## 1. Selected Indicators for Public Spending Policy

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### Overview / Background
- Public investment since 2000 averaged about 20 percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP.
- About 70 percent of public investment went to economic and social infrastructure (roads, ports, rails, airports, power and energy; housing, health, education, recreation and culture).
- Public employment by 2017: 40 percent of total formal employment; central government workers about 20 percent of total formal employment.
- Social outcomes and indicators:
  - Extreme poverty (share below $1.25 per day, PPP) fell from 6.4 percent in 1995 to 1.5 percent in 2011.
  - Human Development Index for 2014: 0.74 (up from 0.6 in 1990).
  - Under-five mortality: 47 per 1,000 births in 1990 to 25 in 2013.
- Public capital stock increased from 120 percent of GDP in 2000 to about 190 percent of GDP in 2015.
- Government gross debt fell from 63 percent of GDP in 2000 to less than 10 percent in 2015.
- Persistent challenges:
  - Labor force participation is low, especially for women.
  - Unemployment around 12 percent; about 60 percent of the unemployed have been looking for a job for over one year.
  - Youth unemployment over 28 percent; female unemployment 20.7 percent.
  - A third of youth are neither employed nor enrolled in school.
  - Access to electricity and roads remains weaker than peers.
- Policy context and constraints:
  - Public spending model financed by hydrocarbon revenues averaged about 18 percent per year between 2003 and 2012.
  - Algeria’s proven hydrocarbon reserves (excluding shale oil and gas) are projected to be exhausted in 1–2 generations' time.
  - Algeria ranks behind other oil exporters and emerging market economies on control of corruption and limiting favoritism (Worldwide Governance Indicators and World Economic Forum).

### Improving Public Investment Efficiency — Findings
- Macroeconomic evidence suggests relatively weak public investment efficiency:
  - Capital spending multipliers in Algeria are lower than the average of other oil exporters in the region.
  - Close relationship between incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) and public investment indicates low productivity of public investment.
- Efficiency comparisons and infrastructure quality:
  - Algeria’s investment efficiency score of 0.76 for infrastructure quality implies it could have improved infrastructure quality by about 24 percent with the same spending amount.
  - Efficiency gap with strong-institution oil exporters (Canada, Norway, Singapore) about 0.6 — implying Algeria could have built up to 60 percent more infrastructure with the same investment if PIM institutions were stronger.
  - Overall infrastructure quality index (Global Competitiveness Indicators, 2017) is lower than other oil exporters; railroads relatively well-developed but ports, roads, air transport, and electricity supply are weaker.
- Unit costs of large projects are relatively high:
  - Roads: unit cost about 34 percent higher than the average cost among benchmark countries.
  - Metros: per-kilometer metro construction cost about 30 percent higher than the average unit cost; adjusted unit cost of metro construction is two-and-a-half times the adjusted cost in benchmark countries, and six times the adjusted cost in the U.S.
- Trends in project implementation (projects > 20 billion dinars, 2002–16):
  - Delays: on average projects completion took two years longer than initially planned; delays declined from 120 percent (2000s) to 50 percent (2010s).
  - Cost overruns: overall final costs were 32 percent higher than initially planned; cost overruns decreased from 45 percent (2000s) to 16 percent (2010s) on average.
  - Out of 65 investment projects, 19 saw costs increased by more than 100 percent.
  - Current cost-overrun range: 10 percent (construction projects) to 22 percent (territorial development projects), comparable to international standards.

### Public Investment Management — Diagnosis and Institutional Developments
- Identified PIM weaknesses in the 2000s:
  - Limited strategic sectoral content; insufficiently structured and sequenced investment plans.
  - Insufficient project preparation and weak cost-benefit analysis; some projects entered budget prior to completion of feasibility studies.
  - Weak governance and institutional frameworks; overlapping responsibilities (example: 25 ministerial and 48 regional commissions in the PSRE) and regional execution capacity mismatches.
  - Weak budget process: absence until recently of an MTEF, lack of performance-based budgeting, extensive use of special treasury accounts (“Comptes d’Affectation Spéciale,” CAS) undermining control of investment spending.
- Reforms and institutional steps taken:
  - Creation of CNED (Caisse Nationale d'Equipement pour le Développement) in 2004; mandate strengthened in 2009 to evaluate economic viability of large projects (above 20 billion dinars) before detailed studies and budget inclusion.
  - CNED issued a manual (2010) on management of large centrally managed investment projects.
  - Presidential decree on public procurement introduced in 2015 emphasizing open, competitive bidding with clear award conditions (article 49 clarifies mutual agreement conditions).
  - 2013 rule: cost revaluations higher than 15 percent of initial budget authorization require Cabinet approval before additional funding.
  - Budget reforms: 2017 adoption of a medium-term budget framework (MTBF); closure of several CAS; initiation of modernization of information systems.
- Remaining shortcomings (survey of PIM practices):
  - Planning, selection, and implementation: interministerial process to cut nonpriority projects since 2016 lacked intra-sectoral coordination; contracting authorities lack sufficient capacity leading to frequent timeline revisions.
  - Ex-post evaluations: no systematic ex-post project evaluations; CNED focuses on a few selected projects.
  - Budgeting and execution: insufficient capacity to monitor budget execution in real time and control spending commitments, leading to payment arrears and project disruption.
- Public procurement weaknesses (World Bank 2017 Benchmarking Public Procurement):
  - Low quality, adequacy, and transparency of information to prospective bidders.
  - Inadequate supplier requirement definitions for effective bidding.
  - Regulatory framework and procedures do not effectively ensure fair and transparent evaluation.

### Improving Public Investment Efficiency — Recommendations
- Ensure consistency between macroeconomic objectives and planning:
  - Implement and operationalize the MTEF as set out in the new organic budget law; combine MTBF with MTEF for sustainable resource envelopes and efficient sector allocations.
- Improve coordination among sectors:
  - Standardize selection and appraisal criteria across government levels; improve intersectoral and wilaya coordination.
  - Consider an investment authority attached to the prime minister’s Office to oversee sectoral consistency and strategic planning.
- Strengthen budget execution and information systems:
  - Build capacity to monitor budget execution in real time and control spending commitments.
  - Accelerate implementation of a modern integrated information system to enable results-oriented budgeting.
- Enhance central oversight and enforcement:
  - Empower an oversight body (potentially an investment authority) to discard technically or economically unsound projects and oversee ex-post evaluations and audits.
  - Strengthen contracting authorities’ capacity in project preparation and execution through permanent capacity building and sector-specific guidance.
  - Establish legal frameworks to define contracting authorities’ responsibilities and promote result-oriented approaches.
- Improve procurement competitiveness and transparency:
  - Review and update procurement rules and processes to ensure consistency with international best practices and evenhanded application.

### Improving Wage Bill Efficiency — Findings and Diagnosis
- Level and composition:
  - Over 2005–16, the wage bill represented around 10 percent of GDP (compared to about 6 percent in emerging and developing economies on average).
  - Latest data indicate the wage bill represents close to 12 percent of GDP in Algeria and nearly 30 percent of total expenditure.
  - Public sector employment: 40 percent of total formal employment; government employment about 20 percent.
  - Health and education sectors represent about half of total government employment and about half of public wage bills.
  - Algeria employs fewer public workers in education and health as a share of the population compared with middle-income countries and MENA averages; employment in the health sector is about one-third of total health spending (global average at least 40 percent).
- Quality and efficiency:
  - Government effectiveness is lower than would be expected given Algeria’s GDP level (Worldwide Governance Indicators).
  - Education quality below emerging-country averages (TIMSS and PISA).
  - Infant mortality and some health indicators are below potential given GDP.
- Labor market distortions:
  - Formal private sector concentrated in low-productivity activities: self-employed and fixed-term/apprentices represent 42.1 percent and 39.8 percent of private employment, respectively.
  - Over 70 percent of private employment in firms with fewer than five employees.
  - Private sector employment by sector in 2016: Hydrocarbons 5%; Agriculture 23%; Manufacturing 6%; Construction and public works 18%; Non government services 48%.
  - Public jobs provide better quality (permanence, benefits): over 70 percent of public employees are permanent versus less than 20 percent in the private sector.
  - Public-private nominal wage gap about 6 percent (public wages higher), varying by sector; nonwage benefits not fully captured may increase the effective gap.
  - Since the mid-2000s public wage increases were not clearly linked to productivity increases; over 2011–16 private sector wages increased at a slightly higher real rate than public sector wages, but wages tended to follow public wage increases, potentially reducing competitiveness.
- Pay and productivity indicators:
  - Algeria’s pay and productivity score (Global Competitiveness) indicates pay and productivity remain lower than could be expected given development level.
  - Real wages vs productivity index shows a divergence in the 2000s; productivity increases accelerated more recently with average public and private wages broadly flat in real terms in the past five years.

### Improving Wage Bill Efficiency — Recommendations and Management Actions
- Short-term measures:
  - Hiring and wage freezes implemented (with exceptions in strategic sectors such as health and education using replacement ratios).
  - These measures help in the short term but often reversed later and may have negative distributional and service-quality effects, disproportionately affecting women and public-sector morale and productivity.
- Complementary and medium-term actions:
  - Use MTBF and MTEF to control wage bill evolution and align with fiscal objectives; develop forecasting tools and understand wage bill drivers early in MTBF preparation.
  - Review public wage-setting systems:
    - Move from seniority-based pay progression to systems linking pay increases to performance.
    - Consider decompressing pay scales and making allowances more transparent.
  - Strengthen institutions and data coverage:
    - Improve public finance statistics, implement integrated information management systems for timely and reliable data.
  - Review government programs and organizational structures:
    - Conduct ex-post evaluations of government programs (e.g., active labor market programs) and functional reviews of departments to identify duplication and inefficiency.
    - Aim to improve delivery and quality of public services at given or lower levels of employment and wages.

### Conclusions — Principles and Broader Agenda
- Four guiding principles for reforming public investment and wage bill management:
  - Refocus public spending on core goals: deliver infrastructure and public services that facilitate private sector activity and meet population needs rather than overreaching objectives that stifle the private sector.
  - Adopt a pluriannual strategy: MTBF and MTEF combination to anchor spending levels and align sectoral expenditures with long-term development objectives.
  - Formulate sectoral strategies more effectively: improve inter-sectoral coordination and define clear performance indicators to align spending decisions with broader economic strategy.
  - Improve institutional capacity, data collection, and analysis: modernize information systems for transparent access, proper monitoring, and results-oriented budgeting.
- Reforms should be part of a broader inclusive growth agenda:
  - Improve transparency and governance to facilitate reforms and enforce regulations equitably.
  - Foster private sector activity and job creation by improving labor and product market efficiency and promoting economic diversification.
  - Evidence suggests that cutting the gap in structural indicators with best performers by half could increase growth potential by up to 2.5 percentage point (Souissi and Auclair, 2017).
  - Implement an effective communication strategy and involve social dialogue to build support and increase the chances of reform success.

*International Monetary Fund — Algeria: Improving Public Spending Efficiency to Foster More Inclusive Growth (May 15, 2018).*

### 1. Selected Indicators for Public Spending Policy _______________________________________ 3

### 1. Selected Indicators for Public Spending Policy _______________________________________ 3

### Overview
- This content unit is organized as part of a larger document and presents the selected indicators relevant to public spending policy.

### Related sections (as listed in source)
- 2. Selected Socio-Economic Indicators __________________________________________________ 4
- 3. Government Wage Bill Level and Composition ______________________________________ 15
- 4. Selected Indicators for the Quality of Public Services _______________________________ 17
- 5. Public and Private Sector Wages and Productivity __________________________________ 18

*Source: cr18169 - 1. Selected Indicators for Public Spending Policy _______________________________________ 3*

### References _____________________________________________________________________________ 22

### cr18169 - References _____________________________________________________________________________ 22

### Background
- Algeria invested heavily after the 1990s civil strife to close infrastructure gaps; public investment has been about 20 percent of nonhydrocarbon GDP on average since 2000.
- Public investment allocation: about 70 percent of public investment went to economic (roads, ports, rails, airports, power and energy) and social infrastructure (housing, health, education, recreation and culture).
- Public employment by 2017: 40 percent of total formal employment; central government workers about 20 percent of total formal employment.
- Social outcomes and indicators:
  - Extreme poverty (share below $1.25 per day, PPP) fell from 6.4 percent in 1995 to 1.5 percent in 2011.
  - Human Development Index for 2014: 0.74 (up from 0.6 in 1990).
  - Under-five mortality: 47 per 1,000 births in 1990 to 25 in 2013.
- Public capital stock increased from 120 percent of GDP in 2000 to about 190 percent of GDP in 2015; government gross debt fell from 63 percent of GDP in 2000 to less than 10 percent in 2015.
- Persistent challenges:
  - Labor force participation is low, especially for women.
  - Unemployment around 12 percent; about 60 percent of the unemployed have been looking for a job for over one year.
  - Youth unemployment over 28 percent; female unemployment 20.7 percent.
  - A third of youth are neither employed nor enrolled in school.
  - Access to electricity and roads remains weaker than peers.
- Policy context and constraints:
  - Public spending model financed by hydrocarbon revenues averaged about 18 percent per year between 2003 and 2012.
  - Algeria’s proven hydrocarbon reserves (excluding shale oil and gas) are projected to be exhausted in 1–2 generations' time.
  - Algeria ranks behind other oil exporters and emerging market economies on control of corruption and limiting favoritism (Worldwide Governance Indicators and World Economic Forum).

### Improving Public Investment Efficiency — Findings
- Macroeconomic evidence suggests relatively weak public investment efficiency:
  - Capital spending multipliers in Algeria are lower than the average of other oil exporters in the region.
  - Close relationship between incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) and public investment indicates low productivity of public investment.
- Efficiency comparisons:
  - Algeria’s investment efficiency score of 0.76 for infrastructure quality implies it could have improved infrastructure quality by about 24 percent with the same spending amount.
  - Efficiency gap with strong-institution oil exporters (Canada, Norway, Singapore) about 0.6 — implying Algeria could have built up to 60 percent more infrastructure with the same investment if PIM institutions were stronger.
- Infrastructure quality: Algeria’s overall infrastructure quality index (Global Competitiveness Indicators, 2017) is lower than other oil exporters; railroads relatively well-developed but ports, roads, air transport, and electricity supply are weaker.
- Unit costs of large projects are relatively high:
  - Roads: unit cost about 34 percent higher than the average cost among benchmark countries.
  - Metros: per-kilometer metro construction cost about 30 percent higher than the average unit cost; adjusted unit cost of metro construction is two-and-a-half times the adjusted cost in benchmark countries, and six times the adjusted cost in the U.S.
- Trends in project implementation (projects > 20 billion dinars, 2002–16):
  - Delays: on average projects completion took two years longer than initially planned; delays declined from 120 percent (2000s) to 50 percent (2010s).
  - Cost overruns: overall final costs were 32 percent higher than initially planned; cost overruns decreased from 45 percent (2000s) to 16 percent (2010s) on average.
  - Out of 65 investment projects, 19 saw costs increased by more than 100 percent.
  - Current cost-overrun range: 10 percent (construction projects) to 22 percent (territorial development projects), comparable to international standards.

### Public Investment Management — Diagnosis and Institutional Developments
- Identified PIM weaknesses in the 2000s:
  - Limited strategic sectoral content; insufficiently structured and sequenced investment plans.
  - Insufficient project preparation and weak cost-benefit analysis; some projects entered budget prior to completion of feasibility studies.
  - Weak governance and institutional frameworks; overlapping responsibilities (example: 25 ministerial and 48 regional commissions in the PSRE) and regional execution capacity mismatches.
  - Weak budget process: absence until recently of an MTEF, lack of performance-based budgeting, extensive use of special treasury accounts (“Comptes d’Affectation Spéciale,” CAS) undermining control of investment spending.
- Reforms and institutional steps taken:
  - Creation of CNED (Caisse Nationale d'Equipement pour le Développement) in 2004; mandate strengthened in 2009 to evaluate economic viability of large projects (above 20 billion dinars) before detailed studies and budget inclusion.
  - CNED issued a manual (2010) on management of large centrally managed investment projects.
  - Presidential decree on public procurement introduced in 2015 emphasizing open, competitive bidding with clear award conditions (article 49 clarifies mutual agreement conditions).
  - 2013 rule: cost revaluations higher than 15 percent of initial budget authorization require Cabinet approval before additional funding.
  - Budget reforms: 2017 adoption of a medium-term budget framework (MTBF); closure of several CAS; initiation of modernization of information systems.
- Remaining shortcomings (survey of PIM practices):
  - Planning, selection, and implementation: interministerial process to cut nonpriority projects since 2016 lacked intra-sectoral coordination; contracting authorities lack sufficient capacity leading to frequent timeline revisions.
  - Ex-post evaluations: no systematic ex-post project evaluations; CNED focuses on a few selected projects.
  - Budgeting and execution: insufficient capacity to monitor budget execution in real time and control spending commitments, leading to payment arrears and project disruption.
- Public procurement weaknesses (World Bank 2017 Benchmarking Public Procurement):
  - Low quality, adequacy, and transparency of information to prospective bidders.
  - Inadequate supplier requirement definitions for effective bidding.
  - Regulatory framework and procedures do not effectively ensure fair and transparent evaluation.

### Improving Public Investment Efficiency — Recommendations
- Ensure consistency between macroeconomic objectives and planning:
  - Implement and operationalize the MTEF as set out in the new organic budget law; combine MTBF with MTEF for sustainable resource envelopes and efficient sector allocations.
- Improve coordination among sectors:
  - Standardize selection and appraisal criteria across government levels; improve intersectoral and wilaya coordination.
  - Consider an investment authority attached to the prime minister’s Office to oversee sectoral consistency and strategic planning.
- Strengthen budget execution and information systems:
  - Build capacity to monitor budget execution in real time and control spending commitments.
  - Accelerate implementation of a modern integrated information system to enable results-oriented budgeting.
- Enhance central oversight and enforcement:
  - Empower an oversight body (potentially an investment authority) to discard technically or economically unsound projects and oversee ex-post evaluations and audits.
  - Strengthen contracting authorities’ capacity in project preparation and execution through permanent capacity building and sector-specific guidance.
  - Establish legal frameworks to define contracting authorities’ responsibilities and promote result-oriented approaches.
- Improve procurement competitiveness and transparency:
  - Review and update procurement rules and processes to ensure consistency with international best practices and evenhanded application.

### Improving Wage Bill Efficiency — Findings and Diagnosis
- Level and composition:
  - Over 2005–16, the wage bill represented around 10 percent of GDP (compared to about 6 percent in emerging and developing economies on average).
  - Latest data indicate the wage bill represents close to 12 percent of GDP in Algeria and nearly 30 percent of total expenditure.
  - Public sector employment: 40 percent of total formal employment; government employment about 20 percent.
  - Health and education sectors represent about half of total government employment and about half of public wage bills.
  - Algeria employs fewer public workers in education and health as a share of the population compared with middle-income countries and MENA averages; employment in the health sector is about one-third of total health spending (global average at least 40 percent).
- Quality and efficiency:
  - Government effectiveness is lower than would be expected given Algeria’s GDP level (Worldwide Governance Indicators).
  - Education quality below emerging-country averages (TIMSS and PISA).
  - Infant mortality and some health indicators are below potential given GDP.
- Labor market distortions:
  - Formal private sector concentrated in low-productivity activities: self-employed and fixed-term/apprentices represent 42.1 percent and 39.8 percent of private employment, respectively.
  - Over 70 percent of private employment in firms with fewer than five employees.
  - Private sector employment by sector in 2016: Hydrocarbons 5%; Agriculture 23%; Manufacturing 6%; Construction and public works 18%; Non government services 48%.
  - Public jobs provide better quality (permanence, benefits): over 70 percent of public employees are permanent versus less than 20 percent in the private sector.
  - Public-private nominal wage gap about 6 percent (public wages higher), varying by sector; nonwage benefits not fully captured may increase the effective gap.
  - Since the mid-2000s public wage increases were not clearly linked to productivity increases; over 2011–16 private sector wages increased at a slightly higher real rate than public sector wages, but wages tended to follow public wage increases, potentially reducing competitiveness.
- Pay and productivity indicators:
  - Algeria’s pay and productivity score (Global Competitiveness) indicates pay and productivity remain lower than could be expected given development level.
  - Real wages vs productivity index shows a divergence in the 2000s; productivity increases accelerated more recently with average public and private wages broadly flat in real terms in the past five years.

### Improving Wage Bill Efficiency — Recommendations and Management Actions
- Short-term measures used:
  - Hiring and wage freezes implemented (with exceptions in strategic sectors such as health and education using replacement ratios).
  - These measures help in the short term but often reversed later and may have negative distributional and service-quality effects, disproportionately affecting women and public-sector morale and productivity.
- Complementary and medium-term actions:
  - Use MTBF and MTEF to control wage bill evolution and align with fiscal objectives; develop forecasting tools and understand wage bill drivers early in MTBF preparation.
  - Review public wage-setting systems:
    - Move from seniority-based pay progression to systems linking pay increases to performance.
    - Consider decompressing pay scales and making allowances more transparent.
  - Strengthen institutions and data coverage:
    - Improve public finance statistics, implement integrated information management systems for timely and reliable data.
  - Review government programs and organizational structures:
    - Conduct ex-post evaluations of government programs (e.g., active labor market programs) and functional reviews of departments to identify duplication and inefficiency.
    - Aim to improve delivery and quality of public services at given or lower levels of employment and wages.

### Conclusions — Principles and Broader Agenda
- Four guiding principles for reforming public investment and wage bill management:
  - Refocus public spending on core goals: deliver infrastructure and public services that facilitate private sector activity and meet population needs rather than overreaching objectives that stifle the private sector.
  - Adopt a pluriannual strategy: MTBF and MTEF combination to anchor spending levels and align sectoral expenditures with long-term development objectives.
  - Formulate sectoral strategies more effectively: improve inter-sectoral coordination and define clear performance indicators to align spending decisions with broader economic strategy.
  - Improve institutional capacity, data collection, and analysis: modernize information systems for transparent access, proper monitoring, and results-oriented budgeting.
- Reforms should be part of a broader inclusive growth agenda:
  - Improve transparency and governance to facilitate reforms and enforce regulations equitably.
  - Foster private sector activity and job creation by improving labor and product market efficiency and promoting economic diversification.
  - Evidence suggests that cutting the gap in structural indicators with best performers by half could increase growth potential by up to 2.5 percentage point (Souissi and Auclair, 2017).
  - Implement an effective communication strategy and involve social dialogue to build support and increase the chances of reform success.

*International Monetary Fund — Algeria: Improving Public Spending Efficiency to Foster More Inclusive Growth (May 15, 2018).*

### References

### References

### Public investment, infrastructure, and transport
- Albino-War, M., Svetlana, C., Francesco, G., Juan Carlos, F., Javier, K., Haonan, Q., Yahia, S., Martin, S., Bahrom, S., SeokHyun, Y. (2014), “Making the Most of Public Investment in Oil-Exporting Countries,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/10. 
- Alexeeva V., C., and Ishihara, S. (2011), “Monitoring Road Works Contracts and Unit Costs for Enhanced Governance in Europe and Central Asia. Transport Papers No. TP-33, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., and Wee, B. (2008), “Comparison of Capital Costs per Route-Kilometre in Urban Rail,” European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 8 (1): 17–30.
- Fox, H. (2000), “World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review – Mass Rapid Transit in Developing Countries”, Final Report prepared for Department for International Development, Lonely, July
- World Bank (2007). “People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria—A Public Expenditure Review”, Vol. 1, World Bank (Washington, D.C.).

### Public investment management and fiscal policy
- IMF (2015), “Making Public Investment More Efficient”, IMF Board Paper, International Monetary Fund (Washington D.C.).
- IMF (2018a), “Public Investment Management and Assessment: Review and Update”, IMF Board Paper, International Monetary Fund (Washington D.C.).
- Albino-War, M., Svetlana, C., Francesco, G., Juan Carlos, F., Javier, K., Haonan, Q., Yahia, S., Martin, S., Bahrom, S., SeokHyun, Y. (2014), “Making the Most of Public Investment in Oil-Exporting Countries,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/10.

### Government employment, wages, and labor market
- Clements, B., Gupta, S., Karpowicz, I. and Shamsuddin, T. (2010), “Evaluating Government Employment and Compensation”, Technical Notes and Manuals, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.).
- IMF (2018b), “Public Wage Bills in the Middle East and Central Asia”, Departmental Paper, Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.).
- Ianovichina, E, Antonio E. Renaud, F. and Gregoire, G. (2013), “Job Creation through Infrastructure Investment in the Middle East and North Africa,” World Development, Vol. 45, pp. 209-222.
- Pierre, G. (2014), “Fostering Private Sector Job Creation in Algeria”. IMF Country Report 14/342. International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.).

### Algeria-specific analyses and policy
- Jewell, A. (2014), “Meeting Algeria’s Fiscal Challenges”, IMF Country Report 14/342, International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.).
- Lahreche, A. (2014), “Fostering Export Diversification in Algeria”. IMF Country Report 14/342, International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.).
- Pierre, G. (2014), “Fostering Private Sector Job Creation in Algeria”. IMF Country Report 14/342. International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.).
- Souissi, M. and Auclair, G. (2017), ”Structural Reforms: Strategies and Possible Payoffs”, IMF Country Report No. 17/142, International Monetary Fund (Washington, D.C.).
- Martinez, L. (2004), “Why the Violence in Algeria”, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.9, No. 2, pp. 14- 27.

*References (cr18169).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2018/cr18169.pdf_