privacy of staff members and ### 8. The Fund respects the privacy of staff members and ### Standards of conduct and obligations of staff - The Fund “respects the privacy of staff members and does not wish to interfere with their personal lives and behavior outside the workplace,” but the status of an international civil servant “carries certain obligations as regards conduct, both at work and elsewhere.” - The Fund attaches great importance to: - observance of local laws by staff members; - avoidance of actions that could be perceived as an abuse of the privileges and immunities conferred on the Fund and its staff. - Examples of conduct of concern: - Failure to meet private legal obligations to pay child support and alimony. - Noncompliance with applicable laws concerning the treatment of G-5 domestic employees (the program is available as a special privilege for international organization personnel). - Notoriously disgraceful conduct involving domestic violence or abuse of family members. - The Fund will inform a staff member if concerns about behavior outside the workplace are brought to its attention by third parties, but the Fund is not the body to determine whether local laws have been violated; domestic courts decide such matters. - If the Fund receives a lawful order from a court or other governmental authority instructing it to withhold an amount of salary to satisfy an outstanding legal obligation, “the Fund will not allow the staff member to take undue advantage of the fact that it is immune from such orders.” ### U.S. Diplomatic Note (July 8, 1998) and U.S. Secretary of State letter - The United States Secretary of State sent a Diplomatic Note on July 8, 1998, requesting voluntary efforts by international organizations to ensure that court-ordered child- and spouse-support payments involving employees are made and that employees are not permitted to use organizational immunity to shield themselves from personal obligations. - The covering letter stated: - Invoking immunity to “protect” the organization may not serve the greater interest of protecting the welfare of spouses and children who have been part of the IMF community. - “Invoking immunity, if unaccompanied by measures which effectively address the difficulties that institutional immunity creates for spouses and children, is wrong.” - The IMF “must be a model for the highest standards of social responsibility.” - “Neither of us wants the International Monetary Fund to protect – or to be seen as protecting – individuals who refuse to provide for their children and former spouse.” - The Diplomatic Note observed: - “... it is highly inappropriate for international organizations to allow their privileges and immunities to be used by employees of the organizations to avoid meeting their court-ordered obligations to divorced spouses and dependent children.” - The Secretary of State requested that steps be taken promptly to ensure that organizations voluntarily provide court-ordered or subpoenaed information required to determine salary and benefits of an employee involved in divorce and family law proceedings, and that organizations voluntarily take steps to enforce court-ordered payments to divorced spouses and dependent children. - The Note warned that perceptions of immunities being used to avoid just financial obligations could lead to “the imposition of non-voluntary remedies which may result in either a diminution of privileges and immunities under the IOIA or protracted litigation.” ### 1999 Fund revisions to internal law and procedures - The IMF formed a working group and, by mid-1999, adopted significant changes to its internal law to give effect to court orders with regard to both current and former members of staff, at the request of a spouse or former spouse of a staff member or retiree. - Staff Bulletin No. 99/11 (May 4, 1999) announced two policy changes: - The Fund will respond directly to court orders seeking information in the context of divorce and child support proceedings as to an employee or former employee’s compensation, SRP benefits and beneficiaries. - At the request of a spouse or former spouse, the Fund will give effect to wage garnishment or withholding orders; the affected employee or former employee is given notice and an opportunity to object. - Procedural protections in Staff Bulletin No. 99/11 (Attachment) include: - The Fund employee will be given written notice and at least ten working days to object to the Fund complying with a request. - If the employee objects, the employee may challenge the adequacy of the order on criteria including: - reasonable method of notification and reasonable opportunity to be heard; - judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; - product of fair proceedings; - final and binding and not subject to appeal; - order does not conflict with any other valid court order or decree. - A court order will be given effect unless the employee demonstrates that the court order does not satisfy the criteria set forth above. - The Fund emphasized these procedures were undertaken “voluntarily”, and “without waiving [the Fund’s] privileges and immunities.” - The changes announced in Staff Bulletin No. 99/11 apply to retirees as well as active staff. ### 1999 revision of SRP Section 11.3 and Rules of the Administration Committee - Staff Bulletin No. 99/12 (June 9, 1999) revised SRP Section 11.3 and attached new Rules of the Administration Committee to address retired SRP participants who moved out of the jurisdiction of the court issuing a domestic relations order. - SRP Section 11.3 (1999 Revision) key provisions: - A participant or retired participant may direct in writing that a benefit payable under the Plan be paid to one or more former spouses or a current spouse from whom there is a decree of legal separation when the legal obligation arises from a marital relationship (including child support) evidenced by a court order or settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce or separation decree. - If a participant or retired participant fails to submit a timely written direction, a spouse or former spouse who is a party to the court order may request that the Administration Committee give effect to such court order or decree and the request will be treated as if it were a direction from the participant or retired participant. - “Pending the Administration Committee’s consideration of such request or the resolution of a dispute ... the Administration Committee may withhold, in whole or in part, payments otherwise payable to the participant or retired participant or the spouse or former spouse.” - 1999 Rules of the Administration Committee under SRP Section 11.3: - Notice and response timeframe: - “The Secretary of the Administration Committee will give a participant or retired participant written notice of such a request from a spouse or former spouse. The participant or retired participant will be allowed, as the Administration Committee shall specify, at least thirty (30) working days either to consent or to object to the request, giving a full written explanation for any objection.” (Rule 1(b)) - Four substantive criteria creating a presumption of validity for a court order or decree (Rule 2): - (A) validity by reason that: - (1) a reasonable method of notification has been employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard has been afforded to the persons affected; and - (2) the judgment has been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and in accordance with such requirements of the state as are necessary for the valid exercise of power by the court; - (B) is the product of fair proceedings; - (C) is final and binding on the parties; and - (D) does not conflict and is not inconsistent with any other valid court order or decree. - If a party objects, the Administration Committee will assess adequacy based on the same criteria (A) through (D) and will not review the merits of the underlying case or attempt to review the judgment of the court regarding rights or equities between the parties. - If the Administration Committee finds the court order does not satisfy any one or more of the criteria, the parties will be notified and the order will not be given effect unless and until deficiencies are remedied. If there is an inconsistency or conflict with a prior direction or accepted request, neither order will be given effect unless and until conflicts are resolved. - Limitations on authority: - The Committee will take no final action where there is a “bona fide dispute” regarding the validity of the court order, though it may place disputed amounts in escrow. - The Committee will not interpret agreements between spouses or former spouses, directions or accepted requests to pay, or orders or decrees of courts in cases of ambiguity, nor will it resolve questions where there is a bona fide dispute about efficacy, finality or meaning of an order or decree; activation of directions or requests and associated payments may be suspended until the ambiguity or dispute is settled to the Committee’s judgment. ### Conflict-of-laws issues and Egyptian divorce example - The dispute discussed involves differing approaches to divorce law and choice of law under Egyptian law and the law of the United States (State of Maryland). - Egyptian divorce example (Mr. “P” and Ms. “Q”): - On July 22, 1998, Mr. “P” obtained a “first revocable divorce” from Ms. “Q” by declaration before a religious notary in Egypt. - Ms. “Q” was not present, nor did she have prior notice of the declaration. - The divorce involved no provision for marital support or division of property. - According to an explanation of Egyptian law provided to the IMF Legal Department by a qualified Egyptian attorney: - “... under Egyptian Law, a Moslem husband may divorce his wife by making declaration to this effect before a duly licensed Religious Notary in the presence of two witnesses notwithstanding wife being present or not. This means that the husband does not need to go to court in order to obtain a divorce order.” - “In other words, there had been no legal proceedings initiated with any court in Egypt, nor were such proceedings at all required, in order for the husband to obtain the divorce he seeks.” - “I reiterate that this is not a divorce judgment.” - By contrast, under Egyptian law access to divorce differs for a wife, who must bring a court action to effect a divorce unless there is an agreement otherwise in the contract of marriage. *Source: IMF Code of Conduct; Diplomatic Note from U.S. Secretary of State (July 8, 1998); Staff Bulletin No. 99/11 (May 4, 1999); Staff Bulletin No. 99/12 (June 9, 1999); SRP Section 11.3 (1999 Revision); 1999 Rules of the Administration Committee under SRP Section 11.3.* ### 91. The meaning of the term “first revocable divorce” is explained by the Egyptian ### j2001-2 - 91. The meaning of the term “first revocable divorce” is explained by the Egyptian ### Meaning of “first revocable divorce” under Egyptian law - The husband has a two-month period in which, at his own prerogative, he may restore the marital relationship. - Once the two-month period has elapsed, the divorce is considered final. - It is undisputed that the two-month period ran without restoration of the marital relationship under Egyptian law, and that it had run before the entry of the Judgment of Absolute Divorce by the Maryland Court. ### Divorce consequences under Egyptian law (property, alimony, and enforceability) - Egyptian law does not provide for mandatory division of property as a consequence of divorce. - Division of property can be effected through an agreement made at the time of marriage. - In the absence of such an agreement, the divorced wife would have the right to seek a court judgment for: - a deferred portion of the dowry as agreed in the certificate of marriage, - “living support alimony” of one year, - “enjoyment alimony” of two years. - No such court action in Egypt, if available to Ms. “Q”, was undertaken by her; she continued to pursue divorce proceedings in Maryland. - An Egyptian attorney opined that: - “any U.S. Court judgment for a division of property between the spouses would not be enforceable in Egypt in connection with any of the husband’s property located in Egypt as such judgment would be deemed inconsistent with Egypt’s Public Policy.” (Emphasis in original.) - “As an absolute rule of mandatory application under Egyptian Law, there is a total patrimonial separation of assets between the two spouses, throughout the period of marriage, and a fortiori after the coming to an end of the marital relationship.” ### Actions taken in Egypt related to extinguishing claims - Mr. “P” filed a declaratory court action in Egypt “... requesting a ruling deciding the clearance of the claimant of any financial liabilities. ...” That action is presently pending according to Applicant’s Additional Statement. ### Notice of the Egyptian divorce and domicile questions - Egyptian procedure: The divorce declaration by the husband is documented in an official certificate signed by Notary, husband and the two witnesses; the Notary enters the declaration into a special ledger kept for this purpose with the Court of Jurisdiction. - A copy of the declaration is formally served on the divorced wife “at the address stated by the husband, at his own responsibility, in the divorce certificate.” - No court proceedings are required to consummate the divorce; accordingly, “no need for serving notice has arisen.” - “Notice,” as described under Egyptian law, is for notification purposes and “does not affect the legality or finality of the divorce.” - Factual dispute: - Applicant asserts: Ms. “Q” “was served in the Egyptian divorce action at her domicile in Egypt and at her abode in Maryland. Her attorney also received service of process on her behalf at her office in Maryland.” Applicant attached documentation that the divorce certificate was delivered on August 30, 1998 to a neighbor in Cairo authorized to receive it. - Ms. “Q” swears she: - “is resident and domiciliary of the state of Maryland, and have been since August, 1989.” - “do not maintain a domicile in Egypt.” - “was not personally served with process in the purported Egyptian action and had no notice of any proceeding, and no opportunity to be heard there.” - “was not served with any documents relating to an Egyptian divorce proceedings at my abode in Maryland.” - “did not appear at any divorce proceeding in Egypt.” - It is noted that Ms. “Q” and her counsel learned of the Egyptian divorce soon after through the 1998 dispute before the SRP Administration Committee and the litigation pending in Maryland. ### Conflict of laws rules of Egypt (Egyptian Civil Code excerpts and application) - Relevant provisions of the Egyptian Civil Code as quoted: - Art. 10 – “Egyptian law will rule to determine the nature of a legal relationship in order to ascertain the law applicable in the event of a conflict between various laws in any particular suit.” - Art. 11 – “The status and the legal capacity of persons are governed by the law of the country to which they belong by reason of their nationality.” - Art. 12 – “The fundamental conditions relating to the validity, of marriage are governed by the (national) law of each of the two spouses.” - Art. 13 – “The effects of marriage, including its effects upon the property of the spouses, are regulated by the law of the country to which the husband belongs at the time of the conclusion of the marriage. Repudiation of marriage is governed by the law of the country to which the husband belongs at the time of repudiation, whereas divorce and separation are governed by the law of the country to which the husband belongs at the time of the commencement of the legal proceedings.” - Art. 14 – “If, in the cases provided for in the two preceding articles one of the two spouses is an Egyptian at the time of the conclusion of the marriage, Egyptian law alone shall apply except as regards the legal capacity to marry.” - Art. 15 – “Obligations as regards payment of alimony to relatives are governed by the (national) law of the person liable for such payment.” - Applicant’s application of the Civil Code to the case: - Both the marriage and the July 1998 divorce of Mr. “P” and Ms. “Q” are governed by Egyptian law. - Citations/arguments presented: - “(C) ... According to the explicit wording of Article 13, all the effects of the marriage, including the patrimonial effects, as well as the consequences of termination of the relationship are subject to the law of nationality, which is Egyptian Law. - (D) As an absolute rule of mandatory application under Egyptian Law, there is a total patrimonial separation of assets between the two spouses, throughout the period of marriage, and a fortiori after the coming to an end of the marital relationship. - (E) Consequently, within the context of the present case, [Ms. “Q”] could not be entitled, under Egyptian Law, to claim any rights on the sums of money allocated by the International Monetary Fund as retirement pension to [Mr. “P”]. - (F) The above-stated lack of standing to claim any rights on the pension payments [received] by [Mr. “P”] is clearly the rule in conformity with Egyptian Law which governs the relationship that existed with the former wife and which continues to prevail after the divorce which took place in July 1998. - (G) Whatever contrary decision emerges as a result of the ‘Judgement of Absolute Divorce’ rendered on February 11th, 2000, rendered by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland, U.S.A., against [Mr. “P”] could not have any effect under Egyptian Law, as the Divorce already took place in July 1998 and the total separation of property rights between the two spouses represents the mandatory applicable rule.” ### Maryland proceedings, property division, and pension award specifics - The Maryland Judgment of Absolute Divorce (entered March 2, 2000) resulted from adversary proceedings initiated by Ms. “Q”’s Complaint for divorce; Mr. “P” participated in proceedings until he left the United States in July 1998. - The Domestic Relations Master based the divorce on a two-year separation and assessed factors including: - contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; - the value of all property interests of each party; - the economic circumstances of each party; - the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; - the duration of the marriage; - the age, physical and mental condition of each party; - how and when specific marital property, including Mr. “P”’s IMF pension entitlement, was acquired. - The Maryland Court ordered: - a monetary award to Ms. “Q” representing one-half of the total marital property (less the value of her personal property and one-half interest in an automobile); - a continuing share (28%) of Mr. “P”’s IMF pension entitlement (an amount representing one-half of the amount of the pension earned during Mr. “P”’s marriage to Ms “Q”); - survivor benefits under the pension attributable to the portion earned during the marriage; - judgment for the amount of pendente lite alimony payments that Mr. “P” had ceased to make after he left the country; - attorney’s fees. ### Maryland conflict-of-laws rule: divisible divorce and statutory bases - Maryland Court’s reasoning retained jurisdiction to grant a divorce and to order division of marital property because: - Ms. “Q” had remained domiciled in Maryland, and - there was no exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ms. “Q” by an Egyptian court in a divorce action. - Family Law Article statutory citations quoted: - § 8-212. Exercise of powers after foreign divorce or annulment. - If an annulment or a divorce has been granted by a court in a foreign jurisdiction, a court in this State may exercise the powers under this subtitle if: - (1) 1 of the parties was domiciled in this State when the foreign proceeding was commenced; and - (2) the court in the other jurisdiction lacked or did not exercise personal jurisdiction over the party domiciled in this State or jurisdiction over the property at issue. (CJ § 3-6A-02; 1984, ch. 296, § 2.) - § 11-105. Same – Following decree by another jurisdiction. - If an annulment or a limited or absolute divorce has been granted by a court in another jurisdiction, a court in this State may award alimony to either party if: - (1) the court in the other jurisdiction lacked or did not exercise personal jurisdiction over the party seeking alimony; and - (2) the party seeking alimony was domiciled in this State at least 1 year before the annulment or divorce was granted. (An. Code 1957, art. 16, § 1; 1984, ch. 296 § 2.) - These provisions codify Maryland’s doctrine of “divisible divorce.” ### U.S. Supreme Court precedent informing divisible divorce doctrine (Estin v. Estin) - Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), arose under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and addressed whether a State could continue to enforce a support order when the payer later obtained an ex parte divorce in another State. - The Supreme Court held that a state in which the spouse receiving support remains domiciled may retain jurisdiction to enforce an earlier support order if that spouse did not participate in the divorce proceedings in the other state. - The Court emphasized the domiciliary state’s legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its domiciliary and noted the absence of power in the divorce-granting state to determine the personal rights of a nonappearing domiciliary. - The Maryland Court applied the divisible divorce doctrine consistent with Estin and with Maryland statutory provisions cited above. *Source: International Monetary Fund* ### 113. The Court concluded by articulating the rule of “divisible divorce”: ### j2001-2 - 113. The Court concluded by articulating the rule of “divisible divorce”: ### Divisible divorce — Estin precedent - Key holding (quotation preserved): - “… the fact that marital capacity was changed does not mean that every other legal incidence of the marriage was necessarily affected. ...An absolutist might quarrel with the result and demand a rule that once a divorce is granted, the whole of the marriage relation is dissolved, leaving no roots or tendrils of any kind. But there are few areas of the law in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable. For the eternal problem of the law is one of making accommodations between conflicting interests. ... The result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible – to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony. It accommodates the interests of both Nevada and New York in this broken marriage by restricting each State to the matters of her dominant concern.” Estin, 334 U.S. at 545, 547. - Application: The Maryland Court’s decision in the divorce action brought by Ms. “Q” against Mr. “P” reflects the policies underlying the Supreme Court’s ruling in Estin. ### Applicant’s argument that the Maryland Court misapplied Maryland law - Applicant’s contentions: - Maryland Court misapplied Maryland law by granting Judgment of Absolute Divorce and ordering division of marital property. - Maryland Court, applying principles of comity, should have recognized the Egyptian divorce and concluded it no longer retained jurisdiction because parties were no longer married. - Argument overlooks statutory grounds relied upon by the Maryland Court or asserts those grounds inapplicable because Ms. “Q”’s domicile was Egypt and there was personal jurisdiction over Ms. “Q” in Egypt. - Intervenor’s responses: - Maryland law embodied in statutory provisions providing for divisibility of divorce was properly applied. - Even absent those statutes, comity would not require recognition of the Egyptian divorce because it offends Maryland public policy: Ms. “Q” lacked notice and did not appear in Egyptian proceedings; Egyptian divorce occurred after Mr. “P” submitted to Maryland jurisdiction and fled the United States while in contempt and contrary to his statements. ### Relevant Maryland precedent — Wolff v. Wolff - Wolff holdings (quotations preserved): - Decree “... may be entitled to recognition under general principles of comity.” (389 A.2d at 418.) - Qualification: “A decree of divorce will not be recognized by comity where it was obtained by a procedure which denies due process of law in the real sense of the term, or was obtained by fraud, or where the divorce offends the public policy of the state in which recognition is sought, or where the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.” Wolff, 389 A.2d at 418-19. - Maryland public policy favors enforcement of support orders; equity courts have jurisdiction to enforce alimony provisions of foreign decrees when such decrees are subject to recognition in the State. (Wolff, 389 A.2d at 419-21; quoting Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 690-91 (1858).) - Observations: - Wolff did not involve competing divorce decrees. - Wolff’s reasoning supports enforcement of support awards and thus has limited applicability to Applicant’s argument that Maryland misapplied Maryland law to defeat recognition. ### Administrative Tribunal’s authority to decide effect of Maryland Judgment under SRP Section 11.3 - Core issue: Whether the Administrative Tribunal has authority to resolve on the merits whether the Maryland Judgment awarding Ms. “Q” an ongoing share of Mr. “P”’s pension entitlement should be given effect under SRP Section 11.3 and Administration Committee Rules. - Respondent’s position (quotation preserved): - “… the sole issues before this Tribunal are: first, whether the Committee acted properly and in accordance with the Rules in deciding to place into escrow a portion of Applicant’s pension benefits; and second, whether the Rules which authorize the withholding of that portion of his pension benefits by the Fund are legal. The unresolved questions of family law concerning the conflicting divorce decrees which provide the underlying basis for the Committee’s decision, and the resolution of a supra-national conflict of jurisdiction regarding the divorce decrees issued in Egypt and Maryland in divorce matters are not appropriate for resolution by the Committee, and need not be reached by the Tribunal in order to resolve the issues outlined above.” - The Fund: “The legality of the Committee’s action could only be challenged if it could be shown that the Committee improperly determined that a bona fide dispute existed.” - Parties’ positions: - Applicant and Intervenor seek a merits decision from the Tribunal on whether the Maryland Judgment should be given effect under SRP Section 11.3. ### Tribunal jurisdiction, remedial authority, and applicable law - Jurisdiction ratione materiæ: - Statutory competence (Article II, quoted and summarized): - Tribunal competent for applications: (a) by a staff member challenging legality of an administrative act adversely affecting him; or (b) by an enrollee/beneficiary under a Fund retirement or benefit plan challenging an administrative act concerning or arising under such plan which adversely affects the applicant. - Definitions: “administrative act” = any individual or regulatory decision in administration of staff; “regulatory decision” = any rule concerning terms and conditions of staff employment, including the General Administrative Orders and the Staff Retirement Plan. - Conclusion: subject matter jurisdiction exists but is limited to review of legality of administrative acts; authority to resolve underlying dispute depends on finding error in Administration Committee decision. - Remedial authority (Article XIV, preserved numeric and textual detail): - If application challenging legality of an individual decision is well-founded, Tribunal shall prescribe rescission of such decision and all other measures required to correct effects. - When prescribing non-monetary measures, Tribunal shall fix an amount of compensation if Managing Director decides not to implement measures; amount shall not exceed the equivalent of three hundred percent (300%) of the current or last annual salary, except in exceptional cases where higher compensation may be ordered with specific reasons. - If application challenging legality of a regulatory decision is well-founded, Tribunal shall annul such decision; individual decisions taken before or after annulment on basis of such regulatory decision shall be null and void. - Tribunal may order reasonable costs, including counsel fees, to be borne by the Fund, considering nature/complexity and prevailing rates. - When required procedures for decision-taking not observed, Tribunal may adjourn proceedings for institution of required procedure or corrective measures for a time certain. - Law to be applied: - Article III: “In deciding on an application, the Tribunal shall apply the internal law of the Fund, including generally recognized principles of international administrative law concerning judicial review of administrative acts.” - Internal law includes formal written sources such as the Articles of Agreement, By-Laws and Rules and Regulations, General Administrative Orders, and unwritten sources; the Articles of Agreement are a higher authority that regulatory decisions must be consistent with. ### Character and legality of the contested administrative acts - Administrative acts at issue: - The individual decision: Administration Committee’s decision to place in escrow the disputed portion of Mr. “P”’s pension entitlement. - The regulatory decision: Section 11.3 of the Staff Retirement Plan (SRP) and Rules under it authorizing the Committee to give effect, under prescribed conditions, to local court orders. - Applicant’s challenges: - Rights claimed by Ms. “Q” via Maryland judgment are “legal claims which will have to be resolved by the courts,” and any remedy must be found under an express waiver of the IMF; SRP Section 11.3 may be illegal under the Fund’s applicable law. - Fund’s policy position: - Fund asserted that mechanisms to give effect to court orders for family support and division of marital property are taken “voluntarily” and “without waiving [the Fund’s] privileges and immunities.” (Staff Bulletin No. 99/11, pp. 1, 2.) - SRP Section 11.3 and Rules do not subject the Fund to court jurisdiction nor require automatic compliance; orders are given effect on case-by-case basis after internal procedures and an Administration Committee decision, subject to appeal to the Administrative Tribunal. - Tribunal conclusion on regulatory decision: - In light of the Executive Board’s authoritative interpretation of the Articles of Agreement and the Fund’s internal law, the Tribunal concludes the regulatory decision (SRP Section 11.3 and Rules) does not violate the Articles of Agreement. ### Legality of the individual decision — scope of review and contested questions - Central legal question: Did the Administration Committee properly apply SRP Section 11.3 and the Rules thereunder in the circumstances? - Parties’ framing: - Respondent: challenge limited to whether a bona fide dispute exists justifying withholding. - Applicant and Intervenor: each argues the other’s position lacks merit and seeks prevailing application of Rules. - Additional Applicant challenges: - SRP Section 11.3 is not applicable to orders for division of marital property but only to support orders. - Holding disputed portion in escrow is unlawful when no foreseeable resolution exists to the dispute between parties (Respondent characterizes this as a challenge to the regulatory decision). ### Does SRP Section 11.3 apply to orders for division of marital property? - Textual analysis (quotations preserved): - SRP Section 11.3 applies broadly to a “legal obligation arising from a marital relationship.” (SRP Section 11.3.) - Specific provision quoted: - “The benefit payable to the spouse or former spouse shall not exceed: (1) 50 percent of the portion of the participant’s or retired participant’s benefit that is attributable to his eligible service during the couple’s marriage whenever the obligation or obligations to which the court order or decree relates are for support of the spouse or former spouse or division of marital property or both, and (2) 66 2/3 percent of the benefit payable to the participant or retired participant whenever the obligation or obligations to which the court order or decree relates includes child support, provided, however, that the amounts payable as support of the spouse and division of marital property remain subject to the limits under (1), above, and any increase that exceeds those limits must be directly related to the amount of the child support portion of such court order or decree.” (SRP Section 11.3.) (Emphasis supplied.) - A similar reference appears in Rule 3 of the Rules of the Administration Committee under Section 11.3. - Conclusion: SRP Section 11.3, by its terms and specific references to division of marital property, encompasses orders for the division of marital property as well as support orders. *IMF Administrative Tribunal judgment (j2001-2).* ### 137. The Administrative Tribunal accordingly concludes that Applicant’s contention that ### j2001-2 - 137. ### Background and core issue - The dispute concerned whether SRP Section 11.3 and the Administration Committee Rules authorize withholding a portion of an Applicant’s pension where there is no foreseeable resolution of the underlying dispute between parties. - Applicant argued that Rule 1(b) (noting the Tribunal’s footnote that Rule 1(c) is the operative provision) requires a foreseeable conclusion to the controversy and that such foreseeability “is certainly not the case here,” rendering suspension inapplicable. - The Fund characterized Applicant’s submission as a challenge both to the Administration Committee’s individual decision and to the underlying regulatory framework. ### Foreseeability and availability of remedies - The record showed no pending court proceedings that could affect the finality or validity of the Maryland Judgment; therefore, the only foreseeable resolutions were either a negotiated settlement between the parties or a decision on the merits by the Administrative Tribunal. - The Fund’s justification for SRP Section 11.3 and the Committee Rules: - The Rules “place[ ] the onus on the parties to resolve what are essentially private, domestic disputes ...” where there are no universally accepted principles for resolving conflicts of law and jurisdiction. - The Rules create an incentive for the parties to resolve the dispute themselves while maintaining the Fund’s neutrality among differing legal systems. - Quoted Fund rationale: “Contrary to Applicant’s assertion, the Rule does admit of a foreseeable conclusion. However, that conclusion is one which must be agreed upon or pursued by the parties themselves, or resolved in the courts, without the intervention of the Fund as employer. ... The approach reflected in Section 11.3 avoids the need for the Committee to act in a manner that is partial to any particular legal system or to one of the parties. Consistent with this objective, the withholding of the disputed portion of the pension benefits pending resolution of the dispute by the parties themselves maintains the neutrality of the Fund vis-à-vis a domestic law matter, maintains the status quo and is a prudent measure that avoids the Fund making payments that might be deemed inappropriate once the dispute is resolved.” ### Tribunal jurisdiction and appellate remedy - SRP Section 7.2(b) provides that Administration Committee decisions on entitlement and amount of benefits are subject to review by the Administrative Tribunal; the Tribunal’s Statute places such review within its jurisdiction ratione materiæ. - The Tribunal emphasized that, absent its appellate authority, Applicant and Intervenor could be indefinitely without third-party remedy; any conjectural error by the Committee in withholding can be remedied by recourse to the Tribunal. ### Existence of a “bona fide dispute” under Rule 1(c) and assessment under Rule 2 - Rule 1(c) (quoted) authorizes suspension where there is ambiguity or a “bona fide dispute about the efficacy, finality or meaning of an order or decree,” permitting suspension “until such ambiguity or dispute shall have been settled in the judgment of the Administration Committee.” - Rule 2 directs assessment of an objected court order against four factors (A)–(D): - (A) validity by reason that (1) reasonable notification and opportunity to be heard were employed and (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with state requirements; - (B) product of fair proceedings; - (C) final and binding on the parties; - (D) does not conflict with or is not inconsistent with any other valid court order or decree. - Application of factors to the Maryland Judgment and the Egyptian divorce: - Factor (A): Applicant did not contest notification or opportunity to be heard in Maryland; the dispute focused on whether the Maryland Court was a “court of competent jurisdiction.” - Factor (B): Fairness of Maryland proceedings not disputed; the question remained jurisdiction. - Factor (C): Finality supported by absence of appeal and both parties’ averments that no litigation was pending affecting validity; bindingness again raised the jurisdiction question. - Factor (D): Relevance unclear; Egyptian divorce prima facie conflicts but may not be a court order/decree and contains no provisions on division of marital property; Rule 2(D) appears directed at conflicts with orders that were the basis of prior directions or accepted requests under the Plan. ### Tribunal’s findings on validity and conflicts of law - The Tribunal has no competence to adjudicate the correctness of municipal law as applied by Maryland or Egyptian authorities; it treated the Maryland Circuit Court decision as the prevailing statement of Maryland law in the absence of appeal. - The Tribunal took as its starting point, based on the record, that: - the Maryland Judgment of Absolute Divorce is valid under Maryland law; and - the Egyptian divorce, as recorded by a religious notary and registered with Egyptian civil authorities, is valid under Egyptian law. - The Tribunal considered institutional policy and legal practice: - SRP Section 11.3 and the Committee Rules align with host-country law and are designed to encourage enforcement of orders for family support and division of marital property. - The Fund’s internal law favors adversary proceedings with reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard; such proceedings receive a presumption of validity under Rule 2. - The Fund’s internal law, and Tribunal jurisprudence, recognize “audi alteram partem” and notice/hearing principles as generally applicable to decisions by international organizations. - Specific factual considerations in the case: - Until July 1998 Mr. “P” submitted to Maryland jurisdiction, then left for Egypt and obtained an ex parte divorce declaration, repudiating Maryland jurisdiction. - SRP Section 11.3 was expressly designed to apply to retired participants who have moved outside the jurisdiction of the court issuing the applicable order. - The Egyptian divorce contains no provisions governing disposition of marital assets; only the Maryland Judgment addressed division of marital property with clear, specific terms. - The Maryland Court held that even if a valid Egyptian divorce existed, the Maryland Court could still issue orders concerning disposition of marital property under Maryland law for the welfare of a Maryland domiciliary. - The Maryland Judgment conformed to the enforceability criteria set out in Rule 2 of the Administration Committee Rules under SRP Section 11.3. ### Tribunal conclusion and order - The Administration Committee’s determination that a “bona fide dispute” existed was understandable but, for reasons set forth by the Tribunal, was in error and must be rescinded. - The Tribunal concluded that the Intervenor’s request should have been given effect under the Staff Retirement Plan by the Administration Committee; the decision responds to the Fund’s internal law (the Fund’s forum public policy), not by enforcing Maryland law or declining Egyptian law. - The Administrative Tribunal unanimously decided: - The decision of the Administration Committee placing in escrow the disputed portion of the Applicant’s pension is rescinded. - The Respondent is directed to pay to the Intervenor the amount now held in escrow, including interest. - In future, the Respondent is directed to pay to the Intervenor the proportion “28%” of the pension of the Applicant as requested by the Intervenor. ### Costs and procedural disposition - Article XIV, Section 4 of the Statute permits discretionary award of reasonable costs to be borne by the Fund when an application is well-founded. - The Tribunal ruled that the Applicant, the Fund and the Intervenor shall bear their own legal costs. --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/imfat/j2001-2.pdf_