## cr17179 — 18.75 percent of The Gambia’s quota in the IMF

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### Background and immediate shock assessment
- Urgent balance of payments need triggered by:
  - weak agricultural season (pre‑harvest report: about half of the groundnut cash crop lost);
  - lower tourism receipts due to political turmoil early 2017;
  - higher commodity prices.
- Staff’s preliminary estimate of combined exogenous shocks: $31 million (3 percent of GDP) in 2017.
- Gross international reserves declined to around $60 million (1.6 months of prospective imports), based on foreign exchange swaps with commercial banks of about $33 million.
- Massive embezzlement by the previous regime depleted state and SOE revenues; preliminary findings suggest at least 4 percent of GDP per year since mid‑2014.
- Total public debt: 120 percent of GDP in 2016 (up from 105 percent in 2015); domestic debt reached 68 percent of GDP in 2016.

### Request for IMF support and program design
- Authorities requested:
  - Fund support under the RCF shocks window of SDR 11,662,500 (18.75 percent of quota).
  - A one‑year Staff Monitored Program (SMP) to catalyze donor support and build a track record toward an eventual ECF.
- Proposed use of RCF: on‑lent for budget support given large financing needs.
- Proposed SMP duration and tests:
  - 12‑month SMP (April 2017 to March 2018) with end‑June and end‑December 2017 test dates.

### Main policy commitments by authorities
- Fiscal anchor: lower net domestic borrowing (NDB) from 11.4 percent in 2016 to 1 percent of GDP in 2017 and beyond; refrain from monetary financing.
- External budget support: 7.2 percent of GDP expected in 2017.
- Complementary non‑tax revenue and expenditure measures: 5 percent of GDP to achieve the NDB target.
- Specific commitments:
  - Drastically reduce domestic borrowing, including ending central bank deficit financing.
  - Increase non‑tax revenue and reduce expenditures in 2017.
  - Comprehensive reforms of key SOEs to secure fiscal adjustment.
  - Develop a strategy to reduce vulnerabilities from domestic debt and coordinate to secure assurances from official creditors.

### Donor and creditor assurances; debt sustainability (DSA)
- Staff informed of commitments of additional support from Multilateral Development Banks and assurances of highly concessional support from some major official bilateral creditors.
- Staff conclusion (with these commitments): total public debt sustainable in the medium term, although risks remain very elevated and external risk rating is high.
- Updated DSA findings (Annex I):
  - The Gambia is in external debt distress and total public debt is not sustainable under the baseline.
  - Decline in CPIA rating lowered indicative DSA thresholds; all five external debt burden indicators breach thresholds under baseline and stress tests.
  - Stock of public debt and SOE contingent liabilities remain above indicative benchmarks for the entire projection horizon.
- Staff notes importance of continuing coordinated approach to secure assurances from other official creditors.

### Recent economic developments and outlook
- GDP growth: 2016 estimated at 2.2 percent (down from 4.3 percent in 2015); growth for 2017 expected at 3 percent.
- Headline annual inflation: 7.9 percent by end‑2016; 8.7 percent in March 2017; CBG target: 5 percent.
- Domestic revenue: fell from 17.6 percent of GDP in 2015 to 16.7 percent of GDP in 2016.
- Total expenditures: just under 30 percent of GDP in 2016.
- Net domestic borrowing in 2016: 11.4 percent of GDP.
- High debt service on domestic debt absorbed 42 percent of government revenue in 2016.
- Exchange rate: stabilized in range 43–48 dalasi per dollar after Nov 1, 2016 directives; 15 percent surrender requirement rescinded in May 2017 and reference rate put under review.
- Medium/longer‑term growth expectations: past episodes of 6–7 percent growth; 20‑year average 3.6 percent; authorities note potential growth gains tied to improvements in corruption index (example: one point increase could raise real GDP by 0.5 percentage points; assumed 5‑point increase over 2017–22 could add around 2.5 percent by 2023).

### Fiscal policy stance, financing needs, and targets (2017)
- Revised 2017 budget and financing situation:
  - Revised tax revenue projection for 2017 down by 2.8 percent of GDP.
  - Total financing needs: 15 percent of GDP.
  - Domestic financing capacity (NDB objective): 1 percent of GDP.
  - Donor support: 7.2 percent of GDP.
  - On‑lending of the RCF: 1.5 percent of GDP.
  - Remaining financing gap to close in 2017: 5.3 percent of GDP.
- Text Table 4 fiscal financing items (GMD Million / Percent of GDP):
  - (A) Fiscal Financing Needs: 706 / 415.0
  - (B) Financing Sources: 692 / 414.7
    - (B.1) NDB Target: 47 / 11.0
    - (B.2) Expenditure cuts: 61 / 21.3
    - (B.3) Non‑tax revenue: 103 / 72.2
    - (B.4) Interest payment savings: 70 / 71.5
    - (B.5) Donor support: 338 / 57.2
    - (B.6) IMF RCF disbursement: 71 / 01.5
  - (C = A − B) Residual Financing Gap: 16 / 30.3
- BOP financing (GMD Million / Percent of GDP):
  - (A) BOP Financing Needs: 409 / 58.7
  - (B) Financing Sources: 409 / 58.7
    - (B.1) Donor support: 338 / 57.2
    - (B.2) IMF RCF disbursement: 71 / 01.5
  - (C = A − B) Residual Financing Gap: 0.0 / 0.0
- Memorandum items:
  - RCF disbursement as share of BOP financing gap: 17.3 percent.
  - RCF disbursement as share of other donor support: 21.0 percent.

### Measures to close the 2017 financing gap (concrete near‑term measures)
- Concrete measures amount to 5.0 percent of GDP (Total Savings: 5.0 | GMD 2348), including (Text Table 2):
  - Expenditure: 2.8 percent of GDP | GMD 1336
  - Interest savings from consolidation into 30‑year CBG bond: 0.7 percent of GDP | GMD 330
  - Interest savings from lower T‑bill rates: 0.8 percent of GDP | GMD 377
  - Expenditure cuts in goods and services: 1.0 percent of GDP | GMD 471
  - Reform policies to reduce the vehicle fleet: 0.3 percent of GDP | GMD 157
  - Revenue items (2.2 percent of GDP | GMD 1013):
    - Sale of the presidential and two other defunct planes: 0.5 percent of GDP | GMD 236
    - Sale of land, including in prime tourist locations: 0.5 percent of GDP | GMD 236
    - Recapture previously diverted non‑tax revenue (international voice gateway, mining concessions, container scanner fees): 1.2 percent of GDP | GMD 541
  - Completion of staff audits to eliminate ghost workers: TBD | TBD
  - Recovery of stolen assets still held in The Gambia: TBD | TBD
- Authorities aim to close the remaining 0.3 percent of GDP financing gap through elimination of ghost workers and recovery of stolen assets.

### Medium‑term fiscal measures (2018–19)
- Medium‑term proposals (Text Table 3):
  - Ongoing reforms to vehicle fleet: 1.7 percent of GDP | GMD 891
  - Streamlining ministries/embassies/memberships: 1.0 percent of GDP | GMD 524
  - Elimination of ghostworkers: TBD | TBD
  - Total Savings — Medium Term: 2.7 percent of GDP | GMD 1,415

### State‑owned enterprise (SOE) reforms and contingent liabilities
- Special audits of all SOEs planned to uncover fraud/embezzlement (stop leakages of 4 percent of GDP annually over past 2½ years) and resolve cross arrears.
- World Bank support: audits for first five SOEs (NAWEC, GNPC, GAMTEL/GAMCEL, GPA, SSHFC) to start soon; audits of CBG and other SOEs to follow.
- NAWEC measures and impacts:
  - Fuel importation switched to competitive tender: reduced cost by 15 percent (based on first tender).
  - Pursue recovery of unpaid bills; increase generating capacity by 50 MW (funding from World Bank, IsDB and BADEA).
  - Regional hydroelectric streaming from 2020 projected to add 80 MW and cut generation cost by about 90 percent.
- GAMTEL/GAMCEL: oversight moved from President’s Office to Ministry of Communications; World Bank support for asset valuation and restructuring/divestiture options.
- Governance and fiscal risk management for SOEs:
  - MoFEA will not contract credit/loan on behalf of SOEs nor approve guarantees unless PFA 2014 preconditions met.
  - MoFEA to create and regularly update a database of government guarantees and publish SOE audit reports on its website.

### Monetary, exchange rate, and financial sector policies
- Monetary policy commitments:
  - Limit central bank financing and phase out any limited new CBG financing completely by October 2017.
  - Reduce policy rate (now cited as 23 percent in one place and 20 percent in another) — text references:
    - "CBG kept its policy rate at 23 percent throughout 2016."
    - "Policy rate: 20 percent (current elevated level)" — program commits to reducing it pending inflation declining toward 5 percent.
  - Exchange rate: flexible policy to absorb shocks and rebuild reserves.
- Monetary operations and institutional strengthening:
  - Strengthen liquidity forecasting, introduce liquidity absorption tools (repos), establish overnight facilities.
  - Revise CBG Act to strengthen autonomy; reconstitute Board; submit amendments by end‑2017.
- Financial sector stability:
  - Financial sector currently stable and profitable but heavily exposed to government and parastatals (assets related to government/parastatals account for 49 percent of banking sector total assets).
  - CBG to monitor impacts of declining interest rates, lower government borrowing, NPLs, and SOE exposure.
  - Plans to develop crisis management capacity, upgrade bank resolution framework, and explore deposit insurance.

### Role of RCF and donor support in closing financing gaps
- Approval of RCF disbursement proposed: SDR 11,662,500 (18.75 percent of quota) — dalasi equivalent around $15.6 million; covers about 11 percent of the fiscal financing gap.
- RCF on‑lending proposal: CBG to on‑lend RCF to government on same financial terms as Fund’s disbursement.
- RCF together with SMP and donor support expected to:
  - Catalyze external budget support disbursements amounting to about $75 million for 2017 (World Bank $41 million; EU $27 million; AfDB $7 million).
  - Help restore gross international reserves to about $85 million, adding 0.4 months to reach 2.0 months of prospective imports in 2017.
- RCF disbursement as presented in monetary tables:
  - Disbursements: 11.7 (Millions of SDRs) in 2017 (Table 8).
  - Memorandum: IMF RCF disbursement: 71 / 01.5 (GMD million / percent of GDP) in Text Table 4.

### Debt sustainability strategy, assurances, and margin for sustainability
- Authorities working with Bank and Fund on strategy to lengthen maturity of domestic debt, including SOE debt.
- Authorities seeking assurances from official creditors (regional development institutions, major non‑Paris Club creditors, Paris Club) for highly concessional support sufficient to cover debt service due over next four years.
- Staff view: if such assurances received by the Board date, debt sustainability could be restored via:
  - lowering gross financing needs;
  - reducing external debt vulnerabilities;
  - lowering PV of total public debt.
- Staff caution: sustainability achievable "but with little margin to spare."
- Assumption on donor use: each additional US$50 million in donor financing would reduce gross financing needs and PV of public debt by about 2–3 percent of GDP in the medium term while supporting growth‑enhancing investment.

### Capacity to repay, risks, and vulnerabilities
- The Gambia’s capacity to repay the Fund: weak but expected to strengthen if measures to make debt sustainable are implemented; risks to outlook persist.
- Key risks:
  - Failure to implement debt‑sustainability measures.
  - Weather‑related shocks.
  - Donor support failing to materialize would likely cause inability to contain spending pressures.
  - Political risks due to ongoing transition.
- Indicators of capacity to repay (selected from Table 8, 2017–27):
  - Principal (millions of SDRs) sequence includes: 3.0, 5.5, 4.6, 3.6, 4.0, 2.8, 1.7, 1.6, 0.8, 0.0, 0.0.
  - Millions of US$: 4.3, 7.6, 6.3, 5.0, 5.5, 5.5, 5.6, 5.4, 4.4, 3.3, 1.7.
  - Percent of Gross International Reserves (outstanding Fund credit): 59.3, 37.0, 27.6, 20.5, 15.8, 11.0, 7.5, 4.5, 2.3, 0.7, 0.0.
  - Outstanding Fund credit (Millions of SDRs): 36.2, 30.7, 26.1, 22.5, 18.5, 14.5, 10.5, 6.6, 3.5, 1.2, 0.0.

### Safeguards assessment findings and needed actions
- Safeguards monitoring visit (March 2017) identified significant areas to strengthen:
  - Fill vacancies at the CBG Board promptly to support governance and oversight.
  - Update the Audit Committee charter to strengthen oversight, including review of external audit firm performance.
  - Amend the CBG Act to strengthen autonomy and curb excessive lending to government.
  - Strengthen procedures for opening/closing accounts and ensure IFMIS reflects government expenditures and revenues properly.
- Key weaknesses to be addressed through SMP program measures (MEFP, Table 2).

### Staff view and rationale for support
- Staff supports authorities’ request for RCF and the SMP, viewing measures as a very significant adjustment effort.
- RCF disbursement would:
  - augment adjustment efforts;
  - help catalyze additional donor financing;
  - provide time to establish a firm picture of state finances given uncovered massive theft.
- SMP will guide policies and establish a track record before a future ECF.
- Staff appraisal summary highlights:
  - External shocks predominantly responsible for urgent BOP need; total BOP‑impact estimated at $31 million (3 percent of GDP).
  - Net usable international reserves precariously low at 0.8 months of prospective imports (Net international reserves noted as US$21.5 million in March 2017 in MEFP).
  - Monetization of the deficit by the CBG created pressures on inflation, exchange rate, and reserves.
  - Gambian authorities need strong external donor support (preferably grants) and strong fiscal measures; exchange rate flexibility will help buffer external shocks and rebuild reserves.

*Italic: IMF staff report content (cr17179).*

### 18.75 percent of The Gambia’s quota in the IMF.

### cr17179 - 18.75 percent of The Gambia’s quota in the IMF.

### Background and immediate shock assessment
- The Gambia faces an urgent balance of payments need triggered by a weak agricultural season, lower tourism receipts due to the political turmoil early this year, and higher commodity prices.
- Staff’s preliminary estimate of the combined exogenous shocks amounts to $31 million (3 percent of GDP) in 2017.
- Gross international reserves have declined to around $60 million (1.6 months of prospective imports), predicated on foreign exchange swaps with commercial banks of about $33 million to shore up the CBG’s foreign exchange holdings.
- Massive embezzlement by the previous regime has depleted state and SOE revenues; preliminary findings of the finance ministry suggest a scale of at least 4 percent of GDP per year since mid-2014 alone.
- Total public debt rose to 120 percent of GDP in 2016, up from 105 percent in 2015, driven by domestic debt reaching 68 percent of GDP in 2016.
- The total BOP-impact of the 2017 shocks is estimated at $31 million (3 percent of GDP) (Text Table 1).

### Request for IMF support and program design
- Authorities requested Fund support under the shocks-window of the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) of SDR 11,662,500 equivalent to 18.75 percent of quota to cope with urgent BOP needs.
- Authorities requested a one-year staff monitored program (SMP) to catalyze donor support, guide policy implementation and help build a track record for an eventual return to an ECF arrangement.
- The RCF disbursement is proposed to be on-lent for budget support given the large financing needs.

### Main policy commitments by authorities
- Lower net domestic borrowing (NDB) from 11.4 percent in 2016 to a fiscal anchor of 1 percent of GDP in 2017 and beyond, and refraining from monetary financing.
- External budget support of 7.2 percent of GDP will be complemented by a set of non-tax revenue and expenditure measures of 5 percent of GDP to achieve the NDB target.
- Drastically reduce domestic borrowing, including by ending central bank deficit financing.
- Increase non-tax revenue and reduce expenditures in 2017.
- Undertake comprehensive reforms of key state-owned enterprises to secure the planned fiscal adjustment.
- Commit to developing a strategy to reduce vulnerabilities stemming from domestic debt and to pursue a coordinated approach to secure assurances of support from other official creditors.

### Donor and creditor assurances; debt sustainability
- Following the staff report, staff was informed of commitments of additional support from Multilateral Development Banks, and has received assurances of highly concessional support from some of The Gambia’s major official bilateral creditors.
- With these commitments and assurances, staff concludes that The Gambia’s total public debt is sustainable in the medium term, although risks remain very elevated and its external risk rating is high.
- Multilateral development banks have committed to provide additional support and assurances of highly concessional support have been received from some major official bilateral creditors.
- Over the coming months, it will be important for the authorities to continue to pursue a coordinated approach to secure assurances of support from other official creditors to reduce debt vulnerabilities.

### Recent economic developments and outlook
- GDP growth in 2016 is now estimated to have reached 2.2 percent, markedly lower than the 4.3 percent growth in 2015.
- Headline annual inflation rose to 7.9 percent by end-2016, above the CBG’s target of 5 percent.
- Domestic revenue collection fell from 17.6 percent of GDP in 2015 to 16.7 percent of GDP in 2016.
- Total expenditures remained broadly unchanged at just under 30 percent of GDP in 2016.
- Net domestic borrowing reached 11.4 percent of GDP in 2016.
- High debt service on domestic debt absorbed 42 percent of government revenue in 2016.
- The exchange rate stabilized within a range of 43–48 dalasi per dollar after new foreign exchange directives on November 1, 2016; in May 2017, the 15 percent surrender requirement was rescinded and the reference rate was put under review.
- Growth for 2017 is expected to pick up marginally to 3 percent.
- Over the medium to longer term, The Gambia’s growth is expected to move to a higher trajectory, with past episodes of 6-7 percent growth and a 20-year average of 3.6 percent; a one point increase in the corruption index could raise real GDP by 0.5 percentage points, and assuming a 5-point increase over 2017-22, this could add up to around 2.5 percent by 2023.

### Fiscal and monetary policy challenges
- Monetary policy has been undermined by fiscal deficit financing; the CBG kept its policy rate at 23 percent throughout 2016, but fiscal dominance has weakened the signaling role and crowded out private sector credit.
- New foreign exchange directives introduced a compulsory requirement for commercial banks to sell 15 percent of their foreign exchange purchases to the CBG and established a reference rate; these measures were later adjusted in May 2017.
- The authorities are taking measures to resolve the financial problems of key SOEs to limit fiscal shocks from unbudgeted support.

### Staff view and rationale for support
- Staff supports the authorities’ request, viewing the committed measures as a very significant adjustment effort.
- The RCF disbursement would augment the authorities’ adjustment efforts, help catalyze additional donor financing, and give time to establish a firm picture of state finances given the uncovered massive theft.
- The SMP will guide policies and establish a track record before moving to a future ECF.
- The IMF is supporting The Gambia with resources from the Rapid Credit Facility; determined and strong policy implementation under the SMP will be critical to restoring macroeconomic stability, catalyzing further donor financing and establishing a track record as the basis for future program engagement with the IMF.

*Prepared by the African Department; Approved By Roger Nord (AFR) and Zuzana Murgasova (SPR); June 13–23, 2017.*

### 13.      An updated Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) indicates that The Gambia is in

### 13.      An updated Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) indicates that The Gambia is in

### Debt sustainability findings
- An updated Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) indicates that The Gambia is in external debt distress, and that total public debt is not sustainable (Annex I).
- The new government inherited an elevated public debt burden.
- The decline in institutional capacity during the previous regime lowered the 2013-15 average CPIA rating so that The Gambia is now classified as weak compared to medium in the last DSA, leading to substantial reductions in the debt threshold levels of the DSA.
- Driven largely by these factors, all five external debt burden indicators breach their respective indicative thresholds under the baseline and stress test scenarios of the DSA.
- The stock of public debt in the baseline as well as SOE contingent liabilities (not included in the baseline) also remain above its indicative benchmark for the entire projection horizon.
- While debt in the baseline is assessed to be unsustainable, the authorities have committed to taking measures to make the debt sustainable in the medium-term (¶31–32).

### Fiscal policy stance, financing needs, and targets
- Authorities plan to anchor policies at an NDB target of 1 percent of GDP to limit monetary expansion and support the rebuilding of reserves, lower T-bill rates, and gradually reduce the ratio of domestic debt to GDP.
- There are strong indications of donor support that could total more than 7 percent of GDP, but to achieve the NDB target the authorities will need to implement measures in 2017 and beyond.
- The 2017 budget revision and financing situation:
  - Revised tax revenue projection for 2017 down by 2.8 percent of GDP.
  - Total financing needs now amount to 15 percent of GDP.
  - Domestic financing capacity: 1 percent of GDP (in line with the NDB objective).
  - Donor support: 7.2 percent of GDP.
  - Onlending of the RCF: 1.5 percent of GDP.
  - Remaining financing gap to close in 2017: 5.3 percent of GDP.

### Measures to close the 2017 financing gap (Text Table 2 and narrative)
- Actions already taken and measures committed for 2017 include:
  - Consolidation of all outstanding CBG lending to the budget into a 30-year bond at an interest rate of 5 percent at end-2016, with projected interest savings of 0.7 percent of GDP per annum.
  - Curtailment of spending supporting a decline in T-bill rates, with average rates reaching 11.5 percent in early April 2017 compared to an average of 17 percent in 2016; expected reduction in domestic interest payments in 2017 by about 0.8 percent of GDP.
  - Expenditure cuts of 1 percent of GDP mainly in goods and services, including from the large budget of the President’s Office.
  - Staff audits of the civil service and uniformed services launched; elimination of ghostworkers could deliver savings (completion expected mid-2017). Completion/value: TBD.
  - Reform policies governing the state vehicle fleet expected to yield savings of 2 percent of GDP over three years (Text Table 2 quantifies as 0.3 percent of GDP / GMD 157).
  - Asset sales expected to yield 1 percent of GDP in 2017 (includes the presidential plane and two others, and land in prime tourist areas).
  - Recapturing previously diverted non-tax revenue expected to yield 1.2 percent of GDP.
  - Vigorous pursuit of recovery of stolen assets (timeframe and possible values unclear; planned use to retire domestic debt where possible).
- Aggregate impact:
  - In total, concrete measures amount to 5 percent of GDP.
  - The authorities aim to close the remaining financing gap of 0.3 percent of GDP through savings from elimination of ghostworkers and recovery of stolen assets.

- Text Table 2 (measures and projected savings) — preserved values exactly as presented:
  - Percent of GDP | GMD millions
  - Expenditure 2.8 | 1336
  - Interest savings from consolidation into 30-year CBG bond 0.7 | 330
  - Interest savings from lower T-bill rates 0.8 | 377
  - Expenditure cuts in goods and services 1.0 | 471
  - Completion of staff audits to eliminate ghost workers in the Gambian civil and uniformed services TBD | TBD
  - Reform policies to reduce the vehicle fleet 0.3 | 157
  - Revenue 2.2 | 1013
  - Sale of the presidential and two other defunct planes 0.5 | 236
  - Sale of land, including in prime tourist locations 0.5 | 236
  - Recapture previously diverted non-tax revenue from the international voice gateway, sand and heavy metal mining concessions, and fees for the use of the container scanner in the port 1.2 | 541
  - Recovery of stolen assets that are still held in The Gambia TBD | TBD
  - Total Savings 5.0 | 2348

### Medium-term fiscal measures (2018–19) (Text Table 3)
- Medium-term proposals to build on 2017 measures include:
  - Ongoing reforms to vehicle fleet 1.7 percent of GDP | GMD 891
  - Elimination of ghostworkers from payroll TBD | TBD
  - Streamlining ministries and subvented agencies, downsizing and rationalizing of embassies, and streamlining of memberships in non-financial international organizations 1.0 percent of GDP | GMD 524
  - Total Savings - Medium Term 2.7 percent of GDP | GMD 1,415

### State-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms and contingent liabilities
- Resolving SOE difficulties is key to avoiding fiscal shocks on the NDB.
- Authorities plan special audits of all SOEs to uncover fraud and embezzlement, stop substantial leakages of 4 percent of GDP annually over the past 2½ years, and provide a basis for resolving cross arrears between government and SOEs.
- World Bank support: audits of the first five SOEs most affected by embezzlement will start soon; audits of the CBG and other SOEs will follow.
- NAWEC-specific measures and impacts:
  - Fuel importation for NAWEC switched to competitive international tender which has reduced cost by 15 percent (based on first tender).
  - NAWEC will pursue more vigorous recovery of unpaid bills, including from municipalities.
  - Generating capacity will be increased by 50 MW (with funding from World Bank, IsDB and BADEA).
  - Regional hydroelectric power streaming from 2020 projected to improve electricity supply by another 80 MW while cutting generation cost by about 90 percent.
- GAMTEL/GAMCEL:
  - Oversight to move from the President’s Office to the Ministry of Communications, with World Bank support for asset valuation and restructuring/divestiture options.
- Governance and fiscal risk management for SOEs:
  - MoFEA will not contract any credit/loan on behalf of SOEs nor approve guarantees to beneficiary agencies including SOEs unless preconditions in the 2014 Public Finance Act (PFA) are fully met.
  - MoFEA will create and regularly update a database of all government guarantees and regularly make details public on the MoFEA website in line with PFA 2014.
  - MoFEA has committed to publish the audit reports of SOEs on its website (ideally six months after fiscal year end).
  - Ring-fencing of SOE debt is underway; discussions with commercial banks on restructuring NAWEC’s domestic debt are ongoing and impacts on bank solvency/liquidity will be assessed.

### Monetary, exchange rate, and financial sector policies
- Monetary and exchange rate policy:
  - Authorities committed to monetary policies aimed at price stability and a flexible exchange rate policy.
  - Plan to anchor monetary policy by limiting central bank financing and to phase out any limited new central bank financing completely by October 2017.
  - The authorities plan to reduce the policy rate — which is now at an elevated level of 20 percent — to provide a floor for market interest rates, pending inflation declining toward the CBG’s objective of 5 percent or less.
  - Exchange rate flexibility is considered necessary to absorb external shocks and help rebuild international reserves.
- Monetary operations and institutional strengthening:
  - CBG plans to strengthen liquidity forecasting capacity, introduce liquidity absorption tools such as repos, and establish overnight facilities to limit interest rate volatility around the policy rate.
  - Authorities intend to revise the CBG Act to strengthen the bank’s autonomy, reconstitute the Board of Directors to full membership, and submit amendments to the CBG Act to the national assembly for approval by end-2017.
- Financial sector stability and supervision:
  - The financial sector is currently stable and profitable, largely due to the high asset share of government securities at the detriment of private sector intermediation.
  - Assets directly related to government and parastatals account for 49 percent of total assets of the banking sector and are about 3.5 times as much as paid-up capital.
  - Short-run financial soundness is weakened by SOE financial difficulties given bank exposures.
  - CBG will closely monitor the banking sector focusing on impacts of declining interest rates, lower government borrowing, NPLs, and exposure to SOEs.
  - CBG plans to develop crisis management capacity, upgrade the bank resolution framework, and is developing forward-looking risk-based supervisory analysis and exploring deposit insurance.

*Italic: IMF staff report chapter.*

### 31.      The authorities are committed to taking measures to make debt sustainable. They

### cr17179 - 31.      The authorities are committed to taking measures to make debt sustainable.

### Debt sustainability strategy and official creditor support
- Authorities are working, with Bank and Fund support, on a strategy for lengthening the maturity of domestic debt, including SOE debt.
- Authorities have approached official creditors—regional development institutions, major non-Paris Club creditors, and the Paris Club—for financial support (on highly concessional terms) sufficient to cover debt service due to them over the next four years.
- If assurances on such support are received by the Board date, staff will have confidence that debt sustainability will be restored via:
  - lowering of gross financing needs;
  - attenuation of heightened external debt vulnerabilities;
  - reduction in the present value of total public debt.
- Such assurances would also serve to meet the authorities’ financing needs over the medium term; absent significant official sector support, a substantial financing gap would likely emerge, assuming full payment of external debt service obligations.

### Margin for sustainability and donor conference needs
- The envisaged strategy could deliver a sustainable debt position, but "with little margin to spare."
- It is important to secure substantial additional concessional resources at the donor conference to be held later this year for general development and to lower the debt burden.
- Assumption on use of donor resources:
  - If resources are used in part for retiring expensive domestic debt as well as for public investment, each additional US$50 million in donor financing would help further reduce gross financing needs and the PV of public debt by about 2-3 percent of GDP in the medium term while supporting growth enhancing and poverty reducing investment.

### National development plans, PAGE and PAGE II
- Government reform agenda is based on Vision 2020 and the medium-term Program for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE).
- PAGE, approved in 2012, aims to accelerate and sustain economic growth and employment.
- Policies under the Staff Monitored Program (SMP) seek to reduce NDB to generate fiscal savings from lower interest costs that could be redirected to PAGE priorities and ease crowding out.
- PAGE II covering 2017–21 is close to finalization; authorities expect to finalize PAGE II by mid-2017.
- Since 2012, almost 50 percent of total locally-financed expenditure has been dedicated to poverty reducing activities identified in the PAGE.
- Infrastructure priorities cited: Trans-Gambia River Bridge, rural road construction, water management.

### Fragility: five aspects and strategy for engagement (Box 2)
- Five aspects of fragility:
  1. Exiting from 22 years of Jammeh rule and transition to democracy (new government took power in January 2017; early parliamentary elections held in April 2017).
  2. Decades of Jammeh rule impeded economic institutions and institutional capacity.
  3. Economic fragility from high susceptibility to weather related shocks, past fiscal slippages and theft of funds by the previous regime.
  4. Limited recent progress on socio-economic indicators which may accentuate social frailties.
  5. Weak provision of vital infrastructure and services, such as reliable electricity.
- Strategy for engagement:
  - Capacity building to rebuild resilience.
  - Ensure previously-diverted revenue streams and public expenditures are brought on-budget.
  - SOE reform and improved fiscal oversight of SOEs to put them on a sound financial footing.
  - Reduce net domestic borrowing and improve effectiveness of monetary policy.
  - Technical assistance to buttress fiscal institutions; strengthen monetary policy tools and financial sector supervision; and enhance statistical capacity.

### Request for Fund support and Staff Monitored Program (SMP)
- Authorities requested financial assistance under the RCF’s shocks window in an amount of SDR 11,662,500 (18.75 percent of quota), combined with a 12-month SMP.
- Country faces an urgent BOP need predominantly caused by external shocks: adverse climate impact on agriculture, political turmoil impacting tourism, and higher commodity prices.
- Net BOP impact of these shocks is estimated at $31 million (3 percent of GDP) in 2017.
- A 12-month SMP (April 2017 to March 2018) with end-June and end-December 2017 test dates will help guide policies and establish a track record.
- The RCF disbursement would:
  - complement authorities’ adjustment efforts and help catalyze additional donor financing;
  - provide time to establish a firm picture of state finances given massive embezzlement being uncovered;
  - help firm up medium-term consolidation strategy and ensure political consensus.

### Role of RCF and donor support in closing financing gaps
- Authorities’ combined measures in 2017 amounting to 5 percent of GDP are expected to close more than one third of the fiscal gap in 2017 and help mitigate external pressures.
- Approval of an RCF disbursement would be instrumental in facilitating external budget support disbursements amounting to about $75 million for 2017 (7.2 percent of GDP), including:
  - World Bank: $41 million;
  - EU: $27 million;
  - AfDB: $7 million.
- Staff proposes the RCF disbursement of 18.75 percent of The Gambia’s quota, the dalasi equivalent of about $15.6 million covering about 11 percent of the fiscal financing gap, be on-lent from the CBG to the government on the same financial terms as the Fund’s RCF disbursement to The Gambia.
- The RCF disbursement together with solid implementation of the associated SMP would help authorities obtain support required to close remaining gaps in outer years, ideally in the form of grants given the country’s elevated debt vulnerabilities.
- The RCF disbursement would help to restore gross international reserves to about $85 million, adding 0.4 months to reach 2.0 months of prospective imports in 2017.

### Capacity to repay, risks, and vulnerabilities
- The Gambia’s capacity to repay the Fund is weak but expected to strengthen once measures to make debt sustainable are fully implemented, with risks to the outlook.
- Key risks:
  - Failure to implement measures to make the debt sustainable.
  - Susceptibility to weather related shocks.
  - If donor support fails to materialize, authorities would likely not be able to contain spending pressures.
  - Political risks as political transition is ongoing but not yet firmly entrenched.

### Safeguards assessment findings and needed actions
- Safeguards assessment monitoring staff visit (March) found areas needing significant strengthening:
  - (i) Vacancies at the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) Board should be filled as quickly as possible to support governance and oversight.
  - (ii) Update the Audit Committee charter to strengthen its oversight role, including review of the external audit firm’s performance.
  - (iii) Amendments to the CBG Act are needed to strengthen the bank’s autonomy, including curbing excessive lending to the government.
  - (iv) Strengthen procedures for opening and closing accounts, and ensure government expenditures and revenues are properly reflected in the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS).
- Key weaknesses will be addressed through program measures proposed as part of the SMP (MEFP, Table 2).

### Fiscal and BOP financing needs and sources, 2017 (Text Table 4)
- Fiscal Financing Needs (GMD Million / Pct. of GDP)
  - (A) Fiscal Financing Needs: 706 / 415.0
    - NDB without corrective actions: 706 / 415.0 (no fiscal cost of external shock assumed)
  - (B) Financing Sources: 692 / 414.7
    - (B.1) NDB Target: 47 / 11.0
    - (B.2) Expenditure cuts: 61 / 21.3 (Budget revision, vehicle fleet reform)
    - (B.3) Non-tax revenue: 103 / 72.2 (Asset sales, voice gateway, concessions and fees)
    - (B.4) Interest payment savings: 70 / 71.5 (30yr bond reconciliation and T-Bill savings)
    - (B.5) Donor support: 338 / 57.2 (WB, EU, AfDB in 2017)
    - (B.6) IMF RCF disbursement: 71 / 01.5
  - (C = A - B) Residual Financing Gap: 16 / 30.3
- BOP Financing Needs (GMD Million / Pct. of GDP)
  - (A) BOP Financing Needs: 409 / 58.7
    - Financing gap: 409 / 58.7
  - (B) Financing Sources: 409 / 58.7
    - (B.1) Donor support: 338 / 57.2 (WB, EU, AfDB in 2017)
    - (B.2) IMF RCF disbursement: 71 / 01.5
  - (C = A - B) Residual Financing Gap: 0.0 / 0.0
- Memorandum items:
  - RCF disbursement as share of BOP financing gap (percent): 17.3
  - RCF disbursement as share of other donor support (percent): 21.0

### Staff appraisal summary
- External shocks are predominantly responsible for the urgent BOP need, exacerbated by the low level of international reserves.
- Total BOP-impact of shocks in 2017 is estimated at $31 million (3 percent of GDP).
- Net usable international reserves are precariously low at 0.8 months of prospective imports.
- The political transition follows depletion of state coffers and massive fiscal overruns, rapid build-up of domestic debt, higher interest rates, and a large share of tax revenue absorbed by interest payments.
- Monetization of the deficit by the CBG has created significant pressures on inflation, the exchange rate, and international reserves.
- To address difficulties, Gambian authorities will need strong external donor support preferably as grants, complemented by strong fiscal measures; exchange rate flexibility will help buffer the economy from external shocks and rebuild reserves.

*Source: IMF staff report content (cr17179).*

### 42.      Staff considers the package of measures articulated in the MEFP a strong and

### cr17179 - 42.      Staff considers the package of measures articulated in the MEFP a strong and 

### Fiscal adjustment and medium-term measures
- Staff considers the package of measures articulated in the MEFP a strong and significant effort by the new government.
- Authorities have already taken upfront actions and are in the process of further revising the 2017 budget with measures supporting the NDB target of 1 percent of GDP under the SMP.
- The envisaged adjustment would represent an ambitious consolidation and contribute significantly to addressing The Gambia’s present difficulties.
- The adjustment would also support a further decline in domestic interest rates and thus alleviate medium-term spending pressures.
- Further medium-term measures will include:
  - deeper savings from staff audits;
  - reform of the vehicle fleet;
  - streamlining of the civil service.
- Reestablishment of previously siphoned-off state funds and possible proceeds from the recovery of stolen assets in the Gambia and abroad should help put the medium-term fiscal position on a sound footing and create more fiscal space for poverty reducing measures.

### State-owned enterprises (SOEs), energy, and telecom reforms
- Comprehensive reforms of key state-owned enterprises, and the energy and telecom sectors remain critical to securing the planned fiscal adjustment in 2017 and beyond.
- Staff welcomes the special SOE audits to identify and stop all leakages, establish a clearer picture of public finances.
- Staff welcomes the steps taken and envisaged to address the cost of service delivery of NAWEC and GAMTEL/GAMCEL, with support from development partners, and general SOE reforms envisaged under the agreement with the World Bank.
- Staff urges the authorities to swiftly deal with NAWEC’s domestic debt obligations, ideally by lengthening its maturity in consultation with creditors and considering the impact of a debt restructuring on financial sector stability.

### Risks to the outlook and political transition
- Risks to the outlook and to The Gambia’s political transition to democracy are significant.
- Vulnerabilities include:
  - The Gambia’s vulnerability to the weather;
  - commodity and import dependence;
  - reliance on tourism revenues;
  - high debt.
- The transition to a new elected government provides the break with the past to finally address long-standing economic vulnerabilities.
- If the authorities follow through on their commitment to the ambitious policies listed in the MEFP, and strong support from the international community is forthcoming, this would provide the basis for The Gambia to restore macroeconomic stability and foster long-term fiscal and debt sustainability.

### Debt strategy and donor financing
- The authorities’ strategy to restore debt sustainability is critical.
- Immediate steps envisaged include:
  - lengthening domestic debt maturities;
  - refinancing external debt service obligations.
- These steps will bring debt to a sustainable position, but only just.
- It will be important for the authorities to mobilize substantial additional and highly concessional official financing at the planned donor conference later this year—to improve medium-term economic prospects, and strengthen debt sustainability, including by replacing expensive domestic debt.

### IMF support and RCF disbursement
- Staff supports the authorities’ request for a disbursement under the RCF in the amount of SDR 11,662,500 (18.75 percent of quota).
- Considering the large financing need to achieve the 2017 fiscal target, staff would be able to support the request for on-lending the RCF for budget support, once the requested assurances on official concessional support are received from creditors.
- The RCF disbursement would:
  - supplement the authorities’ own adjustment efforts;
  - help catalyze additional donor financing;
  - give the authorities the time needed to develop and follow-through on their medium-term reform plans.

*Source: cr17179 - 42.      Staff considers the package of measures articulated in the MEFP a strong and*

### 1. Current account

### 1. Current account

### A. Goods and services
- Goods and services: -19.3 -25.7 -17.9 -22.8 -23.9 -24. 4 -23. 9 -23.0 -21.3
- Goods (net): -25.4 -29.4 -22.8 -26.5 -27.4 -27. 7 -27. 5 -27.0 -25.4
  - Exports, f.o.b.: 14.8 12.1 11.0 9.8 10.7 11.0 11.5 11.8 12.2
  - Imports, f.o.b.: -40.2 -41.5 -33.9 -36.3 -38.1 -38.7 -39.0 -38.8 -37.6
- Services (net): 6.1 3.6 4.9 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.0 4.2
  - Services exports: 14.4 12.6 13.0 11.2 11.8 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.5
    - Of which: travel: 7.3 7.2 7.3 6.0 6.9 7.4 8.0 8.5 9.1
  - Services imports: -8.3 -8.9 -8.0 -7.5 -8.4 -8.9 -9.0 -9.1 -9.4

### B. Income (net)
- Income (net): -2.8 -3.2 -2.9 -2.8 -2.7 -2. 7 -2. 6 -2.6 -2. 7
  - Income credits: 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
  - Income debits: -3.0 -3.4 -3.1 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9
    - Of which: interest on government debt: 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6

### C. Current transfers
- Current transfers: 11.3 13.9 11.9 16.2 14.6 14.0 13.1 12.4 12.0
  - Official transfers: 2.3 1.9 0.8 5.1 3.8 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.5
  - Remittances: 7.1 10.5 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7
  - Other transfers: 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8

### Current account balances
- Current account (excl. budget support): -13.2 -16.9 -9.7 -14.4 -15.8 -16. 2 -15. 8 -15.0 -13.5
- Current account (incl. budget support): -10.8 -15.0 -8.9 -9.4 -12.0 -13. 0 -13. 4 -13.1 -12.0

### 2. Capital and financial account
- A. Capital account: 3.5 2.6 1.7 2.5 1.7 1. 7 1. 7 1.7 1.7
- B. Financial account: 11.8 8.1 4.7 8.1 13.4 13. 2 13. 7 12.6 12. 2
  - Foreign direct investment: 9.2 8.2 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.6 8.9 9.3 9.7
  - Portfolio investment: -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
  - Other investment: 2.8 -0.4 -3.1 -0.2 4.8 4.3 4.5 3.1 2.2
- Capital and financial account total: 15.2 10.7 6.4 10.6 15.1 14. 9 15. 4 14.4 13. 9

### Errors and omissions and overall balance
- Errors and omissions: -9.9 -0.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- Overall balance: -5.5 -4.6 -1.1 1.3 3.1 1. 9 2. 1 1.2 1.9
- Financing gap: 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

*Sources: Gambian authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections. Prel. Projection.*

### Table 8. The Gambia: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the Fund, 2017–27 (selected figures)
- Principal (in millions of SDRs): 3.0 5.5 4.6 3.6 4.0 2.8 1.7 1.6 0.8 0.0 0.0
- Charges and interest (in millions of SDRs): 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
- Millions of SDRs (total obligations based on existing and prospective): 3.1 5.7 4.7 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.2 2.5 1.3
- Millions of US$: 4.3 7.6 6.3 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.4 4.4 3.3 1.7
- Percent of Gross International Reserves: 5.0 6.8 5.0 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.1 1.5 0.8
- Percent of exports of goods and services: 4.1 6.1 4.5 3.2 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.0 1.4 0.7
- Percent of debt service: 11.2 17.6 14.2 10.7 11.7 12.2 12.8 13.4 11.8 12.2 8.1
- Percent of GDP: 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
- Percent of quota: 5.0 9.1 7.6 6.0 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.5 5.2 4.0 2.1
- Outstanding Fund credit (Millions of SDRs): 36.2 30.7 26.1 22.5 18.5 14.5 10.5 6.6 3.5 1.2 0.0
- Outstanding Fund credit (Millions of US$): 50.3 41.2 35.0 30.2 24.9 19.5 14.1 8.9 4.7 1.6 0.0
- Percent of Gross International Reserves (outstanding Fund credit): 59.3 37.0 27.6 20.5 15.8 11.0 7.5 4.5 2.3 0.7 0.0
- Net use of Fund credit (millions of SDRs): 8.7 -5.5 -4.6 -3.6 -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 -3.9 -3.1 -2.3 -1.2
- Disbursements: 11.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- Repayments and Repurchases: 3.0 5.5 4.6 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.1 2.3 1.2

Memorandum items (selected):
- Nominal GDP (millions of US$): 1,037.6 1,093.8 1,153.5 1,213.4 1,273.9 1,337.5 1,398.1 1,466.3 1,537.7 1,612.6 1,691.2
- Exports of goods and services (millions of US$): 104.8 125.6 141.4 157.4 168.9 184.7 190.2 206.8 220.1 234.1 244.5
- Gross International Reserves (millions of US$): 84.8 111.4 127.0 147.3 157.6 177.6 187.6 197.6 207.6 217.6 227.6
- Debt service (millions of US$): 38.2 43.1 44.6 46.9 47.0 45.1 43.8 40.2 36.8 27.0 21.7
- Quota (millions of SDRs): 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2 62.2

*Sources: IMF staff estimates and projections.*

### Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP): Key points (selected)
- Request: disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) equivalent to 18.75 percent of quota, or SDR 11,662,500 to the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG).
- Immediate priorities:
  - Restore macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability.
  - Prevent escalation into crisis.
  - Implement strong upfront fiscal measures and mitigate fiscal shocks, including drastically reducing net domestic borrowing.
  - Put public utility and telecom companies on a sound financial footing.
- Economic context and shocks:
  - Economic growth in 2016 estimated at 2.2 percent, down from 4.3 percent in 2015.
  - Pre-harvest report: about half of the groundnut cash crop lost.
  - Headline annual inflation: 8.7 percent in March 2017; CBG target: 5 percent.
  - Dalasi depreciation: about 5 percent against the U.S. dollar since November 2016.
  - Net international reserves: US$21.5 million in March 2017 (less than one month of prospective imports), supported by foreign exchange swap arrangements with two commercial banks totaling US$33.2 million.
  - Net domestic borrowing reached 11.4 percent of GDP in 2016.
  - Total public debt stock: 120.3 percent of GDP at end-2016 (105.3 percent in 2015).
  - Siphoned funds by previous regime: more than $100 million (10.4 percent of 2016 GDP) diverted over the regime’s last 2½ years, affecting NAWEC and GAMTEL/GAMCEL.
- Monetary and financial conditions:
  - CBG policy rate: 23 percent.
  - 12-month T-bill rate: from 22 percent to around 13 percent by March 2017.
  - 3-month T-bill rate: from 17.8 percent to around 10 percent by March 2017.
  - Lending rates remained high; crowding out of private sector credit continued.
- Growth outlook:
  - Growth for 2017 expected to be 3 percent.
  - Medium-term growth target around 5 percent; 2018–20 growth projection: 4.5 percent; longer term about 4.8 percent.
- Fiscal strategy and external assistance:
  - Anchor NDB target of 1 percent of GDP.
  - Indications of external budget support about $75 million for 2017 (World Bank $41 million, EU $27 million, AfDB $7 million).
  - Plan to use RCF proceeds of $15.6 million for budget support.
  - Tax revenue expected to decline by 1.5 percent of GDP to 15.2 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - Expenditures expected to decline by 1.8 percent of GDP to 29.8 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - Remaining financing gap of 0.3 percent of GDP for 2017 intended to be closed through additional measures.
- Debt management and SOE reform:
  - Develop a debt strategy to deal with domestic debt, including extending maturity and possibly lower interest cost.
  - Engage with creditors on restructuring NAWEC’s debt.
  - Seek concessional official financing and a donor conference later in the year to raise substantial additional official financing; possible use to retire expensive domestic debt and support growth-enhancing investment.

*This document includes the Letter of Intent and the attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) and Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) as provided by the Gambian authorities.*

### 12.      Measures that we have already taken or are underway to achieve the reduction in total

### 12.      Measures that we have already taken or are underway to achieve the reduction in total

### Measures already taken or underway
- Regularly adapted fuel prices to avoid any implicit subsidies from the budget and will continue doing so.
- Liberalized the fuel supply to NAWEC with the help of the World Bank; fuel importation will now be done through competitive tender which so far has reduced the cost to NAWEC by 15 percent, thus reducing its operational losses and the need for budget resources.
- Consolidated all outstanding CBG lending to the budget through various facilities into a 30-year bond at an interest rate of 5 percent with a view to not add further borrowing. Estimated budgetary savings in interest payments of about 0.7 percent of GDP in 2017.
- Kept NDB low through careful prioritization of spending; along with the decline in T-bill rates this is expected to reduce domestic interest payments in 2017 by about 0.8 percent of GDP.
- Revising the 2017 budget to reduce expenditures by about 1 percent of GDP, including through substantial cuts in the budget of the President’s Office.
- Launched staff audits of the civil service and, for the first time, of the uniformed services to eliminate ghost workers; audits could deliver substantial savings and provide a basis for more comprehensive civil service reform including subvented agencies.
- Plan to conduct special audits of all SOEs to uncover fraud and embezzlement, stop leakages and strengthen SOE oversight; with World Bank assistance will start audits for five SOEs (NAWEC, GNPC, GAMTEL/GAMCEL, GPA, SSHFC); audits of the CBG and other SOEs will follow.
- Issued a circular that government will not issue any more guaranties for borrowing by SOEs or other state entities unless consistent with the Public Finance Act to help contain unbudgeted spending.

### Key quantified near-term fiscal impacts (from measures taken)
- Reduction in NAWEC fuel cost: 15 percent (cost to NAWEC).
- Interest rate on consolidated 30-year bond: 5 percent.
- Estimated budgetary interest savings from bond consolidation: about 0.7 percent of GDP in 2017.
- Expected reduction in domestic interest payments in 2017: about 0.8 percent of GDP.
- Planned reduction in 2017 budget expenditures: about 1 percent of GDP.

---

### Further measures planned to fill remaining 2017 financing gap
- Elimination of ghost workers via staff audits; savings not yet estimable until audit results are available; elimination among uniformed services may be phased for security and social reasons; consider facilitating transition into other employment and stepping up participation in UN and other peacekeeping missions to reduce cost in the interim.
- Reform policies to reduce the bloated vehicle fleet, strengthen accountability, reduce fuel and maintenance cost and generate receipts from sale of excess cars; estimated savings of 2 percent of GDP over the next three years.
- Sell the presidential plane and two others that are defunct; could yield about 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Sell land, including in prime tourist areas; could yield about 0.5 percent of GDP and could trigger tourism related investment.
- Ensure all fees and revenue sources previously diverted are now channeled to the budget (including international voice gateway, heavy metal and sand mining, fees for container scanner use in the port); estimated yield up to 1.2 percent of GDP in non-tax revenue in 2017.
- Recover assets stolen by the previous regime that are still held in The Gambia with support from the UN/World Bank StAR Initiative; recovered assets preferably used to retire domestic debt.
- As part of debt strategy, explore lengthening maturity structure of domestic debt by issuing longer-maturity securities and retiring commensurate amounts of T-bills to reduce rollover risk and potentially realize interest savings; World Bank technical assistance ongoing and IMF support requested.
- Over the medium term consider streamlining ministries and subvented agencies, downsizing and rationalizing embassies, and streamlining memberships in non-financial international organizations which could yield up to 1 percent of GDP.

### Further measures — quantified estimates
- Savings from vehicle fleet reform: 2 percent of GDP over next three years.
- Proceeds from selling presidential and two defunct planes: about 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Proceeds from selling land: about 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Potential non-tax revenue from redirecting diverted fees: up to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2017.
- Medium-term streamlining of ministries/embassies/memberships: up to 1 percent of GDP.

---

### Measures to improve financial management
- Set up a Cash Management Committee (CMC) to oversee determination of the NDB requirement, and approve and monitor implementation of the consolidated government cash plan.
- Issue a clear definition of payment arrears and clearly defined procedures for their monitoring and validation; compile an inventory of existing payment arrears and cross-arrears between government and SOEs; define and approve a strategy for reducing the existing stock and start implementing it from 2018 at an appropriate pace (total of the expenditure arrears/3 years).
- CBG to develop a policy for opening and closing accounts to align with the Public Finance Act of 2014.
- Start publishing detailed monthly budget execution data, including all extra-budgetary spending, on the MoFEA’s website no later than 6-weeks after execution; prepare a report identifying all extra-budgetary spending.
- Establish additional procedures adopted by MoFEA to ensure all government expenditures and revenues are entered through IFMIS.
- Prepare a complete inventory of all government and other public sector bank accounts at the CBG and commercial banks, and prepare an action plan to restore the Treasury single account.

---

### Oversight and program monitoring
- Revive the High-level Economic Council (HILEC) to strengthen monitoring of policy implementation; HILEC comprised of the Vice President, the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Governor of the CBG, and the Secretary General of the Office of the President; procedures and protocols were established at end-2013.

---

### Debt management — risks and containment measures
- Acknowledge elevated risks from high public debt and take measures to contain them; express concern about IMF/World Bank lowering of debt threshold values tied to past CPIA decline.
- Ringfence contingent liabilities from SOEs, particularly NAWEC.
- Negotiations with commercial banks on restructuring NAWEC’s domestic debt, including its 5-year bond, are advancing; expectation of an agreement commensurate with NAWEC’s ability to repay over the medium term.
- Facilitate clearance of NAWEC’s and GAMTEL’s external debt service arrears.
- Set up a debt management advisory committee to improve coordination and information exchange between MoFEA, CBG, and relevant SOEs to better forecast debt service payments.
- Continue to seek external grants and highly concessional loans; will not incur any new external payments arrears; will not contract or guarantee any new non-concessional external debt or any external debt with original maturity of one year or less.
- Government agrees to consult IMF staff before contracting or guaranteeing new concessional external loans, and guaranteeing any new domestic loans to SOEs.

---

### SOE reforms and audits
- Develop a comprehensive strategy to address operational and financial difficulties of NAWEC and GAMTEL/GAMCEL with World Bank support.
- NAWEC-specific actions and background:
  - Historical causes of poor performance: tariffs set below cost recovery, economically unviable rural projects, monopoly fuel supplier rent-seeking, obsolete generators, no real investment.
  - World Bank support includes purchase of refurbished generators, advice on fast and cost-efficient power supply diversification, and investment in upgraded transmission for streaming regional hydroelectric power from 2020 that will cut generation cost by about 90 percent.
  - Strategy aims to reduce operating cost through new energy sources, greater efficiency in fuel supply via competitive tender, and cost reductions in NAWEC operations.
  - Budgeted resources to partially support debt service on the rescheduled NAWEC bond during recovery period; plan to resolve cross arrears considering special audit results.
- GAMTEL/GAMCEL-specific actions:
  - Shift oversight from the President’s Office to the Ministry of Communications (MOCI); MOCI to lead reform agenda.
  - With World Bank assistance, conduct asset valuation of government-owned telecom assets; evaluate restructuring and divestiture options including tendering for a strategic investor or management contract, assessing revenue implications for government under short- and long-term scenarios.
- Other SOEs:
  - Some are financially more stable but may not have contributed dividends possibly due to past embezzlement (e.g., GPA).
  - Implementation of the 2017-19 SOE reform program agreed with the World Bank expected to put them on a sound footing.
- Commitment to conduct special audits of all SOEs with development partner support and step up MoFEA oversight and monitoring of SOEs’ operations, financial position, contingent liabilities and fiscal risks.

---

### Monetary and exchange rate policy, and strengthening CBG independence
- Continue implementing a flexible exchange rate policy and a monetary policy aiming at price stability; allow exchange rate to fluctuate to absorb external shocks and increase resilience.
- CBG will intervene only to ensure orderly market conditions or purchase foreign exchange to meet needs for external obligations.
- CBG will continue to use a money targeting framework to pursue price stability objective of keeping inflation at or below 5 percent, and use its rediscount rate to signal changes in policy stance.
- After exiting fiscal dominance, monetary policy expected to become effective in controlling liquidity. Policy rate is now at an elevated level of 20 percent and should be reduced to provide a floor for market interest rates which are already well below the policy rate.
- Curbing monetization of government deficits is paramount, but limited CBG financing may be needed in the next few months within an overall NDB limit of 2 percent of GDP through end-September 2017.
- Starting October 1, 2017, Government will adhere to a zero limit, on a monthly basis, on new credit from the central bank at below-market interest rates.
- Adhere strictly to schedule for payments of principal and interest on the CBG-held 30-year bond.
- Strengthen CBG independence to align with leading practices (autonomy, credit to government, governance and oversight, audit mechanisms); improve liquidity forecasting and management with MoFEA collaboration.

### Quantified monetary/central bank constraints
- Policy rate: 20 percent (current elevated level).
- Inflation target: at or below 5 percent.
- Allowed limited CBG financing within NDB limit: 2 percent of GDP through end-September 2017.
- Zero monthly limit on new below-market central bank credit starting October 1, 2017.
- Commitment to adhere to principal and interest schedule on CBG-held 30-year bond.

---

### Financial sector stability
- Financial sector currently stable and profitable but large exposure to the public sector creates risks; profitability depends on large public interest payments.
- CBG to step up monitoring of banking sector health with focus on impacts of declining interest rates, lower government borrowing, NPLs and exposure to SOEs.
- Develop crisis management capacity and upgrade bank resolution framework, including strategies to handle possible bank crisis.

---

### Progress on poverty reduction and key strategic directions
- Reform agenda based on Vision 2020 and the medium-term Program for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE).
- PAGE aims to accelerate and sustain economic growth and development while creating employment opportunities.
- Macro framework under the SMP seeks to reduce government borrowing needs to free resources for PAGE priorities and ease crowding out of the private sector.
- Requested access under the RCF will support efforts to rebuild international reserves buffers.
- PAGE II (2017–2021) close to finalization; incorporating IHS findings and analytic studies and expected to be finalized by mid-2017.
- An Accelerated National Development Plan synthesizing key priorities for 2017 prepared to garner development partner support.

---

### Selected proposed indicative quantitative targets under the Staff‑Monitored Program (stocks; unless otherwise indicated)
- Ceiling on net domestic borrowing of the central government (cumulative flows from the beginning of the calendar year, GMD millions): Mar. 2017: 545; Jun. 2017: 943; Sep. 2017: 943; Dec. 2017: 471.
- Ceiling on the stock of net domestic assets of the central bank (including RCF onlending, GMD millions, TMU exchange rates): Mar. 2017: 8,897; Jun. 2017: 9,704; Sep. 2017: 10,525; Dec. 2017: 9,685.
- Floor on the stock of net usable international reserves of the central bank (USD millions, TMU exchange rates): Mar. 2017: -10.2; Jun. 2017: -23.9; Sep. 2017: 9.9; Dec. 2017: -0.1.
- Monthly ceiling on central bank credit to the central government at non-market terms (GMD millions): Mar. 2017: 1,187; Jun. 2017: 943; Sep. 2017: 943; Dec. 2017: 0.

*(Source: IMF staff-monitored program documents summarized in the provided chapter)*

### Introduction

### Introduction

### Overview
- Memorandum establishing understandings between the Gambian authorities and IMF staff on definitions of quantitative indicative targets, structural benchmarks, reporting requirements, and adjusters for the staff-monitored program (SMP) covering April 2017 to March 2018.
- Includes a summary finding from an updated debt sustainability analysis (DSA):
  - An updated DSA indicates that The Gambia is currently in external debt distress, a deterioration from the previous moderate risk rating.
  - Main drivers: weakening in The Gambia’s overall institutional capacity in the most recent CPIA assessment and deterioration of several debt burden indicators at the start of the projection horizon associated with past fiscal slippages.
  - All five external debt burden indicators breach their respective indicative thresholds for a sustained period under the baseline scenario.
  - All five external debt burden indicators also breach the respective thresholds under the most extreme stress tests.
  - Ratios of debt service to exports and to revenue are vulnerable to an exports shock and one-time depreciation shock, respectively; remaining indicators vulnerable to a combination shock.
  - Stock of total public debt in the baseline as well as including SOE contingent liabilities remains above its indicative benchmark for the entire projection horizon.
  - Conclusion: analysis suggests that Gambia’s debt is not sustainable under staff’s baseline scenario.
- Approval and preparation:
  - Approved By: Roger Nord and Zuzana Murgasova (IMF), and Paloma Anos-Casero (IDA)
  - Prepared by the staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association
  - Date: June 13, 2017

### Quantitative targets — Definitions, Adjusters, and Reporting (A–H)
- A. Net Domestic Borrowing (NDB) of the Central Government
  - Definition:
    - Change in net claims on the Central Government by the domestic monetary sector (monetary authorities and deposit money banks) plus change in discounted value of domestic government securities held by the non-monetary sector.
    - Also covers change in any other net claims on the Central Government by the domestic non-monetary sector, and change in government arrears on domestic debt service obligations.
    - Central Government excludes local and regional governments and public enterprises.
    - On-lending of the RCF to the budget and changes in balances of the project accounts listed in Table 1 are excluded from NDB calculation.
  - Adjuster:
    - Quarterly NDB targets adjusted downward/upward by the excess/shortfall of the dalasi equivalent of total budget support grants and loans received in that quarter relative to program forecasts.
    - In event budget support is lower than programmed, upward adjustment of NDB may not exceed 472 million GMD.
  - Program forecasts of external budget support grants and loans in 2017/18 (flow in each quarter, in millions of US dollars):
    - June 2017: 0
    - September 2017: 66.80
    - December 2017: 7.00
    - March 2018: (entry aligned with table above)
  - Supporting material:
    - Reporting on NDB to form part of the consolidated budget report (paragraph 25).

- B. Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG)
  - Definition:
    - NDA = reserve money minus net foreign assets of the CBG.
    - Reserve money = currency issued by the CBG (currency in circulation) + deposits of commercial banks at the CBG.
    - Net foreign assets = foreign assets − foreign liabilities (claims on nonresidents and liabilities to nonresidents).
  - Exchange rates for program monitoring (prevailing end-of-period market exchange rates for March 2017):
    - 45.39 GMD/USD
    - 1.07 USD/EUR
    - 1.25 USD/GBP
    - 1.00 USD/CHF
    - 1.36 USD/SDR
    - Foreign assets/liabilities in other currencies: converted to U.S. dollars at prevailing end-of-period market exchange rates for March 2017, then into dalasi at rates listed above.
    - Note: these are accounting exchange rates only and not projections.
  - Supporting material:
    - NDA transmitted as part of the CBG balance sheet (compiled based on the TMU rates) monthly within four weeks of month end.
    - For analytical purposes, CBG balance sheet compiled on a current-rate basis also to be submitted.

- C. Net Usable International Reserves (NIR) of the CBG
  - Definition:
    - NIR = usable reserve assets − reserve liabilities.
    - Usable reserve assets: readily available claims on nonresidents in convertible foreign currencies (SDRs, foreign currency cash, foreign currency securities, deposits abroad, country’s reserve position at the IMF).
    - Exclusions: pledged/collateralized/encumbered assets, claims on residents, derivative claims in foreign exchange vis-à-vis domestic currency, precious metals, assets in nonconvertible currencies, and illiquid assets (including capital shares in international organizations).
    - Reserve liabilities: all foreign exchange liabilities to residents and nonresidents (including commitments to sell FX from derivatives and all credit outstanding from the IMF, but excluding liabilities to the IMF’s SDR Department).
  - Exchange rate treatment:
    - For program monitoring, foreign assets/liabilities converted at exchange rates listed in paragraph 5 above.
  - Adjusters:
    - Quarterly NIR targets adjusted downward/upward by the US dollar equivalent of the shortfall/excess of total budget support grants and loans received in that quarter relative to program forecasts.
    - In case of an SDR allocation by the IMF, NIR adjusted upward by the amount of the SDR allocation.
  - Supporting material:
    - Detailed reserve statement with end-month data on NIR transmitted within seven days of month end.

- D. New External Payments Arrears of the Central Government
  - Definition:
    - External payment arrears = external payments due but unpaid.
    - Government agrees not to accumulate external payment arrears on its debt, except arrears arising from obligations being renegotiated with external creditors, including bilateral non-Paris Club creditors.
    - No accumulation of new external arrears by the government is a continuous benchmark.
  - Supporting material:
    - Accounting of non-reschedulable external arrears (if any) by creditor countries with detailed explanations transmitted monthly within four weeks of month end.
    - Accounting to separate arrears owed by Central Government and other public sector entities to Paris Club and non-Paris-Club creditors.

- E. New Non-Concessional External Debt Contracted or Guaranteed by the Central Government
  - Definition:
    - Refers to new non-concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed by Central Government denominated in any currency other than Gambian Dalasi.
    - Applies to debt as defined in point No. 9 of the Guidelines on Performance Criteria with Respect to Foreign Debt (IMF Decision No. 6230–(79/140), as amended by Decision No. 14415–(09/91)), and to commitments contracted or guaranteed for which value has not been received.
    - Loans/purchases from the IMF and debts with a grant element of at least 35 percent are excluded.
    - This performance criterion assessed continuously.
    - Footnote: To be considered concessional under this arrangement, a loan should have a grant element of at least 35 percent, calculated using the discount rate as 5 percent.
  - Supporting material:
    - Comprehensive record, including loan-by-loan accounting of all new concessional and non-concessional debt contracted or guaranteed by the Central Government with detailed explanations, transmitted quarterly within four weeks of quarter end.
    - Non-concessional external debt includes financial leases and other instruments giving rise to external liabilities, contingent or otherwise, on non-concessional terms.

- F. Outstanding Stock of External Public Debt with Original Maturity of One Year or Less
  - Definition:
    - Refers to stock of outstanding external public debt with original maturity of one year or less, owed or guaranteed by the public sector.
    - Public sector consists of the Central Government and regional governments and other public agencies, including the central bank.
    - Normal import-related credits are excluded.
  - Supporting material:
    - Comprehensive record of all external debt with original maturity < one year owed or contracted by the public sector, with detailed explanations, transmitted quarterly within four weeks of quarter end.

- G. Central Bank Credit to the Central Government at Non-Market Terms
  - Definition:
    - Refers to consolidated balance on the Treasury Expenditure Account, Consolidated Revenue Fund, and other revenue accounts.
    - Covers all gross claims on the Central Government on the central bank balance sheet with terms materially different from market Treasury bills/bonds around acquisition time.
    - Covers overdue payments of principal and interest on Central Government securities held by the central bank.
    - This performance criterion assessed end of each month.
  - Supporting material:
    - Reporting on new central bank credit to government at nonmarket terms included in monetary sector data (paragraphs 27 and 28).

- H. Poverty-Reducing Expenditures
  - Definition:
    - Expenditures financed out of The Gambia Local Fund (GLF) on following areas: Agriculture and Natural Resources; Education; Health; Nutrition, Population and HIV-AIDS; Infrastructure Programme; Social Fund for Poverty Reduction; Implementation and Monitoring of Poverty Reduction Programmes; Support to Cross-Cutting Programmes; ICT Research and Development; Decentralization and Local Government Capacity Building; Governance and Civil Service Reform Programme.
  - Supporting material:
    - Monthly report on poverty-reducing expenditures transmitted within four weeks of month end.

### Other data requirements and reporting standards (I–O)
- I. Prices
  - Monthly disaggregated consumer price index, including weights for each major category, with August 2004 = 100, transmitted within four weeks of month end.

- J. Government Accounts Data
  - Monthly consolidated Central Government budget report (analytical table) on budget execution for the month and cumulatively from beginning of year, transmitted within four weeks of month end. Report to cover:
    - (i) revenue data by major items (taxes on income, profits, and capital gains; domestic taxes on goods and services; taxes on international trade and transactions; other taxes; non-tax revenue);
    - (ii) external grants by type (budget support grants, project grants);
    - (iii) details of recurrent expenditure (goods and services, interest payments, subsidies and other current transfers);
    - (iv) details of capital expenditure and net lending (including externally financed capital expenditure, expenditure from the Gambia Local Fund, net lending);
    - (v) overall balance, the primary and the basic balance;
    - (vi) details of budget financing (including net domestic and net external borrowing and their components).
  - End-week data on net domestic borrowing (including project accounts listed in Table 1) transmitted weekly within five business days of week end.

- K. Monetary Sector Data
  - CBG balance sheet prepared on basis of current and program exchange rates transmitted monthly within four weeks of month end; must explicitly identify all claims on and liabilities to government (claims: overdrafts, holdings of treasury bills, government bonds, advances to government in foreign currency, other claims; liabilities: balances in Treasury expenditure account, Consolidated Revenue Fund and other revenue accounts, treasury bill special deposit account, privatization proceeds account, other deposit accounts).
  - Transmission to include individual balances on government accounts listed in Table 1.
  - Consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks and a monetary survey (consolidation of CBG and commercial banks) including foreign currency deposits held by residents with commercial banks transmitted within four weeks of month end.
  - Daily data on reserve money transmitted weekly within five business days of week end.

- L. Treasury Bill Market and Interbank Money Market
  - Weekly data on amounts offered and issued, net issuance, over/under subscription, and yields transmitted weekly within five business days of week end.
  - Data on treasury bills outstanding (face value and discounted value, including distribution by bank and non-bank holders) transmitted monthly within six weeks of month end.
  - Daily data on interbank money market (interest rates, maturities, volumes) transmitted weekly within five business days of week end.

- M. External Sector Data
  - CBG to forward transactions in official reserves within four weeks of month end.
  - Daily interbank market exchange rates (simple average of daily weighted average buying and selling rates) transmitted weekly within five business days of week end.
  - Weekly interbank market exchange rates (simple average of weekly weighted average buying and selling rates) transmitted monthly within seven days of month end.
  - CBG’s monthly average and end-month exchange rates, including rates for all currencies in which foreign assets and liabilities are denominated, transmitted within seven days after month end.
  - Daily data on foreign exchange intervention by the central bank transmitted weekly within five business days of week end.
  - Detailed reserve statement with end-week data on NIR transmitted weekly within five business days of week end.
  - Monthly data on volume of transactions (purchases, sales, total) in foreign exchange market by each major group of participants (CBG, commercial banks, foreign exchange bureaus) in dalasi transmitted within seven days of month end.

- N. Public Enterprises’ Data
  - MOFEA to forward within four weeks of month end data on monthly cash flow of NAWEC, GNPC, GAMTEL, GAMCEL, GCAA, SSHFC and NFSPMC.
  - MOFEA to forward within four weeks of month end data on stock of consolidated Central Government’s payment arrears to NAWEC at end of each month.

- O. Concessional External Debt Contracted or Guaranteed by the Central Government
  - MOFEA to forward within four weeks of Central Government contracting or guaranteeing any new domestic or external loan the loan’s terms and conditions including disbursement schedule, interest rate, grace period, maturity, interest and principal payment schedule.
  - For existing loans, MOFEA to provide on a loan-by-loan basis, within four weeks of the Board discussion of the SMP, the outstanding disbursed stock, disbursement schedule, and interest and principal payment schedule.

### Table 1 — Project accounts excluded from NDB calculation
- Table 1 lists project account numbers and project account names at the CBG that are excluded from the calculation of NDB (projects include NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LAND & WATER MANAGEMENT DEV. PROJECT (NEMA); BUILDING RESILIENCE TO RECURRING FOOD INSECURITY IN THE GAMBIA IDB COMPONENT; AGRICULTURAL VALUE CHAIN PROJECT (GCAV); and many others as enumerated in Table 1 of the source).

*Source: Introduction (cr17179 - Introduction), IMF staff memorandum and supporting materials, June 13, 2017.*

### 1. The short-term outlook for public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt

### 1. The short-term outlook for public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt

### Overview
- The short-term outlook for PPG external debt remains challenging.
- PPG external debt is elevated above 52 percent of GDP and is expected to remain highly concessional.
- New borrowing is to contain a minimum grant element of 35 percent to limit further increases in debt servicing costs.
- Central government external debt is mainly owed to multilateral creditors (about 71 percent of total external debt) and official bilateral creditors (about 29 percent of total external debt).
- Both multilateral and bilateral debt are on highly concessional terms, with long maturities, grace periods, and low interest rates.
- PPG external debt ratios remain elevated, in part reflecting weaker economic growth in 2016 due to a bad agricultural season and the effects of the political turmoil on tourism during high season.

### Structure of External Public Debt (end-2016) — key figures (Text Table 1)
- Total Debt: $US millions 504.7 — Percent of GDP 100.0 — Percent of Total 52.4
- Multilateral creditors: $US millions 358.8 — Percent of Total 71.1 — Percent of GDP 37.3
  - IMF: $US millions 38.8 — Percent of Total 7.7 — Percent of GDP 4.0
  - IDA: $US millions 58.2 — Percent of Total 11.5 — Percent of GDP 6.0
  - AfDB: $US millions 50.9 — Percent of Total 10.1 — Percent of GDP 5.3
  - Other Multilaterals: $US millions 210.9 — Percent of Total 41.8 — Percent of GDP 21.9
    - Of which: Islamic Development Bank $US millions 101.6 — Percent of Total 20.1 — Percent of GDP 10.6
    - Of which: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa $US millions 38.6 — Percent of Total 7.6 — Percent of GDP 4.0
- Bilateral Creditors: $US millions 145.9 — Percent of Total 28.9 — Percent of GDP 15.2
  - Paris Club: $US millions 8.1 — Percent of Total 1.6 — Percent of GDP 0.8
  - Non Paris Club: $US millions 137.9 — Percent of Total 27.3 — Percent of GDP 14.3
    - Of which: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development $US millions 32.6 — Percent of Total 6.5 — Percent of GDP 3.4
    - Of which: Export-Import Bank of India $US millions 29.3 — Percent of Total 5.8 — Percent of GDP 3.0
    - Of which: Saudi Fund for Development $US millions 23.5 — Percent of Total 4.7 — Percent of GDP 2.4
- Other Borrowing: $US millions 0.0 — Percent of Total 0.0 — Percent of GDP 0.0

Sources: Gambian authorities; and IMF Staff.

### Structure of Public Domestic Debt (end-2016) — key figures (Text Table 2)
- GMD millions Total Debt 28670 — Percent of GDP 100.0 — Percent of Total 67.9
- T-Bills: GMD millions 17891 — Percent of Total 62.4 — Percent of GDP 42.3
  - held by CBG: GMD millions 307 — Percent of Total 1.1 — Percent of GDP 0.7
  - held by Banks: GMD millions 13218 — Percent of Total 46.1 — Percent of GDP 31.3
  - held by Non Banks: GMD millions 4367 — Percent of Total 15.2 — Percent of GDP 10.3
- CBG Bond (30-Year): GMD millions 10779 — Percent of Total 37.6 — Percent of GDP 25.5

Sources: Gambian authorities; and IMF Staff.

### Macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions (Text Table 3 and accompanying text)
- Real GDP growth:
  - 2014: Current DSA 0.9 percent
  - 2015: Current DSA 4.3 percent
  - 2016: Current DSA 2.2 percent (estimated)
  - 2017: Current DSA 3.0 percent
  - 2018: Current DSA 3.5 percent
  - 2019: Current DSA 4.0 percent
  - 15-year average (for Current DSA) 4.8 percent
- The baseline assumptions reflect: weak agricultural output, foreign exchange scarcity, and the impact of political turmoil on tourism. Growth is expected to recover and gradually accelerate thereafter.
- Growth is projected lower at 4.8 percent over the longer term compared to 5.9 percent in the previous DSA.
- Current account (CA) deficit (percent of GDP):
  - 2014: Current DSA 10.8
  - 2015: Current DSA 15.0
  - 2016: Current DSA 8.9
  - 2017: Current DSA 9.4
  - 2018: Current DSA 12.0
  - 2019: Current DSA 13.0
  - 15-year average 8.0
- Exports of goods and services growth (percent), in current dollar terms including re-exports:
  - 2014: Current DSA -7.7
  - 2015: Current DSA -9.5
  - 2016: Current DSA 5.0
  - 2017: Current DSA -6.0
  - 2018: Current DSA 13.3
  - 2019: Current DSA 8.8
  - 15-year average 7.2
- Imports of goods and services growth (percent), in current dollar terms including re-exports:
  - 2014: Current DSA 9.5
  - 2015: Current DSA 11.3
  - 2016: Current DSA -10.2
  - 2017: Current DSA 12.3
  - 2018: Current DSA 12.3
  - 2019: Current DSA 12.0
  - 15-year average 6.5
- Overall fiscal deficit (percent of GDP):
  - 2014: Current DSA 9.8
  - 2015: Current DSA 8.1
  - 2016: Current DSA 9.8
  - 2017: Current DSA 2.6
  - 2018: Current DSA 3.6
  - 2019: Current DSA 3.0
  - 15-year average 2.8
- Inflation is projected to fall below the central bank’s 5 percent target over the medium term.
- Total public debt-to-GDP is around 120 percent in 2016, with 67.9 percent domestic (Text Table 2).
- Public debt is expected to fall to 90 percent by 2022 reflecting slower domestic debt growth than nominal GDP growth, lower T-Bill rates, concessional budget support and robust growth.
- Average T-Bill rates fell from highs around 20 percent in 2016 to around 12 percent in March, and are expected to gradually decline further in line with inflation and fiscal discipline anchored by the NDB target of 1 percent of GDP.

### Debt coverage and treatment of SOE liabilities
- The updated DSA has, to the greatest extent possible, accounted for SOE liabilities as part of overall public debt on a loan by loan basis.
- SOE liabilities incorporated include domestic and external SOE debt that arises from government on-lending and guarantees.
- Special audits of SOEs to be undertaken may provide a fuller picture of SOE liabilities.
- The updated DSA provides a contingent liability shock scenario to account for additional SOE debt not incorporated in the baseline.

### External DSA findings and stress tests
- All five external debt burden ratios breach the now lower respective indicative thresholds under the baseline scenario in the near and medium term.
  - The immediate breach results mainly from the downgrade to the 2015 CPIA rating and the corresponding lowering of all indicative threshold levels, and because of the higher debt stock and debt service indicators.
  - Higher debt ratios also reflect exogenous shocks (higher commodity prices, reduced tourism, bad harvest) and a weaker economic outlook.
- The analysis incorporates committed budget support (grants and concessional loans) from the World Bank, EU and AfDB for the next few years, with less concessional support thereafter. Remaining fiscal financing gaps are assumed to be closed with bilateral concessional external financing.
- Shock scenarios:
  - A combined shock to real GDP growth and international factors (exchange rate and exports) is the most extreme stress test for three out of five external debt burden indicators: PV of debt to GDP ratio, PV of debt-to-exports ratio, and PV of debt to revenue ratio.
  - The debt service-to-exports ratio is vulnerable to a decline in exports.
  - The debt service-to-revenue ratio is vulnerable to a large depreciation of the exchange rate.
- External debt outlook is vulnerable to both domestic and external shocks.

### Public DSA findings and risks
- The high level of public debt and high rollover risks remain a source of concern.
- Present value of public debt-to-GDP remains well above its indicative benchmark for the entire forecast horizon, though declining.
- Elevated public debt ratios reflect weaker growth outturns, past fiscal slippages including unbudgeted SOE support, and massive theft mainly from SOEs under the previous regime.
- Public debt dynamics are highly vulnerable to shocks to domestic interest rates.
- Almost three quarters of T-bills are held by commercial banks (around one-third of bank assets), and another quarter by non-banks — banks’ exposure to the sovereign represents a potential source of financial stability risk.
- Need to develop appropriate crisis resolution tools and financial safety nets to address potential adverse spillovers.

### Implications, scenarios, and policy recommendations
- Bringing public debt to safer levels would require additional measures and donor support.
- Authorities’ commitments and measures:
  - Structured SOE reform program involving governance reform, removal of long-term credit guarantees and on-lending by government, and privatizations when feasible.
  - Commitment to the fiscal anchor of a 1 percent NDB target.
  - Return to stronger growth in the longer term.
- Under baseline and customized scenarios including SOE contingent liabilities, present-value of public debt-to-GDP ratios decline but not sufficiently to bring debt below its benchmark.
- Authorities are working on options to:
  - Gradually move to longer maturity public debt instruments to reduce rollover risks and lower near-term debt servicing costs.
  - Meet demand for longer-dated instruments by banks and nonbanks and help establish an incipient yield curve aimed at securities market development.
  - Engage with domestic creditors to restructure the debt of NAWEC to provide further breathing room.

### Debt distress classification and sustainability assessment
- Based on external debt burden indicators, the current DSA finds that The Gambia is in external debt distress.
  - All external debt burden indicators breach their thresholds for a sustained period, and in some cases the breaches are substantial.
  - External debt sustainability remains sensitive to shocks or a combination of shocks.
  - Under the baseline, most debt burden indicators fall below their respective thresholds after 2022.
- Staff assesses that Gambia’s debt is unsustainable under the baseline scenario.
  - Total public debt remains high throughout the entire projection horizon, well above the country’s debt carrying capacity.
  - Assessment considers significant near-term risks captured by external debt burden indicators, persistently high public debt levels and gross financing needs, and absence of fiscal and external buffers.

*Source: cr17179 - 1. The short-term outlook for public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt (IMF).*

### 11. With the assurances the authorities are seeking from official creditors in respect of debt

### 11. With the assurances the authorities are seeking from official creditors in respect of debt service falling due, debt would be sustainable, but with little margin for error.

### Summary findings
- The highly concessional terms of the new financing should significantly reduce external financing needs and debt service in the medium term.
- The present value of external public and total public debt would immediately fall closer to the thresholds.
- Despite concessional financing, debt would be sustainable "but with little margin for error."

### Debt sustainability indicators (selected projections and levels)
- External debt (nominal) in percent of GDP: 61.5 (2014), 55.5 (2015), 56.2 (2016), 54.0 (2017), declining through projections to 37.7 (2037).
- PPG (public and publicly guaranteed) external debt in percent of GDP: 58.4 (2014), 51.4 (2015), 52.4 (2016), 50.9 (2017), projected to 34.2 (2027) and 37.7 (2037) shown elsewhere as PV dynamics.
- Change in external debt (levels): 11.2 (2014), -6.0 (2015), 0.7 (2016), -2.2 (2017), with identified net debt-creating flows averaging 5.6 (historical) and -0.2 (2017-2022 average).
- Non-interest current account deficit (percent of GDP): 10.2 (2014), 14.1 (2015), 8.1 (2016), 9.1 (2017), with projected averages around 7.6–7.7 in later years.
- Exports (percent of GDP): 29.2 (2014), 24.7 (2015), 24.0 (2016), 21.0 (2017), projected to 35.8 (2037) in a memorandum line.
- Imports (percent of GDP): 48.5 (2014), 50.4 (2015), 41.9 (2016), 43.7 (2017), projected to 59.2 (2037).
- Net current transfers (negative = inflow, percent of GDP): -11.3 (2014), -13.9 (2015), -11.9 (2016), -9.9 (2017), projected around -12.0 to -12.4 in several years.
- Net FDI (negative = inflow, percent of GDP): -9.2 (2014), -8.2 (2015), -7.5 (2016), -8.7 (2017), projected around -8.3 to -9.7 in historical/projection years.
- Endogenous debt dynamics contribution (percent): 4.6 (2014), -3.0 (2015), -3.4 (2016), -0.8 (2017), with projected contributions around -2.1 to -1.4 in later years.
- PV of external debt (percent of GDP): series shows values such as 43.5, 41.1, 41.2, 41.6, 42.6, 42.8, 42.9, 39.2, 35.9, 34.3, 33.6, 32.8, 27.8 (selected years in table).
- PV of external debt (percent of exports): 181.2, 195.9, 182.9, 178.8, 176.1, 172.0, 166.8, 144.5, 127.9, 119.1, 114.0, 109.7, 77.7 (selected years).
- PV of PPG external debt (percent of GDP): 39.7, 37.9, 37.2, 36.4, 35.6, 34.3, 33.1, 31.6, 30.4, 29.4, 28.9, 28.2, 24.3 (selected years).
- PV of PPG external debt (percent of exports): 165.3, 180.8, 165.0, 156.5, 147.3, 137.7, 128.5, 116.6, 108.3, 102.3, 97.9, 94.4, 67.9 (selected years).
- PV of PPG external debt (percent of government revenues): 216.0, 203.3, 214.2, 202.3, 190.4, 175.9, 162.9, 152.0, 148.5, 146.8, 149.6, 149.7, 146.1 (selected years).
- Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent): 14.2 (2014), 14.7 (2015), 10.7 (2016), 19.4 (2017), 20.9, 19.4, 17.6, 16.1, 13.5, 11.8, 10.2, 8.8, 7.3, 7.2, 6.4 (selected years).
- PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent): 22.5 (2014), 18.4 (2015), 14.0 (2016), 21.8 (2017), 27.2, 25.1, 22.7, 20.5, 17.1, 15.4, 14.0, 12.6, 11.2, 11.4, 13.8 (selected years).
- Total gross financing need (Millions of U.S. dollars): 79.3 (2014), 110.0 (2015), 66.4 (2016), 85.3 (2017), 117.7, 139.7, 157.6, 176.2, 178.1, 150.4, 122.8, 101.0, 94.3, 101.9, 160.1 (selected years).
- Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio: -1.0, 20.1, 7.4, 10.8, 10.1, 11.3, 11.1, 12.2, 11.5, 11.5, 11.3, 9.9, 8.8, 8.9, 7.5 (selected years).

### Stress tests and scenarios
- Figures indicate alternative scenarios for public- and publicly-guaranteed external debt 2017-37, including:
  - Baseline
  - Historical scenario
  - Most extreme shock (defined as the test that yields the highest ratio on or before 2027)
  - Specific shocks identified in figure notes: Combination shock (most extreme in multiple panels), Exports shock (panel e), One-time depreciation shock (panel f).
- The "most extreme stress test" differs by indicator: in figures b.–d. it corresponds to a Combination shock; in figure e. to an Exports shock; in figure f. to a One-time depreciation shock.
- Figure 2 presents similar multi-scenario indicators for public debt 2017-37 with scenarios including Baseline, Public debt benchmark, Most extreme shock, SOE Liabilities, Historical scenario, Fix Primary Balance.

### Key macroeconomic assumptions used in projections (selected)
- Real GDP growth (in percent): 0.9 (2014), 4.3 (2015), 2.2 (2016), 3.6 (2017), projections: 3.3, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, 4.8, 4.8, 4.1, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8 (various years and averages shown).
- GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent): -8.1 (2014), 2.7 (2015), 5.8 (2016), 0.8 (2017), subsequent year changes include 9.6, 4.4, 1.8, 1.4, 0.7, 0.2, 0.2, 1.5, -0.2, 0.1 (selected).
- Effective interest rate (percent): 1.2 (2014), 1.8 (2015), 1.4 (2016), 1.7 (2017), with projected values 0.3, 1.4, 1.4, 1.3, 1.2, 1.1, 1.0, 1.3, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 0.9, 0.9 (selected).
- Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent): -7.7 (2014), -9.5 (2015), 5.0 (2016), 0.7 (2017), subsequent series includes 8.0, -6.0, 13.3, 8.8, 9.3, 8.1, 8.6, 7.0, 10.2, 8.6, 7.4, 7.4, 6.5, 7.0, 7.2.
- Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent): 9.5 (2014), 11.3 (2015), -10.2 (2016), 3.1 (2017), subsequent series includes 9.6, 12.3, 12.0, 8.0, 6.1, 4.6, 3.1, 7.7, 10.0, 5.3, 5.2, 6.5, 5.5, 8.8, 6.5.
- Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent): series shown in table with values such as 43.4, 39.2, 39.2, 40.2, 40.5, 40.8, 40.5, 45.1, 42.7, 41.2, 41.1, 41.0, 39.7, 40.8 (selected).
- Government revenues (excluding grants, percent of GDP): 18.5 (2014), 19.7 (2015), 18.4 (2016), 18.7 (2017), series around 17.4–20.8 and later averages.

### Financing, aid flows, and memorandum items
- Aid flows (Millions of US dollars): 115.0 (2014), 80.0 (2015), 31.6 (2016), 102.0 (2017), 137.9, 129.5, 121.7, 102.0, 88.7, 86.7, 82.1, 78.3, 79.5, 78.9, 106.5 (selected).
  - Of which: Grants: 30.8 (2014), 16.7 (2015), 16.2 (2016), 70.1 (2017), subsequently 59.9, 55.9, 49.9, 45.8, 42.8, 42.0, 40.2, 38.6, 36.9, 35.3, 28.4 (selected).
  - Of which: Concessional loans: 84.2 (2014), 63.3 (2015), 15.4 (2016), 32.0 (2017), subsequently 78.0, 73.6, 71.8, 56.2, 45.9, 44.7, 41.9, 39.8, 42.6, 43.6, 78.2 (selected).
- Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP): series includes 8.7, 8.3, 7.3, 6.5, 5.4, 4.6, 4.4, 4.0, 3.6, 3.4, 3.1, 2.2, 2.9 (selected).
- Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing): 77.1, 65.6, 65.4, 64.7, 67.2, 69.3, 71.7, 70.8, 70.2, 68.4, 67.4, 55.8, 63.0 (selected).
- Memorandum items:
  - Nominal GDP (Millions of US dollars): 833.2, 892.2, 964.6, 1037.6, 1093.8, 1153.5, 1213.4, 1273.9, 1337.5, 1398.1, 1466.3, 1537.7, 1612.6, 1691.2, 2721.4 (selected entries).
  - PV of PPG external debt (in Millions of US dollars): 381.9, 385.8, 400.9, 413.6, 425.6, 429.3, 431.6, 432.9, 436.5, 443.0, 455.4, 467.4, 648.0 (selected).
  - Gross workers' remittances (Millions of US dollars): 59.3, 93.6, 93.5, 101.1, 106.5, 112.4, 117.2, 123.1, 129.1, 133.9, 140.2, 147.5, 155.6, 164.3, 285.7 (selected).

### Public sector debt dynamics (selected)
- Public sector debt (percent of GDP): 104.9 (2014), 105.3 (2015), 120.2 (2016), 112.7 (2017), projected averages declining to 51.6 (2027) and 71.8/51.6 entries in tables.
- Foreign-currency denominated share of public sector debt (percent): 58.4 (2014), 51.4 (2015), 52.4 (2016), 50.9 (2017), projected to 34.2 (2027) in selected lines.
- Identified debt-creating flows (percent of GDP): 12.3 (2014), -8.7 (2015), 5.5 (2016), -7.3 (2017), with averages and projections shown.
- Primary deficit and related fiscal indicators:
  - Primary deficit (percent of GDP): 4.3 (2014), 1.2 (2015), 2.3 (2016), -0.6 (2017), with subsequent values including 5.3, -3.3, -1.4, -1.6, -1.5, -2.1, -2.5, -2.1, -0.4, 1.3, 0.1 (selected).
  - Revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 22.2 (2014), 21.6 (2015), 20.0 (2016), 25.4 (2017), series around 22.9–23.5 and later declines.
  - Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP): 26.5 (2014), 22.8 (2015), 22.4 (2016), 22.1 (2017), series around 21.5–21.0 and later 19.0 (selected).
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent): 8.0 (2014), -9.9 (2015), 3.1 (2016), -3.9 (2017), with subsequent contributions from interest/growth differential and real exchange rate depreciation noted.
- PV of public sector debt (selected percent of GDP): 107.5, 99.8, 94.2, 89.3, 84.9, 80.1, 75.9, 59.1, 41.7 (selected).
- Gross financing need (percent of GDP): 47.8 (2014), 52.7 (2015), 60.8 (2016), 44.6 (2017), subsequently 44.3, 41.7, 39.6, 37.0, 34.4, 28.4, 20.7 (selected).

### Policy recommendations and institutional measures (from safeguards and related text)
- Strengthen safeguards at the Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG); monitoring visit in March 2017 identified areas to be strengthened:
  - Amend the CBG Act to align it with leading practices for central banks.
  - Reconstitute the Audit Committee to full membership upon appointment of new Board members.
  - Phase out any further credit to government at below market rates.
  - Revise procedures for opening and closing accounts to ensure all required information is provided, and that transactions are properly authorized by the Accountant General’s Department of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs.
- These measures are included as part of the 2017 SMP.

### Additional institutional and program context (selected)
- The Gambia joined the IMF on September 21, 1967; accepted Article VIII obligations on January 21, 1993.
- Outstanding RCF Loans and ECF arrangements shown: RCF Loans 7.78 (SDR Million), ECF arrangements 19.75 and earlier entries; latest financial arrangements table lists ECF approvals and draws (ECF May 25, 2012 May 20, 2015: 18.66 approved, 10.89 drawn; earlier ECFs listed).
- Implementation of HIPC Initiative (Enhanced Framework): Decision point date Dec 2000; Completion point date Dec 2007. Assistance committed total (US$ million) 66.60; IMF assistance listed in SDR equivalents and disbursements (total disbursement 2.29 SDR million shown).
- Safeguards monitoring: a staff visit of FIN safeguards monitoring occurred March 2017.

*Source: IMF staff report chapter titled "11. With the assurances the authorities are seeking from official creditors in respect of debt service falling due, debt would be sustainable, but with little margin for error."*

### 1. Gambia DPO series

### 1. Gambia DPO series

### Statistical Issues: Assessment of Data Adequacy for Surveillance
- General:
  - Data have serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance; efforts are underway to improve statistics.
  - Most affected areas: monetary and financial data, balance of payments, and external debt statistics.
- National Accounts (NA):
  - GBoS disseminated annual GDP estimates in March 2015 for 2004-13 based on the 2006 Economic Census with 2004 benchmark.
  - Using the 2016 Economic Census, GDP estimates of production are likely to be rebased in late 2017; expenditure estimates will likely be rebased in early 2018.
  - Timeliness and accessibility of GDP figures remain a concern; GBoS faces capacity and financial constraints.
- Price Statistics:
  - Current CPI with weight reference period of 2004 introduced in January 2007.
  - Target to rebase CPI using 2010 integrated household survey and release rebased CPI by January 2015 was missed; rebased CPI scheduled to be released from January 2016 onward.
  - GBoS revising methodology for calculation of CPI elementary aggregates to improve compilation and reflect underlying price movements.
- Government Finance Statistics:
  - Authorities release central government transaction data with a lag of about four weeks for revenues and expenditures.
  - IFMIS introduced in 2010 allows compilation by functional category and administration, but regular public release has not begun.
  - Compilation of project grant disbursements and project grant use has been a challenge, leading to financing discrepancies.
  - Monthly data on domestic government financing available with delay of about four weeks.
- Monetary and Financial Statistics:
  - Central Bank of The Gambia (CBG) suspended reporting monetary and financial statistics to STA (latest data refer to April 2015).
  - CBG addressing capacity weaknesses to resume regular reporting.
- Financial Sector Surveillance:
  - Data quality improved after automated platform for regulatory returns; enabled comprehensive stress tests.
  - Cross border exposure data for financial corporations not available.
  - CBG started reporting FSIs to STA in October 2016; The Gambia reports 11 of the 12 core FSIs and some encouraged FSIs.
- External Sector Statistics:
  - Balance of payments statistics affected by delays in trade, customs, and tourist arrival data; outdated methods for estimating re-exports; poor data on capital flows; poor classification; lack of consistent methodology.
  - Institutional weaknesses impede improvements; official grant and loan disbursements and repayments generally well recorded but gaps exist in project disbursements.
  - Large discrepancy between balance of payments data reported to STA (outdated, available only up to the third quarter of 2013) and adjusted AFR data.
  - CBG produces quarterly BOP statistics according to BPM5; an IIP statement in standard format has not yet been prepared (primary goal following February 2015 TA mission).
  - Surveys conducted: tourism expenditures and re-exports in 2011; FDI and trade credits and advances in 2012.
  - Enterprise registry update and increased response rate (currently around 52 percent); quarterly report forms to real estate agencies launched (response rate remains low).
- Data Standards and Quality:
  - Participates in GDDS since 2003 and enhanced GDDS; metadata and GDDS improvement plans not updated since 2003 except for national accounts, balance of payments and gross official reserves updated in 2011.
  - A data ROSC was published on December 1, 2005.
- Reporting to STA:
  - Authorities provide most FSIs to IMF database; not all core FSIs are reported and reported indicators are not timely.
  - The Gambia suspended reporting GFS data to the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook from fiscal year 2010 onwards.

### Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (selected reporting facts)
- Exchange Rates: latest observation 04/2017; date received 05/2017; Frequency of Data D; Frequency of Reporting W; Frequency of Publication M.
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities: latest observation 04/2017; date received 04/2017; Frequency W; Reporting W; Publication M.
- Reserve/Base Money: latest observation 04/2017; date received 04/2017; Frequency D; Reporting W; Publication M.
- Broad Money: latest observation 03/2017; date received 05/2017; Frequency M; Reporting M; Publication M.
- Central Bank Balance Sheet: latest observation 03/2017; date received 05/2017; Frequency M; Reporting M; Publication M.
- Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System: latest observation 03/2017; date received 05/2017; Frequency M; Reporting M; Publication M.
- Interest Rates: latest observation 04/2017; date received 05/2017; Frequency W; Reporting W; Publication M.
- Consumer Price Index: latest observation 03/2017; date received 04/2017; Frequency M; Reporting M; Publication M.
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – Central Government: latest observation 02/2017; date received 02/2017; Frequency M; Reporting M; Publication M.
- Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt: latest observation 04/2017; date received 04/2017; Frequency M; Reporting M; Publication M.
- External Current Account Balance: latest observation 12/2016; date received 03/2017; Frequency Q; Reporting I; Publication A.
- Exports and Imports of Goods and Services: latest observation 12/2017; date received 03/2017; Frequency Q; Reporting I; Publication A.
- GDP/GNP: latest observation 12/2016; date received 03/2017; Frequency A; Reporting A; Publication A.
- Gross External Debt: latest observation 12/2016; date received 04/2017; Frequency Q; Reporting I; Publication A.
- International Investment Position: N/A.

### Statement by Executive Director — Key Points, Risks, and Requests
- Introduction:
  - Authorities thank staff for frank and productive program discussions and express appreciation for engagement during political transition.
  - Authorities broadly agree with staff’s assessment and reiterate commitment to macroeconomic stability and inclusive growth.
- Context and Challenges:
  - Facing formidable challenges from legacy macroeconomic imbalances, weak governance, a challenged public sector, irregular rainfall disrupting agriculture, and political uncertainty dampening tourism receipts.
  - Urgent balance of payments needs projected at about 3 percent of GDP; low levels of usable international reserves.
- Request for Program:
  - Total financing gap of 15 percent of GDP.
  - Request immediate support from IMF under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) equivalent to 18.75 percent of quota, or SDR 11,662,500, to address immediate balance of payments crisis.
  - Request a one year staff-monitored program (SMP) covering April 2017 to March 2018 to guide implementation and build track record.
  - Intend to request support under Extended Credit Facility (ECF) thereafter for medium-term stability and inclusive growth, consistent with national plan.
  - Balance of financing gap to be covered by donors’ commitment (7.2 percent of GDP), concrete fiscal measures by authorities (5.3 percent of GDP), and domestic financing (1 percent of GDP).
  - Authorities acknowledge structural challenges and plan to seek a more expansive program subsequently.
- Recent Economic Developments and Outlook:
  - Economic growth in 2016 estimated at 2.2 percent, down from 4.3 percent in 2015.
  - Total public debt stock rose from 105.3 percent of GDP in 2015 to 120 percent of GDP at end-2016.
  - Net domestic borrowing estimated at 11.4 percent of GDP in 2016; high debt service on domestic debt absorbed almost half of government revenue in 2016.
  - Gross international reserves have fallen to 1.6 months of prospective imports.
  - Growth projected to rebound to 3 percent in 2017; medium-term GDP growth averaging 4.5 percent supported by governance reforms, private sector growth, commercial farming, tourism, and FDI, with gradual improvements due to lingering political after-effects.
  - Headline annual inflation reached 8.7 percent in March 2017, from 7.9 percent at end-2016; CBG target is 5 percent.
  - Inflation expected to abate to 7.1 percent by 2018, aided by normalization of monetary policy and rebound in agricultural production.
  - Current account deficit narrowed in 2016 due to favorable terms of trade, decline in exports, and moderate rebound in trade.
- Fiscal Policy and Public Financial Management:
  - Authorities committed to tightening fiscal policy while promoting growth and creating space for priority infrastructure and social spending.
  - 2017 budget legislated to contain deficit to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2017, from 9.8 percent in 2016.
  - 2017 budget reduced expenditure by about 1 percent of GDP with substantial cuts in the Presidency budget.
  - Steps taken: channeling all fees and revenue sources to the budget (including petroleum fee concessions); liberalizing fuel supply to NAWEC with a reduction in cost of fuel by 15 percent.
  - Government issued circular to not approve further guarantees for SOEs unless consistent with Public Finance Act.
  - Oversight of GAMTEL transferred from Presidency to Ministry of Information and Communication Infrastructure.
  - PFM reforms: policies to reduce bloated vehicle fleet; strengthen accountability; reduce fuel and maintenance costs; generate receipts from sale of excess cars; initiate nationwide payroll verification audit.
  - Considering streamlining ministries and sub-vented agencies, downsizing and rationalizing embassies, and streamlining memberships in non-financial international organizations.
- Debt Management:
  - Recent DSA suggests The Gambia is at high risk of debt distress.
  - Authorities avoiding contracting new non-concessional debt and reducing interest charges; all outstanding CBG lending consolidated into a 30-year bond.
  - Preparing a domestic debt strategy with Fund and World Bank: curb net domestic borrowing, extend maturities, possibly lower interest costs, and gradually reduce ratio of domestic debt to GDP; to be implemented during proposed SMP.
  - Negotiations with commercial banks to restructure NAWEC’s loans.
  - Interest rates averaged 17 percent in 2016 and have declined to 11.5 percent since April 2017.
  - Engaging official creditors for concessional debt restructuring; additional public investments to be financed through external grants and concessional loans.
  - Government committed to consult the Fund before contracting and guaranteeing any new concessional external loans.
- Monetary and Financial Sector Policies:
  - Monetary policy effectiveness undermined by monetization of fiscal deficit over time; policy will aim to bring down inflation within target over the medium term.
  - Authorities committed to maintain exchange rate flexibility to absorb shocks and increase resilience.
  - Amendments to CBG independence expected to be submitted to parliament by end 2017; CBG Board expected to be fully constituted and an Audit Committee set up.
  - Policies to consolidate current facilities, limit borrowing, and contain SOE financing expected to curb banking sector vulnerabilities.
  - CBG has stepped up monitoring of debt policy impacts, initiated work on upgrading bank resolution framework, and is developing crisis management capabilities.
- Conclusion:
  - International community support is critical; authorities appreciate pledged support from World Bank, European Union, African Development Bank.
  - Authorities commit to prudent fiscal and monetary policies, sustained debt management, and deeper structural reforms to boost competitiveness, promote inclusive growth, and accelerate poverty reduction.
  - Authorities optimistic growth will pick up in 2017 as tourism and trade recover and reforms are institutionalized.
  - Fund’s support through RCF and in building a track record for an ECF seen as critical to unlocking donor funding and catalyzing reform implementation.

*Source: cr17179 - 1. Gambia DPO series (IMF), June 26, 2017.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2017/cr17179.pdf_
