## cr1786 - 1.3 percent in the medium term, driven by continued expansion in non-financial industries and

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### Outlook and growth prospects
- Staff projects growth of 1.3 percent in the medium term, driven by continued expansion in non-financial industries and services.
- On current trends, the pace of growth would not be strong enough to bring output to precrisis levels over the next five years.
- Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside.

### Key macroeconomic indicators (selected)
- GDP per capita (2015): 46,185 U.S. dollars
- Population (2016): 34,267 persons
- Life expectancy at birth (2011): 83.3 years
- Literacy, adult (2008): 96 percent
- Real GDP (percent change): 2013: -3.0; 2014: -0.9; 2015: 0.5; 2016: 1.0; 2017 (projection): 1.2
- Unemployment rate (average; percent): 2013: 8.1; 2014: 8.7; 2015: 9.2; 2016: 8.6; 2017 (projection): 8.0
- Inflation rate (average; percent): 2013: 1.3; 2014: 1.1; 2015: 0.1; 2016: 0.6; 2017 (projection): 0.7

### Public finances (central government) — selected indicators (percent of GDP)
- Revenues: 2013: 20.2; 2014: 22.5; 2015: 20.8; 2016: 22.1; 2017 (projection): 20.9
- Expenditure: 2013: 21.1; 2014: 21.7; 2015: 21.0; 2016: 22.7; 2017 (projection): 21.9
- Overall balance: 2013: -0.9; 2014: 0.8; 2015: -0.2; 2016: -0.6; 2017 (projection): -1.0
- Government debt: 2013: 20.8; 2014: 19.0; 2015: 19.7; 2016: 21.6; 2017 (projection): 21.8

### Financial soundness indicators (latest available)
- Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 2013: 13.6; 2014: 11.4; 2015: 12.7; 2016: 13.6
- Bad loans to total loans: 2013: 13.9; 2014: 16.1; 2015: 18.5; 2016: 18.7
- Loan loss provision to total loans: 2013: 26.7; 2014: 30.3; 2015: 28.6; 2016: 26.6
- Return on equity (ROE): 2013: -7.8; 2014: -21.4; 2015: -9.0; 2016: -10.5
- Liquid assets to total assets: 2013: 29.6; 2014: 32.4; 2015: 29.8; 2016: 29.5
- Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 2013: 60.6; 2014: 65.4; 2015: 58.9; 2016: 59.1

### Financial sector: diagnosis and recommended actions — Findings
- Banking system assets about 370 percent of GDP as of December 2016.
- The three largest banks account for about 70 percent of total bank assets and deposits.
- Reported capital adequacy ratio of the banking system was 13.6 percent in September 2016 after the recapitalization of Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino (CRSM).
- Gross NPLs about 43 percent of total loans (about 113 percent of GDP) at end-2016; about 36 percent net of provisions.
- NPL coverage ratio is relatively low at 26 percent.
- Net losses of about €47 million as of December 2016.
- Bank liquidity buffers cover about 60 percent of short-term liabilities and about 30 percent of total liabilities; buffers worsened slightly in the first half of 2016.
- About half of NPLs belong to nonresident clients; about half of loans are vis-à-vis nonresidents (mostly Italian); about a quarter of deposits are from nonresidents.

### Financial sector: diagnosis and recommended actions — Policy recommendations
- Complete the ongoing Asset Quality Review (AQR) of the banking system and follow with appropriate plans to repair bank balance sheets.
- Accelerate the resolution of NPLs by removing legal, regulatory, and tax obstacles.
- Anchor the restructuring strategy for CRSM on AQR findings and ensure any restructuring plans secure long-term viability.
- Strengthen bank oversight, including revamping supervision and developing a robust macroprudential framework.

### Traction on financial sector actions
- Authorities launched an AQR of all banks in November 2016.
- Central Bank completed an internal audit to enhance supervision and compliance and started collecting more granular information on NPLs.

### Budget outcome and near-term outlook
- 2016 budget points to a small deficit of about ½ percent of GDP, following a broadly balanced budget in 2015; drivers include increased infrastructure spending and spending related to early elections.
- Public debt as a share of GDP increased to 21½ percent at end-2016 (from 19.7 percent in 2015), reflecting mostly the recent recapitalization of CRSM.
- Banking sector vulnerabilities pose significant fiscal risks.

### Outlook and growth projections (summarized)
- GDP growth projections:
  - 2017: 1.2 percent.
  - Medium term: around 1¼ percent.
- Inflation: expected to remain low in the near term and only gradually rise in line with recovery in domestic demand and inflation in Italy.
- San Marino is not expected to reach the pre-2009 GDP level until the end-2020s.
- Drivers of growth expected to rotate from net exports towards domestic demand, especially consumption, with corporate profitability expected to improve gradually despite limited credit growth.

### Risks to the central scenario (tilted to the downside)
- Lingering weakness in the domestic banking system (high NPLs) could undermine credit provision and growth and could lead to loss of confidence if not addressed.
- Structurally weak growth in Italy and the euro area could slow San Marino through weakened external demand and deterioration in Sammarinese banks’ assets located in Italy.
- Upside: improved international relations could boost cross-border activity, growth, tax revenue, and banks’ profitability.

### Financial sector policy to restore stability — status and past measures
- Three closed funds were set up to deal with impaired assets of weak banks absorbed by other Sammarinese credit institutions.
- A tax credit (deferred tax asset, DTA) has been used since 2013 to facilitate transfers of assets and liabilities of significantly under-capitalized banks to healthy ones.
- Transferring NPLs to a closed fund reduces banks’ risk profile as investments in such funds carry a lower risk weight.
- Including the DTA in regulatory capital overstates banks’ financial soundness relative to Basel III and EU Capital Directive frameworks.
- Progress in NPL resolution has been slow, partly due to lack of common valuation criteria.

### CRSM recapitalization (2016) — operations and outcomes
- State subscribed CRSM tier-2 hybrid bond: €40 million (2.7 percent of GDP).
- Real estate revaluation: €13 million.
- €9 million reserve creation through merger of a state-controlled real estate company and the foundation into CRSM.
- These operations brought CRSM’s capital ratio to the minimum requirement of 11 percent.
- The state now holds about 46.5 percent of the share capital with rights to appoint a majority of the bank’s board members.
- The state has injected €220 million (about 16 percent of GDP) in efforts to rescue the bank, making it the majority shareholder.
- CRSM’s NPLs remain high, with a large part originating from Italian assets held by Delta, CRSM’s liquidated subsidiary in Italy; CRSM’s 2016 business plan was optimistic with key targets lagging.

### Financial sector policy to restore stability — Recommended multifaceted approach
- Repair banks’ balance sheets via an AQR applying common asset valuation standards; market-based recapitalization if shortfalls arise, with safeguards (no dividend payments, strengthened governance).
- Limit state support to systemic banks subject to appropriate reorganization plans; resolve other banks that cannot meet solvency requirements within a reasonable period.
- Upgrade legal framework to international standards, including introducing a permanent bank resolution framework in the medium term.
- Manage NPLs: AQR should clarify target provisions, facilitate transfers of NPLs off banks’ balance sheets, and unlock the market for distressed assets; enforce collateral, consider selective write-downs of fully-provisioned bad loans; include quarterly targets for NPL operations in banks’ business plans.
- Explore outsourcing arrangements with distressed assets companies active in Italy to reduce high operating costs of NPL management outside San Marino.
- Remove tax and regulatory disincentives to NPL disposals and consider opening the real estate market to nonresidents to support collateral valuations.
- Enhance insolvency regime effectiveness (including pre-insolvency and out-of-court procedures) and launch the credit registry to increase transparency and reduce strategic defaults.
- Strengthen coordination between the central bank (CBSM) and the government; plan and prepare to deal with possible AQR outcomes, including developing crisis response capability.

### Supervision and macroprudential framework — recommended actions
- Improve data collection and harmonize NPL definitions with international standards.
- Launch the credit registry.
- Strengthen monitoring of bank lending standards through regular surveys and capacity to monitor systemic risks.
- Regular publication of a short, well-targeted financial stability report in Italian and English is suggested.
- Appropriate institutional arrangements, including a streamlined mandate and independence of the CBSM, are important.

### Authorities’ views on banking measures
- Authorities view the ongoing AQR as crucial and are preparing to address capital, viability, and governance issues; prepared to support NPL resolution with legislative reforms (insolvency, securitization, resolution); work underway to launch a credit registry and enhance supervision and compliance.

### Banking sector indicators (Loans to Customers, 2016, Percent)
- Performing loans: 51%
- Bad loans: 18%
- Problem loans: 7%
- Restructured loans: 23%
- Past due and overdue: 0%
- Unsecured to countries at risk: 1%

### Fiscal policy to safeguard sustainability and rebuild buffers — constraints and near-term financing
- Fiscal policy is the main tool to stabilize the economy but is constrained by limited access to financing.
- Pre-2008–09 fiscal surpluses were saved as accumulated government deposits that reached 16 percent of GDP; these buffers are now almost depleted.
- 2017 budget envisages a small deficit of 1 percent of GDP; it is under review by the new government.
- Revenue expected to decline mainly due to lower fees and one-off collections.
- Capital spending expected to be around 2 percent of GDP, financed by bond issuance of €10 million annually for 2017–18.
- Government debt as a share of GDP is projected to increase slightly in the coming years assuming no further bank recapitalization needs.
- Authorities plan to prepare a revised budget by mid-year to reflect policy priorities and lower the deficit.

### Fiscal adjustment path and targets (quantified)
- Gradual fiscal adjustment should start in 2017 assuming continued recovery.
- Aim: achieve a small surplus of ½ percent of GDP by 2019 to allow fiscal buffers to increase to around 3–4 percent of GDP (or equivalently reduce debt to 19 percent) by 2021.
- Policy actions:
  - Expenditure cuts of 0.2 percent of GDP (relative to the baseline) should start immediately.
  - Additional adjustment of 0.3 percent of GDP through increased revenue starting in 2018.
  - Focus on tax policy measures given relatively low tax revenues and high needs for pro-growth, pro-employment investment.

### VAT recommendation and tax policy
- Authorities should introduce a Value Added Tax (VAT) by end-2017; considerable preparatory work has been made, including draft legislation for the VAT regime.
- Draft legislation envisaged introduction of a VAT with a standard rate of 12 percent and reduced rate of 5 percent after a transitional period of 5-6 years.
- The introduction of the VAT was meant to be revenue-neutral as it would replace the 3 percent service tax paid by service businesses and a standard 17 percent import tax.
- The VAT rate should be set to increase revenue while accounting for spending priorities; additional tax revenues will be needed for further investment increases.
- Tax collection efforts should be stepped up to improve compliance and collection.

### Spending-side measures
- Improve spending quality and reallocate spending to more growth-friendly categories; authorities’ intention to increase capital investment is appropriate.
- Consider expanding education and vocational training.
- Expenditure consolidation should come from lower current spending; modest reduction in the wage bill should be explored given its high share in current spending versus euro area peers.
- Consider rationalization of health care spending.
- Authorities are assessing pension reform proposals with a view to implementing them by end-2017; ensuring the social security fund is self-financed would allow reallocation of resources.

### Contingent liabilities and stress scenario
- If contingent liabilities from the banking system were to materialize and some costs were borne by the state, public debt could rise significantly.
- Illustration: a contingent liability shock of 30 percent of GDP would increase public debt to 51 percent of GDP and set it on an upward trajectory under current policies; a more ambitious fiscal adjustment would be required in that scenario.

### Access to external financing
- Establishing access to external financing (including an external private placement or syndicated loan) while advancing fiscal sustainability would enhance the government’s ability to respond to shocks.
- Market access would introduce market discipline, diversify funding sources, and help break the bank-sovereign loop.
- To the extent external financing is available, the need to hold sizable deposit buffers would decline and such buffers could be used only when market access is limited.

### Fiscal policy and rebuilding buffers — authorities’ commitments
- Authorities are working on a revised budget to reflect priorities and reduce the deficit to be adopted by June/July this year.
- Commitment to pursue pro-growth fiscal policies to revive growth while starting to rebuild buffers gradually.
- Recommendation: a gradual fiscal adjustment starting this year, targeting a modest surplus by 2019.
- Quantified path: an annual, phased reduction of deficit by about ½ percent of GDP in coming years.
- Key fiscal measures highlighted:
  - Introduction of a VAT system by the end of this year to play a key role in adjustment.
  - Contain public wage bill and reform the pension system.
- Caveat: potential fiscal contingencies related to banks’ public recapitalization needs remain significant; if realized, a deeper fiscal adjustment would be needed and the authorities should be ready to take additional measures.

### Structural reforms to increase growth potential and business environment
- Progress to date:
  - High-tech business incubator established to facilitate a scientific and technological park.
  - Simple and fast online process to establish a business put in place.
  - Labor market adjustments, including exempting small high-tech businesses in the incubator from slow procedures to hire skilled nonresident workers.
  - Measures supported activity in manufacturing with an increasing number of new firms and employment.
- Priority reforms under consideration:
  - Introduce a one-stop-shop for businesses to simplify administration.
  - Further streamline procedures to hire nonresidents.
  - Reform insolvency and debt restructuring regimes and improve availability of credit.
  - Measures to improve productivity, including enhancing vocational training.
- Guiding principle: reforms should improve efficiency and avoid distortions and additional fiscal costs.
- Expected outcome: diversification beyond the financial sector, supporting growth in industrial and services sectors.

### Financial sector, banking challenges, and oversight — priorities
- Vulnerabilities in the banking system continue to hamper medium-term growth prospects.
- Ongoing AQR is important to restore banking system health and needs to be followed by efforts to repair banks’ balance sheets.
- Recommended actions:
  - Deal with capital shortfalls via market-based solutions, restructuring, or resolution; limit state support to systemic banks and make it contingent on reorganization plans.
  - Credible strategy for CRSM should be guided by AQR findings and ensure long-term viability based on realistic assumptions.
  - Strategy to significantly reduce high stock of NPL over the medium term, including supportive regulatory, tax and legal reforms.
  - Plan and prepare for possible AQR outcomes by upgrading the legal framework and enhancing inter-governmental coordination.

### Strengthening oversight
- Revamp bank supervision and develop a robust macroprudential framework.
- Use the completed internal audit of the central bank as a basis to enhance supervision and compliance.
- Identify and close data and regulatory gaps and develop capacity to monitor systemic risks.
- Produce a regular financial stability report to communicate CBSM’s financial sector assessment and policy intentions.
- Streamline mandate and ensure independence of the CBSM.

### International cooperation and liquidity access
- Engagement in international cooperation remains crucial.
- Recent steps:
  - AML/CFT national risk assessment completed last year; authorities encouraged to implement the AML/CFT Action plan.
  - Multidisciplinary group established in July 2016 to discuss BEPS measures implementation.
- Recommended actions:
  - Continue to build cooperation across Europe and beyond, including continued negotiations with the European Union on an association agreement.
  - Explore ways to gain access to ECB liquidity facilities to help domestic banks against potential liquidity shocks (Note: currently, there is no legal basis for such access to ECB credit operations).
  - In promoting investment, consider tapping expertise of the EBRD and IFC.

### Data provision and transparency
- Current weaknesses: gaps in data coverage and timeliness primarily in balance of payments, national accounts and to a lesser extent public finance statistics; some high frequency indicators available but accessibility relatively limited.
- Recommendation: strengthen data provision — timeliness, availability, and accessibility — and disseminate data in an easily accessible online format.
- Authorities should consider allocating more resources to improve data provision and set this as a key priority in the reform agenda.

### Authorities’ stated views on reforms and labor market
- Considering near-term labor market reforms, including internationalization of the labor market and labor contract reforms, with caution to avoid new distortions.
- Labor market reforms will consider small domestic market size and need to create employment for the internal labor force.
- Emphasis on internationalization across Europe and beyond to achieve higher growth potential.
- Acknowledged need to improve data availability and timeliness to improve policymaking and transparency.

### Staff appraisal — key findings and recommendations
- Macroeconomic context:
  - Slow recovery after a long recession; growth returned in 2015 with continued recovery in 2016, but expected to be subdued and insufficient to restore output to pre-crisis levels within the next decade.
  - Existing buffers almost depleted and no access to external financing; limited fiscal space to respond to shocks and mobilize resources for pro-growth spending.
  - External position moderately weaker than fundamentals and desired policy.
- Reform agenda: developing a comprehensive, medium-term growth strategy with prioritization and sequencing is key given binding capacity and resource constraints.
- Banking sector priority: address banking challenges decisively; reduce NPLs; ensure bank oversight and macroprudential framework strengthened.
- Fiscal recommendation: phased deficit reduction of about ½ percent of GDP annually to reach modest surplus by 2019; VAT introduction by end of this year; contain wage bill and reform pensions.
- External financing: authorities should start exploring external financing options to enhance shock response capacity, diversify funding sources, and help break bank-sovereign loop.
- Structural reforms: continue improving business environment and labor market flexibility while avoiding distortions and fiscal costs.
- International cooperation: maintain focus on cooperation and transparency; implement AML/CFT Action Plan and pursue EU association agreement negotiations.
- Data provision: strengthen data as a key goal in reform agenda.
- Procedural recommendation: next Article IV consultations with the Republic of San Marino be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Box: Economic Crisis in San Marino — selected statistics and chronology
- San Marino has lost a third of the country’s output since 2008.
- Banking sector assets have fallen by more than 200 percent of GDP since then.
- Between 2000 and 2008, credit growth averaged at around 20 percent.
- Key shocks beginning in 2008 included:
  - Increased international scrutiny on tax havens; 2008 MONEYVAL critical AML/CFT assessment; 2009 OECD “gray list” placement.
  - Italian tax amnesty in 2009 and reporting obligations in 2010 led to massive deposit outflows, reducing bank liabilities by a third.
  - CRSM was hit by losses from investments and advances to Delta when Italian authorities seized Delta’s assets and put it into liquidation.
  - Global financial crisis weakened external demand and increased nonperforming loans.
- Post-crisis adjustments: increased transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes; OECD and Italy included San Marino in their white lists; bilateral economic cooperation agreement with Italy entered into force in January 2015; negotiations (with Andorra and Monaco) on an association agreement with the EU started in early 2015.

### Box 2. Managing and Resolving Nonperforming Loans (NPLs) — NPL stock and recent developments
- The gross NPLs to customers have increased sharply from 15 percent of total loans to customers in 2010 to above 50 percent in 2015, equivalent to 125 percent of GDP.
- NPLs to banks are currently below one percent of total loans to banks.
- Banks increased forbearance and the restructuring of loans (the restructured loans category, however, mostly reflects banks’ exposure to the Delta group).
- Lower-quality tiers of NPLs have also increased.
- Banks have continued restructuring, bad loan write-offs, and selected securitization of NPLs, in part supported by the incipient economic recovery. As a result, the NPL ratio has improved slightly in 2016.

### Box 2 — Impact on profitability and impediments to resolution
- The surge in NPLs has dented operating profits by reduced net interest income and increased expenses, and through increased other administrative costs, write-downs, and provisioning.
- Noninterest and extraordinary income provided some buffer, but losses across the banking sector have continued through 2016, albeit gradually diminishing.
- Key impediments:
  - Banks manage their NPLs internally in closed funds because difficulties in agreeing common valuation criteria for transferred assets so far precluded finding a system-wide solution for NPLs.
  - Legal obstacles to managing and resolving nonresident NPLs (75% of NPLs) that are secured by collateral mostly in Italy increase administrative costs.
  - The Sammarinese property market is not very active and lacks potential buyers, impeding timely and effective debt recovery.
  - Slightly more than one-third of NPLs are collateralized, about half of which by real estate (a quarter of which located abroad).

### Box 2 — Policy recommendations and operational measures
- Seek a system-wide solution (once common valuation criteria can be agreed) to reduce administrative costs through economies of scale.
- Address legal obstacles to managing and resolving nonresident NPLs secured by collateral mostly in Italy.
- A gradual opening of the real estate market to nonresidents could reinvigorate the debt recovery process.
- Banks should update their NPL resolution plans by setting quarterly targets for loan restructuring, cure rate, cash collection, and operating expenses.
- Continued loan restructuring, bad loan write-offs, and selected securitization of NPLs have taken place, supported in part by the incipient economic recovery.

### Annex II. Debt Sustainability Analysis — Baseline scenario (selected)
- Real GDP growth reaching at 1.3 percent in the medium term.
- The overall balance is projected to remain at a small deficit of around -0.2 percent of GDP.
- The primary balance is projected to be broadly balanced in the medium term.
- Public debt projected to stabilize at around 21 percent of GDP by 2021.
- Gross financing needs expected to remain stable at around 9–10 percent of GDP during the projection period.

### Annex II — Selected projected indicators (DSA figures)
- Nominal gross public debt: 16.6 (2014), 19.0 (2015), 19.7 (2016), 21.6 (2017), 21.8 (2018), 22.0 (2019), 21.6 (2020), 21.3 (2021), 21.3 (projection).
- Public gross financing needs: 3.8 (2014), 7.4 (2015), 4.1 (2016), 5.4 (2017), 7.6 (2018), 7.2 (2019), 6.5 (2020), 6.0 (2021), 5.8 (projection).
- Real GDP growth (in percent): -6.0 (2014), -0.9 (2015), 0.5 (2016), 1.0 (2017), 1.2 (2018), 1.3 (2019), 1.3 (2020), 1.3 (2021), 1.3 (projection).
- Effective interest rate (in percent): 0.7 (2014), 1.0 (2015), 1.2 (2016), 1.2 (2017), 1.8 (2018), 2.1 (2019), 2.4 (2020), 2.8 (2021), 3.0 (projection).
- Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants: 19.7 (2014), 22.5 (2015), 20.8 (2016), 22.1 (2017), 20.9 (2018), 20.8 (2019), 20.5 (2020), 20.4 (2021), 20.4 (cumulative 2014-21: 125.1).
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure: 21.4 (2014), 21.5 (2015), 20.8 (2016), 22.4 (2017), 21.6 (2018), 21.2 (2019), 20.2 (2020), 20.2 (2021), 20.2 (cumulative 2014-21: 125.9).
- Change in gross public sector debt (2014–21 cumulative): 1.5 (cumulative).

### Annex II — Stress tests and impacts (highlights)
- Real GDP growth shock (one standard deviation, 4.9 percent lower than baseline during 2017–18): debt-to-GDP ratio rises to 29 percent in 2018 (about 7 percentage points higher than baseline) and stays elevated afterwards.
- Primary balance shock (primary deficit widens by 0.7 percent of GDP in 2017–18): debt-to-GDP ratio is 2 percentage points higher than baseline during 2018-21.
- Real interest rate shock (nominal interest rate increases by 150 basis points during 2017–21): debt-to-GDP ratio remains the same as baseline with a slight upward trend in 2020–21.
- Real exchange rate shock (real exchange rate depreciates by 13 percent in 2017): negligible impact on debt-to-GDP trajectory.
- Combined shock (Real GDP, Primary balance, Real interest rate): debt-to-GDP approaches 29 percent in 2018 and stabilizes around 30 percent by 2021.
- Contingent liabilities shock (30 percent of GDP materializes in 2017): debt-to-GDP increases to 51 percent in 2017 and reaches 56 percent by 2021 under unchanged fiscal policy; such dynamics may be unsustainable given limited access to external financing.

### Annex V. Reserve Adequacy — Fiscal reserves and key figures
- Fiscal reserves rule of thumb: cover at least one month of spending.
- One month of spending in San Marino implies about €25 million (1.8 percent of GDP).
- Current government deposits are just at one month of spending.
- Staff recommendation: rebuild fiscal buffers; note government deposits may also be used as bank backstops and not fully correspond to fiscal reserves.

### Annex V — Emergency liquidity and liquidity metrics
- First line of defense: banks’ own liquid assets.
- Ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 60 percent.
- Banks’ liquid assets cover about 155 percent of nonresident deposits as of August 2016.
- Banks hold reserves valued at about €88 million at the CBSM (4 percent reserve requirement).
- Institutional constraint: CBSM’s ability to provide liquidity assistance is constrained due to euroization; no legal basis for access to Eurosystem liquidity.
- Staff recommendation: improve institutional framework for the LOLR function and explore feasibility of access to Eurosystem liquidity.

### San Marino and BEPS
- San Marino recently joined the OECD’s new inclusive framework to tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).
- A multidisciplinary group of authorities was established to facilitate implementation of the BEPS package.

*International Monetary Fund. Staff report for the 2017 Article IV consultation with the Republic of San Marino.*

### 1.3 percent in the medium term, driven by continued expansion in non-financial industries and

### cr1786 - 1.3 percent in the medium term, driven by continued expansion in non-financial industries and 

### Outlook and growth prospects
- Staff projects growth of 1.3 percent in the medium term, driven by continued expansion in non-financial industries and services.
- On current trends, the pace of growth would not be strong enough to bring output to precrisis levels over the next five years.
- Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside.

### Key macroeconomic indicators (selected)
- GDP per capita (2015): 46,185 U.S. dollars
- Population (2016): 34,267 persons
- Life expectancy at birth (2011): 83.3 years
- Literacy, adult (2008): 96 percent

- Real GDP (percent change): 2013: -3.0; 2014: -0.9; 2015: 0.5; 2016: 1.0; 2017 (projection): 1.2
- Unemployment rate (average; percent): 2013: 8.1; 2014: 8.7; 2015: 9.2; 2016: 8.6; 2017 (projection): 8.0
- Inflation rate (average; percent): 2013: 1.3; 2014: 1.1; 2015: 0.1; 2016: 0.6; 2017 (projection): 0.7

- Public finances (percent of GDP), central government:
  - Revenues: 2013: 20.2; 2014: 22.5; 2015: 20.8; 2016: 22.1; 2017 (projection): 20.9
  - Expenditure: 2013: 21.1; 2014: 21.7; 2015: 21.0; 2016: 22.7; 2017 (projection): 21.9
  - Overall balance: 2013: -0.9; 2014: 0.8; 2015: -0.2; 2016: -0.6; 2017 (projection): -1.0
  - Government debt: 2013: 20.8; 2014: 19.0; 2015: 19.7; 2016: 21.6; 2017 (projection): 21.8

- Financial soundness indicators (latest available):
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 2013: 13.6; 2014: 11.4; 2015: 12.7; 2016: 13.6
  - Bad loans to total loans: 2013: 13.9; 2014: 16.1; 2015: 18.5; 2016: 18.7
  - Loan loss provision to total loans: 2013: 26.7; 2014: 30.3; 2015: 28.6; 2016: 26.6
  - Return on equity (ROE): 2013: -7.8; 2014: -21.4; 2015: -9.0; 2016: -10.5
  - Liquid assets to total assets: 2013: 29.6; 2014: 32.4; 2015: 29.8; 2016: 29.5
  - Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 2013: 60.6; 2014: 65.4; 2015: 58.9; 2016: 59.1

### Financial sector: diagnosis and recommended actions
Findings
- Banking system assets about 370 percent of GDP as of December 2016.
- The three largest banks account for about 70 percent of total bank assets and deposits.
- Reported capital adequacy ratio of the banking system was 13.6 percent in September 2016 after the recapitalization of Cassa di Risparmio della Repubblica di San Marino (CRSM).
- Gross NPLs about 43 percent of total loans (about 113 percent of GDP) at end-2016; about 36 percent net of provisions.
- NPL coverage ratio is relatively low at 26 percent.
- Net losses of about €47 million as of December 2016.
- Bank liquidity buffers cover about 60 percent of short-term liabilities and about 30 percent of total liabilities; buffers worsened slightly in the first half of 2016.
- About half of NPLs belong to nonresident clients; about half of loans are vis-à-vis nonresidents (mostly Italian); about a quarter of deposits are from nonresidents.

Policy recommendations
- Complete the ongoing Asset Quality Review (AQR) of the banking system and follow with appropriate plans to repair bank balance sheets.
- Accelerate the resolution of NPLs by removing legal, regulatory, and tax obstacles.
- Anchor the restructuring strategy for CRSM on AQR findings and ensure any restructuring plans secure long-term viability.
- Strengthen bank oversight, including revamping supervision and developing a robust macroprudential framework.

Traction
- Authorities launched an AQR of all banks in November 2016.
- Central Bank completed an internal audit to enhance supervision and compliance and started collecting more granular information on NPLs.

### Fiscal policy: current stance and recommendations
Findings
- Public debt and deficit have been relatively low but public finances have limited space to respond to shocks given limited buffers and no access to external financing.
- Fiscal deficits contained; some increase in public investment expected in 2016 onward.

Policy recommendations
- Rebuild fiscal buffers through a gradual fiscal adjustment targeting a modest surplus by 2019.
- Introduce a VAT system with a revenue-increasing rate.
- Implement pension reforms to contain pension spending over the medium-term.
- Contain the public wage bill.
- Prepare contingency plans for potential fiscal costs related to bank balance sheet repair.
- Continue efforts to establish sovereign access to external financing to diversify funding sources and break the bank-sovereign loop.

### Structural reforms and other policies
Findings
- A moderate recovery underway, supported by increasing number of new firms and rising employment; still considerable challenges to restore financial stability, create fiscal space, and achieve sustainable growth.
- High-frequency indicators: expansion of enterprises through Q3 2016, especially manufacturing (about one third of total employment); wholesale and retail sectors expanding; car registrations increased since mid-2015; construction approvals leveled off.
- Unemployment declined to 8.5 percent in December 2016 after peaking at 10 percent in February 2016.
- CPI inflation low; core inflation close to 0.5 percent (September 2016).

Policy recommendations
- Improve the business environment and increase labor market flexibility to reallocate resources to nonbank sectors.
- Maintain focus on international cooperation and implement the AML/CFT Action Plan following the 2016 AML/CFT national risk assessment.
- Invest in long-term education and vocational training.
- Strengthen data provision to enhance transparency and facilitate more informed decision-making.

### Executive Board and Directors’ views
- Directors welcomed the ongoing recovery but noted the challenging outlook.
- Emphasized rehabilitating the banking system, dealing with very high NPLs, and the importance of the AQR.
- Endorsed a multifaceted approach: repair bank balance sheets based on AQR results; remove obstacles to NPL resolution (regulatory, tax, legal); strengthen oversight.
- Supported gradual fiscal adjustment aiming for a modest surplus by 2019 and noted the role of tax policy, particularly VAT introduction.
- Supported diversification efforts, business environment improvements, labor market flexibility, and long-term investments in education and vocational training.
- Encouraged implementation of the AML/CFT Action Plan and strengthening data provision.

*International Monetary Fund. Staff report for the 2017 Article IV consultation with the Republic of San Marino.*

### 8.      A small budget deficit is expected in 2016.

### 8.      A small budget deficit is expected in 2016.

### Budget outcome and near-term outlook
- 2016 budget points to a small deficit of about ½ percent of GDP, following a broadly balanced budget in 2015; drivers include increased infrastructure spending and spending related to early elections.
- Public debt as a share of GDP increased to 21½ percent at end-2016 (from 19.7 percent in 2015), reflecting mostly the recent recapitalization of CRSM.
- Banking sector vulnerabilities pose significant fiscal risks.

### Outlook and growth projections
- GDP growth projections:
  - 2017: 1.2 percent.
  - Medium term: around 1¼ percent.
- Inflation: expected to remain low in the near term and only gradually rise in line with recovery in domestic demand and inflation in Italy.
- Pace of growth is well below what is needed to regain the lost ground since 2009; San Marino is not expected to reach the pre-2009 GDP level until the end-2020s.
- Drivers of growth are expected to rotate from net exports towards domestic demand, especially consumption, supported by employment growth; corporate profitability expected to improve gradually and finance modest recovery in investment despite limited credit growth.

### Risks to the central scenario (tilted to the downside)
- Lingering weakness in the domestic banking system (high NPLs) could undermine credit provision and growth and could lead to loss of confidence if not addressed.
- Structurally weak growth in Italy and the euro area could slow San Marino through weakened external demand and deterioration in Sammarinese banks’ assets located in Italy.
- Upside: improved international relations could boost cross-border activity, growth, tax revenue, and banks’ profitability.

### Financial sector policy to restore stability
- Status and past measures:
  - Three closed funds were set up to deal with impaired assets of weak banks absorbed by other Sammarinese credit institutions.
  - A tax credit (deferred tax asset, DTA) has been used since 2013 to facilitate transfers of assets and liabilities of significantly under-capitalized banks to healthy ones.
  - Transferring NPLs to a closed fund reduces banks’ risk profile as investments in such funds carry a lower risk weight.
  - Including the DTA in regulatory capital overstates banks’ financial soundness relative to Basel III and EU Capital Directive frameworks.
  - Progress in NPL resolution has been slow, partly due to lack of common valuation criteria.
- CRSM recapitalization (2016):
  - State subscribed CRSM tier-2 hybrid bond: €40 million (2.7 percent of GDP).
  - Real estate revaluation: €13 million.
  - €9 million reserve creation through merger of a state-controlled real estate company and the foundation into CRSM.
  - These operations brought CRSM’s capital ratio to the minimum requirement of 11 percent.
  - The state now holds about 46.5 percent of the share capital with rights to appoint a majority of the bank’s board members.
  - The state has injected €220 million (about 16 percent of GDP) in efforts to rescue the bank, making it the majority shareholder.
  - CRSM’s NPLs remain high, with a large part originating from Italian assets held by Delta, CRSM’s liquidated subsidiary in Italy; CRSM’s 2016 business plan was optimistic with key targets lagging.
- Recommended multifaceted approach:
  - Repair banks’ balance sheets via an AQR applying common asset valuation standards; market-based recapitalization if shortfalls arise, with safeguards (no dividend payments, strengthened governance).
  - Limit state support to systemic banks subject to appropriate reorganization plans; resolve other banks that cannot meet solvency requirements within a reasonable period.
  - Upgrade legal framework to international standards, including introducing a permanent bank resolution framework in the medium term.
  - Manage NPLs: AQR should clarify target provisions, facilitate transfers of NPLs off banks’ balance sheets, and unlock the market for distressed assets; enforce collateral, consider selective write-downs of fully-provisioned bad loans; include quarterly targets for NPL operations in banks’ business plans.
  - Explore outsourcing arrangements with distressed assets companies active in Italy to reduce high operating costs of NPL management outside San Marino.
  - Remove tax and regulatory disincentives to NPL disposals and consider opening the real estate market to nonresidents to support collateral valuations.
  - Enhance insolvency regime effectiveness (including pre-insolvency and out-of-court procedures) and launch the credit registry to increase transparency and reduce strategic defaults.
  - Strengthen coordination between the central bank (CBSM) and the government; plan and prepare to deal with possible AQR outcomes, including developing crisis response capability.
- Supervision and macroprudential framework:
  - Improve data collection and harmonize NPL definitions with international standards.
  - Launch the credit registry.
  - Strengthen monitoring of bank lending standards through regular surveys and capacity to monitor systemic risks.
  - Regular publication of a short, well-targeted financial stability report in Italian and English is suggested.
  - Appropriate institutional arrangements, including a streamlined mandate and independence of the CBSM, are important.
- Authorities’ views on banking measures:
  - Authorities view the ongoing AQR as crucial and are preparing to address capital, viability, and governance issues; prepared to support NPL resolution with legislative reforms (insolvency, securitization, resolution); work underway to launch a credit registry and enhance supervision and compliance.

### Banking sector indicators (Loans to Customers, 2016, Percent)
- Performing loans: 51%
- Bad loans: 18%
- Problem loans: 7%
- Restructured loans: 23%
- Past due and overdue: 0%
- Unsecured to countries at risk: 1%

### Fiscal policy to safeguard sustainability and rebuild buffers
- Fiscal position and constraints:
  - Fiscal policy is the main tool to stabilize the economy but is constrained by limited access to financing.
  - Pre-2008–09 fiscal surpluses were saved as accumulated government deposits that reached 16 percent of GDP; these buffers are now almost depleted.
- 2017 budget and near-term financing:
  - 2017 budget envisages a small deficit of 1 percent of GDP; it is under review by the new government.
  - Revenue expected to decline mainly due to lower fees and one-off collections.
  - Capital spending expected to be around 2 percent of GDP, financed by bond issuance of €10 million annually for 2017–18.
  - Government debt as a share of GDP is projected to increase slightly in the coming years assuming no further bank recapitalization needs.
  - Authorities plan to prepare a revised budget by mid-year to reflect policy priorities and lower the deficit.
- Fiscal adjustment path and targets:
  - Gradual fiscal adjustment should start in 2017 assuming continued recovery.
  - Aim: achieve a small surplus of ½ percent of GDP by 2019 to allow fiscal buffers to increase to around 3–4 percent of GDP (or equivalently reduce debt to 19 percent) by 2021.
  - Policy actions:
    - Expenditure cuts of 0.2 percent of GDP (relative to the baseline) should start immediately.
    - Additional adjustment of 0.3 percent of GDP through increased revenue starting in 2018.
    - Focus on tax policy measures given relatively low tax revenues and high needs for pro-growth, pro-employment investment.
  - VAT recommendation:
    - Authorities should introduce a Value Added Tax (VAT) by end-2017; considerable preparatory work has been made, including draft legislation for the VAT regime.
    - Draft legislation envisaged introduction of a VAT with a standard rate of 12 percent and reduced rate of 5 percent after a transitional period of 5-6 years.
    - The introduction of the VAT was meant to be revenue-neutral as it would replace the 3 percent service tax paid by service businesses and a standard 17 percent import tax.
    - The VAT rate should be set to increase revenue while accounting for spending priorities; additional tax revenues will be needed for further investment increases.
    - Tax collection efforts should be stepped up to improve compliance and collection.
  - Spending-side measures:
    - Improve spending quality and reallocate spending to more growth-friendly categories; authorities’ intention to increase capital investment is appropriate.
    - Consider expanding education and vocational training.
    - Expenditure consolidation should come from lower current spending; modest reduction in the wage bill should be explored given its high share in current spending versus euro area peers.
    - Consider rationalization of health care spending.
    - Authorities are assessing pension reform proposals with a view to implementing them by end-2017; ensuring the social security fund is self-financed would allow reallocation of resources.
- Contingent liabilities and stress scenario:
  - If contingent liabilities from the banking system were to materialize and some costs were borne by the state, public debt could rise significantly.
  - Illustration: a contingent liability shock of 30 percent of GDP would increase public debt to 51 percent of GDP and set it on an upward trajectory under current policies; a more ambitious fiscal adjustment would be required in that scenario.
- Access to external financing:
  - Establishing access to external financing (including an external private placement or syndicated loan) while advancing fiscal sustainability would enhance the government’s ability to respond to shocks.
  - Market access would introduce market discipline, diversify funding sources, and help break the bank-sovereign loop.
  - To the extent external financing is available, the need to hold sizable deposit buffers would decline and such buffers could be used only when market access is limited.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (Republic of San Marino).*

### 23.      The authorities agreed on the need to start rebuilding buffers gradually. They are

### cr1786 - 23.      The authorities agreed on the need to start rebuilding buffers gradually. They are

### Fiscal policy and rebuilding buffers
- Authorities are working on a revised budget to reflect priorities and reduce the deficit to be adopted by June/July this year.
- Commitment to pursue pro-growth fiscal policies to revive growth while starting to rebuild buffers gradually.
- Recommendation: a gradual fiscal adjustment starting this year, targeting a modest surplus by 2019.
- Quantified path: an annual, phased reduction of deficit by about ½ percent of GDP in coming years.
- Key fiscal measures highlighted:
  - Introduction of a VAT system by the end of this year to play a key role in adjustment.
  - Contain public wage bill and reform the pension system.
- Caveat: potential fiscal contingencies related to banks’ public recapitalization needs remain significant; if realized, a deeper fiscal adjustment would be needed and the authorities should be ready to take additional measures.

### Structural reforms to increase growth potential and business environment
- Progress to date:
  - High-tech business incubator established to facilitate a scientific and technological park.
  - Simple and fast online process to establish a business put in place.
  - Labor market adjustments, including exempting small high-tech businesses in the incubator from slow procedures to hire skilled nonresident workers.
  - These measures supported activity in manufacturing with an increasing number of new firms and employment.
- Priority reforms under consideration:
  - Introduce a one-stop-shop for businesses to simplify administration.
  - Further streamline procedures to hire nonresidents.
  - Reform insolvency and debt restructuring regimes and improve availability of credit (Doing Business indicators; see Annex III).
  - Measures to improve productivity, including enhancing vocational training.
- Guiding principle: reforms should improve efficiency and avoid distortions and additional fiscal costs.
- Expected outcome: diversification beyond the financial sector, supporting growth in industrial and services sectors.

### Financial sector, banking challenges, and oversight
- Assessment of banking sector:
  - Vulnerabilities in the banking system continue to hamper medium-term growth prospects.
  - Ongoing AQR is important to restore banking system health and needs to be followed by efforts to repair banks’ balance sheets.
- Recommended actions:
  - Deal with capital shortfalls via market-based solutions, restructuring, or resolution; limit state support to systemic banks and make it contingent on reorganization plans.
  - Credible strategy for CRSM should be guided by AQR findings and ensure long-term viability based on realistic assumptions.
  - Strategy to significantly reduce high stock of NPL over the medium term, including supportive regulatory, tax and legal reforms.
  - Plan and prepare for possible AQR outcomes by upgrading the legal framework and enhancing inter-governmental coordination.
- Strengthening oversight:
  - Revamp bank supervision and develop a robust macroprudential framework.
  - Use the completed internal audit of the central bank as a basis to enhance supervision and compliance.
  - Identify and close data and regulatory gaps and develop capacity to monitor systemic risks.
  - Produce a regular financial stability report to communicate CBSM’s financial sector assessment and policy intentions.
  - Streamline mandate and ensure independence of the CBSM.

### International cooperation and liquidity access
- Engagement in international cooperation remains crucial (Annex IV).
- Recent steps:
  - AML/CFT national risk assessment completed last year; authorities encouraged to implement the AML/CFT Action plan.
  - Multidisciplinary group established in July 2016 to discuss BEPS measures implementation.
- Recommended actions:
  - Continue to build cooperation across Europe and beyond, including continued negotiations with the European Union on an association agreement.
  - Explore ways to gain access to ECB liquidity facilities to help domestic banks against potential liquidity shocks (Annex V). (Note: currently, there is no legal basis for such access to ECB credit operations.)
  - In promoting investment, consider tapping expertise of the EBRD and IFC.

### Data provision and transparency
- Current weaknesses: gaps in data coverage and timeliness primarily in balance of payments, national accounts and to a lesser extent public finance statistics; some high frequency indicators available but accessibility relatively limited.
- Recommendation: strengthen data provision — timeliness, availability, and accessibility — and disseminate data in an easily accessible online format.
- Authorities should consider allocating more resources to improve data provision and set this as a key priority in the reform agenda.

### Authorities’ stated views
- Considering near-term labor market reforms, including internationalization of the labor market and labor contract reforms, with caution to avoid new distortions.
- Labor market reforms will consider small domestic market size and need to create employment for the internal labor force.
- Emphasis on internationalization across Europe and beyond to achieve higher growth potential.
- Acknowledged need to improve data availability and timeliness to improve policymaking and transparency.

### Staff appraisal — key findings and recommendations
- Macroeconomic context:
  - Slow recovery after a long recession; growth returned in 2015 with continued recovery in 2016, but expected to be subdued and insufficient to restore output to pre-crisis levels within the next decade.
  - Existing buffers almost depleted and no access to external financing; limited fiscal space to respond to shocks and mobilize resources for pro-growth spending.
  - External position moderately weaker than fundamentals and desired policy.
- Reform agenda: developing a comprehensive, medium-term growth strategy with prioritization and sequencing is key given binding capacity and resource constraints.
- Banking sector priority: address banking challenges decisively; reduce NPLs; ensure bank oversight and macroprudential framework strengthened.
- Fiscal recommendation: phased deficit reduction of about ½ percent of GDP annually to reach modest surplus by 2019; VAT introduction by end of this year; contain wage bill and reform pensions.
- External financing: authorities should start exploring external financing options to enhance shock response capacity, diversify funding sources, and help break bank-sovereign loop.
- Structural reforms: continue improving business environment and labor market flexibility while avoiding distortions and fiscal costs.
- International cooperation: maintain focus on cooperation and transparency; implement AML/CFT Action Plan and pursue EU association agreement negotiations.
- Data provision: strengthen data as a key goal in reform agenda.
- Procedural recommendation: next Article IV consultations with the Republic of San Marino be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Box: Economic Crisis in San Marino — selected statistics and chronology
- San Marino has lost a third of the country’s output since 2008.
- Banking sector assets have fallen by more than 200 percent of GDP since then.
- Between 2000 and 2008, credit growth averaged at around 20 percent.
- Key shocks beginning in 2008 included:
  - Increased international scrutiny on tax havens; 2008 MONEYVAL critical AML/CFT assessment; 2009 OECD “gray list” placement.
  - Italian tax amnesty in 2009 and reporting obligations in 2010 led to massive deposit outflows, reducing bank liabilities by a third.
  - CRSM was hit by losses from investments and advances to Delta when Italian authorities seized Delta’s assets and put it into liquidation.
  - Global financial crisis weakened external demand and increased nonperforming loans.
- Post-crisis adjustments: increased transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes; OECD and Italy included San Marino in their white lists; bilateral economic cooperation agreement with Italy entered into force in January 2015; negotiations (with Andorra and Monaco) on an association agreement with the EU started in early 2015.

*International Monetary Fund — staff summary of Republic of San Marino chapter content*

### Box 2. Managing and Resolving Nonperforming Loans (NPLs)

### Box 2. Managing and Resolving Nonperforming Loans (NPLs)

### NPL stock and recent developments
- The gross NPLs to customers have increased sharply from 15 percent of total loans to customers in 2010 to above 50 percent in 2015, equivalent to 125 percent of GDP.  
- NPLs to banks are currently below one percent of total loans to banks.  
- Banks increased forbearance and the restructuring of loans (the restructured loans category, however, mostly reflects banks’ exposure to the Delta group).  
- Lower-quality tiers of NPLs have also increased.  
- Banks have continued restructuring, bad loan write-offs, and selected securitization of NPLs, in part supported by the incipient economic recovery. As a result, the NPL ratio has improved slightly in 2016.

### Impact on profitability and bank performance
- The surge in NPLs has dented operating profits by reduced net interest income and increased expenses, and through increased other administrative costs, write-downs, and provisioning.  
- Noninterest and extraordinary income provided some buffer, but losses across the banking sector have continued through 2016, albeit gradually diminishing.

### Key impediments to NPL resolution
- Banks manage their NPLs internally in closed funds because difficulties in agreeing common valuation criteria for transferred assets so far precluded finding a system-wide solution for NPLs.  
- Legal obstacles to managing and resolving nonresident NPLs (75% of NPLs) that are secured by collateral mostly in Italy increase administrative costs.  
- The Sammarinese property market is not very active and lacks potential buyers, impeding timely and effective debt recovery.  
- Slightly more than one-third of NPLs are collateralized, about half of which by real estate (a quarter of which located abroad).

### Policy recommendations and operational measures
- Reducing administrative costs and obstacles related to NPLs:
  - Seek a system-wide solution (once common valuation criteria can be agreed) to reduce administrative costs through economies of scale.  
  - Address legal obstacles to managing and resolving nonresident NPLs secured by collateral mostly in Italy.  
- Gradual opening up of the real estate market:
  - A gradual opening of the real estate market to nonresidents could reinvigorate the debt recovery process.  
- Upgrading NPL resolution strategies:
  - Banks should update their NPL resolution plans by setting quarterly targets for loan restructuring, cure rate, cash collection, and operating expenses.

### Additional operational actions observed
- Continued loan restructuring, bad loan write-offs, and selected securitization of NPLs have taken place, supported in part by the incipient economic recovery.

*Source: IMF staff summary of "Box 2. Managing and Resolving Nonperforming Loans (NPLs)" in the IMF report on the Republic of San Marino.*

### Annex II. Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Annex II. Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Baseline scenario
- Macroeconomic and fiscal outlook:
  - Real GDP growth reaching at 1.3 percent in the medium term.
  - The overall balance is projected to remain at a small deficit of around -0.2 percent of GDP.
  - The primary balance is projected to be broadly balanced in the medium term.
- Public debt and financing:
  - Public debt is projected to rise slightly but start declining and stabilize at around 21 percent of GDP by 2021.
  - Gross financing needs are expected to remain stable at around 9–10 percent of GDP during the projection period.
- Selected projected indicators (as presented in the DSA):
  - Nominal gross public debt: 16.6 (2014), 19.0 (2015), 19.7 (2016), 21.6 (2017), 21.8 (2018), 22.0 (2019), 21.6 (2020), 21.3 (2021), 21.3 (projection).
  - Public gross financing needs: 3.8 (2014), 7.4 (2015), 4.1 (2016), 5.4 (2017), 7.6 (2018), 7.2 (2019), 6.5 (2020), 6.0 (2021), 5.8 (projection).
  - Real GDP growth (in percent): -6.0 (2014), -0.9 (2015), 0.5 (2016), 1.0 (2017), 1.2 (2018), 1.3 (2019), 1.3 (2020), 1.3 (2021), 1.3 (projection).
  - Effective interest rate (in percent): 0.7 (2014), 1.0 (2015), 1.2 (2016), 1.2 (2017), 1.8 (2018), 2.1 (2019), 2.4 (2020), 2.8 (2021), 3.0 (projection).
  - Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants: 19.7 (2014), 22.5 (2015), 20.8 (2016), 22.1 (2017), 20.9 (2018), 20.8 (2019), 20.5 (2020), 20.4 (2021), 20.4 (cumulative 2014-21: 125.1).
  - Primary (noninterest) expenditure: 21.4 (2014), 21.5 (2015), 20.8 (2016), 22.4 (2017), 21.6 (2018), 21.2 (2019), 20.2 (2020), 20.2 (2021), 20.2 (cumulative 2014-21: 125.9).
  - Change in gross public sector debt (2014–21 cumulative): 1.5 (cumulative).

### Stress tests — scenarios and impacts
- Real GDP growth shock:
  - Assumption: Real GDP growth rates are one standard deviation (4.9 percent) lower than the baseline during 2017–18.
  - Impact: Debt-to-GDP ratio will rise to 29 percent in 2018 (about 7 percentage points higher than the baseline) and stay elevated afterwards.
- Primary balance shock:
  - Assumption: The primary deficit is assumed to widen by 0.7 percent of GDP in 2017–18.
  - Impact: Debt-to-GDP ratio is only 2 percentage points higher than the baseline scenario during 2018-21.
- Real interest rate shock:
  - Assumption: The nominal interest rate increases by 150 basis points during 2017–21.
  - Impact: The debt-to-GDP ratio will remain the same as the baseline with a slight upward trend in 2020–21.
- Real exchange rate shock:
  - Assumption: Real exchange rate depreciates by 13 percent in 2017.
  - Impact: The impact on the trajectory of the debt-to-GDP ratio is negligible.
- Combined shock:
  - Assumption: Simultaneous combination of the first three shocks (Real GDP, Primary balance, Real interest rate).
  - Impact: Debt-to-GDP ratio will approach 29 percent in 2018 (roughly 7 percentage points higher than the baseline). After 2018, debt will slightly rise but stabilize at around 30 percent of GDP by 2021.
- Contingent liabilities shock:
  - Assumption: Contingent liabilities from the banking system materialize in 2017.
  - Scenario tested: A contingent liabilities shock of 30 percent of GDP.
  - Impact: Debt-to-GDP ratio would increase to 51 percent in 2017, reaching 56 percent by 2021, assuming the same fiscal policy stance as the baselines scenario.
  - Policy-relevance note: Such debt dynamics may prove not sustainable in a country with untested ability to access external financing.

### Alternative scenarios and underlying assumptions (selected)
- Underlying baseline assumptions summarized in DSA tables:
  - Real GDP growth (baseline projections): 1.0 (2016), 1.2 (2017), 1.3 (2018), 1.3 (2019), 1.3 (2020), 1.3 (2021).
  - Inflation: 0.6 (2016), 1.1 (2017), 1.6 (2018), 1.3 (2019), 1.4 (2020), 1.4 (2021).
  - Primary balance (baseline): -0.3 (2016), -0.7 (2017), -0.4 (2018), 0.2 (2019), 0.2 (2020), 0.1 (2021).
  - Selected alternative scenarios presented include: Historical, Constant Primary Balance, Contingent Liability Shock, Primary Balance Shock, Real GDP Growth Shock, Real Interest Rate Shock, Real Exchange Rate Shock, Combined Shock — with scenario-specific paths for real GDP growth, inflation, primary balance, and effective interest rate as tabulated in the DSA.

### Key takeaways
- Under the baseline, public debt stabilizes at around 21 percent of GDP by 2021 with gross financing needs around 9–10 percent of GDP.
- Macro-fiscal shocks (single shocks such as a primary balance or interest rate shock) have limited impact on debt sustainability in the projections.
- A large contingent liabilities shock (e.g., 30 percent of GDP materializing from the banking system) would dramatically raise debt-to-GDP to levels (51 percent in 2017, 56 percent by 2021) that could be unsustainable given limited proven access to external financing.
- Combined macro-fiscal shocks can raise debt-to-GDP notably (approaching 29 percent in 2018 and stabilizing around 30 percent by 2021), underscoring vulnerability to simultaneous adverse developments.

*Source: IMF staff. As of December 14, 2016.*

### Annex V. Reserve Adequacy

### Annex V. Reserve Adequacy

### Fiscal reserves: definition, assessment, and key figures
- Definition: Fiscal reserves are defined as funds needed to allow spending to continue in the temporary absence of debt financing options.
- Rule of thumb: Fiscal reserves should be able to cover at least one month of spending.
- San Marino implication: One month of spending would imply about €25 million (1.8 percent of GDP) is needed as fiscal reserves.
- Current situation: Government deposits have declined significantly in recent years, and the current level of government deposits is just at one month of spending.
- Staff observation/recommendation:
  - Spending needs are likely to rise when negative shocks hit the economy, suggesting a need for rebuilding fiscal buffers.
  - The analysis assumes fiscal reserves are captured by government deposits, but government deposits may not necessarily correspond to fiscal reserves as they could also be used as bank backstops.

### Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) and lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) considerations
- First line of defense: Banks’ own liquid assets are the first line of defense against liquidity shocks.
- Liquidity ratios and holdings:
  - Ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 60 percent.
  - Banks’ liquid assets cover about 155 percent of nonresident deposits as of August 2016.
  - Banks hold reserves valued at about €88 million at the CBSM (4 percent reserve requirement).
- Institutional constraint:
  - The CBSM’s ability to provide liquidity assistance is constrained due to euroization.
  - Currently, there is no legal basis for access to Eurosystem liquidity.
- Staff recommendation:
  - The institutional framework for the LOLR function needs to be improved.
  - Explore the feasibility to secure access to Eurosystem liquidity for San Marino banks.

### Comparative and contextual points
- Liquid assets to short-term liabilities (percent) comparison shown for selected economies includes San Marino, El Salvador, Kosovo, Panama, with San Marino at 60 percent (data source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators).
- Coverage of nonresident deposits: banks’ liquid assets cover about 155 percent of nonresident deposits as of August 2016.
- Reserve holdings at CBSM: about €88 million (4 percent reserve requirement).

*Source: cr1786 - Annex V. Reserve Adequacy*

### 2017. Moreover, San Marino recently joined the OECD’s new inclusive framework to tackle

### cr1786 - 2017. Moreover, San Marino recently joined the OECD’s new inclusive framework to tackle

### San Marino and BEPS
- San Marino recently joined the OECD’s new inclusive framework to tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).

### Implementation arrangements
- To facilitate the implementation of the BEPS package established in 2016 a multidisciplinary group of authorities.

*Source: cr1786 - 2017. Moreover, San Marino recently joined the OECD’s new inclusive framework to tackle*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2017/cr1786.pdf_
