## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Introduction and context
- Sustained demographic change can have potentially significant effects on the economy and the financial system.
- Aging affects financial intermediation through effects on potential growth, on the term structure of interest rates and risk premiums, and on the demand for retirement-related products and services.
- In an aging society, the financial sector plays an important role in fostering growth and productivity.
- The note analyzes and quantifies the effect of aging in Japan—both at the national and regional levels—on the nature of financial intermediation and concludes that the relative role of banks is likely to diminish.

### Key empirical findings on aging and financial intermediation
- Empirically, aging seems to be associated with a smaller relative role of banks in financial intermediation.
- Economies with an aging population tend to feature smaller term spreads; smaller term spreads are associated with less bank finance.
- The increase in the elderly dependency ratio observed in Japan between 1990 and 2015, according to the estimates, can account for up to 40 percent of the decline in the term spread observed during the same period.
- The offer of services by the financial industry will need to continue to adapt to the demands of an aging population.
- Given relatively flat term structures that drive compressed net interest margins, banks should be encouraged to increase fee-based income, namely by charging for basic banking services.

### Introduction: demographic and macro-financial mechanisms (selected points)
- The Japanese population began to shrink in 2010 and approximately 20 percent was aged 70 or above in 2015.
- Aging may reduce labor supply and productivity growth, thus keeping economic growth and real interest rates at low levels.
- Example estimates: aging is estimated to have reduced the real interest rate in Japan by 1.25 percentage points since 1985.
- Very low interest rates below the 0.8-1 percent range (which administering deposits are estimated to cost) can create incentives for banks to rely more on wholesale funding and may encourage excessive risk taking.
- Low economic growth will probably cause financial intermediaries to further increase their exposures to foreign markets.

### Empirical findings on aging and financial intermediation (cross-country)
- An empirical analysis for a large sample of advanced, emerging, and developing economies shows that aging has on its own no measurable effect on the nature of financial intermediation—either bank-based or market-based.
- When the direct and indirect effect of aging is disentangled, only the indirect effect (via the term spread) is significant.
- Results using a smaller but more homogenous sample of advanced and emerging economies confirm this assertion.
- Table excerpt numerical context: Number of Countries: 113; 38; 38; 34; 34. Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables are used.
- Note: Financial intermediation is measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to bank credit. Statistical insignificance implies the data do not rule out no relation, but absence of significance may reflect measurement error, misspecification, or relatively short time series (average country has between 17 and 22 years of data; maximum of 40 years).

### Term spread as an indirect channel
- Banks’ advantages: (1) ability to screen and monitor credit (particularly in opaque settings); and (2) ability to do maturity transformation, at least in part because of deposit insurance.
- The term spread—the difference between the long- and the short-term sovereign interest rate—can be used as an imperfect measure of the gains accruing to maturity transformation.
- Hypotheses on aging’s effect on term structure:
  - Aging changes demand for safe and liquid assets relative to risky or illiquid assets, which could cause the term premium to rise or fall.
  - Aging can cause deflationary pressures and constrain monetary policy to be at the zero-lower bound, causing the term structure to flatten because real interest rates comove negatively with consumption growth and lower the term premium (IMF 2017).
- Term spread decomposition caveat: The term spread can be decomposed into expected future changes in short-term rates and the term premium proper; benefits to maturity transformation relate to the latter. Measuring term premium across many countries is challenging.

### Japan: links among aging, term spread, and market vs. bank finance
- Empirical evidence indicates the effect of aging on the structure of the financial system is mostly indirect through the term spread.
- A smaller term spread is associated with less bank finance.
- Aging is consistent with smaller term premiums and thus a decrease in the importance of banks.
- Specifically for Japan:
  - The increase in the elderly dependency ratio observed in Japan between 1990 and 2015 can account for roughly 40 percent of the decline in the term spread observed during the same period.
  - A one standard-deviation increase (or about 7 percentage points) in the elderly dependency ratio would cause market-based finance to increase by about 10 percent relative to bank-based finance.
- Figure 2 interpretation: About 40 percent of the increase in the size of market finance in Japan since 1990 can be explained by aging. The stripped pattern for the direct effect in 2010–15 means the effect is not statistically significant.

### Life-cycle investment patterns and model simulations
- NSFIE data show savings habits differ across age groups:
  - In 2014, younger generations have a stronger preference for liquid and safer assets than older age groups.
  - Older generations hold significantly more nonbank instruments, including equity, than younger generations.
  - Stock market participation rates: Japan 15 percent; U.S. 50 percent; Australia 36 percent; Germany 23 percent; France 22 percent.
  - Between 1999 and 2014: holdings of more liquid assets increased for all cohorts; demand deposits now account for a larger share of total financial assets; equity holdings by the older cohort have increased.
- Model simulations (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) style calibrated to Japan):
  - Aging has only a slight effect on portfolio choices; preference for safe assets is little affected by an increase in longevity and the associated increase in the population share of older people.
  - The simulation suggests the average portfolio has slightly more risky assets as the population ages, consistent with a smaller role for banks. The average share of the risky asset increases slightly with an aged population.
  - Mechanism: Increased longevity causes households to save more and raise investment in the risky asset; higher demand for risky assets raises asset prices and lowers the risk premium (assumed to approximate the term premium).
  - Magnitude: The increase in risky asset share is slight and should have a small effect on the risk premium. The simulation takes the risk premium as given and does not solve for it in equilibrium.
  - Uncertainty about retirement income increases precautionary saving; in the model households mostly increase slightly their investment in safe assets when perceiving a cut in retirement income.
- Policy implication: Policies to promote participation in equity markets or investments that offer insurance against longevity risk can have persistent effects; changes induced by low and stable inflation or low trust in capital markets can be difficult to overcome.

### Implications for the nature of financial intermediation in Japan
- Likely outcomes:
  - Aging will lead to a more important role for nonbank financial intermediaries in Japan: aging increases preference for safe assets as people retire; higher longevity risk and doubts about retirement income safety can increase demand for liquid assets.
  - Increases in longevity and longevity risk and perceptions by younger generations of insecure retirement income may encourage more saving, though simulated effects are not large.
  - Banks will need to adjust business models in response to a relatively flat yield curve: cross-country empirical analysis suggests aging will continue to put downward pressure on the term spread and, under certain conditions, on the benefits of maturity transformation; banks are likely to dedicate more resources to fee-based wealth management.
  - Demand for health insurance and certain life-insurance products may increase; a true annuities market could provide substantial welfare gains, especially for older individuals, those with lower retirement income, and those with less certain income. Equity-linked annuities show stronger gains in cited studies.

### Regional banking in an aging Japan — structure and recent performance
- There are currently 105 regional banks operating in Japan’s 47 prefectures and accounting for 14 percent of total assets of Japan’s financial system.
- Regional banks traditionally extend loans to small SMEs and households within their prefecture.
- Regional bank structure:
  - First tier: 64 larger regional banks; second tier: 41 smaller regional banks.
  - Deposits are the main source of funds: share of deposits in total funding liabilities was 97 percent in the early 2000s and has fallen to about 90 percent.
  - On the asset side, loans as a share of total earning assets have fluctuated around 70 percent over the past two decades. Other main assets include securities (about 25 percent) and cash.
- Performance trends:
  - Net interest rate margins for regional banks have been falling since the early 2000s.
  - Lower long-term interest rates combined with falling loan-deposit ratios have put downward pressure on net interest margins and squeezed profitability.
  - Some regional institutions have adjusted business models by increasing securities investments (foreign and domestic), lending to local government, and real estate investments.
  - Note: Loan-to-deposit ratios of regional banks have not fallen as much as for Shinkin and major banks.

### Demographic trends and empirical links to loan and deposit dynamics
- Demographic headwinds have worsened and are projected to intensify over the next two decades.
- Population growth:
  - Average prefectural population growth rate fell into negative territory in the early 2000s.
  - By 2015, only a handful of prefectures—mostly metropolitan areas—still experienced positive population growth.
  - After 2020, all prefectures are expected to experience negative population growth, with loss of population less pronounced in metropolitan areas.
- Aging:
  - The average prefectural share of the adult population aged 70 and above rose from 13 percent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2015, and is projected to further increase to 32 percent by 2035.
  - Between 1995 and 2005 aging came mostly at the expense of the age group 34−54; between 2005 and 2015 it was mirrored primarily by a fall in the share of those aged 20−34. Looking forward, the pace of aging will slow somewhat and largely be associated with a fall in the shares of age groups 55−69 (between 2020–30) and 34−54 (between 2025−35).
- Panel regression results (annual data covering more than 100 regional banks over 1990−2015):
  - If the population shrinks by one percent, loan growth would fall by 2.2 percentage points while deposit growth would only shrink by 1.1 percentage points, leading to a one percentage point fall in the loan-to-deposit ratio.
  - A one percentage point shift from the 35−54 age group to the 70+ age group lowers loan growth by 1.9 percentage points, while it contracts deposit growth by 0.7 percentage points, leading to a fall in the loan-to-deposit ratio by about 1.2 percentage points.
- Historical and projected impacts:
  - 1990s: population growth raised annual loan growth by an average of 0.5 percentage points across prefectures between 1990 and 1995.
  - 2010–2015: shrinking prefectural populations reduced annual loan growth by 0.8 percentage points.
  - Aging in the 1990s reduced loan growth by around 0.7−0.8 percentage points per year, and caused downward pressure on the loan-deposit ratio of about 0.2–0.4 percentage points per year.
  - Projections to 2035: combined negative impact from aging and population growth on annual loan and deposit growth is projected at around 2.0−2.5 and 1.0−1.2 percentage points, respectively.
  - Because the impact on loan growth is relatively larger than on deposit growth, the average annual decline in the loan-deposit rate will be about 1−1.5 percentage points.
  - Over the next two decades the average cumulative decline in the loan-deposit ratio would be well over 20 percentage points.
  - During 2030−35, aging is projected to have a negligible impact relative to population decline.
  - Regional variation: banks in the three major metropolitan areas will fare better; a nontrivial share of banks could see their loan-deposit ratios fall by more than 30 percentage points by 2035.

### Business model clustering and transitions (regional banks)
- Three business models identified with means and standard deviations:
  - Securities Oriented Business Model: Loans 0.61 (Stdev. 0.04); Securities 0.36 (Stdev. 0.05); Deposits 0.94 (Stdev. 0.04); Fees 0.10 (Stdev. 0.04)
  - Mixed Business Model: Loans 0.70 (Stdev. 0.03); Securities 0.25 (Stdev. 0.03); Deposits 0.96 (Stdev. 0.03); Fees 0.07 (Stdev. 0.04)
  - Loan Oriented Business Model: Loans 0.79 (Stdev. 0.04); Securities 0.17 (Stdev. 0.03); Deposits 0.97 (Stdev. 0.04); Fees 0.04 (Stdev. 0.05)
- Transition probabilities (unconditional one-year, Year T to Year T+1):
  - Securities → Year T+1: 89 (stay Securities), 11 (to Mixed), 0 (to Loan oriented)
  - Mixed → Year T+1: 7 (to Securities), 84 (stay Mixed), 9 (to Loan oriented)
  - Loan Oriented → Year T+1: 0 (to Securities), 12 (to Mixed), 88 (stay Loan oriented)
- Ordered probit results:
  - Increases in the share of age groups 55−69 and 70+ raise the likelihood that a bank will switch to a more securities oriented and fee based banking model.
  - Higher population growth tends to be associated with more lending-oriented banking.

### Implications and mitigation options for regional banks
- Demographic headwinds will push regional banks away from lending and toward holding securities and fee-based activities.
- To counter demographic trends, significant improvements in macroeconomic performance are required:
  - Consistent achievement of the two percent inflation target across prefectures would help raise the loan-deposit ratio by about 1.4 percentage points per year (based on specification (4) and (9) in Table 1 Annex III).
  - A potential growth rate of 2 percent would increase loan growth by another 0.3-0.4 percentage points per year.
  - BoJ’s current estimate of potential growth is about 0.7 percent.
- Bank-level strategic responses:
  - Consolidation to improve efficiency and reduce fixed costs.
  - Use of wholesale funding to finance extra-regional lending or securities investments to prevent balance sheets from shrinking.
  - Deploy surplus funds to extend extra-regional loans or invest in securities if demographic trends disproportionately reduce regional lending relative to deposits.

### SMEs, startups, access to finance, and ABL
- SME challenges and constraints:
  - SMEs face labor shortages, aging owners, and lack of managerial skills; in 2015 SMEs posted three job offers per job seeker while large firms posted one.
  - About half of all SME owners are over the age of 60; 27 percent of SMEs mentioned difficulties in finding successors.
  - SMEs in Japan tend to have lower productivity than peers elsewhere in the OECD.
- SME financing conditions:
  - A survey shows that about 24 percent of SMEs face difficult financial position.
  - About 37 percent of SMEs still rely on public credit guarantees to obtain loans.
  - The rejection rate in loan applications is about 16 percent in Japan.
  - About 30 percent of SME financing comes from bank loans and 22 percent from internal funds.
- Venture capital and startup finance:
  - Venture capital is 0.02 percent of GDP in Japan compared with 0.3 percent in Israel and the U.S.
  - In 2016, total capital raised for ventures in Japan reached a record ¥276 billion (US$2.5 billion), above an average of ¥50 billion per year since 2008.
  - Startups at an early stage mostly rely on internal funds, personal savings, and family loans.
- Collateral-based lending vs. asset-based lending (ABL):
  - About 80 percent of SME loans require personal guarantees or fixed-assets collateral.
  - The value of personal guarantees exceeds owners’ assets in 78 percent of the cases.
  - Lending based on movable collateral and account receivables is less than 0.5 percent of total bank loans.
  - Number of asset-backed loans tripled from about 4,000 cases in 2011 to 12,000 cases in 2015 after FSA measures.
  - Leasing volumes to SMEs account for less than one percent of total leasing volumes.
- Enabling factors for ABL (OECD 2015):
  - An efficient secured-transactions law and a modern collateral registry.
  - Specialized expertise by lenders to assess and monitor collateral.
- Reported practitioner concerns for ABL include inability to judge suitability of property as security, inability to ascertain management status of assets, low enterprise recognition of ABL, insufficient promotion structure, lack of branch staff understanding, and absence of clear procedures and targets.

### Credit guarantees and revised guarantee scheme
- Public credit guarantees remain large in scale and broad in scope despite declines in total outstanding amount.
  - Coverage of credit guarantees is 80–100 percent.
  - Total credit guarantees declined from a peak of ¥35.9 trillion in 2009 to ¥25.8 trillion.
  - 37 percent of SMEs rely on credit guarantees to obtain loans.
- Revised guarantee scheme objectives:
  - Encourage financial institutions to provide non-guarantee loans in addition to guaranteed loans.
  - Decrease coverage from 100 to 80 percent for the Safety Net Guarantees Program No. 5 while establish a new Safety Net Guarantee program exclusively for crises.
  - Enhance 100 percent credit guarantees for startups (from ¥10 to ¥20 million) and microbusiness (from ¥12.5 to ¥20 million).
- Risks and best practices:
  - Excessive guarantees can weaken banks’ incentives in credit screening and monitoring and create moral hazard.
  - International best practices (World Bank 2013): private sector responsibility for credit decisions; capped coverage and lender recovery attempts before payouts; encourage use of risk management tools.
  - Policy implication: gradually phasing out credit guarantees is important to encourage credit risk assessment capacity among financial institutions and avoid credit misallocation.

### Policy recommendations (financial sector and SMEs)
- Promote risk-based and asset-based lending:
  - Encourage banks to upgrade credit risk-assessment capacity and reduce reliance on collateral and personal guarantees.
  - Further promote asset-based lending by upgrading lenders’ ability to value movable collateral and accounts receivable.
  - Improve reporting standards by SMEs and sustain investment in financial literacy promotion.
- Reform credit guarantees:
  - Reduce coverage and duration to avoid discouraging banks from improving credit screening and monitoring.
  - After careful design, public credit guarantees can help address information problems but should not discourage bank capacity building.
- Encourage alternative finance and venture capital:
  - Foster venture capital growth by enabling VC funds to become larger to fund later-stage ventures.
  - Explore room for pension funds to invest in funds of funds and rebalance toward riskier assets.
- Institutional risk management and service adaptation:
  - Encourage development of adequate risk management in institutions expanding into higher-return, higher-risk businesses abroad or into new activities.
  - Financial industry should adapt services to aging population needs (e.g., advisory services for life-cycle portfolio management, retirement planning, and development of a market for life annuities).
- Managing structural adjustment for regional banks:
  - Engage with regional banks to ensure prudent adaptation to demographic trends (improve risk management, develop realistic business strategies).
  - Authorities could facilitate exit of unviable firms and encourage consolidation after cost–benefit analysis to achieve economies of scale and preserve borrower credit histories.

### Annex I — country panel regression analysis (selected results and diagnostics)
- Two samples:
  - First sample: 133 economies; period 1975−2014.
  - Second sample: up to 38 advanced and emerging economies; period 1990−2014.
- Core panel model: FIit−1 = αi + βAgingit−τ + Γ′xit−τ + τt + uit, where FI = log(stock market capitalization / bank credit).
- Instruments for term spread: lagged real GDP growth rate; lagged inflation rate; sovereign long-term credit rating (Fitch Ratings).
- Selected diagnostics and table figures (Annex Table 1):
  - Observations: 2488; 666; 666; 590; 590
  - Number of Countries: 113; 38; 38; 34; 34
  - GDP per capita coefficients: 0.167; 0.732***; 0.444**; -3.754***; 0.257
  - Credit to Deposits: -0.575***; -0.734***; -0.711***; 0.047; -0.681***
  - Aging: -2.184; 0.271; -0.123; -7.901**; 0.552
  - Term Spread: -0.045***; -0.201***
  - Model diagnostics: F-test: 17.42***; 42.51***; 36.93***; 9.58***; 28.23***; Overidentification: 4.33; Underidentification: 24.89***; Weak Instruments: 9.58; WI Robust Inference: 8.73***
- Empirical interpretations:
  - Direct effect of aging on FI is not statistically significant in fixed-effects specifications.
  - The term spread is highly significant and a flatter yield curve works against banks’ role in intermediation.
  - IV first-stage indicates aging is associated with a declining term spread.
  - Quantified illustrative effect: if the old-age dependency ratio increases by one percentage point, then, on average, the term spread would increase by about 8 basis points, everything else equal; such an increase in the term spread is estimated to increase the relative size of market finance by about 1.6 percent.

### Annex IV — SMEs financial constraints (KZ index and investment-cash flow)
- KZ index (top 25% threshold, KZ*): Japan 0.23; France 0.41; Germany 1.09.
- SMEs with KZ > KZ* (counts): Japan 1,253 of 3,730; France 39,816 of 212,542; Germany 1,134 of 4,346.
- Share of SMEs with financial constraints (%): Japan 33.6; France 18.7; Germany 26.1.
- Investment-cash flow sensitivities (Annex Table 2):
  - Cash Flows coefficient (β1): Japan 0.33*** (Robust SE (0.085)); Germany 0.23*** (Robust SE (0.010)); France 0.29*** (Robust SE (0.003))
  - Sale Growth: Japan 0.49*** (0.109); Germany 0.60*** (0.054); France 0.08 (0.095)
  - Fixed Asset: Japan 0.06*** (0.010); Germany 0.01*** (0.001); France 0.39*** (0.002)
  - Observations: Japan 3,147; Germany 44,095; France 140,689
  - R-squared: Japan 0.155; Germany 0.059; France 0.289
- Interpretation: the higher cash-flow sensitivity in Japan suggests a proportion of SMEs are more financially constrained relative to France and Germany.

*International Monetary Fund. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Technical Note). Provided content: cr17283 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 5

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction and context
- Sustained demographic change can have potentially significant effects on the economy and the financial system.
- Aging affects financial intermediation through effects on potential growth, on the term structure of interest rates and risk premiums, and on the demand for retirement-related products and services.
- In an aging society, the financial sector plays an important role in fostering growth and productivity.
- The note analyzes and quantifies the effect of aging in Japan—both at the national and regional levels—on the nature of financial intermediation and concludes that the relative role of banks is likely to diminish.

### Key empirical findings on aging and financial intermediation
- Empirically, aging seems to be associated with a smaller relative role of banks in financial intermediation.
- Economies with an aging population tend to feature smaller term spreads; smaller term spreads are associated with less bank finance.
- The increase in the elderly dependency ratio observed in Japan between 1990 and 2015, according to the estimates, can account for up to 40 percent of the decline in the term spread observed during the same period.
- The offer of services by the financial industry will need to continue to adapt to the demands of an aging population.
- Given relatively flat term structures that drive compressed net interest margins, banks should be encouraged to increase fee-based income, namely by charging for basic banking services.

### Introduction: demographic and macro-financial mechanisms (selected points)
- The Japanese population began to shrink in 2010 and approximately 20 percent was aged 70 or above in 2015.
- Aging may reduce labor supply and productivity growth, thus keeping economic growth and real interest rates at low levels.
- Example estimates: aging is estimated to have reduced the real interest rate in Japan by 1.25 percentage points since 1985.
- Very low interest rates below the 0.8-1 percent range (which administering deposits are estimated to cost) can create incentives for banks to rely more on wholesale funding and may encourage excessive risk taking.
- Low economic growth will probably cause financial intermediaries to further increase their exposures to foreign markets.

### Regional banking: demographic headwinds and bank business models
- Strong demographic headwinds have contributed to a challenging operating environment for regional banks.
- Trends vary significantly across regions; rural prefectures are hit harder than prefectures close to Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.
- Declining loan-to-deposit ratios combined with falling term premiums have squeezed net interest margins and put downward pressure on bank profitability.
- Some regional institutions have adjusted business models by increasing securities investments (foreign and domestic), lending to local government, and real estate investments.
- Econometric analysis of regional bank data shows:
  - Shrinking populations tend to lead to smaller balance sheets and declining loan-deposit ratios.
  - Population aging has been an important driver of an ongoing shift in regional banks’ business models away from primarily lending-oriented banking towards a greater focus on securities investments and fees as new sources of income.
- The combined negative impact from aging and especially of population growth on the loan-deposit ratio is estimated to decline by an average of over 1 percentage point per year over the next two decades.
- The observed trend of regional banks shifting away from lending-based banking is likely to accelerate in the near future, highlighting the need for supervisors and regulators to engage with banks to ensure a smooth transition.
- After carefully weighing costs and benefits, authorities should promote sustainable business models, could facilitate the exit of unviable firms, and provide an enabling environment for consolidation among regional banks.

### SMEs, startups, and access to finance
- A significant portion of Japanese SMEs still face financial constraints, in addition to labor shortages and the lack of managerial skills.
- The percentage of SMEs that face financial constraints in Japan is higher than in Germany and in France.
- Lending to SMEs in Japan remains largely based on fixed-assets collateral and personal guarantees:
  - Bank loans to SMEs in Japan require fixed-assets collateral more frequently than in other advanced economies.
  - SME loans backed by personal guarantees are four times more likely in Japan than in the average for advanced economies.
- Collateral-based lending and extensive use of personal guarantees can mean credit is not channeled to the most productive firms but to those with more collateral, constituting an important constraint on limited liability and hindering risk taking by nonfinancial firms.

### Financial sector policy recommendations (selected)
- Financial sector policies should aim to address the constraints to financial access by further promoting risk-based lending and asset-based lending.
- Banks should continue to be encouraged to build capacity for risk assessment to do more risk-based lending.
- Public credit guarantees can help address information problems but need improvement so that they do not discourage banks from improving credit screening and monitoring.
- Further enhancing the ease in the transfer of account receivables, and upgrading lenders’ ability to value movable collateral is essential.
- Larger venture capital funds are necessary to improve access to finance by startups.
- Authorities should continue to encourage the development of adequate risk management in institutions that do not have significant experience in new types of investment.

### FSAP Key Recommendations (summary table entries and timeframes)
- Further engage with banks on implications of macroeconomic and demographic trends and take actions on a timely basis when viability concerns are identified for individual institutions (Japan Financial Service Authority (JFSA)). Timeframe: I
- Encourage regional and Shinkin banks to review measures such as cost reduction, consolidation, income diversification, and fee structures to address medium term profitability concerns (JFSA, Government). Timeframe: MT
- Promote asset-based lending further by continuing to encourage banks to build capacity for risk assessment (JFSA). Timeframe: NT
- Credit guarantees should have lower coverage (SME Agency). Timeframe: MT
- Timeframe definitions: "I–Immediate" is within one year; "NT–near-term" is 1–3 years; "MT–medium-term" is 3–5 years.

_International Monetary Fund. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Technical Note). Provided content: cr17283 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY._

### 9. However, data suggest that aging does not seem to directly affect the composition of

### However, data suggest that aging does not seem to directly affect the composition of the financial sector.

### Empirical findings on aging and financial intermediation
- An empirical analysis for a large sample of advanced, emerging, and developing economies shows that aging has on its own no measurable effect on the nature of financial intermediation—either bank-based or market-based.  
- When the direct and indirect effect of aging is disentangled, only the indirect effect is significant (see last two columns of Table 2).  
- Results using a smaller but more homogenous sample of advanced and emerging economies confirm this assertion.  
- Table excerpt numerical context: Number of Countries: 113; 38; 38; 34; 34. Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables are used. (Sources: FactSet; Haver Analytics; Thomson-Reuters Datastream; United Nations; World Bank; and IMF staff estimates.)  
- Note: Financial intermediation is measured by the ratio of stock market capitalization to bank credit. Statistical insignificance implies the data do not rule out no relation, but absence of significance may reflect measurement error, misspecification, or relatively short time series (average country has between 17 and 22 years of data; maximum of 40 years).

### Term spread as an indirect channel
- Banks’ advantages: (1) ability to screen and monitor credit (particularly in opaque settings); and (2) ability to do maturity transformation, at least in part because of deposit insurance.  
- The term spread—the difference between the long- and the short-term sovereign interest rate—can be used as an imperfect measure of the gains accruing to maturity transformation.  
- Hypotheses on aging’s effect on term structure:
  - Aging changes demand for safe and liquid assets relative to risky or illiquid assets, which could cause the term premium to rise or fall.
  - Aging can cause deflationary pressures and constrain monetary policy to be at the zero-lower bound, causing the term structure to flatten because real interest rates comove negatively with consumption growth and lower the term premium (IMF 2017).  
- Term spread decomposition caveat: The term spread can be decomposed into expected future changes in short-term rates and the term premium proper; benefits to maturity transformation relate to the latter. Measuring term premium across many countries is challenging.

### Japan: empirical links among aging, term spread, and market vs. bank finance
- Empirical evidence indicates the effect of aging on the structure of the financial system is mostly indirect through the term spread.  
- A smaller term spread is associated with less bank finance.  
- Aging is consistent with smaller term premiums and thus a decrease in the importance of banks.  
- Specifically for Japan:
  - The increase in the elderly dependency ratio observed in Japan between 1990 and 2015 can account for roughly 40 percent of the decline in the term spread observed during the same period (Figure 2).  
  - A one standard-deviation increase (or about 7 percentage points) in the elderly dependency ratio would cause market-based finance to increase by about 10 percent relative to bank-based finance.  
- Figure 2 interpretation: About 40 percent of the increase in the size of market finance in Japan since 1990 can be explained by aging. The stripped pattern for the direct effect in 2010–15 means the effect is not statistically significant.

### Life-cycle investment patterns in Japan
- NSFIE data show savings habits differ across age groups:
  - In 2014, younger generations have a stronger preference for liquid and safer assets than older age groups.
  - Older generations hold significantly more nonbank instruments, including equity, than younger generations.
  - Japanese households, regardless of age, hold fewer risky assets as a share of total wealth than households in the United States and slightly less than in Europe, owing to lower participation in capital markets and, conditional on participation, lower equity holdings.  
- Stock market participation rates: Japan 15 percent; U.S. 50 percent; Australia 36 percent; Germany 23 percent; France 22 percent.  
- Between 1999 and 2014:
  - Holdings of more liquid assets increased for all cohorts, especially younger assets.
  - Demand deposits now account for a larger share of total financial assets at the expense of time deposits and money market funds.
  - Equity holdings by the older cohort have increased.
  - These developments are likely related to low real rates, low term spreads, and low inflation risk which increase preference for cash and demand deposits.

### Cohort persistence and policy implications
- Changes in asset holdings by age cohort are very persistent (e.g., higher ownership of life-insurance products in the 40−49 age group in 1999 continues in 2014 for the 50−59 age group).  
- Policy implication: Policies to promote participation in equity markets or investments in products that offer insurance against longevity risk can have persistent effects, but changes induced by low and stable inflation or low trust in capital markets can be difficult to overcome.

### Model simulations of portfolio choice and aging
- A model in the spirit of Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) is calibrated to Japan’s labor income risk and survival probabilities (details in Annex II).  
- Key model results:
  - Aging has only a slight effect on portfolio choices; preference for safe assets is little affected by an increase in longevity and the associated increase in the population share of older people (Figure 4).  
  - The simulation suggests the average portfolio has slightly more risky assets as the population ages, consistent with a smaller role for banks. The average share of the risky asset increases slightly with an aged population.  
  - Mechanism: Increased longevity causes households to save more and raise investment in the risky asset; higher demand for risky assets raises asset prices and lowers the risk premium (assumed to approximate the term premium).  
  - Magnitude: The increase in risky asset share is slight and should have a small effect on the risk premium. (The simulation takes the risk premium as given and does not solve for it in equilibrium.)
- Uncertainty about retirement income increases precautionary saving; in the model households mostly increase slightly their investment in safe assets when perceiving a cut in retirement income.

### Implications for the nature of financial intermediation in Japan
- Likely outcomes:
  - Aging will lead to a more important role for nonbank financial intermediaries in Japan: aging increases preference for safe assets as people retire; higher longevity risk and doubts about retirement income safety can increase demand for liquid assets.  
  - Increases in longevity and longevity risk and perceptions by younger generations of insecure retirement income may encourage more saving, though simulated effects are not large.  
  - Banks will need to adjust business models in response to a relatively flat yield curve: cross-country empirical analysis suggests aging will continue to put downward pressure on the term spread and, under certain conditions, on the benefits of maturity transformation; banks are likely to dedicate more resources to fee-based wealth management.  
  - Demand for health insurance and certain life-insurance products may increase; a true annuities market could provide substantial welfare gains, especially for older individuals, those with lower retirement income, and those with less certain income. Equity-linked annuities show stronger gains in cited studies.

### Regional banking in an aging Japan — structure and recent performance
- There are currently 105 regional banks operating in Japan’s 47 prefectures and accounting for 14 percent of total assets of Japan’s financial system.  
- Regional banks traditionally extend loans to small SMEs and households within their prefecture.  
- Regional bank structure:
  - First tier: 64 larger regional banks; second tier: 41 smaller regional banks.  
  - Deposits are the main source of funds: share of deposits in total funding liabilities was 97 percent in the early 2000s and has fallen to about 90 percent.  
  - On the asset side, loans as a share of total earning assets have fluctuated around 70 percent over the past two decades. Other main assets include securities (about 25 percent) and cash.  
- Performance trends:
  - Net interest rate margins for regional banks have been falling since the early 2000s.  
  - Lower long-term interest rates combined with falling loan-deposit ratios have put downward pressure on net interest margins and squeezed profitability.  
  - In response, some banks have adjusted business models or merged to diversify income and cut costs; some have shifted from loan-oriented to more securities-oriented business models.  
  - Note: Loan-to-deposit ratios of regional banks have not fallen as much as for Shinkin and major banks.

### Demographic trends and links to loan and deposit dynamics
- Demographic headwinds have worsened and are projected to intensify over the next two decades.  
- Population growth:
  - Average prefectural population growth rate fell into negative territory in the early 2000s.
  - By 2015, only a handful of prefectures—mostly metropolitan areas—still experienced positive population growth.  
  - After 2020, all prefectures are expected to experience negative population growth, with loss of population less pronounced in metropolitan areas.  
- Aging:
  - The average prefectural share of the adult population aged 70 and above rose from 13 percent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2015, and is projected to further increase to 32 percent by 2035.  
  - Between 1995 and 2005 aging came mostly at the expense of the age group 34−54; between 2005 and 2015 it was mirrored primarily by a fall in the share of those aged 20−34. Looking forward, the pace of aging will slow somewhat and largely be associated with a fall in the shares of age groups 55−69 (between 2020–30) and 34−54 (between 2025−35).

*International Monetary Fund — cr17283 chapter excerpt*

### 26. Population growth and aging affect regional banking through various channels.

### 26. Population growth and aging affect regional banking through various channels.

### Population growth: balance-sheet scale and factor returns
- A larger population implies a larger economy and greater customer base, translating into higher loan demand and greater availability of loanable funds.
- Lower population growth should lead to a higher capital-labor ratio and a decrease in the return to capital; falling returns to investment is likely to depress loan demand (Gagnon and others 2016).
- Population growth can spur technology change, positive agglomeration and network effects, and learning by doing, leading to productivity growth and increased demand for loanable funds.
- Net effect: the size of banks’ balance sheets should rise with population growth, though the relative impact on loan versus deposit growth (and hence the loan-to-deposit ratio) is unclear.

### Aging: life-cycle effects on lending and deposits
- Life-cycle patterns:
  - Young households accumulate debt to smooth consumption and invest in education and housing.
  - Older households tend to pay off loans and opt for more liquid assets such as deposits.
- Empirical household evidence (2016 Family Savings Survey):
  - Debt and financial assets vary by age group; debt rises and falls with age, while financial asset holdings rise and only marginally fall at later ages.
  - Limited evidence of a strong preference for more liquid assets at advanced ages.
- Productivity effects:
  - Some studies show an inverted U-shaped relationship between productivity and age: productivity rises with age due to experience and then falls due to health, processing speed, and less entrepreneurship.
- Implication: aging could have a significant negative impact on the loan-deposit ratio.

### Empirical strategy and data
- Panel regression to estimate impact of aging and population growth across prefectures on loan and deposit growth.
  - Annual data covering more than 100 regional banks over the period 1990−2015.
  - Two separate regressions: loan growth and deposit growth as dependent variables.
- Independent variables grouped as:
  - Demographics: prefectural population growth; changes in shares of age groups 20−34, 35−54 (reference group), 55−69, and 70+.
  - Macroeconomic controls: prefectural consumer price inflation and real GDP growth; a capital-labor ratio estimate.
  - Bank-specific controls: profitability, capitalization, efficiency, loan quality; bank fixed effects.
- Note: prefectural CPI and GDP growth data cover 1990–2008.

### Key regression results: relative roles and elasticities
- Macroeconomic and bank-specific factors matter more for loan growth than demographics.
  - Capitalization is positively and significantly associated with both loan and deposit growth; larger relative impact on loan growth (higher capital-to-assets translates into higher loan-deposit ratios).
  - Profitability and loan quality are positively related to deposit growth but do not impact loan growth.
- Population growth effects:
  - Population growth expands banks’ balance sheets and has a larger impact on loan growth relative to deposit growth.
  - Example elasticity: if the population shrinks by one percent, loan growth would fall by 2.2 percentage points while deposit growth would only shrink by 1.1 percentage points, leading to a one percentage point fall in the loan-to-deposit ratio.
  - Population growth becomes statistically insignificant in the loan regression once the capital-labor ratio is included; the capital-labor ratio is highly significant with a negative coefficient—suggesting shrinking population primarily impacts loan growth by raising relative capital abundance and lowering returns to investment.
- Aging effects (non-linear):
  - Loan growth increases as age distribution shifts from 20–34 to 35–54, and falls as it shifts from 35–54 to older age groups.
  - Aging has a relatively stronger impact on loan growth than deposit growth.
  - Example: a one percentage point shift from the 35–54 age group to the 70+ age group lowers loan growth by 1.9 percentage points, while it contracts deposit growth by 0.7 percentage points, leading to a fall in the loan-to-deposit ratio by about 1.2 percentage points.

### Historical and projected demographic impacts on loan, deposit, and loan-deposit dynamics
- Historical pattern:
  - 1990s: population growth had a positive impact on loan and deposit growth. Between 1990 and 1995, population growth raised annual loan growth by an average of 0.5 percentage points across prefectures.
  - 2000s onward: as more banks faced shrinking populations, the average impact turned negative. Between 2010 and 2015, shrinking prefectural populations reduced annual loan growth by 0.8 percentage points.
  - Aging in the 1990s reduced loan growth by around 0.7−0.8 percentage points per year, and caused a downward pressure on the loan-deposit ratio of about 0.2–0.4 percentage points per year.
  - In 2005–2010, shifts in age groups produced an estimated positive annual impact on the loan-deposit ratio of about 0.4 percent (some pickup in loan growth before the global financial crisis).
- Projections using prefectural population projections to 2035 (specification (4) and (9) in Table 1, Annex III):
  - The combined negative impact from aging and population growth on annual loan and deposit growth is projected at around 2.0−2.5 and 1.0−1.2 percentage points, respectively.
  - Because the impact on loan growth is relatively larger than on deposit growth, the average annual decline in the loan-deposit rate will be about 1−1.5 percentage points.
  - Over the next two decades the average cumulative decline in the loan-deposit ratio would be well over 20 percentage points.
  - During 2030−35, aging is projected to have a negligible impact relative to population decline.
  - Regional variation: banks in the three major metropolitan areas will fare better; a nontrivial share of banks could see their loan-deposit ratios fall by more than 30 percentage points by 2035.

### Business model clustering and transitions
- Clustering based on loan-to-asset, securities-to-assets, deposit-to-liabilities ratios, and fees/commissions share identifies three business models:
  - Securities Oriented Business Model
    - Loans as share of total earning assets: Mean 0.61, Stdev. 0.04
    - Securities as share of total earning assets: Mean 0.36, Stdev. 0.05
    - Deposits as a share of funding liabilities: Mean 0.94, Stdev. 0.04
    - Fees and commissions as a share of income: Mean 0.10, Stdev. 0.04
  - Mixed Business Model
    - Loans: Mean 0.70, Stdev. 0.03
    - Securities: Mean 0.25, Stdev. 0.03
    - Deposits: Mean 0.96, Stdev. 0.03
    - Fees: Mean 0.07, Stdev. 0.04
  - Loan Oriented Business Model
    - Loans: Mean 0.79, Stdev. 0.04
    - Securities: Mean 0.17, Stdev. 0.03
    - Deposits: Mean 0.97, Stdev. 0.04
    - Fees: Mean 0.04, Stdev. 0.05
- Evolution and transition patterns:
  - The share of regional banks utilizing a securities- and fees-based business model has increased since the early 2000s.
  - Unconditional one-year transition probabilities (Year T to Year T+1) reported:
    - Large share of securities holdings → Year T+1: 89 (stay securities), 11 (to Mixed), 0 (to Loan oriented)
    - Mixed Business Model → Year T+1: 7 (to Securities), 84 (stay Mixed), 9 (to Loan oriented)
    - Loan Oriented Model → Year T+1: 0 (to Securities), 12 (to Mixed), 88 (stay Loan oriented)
  - Ordered probit models indicate:
    - Increases in the share of age groups 55−69 and 70+ raise the likelihood that a bank will switch to a more securities oriented and fee based banking model.
    - Higher population growth tends to be associated with more lending-oriented banking.

### Implications and mitigation options
- Demographic headwinds will push regional banks away from lending and toward holding securities and fee-based activities.
- To counter demographic trends, significant improvements in macroeconomic performance are required:
  - Consistent achievement of the two percent inflation target across prefectures would help raise the loan-deposit ratio by about 1.4 percentage points per year (based on specification (4) and (9) in Table 1 Annex III).
  - A potential growth rate of 2 percent would increase loan growth by another 0.3-0.4 percentage points per year.
  - By contrast, BoJ’s current estimate of potential growth is about 0.7 percent.
- Bank-level strategic responses observed or possible:
  - Consolidation to improve efficiency and reduce fixed costs if demographic changes mainly shrink balance-sheet size without large loan-deposit ratio shifts.
  - Use of wholesale funding to finance extra-regional lending or securities investments to prevent balance sheets from shrinking.
  - If demographic trends disproportionately reduce regional lending relative to deposits, banks may deploy surplus funds to extend extra-regional loans or invest in securities rather than raising wholesale funding.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in "26. Population growth and aging affect regional banking through various channels."*

### 39. Mounting demographic headwinds constitute a major challenge for regional financial

### 39. Mounting demographic headwinds constitute a major challenge for regional financial

### Demographic headwinds and regional banks
- Regional banks depend on local deposit-taking and lending activities and are sensitive to changes in the local environment.
- Past shifts in age distribution and population growth partially offset each other (e.g., lower population growth in the early 2000s coexisted with an either stable or increasing share of the most economically active part of the population), but this is likely to change over the next decade, creating a potential demographic cliff.
- Two important channels through which demographics will impact regional banking:
  - Shrinking and aging prefectural populations will lead to smaller balance sheets and declining loan-deposit ratios unless regional banks find alternative sources and uses of funds. This would continue to put downward pressure on already low levels of profitability.
  - The trend of regional banks shifting to a more securities-holding, and fee based banking model is likely to accelerate in the near future.
- Policy implications for regulators and supervisors:
  - Engage with regional financial institutions to ensure they are appropriately and prudently adapting to demographic trends (e.g., by improving risk management capabilities and developing realistic business strategies).
  - Ensure that systemic risks to the banking system due to shifting business models are monitored and managed effectively.

### Are Japanese SMEs financially constrained? — Overview of SME challenges
- SMEs face labor shortages, aging owners, and lack of managerial skills.
  - In 2015, SMEs posted three job offers per job seeker; large firms posted only one.
  - Overall labor shortages, as measured by the employment condition index, are twice as bad for SMEs than for large firms.
  - About half of all SME owners are over the age of 60 (Labor Force Survey, MIC 2015).
  - 27 percent of SMEs mentioned difficulties in finding successors (Mizuho Research Institute 2015).
  - Firms older than 10 years old account for three quarters of SMEs, compared to one half in most of the OECD countries (Criscuolo et al. 2014).
  - SMEs in Japan tend to have lower productivity than peers elsewhere in the OECD (OECD 2015).

### SME financing conditions and constraints
- Financing conditions for SMEs remain subdued despite recent improvements.
  - A large part of SME credit flows to construction- and real-estate-related businesses.
  - Many small firms still find it difficult to obtain loans, their main source of external funds.
  - Obtaining financing remains challenging for SMEs in key sectors such as manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and services.
- Indicators of financial constraints:
  - A survey shows that about 24 percent of SMEs face difficult financial position (Mizuho Research Institute 2015).
  - About 37 percent of SMEs still rely on public credit guarantees to obtain loans.
  - The rejection rate in loan applications is about 16 percent in Japan (Mizuho Research Institute 2015).
  - Other standard measures based on the literature suggest significant financial constraints among SMEs (See Annex IV).
- SME funding sources:
  - About 30 percent of SME financing comes from bank loans and 22 percent from internal funds (Financial Statements Statistics of Corporation by Industry, Ministry of Finance 2016).

### Finance for entrepreneurial firms and venture capital
- Venture capital availability is limited:
  - Venture capital is 0.02 percent of GDP in Japan compared with 0.3 percent in Israel and the U.S.
  - Funding for startups has increased recently but remains concentrated in information technology (IT).
  - In 2016, total capital raised for ventures in Japan reached a record ¥276 billion (US$2.5 billion), well above an average of ¥50 billion per year since 2008 (Japan Times).
- Startup financing characteristics:
  - Startups at an early stage mostly rely on internal funds, personal savings, and family loans.
  - Raising funds is especially hard for female entrepreneurs; the gender gap in access to entrepreneurial finance is larger in Japan compared to other OECD countries (OECD 2015).
  - Firm creation is slow and well below what is found in other advanced economies.
- Role of angel investors and venture capitalists:
  - Angel inventors provide finance as well as mentoring and networking; improving the environment for them is important.
  - Most local venture capitalists are affiliated with large firms; corporate sector accounts for about ¾ of the total venture capital, compared to a quarter in the U.S.
  - Limited funding engagement from institutional investors such as pension funds; there is room for pension funds in Japan to invest in funds of funds along with portfolio rebalancing toward riskier assets.

### Collateral-based lending versus asset-based lending (ABL)
- Current lending practices:
  - Lending to SMEs remains largely based on fixed-assets collateral and personal guarantees.
  - About 80 percent of SME loans require personal guarantees or fixed-assets collateral, including personal real estate (Mizuho Research Institute 2015).
  - The value of personal guarantees exceeds owners’ assets in 78 percent of the cases (The Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Group 2010).
  - SMEs seldom produce audited financial statements that yield credible financial information and have no obligation to publicly disclose their financial reports.
- Negative impacts of collateral-based lending:
  - Collateral-based lending can pose challenges to newer, more innovative, and fast growing SMEs without sufficient collateral.
  - Banks’ preference for collateral can limit financial access and weaken banks’ incentives to do credit screening and risk-based lending.
  - Widespread use of personal guarantees may reduce risk taking by entrepreneurs as it goes against limited liability.
  - Overreliance on collateral can lead banks to lend to firms with sufficient collateral rather than the most productive firms, resulting in inefficient allocation of financial resources and amplifying macrofinancial risks during downturns.
- Asset-based lending (ABL):
  - ABL has increased recently but remains low: the number of asset-backed loans tripled from about 4,000 cases in 2011 to 12,000 cases in 2015 after FSA measures.
  - Lending based on movable collateral—machines and inventory—and account receivables is less than 0.5 percent of total bank loans.
  - Leasing volumes to SMEs have been very limited, accounting for less than one percent of total leasing volumes (OECD 2017; Japan Leasing Association 2017).
- Challenges for ABL:
  - Lack of a collateral registry in which all functional equivalents can be registered.
  - Limited capacity of financial institutions in assessing the fair value and the status of movable assets.
  - For ABL to SMEs expanding abroad, challenges include assessing implications for collateral valuations of differences in property rights and legal or juridical uncertainty in host countries.
  - High monitoring costs of asset values, especially under a low-interest rate environment.
- Issues reported by practitioners in ABL (selected concerns and their prevalence among respondents):
  - Can't judge the suitability of property as security.
  - Can't ascertain the management status of assets.
  - Enterprises' low recognition of ABL.
  - Insufficient structure to promote ABL.
  - Lack of branch staffs' understanding.
  - No clear procedure on ABL within bank.
  - No clear targeted enterprise.
  - Can't confirm the business flows of financing target.
  - Undertaking ABL without assistance is very risky.

### Box: Enabling factors for asset-based lending
- Two key enabling factors for ABL (OECD 2015):
  - An efficient secured-transactions law:
    - Clarity on how a collateral lien can be perfected, how collateral priority is determined, and how notification of a lien is made.
    - The ability of lenders to file a single lien on all existing and future accounts receivable and inventory supports ABL development observed in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.
  - Specialized expertise by lenders:
    - Assessing and monitoring the value of collateral for liquidation purposes is critical and often relies on industry-specific knowledge which may not be available in brick-and-mortar credit institutions but may be available to specialized lenders.
- Japan’s legal and institutional features relative to countries with developed ABL markets (summary of Box Table 1.1):
  - Japan does not have an integrated or unified legal framework for secured transactions that extends to creation, publicity and enforcement of functional equivalents to security interests in movable assets.
  - Japan does not allow a business to grant a non-possessory security right in substantially all of its assets without requiring a specific description of collateral.
  - Japan does not allow security rights to extend to future or after-acquired assets automatically to products, proceeds or replacements of the original assets.
  - A notice-based collateral registry covering all functional equivalents cannot be registered in Japan.
  - A modern collateral registry with online registrations, amendments, cancellations and searches is not available in Japan.
  - Secured creditors are not paid first in Japan when a business is liquidated, in contrast to several comparator countries.

### Credit guarantees and public support
- Public credit guarantees remain large in scale and broad in scope despite declines in total outstanding amount.
  - Coverage of credit guarantees is 80–100 percent.
  - Total credit guarantees have declined from the peak of ¥35.9 trillion in 2009 to ¥25.8 trillion, driven by a decline in Safety Net Guarantee No. 5 (100 percent guarantee) and emergency guarantees.
  - Nonetheless, 37 percent of SMEs rely on credit guarantees to obtain loans.

*International Monetary Fund*

### 51. The government is revising the guarantee scheme to effectively support SMEs’ financing

### 51. The government is revising the guarantee scheme to effectively support SMEs’ financing

### Revised guarantee scheme: objectives and design
- Aim: encourage financial institutions to provide loans based on business evaluation and support SMEs according to their business cycles without creating overdependence.
- System predicates on three pillars:
  - (i) encourage financial institutions to provide non-guarantee loans in addition to guaranteed loans;
  - (ii) decrease coverage from 100 to 80 percent for the Safety Net Guarantees Program No. 5 while establish a new Safety Net Guarantee program exclusively for crises;
  - (iii) enhance 100 percent credit guarantees for startups (from ¥10 to ¥20 million) and microbusiness (from ¥12.5 to ¥20 million).

### Role and effects of credit guarantees
- Credit guarantees have helped many SMEs obtain loans by addressing information problems and allowing risk sharing among financial institutions.
- Observed mechanisms:
  - Guarantees help lenders offset costly information acquisition about new borrowers; benefits of learning often accrue to other lenders.
  - Over one third of SMEs obtain loans with guarantees (figure caption: 37.1).
- Empirical and literature observations noted:
  - Public credit guarantees can address information problems (Honohan 2010; Banerjee and Duflo 2004).
  - Credit guarantees are often designed to help young firms lacking collateral or a long credit history.

### Risks, distortions, and international best practices
- Risks of excessive or prolonged guarantees:
  - Weaken banks’ incentives in credit screening and monitoring and risk-based lending (Arping, Loranth, and Morrison 2010).
  - Moral hazard when coverage is excessive or duration is long.
  - Guarantees may not always lead to additional lending after some time (Wilcox and Yazuda 2008; Ono and Uesugi 2014; World Bank 2014).
  - Poor implementation can increase credit misallocation and delay exit of non-viable firms (Lam and Shin 2012).
- International best practices for credit guarantee schemes (World Bank 2013):
  - a. The private sector should be responsible for assessing and deciding about credit;
  - b. Coverage should be capped and payouts should only occur after the lender has attempted recovery;
  - c. The use of risk management tools should be encouraged.
- Policy implication emphasized: gradually phasing out credit guarantees is important to encourage credit risk assessment capacity among financial institutions and avoid credit misallocation.

### SME financing constraints and consequences
- Current lending practices and constraints:
  - Lending to SMEs in Japan remains largely based on fixed-asset collateral and personal guarantees.
  - About 80 percent of SME loans require personal guarantees or fixed-asset collateral (SME white paper 2016).
  - These practices depress lending to younger and more innovative firms and discourage risk taking by entrepreneurs.
- Broader economic effects:
  - Firms with most collateral, not necessarily those with best prospects, obtain credit → potential misallocation of credit.
  - Large-scale and broad-scope public credit guarantees discourage banks from investing in credit screening and monitoring technologies.
  - Alternative finance (asset-backed lending and venture capital) has grown from very low levels and faces significant challenges.

### Policy recommendations to improve SME and startup finance
- Promote risk-based lending:
  - Encourage banks to upgrade credit risk-assessment capacity and reduce reliance on collateral and personal guarantees.
  - Reduce the size and duration of credit guarantees to incentivize risk assessment.
  - Improve reporting standards by SMEs and sustain investment in financial literacy promotion.
- Encourage alternative forms of finance:
  - Expand asset-backed lending (ABL) by upgrading lenders’ ability to value movable collateral and accounts receivable.
  - Foster venture capital growth by enabling VC funds to become larger to fund later-stage ventures.
- Institutional risk management and service adaptation:
  - Encourage development of adequate risk management in institutions expanding into higher-return, higher-risk businesses abroad or into new activities.
  - Financial industry should adapt services to aging population needs (e.g., advisory services for life-cycle portfolio management, retirement planning, and development of a market for life annuities).

### Managing structural adjustment in the financial sector (regional banks)
- Two main policy thrusts:
  - a. Banks, especially regional banks, must adapt to an environment of low growth and low margins; consider increasing fee-based income but recognize cultural and competitive constraints.
  - b. Authorities could facilitate exit of unviable firms and encourage consolidation after careful cost–benefit analysis to achieve economies of scale and preserve borrower credit histories; consolidation through mergers and acquisitions may be less disruptive than attrition if weaker players gamble for resurrection.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter section “51. The government is revising the guarantee scheme to effectively support SMEs’ financing.”*

### Annex I. Country Panel Regression Analysis

### Annex I. Country Panel Regression Analysis

### Data and samples
- Two annual-frequency samples:
  - First sample: 133 advanced, emerging, and developing economies; period 1975−2014.
  - Second sample: up to 38 advanced and emerging economies; period 1990−2014.
- Rationale:
  - First sample: wider and longer coverage; important for slow-moving demographic changes.
  - Second sample: narrower and shorter but more homogeneous and includes data on the term spread.

### Empirical specification
- Core panel model (fixed effects):
  - FIit−1 = αi + βAgingit−τ + Γ′xit−τ + τt + uit
  - FI: log of the ratio of stock market capitalization (market finance) to bank credit (bank finance) (World Bank Global Financial Development Database 1960−2014).
  - Aging: ratio of population aged 65+ to population between 15 and 65 (UN’s Demographic Yearbook 1948−2015).
  - X: lagged controls including:
    - log real GDP per capita,
    - log credit-to-deposits ratio,
    - dummy for existence of deposit insurance.
  - Country fixed effects absorb time-invariant determinants (e.g., institutional quality, legal system).

### Role of the term spread and instruments
- Theory:
  - Benefits of maturity transformation (banks’ main purpose) depend on the term premium; term spread (Term) is included as explanatory variable where available.
- Endogeneity concern:
  - Term spread may be jointly determined with FI; instrumental variables (IV) approach used.
- Instruments (z):
  - Lagged real GDP growth rate,
  - Lagged inflation rate,
  - Sovereign long-term credit rating (Fitch Ratings).
  - GDP growth and inflation are lagged to avoid joint determination; credit rating is contemporaneous under the assumption its information content is mostly backward looking.

### Main regression diagnostics and selected table figures (Annex Table 1)
- Observations: 2488; 666; 666; 590; 590
- Number of Countries: 113; 38; 38; 34; 34
- Selected coefficient entries (as reported in Annex Table 1):
  - GDP per capita: 0.167; 0.732***; 0.444**; -3.754***; 0.257
  - Credit to Deposits: -0.575***; -0.734***; -0.711***; 0.047; -0.681***
  - Deposit Insurance: 0.200; -0.423***; -0.407***; 0.582; -0.079
  - Aging: -2.184; 0.271; -0.123; -7.901**; 0.552
  - Term Spread: -0.045***; -0.201***
  - Inflation: -0.028
  - Growth: -0.110***
  - Credit Rating: 0.039***
- Model diagnostics:
  - F-test: 17.42***; 42.51***; 36.93***; 9.58***; 28.23***
  - Overidentification: 4.33
  - Underidentification: 24.89***
  - Weak Instruments: 9.58
  - WI Robust Inference: 8.73***

- Notes on table:
  - Columns 1–3: fixed effects estimator.
  - Column 4: first-stage fixed effects regression of simultaneous-equation model (FI and TS) estimated by 2SLS.
  - Column 5: second-stage regression.
  - All specifications contain country and year fixed effects.
  - FI = ratio of stock market capitalization to bank credit; TS = Term spread (difference between a long-term interest rate and a short-term rate).

### Empirical findings and quantitative magnitudes
- Direct effect of aging on financial structure:
  - Aging (ratio of older-to-working-age people) does not have a statistically significant direct association with a shift toward market finance or bank finance (Annex Table 1).
- Role of the term spread:
  - When the term spread is added, it is highly significant.
  - A flatter yield curve (lower term spread) works against banks’ role in financial intermediation.
  - Aging on its own still shows no influence once term spread is included as a direct explanatory variable.
- IV results and indirect channel via term spread:
  - First-stage IV regression (column 5) indicates aging is associated with a declining term spread.
  - Quantified illustrative effect reported in text:
    - If the old-age dependency ratio (people over 65 to those between 40 and 65) increases by one percentage point, then, on average, the term spread would increase by about 8 basis points, everything else equal.
    - Such an increase in the term spread is estimated to increase the relative size of market finance by about 1.6 percent.
- Interpretation:
  - Aging may influence the composition of financial intermediation indirectly by changing the term spread rather than directly altering the market-vs-bank finance ratio.

### Ancillary data: summary statistics (Annex Table 2)
- Observations and moments (all for sample of 666 observations):
  - Financial Intermediation — Mean: -0.465; Std. Dev.: 0.777; Min: -3.407; Max: 1.204
  - Spread — Mean: 1.736; Std. Dev.: 1.887; Min: -3.870; Max: 11.921
  - log GDP per capita — Mean: 9.716; Std. Dev.: 1.120; Min: 6.200; Max: 11.125
  - log Credit-to-Deposits — Mean: 4.710; Std. Dev.: 0.357; Min: 3.867; Max: 5.906
  - Deposit Insurance — Mean: 0.887; Std. Dev.: 0.316; Min: 0.000; Max: 1.000
  - Aging — Mean: 0.185; Std. Dev.: 0.075; Min: 0.054; Max: 0.419

*Sources: ADIC - Association of Deposit Insurance Corporations; Central Bank of Chile; Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2014); FactSet; Fitch Ratings; Haver Analytics; IADI - International Association of Deposit Insurers; International Financial Statistics; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; and IMF staff.*

### 5. The results displayed in Annex Table 2 show a strong relationship between

### 5. The results displayed in Annex Table 2 show a strong relationship between

### Determinants of Banks' Choice of Business Model
- Specification notes:
  - Specifications (1)-(3) exclude year fixed effects.
  - Specifications (1) and (4) include only demographic variables.
  - Specifications (2) and (5) also include bank specific factors.
  - Specifications (3) and (6) include all dependent variables.
- Main findings:
  - The coefficients on older age groups are significant and negative across specifications, indicating that banks that face older populations tend to gravitate towards more securities and fee oriented banking.
  - The result for population growth is only positive and significant for specification (2), which excludes year fixed effects.
- Key table statistics (Annex Table 2. Determinants of Banks' Choice of Business Model):
  - Population growth: -4.722; 16.93**; -7.132; -4.442; 5.313; -10.29
  - Age group share 20-34: 2.352; -0.00765; -0.419; 2.409; 2.661; 7.314**
  - Age group share 55-69: -7.453***; -12.35***; -13.38***; -8.889***; -12.49***; -10.56***
  - Age group share 70+: -7.506***; -2.899**; -4.404***; -5.800**; -2.052; -10.56***
  - Bank specific variables (where included):
    - Capitalization: -27.19***; -29.35***; -27.66***; -29.17***
    - Profitability: 1.148***; 1.014***; 1.274***; 1.061***
    - Efficiency: 0.864***; 0.834***; 0.721***; 0.606**
    - Loan quality: 14.25***; 14.19***; 9.362*; 9.302*
  - Macroeconomic variable:
    - Real income per capita: 0.407**; 0.313*
  - Year fixed effects: No for (1)-(3); Yes for (4)-(6)
  - Observations by specification:
    - (1): 2,442
    - (2): 2,536
    - (3): 1,968
    - (4): 2,557
    - (5): 2,536
    - (6): 1,968
- Notes:
  - Source: IMF staff calculations.
  - Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * signify significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
  - Capitalization is measured by the simple capital-asset ratio, profitability by return to assets, efficiency by the cost-income ratio, and loan quality by impairment cost.

### Annex IV. Financial Constraints for Japanese SMEs — Overview
- Objectives:
  - Estimate intensity of financial constraints using the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index and investment-cash flow sensitivity of SMEs.
  - Complement KZ index results with investment-cash flow sensitivity analysis, as firms facing financial constraints tend to have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity.
- Data scope:
  - Firm-level data primarily from Orbis database of Bureau van Dijk.
  - SMEs defined as firms with capital below ¥300 million or that employ under 100 people.
  - Data cover years 2005 to 2015.

### A. The Kaplan and Zingales Index (KZ Index)
- KZ Index formula used:
  - KZ Index = - 1.001909*[cashflow to capital] + 0.2826389*[Tobin's Q] + 3.139193*[debt to capital] - 39.3678*[dividends to capital] - 1.314759*[cash to capital]
  - Coefficients based on regressions by Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
- Construction steps for this analysis:
  - KZ index for SMEs calculated with firm-level data for 2015 from Orbis, excluding Tobin’s Q and dividends (not available for private firms).
  - KZ index for all firms derived for public listed firms and top 25 percent defined as likely financially constrained.
  - Count SMEs with KZ index above the threshold from Step 2 to obtain percentage likely financially constrained.
- Caveats:
  - KZ index coefficients are based on U.S. data and may not transfer perfectly to other countries.
  - Tobin’s Q and dividends set to zero due to data unavailability for private firms.
  - Sample of Japanese firms is considerably smaller than for France or Germany.

### Annex Table 1 — KZ Index Results (Financial Constraints)
- KZ* (top 25% of all firms): Japan 0.23; France 0.41; Germany 1.09
- SMEs with KZ > KZ*:
  - Japan: 1,253
  - France: 39,816
  - Germany: 1,134
- Number of SMEs in sample:
  - Japan: 3,730
  - France: 212,542
  - Germany: 4,346
- Share of SMEs with Financial Constraints (%):
  - Japan: 33.6
  - France: 18.7
  - Germany: 26.1
- Notes:
  - Source: IMF staff estimates.
  - Note: SME is defined as a firm with employees fewer than <100.

### B. Estimates of the Investment-Cash Flows Sensitivity
- Rationale:
  - Literature: Investment sensitivity to internal funds should increase with wedge between costs of internal and external funds.
  - Cash flow expected to have positive effect on investment; higher sensitivity indicates greater financial constraints.
  - To mitigate criticisms, fixed assets are incorporated because tangible assets support borrowing by SMEs.
- Estimation approach:
  - Follow Almeida and Campello (2007) and Gelos and Werner (2002).
  - Estimate investment functions with cash flow as key explanatory variable and observe differences by industry and country.

### Data (for investment-cash flow analysis)
- Source: Orbis database of Bureau van Dijk.
- Firm-level variables: cash flow, capital, total assets, fixed assets, depreciation.
- Investment defined as: investment_it = total assets_it – total assets_it-1 – depreciation_it.
- Sample period: 2005–2015.
- SME definition: capital below ¥300 million or under 100 employees.

### Econometric Specification
- Fixed-effect regression form:
  - I_it / K_it−1 = α + β1 (CF_it / K_it−1) + β2 ∆S_it + β3 (FA_it / K_it−1) + λ_t + ν_i + ε_it
  - Where:
    - I = investment
    - CF = cash flows
    - K = capital
    - ∆S = sale growth
    - FA = fixed assets
    - λ_t = year dummy
    - ν_i = firm fixed effect
  - Interest focuses on β1, the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow.
  - Expectation: β1 larger for firms with higher financial constraints.

### C. Results — Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities (Annex Table 2)
- Main finding:
  - The coefficient associated with cash flow (β1) in Japan is higher than those in France and Germany, suggesting a proportion of SMEs in Japan are more financially constrained than those in France and Germany.
  - The value of fixed assets also affects investment decisions.
- Key regression results (Annex Table 2. Comparison of Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities):
  - Cash Flows:
    - Japan: 0.33***
    - Germany: 0.23***
    - France: 0.29***
    - Robust standard errors (in parentheses): (0.085); (0.010); (0.003)
  - Sale Growth:
    - Japan: 0.49***
    - Germany: 0.60***
    - France: 0.08
    - Robust standard errors: (0.109); (0.054); (0.095)
  - Fixed Asset:
    - Japan: 0.06***
    - Germany: 0.01***
    - France: 0.39***
    - Robust standard errors: (0.010); (0.001); (0.002)
  - Observations:
    - Japan: 3,147
    - Germany: 44,095
    - France: 140,689
  - R-squared:
    - Japan: 0.155
    - Germany: 0.059
    - France: 0.289
- Notes:
  - Source: IMF staff estimates.
  - All regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * signify significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and estimates as presented in the content unit.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2017/cr17283.pdf_
