## cr17310 — Executive Summary and Nasdaq Clearing Assessment

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### Standards and assessment basis
- Analysis and recommendations are based on the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI), introduced in 2012.
- Supervision and oversight analysis uses the five Responsibilities for authorities of the PFMI (Box 1).
- The analysis of Nasdaq Clearing focuses on selected issues and risks from relevant PFMI Principles and does not provide a comprehensive Principles assessment.
- Box 1. PFMI Responsibility A–E (as stated in source):
  - Responsibility A: Regulation, supervision, and oversight of FMIs — FMIs should be subject to appropriate and effective regulation, supervision, and oversight by a central bank, market regulator, or other relevant authority.
  - Responsibility B: Regulatory, supervisory, and oversight powers and resources — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should have the powers and resources to carry out effectively their responsibilities in regulating, supervising, and overseeing FMIs.
  - Responsibility C: Disclosure of policies with respect to FMIs — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should clearly define and disclose their regulatory, supervisory, and oversight policies with respect to FMIs.
  - Responsibility D: Application of the principles for FMIs — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should adopt the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures and apply them consistently.
  - Responsibility E: Cooperation with other authorities — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should cooperate with each other, both domestically and internationally, as appropriate, in promoting the safety and efficiency of FMIs.

### Overview of FMIs in Sweden
- Domestic critical FMIs include:
  - RIX, the Swedish RTGS payments system (owned and operated by Sveriges Riksbank).
  - Bankgirotcentralen BGC AB (Bankgirot), a retail payments system (owned by a group of Nordic banks).
  - Nasdaq Clearing (one domestic CCP).
  - Euroclear Sweden (one domestic CSD and SSS, owned by Euroclear SA).
- Overseas-based FMIs important to Sweden include EuroCCP, LCH.Clearnet Ltd, CLS, and SWIFT.
- Nasdaq Clearing specifics:
  - 100 percent owned subsidiary of Nasdaq Nordic Limited, ultimately wholly owned by Nasdaq Group.
  - Legal entity created in September 2013 via de-merger; markets and exchange operations moved to Nasdaq Stockholm AB.

### Assessment of supervision and oversight (Responsibilities A, B, C, D, E)
- Overall findings:
  - FMIs in Sweden are well developed and subject to PFMI-aligned minimum regulatory requirements.
  - Finansinspektionen (FI) and Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) provide appropriate and effective supervision and oversight of FMIs.
  - Scope, basis and objectives of each authority’s supervision and oversight are clearly defined and disclosed.
  - Evidence indicates supervision and oversight have been effective in improving FMI risk management practices.
- Cooperation and coordination:
  - Effective cooperation exists between FI and Riksbank; overlap in responsibilities is managed and authorities “speak with one voice” where relevant.
  - Recommendation: FI and Riksbank should clarify coordination in a (non-resolution) crisis, possibly via a joint crisis management plan.
  - Authorities participate in several cooperative oversight/supervision arrangements for domestic and foreign FMIs, including supervisory colleges.
- Legal and regulatory context:
  - EMIR is directly applicable in Sweden and is of relevance for Nasdaq Clearing.
  - Riksbank’s oversight responsibilities derive from the Sveriges Riksbank Act (1988); FI’s from the Securities Market Act (2007) and Financial Instruments Accounts Act (1998).
  - Areas of the PFMI not implemented in Swedish law (gaps in EMIR) include recovery plans, allocation of uncovered credit losses, and replenishment of financial and liquidity resources; EU legislation covering these gaps was expected to be proposed in late 2016.

### Resourcing and capacity
- Staffing and organization:
  - FI’s Infrastructure Supervision Division employs seven staff; supported by other FI divisions.
  - Riksbank’s Financial Infrastructure Division employs 11 staff.
  - Retail payments market work accounts for approximately 2.5 full time staff in Riksbank’s Financial Infrastructure Division.
  - Organizational lead arrangements: FI assigns one lead supervisor per FMI; Riksbank assigns one lead overseer and one back-up per FMI.
- Findings and recommendations:
  - Resourcing of FMI oversight and supervision functions appears to be tight.
  - Recommendation: "Resourcing of the FMI supervision function at FI should be strengthened and resourcing of the FMI oversight function at Riksbank should be kept under review."
    - Timing: Short term, ongoing
    - Authority: FI & Riksbank
    - Paragraph: 28–29
  - Rationale: international policy work, EMIR annual assessments, supervisory colleges, and future CCP resolution work may create additional pressures; Nasdaq Clearing clears complex products and competes for OTC derivatives clearing growth, warranting additional supervisory attention.

### Nasdaq Clearing — clearing scope and business profile
- Products cleared:
  - Equity derivatives: exchange traded forwards, futures and options on single Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish and Danish stocks; options and futures on several indices.
  - Fixed income derivatives: exchange traded and OTC derivatives and repos.
  - Commodity derivatives: seafood, power, freight, oil, coal, renewables, gas, iron-ore.
- Business concentration and currencies:
  - Bulk of business is in fixed income and equity derivatives.
  - Bulk of clearing is denominated in SEK; also clears EUR, USD, DKK and NOK.
- Membership and structure (end-2015):
  - Two clearing services: financial derivatives; commodity derivatives.
  - Participants: Financial service: 46 participants (31 foreign); Commodities service: 323 participants (252 foreign).
  - OTC fixed income clearing more concentrated with seven members.
  - Both services provided within the same legal entity and governed by the same policy framework.

### Governance, corporate structure, and stakeholder mechanisms
- Corporate facts:
  - Legal separation of the CCP from the exchange business in September 2013.
  - Nasdaq Clearing employs 64 staff and operates a Norwegian branch, Nasdaq Clearing Oslo.
- Board and committees:
  - Board comprises six members, two independent; Board retains legal responsibility for all decisions.
  - Clearing Risk Committee (CRC) chaired by the CRO; Member Risk Committee (MRC) provides advisory role and includes clearing participants; escalation to Board where required.
  - Recommendation: "The Board of Nasdaq Clearing should adopt objectives that explicitly support financial stability and other public interest considerations."
    - Timing: Short–medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 42
- Stakeholder input and transparency:
  - Mechanisms: MRC; Clearing Councils and Forums; IT forums; OTC Advisory Board.
  - Nasdaq Clearing has published CPMI-IOSCO qualitative and quantitative disclosures and additional summaries (back-testing, stress testing, independent validation reports, investment policy, business continuity summary, default management summaries).
  - Recommendation: ensure all disclosures are up to date.

### Model testing, validation, and use of external validators
- Policies:
  - Model Validation Policy approved by Board; risk models validated by an independent party annually.
  - External validators rotated at least every five years.
- Internal testing:
  - Back-testing and sensitivity analysis of margin models; monthly review of credit and liquidity stress testing; reverse stress testing; formal annual internal model reviews.
- Adoption of outcomes:
  - CRC recommends actions; MRC provides non-objection; EMIR requires FI and ESMA validation and College opinion for significant model changes.

### Recovery and wind-down planning
- Current status:
  - Recovery Plan (RP) implemented in 2013, updated September 2015; Nasdaq Clearing expects a revised version later in 2016.
  - Recovery planning not explicitly required under EU legislation at time of report; EU legislation on CCP recovery and resolution expected to be proposed later in 2016.
- Key enhancements required:
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should make significant enhancements to its Recovery Plan. This should include ensuring that that its recovery tools are either supported in the Rules and Regulation or backed by formal agreements, as appropriate. (This work is already underway.)"
    - Timing: Short term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraphs: 52–53, 63, 82, 84, 87, 88
  - Documented, Board-approved plans for raising additional capital from affiliates and clarity on allocation of losses to third parties.
  - Consider multiple-scenario analysis and development of wind-down components; consider sharing elements of the plan with participants and their clients.
  - Recommendation: Nasdaq Clearing should consider including in its RP how it would continue critical operations in the case of a crisis (including potential insolvency) at Nasdaq Group.

### Credit risk, margining, and default resources
- Margining and collateral:
  - Daily exchange of variation and initial margin; intra-day margin calculations each hour.
  - Haircuts set using a 10 year look back period to a 99.9 percent confidence level.
  - Margin models: single tailed confidence level of at least 99.2 percent, depending on product; minimum close out of two days for listed derivatives and five days for OTC derivatives.
- Default coverage standard and waterfall:
  - Seeks to ensure total prefunded financial resources cover default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause largest aggregate exposure (the ‘Cover 2’ standard).
  - Default waterfall includes Nasdaq Clearing junior capital (skin in the game), service-specific pre-funded default funds, loss-sharing pool (OTC IRD), senior capital, mutualized default fund, and Assessments.
  - Junior capital: must amount to at least 25 percent of ‘Regulatory Capital’ (as defined in EMIR).
  - Senior capital: subject to a minimum value of SEK 100 million and sized to give an excess of at least 100–200 MSEK above the twelve month high point.
  - Participant contributions to mutualized default fund set at 15 percent of each participant’s contribution to service specific default funds.
- Shortcomings and recommendations:
  - No clear arrangement for allocation of default losses beyond default waterfall; if pre-funded resources exhausted, options include capped Assessments (capped at 100 percent of participant’s contribution), absorbing losses into capital buffer, seeking capital from parent, or exercising rulebook early termination rights.
  - Recommendation: establish explicit rules and procedures addressing allocation of credit losses, in consultation with participants (Nasdaq Clearing intends to do so).
  - Replenishment rule: resources utilized in default management must be replenished within 10 business days; recommendation to consider options to replenish prefunded default resources in a more timely manner.
    - Recommendation: "Nasdaq Clearing should consider whether there are options to replenish its prefunded default resources in a more timely manner."
      - Timing: Medium term
      - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
      - Paragraph: 65
  - Interim treatment: 90 day interim period where replenished funds are placed senior in waterfall; after interim, placed junior.

### Stress testing and risk tolerance
- Stress testing regime:
  - Daily end-of-day stress testing using internal model Clearing Capital at Risk (CCaR); uses hypothetical and historical scenarios; does not apply forward-looking scenarios.
  - ‘Cover 2’ amount determined as largest stress test loss (over margin) generated during last twelve months from two participant defaults on same day using same stress scenario.
  - Total clearing capital set to give an excess of at least 100–200 MSEK above the twelve month high point.
  - Values formally recalculated on a quarterly basis.
- Treatment of client accounts:
  - Excludes exposure to clients with individually segregated accounts when estimating exposure to a participant default (aggregated and treated as separate member).
  - Stressed exposure includes losses from affiliates and clients that use an omnibus account.
  - Recommendation: "Nasdaq Clearing should adopt a more conservative approach to the treatment of individual client segregated accounts in stress testing of its pre-funded default resources."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 68
- Risk tolerance and scenario generation:
  - Board has defined a 99.9 percent confidence level to represent a ‘catastrophic’ or extreme but plausible event.
  - Recommendation: "Nasdaq Clearing should review whether its use of a 99.9 percent confidence level to define ‘catastrophic’ events delivers sufficiently extreme outcomes in all cases."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 72
  - Recommendation: consider whether other areas of the stress testing framework should include interdependencies and include default of a participant that plays multiple roles in default management fire drills.
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 57

### Default management and operational preparedness
- Default management governance:
  - Default Committee decides on declaration of default, management and communication; objective is to close out and/or mitigate market risk while minimizing costs to default funds and CCP.
  - OTC IRD default management depends on active participation of OTC IRD participants; rotating group of three participants advises on hedging strategy and invited to bid in auctions.
- Porting and fire drills:
  - Porting typically least disruptive; clients responsible for finding a back-up clearing member.
  - Fire-drills: product-specific drills at least annually; fixed income drills semi-annually with mandatory OTC IRD participation.
  - Recommendation: expand fire drills to test porting in defaults involving a large client clearer and defaults of a clearing participant that provides additional services (e.g., settlement bank).
- Business continuity and failover testing:
  - Two-hour recovery time objective for all business critical functions and processes.
  - Secondary site around 20km from primary; both sites staffed with different capacities.
  - Participant involvement in annual disaster recovery tests low (5 percent participation in October 2015 test); testing mandatory in 2016 when operations move to a new primary site.
  - Recommendation: "Nasdaq Clearing should review whether all stakeholders that would be affected by an operational failover participate in business continuity tests, and should consider posing more stringent requirements regarding participation in these exercises."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 91

### Liquidity risk management
- Liquidity model and coverage objectives:
  - Liquidity model measures stressed liquidity requirements; seeks QLR in each currency to cover single largest expected stressed liquidity need and additional resources to cover two largest exposures.
  - QLR composition includes committed liquidity lines, cash and cash equivalents, and government securities with pre-arranged GMRA.
  - Committed liquidity lines with four commercial banks: three Nordic banks (with direct access to the Riksbank) and a fourth international bank providing multicurrency committed liquidity.
  - Liquidity buffer: 20 million SEK for stressed corporate needs.
- Stress testing for liquidity:
  - Liquidity needs estimated over one and two-day horizons; twelve month lookback period used to determine the ‘high point’.
  - Stressed liquidity needs from other sources scaled up from historical high point; scaling factor linked roughly to Nasdaq Clearing’s 99.9 percent definition of ‘catastrophic’.
  - Recommendation: Nasdaq Clearing should continue review of liquidity model and consider using full CCaR scenario set, extend time horizon beyond two days, include collateral liquidation in simulations, and reassess basis for scaling factor and twelve month look-back.
  - Recommendation: "Nasdaq Clearing should continue to refine its liquidity risk model."
    - Timing: Short–medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 81
- Concentration and interdependencies:
  - Reliance on three Nordic banks as liquidity providers which are also clearing participants; GMRA providers overlap with liquidity providers.
  - Recommendation: continue work to expand pool of providers outside Nordic banks; consider whether to eliminate credit exposure to settlement banks by extending participant obligation until funds are paid to concentration bank.
    - Recommendation: "Nasdaq Clearing should consider eliminating its credit exposure to its settlement banks, by extending the clearing participants’ obligation until the funds are paid to the concentration bank."
      - Timing: Medium–long term
      - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
      - Paragraph: 59

### Operational risk, custody, investment risk, and cyber security
- Custody and investments:
  - Assets held at CSDs in Nasdaq Clearing’s name where possible; otherwise with commercial custodians meeting minimum requirements.
  - Investment objective: minimize credit, market, concentration and liquidity risks; primary investments in government securities or collateralized investments.
  - Maximum unsecured investments with commercial banks limited to 5 percent of the portfolio (on average over the month), per EMIR.
  - Nasdaq Clearing holds a 33 percent buffer on top of its regulatory capital for general business risks and orderly wind-down; investment losses would be allocated to Nasdaq Clearing’s capital and excess losses treated under RP.
  - Recommendation: formalize alignment between investment limits and capital buffer and consider limiting unsecured investments with higher rated counterparties to available capital.
- Operational outsourcing and SLAs:
  - Much IT infrastructure provided by other Nasdaq Group companies; governed by SLAs with availability and capacity targets; quarterly service reviews and annual SLA review.
  - Recommendation: ensure RP covers continuity in case of crisis or insolvency at Nasdaq Group, including staff and systems availability.
- Cybersecurity:
  - Policies and procedures in place; benchmarking against NIST; work coordinated via Nasdaq Information Security Risk Committee.
  - Recommendation: ensure controls and governance processes continue to evolve to meet industry best practice.

### Main consolidated recommendations (excerpt and preservation of key recommendations)
- Supervision and oversight of FMIs:
  - "Resourcing of the FMI supervision function at FI should be strengthened and resourcing of the FMI oversight function at Riksbank should be kept under review."
    - Timing: Short term, ongoing
    - Authority: FI & Riksbank
    - Paragraph: 28–29
  - "FI and Riksbank should clarify how they would coordinate during a crisis, possibly by establishing a joint crisis management plan."
    - Timing: Short term
    - Authority: FI & Riksbank
    - Paragraph: 34
  - "Riksbank should consider extending its offering of central bank services to FMIs, in particular CCPs, to include access to collateralized overnight liquidity."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Riksbank
    - Paragraph: 19
- Risk management of Nasdaq Clearing (selected):
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should make significant enhancements to its Recovery Plan. This should include ensuring that that its recovery tools are either supported in the Rules and Regulation or backed by formal agreements, as appropriate. (This work is already underway.)"
    - Timing: Short term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraphs: 52–53, 63, 82, 84, 87, 88
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should continue to refine its liquidity risk model."
    - Timing: Short–medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 81
  - "The Board of Nasdaq Clearing should adopt objectives that explicitly support financial stability and other public interest considerations."
    - Timing: Short–medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 42
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should review whether its use of a 99.9 percent confidence level to define ‘catastrophic’ events delivers sufficiently extreme outcomes in all cases."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 72
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should adopt a more conservative approach to the treatment of individual client segregated accounts in stress testing of its pre-funded default resources."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 68
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider whether there are options to replenish its prefunded default resources in a more timely manner."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 65
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should review whether all stakeholders that would be affected by an operational failover participate in business continuity tests, and should consider posing more stringent requirements regarding participation in these exercises."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 91
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider whether there are additional areas of its stress testing framework in which interdependencies should be included. Nasdaq Clearing should also consider including the default of a clearing participant that plays multiple roles in a default management fire drill."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 57
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider introducing a more holistic approach to the management of pro-cyclicality, including by regularly assessing the effectiveness of its chosen tools."
    - Timing: Medium–long term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 54
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider eliminating its credit exposure to its settlement banks, by extending the clearing participants’ obligation until the funds are paid to the concentration bank."
    - Timing: Medium–long term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 59

### Key statistics (selected, preserved exactly)
- RIX – volume of transactions (million):
  - 2014: 4.06
  - 2013: 3.81
  - 2012: 3.62
- RIX – value of transactions (SEK billion):
  - 2014: 117,537
  - 2013: 111,986
  - 2012: 124,454
- Bankgirot – volume of transactions (million):
  - 2014: 903
  - 2013: 850
  - 2012: 808
- Bankgirot – value of transactions (SEK billion):
  - 2014: 9,394
  - 2013: 9,044
  - 2012: 8,667
- Nasdaq Clearing – number of transactions (million) — Financials:
  - 2014: 11.69
  - 2013: 10.20
  - 2012: 10.09
- Nasdaq Clearing – number of transactions (million) — Commodities:
  - 2014: 0.19
  - 2013: 0.14
  - 2012: 0.16
- Nasdaq Clearing – value of transactions (SEK billion) — Financials:
  - 2014: 28,699
  - 2013: 37,821
  - 2012: 41,393
- Nasdaq Clearing – value of transactions (SEK billion) — Commodities:
  - 2014: 490
  - 2013: 484
  - 2012: 500
- Euroclear Sweden — number of delivery instructions (million):
  - 2014: 14
  - 2013: 13
  - 2012: 11
- Nasdaq Clearing: Members (2015):
  - Financial Markets (total): 46
  - Of which foreign: 31
  - Commodities: 323
  - Of which foreign: 252
- Nasdaq Clearing: Volume — Daily average (Notional Value) (selected):
  - Financial Markets (total): 72,068.4 (Daily average SEK billions: 130.9)
  - Equity derivatives — Volume: 71,602.2 (Daily average SEK billions: 32.3)
  - Fixed income derivatives — Volume: 466.2 (Daily average SEK billions: 98.7)
  - Commodities — Volume: 679.1 (Daily average SEK billions: 1.6)
- Nasdaq Clearing: Currency breakdown — Total (SEK) and Total (%):
  - Total (SEK): 132.62
  - Total (%): 100
  - SEK — Total (SEK): 127.3; Total (%): 96.0
  - EUR — Total (SEK): 1.3; Total (%): 1.0
  - USD — Total (SEK): 0.3; Total (%): 0.2
  - DKK — Total (SEK): 1.9; Total (%): 1.4
  - NOK — Total (SEK): 1.82; Total (%): 1.4

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and selected sections, IMF Staff Report (cr17310).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 5

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Standards and assessment basis
- The analysis and recommendations are based on the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI), introduced in 2012.
- The analysis of supervision and oversight uses the five Responsibilities for authorities of the PFMI (Box 1).
- The analysis of Nasdaq Clearing focuses on selected issues and risks from relevant PFMI Principles and does not provide a comprehensive Principles assessment.

### Box 1. PFMI Responsibility A–E (as stated in source)
- Responsibility A: Regulation, supervision, and oversight of FMIs — FMIs should be subject to appropriate and effective regulation, supervision, and oversight by a central bank, market regulator, or other relevant authority.
- Responsibility B: Regulatory, supervisory, and oversight powers and resources — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should have the powers and resources to carry out effectively their responsibilities in regulating, supervising, and overseeing FMIs.
- Responsibility C: Disclosure of policies with respect to FMIs — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should clearly define and disclose their regulatory, supervisory, and oversight policies with respect to FMIs.
- Responsibility D: Application of the principles for FMIs — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should adopt the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures and apply them consistently.
- Responsibility E: Cooperation with other authorities — Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should cooperate with each other, both domestically and internationally, as appropriate, in promoting the safety and efficiency of FMIs.

### Overview of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) in Sweden
- Domestic critical FMIs include:
  - RIX, the Swedish RTGS payments system (owned and operated by Sveriges Riksbank).
  - Bankgirotcentralen BGC AB (Bankgirot), a retail payments system (owned by a group of Nordic banks).
  - Nasdaq Clearing (one domestic CCP).
  - Euroclear Sweden (one domestic CSD and SSS, owned by Euroclear SA).
- Several overseas-based FMIs important to Sweden:
  - EuroCCP (Dutch CCP).
  - LCH.Clearnet Ltd (UK-based CCP).
  - CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement).
  - SWIFT (network and message standards).
- Nasdaq Clearing specifics:
  - Nasdaq Clearing is a 100 percent owned subsidiary of Nasdaq Nordic Limited (Nasdaq Nordic), ultimately wholly owned by Nasdaq Group.
  - Nasdaq Clearing legal entity created in September 2013 via de-merger; markets and exchange operations moved to Nasdaq Stockholm AB.

### Assessment of supervision and oversight
- FMIs in Sweden are well developed and subject to PFMI-aligned minimum regulatory requirements.
- Finansinspektionen (FI) and Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) provide appropriate and effective supervision and oversight of FMIs.
- Scope, basis and objectives of each authority’s supervision and oversight are clearly defined and disclosed.
- Evidence indicates supervision and oversight have been effective in improving FMI risk management practices.
- Cooperation:
  - Effective cooperation exists between FI and Riksbank.
  - Overlap in supervision and oversight responsibilities is managed via established arrangements and there is evidence authorities "speak with one voice" where relevant.
  - FI and Riksbank should clarify coordination in a (non-resolution) crisis, possibly via a joint crisis management plan.
  - Swedish authorities participate in several cooperative oversight/supervision arrangements for domestic and foreign FMIs.

### Resourcing and capacity
- Resourcing of FMI oversight and supervision functions appears to be tight.
- Recommendations:
  - FI and Riksbank are encouraged to continue reviewing adequacy of resourcing for FMI oversight and supervision.
  - Resourcing of the FMI supervision function at FI should be strengthened.
  - Resourcing of the FMI oversight function at Riksbank should be kept under review.
- Rationale:
  - Effective cooperation and streamlined processes help alleviate pressures, but international policy work and increasing demands may create further pressures.
  - Additional supervisory attention is warranted because Nasdaq Clearing clears complex products and competes for growth in OTC derivatives clearing.
  - Additional resources likely needed for FMI crisis management work when EU legislation on CCP resolution is introduced.

### Assessment of Nasdaq Clearing risk management
- Overall, Nasdaq Clearing’s risk management appears sound and largely aligned with PFMI requirements.
- Significant changes since 2011 to improve safety and soundness include:
  - Legal separation of the CCP from the exchange business.
  - Introduction of a waterfall of pre-funded resources.
  - Introduction of a new collateral management system.
  - Phasing out of bank guarantees not fully backed by collateral.
  - CCP authorized under EMIR in 2014.
- Key shortcomings and action areas:
  - Recovery planning:
    - Nasdaq Clearing should make significant enhancements to its Recovery Plan.
    - CCPs must have comprehensive recovery plans to continue critical services in crisis.
    - Recovery tools must be backed by formal agreements or in the rulebook, as appropriate.
    - Work on enhancing the Recovery Plan is already underway in consultation with FI and Riksbank.
    - A proposal for EU legislation on CCP recovery and resolution was expected to be presented in late 2016, which would provide additional certainty and enforcement powers for authorities.
  - Other risk management enhancements recommended:
    - Continue enhancements to credit and liquidity stress testing approaches.
    - The Board should adopt objectives that explicitly support financial stability and other public interest considerations.
    - Ensure risk management framework tracks evolving industry best practice.

### Main recommendations (excerpted and preserved from Table 1)
- Supervision and oversight of FMIs
  - "Resourcing of the FMI supervision function at FI should be strengthened and resourcing of the FMI oversight function at Riksbank should be kept under review."
    - Timing: Short term, ongoing
    - Authority: FI & Riksbank
    - Paragraph: 28–29
  - "FI and Riksbank should clarify how they would coordinate during a crisis, possibly by establishing a joint crisis management plan."
    - Timing: Short term
    - Authority: FI & Riksbank
    - Paragraph: 34
  - "Riksbank should consider extending its offering of central bank services to FMIs, in particular CCPs, to include access to collateralized overnight liquidity."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Riksbank
    - Paragraph: 19

- Risk management of Nasdaq Clearing
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should make significant enhancements to its Recovery Plan. This should include ensuring that that its recovery tools are either supported in the Rules and Regulation or backed by formal agreements, as appropriate. (This work is already underway.)"
    - Timing: Short term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraphs: 52–53, 63, 82, 84, 87, 88
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should continue to refine its liquidity risk model."
    - Timing: Short–medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 81
  - "The Board of Nasdaq Clearing should adopt objectives that explicitly support financial stability and other public interest considerations."
    - Timing: Short–medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 42
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should review whether its use of a 99.9 percent confidence level to define ‘catastrophic’ events delivers sufficiently extreme outcomes in all cases."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 72
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should adopt a more conservative approach to the treatment of individual client segregated accounts in stress testing of its pre-funded default resources."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 68
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider whether there are options to replenish its prefunded default resources in a more timely manner."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 65
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should review whether all stakeholders that would be affected by an operational failover participate in business continuity tests, and should consider posing more stringent requirements regarding participation in these exercises."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 91
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider whether there are additional areas of its stress testing framework in which interdependencies should be included. Nasdaq Clearing should also consider including the default of a clearing participant that plays multiple roles in a default management fire drill."
    - Timing: Medium term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 57
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider introducing a more holistic approach to the management of pro-cyclicality, including by regularly assessing the effectiveness of its chosen tools."
    - Timing: Medium–long term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 54
  - "Nasdaq Clearing should consider eliminating its credit exposure to its settlement banks, by extending the clearing participants’ obligation until the funds are paid to the concentration bank."
    - Timing: Medium–long term
    - Authority: Nasdaq Clearing
    - Paragraph: 59

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, IMF Staff Report (cr17310).*

### 8.      Nasdaq Clearing clears a range of products: equity derivatives (including exchange

### 8.      Nasdaq Clearing clears a range of products: equity derivatives (including exchange

### Clearing scope and business profile
- Products cleared include:
  - Equity derivatives: exchange traded forwards, futures and options on single Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish and Danish stocks; options and futures on several indices.
  - Fixed income derivatives: exchange traded and OTC derivatives and repos.
  - Commodity derivatives: seafood, power, freight, oil, coal, renewables, gas, iron-ore.
- Business concentration and currencies:
  - The bulk of its business is in fixed income and equity derivatives.
  - The bulk of clearing is denominated in SEK.
  - The CCP also clears products denominated in EUR, USD, DKK and NOK.
- Competitive position:
  - Nasdaq Clearing faces competition with other CCPs regarding the clearing of OTC IRD.

### Clearing service structure and membership (end-2015)
- Nasdaq Clearing organizes clearing into two clearing “services”: financial derivatives; and commodity derivatives.
- Participant counts:
  - Financial service: 46 participants.
  - Commodities service: 323 participants.
  - Foreign participants: 31 in the financial service; 252 in the commodities service.
  - Clearing of OTC fixed income products (part of the financial service) is more concentrated with only seven members.
- Governance:
  - The two services are provided within the same legal entity of Nasdaq Clearing and are governed by the same policy framework.

### Supervisory and oversight framework (responsible authorities)
- Authorities and responsibilities:
  - Finansinspektionen (FI): responsible for authorizing firms to engage in clearing and settlement activities, including operating as a central counterparty; FI is the national competent authority (NCA) for Nasdaq Clearing.
  - Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank): responsible for oversight of FMIs, including RIX (the central-bank owned RTGS system).
  - FI and Riksbank currently supervise and oversee: Nasdaq Clearing; Euroclear Sweden; and Bankgirot.
  - FI and Riksbank participate in international cooperative oversight and supervision arrangements for overseas FMIs that operate in Sweden (EuroCCP, Euroclear Group, LCH.Clearnet Ltd, CLS, and SWIFT).
- Legal basis and frameworks:
  - FI’s regulatory responsibilities are defined in the Securities Market Act (2007) and the Financial Instruments Accounts Act (1998).
  - Riksbank’s oversight responsibilities are based on the Sveriges Riksbank Act (1988).
  - EMIR is directly applicable in Sweden and is of relevance for Nasdaq Clearing.
  - Both FI and Riksbank have adopted the PFMI and have published policy statements that they will apply the PFMI in their supervision and oversight.

### Regulation, supervision and transparency (Responsibilities A, C and D)
- Public criteria and disclosure:
  - Riksbank has published on its website the criteria used to identify FMIs subject to its oversight; criteria are based on importance to the Swedish financial system and linked to the PFMI.
  - FI’s scope is determined in legislation. Both authorities publicly disclose policies, oversight/supervisory work, and current priorities.
- Objectives:
  - Riksbank’s objective: identify and analyze sources of systemic risks and efficiency losses in FMIs and act to reduce these.
  - FI’s objectives: promote stability in the financial system, consumer protection, efficiency and smoothly functioning markets; supervisory focus for financial infrastructure is stability and operational security.
- Application of PFMI and EMIR:
  - PFMI forms the basis for Riksbank’s oversight; Riksbank may impose more stringent requirements when required.
  - FI’s focus in supervising CCPs is primarily on EMIR; PFMI may serve as additional guidance where legislation is lacking.
  - The authorities apply the PFMI to all critical FMIs in Sweden, including RIX; Riksbank’s oversight of RIX is conducted separately from its operation with conflict-of-interest procedures in place.
- Assessment approach and planned changes:
  - FI and Riksbank take a risk-based approach; develop annual supervisory/oversight plans that can be amended.
  - Under EMIR, FI (in consultation with the EMIR College, which includes Riksbank) must approve material changes to a CCP’s operations.
  - Authorities are moving away from a self-assessment approach (previously required every three years) toward annual authority-led assessments under EMIR NCAs and requiring FMIs to publish disclosure frameworks at least every two years as required by the PFMI.
  - The authorities are encouraged to adopt an approach ensuring each critical FMI’s observance of all regulatory requirements is assessed in depth at least periodically.

### Policy recommendation: central bank liquidity access
- Riksbank should consider extending its offering of central bank services to FMIs, in particular CCPs, to include access to collateralized overnight liquidity.
  - Current access: FMIs may access certain central bank facilities, including intraday liquidity, but may not access overnight liquidity.
  - Rationale: FMIs are systemically important; distress at an FMI may have broader macroprudential implications. In extreme market conditions, reliance on commercial liquidity providers may not be reliable. Access to collateralized overnight liquidity would help ensure continuity of CCP payments and market stability. An ex-ante policy on access would provide market confidence; any such policy would consider that the CCP is sound and observes relevant regulatory requirements.

### Effectiveness of supervision and oversight
- Evidence of effectiveness:
  - FI and Riksbank’s supervision and oversight have improved risk management practices at Swedish FMIs.
  - Authorities engage regularly with FMIs via scheduled quarterly meetings (with the exception of RIX), more frequent topic-specific meetings, and deep dives (e.g., cyber risk).
  - Authorities engage constructively on regulatory interpretation and require detailed supporting evidence for FMI self-assessments.
- Risk prioritization and planning:
  - Identified risks prioritized by likelihood and consequences; oversight plans driven by risks and changes at FMIs.
  - FI must produce an annual risk-assessment regarding how Nasdaq Clearing meets all EMIR requirements; a similar requirement is expected for CSDs under new EU legislation.

### Powers, resources and enforcement (Responsibility B)
- Information and enforcement powers:
  - FI and Riksbank have powers to obtain information from supervised/overseen FMIs based in relevant laws.
  - FMIs must provide information regarding planned changes, significant matters, and certain statistical information.
  - FI’s enforcement powers: moral suasion; issue a remark, a public warning, or an order that an FMI take certain actions; remarks or public warnings may be accompanied by a fine; power to withdraw the license of a supervised FMI.
  - Riksbank has no formal enforcement powers and relies on moral suasion, dialogue, speeches, publications (including its annual Financial Infrastructure report), and discussion with FI or the Financial Stability Council. Riksbank’s role as emergency liquidity provider underpins its moral suasion.
- Legal gaps and forthcoming EU legislation:
  - Areas of the PFMI not implemented in Swedish law (gaps in EMIR) include requirements regarding recovery plans, allocation of uncovered credit losses, and replenishment of financial and liquidity resources a CCP may employ during a stress event.
  - Implementation of EU legislation covering these gaps is expected to be proposed in late 2016.
- Resourcing of supervision and oversight functions:
  - FI’s Infrastructure Supervision Division employs seven staff; supported by the Securities Law Division, the Market Analysis Division and the Market Monitoring Division.
  - Riksbank’s Financial Infrastructure Division employs 11 staff.
  - Additional resourcing details:
    - Retail payments market work accounts for approximately 2.5 full time staff in Riksbank’s Financial Infrastructure Division.
    - Two members of the Division who are lawyers also support other parts of the Financial Stability Department.
  - Organizational arrangements:
    - FI’s Infrastructure Supervision Division: one lead supervisor for each FMI.
    - Riksbank’s Financial Infrastructure Division: one lead overseer and one back-up for each FMI.
  - Use of external resources:
    - Authorities may commission external consultants and/or temporary staff as needed; recent uses include IT-review, cyber-security work, and validation of internal risk models.
    - FI has internal specialist resources with expertise in risk models.
  - Expectations on critical service providers:
    - FI and Riksbank expect FMIs to apply Annex F of the PFMI; authorities should ensure all FMIs have conducted such assessments on all critical service providers.
- Resourcing concerns and recommendations:
  - Resourcing appears tight; joint internal audit (finalized in 2014) noted potential insufficiency.
  - Authorities have assessed resourcing is sufficient but increasing demands (e.g., EMIR annual assessments, supervisory colleges, FMI resolution work) raise concerns.
  - Specific concerns:
    - Nasdaq Clearing clears complex products and competes for OTC derivatives clearing growth, warranting particular supervisory attention.
    - In case of unexpected events (e.g., unanticipated staff absences, significant changes at an FMI), it is not clear sufficient experienced resources would be available without diverting resources from ongoing supervision.
    - FI has only one dedicated supervisor per FMI, increasing potential vulnerability.
  - Recommendation: FI’s FMI supervision resourcing should be strengthened and Riksbank’s FMI oversight resourcing should be kept under review.

### Cooperation in normal and stressed circumstances (Responsibility E)
- Domestic cooperation:
  - FI and Riksbank cooperate effectively; joint agreement on cooperation and information sharing encapsulated in a broader MoU between the Ministry of Finance, Riksbank, FI and the Swedish National Debt Office.
  - Regular joint meetings with domestic FMIs; regular meetings between heads of departments with primary FMI responsibility; ongoing working-level contact.
  - Authorities coordinate annual supervision and oversight plans; industry feedback suggests authorities “speak with one voice” on FMI matters.
- Supervisory college for Nasdaq Clearing:
  - A supervisory college has been formed for Nasdaq Clearing as required under EMIR.
  - FI chairs the college as the NCA; Riksbank is a member, as are ESMA, the ECB and authorities from the U.K., Norway, Finland and Denmark.
  - The college’s role includes information sharing, coordination of supervisory examinations and establishing contingency planning for crisis situations; FI is obliged to consult with the college on several matters pertaining to Nasdaq Clearing.
  - The College meets at least once per year.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2017/cr17310.pdf*

### 32.      FI and/or Riksbank participate in cooperative oversight and supervision arrangements

### 32.      FI and/or Riksbank participate in cooperative oversight and supervision arrangements

### Cooperative oversight arrangements
- FI and/or Riksbank participate in cooperative oversight and supervision arrangements for each of the critical foreign FMIs that operate in Sweden.
- These cooperative arrangements provide for the exchange of information between authorities, including in times of crisis.
- A full list of cooperative agreements the authorities participate in with respect to FMIs is provided in Appendix 5.

### Crisis Management: documented plans and testing
- Riksbank:
  - Has a FMI specific crisis management manual describing contact details for key internal and external stakeholders.
  - Maintains a manual regarding the actions that would be taken if an FMI were to request emergency liquidity assistance; this process is tested.
- FI:
  - Has an internal crisis management manual covering all its supervisory responsibilities, which is also tested.
- Ministry of Finance:
  - Has initiated a project that will, among other things, clarify the powers of Riksbank with regards to participants in ‘the central payment system’ including with respect to operational crisis preparedness.

### Crisis coordination and gaps (recommendation)
- FI and Riksbank should clarify how they would coordinate during a crisis, possibly by establishing a joint crisis management plan.
- Observations:
  - The MoU between the Ministry of Finance, Riksbank, FI and the Swedish National Debt Office covers crisis management but at a very high level.
  - No domestic FMI-specific crisis management arrangements have yet been developed between FI and Riksbank.
  - Given overlapping interests, authorities would benefit from agreeing how they would coordinate amongst themselves and with the relevant FMI(s) during a crisis.
- Further work on crisis management will be required, likely involving additional authorities, when EU legislation on CCP resolution is introduced.

### Legal and regulatory context for FMI resolution
- There are currently no specific regulations in Sweden or the EU regarding managing a FMI in severe distress.
- International work is being conducted (notably FSB work on CCP resolution, in which the Riksbank is participating).
- This international work is expected to form the basis of an EU proposal for new regulations regarding the recovery and resolution of CCPs, which at present is expected to be proposed in late 2016.
- Importance:
  - Introduction of such legislation is important to facilitate FMI resolution planning by authorities.
  - At present, resolution of an FMI in Sweden would be within the prevailing bankruptcy legislation.

### Crisis communication and cross-jurisdictional engagement
- An emergency protocol has been established within the Nasdaq Clearing EMIR College based on the ESMA template.
- EMIR requires that these crisis communication procedures must be tested annually.
- As EU legislation on FMI resolution is implemented, Swedish authorities should consider whether a CMG is required for Nasdaq Clearing.
- Nasdaq Clearing’s operations spread across jurisdictions; Swedish authorities should ensure appropriate engagement and communication with authorities in these jurisdictions when developing the resolution plan for the CCP.

### Analysis of the safety of Nasdaq Clearing — A. Legal Risk
- Legal basis:
  - EU, Swedish and Norwegian legislation, together with the CCP’s rules and regulations, form the legal basis for Nasdaq Clearing’s activities.
  - Nasdaq Clearing was authorized under EMIR in 2014 and is regulated by FI under EMIR and the Swedish Securities Market Act.
  - It is also licensed by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance.
- Membership and governing law:
  - Participants are required to sign membership agreements prior to accessing Nasdaq Clearing, under which they agree to the governing law and to be bound by the relevant rules and regulations.
  - Nasdaq Clearing operates two rulebooks, for clearing of financial derivatives and commodity derivatives respectively, governed by different laws:
    - Rulebook for Nasdaq Financial is governed under Swedish law.
    - Rulebook for Nasdaq Commodities is governed under Norwegian law.
  - Nasdaq Clearing has assessed that due to the similarity of Swedish and Norwegian law, the different governing laws do not result in any material differences or legal risks, and it seeks to synchronize the rulebooks.
- Cross-border legal risk mitigation:
  - Nasdaq Clearing seeks legal opinions prior to accepting participants or engaging with entities in foreign jurisdictions.
  - Nasdaq Clearing has assessed that the implementation of the Settlement Finality Directive and Collateral Directive into Swedish and Norwegian legislation has reduced many cross-border risks associated with settlement, netting and collateral.
  - Nasdaq Clearing only establishes relationships with settlement and concentration banks and CSDs where these parties are domiciled in jurisdictions that have implemented relevant EU legislation.

### Analysis of the safety of Nasdaq Clearing — B. Governance and Corporate Structure
- Corporate structure and scale:
  - Nasdaq Clearing conducts only clearing business.
  - The legal entity was created in September 2013, separating the clearing and exchange businesses previously conducted within the same entity.
  - The CCP now employs 64 staff.
  - Nasdaq Clearing operates a Norwegian branch, Nasdaq Clearing Oslo, with a primarily operational role.
- Board responsibilities and composition:
  - The Board of Nasdaq Clearing retains legal responsibility for all decisions related to Nasdaq Clearing, including compliance and risk matters.
  - Any Nasdaq Group-wide or Nasdaq Nordic-level policies must be adopted by the Board before they would apply to Nasdaq Clearing; the Board assesses appropriateness for the CCP.
  - The Board comprises six members, two of whom are independent.
  - One member of the Nasdaq Clearing Board is also a member of the boards of the exchanges owned by Nasdaq Nordic; there is no overlap between membership of the Board of Nasdaq Clearing and the Board of Nasdaq Nordic.
  - Nasdaq Clearing receives services from several other companies within the Nasdaq Group governed by service level agreements (SLAs).
- Recommendation on board objectives:
  - The Board of Nasdaq Clearing should adopt objectives that explicitly support financial stability and other public interest considerations.
  - Rationale:
    - Such an objective is implicit in regulatory requirements (e.g. EMIR requires that CCPs should ‘provide clearing services honestly, fairly and professionally and in a manner so that public confidence is maintained’).
    - Explicit adoption would ensure safety and financial stability are taken into account in future decision making and support establishing standards beyond minimum regulatory requirements.
- Risk governance:
  - The Board defines the risk appetite of Nasdaq Clearing and has adopted a ‘Clearing Risk Policy’ and a ‘Risk Mandate’.
  - For business and operational risks, the Board signs off on outcomes of Nasdaq Clearing’s risk-self assessment.
  - The Board adopts policies regarding management of various risks, adopts the internal audit plan, and approves material amendments to the Rules and Regulations.
  - Risk management and audit functions have independent reporting lines to the Board.
- Committees and escalation:
  - Clearing Risk Committee (CRC):
    - Delegated responsibilities from the Board.
    - Chaired by the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and comprises the CEO, CTO, representatives from Treasury, Clearing Operations, Business units, and Group Risk management.
    - Has a formal mandate to decide on risk matters in accordance with Board policies and the risk mandate.
    - Any risks outside approved tolerance must be escalated to the Board.
    - If CRO and CEO do not agree on a matter within the CRC, it is escalated to the Board.
    - Meets at least monthly, often more frequently.
  - Member Risk Committee (MRC):
    - Advisory role regarding clearing risk management controls, models, policies and procedures.
    - Risk issues of material impact are passed through the MRC for non-objection.
    - Membership includes clearing participants from the Financial and Commodities services, as well as clients; members must have adequate expertise and are appointed for a 24 month term.
    - Chaired by an independent Board member with a second independent Board member also on the MRC.
    - Receives reports similar to information received by the Board and reports directly to the Board.
    - On matters delegated to the CRC, the CRC is required to take the MRC’s advice into account before implementing changes.
    - If the advice of the MRC was not taken, Nasdaq Clearing would be required to submit a letter of explanation to FI.
  - Conflict management:
    - Possibility of conflicts of interest may arise in a risk committee that comprises clearing participants and clients.
    - Nasdaq Clearing manages this by escalating disagreements between the CRC and the MRC to the Board; the Board is the ultimate decision maker.
- Reporting:
  - The Board receives regular reports on risks; the report is distributed in advance and presented during the meeting.
  - The same report is largely presented to the MRC; independent board members report conclusions back to the Board.
  - Risks deemed critical or breaches of defined risk tolerance are escalated to the Board.

### Analysis of the safety of Nasdaq Clearing — Mechanisms for Considering Stakeholder Interests
- Mechanisms for stakeholder input:
  - MRC; Clearing Councils and Forums; IT forums; meetings with participants, customers and relevant industry associations.
  - Nasdaq Clearing is obliged to consult with the Swedish Securities Dealers Association on changes to the Nasdaq Financial Rules and Regulations; all members have an opportunity to review and comment on such changes.
  - No equivalent requirement on the commodities service; rule changes are posted on Nasdaq Clearing’s website prior to implementation, giving members an opportunity to comment.
  - Nasdaq Clearing operates an ‘OTC Advisory Board’ which provides participants clearing these products influence over future development of the OTC service and its default management process.
- Transparency and disclosures:
  - Nasdaq Clearing has published information in accordance with CPMI-IOSCO qualitative and quantitative disclosure requirements.
  - Additional disclosures on Nasdaq Clearing’s website include summaries of back-testing and credit and liquidity stress testing results, independent model validation reports for margin, liquidity risk, credit risk and haircut models, an overview of the investment policy, a summary of the business continuity plan, and summaries of default management strategies.
  - Recommendation: Nasdaq Clearing should ensure all disclosures are up to date.

### Analysis of the safety of Nasdaq Clearing — Model Testing and Validation
- Policies and validation frequency:
  - Nasdaq Clearing has adopted a Model Validation Policy approved by the Board.
  - Risk models must be validated by an independent party on an annual basis.
  - Significant changes to a model must be independently validated and the results presented to the MRC for non-objection prior to adoption.
  - External validators will be changed at least every five years.
- Internal testing and review:
  - Nasdaq Clearing conducts internal validation and testing of key risk models including:
    - Back-testing and sensitivity analysis of margin models.
    - Formal monthly review of credit and liquidity stress testing results and analysis of stress scenarios, including sensitivity analysis.
    - Reverse stress testing of credit and liquidity resources.
    - Formal annual internal review of key models (including margin and stress testing).
- Adoption of validation outcomes:
  - CRC recommends which recommendations from internal and external validations should be taken forward; presented to the MRC for non-objection and to the Board.
  - Validations are also discussed with Riksbank and FI.
  - EMIR requires that significant changes to models and parameters be validated by FI and ESMA, and be subject to a College opinion.
  - Actions are tracked by the risk management department and followed up during the next annual review; ongoing testing results would be escalated more quickly if required.

### Analysis of the safety of Nasdaq Clearing — C. Recovery and Wind-Down Planning
- Current Recovery Plan (RP) status:
  - Nasdaq Clearing implemented a RP in 2013, updated in September 2015.
  - The plan covers several scenarios that may trigger recovery and the recovery tools Nasdaq Clearing considers might be adopted.
  - Need for further enhancement has been recognized by Nasdaq Clearing, FI and Riksbank.
  - Nasdaq Clearing expects to introduce a revised version later in 2016.
  - Recovery planning is not currently an explicit requirement under EU legislation; legislation on this matter is expected to be proposed later in 2016.
- Areas for enhancement (high level):
  - Ensure recovery tools are either supported in the Rules and Regulation or backed by formal agreements, as appropriate.
  - Plans to raise additional capital from affiliated entities should be documented and approved by all relevant decision makers to ensure implementability.
  - Where the plan involves allocation of losses to third parties (e.g. participants) provide as much certainty as possible to manage incentives and allow third parties to measure, manage and control exposures.
  - Given interdependencies in Nasdaq Clearing’s operations where third parties can play multiple roles (see paragraph 55), consider likelihood of multiple recovery scenarios occurring simultaneously and whether overlapping tools would be sufficient.
  - Nasdaq Clearing indicated it will consider multiple-scenario analysis in its revised RP.
  - Consider sharing elements of the plan with participants and their clients more broadly; further develop the ‘wind-down’ component of the RP.
  - Further specific areas for development are discussed in relevant sections throughout the note.

### Analysis of the safety of Nasdaq Clearing — D. Systemic Risk
- Pro-cyclicality management:
  - Tools used include: absolute floors on margin parameters; a ten-year look back period with a ‘conservative’ confidence; and a pro-cyclicality buffer.
  - Nasdaq Clearing does not have a formal framework for considering when the pro-cyclicality buffer might be used.
  - Nasdaq Clearing does not conduct continued monitoring, validation or testing of the effectiveness of these tools.
  - Recommendation: consider introducing a more holistic approach to management of pro-cyclicality, including regularly assessing effectiveness of chosen tools.
  - Nasdaq Clearing is considering whether to adopt a new margin model; approach to pro-cyclicality could be reconsidered accordingly.
- Use of external credit ratings:
  - Nasdaq Clearing includes external credit ratings in eligibility criteria for collateral and for settlement banks.
  - Minimum external ratings are only one input into due-diligence; other factors include financials, affiliations to other Nasdaq Clearing counterparties, CSD spreads, and geographical locations.
  - Nasdaq Clearing conducts ongoing monitoring and no action is automatically triggered if a minimum rating is breached; it has discretion to take various actions.
- Interdependencies and concentration (key exposures):
  - Nasdaq Clearing relies on three Nordic banks as liquidity providers which are also clearing participants.
  - All GMRA providers are also clearing participants, and three GMRA providers are also liquidity providers.
  - Some investment counterparties are also clearing participants.
  - The concentration bank for NOK is a clearing participant.
  - There is no overlap between clearing participants and custodian banks.

*cr17310 - 32.      FI and/or Riksbank participate in cooperative oversight and supervision arrangements*

### 57.      The risks from these interdependencies have been recognized by Nasdaq Clearing, as

### cr17310 - 57.      The risks from these interdependencies have been recognized by Nasdaq Clearing, as

### Interdependencies and concentration
- Finding: Risks arise from interdependencies among Nasdaq Clearing, FI and Riksbank due to the concentrated nature of the Nordic banking system.
- Nasdaq Clearing practice: Seeks to diversify service providers but balances diversification against the need for providers who can offer appropriate service in main currencies relevant for the CCP.
- Controls:
  - Nasdaq Clearing has established a ‘soft’ concentration limit on its overall exposure to an institution.
  - The CRC would choose mitigating action if risks are deemed unacceptable; actions would be reported to the MRC and the Board.
  - Total risk posed by entities with multiple roles is reported to the Board of Nasdaq Clearing quarterly.
  - Where a clearing participant acts as a liquidity provider, Nasdaq adds the committed liquidity amount to the stressed liquidity obligation of the clearing participant; otherwise multiple roles are not included in the stress testing.
- Recommendations:
  - Consider whether other areas of the stress testing framework should include interdependencies.
  - Consider including the default of a clearing participant that plays multiple roles in a default management fire drill; combining procedures into a single drill may reveal operational capacity constraints.
  - Access to central bank facilities including collateralized overnight central bank liquidity would mitigate some interdependencies (see paragraph 19).

### E. Credit Risk — exposures and counterparty standards
- Finding: Nasdaq Clearing is exposed to credit risk from clearing participants and entities involved in payment, clearing and settlement processes (including settlement banks, nostro agents, issuers, investment counterparties and custodian banks).
- Controls:
  - Sets minimum criteria regarding robustness of counterparties and conducts ongoing monitoring.
  - Uses an internal risk-rating model for clearing participants.
  - Relies on external ratings for other entities (e.g., settlement and commercial concentration banks must have a minimum rating of A- (S&P) or A3 (Moody’s)).
  - If a firm approaches the minimum rating, CRC would determine appropriate action; a clearing participant could be placed on a watch list and may face stricter intra-day exposure limits.
- Recommendation:
  - Consider eliminating credit exposure to settlement banks by extending the clearing participant’s obligation until funds are paid to the concentration bank to remove the short interval of exposure prior to funds being swept into the concentration bank.

### Financial resources to cover credit risk to clearing participants
- Margining and prefunded resources:
  - Nasdaq Clearing covers exposure using variation margin, initial margin and other prefunded financial resources.
  - There is at least daily exchange of variation and initial margin.
  - Certain initial margin parameters are set above minimum regulatory requirements.
  - Intra-day margin calculations are conducted each hour during the trading day; intra-day margin calls are made if pre-defined credit limits are breached.
  - Participants on the credit watch list are subject to lower intraday exposure limits.
  - Additional margin is collected on concentrated positions.
  - Portfolio margining across products is permitted only where there is demonstrated stable and high correlation.
  - Portfolio margining is not conducted between financial and commodity derivatives, or between seafood and other commodity derivatives.
- Collateral:
  - Accepted collateral includes cash, certain government bonds, certain covered bonds, and certain shares and exchange traded funds.
  - Haircuts are set using a 10 year look back period to a 99.9 percent confidence level, considered ‘extreme but plausible’.
- Default coverage standard:
  - Nasdaq Clearing seeks to ensure total prefunded financial resources cover the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate exposure in extreme but plausible conditions (i.e. the ‘Cover 2’ standard).
  - Default waterfall comprises Nasdaq Clearing’s own capital and participant-funded default funds (three service specific funds, and one mutualized across all services).
- Shortcomings and recommendations:
  - No clear arrangement for allocation of default losses beyond the default waterfall. If pre-funded resources are exhausted:
    - Losses would be allocated to assessments from clearing participants capped at 100 percent of each participant’s contribution to each relevant service specific default fund.
    - If capped assessments are exhausted, any further losses would either be absorbed into the capital buffer, Nasdaq Clearing could seek capital from its parent, or it could exercise rulebook rights to early termination of contracts.
  - Recommendation: Establish explicit rules and procedures that fully address any credit losses from participant defaults, in consultation with participants (Nasdaq Clearing intends to do so).
- Replenishment:
  - Nasdaq Clearing requires resources utilized in default management be replenished within 10 business days (applies to participant contributions and Nasdaq Clearing’s capital).
  - Nasdaq Clearing would replenish its capital contribution using retained earnings in the CCP; if insufficient, using the buffer held in non-regulatory tangible capital (set to 33 percent of regulatory capital); if still insufficient, it would seek a contribution from its parent (see paragraph 71).
  - Recommendation: Consider options to replenish prefunded default resources in a more timely manner given that during the current 10 day replenishment period pre-funded resources may not meet the ‘Cover 2’ standard; review approach in light of CPMI-IOSCO guidance that a CCP should have “the capacity to effect a replenishment as soon as practicable, including by the following business day”.
  - Interim period: Defined as 90 days following a replenishment during which replenished funds are placed in a senior position in the default waterfall above the Assessment power; if another default occurs during the interim period, remaining funds in the ‘original’ waterfall absorb losses prior to replenished funds. After the interim period, replenished funds are placed in junior positions. A clearing participant’s Assessment obligation is reduced by an amount equal to any replenished amount within the interim period.

### Stress testing
- Purpose: Used to determine the size and test adequacy of service-specific default funds and total clearing capital.
- Method and frequency:
  - ‘Cover 2’ amount is determined as the largest stress test loss (over margin) generated during the last twelve months from two participant defaults on the same day using the same stress scenario.
  - Total clearing capital is set to give an excess of at least 100–200 MSEK above the twelve month high point (usually funded through senior capital).
  - Values, including participants’ contributions, are formally recalculated on a quarterly basis.
  - Stress testing is conducted daily, on an end-of-day basis, using an internal model, Clearing Capital at Risk (CCaR).
  - Uses hypothetical and historical scenarios; does not apply ‘forward looking’ scenarios (but considers hypothetical scenarios sufficient).
- Treatment of client accounts:
  - Current practice excludes exposure to clients with individually segregated accounts when estimating exposure to a participant default (such accounts are aggregated and treated as a separate member).
  - The stressed exposure to a participant does include potential losses from affiliates and clients that use an omnibus account.
  - Recommendation: Take a more conservative approach to individual client segregated accounts in stress testing because excluding them assumes all such accounts would be ported in the event of the clearing participant’s default; review approach pending forthcoming EMIR review and potential international guidance.
- Escalation and responses:
  - If daily stress testing indicates pre-funded resources are insufficient or lower internal limits breached, the CRC would propose a solution; there is no ‘automatic response’.
  - Nasdaq Clearing has the right to call clearing participants for additional contributions between scheduled recalculations but would in most cases seek to cover deficits using its own capital.
  - Any stress-test results indicating a breach of pre-funded resources would be reported to the Board and FI.
- Risk tolerance and scenario generation:
  - The Board has defined a 99.9 percent confidence level to represent a ‘catastrophic’ or extreme but plausible event.
  - Hypothetical scenarios are generated by estimating individual parameters to the 99.9 percentile market movement and combining them, creating a ‘diversification effect’ that produces more extreme scenarios.
  - For non-diversified portfolios this diversification effect may not apply; Nasdaq Clearing relies on historical stress scenarios to cover such portfolios.
  - Nasdaq Clearing monitors participants’ portfolios quarterly to consider whether additional scenarios are required; large concentrated portfolios attract an additional concentration charge.
  - Recommendation: Review whether the 99.9 percent confidence level delivers sufficiently extreme outcomes in all cases and assess whether a more conservative risk tolerance is warranted where diversification effects do not apply.

### Default management
- Governance and objectives:
  - Rules and procedures for managing a participant default are established in the Rules and Regulations.
  - Decisions on declaration of default, management and communication are made by the Default Committee.
  - Objective: Close out and/or mitigate market risk of the defaulter’s positions while minimizing costs to participant default funds and the CCP.
- Processes:
  - Default management is tailored by asset class; for defaults affecting multiple services decisions are made by the Default Committee.
  - OTC IRD participants must advise Nasdaq Clearing regarding hedging strategy for a defaulting participant’s portfolio (a rotating group of three participants carries this responsibility).
  - OTC IRD participants are invited, though not required, to bid in auctions of defaulting OTC IRD portfolios.
  - Participant behavior affects the protection they receive when losses are allocated to the OTC loss-sharing pool.
  - Participants must take part in regular default fire drills.
  - The default management process for OTC IRD depends on active participation of OTC IRD participants and should be monitored as incentives change with market evolution.
- Porting and fire drills:
  - In a participant default, customer collateral and accounts may be transferred (ported) to a back-up clearing member; porting is typically least disruptive.
  - Nasdaq Clearing states on its website that clients are responsible for finding a back-up participant; back-up participants are not required but increase probability of porting.
  - Fire-drills:
    - Product-specific default fire drills are conducted at least annually.
    - For the fixed income asset class, default fire drills are conducted semi-annually and OTC IRD participants are required to take part.
    - Fire drills test close-out options, new products and processes; results are presented to the CRC, the MRC and the Board and feedback is sought from participants.
    - Nasdaq Clearing plans a fire-drill covering a default in both the commodities and the financial service later in 2016.
  - Recommendation: Further expand fire drills to test ability to handle porting in the event of default of a large client clearer and default of a clearing participant that provides additional services to the CCP (e.g., also a settlement bank).

### F. Liquidity Risk
- Recognized sources of liquidity risk: participant default (liquidity needs from market movement and/or settlement amounts), operational problems in a settlement bank, delivery failures and return of cash collateral.
- Liquidity model and coverage objectives:
  - Nasdaq Clearing has a liquidity model to measure and monitor stressed liquidity requirements and seeks to hold sufficient qualifying liquid resources (QLR) in each currency to cover the single largest expected stressed liquidity need (including the default of the participant and its affiliates and customers that would generate the largest liquidity exposure).
  - Seeks additional liquid resources in each currency to cover the additional liquidity requirement if the two largest exposures crystalize (including simultaneous default of the two largest participants with the largest liquidity exposure).
- Composition and diversification of QLR:
  - QLR include committed liquidity lines; cash and cash equivalents (overnight repos, cash on own accounts including cash at central banks and overnight cash deposits); and government securities available to sell with pre-arranged GMRA.
  - Nasdaq Clearing has committed liquidity lines with four commercial banks: three Nordic banks (with direct access to the Riksbank, and access to central banks in other relevant currencies); and a fourth international bank providing multicurrency committed liquidity.
  - Nasdaq Clearing gains comfort from the committed nature of the facilities and the diversity of the QLR pool.
- Risk and recommendation:
  - Risk remains regarding reliability of liquidity providers in times of stress given the concentrated Nordic banking system.
  - Recommendation: Continue ongoing work to expand the pool of providers outside Nordic banks.

*International Monetary Fund — SWEDEN (excerpt as provided)*

### 79.      Stress testing is used to estimate liquidity requirements due to market movements in

### cr17310 - 79.      Stress testing is used to estimate liquidity requirements due to market movements in

### Stress testing and liquidity estimation
- Stress testing is used to estimate liquidity requirements due to market movements in the event of a member default.
- Liquidity needs are estimated based on current positions and market scenarios over one and two-day horizons.
- The stressed scenarios are a sub-set of those simulated for the CCaR model.
- A twelve month lookback period is used to determine the ‘high point’ (i.e. the highest stressed liquidity need).
- Stressed liquidity needs from other sources of liquidity risk are estimated by scaling up the historical high point from the past 12 months.
- The scaling factor is linked roughly to Nasdaq Clearing’s 99.9 percent definition of ‘catastrophic’.
- Nasdaq Clearing considers that a twelve month look-back period is appropriate since the risk drivers (trading patterns, volatility, product features, and settlement arrangements) change over time.
- Nasdaq Clearing considers that a simulation approach would be too complex, relative to the materiality of the risks.

### Model refinements and recommendation for stress testing
- Nasdaq Clearing is currently conducting a review of the liquidity model to address the recommendations of the latest independent validation, including:
  - use of consistent risk scenarios in stress testing (i.e. on the same day);
  - extending the time horizon covered by the model (currently only two days);
  - including collateral liquidation in the scenario simulation;
  - changing the priority order of committed liquidity facilities versus highly liquid bonds.
- As Nasdaq Clearing refines its liquidity model, it should also:
  - consider whether it should use the full CCaR scenario set in estimating default liquidity requirements (and provide justification if it believes this is not necessary);
  - re-assess the approach to estimating stressed liquidity needs from other sources (in particular the basis for the 25 percent scaling factor and whether the twelve month historical look-back is sufficient).

### Recovery planning and capital arrangements
- Nasdaq Clearing’s RP suggests it currently has only a limited number of tools to address an actual liquidity shortfall, not all of which are certain to be available to the CCP.
- Nasdaq Clearing should ensure that its recovery tools are either supported in the Rules and Regulations, or backed by formal agreements, as appropriate.
- Nasdaq Clearing holds liquid net assets funded by equity to cover general business risks and orderly wind-down (as well as capital to cover operational and legal risk and investment risk). This capital is separate to capital that Nasdaq Clearing contributes to its default waterfall.
- Amount of capital held to cover general business risk is calculated in accordance with minimum requirements in EMIR, taking into account Nasdaq Clearing’s risk profile and its estimated wind-down time.
- Nasdaq Clearing also holds a 33 percent buffer on top of its regulatory capital; this buffer can be used to meet capital shortfalls from a range of sources, including replenishing capital Nasdaq Clearing contributes to the default waterfall.
- In the event that Nasdaq Clearing needed to raise additional capital, Nasdaq Clearing would request this from its parent company; Approval would also be required from the Nasdaq Group CFO.
  - This arrangement is not currently explicitly documented; Nasdaq Clearing plans to establish a formalized agreement in the context of its RP.

### Custody, investment risk, and treatment of investment losses
- Nasdaq Clearing seeks to hold assets provided by clearing participants at CSDs in accounts in Nasdaq Clearing’s own name; where this is not possible, assets are held with a commercial custodian.
- Custodians and CSDs must meet minimum requirements and are monitored by Nasdaq Clearing.
- Investment objective: minimize credit, market, concentration and liquidity risks; investments primarily direct purchases of government securities or investments collateralized with government securities.
- A smaller share of cash is held unsecured with commercial banks or central banks to accommodate operational requirements.
- Unsecured investments with commercial banks are limited to a maximum of 5 percent of the portfolio (on average over the month), as stipulated in EMIR.
- Investments with individual counterparties or categories of counterparty are subject to limits; restrictions prevent wrong-way risk and a maximum maturity limit is in place.
- Cash is invested in the same currency that it was lodged in.
- In the event of an investment loss:
  - the loss would be allocated to Nasdaq Clearing’s capital;
  - investment losses that exceed available capital would be treated as a capital shortfall, and dealt with under the RP.
- Under current arrangements, Nasdaq Clearing would seek to use its 33% capital buffer to absorb losses.
- Nasdaq Clearing has stated that the value of the capital buffer is around the same as the limit for unsecured investments with individual counterparties rated AA-.
- Recommendation: formalize the alignment between investment limits and the capital buffer (for example through its investment policy) and consider whether to limit unsecured investment with higher rated counterparties to available capital.

### Operational risk, outsourcing, and business continuity
- Much of the IT infrastructure on which Nasdaq Clearing operates is provided by other companies within Nasdaq Group; Nasdaq Group Risk Management provides support on business continuity management, crisis management, enterprise risk management, physical security and travel security.
- Responsibility for operational risk rests with the Board; the CEO, CRO and CTO of Nasdaq Clearing are responsible for ensuring independent operational risk controls.
- Critical service providers (functions provided by other Group companies) are governed by SLAs that include operational reliability objectives such as service availability targets and capacity requirements.
- Nasdaq Clearing monitors performance through quantitative reporting, quarterly service reviews and an annual review of the SLAs; escalation within the Group is possible if adequate service is not provided.
- Nasdaq Clearing is represented in the Nasdaq Group crisis management team.
- Recommendation: Nasdaq Clearing should consider including in its RP how it would continue its critical operations in the case of a crisis (including potential insolvency) at Nasdaq Group, in particular how it would ensure that staff and systems would continue to be available to Nasdaq Clearing.
- Recovery and testing specifics:
  - two-hour recovery time objective for all business critical functions and processes;
  - secondary site is currently located around 20km away from the primary site;
  - both sites are staffed, although with different capacities (the primary site for Nasdaq Clearing’s IT systems is its secondary site for staff);
  - a system failover can be performed from the primary to the secondary site without any need for staff relocation.
- Nasdaq Nordic conducts annual disaster recovery tests; participant involvement has been low:
  - During the October 2015 test, only five per cent of participants took part.
  - During 2016, testing will be mandatory as Nasdaq Clearing moves its operations to a new primary site.
- Recommendation: review whether all stakeholders that would be affected by a failover are participating in business continuity tests and consider posing more stringent requirements regarding participation.

### Cybersecurity and evolving standards
- Nasdaq Clearing has policies and procedures to monitor and manage cyber risk; the Board has oversight of information security related issues.
- Work is coordinated with Nasdaq Group via the Nasdaq Information Security Risk Committee, co-headed by the Nasdaq CIO and the CISO.
- Specialist staff and external consultants have been used; staff and systems are subject to testing regarding cyber vulnerabilities.
- Nasdaq Clearing is reviewing its SLAs to ensure information security requirements are appropriately reflected; internal controls are being benchmarked against the NIST standard.
- Recommendation: ensure controls and governance processes continue to evolve to meet industry best practice.

### Main gaps identified and consolidated recommendations
- Broad assessment: risk management at Nasdaq Clearing appears to be sound and comprehensive for areas covered and largely aligned with the requirements in the Principles.
- Significant enhancements needed to the RP; work is already underway and has been recognized by Swedish authorities and Nasdaq Clearing.
- Nasdaq Clearing should clarify how it would comprehensively handle shortfalls arising from credit, liquidity and investment risks.
- All recovery tools should be supported either in the Rules and Regulations or through formal agreements, where relevant.
- Documentation and formal approval by the Boards of Nasdaq Clearing and relevant affiliated companies will improve the reliability and implementability of plans, particularly where Nasdaq Clearing intends to rely on additional capital from its parent entity.
- Additional areas for development include elements of the CCP’s credit and liquidity stress testing models.
- Nasdaq Clearing should adopt objectives that explicitly support financial stability and other public interest considerations to ensure safety and financial stability are taken into account in future decision making.
- Nasdaq Clearing should continue to review its risk management approach in line with evolving industry best practice and regulatory guidance.

*cr17310 - 79.      Stress testing is used to estimate liquidity requirements due to market movements in (IMF).*

### Appendix II. FMI Landscape in Sweden

### Appendix II. FMI Landscape in Sweden

### Key statistics on FMIs in Sweden (Table 1)
- Source: CPMI Red Book (for RIX, Bankgirot and Euroclear Sweden); Nasdaq Clearing.
- RIX – volume of transactions (million):
  - 2014: 4.06
  - 2013: 3.81
  - 2012: 3.62
- RIX – value of transactions (SEK billion):
  - 2014: 117,537
  - 2013: 111,986
  - 2012: 124,454
- Bankgirot – volume of transactions (million):
  - 2014: 903
  - 2013: 850
  - 2012: 808
- Bankgirot – value of transactions (SEK billion):
  - 2014: 9,394
  - 2013: 9,044
  - 2012: 8,667
- Nasdaq Clearing – number of transactions (million):
  - Financials:
    - 2014: 11.69
    - 2013: 10.20
    - 2012: 10.09
  - Commodities:
    - 2014: 0.19
    - 2013: 0.14
    - 2012: 0.16
- Nasdaq Clearing – value of transactions (SEK billion):
  - Financials:
    - 2014: 28,699
    - 2013: 37,821
    - 2012: 41,393
  - Commodities:
    - 2014: 490
    - 2013: 484
    - 2012: 500
- Euroclear Sweden – number of delivery instructions (million):
  - 2014: 14
  - 2013: 13
  - 2012: 11
- Euroclear Sweden – value of delivery instructions (SEK billion):
  - 2014: 85,305
  - 2013: 92,946
  - 2012: 93,580
- Euroclear Sweden – value of securities held on accounts (SEK billion):
  - 2014: 9,070
  - 2013: 11,387
  - 2012: 10,342

### Nasdaq Clearing: Key statistics 2015 (Table 2)
- Source: Nasdaq Clearing.
- Members:
  - Financial Markets (total): 46
  - Of which foreign: 31
  - Commodities: 323
  - Of which foreign: 252
- Volume — Daily average (Notional Value):
  - Financial Markets (total): 72,068.4 (Daily average SEK billions: 130.9)
  - Equity derivatives:
    - Volume: 71,602.2 (Daily average SEK billions: 32.3)
    - Of which: Exchange traded: 100%
  - Fixed income derivatives:
    - Volume: 466.2 (Daily average SEK billions: 98.7)
    - Of which:
      - Exchange traded: 67.0%
      - OTC – interest rate: 1.4%
      - OTC – repo: 31.6%
  - Commodities:
    - Volume: 679.1 (Daily average SEK billions: 1.6)
    - Commodity derivatives:
      - Volume: 674.5 (Daily average SEK billions: 1.6)
      - Of which: Exchange traded: 100%
    - Seafood derivatives:
      - Volume: 4.6 (Daily average SEK billions: 0.02)
      - Of which: Exchange traded: 100%

### Nasdaq Clearing: Currency breakdown — Average Daily Value (Table 3)
- Source: Nasdaq Clearing.
- Currency breakdown (Average Daily Value, Notional Value in SEK equivalent):
  - SEK:
    - Equity: 32.3
    - Fixed income: 95.0
    - Commodities: 0.0
    - Seafood: -
    - Total (SEK): 127.3
    - Total (%): 96.0
  - EUR:
    - Equity: -
    - Fixed income: -
    - Commodities: 1.3
    - Seafood: -
    - Total (SEK): 1.3
    - Total (%): 1.0
  - USD:
    - Equity: -
    - Fixed income: -
    - Commodities: 0.3
    - Seafood: -
    - Total (SEK): 0.3
    - Total (%): 0.2
  - DKK:
    - Equity: -
    - Fixed income: 1.9
    - Commodities: -
    - Seafood: -
    - Total (SEK): 1.9
    - Total (%): 1.4
  - NOK:
    - Equity: -
    - Fixed income: 1.8
    - Commodities: -
    - Seafood: 0.02
    - Total (SEK): 1.82
    - Total (%): 1.4
  - Total:
    - Equity: 32.3
    - Fixed income: 98.7
    - Commodities: 1.6
    - Seafood: 0.02
    - Total (SEK): 132.62
    - Total (%): 100

### Overview of key laws applicable to FMI oversight and supervision (Appendix IV)
- Securities Market Act (2007):
  - Contains provisions on investment services, markets for securities trading, and clearing and settlement of securities trading.
  - Requires that firms conducting clearing operations not covered by EMIR or CSDR be authorized by FI.
  - Contains provisions requiring FMIs to provide information to FI.
  - Based on the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2004/39/EC).
  - Authority: FI.
  - Applicable FMIs: Euroclear Sweden, Bankgirot, Nasdaq Clearing.
- Central Securities Depositories and Financial Instruments Accounts Act (1998):
  - Contains provisions complementing CSDR and on the registration of ownership of financial instruments.
  - Requires that CSDs be authorized by FI.
  - Authority: FI.
  - Applicable FMI: Euroclear Sweden.
- Financial Instruments Trading Act (1991):
  - Regulates collateral issues set out in the Financial Collateral Directive (2002/47/EC).
  - Authority: FI.
  - Applicable FMIs: Euroclear Sweden, Nasdaq Clearing, RIX, Bankgirot.
- Sveriges Riksbank Act (1988):
  - Mandates that Riksbank has responsibility to promote a safe and efficient payments system.
  - Requires FMIs to provide information to Riksbank.
  - Establishes that Riksbank may make available systems for settlement of payments and may grant intraday credit to participants in the system against collateral.
  - Authority: Riksbank.
  - Applicable FMIs: Euroclear Sweden, Bankgirot, Nasdaq Clearing, RIX.
- Settlement Systems Act (1999):
  - Provides for finality of settlement of payments.
  - Based on the Settlement Finality Directive (1998/26/EC).
  - Applicable FMIs: Euroclear Sweden, Bankgirot, Nasdaq Clearing, RIX.
- Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR):
  - Regulation of CCPs and TRs and of the clearing obligation within the EU.
  - Establishes cooperative supervision colleges.
  - Under EMIR, FI is the competent authority for Nasdaq Clearing.
  - Authority: FI.
  - Applicable FMI: Nasdaq Clearing.
- Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 (CSDR):
  - Regulation of CSDs and SSS.
  - Authority: FI (In the future: Euroclear Sweden).

### Swedish authorities’ active cooperation agreements regarding FMI oversight (Appendix V)
- Source: Authorities’ response to FSAP questionnaire; FI and Riksbank 2014 internal audit.
- MoU between Government Offices, Sveriges Riksbank, FI and Swedish National Debt Office:
  - Authorities: FI and Riksbank
  - Type: Multilateral MoU
- Nasdaq Clearing College:
  - Authorities: FI and Riksbank
  - Type: EMIR College – Chaired by FI
- EuroCCP EMIR College:
  - Authorities: FI and Riksbank
  - Type: EMIR College – Chaired by Central bank of the Netherlands
- Euroclear Group:
  - Authorities: FI and Riksbank
  - Type: Multilateral MoU – Led by National Bank of Belgium
- LCH.Clearnet Ltd EMIR College:
  - Authority: FI
  - Type: EMIR college – Chaired by Bank of England
- LCH.Clearnet Ltd Global College:
  - Authority: Riksbank
  - Type: College – Chaired by Bank of England
- SWIFT Oversight Forum:
  - Authority: Riksbank
  - Type: Multilateral MoU – led by National Bank of Belgium
- CLS Oversight Committee:
  - Authority: Riksbank
  - Type: Multilateral protocol – led by Federal Reserve Bank of New York

### Responses to recommendations of 2011 FSAP (Appendix VI)
- Source: Sweden: Financial Sector Stability Assessment, July 2011, IMF Country Report No. 11/172, discussions with authorities.
- Key recommendations and responses:
  - Enhance NOMX DM’s risk management procedures and separate financial resources between NOMX DM and NOMX COM.
    - Response: There have been wide-ranging changes to Nasdaq Clearing’s risk management procedures since 2011.
  - Review relevant laws and regulations to address legal uncertainty related to settlement finality and collateralization procedures.
    - Response: Addressed by an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act (SFS 1987:672). No explicit provision for bankruptcy of non-Swedish participants; authorities state FMIs’ own legal analysis when accepting non-Swedish participants can manage the issue.
  - Review its Act to allow Riksbank to issue regulations and formalize division of responsibilities between Riksbank and FI.
    - Response: A project on increased security in the central payments system has been initiated to clarify Riksbank powers; no formal division of responsibilities exists, but cooperation arrangements aim to achieve efficient cooperation where responsibilities overlap.
- Other recommendations and responses (selected):
  - Publish additional information on the Riksbank’s oversight objectives and approach.
    - Response: Riksbank has published an oversight approach statement on its website and publishes an annual Financial Infrastructure report.
  - Formalize change assessments and consider lower frequency for full-scale assessments.
    - Response: FI and Riksbank have adopted a risk based approach to supervision and oversight of FMIs.
  - Take more straightforward positions when areas of concern are identified.
    - Response: Riksbank has taken steps to improve clarity, including through its annual Financial Infrastructure report.
  - Clarify with Norwegian authorities sharing of responsibilities and operationalize 2010 MOU for clearing activities.
    - Response: EMIR established FI as the NCA for Nasdaq Clearing; Norwegian and other Nordic authorities participate in the EMIR College for Nasdaq Clearing.
  - Enhance knowledge of activities conducted by NOMX COM due to possible spillovers.
    - Response: Structure of Nasdaq Clearing changed significantly since 2011 FSAP; FI is the NCA for Nasdaq Clearing, which includes both commodities and financial services.
  - Formalize routines and procedures of cooperation among authorities.
    - Response: Evidence of effective cooperation: joint meetings with FMIs, regular meetings at all levels, coordinated annual plans, joint work where appropriate.
  - Strengthen staffing resources with skills in quantitative analysis.
    - Response: FI has dedicated staff with quantitative skills; model validation is also conducted within the EMIR process, including through ESMA.
  - Implement a business recovery requirement of two hours for RIX.
    - Response: Addressed.
  - NOMX DM should set participation requirements for direct pledge end customers.
    - Response: Participation requirements for direct pledge customers were implemented.
  - NOMX DM should not accept bank guarantees as collateral.
    - Response: Bank guarantees not fully backed by collateral have been phased out as eligible collateral.
  - NOMX DM should implement ring-fenced capital bases for NOMX DM and NOMX COM.
    - Response: Nasdaq Clearing has pre-funded default resources to the ‘Cover 2’ standard and introduced three separate member default funds for each clearing ‘service’; at later stages losses are mutualized across services.
  - NOMX DM should raise number of liquidity providers and enable intraday liquidity with Riksbank.
    - Response: Nasdaq Clearing increased multicurrency liquidity lines to four: three with major Nordic banks and one with a bank outside the Nordic region. Nasdaq Clearing has access to intraday liquidity with the Riksbank.
  - Explore legal separation of clearing activities from trading activities.
    - Response: Clearing business has been separated from the exchange. Nasdaq Clearing conducts only clearing business.
  - NOMX DM should overhaul custodian arrangements and rely on CSDs.
    - Response: Nasdaq Clearing introduced a new collateral management system (CMS).
  - NOMX DM should consider restricting investments to highest rated securities (AAA).
    - Response: Nasdaq Clearing allows investments with lower credit rating than AAA, but imposes limits regarding investments rated below AAA.
  - NOMX DM should enhance member involvement through advisory committee.
    - Response: Nasdaq Clearing introduced a member risk committee as required under EMIR, and other stakeholder engagement mechanisms.

### Elements of Nasdaq Clearing’s credit and liquidity risk management (Appendix VII)
- A. Credit Risk — Margin and Default Resources
  - Margin:
    - At least daily variation margin.
    - Single tailed confidence level of at least 99.2 percent, depending on product.
    - Minimum close out of two days for listed derivatives and five days for OTC derivatives.
    - Data period of 10 years (in the event that this is not available, a pro-cyclicality buffer is added).
    - Intraday margin calls, covering both changes in positions and prices, are made in the event that pre-defined limits are breached.
    - Additional margin is collected on concentrated positions.
    - No portfolio margining between financial and commodity derivatives, or between seafood derivatives and other commodity derivatives.
    - Default waterfall for pre-funded and ex-post resources (Figure 1). Source: Nasdaq Clearing.
  - Default waterfall components:
    - Junior capital contribution from Nasdaq Clearing (skin in the game):
      - Nasdaq Clearing capital would be the first to absorb remaining losses if collateral lodged by the defaulting clearing participant(s) was insufficient.
      - A separate amount is contributed for each of the three services.
      - Junior capital must amount to at least 25 percent of ‘Regulatory Capital’ (as defined in EMIR); allocation across services reflects relative risk exposure.
    - Service-specific pre-funded default funds, funded by participant contributions:
      - Each service-specific default fund is sized to cover the larger of the default of the largest participant, or second and third largest participants (including affiliates and clients) combined, in extreme but plausible scenarios.
      - Each service-specific default fund is only available to cover default losses arising in that particular service.
      - Participant contributions are based on their proportion of initial margin for particular service, averaged over three months, subject to a minimum amount.
    - Loss-sharing pool specific to OTC interest rate derivatives:
      - Funded by contributions from participants that clear OTC interest rate products.
      - Purpose: provide incentives for participants that clear OTC interest rate derivatives to assist Nasdaq Clearing in managing a default involving these products.
      - The loss-sharing pool would be used first (after the junior capital contribution) in such a default event.
      - The size of pool is not taken into account when calculating the size of the default funds or total clearing capital.
    - Senior capital contribution from Nasdaq Clearing:
      - This layer may absorb losses across all services.
      - Sized to ensure total clearing capital will withstand the default of the two largest counterparties, across each service, in extreme but plausible market conditions (plus a buffer of around 100–200 million SEK).
      - Subject to a minimum value of SEK 100 million.
    - Mutualized default fund:
      - Can be used to absorb losses in the event of the default of a participant from any of the three services (mutualized across services).
      - Participants from each service contribute to the mutualized default fund.
      - The value of contributions is set at 15 percent of each participant’s contribution to the service specific default funds.
    - Assessments:
      - If pre-funded default resources are insufficient, Nasdaq Clearing has the right to call Assessments from non-defaulting clearing participants.
      - Assessments are capped at 100 percent of each participant’s contribution to each relevant service specific default fund.
      - Assessments are ‘service specific’ and may only be used to absorb losses in the relevant service.
- B. Liquidity Risk
  - Managed at the CCP as a whole (not service-by-service).
  - Assumes only daily cash settled products create liquidity pressures at default.
  - Two liquidity requirements — the ‘minimum requirement’ (MR) and the ‘additional requirement’ (AR) — based on estimated liquidity needs over a range of risk scenarios (Figure 2). Source: Zeb Consulting Validation report, 2015.
    - MR: the single largest liquidity need across any of the identified risk scenarios over the previous 12 months; includes the scenario where the participant (and its affiliates and customers) with the largest liquidity requirement for the CCP defaults in extreme but plausible conditions. Always includes liquidity needs from returning cash collateral.
    - AR: the sum of the worst and second worst scenario; includes the simultaneous default of two participants with the largest liquidity requirement for the CCP.
    - Nasdaq Clearing also maintains a liquidity buffer of 20 million SEK for stressed corporate needs.
  - Liquidity needs estimated for each currency cleared and in total; the largest liquidity needs are in SEK because the majority of contracts and cash settlements are denominated in SEK.
  - MR and AR are compared against available liquid resources:
    - Qualifying liquid resources (QLR) must exceed MR, with a buffer of 10 percent.
    - QLR are subject to a diversification requirement — at least 50 percent of MR must be covered by cash and cash equivalent, and committed liquidity facilities.
    - Additional liquid resources must exceed AR, with a buffer of 10 percent.
  - Nasdaq Clearing has intraday liquidity arrangements with all its settlement banks; these are not included in the QLR or ALR.

*Source: Appendix II. FMI Landscape in Sweden (cr17310 - Appendix II. FMI Landscape in Sweden).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2017/cr17310.pdf_
