## INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

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### Summary (high-level)
- As an European Union (EU) Member State, Romania is subject and aligned to the EU common regulatory framework for banking supervision.
- The Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRR/CRD IV) form the Single Rule Book.
- A large part of Romania’s banking system is owned by Eurozone banks; the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as the home supervisor for Eurozone banks, is a key partner of the National Bank of Romania (NBR).
- Prudential regulations of the NBR are broadly aligned to the requirements of the Basel Core Principles (BCP).
- As of 2017, the NBR has identified 11 banks as systematically important, of which 8 are supervised at group level by the SSM.

### Main findings and supervisory implications
- NBR supervisory approach and SREP adoption
  - As of January 2016, the NBR Board approved adoption of the EBA SREP Guidelines (EBA/GL/2014/13) into national supervisory practices; SREP is the core supervisory tool.
  - The new EBA SREP methodology is still in the early stages of implementation.
  - There is no structured/independent review during SREP to ensure consistency and accuracy of scoring, findings, and measures of the supervisory report.
  - Processes for ensuring consistency and accuracy of scoring, findings, and supervisory measures across different banks need to be improved and formalized.
  - NBR needs to enhance off-site monitoring tools by incorporating more forward-looking views (e.g., bottom up stress testing tools) and perform more risk-focused and thematic industry-wide analyses.
- Supervisory capacity and specialization
  - NBR may need to devote more supervisory attention to banks’ risk models and build expertise in specialized areas such as IT and market risk.
  - There is no dedicated team/unit in the Supervision Department responsible for internal models oversight.
  - Two banks approved to use the advanced approach for credit risk; three banks approved for operational risks.
- Corrective actions, sanctions, and post-examination processes
  - NBR has sanctioning powers but the sanctioning/order issuance process needs enhancement (no consistent internal independent review of measures/sanctions).
  - Timeframes in internal rules are not always adhered to; draft supervisory reports should be sent within 60 working days but many were issued more than six months later.
  - Formal wrap-up meetings after on-site inspections do not always take place, hindering prompt implementation of supervisory measures.
- Corporate governance and board engagement
  - Corporate governance requirements were strengthened; NBR places substantial responsibilities on the board.
  - NBR requires only some banks (i.e., subsidiaries) to have an “adequate” number of independent board members; banks usually have one or two independent board member(s), which is insufficient.
  - NBR does not organize regular exchanges with nonexecutive and independent members; intensified engagement is warranted.
- Related party, concentration and country/transfer risk regulations
  - Regulations on related party transactions and country/transfer risk include only high level principles and lack sufficient specificity; related party definition is not comprehensive.
  - NBR should consider amending regulations, issuing instructions, and/or developing on-site handbooks to give more specific guidance.
  - Oversight of concentration risk and intra-group transactions should be enhanced even if exposures comply with regulatory limits.
- Nonperforming exposures and credit risk
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) peaked at 21.9 percent in 2013 and declined to close to 6 percent in 2017 (NPE peaked at 22 percent in 2013 and declined to 6.4 percent in December 2017 under broader definitions).
  - NBR led cleanup efforts via interim June audits, independent collateral revaluations, full provisioning of high risk exposures, write-offs, and annual bank-by-bank supervisory targets for NPL reductions.
  - Given still-high levels of nonperforming and forborne exposures, NBR should continue close monitoring and proactive measures.

### Introduction: scope and purpose of the assessment
- Assessment completed as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) jointly by the IMF and the World Bank in 2017, at the request of Romanian authorities.
- Assessment reflects regulatory and supervisory framework in place as of completion of the assessment.
- Focused on NBR supervision of banks; did not cover regulation/supervision specifics of other financial intermediaries.
- Not intended to analyze the state of the banking sector or the crisis management framework (addressed in other FSAP assessments).

### Information and methodology used for assessment
- Assessment conducted against the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2012 Core Principles standard.
  - The 2012 revision strengthens supervisors’ requirements, risk-based supervision, early intervention and emphasis on corporate governance.
- Romania opted to be assessed against both essential criteria (EC) and additional criteria (AC) but graded on EC only.
- Grading qualitative; emphasis on commentary accompanying each Principle grading.
- Assessment team held extensive meetings with NBR, MOPF, industry and counterparts; reviewed laws, regulations, supervisory guidelines, supervisory files, staff and systems.

### Institutional and market structure (selected statistics and structure)
- Banks hold around 80 percent of financial sector assets.
- In April 2018, there were 35 banks in Romania, 29 foreign-owned (22 subsidiaries, seven branches).
- The five largest banks concentrate about 60 percent of total deposits (57 percent of all loans).
- Nonbank financial sector accounts for about 20 percent of financial system assets.
- Equity market: 84 listed companies, market capitalization EUR 32 billion as at end-2015.
- Fixed-income market: around 80 bonds traded at the Bucharest Stock Exchange; majority government securities; seven corporate bonds issued.
- Overview of the Structure of the Banking System (As of end–2016):
  - Banks incorporated in Romania:
    - Controlled by Romanian interests: Number of Banks 9; Market Share (total assets) 23.7%
      - Public: 2; 8.3%
      - Private: 7; 15.4%
    - Controlled by EU banking groups supervised by the SSM /ECB: Number of Banks 14; Market Share (total assets) 61.1%
    - Controlled by other EU banking groups: Number of Banks 5; Market Share (total assets) 4.0%
    - Controlled by banking groups based outside the EU: Number of Banks 1; Market Share (total assets) 0.3%
  - Branches:
    - Branches of EU banking groups supervised by the SSM /ECB: Number of Banks 5; Market Share (total assets) 10.5%
    - Other branches of EU banks: Number of Banks 3; Market Share (total assets) 0.4%
  - Source: NBR.
- Funding and liquidity indicators:
  - Share of deposits from domestic private sector increased from about 48 percent of banks’ total liabilities in 2011 to about 66 percent in 2017.
  - Parent funding declined to about EUR 7 billion (approximately 7 percent of total liabilities) in 2017, a third of the 2011 level.
  - System-wide loan-to-deposit ratio fell to around 77 percent in 2017 from 131 percent in 2008.

### Macro context and macroprudential framework
- Macroeconomic context and risks:
  - Romania’s real GDP growth surged to 6.9 percent in 2017.
  - Inflation subdued by low imported inflation and indirect tax cuts, but inflationary pressures increased since mid-2017 due to sharp wage increases and strong domestic demand; monetary policy tightened after prolonged accommodation.
  - Risk that current policy trajectory increases macroeconomic volatility and wears down buffers; sound macroeconomic policy coordination is essential.
- Macroprudential institutional framework:
  - National Committee for Macroprudential Oversight (NCMO) established April 2017; nine-member committee chaired by Governor of NBR; NBR representation reduced to three members.
  - NCMO has direct powers over a wide range of macroprudential tools; can issue recommendations with ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.
  - As of April 2018, NCMO held five meetings and issued ten recommendations including quarterly recommendations on the countercyclical capital buffer.
  - Technical Commissions on Systemic Risk and Financial Crisis Management pending operationalization.
  - Macroprudential toolkit: CRR/CRD IV framework operational; a stressed DSTI limit applied to consumer loans; Maximum LTV ratios undermined by Prima Casa program.

### Public infrastructure, insolvency, and fiscal measures affecting banks
- Personal insolvency regime:
  - Law No. 151/2015 on insolvency of natural persons intended to provide debt discharge; implementation delayed; Government approved methodological norms on June 9, 2017; additional rules still needed.
- Credit reporting improvements:
  - Private Credit Bureau initiated 2004; expanded from negative information to include positive data and credit scoring services after five years.
- Financial market infrastructures:
  - NBR oversees RTGS and SaFIR; NBR adopted CPSS-IOSCO Principles for FMIs and assessed systems under its purview.
  - NBR project to internalize payment and settlement systems within central bank underway.
- Legislative and fiscal measures:
  - Laws proposed/considered on datio in solutum and CHF loan conversion; constitutional court rulings limited negative impact; legislative risks remain.
  - Government capped tax deductibility on NPL sales to 30 percent of value, discouraging NPL sales and encouraging direct execution of debtors.

### Crisis management, recovery and resolution
- BRRD transposition:
  - Transposition concluded in 2015 (Law 312/2015); NBR is resolution authority; some operational elements (MoUs, framework agreements with MOPF and FGDB) remain to be settled.
  - Operational readiness not fully tested; market structure: 61 percent of banking assets fall under SRB authority requiring cross-border coordination.
- FGDB (Deposit Guarantee Fund) and resolution fund:
  - Resolution fund target level: 1 percent of deposits covered.
  - Resolution fund current level: 60 percent of that objective.
  - Target attainment timeline: latest by 2024.
  - FGDB mandates: temporary administrator; special administrator under resolution; shareholder of bridge institution or asset management vehicle.
- Public safety net and liquidity:
  - NBR strengthened liquidity provision framework; formal emergency liquidity assistance framework still under construction and untested.
- Deposit insurance:
  - Law 311/2015 transposed Directive 2014/49; deposit insurance fund covers 99.5 percent of accounts.
  - Fund level: 3.4 percent of the amount of eligible deposits; nearly reached its target.
  - Contingent financing arrangements with MOPF exist in law but specific financing arrangements pending.

### Supervisory framework, SREP, tools and resource allocation
- SREP adoption and implementation:
  - EBA SREP Guidelines adopted January 1, 2016; SREP deployed via on-site and off-site tools.
  - NBR has broad information-gathering powers; Central Credit Register provides high-granularity data.
  - No structured independent review process within SREP to ensure consistency/objectivity of scores and measures.
  - Recommendation: establish independent review, develop on-site/off-site assessment handbooks, and improve electronic platform for findings/measures/follow-ups.
- Off-site supervision workload and focus:
  - Off-site work includes approval/rejection of requests (e.g., amendments in bank’s situation) which may limit qualitative risk analysis capacity.
  - Recommendation: review off-site activities to optimize supervisory resource allocation.
- Thematic analyses and stress testing:
  - Financial Stability Department (FSD) publishes semi-annual Financial Stability Reports and performs top-down stress testing; results have limited direct applicability to supervisory SREP.
  - No thematic inspections at banking system level in 2016–2017.
  - NBR does not differentiate full-scope exam frequency based on risk profile; asset size and prior SREP score mainly determine scope/intensity.
  - Recommendation: conduct thematic analyses, develop bottom-up stress testing, enhance monitoring of intra-group exposures and consolidated supervision (coordination with ASF where relevant).

### Ongoing supervision, inspection practices and reporting
- On-site and off-site arrangements:
  - Three inspection divisions within Supervision Department with both on-site and off-site responsibilities; all credit institutions subject to annual full-scope on-site examinations.
  - On-site missions: full-scope inspections typically 2–5 weeks; targeted inspections for specific issues; teams of 3 to 10 people (larger for OSIIs).
  - Line supervisors assigned to each institution for off-site monitoring and approvals.
  - No formal process that sets bank-level proposed priorities/inspection plans for approval by decision-making bodies.
- Reporting systems and KRIs:
  - KRI framework: 26 KRIs used for scoring (from a total of 34 KRIs); monitoring via FINREP monthly/quarterly, loan classification monthly, NPL loans monthly, asset sales monthly, liquidity reports weekly and monthly.
  - Electronic systems: ABACUS, SIRBNR, RCI for prudential data collection and analysis.
- SREP and quality assurance:
  - SREP focuses on capital adequacy; weak processes to ensure consistency/objectivity in SREP outcomes.
  - Recommendation: create independent review unit, SREP handbooks, and enhance electronic management of findings/measures.

### Corporate governance, fit & proper, and Board practices
- Legal and regulatory framework:
  - NBR Regulation No. 5/2013 transposes EBA internal governance aspects; banks must have robust governance, internal controls, remuneration frameworks and risk management.
  - Boards: one-tier (unitary) and two-tier (dual) systems exist; management body responsibilities and committee structures defined.
- Fit and proper and vetting:
  - NBR conducts in-depth vetting for management body members, including criminal records checks, intelligence reports, feedback from supervisors and face-to-face interviews.
- Independent directors and committees:
  - Only subsidiaries required to have an “adequate” number of independent members; most banks have 1 or 2 independent directors.
  - All banks required to have an audit committee chaired by an independent member; other committees (risk, nomination, remuneration) less consistently constituted with independent chairs.
- Supervisory engagement shortcomings:
  - NBR rarely meets with nonexecutive/independent board members separately; letters detailing serious shortcomings often sent only to senior management not to the management body.
  - Recommendation: require adequate independent representation across all banks, formalize engagement with nonexecutive directors, send supervisory communications to management body.

### Credit risk management, NPLs and provisioning (Principles 17–18 and Section 6.2.3)
- Credit risk strategy and supervisory practice:
  - SREP Section 6.2.3 requires assessment of credit risk strategy, organizational framework, policies, risk identification/measurement/monitoring, and internal control.
  - On-site full-scope examinations annually; typically 1–2 team members focus on credit risk per mission.
  - Off-site receives annual risk management reports and ICAAP; few documented expectations for content and no systematic methodology to review them.
- NPL history and supervisory actions:
  - NPLs: 7.9 percent of gross loans at end-2009 → 21.9 percent at end-2013 peak; NPE peaked at 22 percent in 2013 and declined to 6.4 percent in December 2017.
  - NBR actions: interim June audits, independent collateral valuations, AQRs for large banks, full provisioning for certain exposures, write-offs; resulted in additional provisions: about 600 million EUR (June 2012), 60 MEUR (June 2013) and 700 M EUR (June 2014).
  - Regulation 16 introduced five-category classification and prudential filters; CRR Article 481 phased out prudential filters with partial phase-in in 2017.
  - NBR to implement EBA 2017 ECL guideline in 2018; expects IFRS 9 to align provisions with prior prudential adjustments.
- Assessment outcomes:
  - Principle 17: Compliant.
  - Principle 18: Compliant.

### Related party transactions, concentration and country/transfer risk
- Related party (RP) transactions:
  - Current RP regulation deficient versus CP: affiliated parties definition not comprehensive; fails to capture persons in key positions or major individual shareholders and special purpose entities.
  - No explicit presumption power for RP identification; off-site RP data not sufficiently granular.
  - No explicit provision requiring board approval for write-off of RP exposures exceeding specified amounts.
  - Assessment: Transactions with related parties — Materially Noncompliant.
  - Recommendation: review and amend regulation for more prudent RP identification and supervision.
- Concentration risk and large exposures:
  - NBR applies EU large exposure regime; CRR allows EU competent authorities to set lower absolute limits but NBR has not exercised this option.
  - As of June 2017, around 29 percent of Romanian banks apply large exposure limit of EUR 150 million (i.e., 100 percent of capital limit).
  - Some institutions have exposures ~80–90 percent of capital to a group entity.
  - Recommendation: thematic review of concentration risks and explicit regulatory requirements for Board review/reporting of material concentrations.
- Country and transfer risk:
  - NBR regulation on country/transfer risk high-level only; lacks specific guidance, provisioning standards, and stress-testing scenario requirements.
  - Assessment: Country and transfer risks — Materially Noncompliant.
  - Recommendation: develop detailed guidance, supervisory procedures, and reporting to support group-wide country risk analysis.

### Market risk, IRRBB, and operational risk
- Market risk:
  - As of June 2017, RWAs for market risk around three percent of total RWAs.
  - No banks use advanced approach for market risk; no market risk specialist in supervision department.
  - Recommendation: assign market risk specialist to build expertise.
- IRRBB:
  - Basel Committee IRRBB standards published April 2016; NBR has not updated IRRBB rules accordingly but indicated amendment in process.
  - No explicit requirement for independent validation of models used for IRRBB.
  - Recommendation: update IRRBB rules and require independent validation.
- Operational risk and ICT:
  - RWAs for operational risk around 15 percent of total RWAs as of June 2017.
  - Three banks authorized to use AMA; others use SA or BIA.
  - No comprehensive guideline on cyber security/ICT implemented yet; Supervisory Department has one IT systems specialist and no dedicated unit.
  - Recommendation: implement EBA Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment, enhance IT supervisory capacity, expand operational risk incident reporting templates and timeliness.

### Financial reporting, external audit and disclosure
- Financial reporting and audit:
  - IFRS reporting required at consolidated level since 2006 and at individual level since January 2012.
  - External auditors subject to oversight; rotation requirements implemented since 2014 (firm or signing partner), with NBR guidance ensuring signing partner tenure not exceed seven years in specific cases.
  - NBR meets regularly with external audit firms.
  - Assessment: Principle 27 — Compliant.
  - Recommendation: document internal methodology to assess adequacy of auditor rotation policies and set maximum time limits.
- Disclosure:
  - Prudential and financial disclosure largely harmonized with EU frameworks (CRR Pillar 3, IFRS).
  - Disclosures annual by default; NBR could consider requiring more frequent disclosure for significant banks.
  - Assessment: Principle 28 — Compliant.
  - Recommendation: review disclosure practices across industry, particularly governance disclosures.

### AML/CFT supervision (Principle 29)
- Strengthening and implementation:
  - AML/CFT supervision strengthened to align with Directive (EU) 2015/849; NBR to submit enhanced AML/CFT law for Parliament.
  - NBR in early stages of implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision; has assessed ML/TF risks, ranked banks, and established a detailed supervisory methodology.
- Key supervisory activity and statistics:
  - In 2016, 39 inspections conducted.
  - STRs increased from 4.610 in 2015 to 8.555 in 2016.
  - Sanctions: 38 sanctions applied to 20 institutions in 2016 (19 warnings and 19 fines totaling RON 335,000); first semester 2017: 52 sanctions—32 warnings and 20 fines (totaling RON 435,000).
- Shortcomings:
  - Romanian law requires enhanced due diligence only for correspondent banking with banks outside the EU; FATF standard requires EDD for all correspondent banking relationships (no intra-EU exception).
  - Simplified due diligence allowed in certain circumstances without evidence of low ML/TF risk.
  - Foreign PEPs requirements based on residence rather than country where position is/was exercised.
- Assessment: Principle 29 — Largely Compliant.
- Recommendations:
  - Continue implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervision.
  - Restrict simplified due diligence to proven low ML/TF risk cases.
  - Ensure CDD measures for foreign PEPs align with FATF Recommendation 12.
  - Extend correspondent banking EDD requirements to intra-EU relationships.

### Independence, governance, resourcing and legal protections (Principle 2)
- Governance and independence:
  - NBR established under Law 312/2004; NBR statute declares independence; Board nine members; Minister of Public Finance may participate in Board meetings without voting rights.
  - NBR has effective operational independence but legal framework protecting independence should be strengthened (e.g., remove MOPF participation, require disclosure of reasons for Board dismissal).
- Resourcing and capacity:
  - Supervision Department staff: 131 at end-2016 (55 percent off-site, 45 percent on-site); Regulation & Licensing Department 42 staff at end-2016.
  - Vacancies: 17 in 2017, 8 in 2016, 8 in 2015, 13 in 2014, 5 in 2013.
  - Turnover: 6.9 percent for first nine months of 2017; 4.7 percent in 2016; 1.9 percent in 2015; 4 percent in 2014.
  - NBR reported profits of 783 million RON (196 million USD) in 2015 and 125 million RON (31 million) in 2016; capital and reserves totaled 17.8 billion RON -4.5 billion USD- in 2016.
- Legal protections:
  - Board members and staff protected against lawsuits for actions taken in good faith; no legal provision protecting NBR as an institution against lawsuits for actions/omissions in good faith.
- Assessment: Principle 2 — Materially Noncompliant.
- Recommended enhancements:
  - Publish fit and proper criteria applied by parliamentary subcommittees.
  - Amend statute to prevent MOPF participation in Board meetings.
  - Require disclosure of reasons for Board member removal.
  - Provide legal protection for NBR as an institution.
  - Introduce post-employment cooling-off rules for staff/Board taking positions at supervised banks.
  - Strengthen internal guidance on approval of sanctions/orders (currently sole responsibility of first deputy governor).
  - Fill vacancies proactively and ensure recruitment ahead of planned retirements.

### Cooperation, home-host and domestic coordination (Principle 3)
- Cooperation frameworks:
  - NBR member of 15 EU supervisory colleges; active coordination with ECB/SSM as host supervisor for Eurozone groups controlling a large share of Romanian banking assets.
  - A working procedure exists for information exchange between NBR and ASF; MoU with FGDB; cooperation with foreign supervisors in practice works.
- Domestic coordination gaps:
  - Exchanges between NBR and ASF primarily written; no joint on-site inspections; technical meetings exceptional.
  - No regular meetings to discuss risk profiles of institutions active in banking and sectors supervised by ASF.
- Recovery and resolution:
  - NBR is resolution authority under Law 312/2015; recovery and resolution plans prepared for banks in 2016–2017; coordination processes between supervision and resolution exist.
- Assessment: Principle 3 — Largely Compliant.
- Recommendation: formalize regular NBR–ASF meetings and add statutory provisions for information treatment from non-EU authorities.

### Corrective actions, enforcement and timeliness (Principle 11)
- Powers and tools:
  - NBR has broad corrective powers (additional own funds, restrictions, reporting requirements, requiring disposal of qualifying holdings, limiting profit distribution, suspension of voting rights, withdrawal of approval).
  - Administrative pecuniary penalties up to 10 percent of total annual net turnover or up to EUR 5 000 000 for natural persons (value in national currency as of July 17, 2013).
- Implementation weaknesses:
  - Lack of mandatory independent review to ensure consistency/justification of inspection outcomes and sanctions.
  - Timeliness: draft supervisory reports often delayed (average approximately 140 days in 2016 vs internal 60 working days target).
  - Wrap-up meetings not consistently formalized.
  - Approximately 45 cases submitted to the board within a five-year period with 18 contested in court.
- Assessment: Principle 11 — Largely Compliant.
- Recommendations:
  - Establish independent review for written orders and sanctions.
  - Formalize post-examination wrap-up meetings and improve timeliness.
  - Intensify coordination with ASF on corrective actions affecting financial groups.

### Selected quantitative indicators (as reported)
- NPL / NPE trends:
  - NPLs peaked at 21.9 percent in 2013.
  - NPE peaked at 22 percent in 2013 and declined to 6.4 percent in December 2017.
  - NPLs declined to close to 6 percent in 2017.
- Banking sector structure and market shares (As of end–2016):
  - Controlled by EU SSM banking groups: 14 banks; Market Share 61.1%
  - Romanian-controlled banks: 9 banks; Market Share 23.7%
  - Branches of EU SSM /ECB: 5 banks; Market Share 10.5%
- Funding and balance sheet ratios:
  - Domestic private sector deposits share: about 66 percent of banks’ total liabilities in 2017 (from about 48 percent in 2011).
  - Parent funding: about EUR 7 billion (approximately 7 percent of total liabilities) in 2017.
  - System-wide loan-to-deposit ratio: around 77 percent in 2017 (from 131 percent in 2008).
- RWAs composition (June 2017):
  - Market risk RWAs: around three percent of total RWAs.
  - Operational risk RWAs: around 15 percent of total RWAs.
- Resolution fund:
  - Target: 1 percent of deposits covered.
  - Current level: 60 percent of that objective.
  - Target attainment: latest by 2024.

### Key recommended supervisory actions (selected)
- Institutional and legal
  - Amend NBR statute to strengthen independence (prevent MOPF participation; require disclosure of reasons for Board removal).
  - Establish legal protection for NBR institution against lawsuits for actions/omissions in good faith.
  - Introduce post-employment cooling-off rules for staff/Board members joining supervised banks.
- SREP and supervisory quality
  - Establish independent review/quality assurance for SREP scores, findings, and supervisory measures.
  - Develop on-site and off-site supervisory assessment handbooks and internal methodologies.
  - Improve electronic platform to manage findings, measures and follow-ups.
  - Enhance off-site monitoring with forward-looking tools (bottom-up stress testing, early warning indicators).
  - Conduct thematic industry-wide analyses and systemic examinations; more risk-differentiated full-scope exam scheduling.
- Specialized capacity
  - Create/strengthen dedicated units or specialists for: internal model validation, market risk, IRRBB, IT/ICT and cyber risk oversight.
  - Expand hiring/training of IT risk experts and quantitative model specialists.
- Governance and board engagement
  - Require an “adequate” number of independent directors across all banks; consider minimum thresholds and requirements for committee chairs to be independent.
  - Intensify engagement with nonexecutive and independent board members; schedule regular meetings and send reports/letters to management body.
  - Require banks to notify supervisor as soon as they become aware of material information affecting fitness and propriety of major shareholders or senior managers.
- Risk areas and reporting
  - Review and strengthen regulations on related party transactions, concentration risk, and country/transfer risk with specific guidance and reporting requirements.
  - Expand and standardize operational risk incident reporting templates and timelines.
  - Prepare guidelines on ICT/cyber security and implement EBA Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment (2017).
- AML/CFT
  - Continue implementation of risk-based AML/CFT supervisory approach and new AML/CFT law.
  - Extend enhanced due diligence requirements for correspondent banking to intra-EU relationships and align foreign PEP treatment with FATF Recommendation 12.
  - Restrict simplified due diligence to proven low ML/TF risk circumstances.

*Source: Detailed Assessment — INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY (CR18171).*

### INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ________________________________________________________ 7

### INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

### Summary (high-level)
- As an European Union (EU) Member State, Romania is subject and aligned to the EU common regulatory framework for banking supervision.
- The Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRR/CRD IV) form the Single Rule Book.
- A large part of Romania’s banking system is owned by Eurozone banks; the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as the home supervisor for Eurozone banks, is a key partner of the National Bank of Romania (NBR).
- Prudential regulations of the NBR are broadly aligned to the requirements of the Basel Core Principles (BCP).
- As of 2017, the NBR has identified 11 banks as systematically important, of which 8 are supervised at group level by the SSM.

### Main findings and supervisory implications
- The NBR supervisory approach has been changing toward a more risk based approach since the previous BCP assessment.
  - As of January 2016, the NBR Board approved the adoption of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) Guidelines of the European Banking Authority (EBA) into national supervisory practices, making it the core supervisory tool for banking supervision.
  - The new EBA SREP methodology is still in the early stages of implementation.
  - Processes for ensuring consistency and accuracy of scoring, findings, and supervisory measures across different banks need to be improved and have yet to be formalized and documented.
  - The NBR needs to further enhance off-site monitoring tools by incorporating more forward-looking views (e.g., bottom up stress testing tools).
  - More risk-focused and thematic banking industry-wide analyses and examinations triggered by recent trends or events are warranted.
- Further development of the NBR’s supervisory approach will make supervision more effective and in line with the requirements of the 2012 BCP.
  - The NBR may need to devote more supervisory attention to banks’ risk models and build up further expertise in specialized areas such as IT and market risk.
  - In the area of corrective actions and sanctions, the NBR should review its framework to ensure it is protected from undue legal challenges, and strengthen internal procedures to ascertain that supervisory measures or sanctions are more consistently applied across the banking system.
  - Post examination processes should be enhanced for banks to implement supervisory measures in a prompt manner.
  - Intensified engagement with nonexecutive/independent board members is warranted for a more proactive supervisory practice.
- Some weaknesses were observed concerning regulations not governed by the harmonized EU framework.
  - Regulations on related party transactions and country/transfer risk include only high level principles, and lack sufficient specificity.
  - The NBR should consider giving more specific guidance to banks and supervisors through amending regulations, issuing instructions, and/or developing the on-site handbook.
  - The NBR also needs to enhance its oversight of concentration risk and intra-group transactions, even if the exposures comply with the regulatory limits.
- Authorities should maintain their current successful and proactive approach to steer the timely reduction in problem assets.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) peaked at 21.9 percent in 2013 following the 2007 crisis, before declining to close to 6 percent in 2017.
  - The NBR led efforts to clean up banks’ balance sheets through initiatives designed to ensure timely recognition, realistic provisioning and disposal of NPLs, and maintains annual bank-by-bank supervisory targets for NPL reductions.
  - The framework for credit risk management was significantly strengthened and close monitoring, including through annual examinations, is conducted.
  - Considering still high levels of nonperforming and forborne exposures, the NBR shall continue to closely monitor these exposures and ensure that proactive measures are implemented to clean up bank balance sheets and prevent any new increase in credit risk.
- The NBR should better ensure banks’ boards effectively exercise their responsibilities.
  - Corporate governance requirements were appropriately strengthened in recent years and now constitute a cornerstone of the NBR’s supervisory approach.
  - The NBR only requires some banks (i.e., subsidiaries) to have an “adequate” number of independent board members; banks usually only have one or two independent board member(s), which is insufficient.
  - Although the NBR places a lot of responsibilities on the board, it does not yet organize regular exchanges with nonexecutive and independent members.

### Introduction: scope and purpose of the assessment
- The assessment of the implementation of the BCP in Romania was completed as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), jointly undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 2017, at the request of the Romanian authorities.
- The assessment reflects the regulatory and supervisory framework in place as of the completion of the assessment.
- The assessment focused on the NBR’s supervision of banks and did not cover the specificities of regulation and supervision of other financial intermediaries, which are addressed by other assessments conducted in this FSAP.
- The assessment is not intended to analyze the state of the banking sector or the crisis management framework, which are addressed by other assessments in this FSAP.

### Information and methodology used for assessment
- The assessment was conducted against the standard issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 2012.
  - The revised Core Principles (CPs) strengthen requirements for supervisors, approaches to supervision, and supervisors’ expectations of banks through a greater focus on effective risk-based supervision and the need for early intervention and timely supervisory actions.
  - The 2012 revision placed increased emphasis on corporate governance and supervisors’ conducting sufficient reviews to determine compliance with regulatory requirements and thoroughly understanding the risk profile of banks and the banking system.
- The Romanian authorities opted to be assessed against both essential criteria (EC) and the additional criteria (AC) but graded on the basis of EC only.
  - The EC set out minimum baseline requirements for sound supervisory practices.
  - The AC are recommended as best practices; Romania chose to be graded against only EC.
- Grading is qualitative and not an exact science; emphasis is placed on the commentary accompanying each Principle grading.
- The assessment team held extensive meetings with NBR staff, the Ministry of Public Finance (MOPF), the industry, and other counterparts; reviewed laws, regulations, supervisory guidelines; and used NBR self-assessments and supervisory documents, files, staff, and systems.
- The assessment team noted excellent cooperation and extensive provision of internal guidelines/procedures, supervisory files, and reports.

### Institutional and market structure (selected statistics and structure)
- Romania’s financial sector remains dominated by banks that hold around 80 percent of financial sector assets.
- In April 2018, there were 35 banks in Romania, 29 of which are foreign-owned (22 subsidiaries, seven branches).
- The five largest banks concentrate about 60 percent of total deposits in the system (57 percent of all loans).
- The nonbank financial sector accounts for about 20 percent of financial system assets (investment funds, private pension funds, insurance companies and other nonbank financial institutions).
- The equity market had 84 listed companies with a market capitalization of EUR 32 billion as at the end of 2015.
- The fixed-income market had around 80 bonds traded at the Bucharest Stock Exchange, the majority being securities issued by central and local governments; there are only seven corporate bonds issued.

Table (as reported)
- Overview of the Structure of the Banking System (As of end–2016):
  - Banks incorporated in Romania:
    - Controlled by Romanian interests: Number of Banks 9; Market Share (total assets) 23.7%
      - Public: 2; 8.3%
      - Private: 7; 15.4%
    - Controlled by EU banking groups supervised by the SSM /ECB: Number of Banks 14; Market Share (total assets) 61.1%
    - Controlled by other EU banking groups: Number of Banks 5; Market Share (total assets) 4.0%
    - Controlled by banking groups based outside the EU: Number of Banks 1; Market Share (total assets) 0.3%
  - Branches:
    - Branches of EU banking groups supervised by the SSM /ECB: Number of Banks 5; Market Share (total assets) 10.5%
    - Other branches of EU banks: Number of Banks 3; Market Share (total assets) 0.4%
  - Source: NBR.

- Foreign-owned banks’ dependencies on parent funding has significantly declined.
  - The share of deposits from the domestic private sector (about a third of which are demandable, and the rest at short terms of up to one year) has increased from about 48 percent of banks’ total liabilities in 2011 to about 66 percent in 2017.
  - Parent funding declined markedly to about EUR 7 billion (approximately 7 percent of total liabilities), a third of the level in 2011.
  - The system-wide loan-to-deposit ratio fell to around 77 percent in 2017, from 131 percent in 2008.
  - In the context of the Vienna initiative, debt liabilities were replaced by capital injections from parent banks, boosting capital ratios and reducing vulnerabilities.

*Source: Detailed Assessment — INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY (CR18171).*

### 16.      As a non-Eurozone EU Member State, Romania is subject to the EU common

### As a non-Eurozone EU Member State, Romania is subject to the EU common regulatory framework for banking supervision (Content unit: cr18171 — sections 16–37)

### Regulatory and supervisory framework
- All Member States must apply the CRR/CRD IV; the SSM is applicable only to Eurozone members and non-Eurozone members who opt to join.
- No non-Eurozone EU members have officially opted into the SSM to date.
- For non-Eurozone EU countries like Romania, where a large part of the banking system is owned by SSM-supervised Eurozone banks, the SSM has become the home supervisor with whom close collaboration with the NBR takes place.
- The NBR is an administratively independent Central Bank mandated to supervise credit institutions and verify observance of banking laws and regulations.
- The Financial Supervisory Authority (ASF), established in 2013, is responsible for supervision of nonbanking financial market participants and licensing/registration of individuals and institutions across: (i) intermediaries of financial instruments operations; (ii) insurance, insurance-reinsurance and reinsurance companies, mutual undertakings, and insurance intermediaries; and (iii) the private pension system.

### NBR: roles, mandate, and powers
- The NBR was established under Law 312/2004.
- Main tasks include: define and implement monetary and exchange rate policy; license, regulate and supervise credit institutions; promote and oversee payment systems; issue notes and coins as legal tender in Romania; set exchange rate regime and supervise observance; manage official reserves.
- Banking supervision falls exclusively within the responsibility of the central bank; laws and regulations are regularly updated.
- The NBR possesses stable governance arrangements and effective operational independence, but the framework protecting independence should be strengthened (e.g., MOPF could participate in NBR Board meetings; reasons for dismissal of a Board member do not have to be disclosed).
- The decision to approve sanctions/orders is the sole responsibility of the first deputy governor; there is no internal guidance or formal independent function to assist that decision.
- The NBR dedicates large resources to supervision (staff, equipment, variable costs) and has detailed arrangements to prevent and manage conflicts of interest. There is no post-employment or cooling-off framework for staff or Board members taking positions in supervised banks.
- Board members and staff are protected against lawsuits for actions taken in good faith; this protection does not apply to the institution.

### Preconditions for effective supervision — macroeconomic context
- Romania restored macroeconomic stability after the global financial crisis; growth accelerated on fiscal stimulus.
- Romania’s real GDP growth surged to 6.9 percent in 2017.
- Low imported inflation and indirect tax cuts kept inflation subdued, but inflationary pressures increased since mid-2017 due to sharp wage increases and strong domestic demand; monetary policy tightened after prolonged accommodation.
- With signs of overheating, there is a risk that the current policy trajectory increases macroeconomic volatility and wears down buffers, adversely affecting market confidence.
- Implementation of sound macroeconomic policies is essential; weak cooperation and synchronization among monetary, macroprudential and fiscal policies may lead to cyclical imbalances and structural vulnerabilities, creating potential for negative spillovers under adverse shocks.

### Macroprudential institutional framework and toolkit
- A National Committee for Macroprudential Oversight (NCMO) was established in April 2017 as the national macroprudential authority with a legal mandate to set macroprudential policies to strengthen financial system resilience and contain systemic risk.
- NCMO composition and governance:
  - Nine-member committee; number of NBR representatives was reduced from the proposed five to three, giving the NCMO the same number of representatives as the ASF and the Government.
  - Chaired by the Governor of the NBR; Secretariat resides within the NBR.
- Powers and activity:
  - NCMO has direct (hard) powers over a wide range of macroprudential tools; can recommend actions to other authorities or Government, issue warnings with a ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.
  - As of April 2018, the NCMO had held five meetings and issued ten recommendations, including the required quarterly recommendations on the countercyclical capital buffer.
  - Technical Commissions on Systemic Risk and Financial Crisis Management are still to become operational.
- Communication and transparency:
  - Official press release published on website after General Board meetings with summary.
  - Publication of a macroprudential policy strategy; publication of recommendations and adopted decisions with motivations.
  - Annual Report to be published for the first time by 30 June 2018.
  - Macroprudential measures also included in NBR Financial Stability Report published semi-annually; seminars and debates planned.
- Macroprudential toolkit developments:
  - CRR/CRD IV framework became operational in Romania; authorities have implemented or are phasing-in a number of capital buffers.
  - A stressed Debt Service to Income (DSTI) limit is currently applied to consumer loans.
  - Maximum LTV ratios on mortgages have been undermined by the Prima Casa program.

### Public infrastructure and credit environment
- Personal insolvency regime:
  - Law No. 151/2015 on insolvency of natural persons aimed to provide over-indebted consumers with a second chance via debt discharge.
  - Initially scheduled to enter into force in January 2016; implementation postponed several times due to administrative reasons (establishment of specialized regional administrative bodies, lack of trained personnel and financial resources).
  - On June 9, 2017, the Government approved methodological norms required to administer the procedure; additional rules, regulations, and guidelines still needed.
  - Final effects on the financial sector remain to be seen.
- Credit reporting:
  - Significant improvements over the past decade.
  - Private Credit Bureau initiated in 2004; data collection expanded from negative information to include positive data and credit scoring services after five years of operation.
- Financial market infrastructures:
  - NBR oversees RTGS payment system and SaFIR (central securities depository for government and NBR securities); ASF supervises clearing and settlement systems of the Bucharest Stock Exchange.
  - Legal framework strengthened via adoption of EU legislation.
  - NBR adopted CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures and assessed systems under its purview.
  - NBR project to internalize payment and settlement systems within the central bank expected to strengthen financial infrastructure.
- Legislative and fiscal measures affecting banks:
  - Parliament passed laws that would have allowed ‘datio in solutum’ and conversion of Swiss Franc loans at historical exchange rates; constitutional court rulings have limited potential negative impact, but further legislative risks remain.
  - Government decided to cap deductions from nonperforming loan sales to 30 percent of their value, limiting tax deductibility of losses when firms sell NPLs at a discount relative to provisions; this discourages banks from selling receivables and encourages direct execution of debtors.

### Crisis management, recovery, and resolution
- BRRD transposition:
  - Transposition concluded in 2015 (Law 312/2015); institutions (NBR, MOPF, ASF, FGDB) have adapted to new responsibilities and toolkit.
  - NBR is the resolution authority with key responsibilities; some components delegated to deposit insurer (FGDB) and MOPF.
  - Some operational elements (e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, framework agreements between MOPF and FGDB) remain to be settled.
  - Operational readiness has not been fully tested.
  - Market structure: 61 percent of assets in the banking sector fall under the Single Resolution Board’s (SRB’s) authority, requiring tight cross-border coordination within resolution colleges; international coordination work has started through continuous review of group resolution plans.
- FGDB responsibilities and funding:
  - FGDB administers the newly created bank resolution fund.
  - Resolution fund target level: 1 percent of deposits covered.
  - Resolution fund current level: 60 percent of that objective.
  - Target attainment timeline: latest by 2024.
  - FGDB mandates include serving as (i) temporary administrator; (ii) special administrator of a credit institution under resolution; (iii) shareholder of a bridge institution; (iv) shareholder of an asset management vehicle.
- Public safety net and liquidity:
  - NBR strengthened liquidity provision framework; overarching criteria based on preserving economic stability and supporting solvent but illiquid entities.
  - Formal operational framework for emergency liquidity assistance is still under construction and has not been tested under systemic stress.
  - Authorities are using the legal framework of the ECB 2017 agreement as the base for formulation.
- Deposit insurance:
  - New legislation (Law 311/2015) transposed EU Directive 2014/49 on deposit guarantee schemes in December 2015.
  - Deposit insurance fund covers 99.5 percent of accounts.
  - Fund level: 3.4 percent of the amount of eligible deposits; nearly reached its target.
  - Contingent financing remains work in progress; law allows FGDB to count on MOPF within specific time limits (five days) but specific arrangements for financing are yet to be finalized.
- Crisis preparedness:
  - Romania undertook a crisis simulation exercise in 2013; many lessons internalized by BRRD transposition and other enhancements, but a new simulation exercise would be useful to test preparedness domestically and regionally.
  - Authorities should consider a program of continuous tests and simulations for crisis management readiness.

### Market discipline, reporting, and corporate governance
- Financial reporting and auditing:
  - Reporting, auditing and disclosure requirements largely harmonized with the EU and international standards.
  - IFRS reporting required at consolidated level since 2006 and at individual level since January 2012.
  - Banks representing close to three quarters of banking assets are subsidiaries of EU banking groups, generally listed and subject to effective market discipline at group level.
  - A 2017 law created a new public oversight body for external auditors in Romania.
- Corporate governance assessment (2016 EBRD analysis):
  - Assessed five dimensions and rated: structure and functioning of the Board, internal control and stakeholders and Institutions as fair; transparency and disclosure as fair/moderately strong; rights of shareholders as moderately strong.
  - Weak areas: board effectiveness (no requirement for Board to approve company budget and set risk profile/appetite, uncommon practice of board evaluation, limited audit committee meetings), gender diversity at the Board, functioning and independence of the Audit Committee (minority of independent members, lack of proper qualifications, insufficient disclosure on number of meetings).
- Corporate governance rules under Romanian Banking Law (Government Emergency Ordinance No. 99/2006):
  - Each credit institution must have robust governance arrangements, including clear organizational structure, effective processes to identify/manage/monitor/report risks, adequate internal control mechanisms (sound administration and accounting procedures), and remuneration policies consistent with sound risk management.
  - Governance arrangements and internal regulations must be established by Articles of Association and internal regulations, according to Companies Law and in compliance with national and European legal banking framework.

### Main findings — selected CP assessments (summary)
- Responsibilities, objectives, powers, independence, accountabilities (CPs 1–2):
  - NBR has clear supervisory responsibilities, adequate resources and independence, though the legal framework protecting independence should be strengthened (see Board dismissal reasons, MOPF participation).
  - No post-employment/cooling-off framework for staff/Board moving to supervised banks.
- Ownership, licensing, and structure (CPs 4–7):
  - NBR implements a well-designed regime for licensing, transfer of significant ownership and major acquisitions.
  - NBR has exclusive competence for granting and withdrawing licenses of banks incorporated in Romania and branches of banks located outside the EU.
  - The NBR last licensed a bank in 2009.
  - Licensing framework includes clear, detailed criteria; ownership structure of locally incorporated banks and EU branches is transparent.
  - NBR’s rigorous definition of transfer of significant ownership aligns with CRD IV; may not fully cover transfer of beneficial ownership.
  - NBR has a detailed framework to review major acquisitions; as part of consolidation, NBR reviewed and approved four requests for acquisitions in the past five years (all related to mergers between banks licensed in Romania).
  - Romanian banks have only small activities outside Romania.
- Ongoing supervision (CPs 8–10, 12):
  - (Content unit ends at introduction to ongoing supervision; detailed assessments of CPs 8–10, 12 are contained in subsequent sections of the source.)

*IMF Country Report content unit cr18171 (sections 16–37).*

### 38.      The supervisory approach of the NBR has changed towards a more risk based

### 38.      The supervisory approach of the NBR has changed towards a more risk based

### Supervisory framework and SREP
- As of January 1, 2016, the NBR Board approved the adoption of the EBA SREP Guidelines (EBA/GL/2014/13) into national supervisory practices.
- The Romanian regulatory framework has implemented the provisions of CRR, CRD IV and BRRD (resolvability assessment).
- The SREP is a core supervisory tool in Romania and deploys a mix of onsite and offsite supervisory tools and techniques.
- The NBR has broad information collecting power by legislation; in particular, the Central Credit Register allows supervisors to access high-granularity data.
- Implementation status and issues:
  - The new EBA SREP methodology is still in the early stages of implementation.
  - There is no structured/independent review during SREP to ensure consistency and accuracy of scoring, findings, and measures of the supervisory report.
- Recommendations:
  - Establish an independent review process to ensure consistency and objectivity of SREP scores, findings, and supervisory measures.
  - Develop on-site and off-site supervisory assessment handbooks.
  - Improve the electronic platform to better manage findings, measures, and follow-ups.

### Off-site supervision and allocation of supervisory resources
- A significant part of off-site work includes approval/rejection of requests concerning amendments in a bank’s situation; this responsibility could limit the NBR’s ability to maintain thorough qualitative risk analysis.
- Regulatory cost-benefit exercises may be warranted to optimize allocation of supervisory resources.
- Recommendation:
  - Review off-site activities regarding various approval processes so supervisors can focus more on qualitative risk analysis.

### Thematic analysis, industry-wide examinations, and stress testing
- The Financial Stability Department (FSD) publishes financial stability reports on a half yearly basis and performs top-down stress testing, sharing results with banking supervisors.
- Limitations noted:
  - Results of the FSD have limited applicability and are not directly communicated to individual banks for supervisory purposes.
  - During 2016 and 2017, there were no thematic inspections carried out at the banking system level.
  - The NBR does not differentiate the frequency of full-scope examinations based on the outcome of risk profile analysis; asset size and the overall SREP score of the previous year mainly determine scope and intensity.
- Recommendation:
  - Adopt a more risk-focused approach by conducting thematic analyses and/or examinations across the banking system with a mix of off- and on-site activities for specific risks.
  - Develop bottom-up stress testing as a complementary supervisory tool.
  - Enhance monitoring of intra-group exposures and consolidated supervision, in coordination with the ASF where relevant.

### Corrective and sanctioning powers (CP 11)
- The NBR has sanctioning powers and tools in almost all respects, but the sanctioning/order issuance process needs enhancement.
- Internal process deficiencies:
  - Insufficient analysis to ensure consistency, accuracy and justification of inspection outcomes and sanctions across the banking system.
  - No consistent internal independent review process to ascertain adequacy and consistency of applied measures or corrective actions.
  - The NBR, as competent authority of credit institutions, cannot impose measures regarding the merger process or acquisition by a third party per Banking Law.
- Post-examination process issues:
  - Time frames in internal rules are not always adhered to; issuance of supervisory reports and written orders is often delayed.
  - The draft should be sent to banks within 60 working days according to NBR internal procedure, but many examination reports were issued to banks more than six months later with the issuance of written orders taking even longer.
  - Formal wrap-up meetings after on-site inspections do not always take place, hindering prompt implementation of supervisory measures.
- Recommendations:
  - Establish an independent review process and/or introduce relevant guidance for consistency of measures and sanctions.
  - Improve adherence to internal time frames and ensure timely issuance of reports, orders, and wrap-up meetings.

### Cooperation and cross-border supervision (CPs 3, 13)
- Cooperation among EU supervisors is intense; arrangements exist to facilitate cooperation with domestic and foreign authorities.
- Domestic cooperation:
  - Cooperation among domestic authorities is organized, but meetings with the ASF are too infrequent to allow effective coordination.
- International cooperation:
  - The NBR is a member of 15 EU colleges of supervisors.
  - EU banking groups control three quarters of banking assets in Romania, and the NBR is host supervisor for these groups.
  - Close coordination exists for crisis management and resolution domestically with the resolution arm of the NBR; for large banks active in Romania, coordination occurs within EU supervisory and resolution colleges.
- Recovery and resolution planning:
  - All Romanian banks prepared recovery plans starting in 2016; resolution plans were also prepared for almost all of these institutions (and their groups where applicable).

### Corporate governance, risk management, internal control and audit (CPs 14, 15, 26)
- Regulatory and supervisory practices:
  - Corporate governance requirements were strengthened at the EU level and transposed in Romania starting in 2013.
  - The NBR conducts thorough review processes, including challenging interviews, before approving members of the management body and during on-site full-scope examinations.
- Observed weaknesses:
  - The NBR only requires subsidiaries to have an “adequate” number of independent members in the management body; banks usually have 1 or 2 independent member(s), which is insufficient to challenge executives or lead specialized committees.
  - The NBR does not regularly meet with nonexecutive and independent members nor sends them letters detailing serious shortcomings or transmitting on-site reports.
  - The NBR has not developed detailed internal methodologies to facilitate comprehensive and consistent review of risk management, internal control and audit issues.
- Recommendation:
  - Increase emphasis on independent directors and direct regular exchanges between the NBR and non-executive Board members.
  - Develop detailed internal methodologies and industry-level reviews to inform supervisory processes.

### Capital adequacy and liquidity risk (CPs 16, 24)
- BCBS RCAP findings:
  - The RCAP reviewed the EU-wide capital and liquidity framework and concluded that certain features deviated from Basel standards.
  - The RCAP concluded that the EU requirements follow the Basel standards set by the BCBS broadly, but with a number of divergences, where the EU is less conservative than the BCBS, which positively impacts ratios.
  - A notable deviation concerns the treatment of credit exposures for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under the Standardized Approach, where less stringent capital requirements seem to be applied.
- Internal model oversight:
  - There is no dedicated team or unit within the NBR’s supervisory department (SD) responsible for evaluating, approving, reviewing and overseeing banks’ internal models.
  - Two banks have been approved to use the advanced approach to calculate regulatory capital for credit risks and three banks for operational risks.
  - The FSD has a quantitative assessment division that assists the SD when supervisors need to approve the advanced approach or validate internal models, but they are not involved in supervision and examination on an ongoing basis.
- Recommendation:
  - Increase supervisory attention to banks’ risk models used for risk management and regulatory capital calculations.
  - NBR examiners should focus more on periodic validations and independent testing of different models, even when banks are not generating inputs for regulatory capital calculations.

### Credit risk and problem assets (CPs 17–18)
- Historical and recent NPE trends:
  - Nonperforming exposures (NPE) peaked at 22 percent in 2013 before declining to 6.4 percent in December 2017.
- NBR actions and ongoing supervision:
  - The NBR led efforts to clean up banks’ balance sheets after the global financial crisis and significantly strengthened the framework for credit risk management.
  - The NBR promoted rapid reduction of NPEs through initiatives such as interim June audits, independent collateral revaluations, full provisioning of high risk exposures, and write-offs.
  - The NBR continues to closely monitor NPEs via detailed and regular reporting and proactive implementation of requirements on problem loans.

### Related party transactions, concentration, and country risks (CPs 19–21)
- Related parties (RP):
  - Current regulation on transactions with related parties has deficiencies against the CP.
  - The current definition of affiliated parties is not as broad as requirements in the CP; it fails to capture any person in a key position or a major individual shareholder of other group entities within a banking group, including the parent bank/company itself.
  - There is no explicit presumption power of the NBR in the regulation for RP identification, although the NBR may exercise discretion in practice.
  - No explicit provisions require the “write-off” of RP exposures exceeding specified amounts to be subject to prior board approval.
  - Information on RP transactions collected during off-site supervision is not sufficiently granular.
  - Recommendation: Review and amend regulation on affiliated party transactions in a more prudent manner.
- Concentration risk:
  - The NBR applies the EU-wide large exposure regime and assesses banks’ concentration risk management in SREP.
  - There is no explicit regulatory requirement that bank policies/processes require all material concentrations to be regularly reviewed and reported to the board.
  - The high level of sovereign debt concentration in the banking industry makes explicit inclusion in regulation important.
  - Recommendation: Conduct a thematic review on concentration risks across banks, particularly focusing on banks where the large exposure limit is set at EUR 150 million or 100 percent of capital, and banks that have high concentration risks.
- Country and transfer risk:
  - NBR regulation for country and transfer risk management is not sufficiently comprehensive; it includes only high-level principles and lacks sufficient substance and specific guidance for supervisors and banks.
  - There are no specific regulatory provisioning standards for country risk and transfer risk in Romania.
  - There are no specific regulatory requirements for banks to include appropriate scenarios into stress testing programs to reflect country and transfer risk analysis.
  - It is unclear how supervisors perform a banking group-wide country risk analysis across entities to form a comprehensive view of country risk.

### Market risk, IRRBB, and operational risk (CPs 22, 23, 25)
- Market risk:
  - As of June 2017, risk weighted assets (RWAs) for market risk were around three percent of total RWAs.
  - None of the banks use the advanced approach for computing market risk capital charges.
  - There is no market risk specialist in the supervision department; one should be assigned to build expertise.
- Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB):
  - The Basel Committee published a new guideline on standards for IRRBB in April 2016, but the NBR has not updated IRRBB rules accordingly.
  - Authorities indicated they are in the process of amending regulation regarding IRRBB.
- Operational risk and ICT:
  - A guideline on cyber security and/or information communication technology (ICT) for banks has not been implemented yet.
  - The SD has one IT systems specialist but does not have a dedicated unit and does not use external IT experts.
  - Authorities plan to hire more IT risk experts and implement new EBA Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment (2017) starting January 2018.

### Financial reporting, auditing and disclosure (CPs 26–28)
- Harmonization and requirements:
  - Financial reporting, auditing and disclosure requirements are largely harmonized at the EU level.
  - Banks are required to prepare financial statements in compliance with the IFRS and have them certified by an external auditor which complies with international audit standards.
- Auditor rotation and tenure:
  - Rotation requirements are implemented since 2014, either for the firm or the signing partner; most banks rotated the firm.
  - Five small banks appointed their external auditor in 2001–08 and only rotated the signing partner; the NBR confirmed tenure of these signing partners did not exceed seven years.
  - There is no internal methodology defining criteria used by the NBR to assess adequacy of banks’ rotation policies or to set a maximum time limit to guide supervisory assessments.
- Disclosure practices:
  - Financial and prudential disclosure requirements are detailed and largely unified at the EU level and fully apply to banks incorporated in Romania on an annual basis.
  - The NBR verifies individual disclosure requirements and publishes detailed and updated information on banking activities and risks.
  - Recommendation: Conduct a review of disclosure practices across the entire industry.

*Source: cr18171 - 38.      The supervisory approach of the NBR has changed towards a more risk based*

### 57.      In recent years, the Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism

### 57.      In recent years, the Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision of the NBR was strengthened particularly to be in line with the changes imposed by the new European Directive

### Strengthening of AML/CFT supervisory framework
- AML/CFT supervision of the NBR was strengthened to align with changes imposed by the new European Directive.
- The new European regulatory framework Directive (EU) 2015/849 provides a number of requirements on risk-based supervision.
- A newly enhanced AML/CFT law is to be submitted for the Parliament’s legislative procedure.

### Implementation of a risk-based approach
- The NBR is in the early stages of implementing a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision.
- The NBR has assessed the Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (ML/TF) risks.
- The NBR has ranked banks as part of its risk assessment.
- The NBR has established a detailed methodology for a risk-based approach to its AML/CFT supervisory activities.

*Source: cr18171 - 57. In recent years, the Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision of the NBR was strengthened particularly to be in line with the changes imposed by the new European Directive.*

### 58.      Nevertheless, several shortcomings remain. Under Romanian law, only correspondent

### cr18171 - 58.      Nevertheless, several shortcomings remain. Under Romanian law, only correspondent

### AML/CFT shortcoming: correspondent banking due diligence
- Under Romanian law, only correspondent banking relationships with banks outside the EU are subject to enhanced due diligence measures.
- Under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standard, enhanced due diligence should be implemented with respect to all correspondent banking relationships; no exception is currently made for intra EU correspondent banking relationships.
- Simplified due diligence is imposed in specific circumstances without a sound assessment that would have established that these circumstances present low ML/TF risks.

### Supervisory framework overview (Principle 1)
- Banking supervision in Romania falls within the responsibility of the central bank, the National Bank of Romania (NBR), the only domestic prudential supervisor for banks in Romania (Article 3 of the NBR statute).
- As an EU member, important responsibilities regarding banking supervision are harmonized, coordinated or exercised at the EU or eurozone levels.
- NBR supervisory objectives focus on ensuring financial stability, protecting the interests of depositors and ensuring a sound and viable banking sector (Article 2–1 of the NBR statute; Article 2–2–b: “to conduct the authorization, regulation and prudential supervision of credit institutions and to promote and oversee the smooth operation of the payment systems with a view to ensuring financial stability.”; Article 164 of the banking law: “for protecting the interests of depositors and ensuring a sound and viable banking sector, the National Bank of Romania shall carry on the prudential oversight of credit institutions.”)
- Banking law Article 4: “the National Bank of Romania is the competent authority for the regulation, licensing, prudential supervision of credit institutions”.

Findings on Essential Criteria (ECs) under Principle 1:
- EC1: Responsibilities and objectives are clearly defined in legislation and publicly disclosed; NBR is the sole domestic prudential supervisor.
- EC2: Primary objective is to promote safety and soundness; both banking law Article 164 and NBR statute Article 2–2 assign this responsibility.
- EC3: Laws and regulations provide framework to set and enforce minimum prudential standards; NBR statute Article 25 empowers NBR to issue regulations and apply sanctions. NBR can increase prudential requirements for individual banks (Article 226–3 and 226–4). SREP allows annual review for additional capital requirements; for subsidiaries of EU banks, additional capital requirements require joint decision with the home supervisor.
- EC4: Banking laws, regulations and prudential standards are frequently updated; the banking law was amended every year (except 2014) since it was passed in 2006. Draft laws and regulations are subject to public consultation under Law No. 52/2003; NBR publishes draft regulations on its website for public consultation and then publishes final regulations in the Official Gazette (Article 56 of the NBR Statute).
- EC5: NBR has full information-gathering and investigatory powers (Article 225–5; Article 225–8; Article 171). Article 176 defines consolidated supervision scope; NBR supervises subsidiaries and branches of non-EU countries (Article 67 and following).
- EC6: NBR has powers to require timely corrective action, impose sanctions and revoke licenses; NBR cooperates with relevant authorities for orderly resolution (see CP 3 and CP 11 references in source).
- EC7: NBR can review activities of parent companies and affiliated companies; Article 225 grants broad investigatory powers over credit institutions, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and mixed-activity holding companies. Regulation 6 requires annual shareholder statements and information for qualifying holdings.

Assessment of Principle 1:
- Compliant.
- Comments: NBR is the central supervisor; primary objective is safety and soundness; EU-level harmonization affects responsibilities and passporting enables EU banks to set up branches or provide services in Romania under home supervision. Laws and regulations are regularly updated and NBR has powers to take corrective actions and sanctions.

### Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors (Principle 2)

Governance and independence (EC1–EC5):
- NBR Board composition (Article 33): nine members — four executives (Governor as Chair, a senior deputy governor and two deputy governors) and five nonexecutive directors. Board members are appointed for a renewable five-year term by Parliament on recommendation of the competent standing committees of the two Chambers of Parliament.
- Board member appointment timeline: last appointed in October 2014 except a deputy governor who resigned in October 2016 and was replaced in April 2017. A majority (five) of Board members were appointed over eight years ago (Governor first appointed in 1990, senior deputy Governor in 2004, two members present on the Board in 2004 and one in 2009).
- Supervisory committee (Article 32; Regulation 99/2): 10 members including the Governor as chair; responsibilities include assessing banking risks, approving on-site examination program, approving or rejecting individual bank requests (with limited exceptions), approving sanctions based on on-site findings, and validating materials for the Board. The committee met 24 times in 2016.
- Independence provisions: NBR statute Article 1 declares NBR independent; Article 3 prohibits NBR or its decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from public authorities; Article 34 restricts Board political affiliations. The Minister of Public Finance and State secretary may participate in Board without voting rights (Article 33); Ministry stated it never participated. In practice NBR has been able to independently express its opinion; no identified compromise to supervisory independence in review.
- Accountability: banking law Article 224 requires NBR to disclose laws, regulations, options and discretions, methodologies used in SREP, and aggregate statistical data including number and nature of supervisory measures and administrative penalties. NBR statute Article 35 requires annual report to Parliament; 2016 NBR report contained governance, licensing, supervision implementation, SREP distributions, on-site program and statistics on corrective measures and sanctions. NBR supervision is subject to internal audit.
- EC2 (appointment/removal): Governor and first deputy Governor appointed by Parliament; processes and criteria of standing committees are not known. Article 33 states recall by Parliament only if conditions no longer met or guilty of serious misconduct; appointments, retirements and recalls must be published and can be appealed to the High Court of Cassation and Justice within 15 days. No explicit provision that reasons for removal are publicly disclosed. No Board member removals occurred (resignation of deputy Governor in 2016 noted).
- EC4 (internal governance): NBR has regulation defining supervisory committee responsibilities and detailed senior management responsibilities. First deputy governor has sole responsibility to approve most measures; inspection teams propose corrective measures or sanctions through written order to first deputy governor. Decision processes include a first deputy governor’s counselor for consistency checks.
- EC5 (credibility and conflicts): Codes of ethics exist at Board, NBR and supervisory staff level; code for supervisory staff latest version October 2015. Statute Article 52 requires confidentiality; code states disclosure of confidential information constitutes misconduct and is sanctioned under applicable law. No specific post-employment cooling-off period exists.

Resourcing and capacity (EC6):
- Financing: Supervision financed out of NBR overall budget approved by its Board; no transfers from Ministry of Finance and no industry levies. NBR reported profits of 783 million RON (196 million USD) in 2015 and 125 million RON (31 million) in 2016; capital and reserves totaled 17.8 billion RON -4.5 billion USD- in 2016.
- Staffing: NBR supervision department had 131 staff at end-2016 (55 percent with off-site and 45 percent with on-site) and 42 staff in the regulation and licensing department at the end of 2016. Senior staff are very experienced (director, deputy director and heads of division have at least 14 years in the department).
- Vacancies: 17 in 2017, 8 in 2016, 8 in 2015, 13 in 2014, and 5 in 2013.
- Recruitment and retention: rigorous hiring process (public advertisement, written exam, interview, psychometric exam); most hires have five to six years of professional experience. NBR considered an attractive employer; median salary reported above industry average in a 2014 formal review. Turnover largely due to retirements: turnover reached 6.9 percent for the first nine months of 2017, 4.7 percent in 2016, 1.9 percent in 2015, and 4 percent in 2014.
- Skills and gaps: challenges recruiting candidates with rare skills (quantitative or IT banking expertise). NBR can commission external experts and runs training programs; technology and travel budgets described as sufficient for supervisory work.

Key quotes from legislation and regulations cited:
- NBR statute Article 2–2–b: “the main tasks of the National Bank of Romania shall be: [...] to conduct the authorization, regulation and prudential supervision of credit institutions and to promote and oversee the smooth operation of the payment systems with a view to ensuring financial stability. “
- Banking law Article 164: “for protecting the interests of depositors and ensuring a sound and viable banking sector, the National Bank of Romania shall carry on the prudential oversight of credit institutions.”
- NBR statute Article 25 empowers NBR to: “(a) Issue regulations, take measures for their observance and apply legal sanctions in cases of infringement and (b) check and verify, based on off-site and on-site supervision.”
- Banking law Article 225: NBR “shall have all information gathering and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of its functions.”
- Banking law Article 176: defines cases where supervision shall be applied on a consolidated basis.

*Source: cr18171 - extract of IMF Detailed Assessment chapter on Romania (as supplied).*

### 0.4 percent in 2013). Resignations are exceptional and generally linked to staff moving to

### cr18171 - 0.4 percent in 2013). Resignations are exceptional and generally linked to staff moving to

### Resources, staffing, and use of external experts
- Resignations are exceptional and generally linked to staff moving to international institutions (e.g., ECB).
- NBR indicated that no staff working on supervisory issues left NBR to work in a commercial bank in recent years.
- Training, travel and IT budgets are appropriate to allow NBR to perform its supervisory work, including actively engaging in international cooperation (e.g., colleges of supervisors and EBA working groups).
- Overall budgets in these areas are approved annually by the Board; within overall envelopes approved by the Board for NBR adjustments can be made during the year where additional needs surface.
- NBR has the power and overall budget necessary to commission external experts (Article 203 of the banking law allows NBR to use such experts and, for financial auditors, Article 52 of the NBR statute specifically mentions this should comply with confidentiality requirements).
- NBR had not used external experts to perform supervisory activities in recent years (in some cases, it asked banks to hire external experts e.g., to conduct independent reviews of collateral valuation see CP 18).

### EC7 — Annual skills identification and gap-bridging
- Supervisors regularly take stock of existing skills and projected requirements over the short- and medium-term, taking into account relevant emerging supervisory practices.
- The identification of skills required is conducted on an annual basis in the process of staff performance assessment which is performed by each head of division in the first quarter.
- General training needs for all relevant staff are identified, such as: liquidity requirements, SREP, IFRS 9, Recovery Plans.
- Participation in colleges of supervisors, committees, working groups and task forces set up at the EBA level and joint on-site visits performed in the context of Review panel assessment also contribute to building skills.

### EC8 — Risk-based allocation of supervisory programs and resources
- In determining supervisory programs and allocating resources, supervisors take into account the risk profile and systemic importance of individual banks and banking groups, and the different mitigation approaches available.
- All banks are subject to annual full-scope on-site examinations and close on-going off-site supervision (see CP 8 and 9).
- As part of the supervisory review and examination program (SREP), conducted on an annual basis, the risk profile and systemic importance of individual banks and banking groups are assessed. These findings guide the allocation of supervisory resources.

### EC9 — Legal protections for supervisors and staff
- Laws provide protection to the supervisor and its staff against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith. The supervisor and its staff are adequately protected against the costs of defending their actions and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith.
- The NBR statute Article 25 mentions that: “the members of the NBR’s Board and the NBR’s employees charged with prudential supervision tasks shall not be subject to any civil or penal sanctions, as the case may be, if the Court finds that these persons fulfilled or failed to fulfill, in good faith and with due care, any action or fact related to the discharge, by law, of prudential supervision tasks. “The costs associated with the judicial proceedings instituted against [these] persons [...] shall be borne by the NBR.”
- These provisions were effectively applied in cases when NBR and its staff were sued by banks, their shareholders, directors or senior management.
- There is however no legal provision protecting the NBR against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith.

### Assessment of Principle 2 — Key findings and recommended enhancements
- Assessment: Materially Noncompliant.
- Strengths:
  - NBR possesses stable governance arrangements (including a Governor and first deputy Governor appointed for the first time in 1990 and 2004 respectively) and effective operational independence, facilitated by adequate funding provided out of incomes it generates.
  - It can publicly voice concerns regarding parliamentary or government initiatives affecting banking safety and soundness and consistently supervise all banks, irrespective of ownership structure.
  - NBR dedicates generous resources to supervision, in terms of staff, equipment and other variable costs, with appropriate flexibility in allocation to respond to emerging priorities.
- Weaknesses and recommended actions:
  - Parliamentary subcommittees responsible for the appointment of NBR board members shall publish rigorous fit and proper criteria.
  - The central bank statute shall be revised so that the Minister of Public Finance (and its State secretary) may not participate to NBR board meetings.
  - It should be required that the reason(s) for removal of a board member are disclosed.
  - The NBR as an institution should, in addition to its board members and staff, also be protected against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging its duties in good faith.
  - Internal governance: the decision to approve sanctions or orders is the sole responsibility of the first deputy governor; there is no internal guidance available to assist the first deputy governor in determining adequate decisions.
  - The number of vacant positions increased significantly in 2017, largely due to retirements. Although this did not hamper effective supervision, NBR should fill these positions as soon as possible and ensure recruitment processes can be completed ahead of planned retirements.
  - NBR adopted detailed arrangements to prevent and manage conflicts of interests at all levels. These should be complemented by a post-employment or cooling-off policy to govern situations where a staff or Board member intends to take a position in a bank supervised by NBR; effective monitoring and possible sanctions should be associated to this regime.

### Principle 3 — Cooperation and collaboration (EC1) and microprudential arrangements
- EC1: Arrangements, formal or informal, are in place for cooperation, including analysis and sharing of information, and undertaking collaborative work, with all domestic authorities with responsibility for the safety and soundness of banks, other financial institutions and/or the stability of the financial system. There is evidence that these arrangements work in practice, where necessary.
- The banking law Article 218–1 and the statutes of the central bank Article 3 authorize NBR to exchange information with other domestic authorities responsible for the safety and soundness of the financial system, other financial institutions and financial stability (including deposit insurance, reorganization, resolution and liquidation).
- Cooperation is explicitly contemplated with external auditors (see CP 29 for AML/CFT aspects).
- Internal arrangements facilitate close cooperation within NBR between the supervisory function and other relevant functions (financial stability, resolution, etc.).

On microprudential supervision:
- The banking law requires NBR and the Financial supervision authority (ASF) to enter written cooperation arrangements (Article 189 of the banking law). An MOU was last updated in 2007.
- Three banks are listed, including the largest domestic bank (13.2 percent of assets at end 2016).
- NBR mentioned that nonbanking activities (including some under NBR supervision such as leasing) remain relatively limited in size (<10 percent of consolidated assets), even if several banks have small insurance and securities subsidiaries.
- No bank is controlled by an insurance or securities firm.
- The banking law requires that “for the exercise of their supervisory tasks on an individual and/or on a consolidated basis [... NBR and the ASF] shall provide on request all relevant information and on their own initiative all essential information” (Article 190).
- The banking law further requires, where applicable, consultations prior to taking a “decision of importance” affecting a bank or a financial investment company (Article 191–1) and sharing of any information “likely to simplify their task and to allow supervision of the activity and overall financial situation of the undertakings they supervise” where a bank (or a related holding company) controls one or more subsidiaries that are insurance companies or other undertakings provided investment services (Article 202–1).
- A working procedure was issued in 2012 for the exchange of information among the Romanian financial supervisory authorities (NBR and ASF) with respect to the supervised entities within financial groups. It focuses on information relevant to financial soundness (including changes in the structure of the financial group, developments that may significantly affect other entities of the group in terms of capitalization, liquidity, profitability, asset quality etc., sanctions and exceptional measures taken by authorities).

*IMF staff report excerpt.*

### conclusions of controls).

### cr18171 - conclusions of controls).

### Cooperation and coordination between NBR and ASF
- Exchanges between NBR and the ASF are primarily written and related to authorization and modification of the situation of institutions supervised by the two authorities (and related persons who require approval by NBR or the ASF).
- On-site examination processes are not coordinated; no joint or coordinated inspections have taken place. Technical meetings between NBR and ASF staff tasked with supervisory responsibilities are exceptional.
- There are no regular meetings between NBR and ASF to:
  - discuss the situation and risk profiles of individual institutions active in banking and another sector supervised by the ASF (e.g., governance, disclosure requirements, financial reporting), or
  - coordinate (or agree on joint) supervisory actions, including on-site examination.
- Considering some banks are listed and many have financial groups, regular meetings would be beneficial (both for NBR and the ASF) (See CP8).

### Macroprudential oversight — National Committee for Macroprudential Oversight (NCMO)
- A MOU in July 2007 created the National Committee for Financial Stability; Law 12/2017 (17 March 2017) replaced it with the National Committee for Macroprudential Oversight (NCMO).
- NCMO composition: NBR (three board members), the ASF (three Board members), and the Government/Ministry of Finance (three Board members).
- NCMO responsibilities (Article 3 of Law 12/2017) include:
  - identifying, collecting and analyzing information related to its objective;
  - identifying, monitoring and assessing systemic risk and identifying systemically important financial institutions and financial system structures;
  - preparing a strategy on macroprudential policy;
  - issuing recommendations and warnings to prevent or mitigate systemic risks (and monitor implementation);
  - setting and monitoring intermediate objectives and instruments of macroprudential policy;
  - coordination of financial crisis management.
- NCMO powers:
  - entitled to request all relevant data and information necessary for its objective from NBR, ASF, other authorities and institutions (if appropriate confidentiality arrangements are in place);
  - required to provide the MOPF, NBR and the ASF with relevant information necessary to fulfil their tasks.
- NCMO issued five recommendations in 2017 (as of November), including working groups on households’ indebtedness and firms’ financial soundness. It is unclear whether initiatives led by NCMO members (or other initiatives) that could impact bank safety and soundness are systematically reviewed in NCMO (example: proposed reduction in tax deductibility of provisions on nonperforming loans).

### Information exchange and cooperation with domestic counterparties
- Bank Resolution Law No. 312/2015 contains provisions (Article 4, Article 6, Articles 469–472) on exchange of information, cooperation and coordination of authorities; an MOU exists between NBR and the Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund (April 2012, amended 2016 and 2017).
- Arrangements, formal or informal, are in place for cooperation, analysis and sharing of information with relevant foreign supervisors of banks and banking groups (EC2).

### Cooperation with foreign supervisors and EU institutions
- Banking law Articles 215 and NBR statutes Article 3 authorize NBR to cooperate with foreign supervisors, including EU and third country supervisors, the European Systemic Risk Board and the European Banking Authority (EBA). Article 222 allows NBR to share information with specified EU bodies.
- The ECB/SSM has been home supervisor for banking groups whose subsidiaries and branches have a combined market share of 72 percent of banking assets in Romania (end 2016) since 2014. NBR actively cooperates with the ECB/SSM, even if an MOU is still to be signed.
- NBR is a member of 15 supervisory colleges covering the main EU banking groups active in Romania.
- NBR concluded cooperation agreements with competent authorities of third countries (Republic of Moldova, Turkey, Lebanon). Lack of MOU with Israel has not impeded collaboration where needed.
- Evidence that cooperation arrangements work in practice where necessary.

### Confidentiality and use of confidential information (EC3 / EC4)
- Articles 215, 217, and 218 of the banking law allow NBR to provide confidential information to domestic, EU and third country authorities subject to “professional secrecy” requirements similar to Article 214.
- For EU counterparts, confidentiality regimes are considered equivalent under CRD IV (Article 53). MOUs with EU authorities can include specific confidentiality requirements (example provided from MOU with Bank of Italy).
- For third-country authorities, NBR performed its own assessment of equivalence of confidentiality regimes where EBA equivalence was not available; cooperation occurs outside supervisory colleges.
- Article 216 requires NBR to use confidential information received from other supervisors for bank-specific or system-wide supervisory purposes only. Quoted permitted uses (Article 216) include: checking prudential conditions, imposing penalties, appeals, and court proceedings.
- Article 219–2: information originating in another Member State shall not be disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which disclosed it.
- There is no explicit statutory provision in the banking law equivalent to Article 219–2 for information received from non-EU authorities; NBR indicates these aspects are covered in MOUs as applicable.

### Recovery and resolution arrangements (EC5)
- Per Law 312/2015, NBR is the resolution authority for banks. The resolution function at NBR is operationally independent and structurally separated from the supervisory function.
- Internal procedures exist regarding information flow, frequency and transmission between Bank Resolution Department (resolution) and Supervision Department (supervision) for recovery and resolution.
- Recovery requirements under Law 312/2015:
  - Each bank (not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision) must draw up and maintain a recovery plan.
  - Supervisory structure provides recovery plans to resolution structure; resolution function examines recovery plans for actions that may adversely impact resolvability and makes recommendations.
  - All banks prepared and sent recovery plans (individual or group). Recovery plans were assessed by off-site supervision and during on-site inspections.
- Resolution requirements:
  - NBR shall draw up a resolution plan for each bank under its remit (individual or group level where applicable).
  - Resolution structure draws up resolution plan after consulting supervisory structure; supervisory structure transmits available information relevant to resolution planning.
  - Article 180(1) of Law No. 312/2015 (transposing Article 32(1) of the BRRD): NBR shall take a resolution action only if all the following are met:
    - The NBR (competent authority) determines the credit institution is failing or likely to fail (supervisory structure shall consult resolution structure).
    - No reasonable prospect that failure could be prevented within a reasonable timeframe by private sector measures or supervisory action, including early intervention or write-down/conversion of relevant capital instruments in accordance with Article 359.
    - A resolution action is necessary in the public interest pursuant to Article 182.
- For 2016, NBR participated in drafting or drafted resolution plans for:
  - Fourteen credit institutions that are subsidiaries of cross–border groups (63 percent of the banking assets at end 2016).
  - Eight credit institutions that do not belong to cross–border groups under NBR’s remit (23 percent of banking assets at end 2016).
- Supervisory structure must notify resolution structure without delay upon determining a bank infringes or is likely to infringe key prudential requirements (Article 150 of recovery and resolution law).

### Assessment summary — Principle 3 (Cooperation and information sharing)
- Assessment: Largely Compliant.
- Key comments:
  - Arrangements facilitate cooperation with domestic and foreign authorities; intense cooperation among EU authorities jointly supervises EU banking groups with combined market share of 76 percent of banking assets in Romania (see CP 13).
  - Cooperation among domestic authorities is organized, including with ASF for macroprudential matters within NCMO.
  - Lack of regular meetings between NBR and ASF to discuss individual institutions or coordinate joint supervisory actions is a gap; regular meetings would be beneficial.
  - Processes for coordination between NBR supervisory and resolution functions implemented following Law 312/2015; recovery and resolution plans were prepared and implemented in 2016 and 2017.
  - Recommendation: add explicit provisions in the banking law regarding treatment of information received from authorities outside the EU (no disclosure without permission of originating supervisor and prompt notification when disclosure is legally required) to strengthen practices currently covered by MOUs.

### Permissible activities and use of the word “bank” (Principle 4)
- Article 7–1 defines banking activity as taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public and granting credits for its own account.
- Article 18–1 lists permissible activities for “credit institutions,” including deposit taking, lending (consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring), financial leasing, payment services, issuing/administrating means of payment, guarantees, trading for own account or for customers, participation in securities issues, portfolio management, safekeeping of financial instruments, issuing of electronic money, operations with precious metals, acquiring participations in capital of other entities, and other financial activities under special laws.
- Article 6 prohibits use of the name “bank” and derivations by unauthorized persons, with specified exceptions.
- Article 5 reserves taking deposits from the public to authorized credit institutions; exceptions exist for certain public authorities and cases under Romanian or EU law; NBR indicated no institution fell into exception (iii).
- Law on NBFIs prohibits them from taking deposits; credit unions and post office cannot take deposits from public members in general.
- Article 417 requires registration of credit institutions; NBR publishes an updated list of credit institutions and authorized branches on its website.
- Assessment of Principle 4: Compliant.

### Licensing criteria and process (Principle 5)
- NBR has exclusive competence to grant/withdraw licenses for:
  - Banks incorporated in Romania (as of October 2017: 25 banks had a full license and two were housing banks),
  - Branches of banks of countries outside the EU (as of October 2017, no branch from a third country was licensed),
  - Credit cooperatives (as of October 2017: one credit cooperative central body licensed as a bank and 41 individual credit cooperatives; aggregated assets represent 0.3 percent of banking assets).
- EU passporting regime allows banks licensed in another EU country to offer services in Romania via branch or freedom to provide services; NBR receives notification and may communicate nonprudential requirements but cannot impose prudential requirements on EU branches.
- NBR issued Regulation 11 (authorization) in 2007 (amended 2009 and 2011); EBA RTS/ITS drafts may replace parts once issued.
- NBR can reject applications if criteria not fulfilled or information inadequate (Article 38–1) and can withdraw license if based on false information (Article 39).
- Licensing elements cover ownership structure, governance, strategic and operating plans, internal controls, risk management, and financial projections. Specific observations:
  - Last bank licensed in Romania was in 2009; no recent applications. Recommendation: involve supervision (and resolution where applicable) staff closely for any new applications given supervisory evolutions since 2009.
  - Expectations and information requirements related to detection and prevention of criminal activities could usefully be described in more detail.
- Initial capital requirements (Articles 11, 70, 345 and Regulation 5/2013 Article 249):
  - 37 million RON (9.25 million USD) for a bank licensed in Romania or a branch of a third country (unless only mortgage activities);
  - 25 million RON (6.125 million USD) for a mortgage bank or building society;
  - Equivalent in RON of 10 million EUR (9 million USD) for the entire network of credit cooperatives including at least equivalent in RON of 5 million EUR (4.2 million USD) for the central body and 300,000 RON (75.000 USD) for each individual credit cooperative.
- Fit and proper requirements (Article 108, Regulation 11 Article 17) include assessment over the last ten years of conflicts with supervisors, sanctions, denials of approval, criminal or administrative proceedings; board collective knowledge requirement covered under Article 108–4.
- Assessment of Principle 5: Compliant.
- Comments include need to involve supervision/resolution staff in potential future licensing and clarifications on contact with home supervisors for shareholders with banking interests in third countries.

### Transfer of significant ownership (Principle 6)
- Definitions and thresholds follow CRR/CRD IV qualifying holding concept (10 percent in CRR; proposed acquisition defined by Article 7 as reaching 20 percent, 33 percent, or 50 percent or making bank a subsidiary).
- Regulation 11 Article 2 defines significant shareholder.
- Notification and assessment procedures (Article 25):
  - Proposed acquirer must notify NBR in advance when intending to acquire 20 percent, 33 percent, or 50 percent of capital or voting rights; if notification cannot be in advance, notify from date of acquisition.
  - NBR acknowledges receipt within two days and indicates assessment period expiration, which shall not exceed 60 working days after all required documents are received.
  - NBR may require additional information no later than the 50th business day; proposed acquirer must provide within 20 working days.
  - Assessment period may be extended by 30 days if proposed acquirer is outside EU or not subject to prudential supervision.
  - If NBR does not oppose within assessment period in writing, it is deemed approved.
- NBR shall assess suitability of proposed acquirer against criteria including reputation, competence, financial soundness, group structure allowing effective supervision, and AML/CTF concerns (Article 26).
- No statutory definition of beneficial ownership; questionnaires require identification of “real beneficiaries” with a natural person emphasis, but a definition of ultimate beneficial owner could be introduced.
- NBR powers where acquisition occurs without notification or despite opposition:
  - issue order to cease conduct and suspend voting rights (Articles 229–2 and 2291);
  - require sale within three months or cancel shares and reduce share capital (Article 232).
- Banks must provide annually financial information related to shareholders with qualifying holdings (Regulation 6 Article 15 16) and a statement of all shareholders.
- No specific regulatory duty for banks to notify NBR as soon as they become aware of material information negatively affecting a major shareholder’s suitability.
- Assessment of Principle 6: Largely Compliant.
- Comments: In the past five years, 33 requests for changes in significant ownership were received; 31 approved and two denied (2013 and 2014) for reasons of insufficient integrity and insufficient transparency of shareholders abroad.

### Major acquisitions (Principle 7)
- Regime based on qualifying holding concept: prior approval required where acquisition of qualifying holding in a third country entity would include that entity in prudential consolidation (Article 146).
- Notification within five business days required for other qualifying holdings (Article 147).
- CRR limits individual participations to 15 percent of bank’s own funds and aggregate to 60 percent; banking law Article 144 prohibits acquiring qualifying holdings that would make the entity a subsidiary if Article 89 limits breached.
- For establishment of branches abroad:
  - Within EU: notification process; NBR has three months to communicate info to EU host supervisor or oppose establishment if administrative or financial inadequacy identified.
  - Third country branch: Article 91 requires prior approval; NBR may reject on grounds including inadequate financial standing, impediments to NBR’s supervisory functions, or inappropriate prudential indicators.
- Assessment of Principle 7: Compliant.
- Comments: NBR reviewed and approved four acquisition requests in past five years (mergers among Romanian banks); rigorous reviews applied for large/deteriorated targets.

### Supervisory approach (Principle 8)
- NBR implemented EBA SREP Guidelines (EBA/GL/2014/13) as of January 1, 2016. SREP components include categorization, monitoring of key indicators, business model analysis, governance assessment, risks to capital and liquidity, capital and liquidity adequacy assessments, overall SREP assessment and supervisory measures.
- Institution categorization into four categories:
  - Category 1 - OSII;
  - Category 2 - large and medium institutions other than OSII with universal business model and market share by assets more than 5 percent;
  - Category 3 - small and medium credit institutions with universal business model and market share by assets below or equal to 5 percent;
  - Category 4 - specialized credit institutions, respective savings bank for housing.
- SREP assessment performed on-site annually for all 28 supervised banks or banking groups (Article 166 NBR Regulation No. 5/2013); leads to overall SREP score updated off-site as developments occur.
- NBR is not differentiating frequency of full-scope examinations based on outcome of risk profile analysis; asset size and previous year SREP score are main determinants of examination periods and number of examiners.
- KRI framework: 26 KRIs used for scoring (from total of 34 KRIs); KRI thresholds can trigger SREP updates outside annual cycle. Monitoring uses supervisory reporting and additional reports: FINREP solo monthly, classification of loans and investments monthly, NBR NPL loans by client monthly, asset sales monthly, liquidity reports weekly and monthly.
- Resolution Department assesses resolvability and communicates with Supervision Department; no clear methodology on how resolvability assessments are quantitatively fed into supervisory activities, though considered qualitatively in SREP.
- FSD performs top-down stress tests and publishes FSRs half-yearly; results shared with SD.
- Gaps and recommendations:
  - New EBA SREP methodology in early stages; supervisory frequency not fully risk-differentiated.
  - Limited embedding of forward-looking views in off-site monitoring (no bottom-up supervisory stress-testing tools or early warning indicators).
  - Limited industry-wide thematic analyses and cross-system examinations; none in 2016 and 2017.
  - No systematic process or regular meetings with ASF before on-site examinations of banking groups to discuss group-wide risks.
  - Suggested supervisory approach actions:
    - Enhance off-site monitoring tools with forward-looking methods (e.g., bottom-up stress testing).
    - Enhance yearly examination planning/approval to set proposed priorities for each bank/banking group.
    - Establish systematic framework collecting relevant information from NBFI (including securities and insurance supervisors) to facilitate on-site examination.
    - Conduct thematic analyses/examinations across banking system on particular risks (e.g., cyber security).

- Assessment of Principle 8: Largely Compliant.

### Supervisory techniques and tools (Principle 9)
- Supervision integrated within Supervision Department (SD) coordinated by First Deputy Governor; three inspection divisions with both on-site and off-site responsibilities.
- On-site:
  - Two types of missions: full-scope inspections (typically 2–5 weeks) and targeted inspections (specific issues).
  - Team sizes: usually 3 to 10 people; larger teams for OSIIs. All credit institutions subject to a full-scope examination per EBA SREP guidelines.
  - Annual on-site full-scope inspection required by legislation; in practice all supervised credit institutions included in annual program.
  - No dedicated team for internal model analysis within SD; FSD quantitative assessment division assists for advanced approaches.
- Off-site:
  - Line supervisors (off-site examiners and analysts) assigned to each institution; rotation of personnel and banks.
  - Off-site monitors overall risk profile, approves/rejects changes requiring NBR approval (persons, auditors, acquisitions), and participates in college activities.
  - Off-site sets preliminary risk profile prior to on-site missions and compiles risk assessment templates and credit institution templates.
- Planning and coordination:
  - Internal procedures describe on/off-site workflows; annual on-site examination program approved by Supervisory Committee.
  - No formal process to set proposed priorities and inspection plans for following year that would inform decision-making body before approval.
  - Team selection for visits approved by head of inspection division and SD management.
- Information and tools:
  - Wide range of supervisory reporting and external sources used; NBR has power to collect any information from credit institutions (Article 171 (2) of Banking Law).
  - Sources include prudential reports, credit registers, Credit Risk Bureau, Payment Incident Bureau, ITS reporting, FINREP, NPL reports, liquidity reports.
  - KRI monitoring system and centralized SREP capital requirement breakdowns enable peer comparisons and horizontal assessments.
- Use of supervisory techniques:
  - Analysis of financial statements, business model analysis, peer reviews, review of stress test outcomes, and corporate governance analysis are performed; findings communicated and remedial actions required via supervisory letters, written orders, and enhanced reporting.
  - SD lacks dedicated bottom-up stress-testing tools; relies on banks’ ICAAP stress tests and FSD top-down exercises.
  - Internal audit functions assessed annually on-site; off-site analysis captures internal control issues from reports submitted by banks.
- Assessment of Principle 9: (findings described under EC1–EC6 above as Largely Compliant in some respects; see Principle 9 detailed EC findings).

*Source: cr18171 - conclusions of controls).*

### conclusions and recommendations of the internal audit and implementation suggested by

### conclusions and recommendations of the internal audit and implementation suggested by

### Internal audit and management approval
- Internal audit reports are used as preliminary inputs into the supervisory assessment and potential areas of risks are further investigated by the supervisory team.
- In Romania, internal audit managers are subject to NBR’s prior approval by legislation (NBR Regulation No. 6/2008).
- Individuals in middle level management positions performing important activities in banks need approval by NBR and internal audit activities are one of the key functions.

### Supervisor contacts with boards and management (EC7)
- The supervisor maintains sufficiently frequent contacts as appropriate with the bank’s Board, nonexecutive Board members and senior and middle management (including heads of individual business units and control functions) to develop an understanding of and assess matters such as strategy, group structure, corporate governance, performance, capital adequacy, liquidity, asset quality, risk management systems and internal controls.
- The NBR has regular meetings with the bank’s senior and middle management, and other representatives; subjects such as strategies and business model are challenged and discussed with the bank’s senior management and board members.
- Various forms of contact: meetings between NBR senior management and credit institution board members on strategic plans and systemic risks; contacts during on-site inspections and off-site surveillance.
- On-site mission contacts occur when SREP elements are examined; meetings usually take place at the beginning of on-site mission and throughout as needed.
- Off-site supervision meetings are held as needed to clarify technical matters, monitor correction of irregularities, or share views on specific issues.

### Communication of supervisory findings (EC8)
- The supervisor communicates on- and off-site supervisory analyses in a timely manner by written reports or through discussions/meetings with bank management.
- All findings of supervisory work are formalized in writing through letters or reports and are discussed with the bank’s management.
- Off-site supervisory analyses are communicated on at least a quarterly basis.
- External auditor findings are discussed with bank management when necessary.
- Weakness identified: there is no systematic process of regular meeting with nonexecutive/independent members after on-site examination to discuss findings and remedial actions; contact with such members rarely occurs during on-site missions. (See CP 14)

### Follow-up, enforcement and sanctions (EC9)
- Follow up for supervisory measures is performed as part of on-site and off-site activities, based on documents provided by banks and correlated with deadlines imposed for implementation.
- Sanctions are imposed on responsible entities within the bank/senior management and/or bank’s board members in case of failure to implement prescribed measures in a timely manner.
- A dedicated section to disclose sanctions imposed by the supervisory authority to credit institutions is available on the NBR’s website (http://www.bnro.ro/Sancțiuni-emise-de-BNR-12553.aspx).
- Assessors saw cases where sanctions were imposed to all board members and senior management when failure of implementation of supervisory measures occurred.
- The supervisory authority can impose measures and sanctions when reports are not compliant with the reporting framework in place (Banking Law Article 228 Paragraph 1).

### Notification of material changes (EC10)
- The supervisor requires banks to notify it in advance of substantive changes or as soon as aware of material adverse developments, including breach of legal or prudential requirements.
- Notifications or prior approval on certain activities are required by regulatory framework (e.g., NBR Regulation No. 6/2008 Article 3 and 4).
- Some changes are subject to NBR prior approval; requirements described in NBRs and other EU regulations.

### Use of independent third parties (EC11)
- Supervisor may use independent third parties provided there is a clear and detailed mandate; final prudential responsibilities remain with supervisory authority (Article 170 of Banking Law).
- To date there have been no cases of outsourcing prudential responsibilities.
- External auditors mainly audit annual financial statements; management letters usually submitted to NBR or presented during on-site missions.
- Certain requests by SD require certification of results from external auditors (e.g., NPLs identification, collaterals evaluation, stress-test exercise estimating expected impact over exposures as of June 2017 following IFRS 9 implementation).
- NBR has started organizing meetings with financial auditors of credit institutions to exchange information of common interest.

### Information systems for prudential data (EC12)
- A Banking System Assessment, Methodology and Supervision Procedures Division within the SD monitors and processes a broad range of financial information and prudential reports; results shared regularly with management and on-/off-site teams.
- Main electronic systems used:
  - ABACUS — for financial information and prudential reports of credit institutions with consolidation perimeter (FINREP at consolidated level, COREP, Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), Large Exposures, NSFR, AE, ALMM);
  - SIRBNR — for financial reports of other Romanian credit institutions, legal entities, at individual level, and branches in Romania of Member State and third-country credit institutions; also for other prudential reports (benchmark remuneration, high earner remuneration);
  - RCI — for prudential reports (individual COREP), banks’ internal regulations, accounting balances and ad-hoc reports requested by NBR.
- These systems facilitate analysis of prudential information and aid identification of areas requiring follow-up action.

### Periodic independent review (AC1)
- Adequacy and effectiveness of supervisory process is periodically assessed by EBA and the internal audit function within the NBR.
- Technical areas such as IT data securities or workflows are audited by internal audit once every 2–3 years.
- Recommendations for improvements are addressed and subject to follow up by these entities.

### Assessment of SREP and supervisory resource allocation
- Assessment: Largely Compliant.
- Comments:
  - SREP methodology deploys a good mix of on-site and off-site supervisory tools; NBR has comprehensive supervisory tools and data collection power; Central Credit Register provides high-granularity data.
  - Process of ensuring consistency and accuracy of scoring, findings and supervisory measures across different banks is weak.
  - Annual supervisory report draft is sent to banks within 60 working days with review of head of inspection division; after discussion and official bank response, final report is issued within two weeks with signature of director of supervision. SREP summary report is reported to the fist deputy governor.
  - There is no structured/independent review to ensure consistency and accuracy on scoring, findings, and measures of the supervisory report. Given recent adoption of EBA SREP methodology in Romania, quality assurance is critical.
  - SREP focuses on assessing capital adequacy; other proactive supervisory approaches may need consideration in company with SREP (See CP8).
  - Off-site function monitors bank risk profile but also handles approval/rejection of amendments in bank’s situation (e.g., nominations, acquisition of qualifying holdings, financial auditors). From 2009 to 2017, the NBR interviewed approximately 1,700 board members, executives, middle managers (key function holders); more than half of the interviewees were middle managers.
  - This approval workload could limit NBR’s capacity for deeper qualitative risk analysis; regulatory cost-benefit exercises may be warranted to optimize supervisory resource allocation.
  - Lack of systematic meetings with nonexecutive/independent board members after on-site examinations is a concern given boards often comprise mostly nonexecutive members and supervisory work relies heavily on annual examinations. Important to keep boards informed promptly after on-site visits. (See CP 14)

### Recommendations for improvements
- Ensure consistency and objectivity in SREP scores, findings and supervisory measures, for example:
  - establish an independent review unit;
  - develop on-site and off-site supervisory assessment handbook;
  - improve an electronic platform to more effectively manage findings, measures, and follow-ups.
- Review off-site activities regarding various approval processes within SD to better focus on qualitative risk analysis.
- Intensify engagement with nonexecutive/independent board members as part of the on-site examination process (See CP 14).

### Supervisory reporting framework (Principle 10 — EC1–EC8)
- Legal powers and reporting standards:
  - NBR statutorily empowered to collect financial statements and other data on both solo and consolidated basis (Article 153, 165, 59, and 171 (2) of Banking Law).
  - EU harmonized supervisory reporting requirements cover: own funds requirements, losses from lending collateralized by immovable property, large exposures, leverage ratio, liquidity coverage and net stable funding requirements, asset encumbrance, additional liquidity monitoring metrics.
  - NBR Regulation No. 5/2013 does not provide derogations or exemptions from the applications of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013.
- COREP and FINREP:
  - All banks required to prepare and deliver COREP based on the harmonized European supervisory reporting framework; EBA ITS on supervisory reporting introduced in Q1 2014 and phased in over years.
  - Frequency varies: monthly (liquidity), quarterly, semi-annual, or annual for some templates.
  - According to EBA ITS, COREP must be reported on both solo and consolidated basis by all banks; FINREP is mandatory at consolidated level only. Solo FINREP remains national discretion; templates in Romania are consistent with consolidated level.
  - COREP covers capital adequacy, liquidity, large exposures, risk concentrations, asset quality, loan loss provisioning, related party transactions, market risk. FINREP covers on- and off-balance sheet assets and liabilities, and P&L.
- Reporting instructions and accounting standards:
  - Romanian banks required to report financial information based on IFRS at consolidated level since January 2006 and at individual level since January 2012.
  - FINREP templates for supervisory purposes are based on IFRS at solo and consolidated level.
  - Reporting instructions for consolidated level included in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 680/2014; solo reporting instructions included in NBR Order No. 6/2014 and NBR Order No. 5/2014.
- Valuation governance (EC3):
  - Valuation of assets and off-balance sheet items effected in accordance with applicable accounting framework (Article 24 of CRR).
  - IFRS introduced for all CIs in 2012; fair value measurement and valuation rules determined by IFRS requirements.
  - Article 105 of CRR sets requirements for prudent valuation; Article 34 requires application of Article 105 when calculating own funds and potential deductions from Common Equity Tier 1.
  - NBR Regulation No. 5/2013 requires management body involvement and allocation of resources for valuation, use of external ratings and internal models.
  - Adherence to IFRS valuation standards (mainly IAS 39, IFRS 13) and other regulations is assessed during on-site missions; inadequate practices may result in supervisory measures including adjustments to provisions or capital.
- Frequency and comparability (EC4–EC5):
  - Reporting frequency and structure follow EU harmonized framework; frequency set depending on complexity, size, and risk profile.
  - In Romania, scope and periodicity are the same for all credit institutions except branches of credit institutions with headquarters in other Member States (not subject to reporting under Regulation (EU) No. 680/2014).
  - NBR can require additional information more frequently (e.g., daily liquidity reporting, more granular NPL data).
  - Harmonized reporting framework ensures comparable data collection for meaningful comparisons across banks; data used for risk indicators, trends, peers, stocks, and flows.
- Powers to request information and access (EC6–EC7):
  - Banking Law provides authority for NBR to require all necessary information (Article 169 Index 1 paragraph 2 and Article 226).
  - Supervisors have access to all bank records and to Board, management and staff when required (Article 171 (1) and (2)).
- Data quality, deadlines, and enforcement (EC8):
  - EU harmonized rules define reporting reference dates; corrections submitted to NCA without undue delay.
  - Off-site process reviews reports for discrepancies; inconsistencies clarified with credit institution; resubmission may be requested.
  - Banking System Assessment, Methodology and Supervision Procedures Division cross-checks submission status; delayed submissions require assessment and approval before acceptance.
  - When reports are delayed or low quality, NBR contacts bank, sets deadline for correction and resubmission; management involvement expected when deadlines or quality requirements not met.
  - Management held responsible for late, missing or inaccurate reports; supervisory report concluded to solve deficiencies within a timeframe when ITS 680/2014 requirements not met.

*Source: cr18171 - conclusions and recommendations of the internal audit and implementation suggested by*

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### cr18171 - conclusions from the said supervisory report, the credit institution has to resubmit the

### Validation, supervisory returns, and use of external experts (EC9–EC12)
- Validation rules for COREP and FINREP reporting are applied on submission; resubmissions are required in cases of errors and noncompliance with the validation rules.
- The NBR carries out plausibility checks after receipt of data, focusing on capital adequacy, liquidity, and FINREP returns.
- The SD staff monitor compliance with reporting deadlines and crosscheck submission status by bank/type of report/reporting date.
- Online validation:
  - Failed validation triggers an automatic system message to the reporting entity.
  - Blocking validation failures prevent system acceptance until the credit institution resolves the issue.
  - Successful submissions prompt supervisory staff to assess failed nonblocking validation rules; satisfactory results lead to signoff.
- Supervisory staff in SD verify correctness, reasonability, or plausibility of failed validations and contact credit institutions for explanations as needed.
- Supervisory information is tested through on-site and off-site analysis, including sampling.
- External auditors or experts may be requested to perform limited scope audits of banks’ financial situations; outcomes are submitted to the NBR (use is very rare).
- Legal/regulatory framework:
  - NBR can assign external experts or auditors for supervisory tasks (Banking Law Article 170 (1)); in practice there were no such cases.
  - Regulations define delegation to financial auditors (Banking Law Article 170 (2)), but there are no comprehensive guidelines/criteria for hiring third parties or assessing their work quality.
  - Banking Law Article 156 requires financial auditors to inform the NBR of certain material matters while performing duties, but there is no explicit legal requirement that external experts promptly notify the NBR of material shortcomings identified during supervisory work.
- Reporting formats:
  - COREP and FINREP formats are developed by the EBA and issued under directly applicable Regulation.
  - Information collected outside the common European reporting framework is frequently reassessed on a need-to-know basis, but there is no explicit periodic assessment process for prudential returns outside the EU framework.

### Assessment of Principle 10: Summary and recommended actions
- Assessment: Largely Compliant
- Key observations:
  - Legal authority exists for NBR to require information; IFRS-based reporting in place since 2006 (consolidated) and 2012 (individual).
  - Supervisory reporting/validation is governed by harmonized EU reporting framework.
  - Ongoing bank projects to improve data warehouses; banks should continue upgrading systems and implementing a variety of controls.
  - NBR needs to keep providing feedback on data quality assessments to banks.
  - No explicit guidelines/criteria for hiring third parties for supervisory tasks or obliging them to report promptly to NBR.
  - No explicit/regular evaluation process to periodically review collected information (except for EU reporting).
- Authorities should consider:
  - Develop rules and processes for hiring external experts, including quality control and conflict-of-interest avoidance.
  - Perform a periodic review of whether prudential returns (outside the European reporting framework) satisfy a supervisory need.

### Corrective and sanctioning powers (Principle 11 — EC1–EC7, AC1–AC2)
- EC1 — Early engagement, written corrective actions, and follow-up:
  - SD discusses findings with banks at end of on-site examinations; draft supervision reports are sent to banks for observations.
  - SD proposals can materialize into sanctions, measures, and recommendations via written orders sent to bank management.
  - Where significant corrective actions are identified, authorities require measures/actions to be presented to the board, but NBR orders are not directly submitted in writing to the bank’s Board.
  - Banks must prepare action plans for issues not included in orders and inform NBR in writing about remedial status within specified timeframes.
  - On-site procedural timelines (not consistently followed):
    - Draft supervisory report: within 60 working days after on-site assessment ends.
    - Final draft: within 10 working days after discussions or receipt of additional documents.
    - Consolidated note after signed report: within 15 working days.
  - Timeframes are not consistently met.

- EC2–EC4 — Range of supervisory tools and escalation:
  - NBR has tools to require corrective action or impose sanctions when CIs do not comply with Banking Law or where noncompliance is likely.
  - Examples of measures taken in past two years (Article 226):
    - Maintain own funds above minimum capital requirements.
    - Reduce risk inherent to activities, products, and systems.
    - Implement specific provisioning policy or asset treatment.
    - Submit a plan for restoring compliance.
  - Escalation measures (Article 226 paragraph 3 and related):
    - Require CI to hold own funds in excess of requirements.
    - Require specific provisioning policy or asset treatment for own funds requirements.
    - Restrict or limit business, operations or network of CIs (including withdrawal of approval for branches abroad), or request divestment of excessive-risk activities.
    - Require reduction of risk in activities/products/systems.
    - Require CI to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net revenues inconsistent with sound capital base.
    - Require CI to use net profits to strengthen own funds.
    - Require replacement of individuals appointed to conduct branches.
    - Limit qualifying holdings requiring sale.
    - Require CI to present plan to restore compliance with deadline.
    - Limit or prohibit distribution of profit to shareholders and/or interest payments to holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments, where prohibition does not constitute default.
    - Impose additional or more frequent reporting including capital and liquidity.
    - Impose specific liquidity requirements including restrictions on maturity mismatches.
    - Require additional disclosures.

- EC2 — Administrative penalties and sanctions (Article 229):
  - Administrative penalties include:
    - Written warning.
    - Public warning indicating responsible natural person, CI, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company and deed committed.
    - Administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 10 percent of the total annual net turnover including the gross income.
    - In the case of a natural person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to EUR 5 000 000, to the corresponding value in the national currency on July 17, 2013.
    - Withdrawal of approval granted to key persons referred to in Article 108 paragraph (1).
    - Administrative pecuniary penalties up to twice the amount of profit gained, where determinable.
  - Sanctions (Article 229 Paragraph 2) include:
    - Order to cease and desist from repetition of conduct.
    - Temporary ban from exercising functions in a CI for responsible persons.
    - Withdrawal of authorization granted to the CI (Article 39).
    - Suspension of voting rights of shareholders or responsible shareholders.
  - NBR actively imposes sanctions and measures and discloses them on its webpage.

- EC3 — Power to act before breaches occur:
  - NBR powers are available when a CI breaches requirements or where NBR has evidence the bank is likely to breach requirements within the next 12 months (Article 226).
  - SREP methodology used to determine adequacy of management framework, own funds, and liquidity relative to risk profile.

- EC4 — Early-stage measures:
  - NBR may require reinforcement of arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies (Articles 24 and 148).
  - Article 39 allows withdrawal of authorization for breaches of prudential requirements in CRR (parts III, IV, VI); withdrawal leads to dissolution and windup (Articles 44 and 255).
  - Law No. 312/2015 (Recovery and Resolution Law) gives NBR early intervention measures and the power to appoint temporary administrators (Article 153).
  - NBR does not have explicit power to facilitate a takeover/merger by a healthier institution under Banking Law; purchase and assumption transactions are resolution instruments under Law No. 312/2015.

- EC5 — Sanctions against banks and individuals:
  - NBR may adopt measures and sanctions against CIs or persons effectively controlling CIs that infringe laws/regulations.
  - Sanctioning powers apply to banks, management, Board members, and individuals; enforcement does not remove material, civil or penal responsibility.

- EC6 — Ring-fencing and limiting intragroup risks:
  - Article 166: NBR assesses CI risks related to parent company operations and may require measures under Article 226 paragraph 3 (e), including limiting profit distributions and payments to holders of Tier 1 instruments where prohibition is not default.
  - Article 230(1): NBR may suspend voting rights of shareholders whose influence jeopardizes prudent management.
  - NBR can restrict/limit CI business operations or require cessation of excessive-risk activities; can require sale of qualifying holdings.

- EC7 — Cooperation on resolution:
  - NBR cooperates with relevant authorities under Law No. 312/2015 (recovery and resolution) and takes resolution action only if:
    - The credit institution is failing or likely to fail (consulting supervisory structure and resolution structure).
    - There is no reasonable prospect of private sector measures or supervisory action preventing failure within reasonable time.
    - Resolution action is necessary in the public interest.
  - Deposits Guarantee Fund has competencies for liquidation (Article 256 paragraph 2).

- AC1 — Laws/regulations to avoid undue delay:
  - SD internal procedures establish deadlines for supervisory authority and banks, but these are internal rules, not law or regulation.

- AC2 — Coordination with nonbank supervisors:
  - Article 189: NBR and ASF shall conclude written coordination and cooperation agreements.
  - An agreement exists to set cooperation rules and ensure efficient supervision; however, no systematic or regular process informs supervisors of nonbank financial entities of NBR actions—cooperation is need-based.
  - Sanctions and written orders are disclosed on NBR webpage.
  - Assessors note Romanian financial sector is bank-dominated, and need-based cooperation is considered sufficient by authorities.

### Assessment of Principle 11: Summary, findings, and recommended actions
- Assessment: Largely Compliant
- Key findings and statistics:
  - Internal process weaknesses:
    - Insufficient mandatory review and analysis processes to ensure consistency or justification of inspection outcomes and supervisory/sanction measures across the banking system.
    - No consistent internal independent review process to ascertain adequacy of measures/sanctions according to law and regulations.
  - Dispute and litigation data:
    - Approximately 45 cases were submitted to the board within a five-year period with 18 cases being contested in court.
  - Timeliness:
    - Draft should be sent within 60 working days per internal procedure, but many examination reports were issued more than 6 months later (on average approximately 140 days in 2016).
  - Practices limiting prompt remediation:
    - Wrap-up meetings after on-site inspection were sometimes not held in an official manner; this could hinder prompt implementation of measures.
- Recommendations the authorities should consider:
  - Establish an independent review process in determining written orders and sanctions to guarantee consistent approach and clearer justification; introduce internal guidance to ensure more objectivity, accuracy and consistency in exercising sanctioning power and corrective actions.
  - Improve the post-examination process by formalizing a wrap-up meeting to convey findings that require immediate improvement or corrective actions.
  - Intensify engagement and cooperation with the ASF in the process of imposing corrective actions and sanctions.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2018/cr18171.pdf*

### 1. One-tier or unitary system (22 banks at end 2016)

### 1. One-tier or unitary system (22 banks at end 2016)

### System description
- It includes:
  - A board of Directors
  - Senior management
- In the unitary management system, the Board and senior management can and generally do overlap (i.e., members of senior management are also members of the Board).

### Legal framework
- Article 107-1 of the banking law indicates that management needs to be delegated by the Board of directors to at least two managers.
- Article 143 of the 1990 company law states that managers may be appointed from among board members or from outside.

### In practice
- The assessors identified three cases where the Board does not include any executive member (i.e., senior management is completely distinct).
- The most common case is that the Board includes one executive member (who belongs to senior management).
- The assessors identified six cases where there were two to four executive members on the Board (i.e., all members of senior management belong to the Board).

*cr18171 - 1. One-tier or unitary system (22 banks at end 2016)*

### 2. two-tier or dual management system (7 banks at end 2016)

### 2. two-tier or dual management system (7 banks at end 2016)

### Structure of the dual management system
- Two separate Boards:
  - A Board with supervisory responsibility (“supervisory committee”).
  - A Board with management functions (“directorate”).
- Article 107-2 of the banking law: “where a credit institution opts for a dual management system, the directorate comprises at least 3 members.”
- In the dual management system, the Board and senior management are completely distinct.
- Company law requires that Board include 3 to 11 members.
  - In practice, most bank Boards include 6 to 9 members.
  - Small banking subsidiaries: as few as 5 in the unitary system and 3 in the dual management system.

### Definitions used (per CRD IV transposition and NBR Regulation 5/2013)
- “Management body”: institution's body or bodies appointed in accordance with national law, empowered to set strategy, objectives and overall direction, and which oversee and monitor management decision-making, and include the persons who effectively direct the business of the institution.
- “Management body in its supervisory function”: the management body acting in its role of overseeing and monitoring management decision-making (represented by the management body (Board of administration) within the unitary system, and by the supervisory board within the two-tier system).
- “Senior management”: natural persons who exercise executive functions and are responsible and accountable to the management body for day-to-day management (represented by directors in the unitary system and by the directorate in the two-tier system).

### Board and senior management responsibilities (banking law and NBR Regulation 5/2013)
- Article 106 banking law: Board members and managers (or supervisory committee and directorate) “shall discharge the duties and tasks provided for in the legislation on commercial companies, and they are responsible for the fulfillment of all requirements provided for in this emergency ordinance and the regulations issued for its enforcement.”
- NBR Regulation 5/2013 (Article 11): management body must define, oversee and be accountable for governance arrangements ensuring effective and prudent management, including segregation of duties and prevention of conflicts of interest; management body has overall responsibility, ensures integrity of accounting and reporting systems, oversees disclosure, and provides effective oversight of senior management.
- Article 12–1: management body responsible for:
  - amounts, types and distribution of internal capital and own funds adequate to cover risks;
  - robust and transparent organizational structure with effective communication and reporting channels;
  - policy on nomination and succession of individuals with key functions;
  - a remuneration framework in line with risk strategies;
  - governance principles and corporate values (including code of conduct);
  - an adequate and effective internal control framework (risk control, compliance, internal audit, financial reporting).
- Article 12–2: management body shall approve and periodically review strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring and mitigating risks, including macroeconomic environment risks.
- Article 13–1: management body shall monitor and periodically assess effectiveness of governance arrangements and address deficiencies.

### Senior management specific responsibilities (NBR Regulation 5/2013)
- Article 3–3 defines senior management and representation in unitary and two-tier systems.
- Other Articles set responsibilities regarding:
  - information to management body (Article 14–3),
  - ICAAP (Article 79–3),
  - credit risk management strategy implementation (Article 84–2),
  - approval of certain credit exposures (Article 90),
  - monitoring related party transactions (Article 103),
  - stress test considerations (Article 135–2),
  - liquidity risk strategies (Article 137–9, Article 137–10),
  - market access monitoring (Article 140–5),
  - operational risk strategy implementation (Article 154),
  - outsourcing financial performance monitoring (Article 240–f),
  - internal ratings based approach verification and control (Articles 495–1 to 496),
  - understanding lending policies and underwriting standards (Articles 495–2 to 495–3).

### Supervisory expectations, guidance and planned updates
- Supervisory expectations primarily enshrined in NBR Regulation No. 5/2013 (including aspects from the 2011 EBA guidelines on internal governance).
- No further communication or guidance made to industry on corporate governance beyond Regulation 5/2013.
- EBA revised guidelines on internal governance (published September 2017) to be incorporated into NBR Regulation No. 5/2013 in 2018; these guidelines:
  - emphasize duties and responsibilities of the management body in supervisory function and committee roles;
  - aim to improve status of risk management function and information flow between risk function and management body;
  - strengthen “know–your–structure” and complex structures sections for transparency following the ‘Panama events’;
  - develop framework for business conduct, emphasize risk culture, code of conduct and conflicts of interest management.

### Supervisory assessment and practices (selected Findings and Statistics)
- SREP approach used by NBR includes corporate governance in assessments; EBA SREP guidelines require review of:
  - overall internal governance framework;
  - corporate and risk culture;
  - organization and functioning of the management body;
  - remuneration policies and practices;
  - risk management framework (including ICAAP and ILAAP);
  - internal control framework (including internal audit);
  - information systems and business continuity;
  - recovery planning arrangements.
- On-site teams typically assess governance by reviewing minutes and interviewing executive directors and key control function holders; meetings with nonexecutive directors are only exceptional.
- Off-site process includes vetting of Board members and review of governance procedures and annual internal control reports, though there is no internal guideline on when/how to review/document these submissions.
- No cross-industry review of corporate governance practices has been performed to identify risks and best practices.
- Sanctions publicly disclosed in 2016 and first nine months of 2017 included:
  - Fines of RON 20,000 to RON 30,000 (USD 5,000 to USD 7.500) to five natural persons for multiple governance failures (absence of evaluation of knowledge/skills of management body, failures of risk management committee, oversight deficiencies, lack of involvement of risk management in product review).
  - Fine of RON 15.000 (USD 3.750) to a natural person for inappropriate exercise of coordination responsibilities and maintaining a director without prior NBR approval.
  - Fine of RON 20,000 (USD 5,000) for shortcomings including lack of succession policy, lack of diversity policy, remuneration governance failures, and noninvolvement of control function staff in remuneration design.
  - Fine of RON 25.000 (USD 6.250) for shortcomings including failure to timely implement internal audit recommendations, audit committee issues, and inadequate controls in electronic payment instruments increasing compliance risk.
- NBR imposed 21 supervisory measures on strengthening governance an internal capital management in 2016 and 32 in 2016.
- SREP governance/risk-management sub-component ratings at end 2016 for locally incorporated banks: 11 banks rated 2, 17 rated 3 and 1 rated 4 (scale 1 to 4).

### Governance of branches of EU banks
- Corporate governance aspects for branches of EU banks/banking groups fall exclusively within responsibility of the home supervisor; NBR needs to be notified of names of two managers responsible for the branch.
- For the largest branch active in Romania, NBR participates in the college of supervisors and corporate governance at group level is systematically discussed (including in relation to SREP analyses).

### EC3–EC7: nomination, suitability, committees, duties and remuneration oversight
- Composition and nomination:
  - Banking law (107–108) and NBR Regulation 5/2013 (Articles 15–19) require adequate number and composition, suitability assessment at appointment and when needed, diversity considerations, sufficient expertise and independence, succession policies, appropriate size relative to complexity, and time availability rules (limits on number of other directorships for significant institutions, with exception for State representatives).
  - Unitary system: chairman cannot be general manager (except exceptionally with NBR approval).
- Independent directors:
  - Only subsidiaries required to have sufficient number of independent members (Article 7, NBR Regulation 5/2013).
  - For other banks requirement only that audit committee chair is independent.
  - Statistics for 17 subsidiaries and 6 locally owned banks: most subsidiaries and locally owned banks have 1 or 2 independent directors; largest state-owned bank exception (7 out of 11 members independent) with unclear applied criteria.
- NBR vetting process:
  - In-depth vetting for all management body members (Article 109 banking law): background checks (criminal records in all countries where person worked, intelligence reports, feedback from supervisory authorities), followed by face-to-face interview.
  - NBR panel usually comprises about a dozen people led by banking supervision department; interviews last a couple of hours and are rigorous.
  - NBR pays attention to Board diversity; rejections commonly occur.
- Specialized committees:
  - All banks required to have an audit committee chaired by an independent member (Article 22).
  - Significant banks also required to have risk management, nomination and remuneration committees (Articles 23–1, 24–1 and 173–1); members of these committees shall be nonexecutive.
  - No requirement that risk/nomination/remuneration committees be chaired by independent members.
  - Statistics for 28 locally incorporated banks:
    - All have an audit committee chaired by an independent member.
    - 16 have a risk committee (chair independent in 8 cases).
    - 13 have a nomination committee (chair independent in 4 cases).
    - 11 have a remuneration committee (chair independent in 3 cases).
- Duties of care and loyalty:
  - Article 108 defines suitability, duty of loyalty (Article 108–4 1), duty of care (Article 108–5), and time availability (Article 108 1–1).
  - NBR Regulation 5/2013 (Article 16, 18, 16–1) reinforces objectivity, independence, training and suitability requirements.
- Remuneration oversight:
  - Article 12–1 requires remuneration framework in line with risk strategies.
  - Article 169–1 and 170–2 require alignment with prudent risk taking, business strategy, control environment; independent annual review of implementation required (Article 170–2–d).

### EC8–EC13: board understanding of structure and risks, risk management process, stress testing, contingency planning
- Board and senior management must fully know and understand operational structure and risks (Article 8, Article 9); no opaque or complex structures identified for Romanian banks.
- Risk management (NBR Regulation 5/2013 and banking law) requires:
  - sound risk management framework proportionate to nature, scale and complexity (Article 24 banking law; Articles 28–32 Regulation 5/2013);
  - risk appetite set/advised by risk committee (Article 23–2) and retained by management body (Articles 11–2-a, 12–2);
  - documented policies, procedures, limits and controls (Article 30–1) and reporting mechanisms (Article 30–5);
  - stress testing requirements (Articles 175–202) with management body responsibility, scenario challenge, annual review and use in capital planning.
- Findings and supervisory practice:
  - On-site inspections focus on risk management; however, NBR lacks an internal methodology beyond SREP guidance to ensure consistent, documented review across supervisors.
  - No industry-wide review of risk management practices has been done.
  - SREP ratings for governance/risk-management component cited above.
- Contingency and recovery:
  - Banks required to have contingency and business continuity plans (Articles 62–1, 63, 64) and recovery plans for critical resources; NBR assesses adequacy during on-site examinations; resolution function involved.
- Stress testing:
  - Detailed regulatory requirements (Articles 175–202) and SREP-based supervisory assessment; stress tests must be actionable, cover all significant risks, use severe but plausible scenarios, and inform capital planning (Article 188–1, Article 201, Article 202–1).

### Capital, models and supervisory powers (selected capital framework findings)
- CRR directly applicable; capital minima: CET1 4.5 percent, Tier 1 capital ratio 6 percent and total capital ratio 8 percent.
- Total capital ratio of banking sector: 19.83 percent (most recent data submitted to NBR).
- Own funds composition per CRR Article 72 and CET1 components listed (capital instruments, share premium, retained earnings, accumulated other comprehensive income, other reserves, funds for general banking risk) with CET1 loss-absorbing characteristics conditions preserved.
- Capital buffers specified:
  - capital conservation buffer 2.5 percent (with transitional arrangement),
  - countercyclical capital buffer currently zero percent,
  - OSII buffer currently one percent,
  - systemic risk buffer currently zero percent.
- Leverage ratio:
  - CRR regulates composition and banks must compute and report; no binding requirement currently.
  - EU amendment to CRR to introduce binding 3 percent leverage ratio requirement beginning in 2019.
- Internal models:
  - NBR prior permission required for IRB/VAR/AMA/IMA (CRR Articles 143(1), 363(1), 283(1), 312(2)).
  - Approvals involve joint decisions for group banks; Regulation No. 5/2013 supplements CRR with documentation and qualitative/quantitative standards.
  - NBR reviews compliance with model requirements at least every 3 years and can impose multiplication factors, capital add-ons, revoke permissions.
  - In practice: two banks approved for IRB (credit risk) and three banks approved to use AMA (operational risk).
  - No dedicated team/unit within the Supervision Department responsible for evaluating, approving, reviewing and overseeing internal models; Financial Stability Department provides technical analysis when needed.
- Supervisory powers to require capital actions:
  - NBR can require additional own funds, restrict bank business/operations or network, adjust risk weights and criteria, impose counter-cyclical buffer per NCMS recommendation, and withdraw approval of Board members or senior managers (Article 228–1; Articles 229–1 sanctions include withdrawal of approval).

### Assessments and Recommendations (from the source)
- Assessment of Principle 14: Largely Compliant.
- Assessment of Principle 15: Largely Compliant.
- Assessment of Principle 16: Largely Compliant.
- Key supervisory observations and recommended supervisory enhancements (as stated in source):
  - Requirement that Board include an “adequate” number of independent members should apply to all banks, not only subsidiaries; current practice of 1 or 2 independent members is generally insufficient.
  - NBR should formalize criteria or set a minimum level (possibly as a share of Board members) for independent directors and regularly meet with independent members separately to assess their exercise of responsibilities.
  - NBR does not regularly meet with nonexecutive members; it should organize regular meetings with nonexecutive members to discuss bank status and supervisory expectations.
  - NBR often sends letters on serious shortcomings only to senior management rather than to management body in supervisory capacity; written communications on key findings and corrective actions should be sent directly to management body.
  - In line with BCBS 2015 guidelines, NBR could specify that each committee chair (including risk and remuneration) should be an independent and nonexecutive member, and that a majority of the risk management committee should be independent.
  - NBR could initiate a review of corporate governance arrangements across the industry to bench-mark practices, identify risks and disseminate supervisory expectations.
  - Internal guidelines for NBR staff should be prepared to decide when and how to review procedures and annual reports on governance and to document such work.
  - NBR could introduce explicit regulatory provision requiring banks to notify the supervisor as soon as they become aware of material bona fide information that may negatively affect fitness and propriety of Board or senior management members.
  - NBR could require clarification and additional explicit requirements regarding:
    - Boards and senior management understanding limitations/uncertainties of model outputs;
    - Boards and senior management understanding risks inherent in major management initiatives (system/process/business model changes, major acquisitions);
    - Recognition of uncertainties attached to risk measurement.
  - For internal models and advanced approaches, supervisory capacity should be strengthened:
    - establish a dedicated unit for periodic and rigorous model reviews and validation within the Supervision Department;
    - devote further supervisory attention to risk models used for internal risk management and regulatory capital calculation (even when banks do not use models as regulatory inputs).
  - NBR should consider removing exception that permits State representatives to exceed limits on other directorships.
  - NBR should send letters detailing serious shortcomings and on-site reports directly to management body in its supervisory capacity (or copy it) rather than only to senior management.

*Source: cr18171 - 2. two-tier or dual management system (7 banks at end 2016)*

### Section 6.2.3 of the SREP guidelines cover the assessment of credit risk management and

### Section 6.2.3 — Assessment of credit risk management and controls

### Scope and regulatory requirements
- SREP guidelines require assessment of:
  - Credit risk strategy and appetite, including review of whether: “d) whether the institution’s credit risk strategy is appropriate for the institution given its: business model, overall risk appetite, market environment and role in the financial system, and financial condition, funding capacity and adequacy of own funds.” and “f) whether the institution’s credit risk strategy broadly covers all the activities of the institution where credit risk can be significant.”
  - Organizational framework
  - Policies and procedures
  - Risk identification, measurement, monitoring and reporting
  - Internal control framework
- NBR Regulation 5/2013 transposes many SREP requirements (e.g., Articles 84–1, 84–2, 86, 87, 89, 93, 94, 109–1, 171–1, 171–2, 178–1, 178–3, 212, 75–6).

### Supervisory practice (on-site and off-site)
- Primary assessments performed during annual on-site examinations; typically 1–2 team members focus exclusively on credit risk management (including sample review of credit files).
- Off-site divisions receive systematic reports:
  - Annual reports on risk management (Article 673–1 of NBR Regulation 5/2013) and ICAAP (Article 674–1).
  - Credit risk management procedures (Article 671–1).
- Weakness noted: few details provided by supervisor on expectations for content of off-site reports; no systematic methodology to review them; analyses not documented beyond exceptional letters to banks.
- Home-supervisor responsibility for branches of EU banks (10.5 percent of banking assets at end 2016); NBR participates in supervisory colleges (largest branch holds 67 percent of assets of all branches of EU banks in Romania).

### Findings, corrective actions and sanctions
- NBR regularly issues recommendations after on-site exams; when significant deficiencies are identified, increased attention and sanctions applied.
- Examples of sanctions:
  - Bank sanctioned in 2016 with a written warning for inadequate credit policies and insufficient provisioning; Board members and senior management received written warnings in 2017 for similar reasons.
  - Written warning in 2017 for serious weaknesses in evaluation and monitoring of credit risk.
  - Fine of 20,000 lei (ca. 4,000 USD) for breaches including lack of comprehensive criteria for identification of all nonperforming exposures, inadequate procedures to monitor restructured nonperforming exposures, and inadequate review of capacity of nonresident debtors to repay FX exposures.
  - Fine of RON 25,000 (ca 6,250 USD) for failure to have some key credit risk management procedures approved at Board level and weaknesses in credit administration (defective automatic repayment process).
- NBR required outlier banks in 2015 to conduct independent collateral valuation reviews; interim audit recommendations in 2012–2014 led to early recognition of additional provisions: about 600 million EUR in June 2012, 60 MEUR in June 2013 and 700 M EUR in June 2014.

### Key evaluations against Essential Criteria (selected)
- EC2 (Board approval and senior management implementation):
  - Regulation 5/2013 Article 84–1: Board approves and regularly reviews (at least once in a year) the credit risk management strategy and significant policies and processes; must cover activities for which credit exposure leads to significant risk.
  - Article 84–2: senior management implements strategy and develops policies and procedures.
  - On-site inspections review Board minutes; examples of shortcomings where limits had not been recently reviewed by the Board or Board minutes were lacking.
- EC3 (controlled credit risk environment — policy elements a–g):
  - Regulation 5/2013 Articles 86, 87, 89, Section 7.3 and Article 5–4 of Regulation 16 articulate requirements mirroring EC3 elements including independent credit decisions, credit administration, information systems, limits, exception reporting, and controls around models.
  - Sanctions in 2017 reflected enforcement where weaknesses identified.
- EC4 (monitoring total indebtedness, unhedged FX risk):
  - Article 93 and Article 94 require policies to monitor total indebtedness and foreign currency lending risks related to unhedged borrowers.
  - NBR has long experience with DSTI and LTV caps since 2004; historical caps: DSTI 30 percent consumer loans and 35 percent mortgage loans in 2003; LTV 75 percent in 2003. Caps removed in 2007; subsequent approaches included mandatory stress assessment and calibration.
- EC5 (arm’s length credit decisions):
  - Article 88 requires independent credit decisions free of conflicts of interest; Article 109–1 regulates non-arm’s length transactions and empowers NBR to assess arm’s length basis; compliance assessed on-site; no material issues reported.
- EC6 (senior management approval of major exposures):
  - Article 90 requires credit policy to prescribe that major credit risk exposures exceeding a certain amount or percentage of the bank’s capital, and especially risky exposures, are decided by senior management (Board not expected to approve such exposures).
- EC7 (supervisor access to information and officers):
  - Banking law Articles 171–1 and 171–2 compel banks to allow NBR staff access to reports, accounts, operations, documents and information; NBR reports no challenge in obtaining access.
- EC8 (credit risk stress testing included in ICAAP):
  - Article 178–1, 178–3, Article 212, Article 75–6 require stress testing as integral to risk management and ICAAP; Section 7.3 sets detailed credit risk stress testing requirements. NBR reviews stress testing on-site; example where bank adjusted limits following stress tests.

### Asset quality, problem assets and provisioning (Principle 18)
- Legal and regulatory basis:
  - Banking law Article 24–1 and NBR Regulation 5/2013 Articles 86, 87 require policies/processes for identifying/managing problem assets and making adequate value adjustments and provisions.
- NPL history and NBR response:
  - NPL increase (narrow definition: >90 days past due or legal procedure initiated): 7.9 percent of gross loans at end 2009 → 21.9 percent at end 2013; peak cited as 22 percent in 2013.
  - NBR measures (examples):
    - 2014 recommendations: full coverage for NPLs >360 days past due (no judicial procedures), ensure at least 90 percent provisioning for exposures on debtors in insolvency without reorganization plan.
    - 2015: independent collateral valuation for outlier banks where provisioning on insolvent debtors was below industry average of 73 percent.
    - 2016: ensure unsecured loans >180 days past due are fully covered with IFRS provisions.
    - Interim audited accounts at June led to additional provisions: about 600 million EUR (June 2012), 60 MEUR (June 2013), 700 M EUR (June 2014).
    - AQRs based on EBA methodology performed for three large domestic banks.
  - Result: NPEs decreased significantly; with stricter definition, NPEs were less than 10 percent of gross credit at end 2016.
- Classification, provisioning, write-offs:
  - Regulation 16 introduced five-category classification and prudential filters; prudential filters increased capital requirements in 2012 (without them capital adequacy ratio would have been 200–300 basis points higher; ratio stood at 14.7 percent at end 2012).
  - EU CRR Article 481 phased out prudential filters: 20 percent of prudential filter applied in 2017; filters prohibited starting 2018. NBR expects IFRS 9 implementation to lead to provisions roughly equal to 2017 prudential adjustments based on June 2017 impact study.
  - NBR required write-offs and derecognition for exposures with no reasonable expectation of recovery; IFRS guidance (IAS 39) and upcoming IFRS 9 (from January 1, 2018) affect write-off treatment.
- Reporting and supervisory data:
  - FINREP templates F18.00, F19.00, F12.00 used for impaired/non-performing/forborne exposures and movements in allowances.
  - Reporting frequencies: F18.00 and F19.00 – Solo monthly and consolidated quarterly; F12.00 – Solo and consolidated quarterly.
  - Additional domestic reporting: monthly information on individual non–performing exposures (since June 2013), quarterly on 500 largest restructured exposures, quarterly on individual exposures on insolvent companies.
- Supervisory powers and outcomes:
  - NBR can require adjustments to classifications/provisions, require specific provisioning policies, or require additional capital where prudential requirements not met (Article 226-1, Article 226-3-a and c).
  - Assessment: Principle 18 graded "Compliant." NBR instrumental in NPE reduction and continues to monitor NPEs closely; intends to implement EBA 2017 ECL guideline in 2018.

### Observed weaknesses and supervisory gaps (selected)
- Off-site reporting reviews:
  - Off-site reviews of annual risk management and ICAAP reports are systematic but lack documented methodology and detailed expectations for report content; analyses often undocumented except when serious shortcomings identified.
  - Credit risk management procedures are not systematically reviewed off-site; no internal guidelines for prioritizing/conducting such reviews.
- On-site methodology:
  - No detailed on-site examination manual to ensure systematic and consistent conduct of credit risk assessments (see principle 9).
  - On-site teams do not meet with non-executive Board members; reliance on Board minutes which were sometimes missing.
- Related areas with noted gaps (from broader section content but relevant to credit risk controls):
  - No explicit regulatory requirement to ensure Board receives standardized, timely asset-quality and provisioning reports (EC10); expectations communicated informally and verified on-site.
  - No specific requirement for independent validation of models used for interest rate risk (EC3 of Principle 23) — analogous model-validation gap may be relevant to credit models.
  - Planned regulatory updates: NBR intends to amend Regulation 5/2013 in 2017/2018 to implement EBA 2017 ECL guidelines and EBA guidelines on credit risk management practices.

### Supervisory assessments (Principle-level outcomes)
- Principle 17 (Credit risk management): Compliant
  - Comment: Key regulatory requirements covered by banking law and Regulation 5/2013; NBR implements a thorough supervisory process emphasizing credit risk; corrective actions and sanctions applied where appropriate; SREP used for subsidiaries/branches via colleges for EU groups.
- Principle 18 (Problem assets, provisions and reserves): Compliant
  - Comment: NPEs peaked at 22 percent in 2013 and declined significantly; stringent supervisory measures (interim audits, independent valuations, AQRs, recommendations) contributed to timely recognition and coverage; NBR to implement EBA 2017 ECL guidelines to strengthen consistency and systematic approach.

_Italic source attribution: Section 6.2.3 of cr18171 (NBR assessment) — cr18171 - Section 6.2.3 of the SREP guidelines cover the assessment of credit risk management and controls_

### Section 3, Chapter V of No. 5/2013 indicates that notifications to the NBR regarding the

### Section 3, Chapter V of No. 5/2013 indicates that notifications to the NBR regarding the

### Outsourcing notifications and supervisory oversight
- Notifications to the NBR regarding the outsourcing of a credit institution’s material activities shall include a description of the service provider including at minimum:
  - the name and scope of activity,
  - the operating market and market position,
  - the applicable jurisdiction,
  - its ownership structure and, by case, the extent to which the service provider is included in the credit institution’s group and in the consolidated supervision of that group.
- Notification of a change in the outsourcing provider shall be made one month before the possible date of concluding the new outsourcing contract, so the NBR may evaluate the new circumstances and take any necessary measures.
- Current practice: The NBR can identify common points of exposure to operational risk or potential vulnerability. To date, the NBR has not met/interact directly with the major service providers to assess the issues from an operational risk perspective.

### Operational risk framework and ICT
- Banks’ operational risk capital:
  - As of June 2017, RWAs for operational risk have been around 15 percent of total RWAs.
- Models used by banks:
  - Three banks have been allowed to use AMA,
  - Two are using SA,
  - The rest use BIA to calculate operational risk regulatory capital.
- Supervisory basis:
  - Supervision on operational risk management is conducted based on provisions in CRR, NBR regulation No. 5, and EBA SREP guidelines.
  - Adequacy and implementation assessed during annual onsite inspections.
- ICT and cyber security:
  - A comprehensive guideline on cyber security and information technology for banks has not been implemented yet.
  - Authorities mention that starting January 2018, the NBR will implement the new EBA Guidelines on ICT Risk Assessment (2017) under the SREP.
- Supervisory IT capacity:
  - The Supervisory Department has one IT systems specialist but does not have a dedicated unit; this could be considered insufficient in times of increasing demand.
  - The Supervision Department does not use outside IT experts.
  - Authorities mention that they are planning to hire more IT risk experts.
- Operational risk reporting shortcomings:
  - Current reporting requirement is not sufficiently broad as this EC require, the template does not exist and the reporting timing is also unclear.
  - Lack of explicit regulatory requirement for banks to “immediately” notify the NBR of “any” developments affecting operational risk.
  - No template/framework specifying minimum elements to report (e.g., related staff members, dates of occurrence/identification/reporting, types of incidents, (expected) loss amount, total related amount, recovered amount, internal measures/actions taken by the bank, problems in internal control, prevention measure, etc.).
- Recommendations to authorities:
  - Introduce guidelines on a comprehensive information and communication technology as intended;
  - Enhance IT risk supervisory capacity (e.g., establish a specialized unit/ increase IT specialists);
  - Expand the scope and required items of reporting on operational risk events to keep the NBR apprised of developments affecting operational risk in a timelier and comprehensive manner.
- Assessment of Principle 25: Largely Compliant

### Principle 26 — Internal control and audit: framework and findings
- Principle description: Supervisor determines banks have adequate internal control frameworks including delegating authority, separation of functions, reconciliation, safeguarding assets, and appropriate independent internal audit and compliance functions.
- Legal/regulatory basis and high-level requirements:
  - Banking law and NBR Regulation 5/2013 set high-level internal control requirements:
    - Article 24–1: Every bank must have on an ongoing basis “adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administration and accounting procedures”.
    - Article 24–2: Internal control framework must be “comprehensive and proportionate, related to the nature, scale and complexity of the risks inherent in the business model and of the credit institution's activities”.
    - NBR Regulation 5/2013 (Article 3-1-4): Internal control framework broadly defined to ensure effective and efficient operations, appropriate control of risks, prudential pursuit of activity, credibility of financial and nonfinancial information, compliance with legal and regulatory framework, supervision requirements and internal rules.
    - Article 12–1: Management body responsible for setting and overseeing an adequate and effective internal control framework, including risk management, compliance and internal audit functions and appropriate financial reporting and accounting framework.
    - Article 33–b: Banks must have independent control functions.
    - Article 11–1: Management body shall define, oversee and be accountable for governance arrangements including segregation of duties and prevention of conflicts of interest.
    - Article 26–1: Policy on conflicts of interest shall establish measures to prevent or manage conflicts of interest including an adequate separation of duties.
- Gaps and observations:
  - Some specific controls (e.g., reconciliation of accounts, control lists, cross-checking, dual control, double signatures) are not individually mentioned but are covered by broader requirements or past regulations.
  - NBR systematically examines these issues during on-site inspections, but the systematic (or appropriately risk-based) and consistent application is hard to assess in the absence of a detailed methodology for on-site inspections; on-site templates cover such issues at a high level.
- Sanctions evidence (2016–2017):
  - Written warning to a bank in 2017 due to lack of timely follow up by the management body to implement internal audit recommendations, lack of audit committee during nine months and failure to implement adequate control regarding issuance and use of electronic payment instruments;
  - Written warning to a bank in 2016 due, inter alia, to inadequate internal control mechanisms regarding the compilation and transmission to the supervisory authority of annual consolidated reports covering the main deficiencies identified in the internal control functions and the conditions under which internal control was carried out.
- EC2 (balance of skills/resources between back office/control and business origination):
  - NBR Regulation 5/2013 (Article 35–4) requires control functions to have an adequate number of qualified staff and ongoing training, with appropriate authority and access to data systems.
  - Article 35 requires control functions to be independent, established at an adequate hierarchical level, and to report directly to the management body; remuneration of control staff should not be linked to performance of activities they monitor.
  - No specific requirement for banks to ensure an appropriate balance in skills/resources of back office vs business origination units; covered by broader requirements and reviewed during on-site processes.
  - No specific NBR guidelines/methodologies for supervisors on internal control and audit to standardize on-site examinations.
  - No regular industry-level analysis (beyond SREP ratings) on implementation of internal control and audit requirements.
- EC3 (compliance function):
  - Article 50 requires compliance function to ensure compliance policy is observed and to report to the management body on compliance risk management; Article 51 requires the compliance function to advise on legal/regulatory changes and assess impact.
  - Main compliance risks identified by NBR: (i) risk of litigation (NBR regularly asks banks to increase provisions), (ii) money laundering and terrorism financing, (iii) conflicts of interests (instances of lack of disclosure; one bank had no Board declarations of interest), and (iv) customer complaints.
  - Example corrective action: request to a bank to increase frequency of compliance risk reporting to the Board at least to a quarterly basis.
- EC4 and EC5 (internal audit):
  - Article 54 requires internal audit to assess compliance of all activities and business units and whether policies and procedures are appropriate and comply with legal/regulatory requirements.
  - Article 56: internal audit has unfettered access to relevant documents and information in all operational and control units.
  - Article 59: internal audit work is performed according to an audit plan and detailed audit programs following a risk based approach.
  - No specific requirement that internal audit is kept informed in a timely manner of any material changes to the bank’s risk management strategy, policies or processes.
  - Shortcomings regularly identified:
    - lack of sufficient resources (sometimes due to turnover) leading to delays in implementation of audit plans;
    - insufficiently risk-based audit approaches leading to infrequent periodicity of some activities (up to a 3–4 year cycle);
    - historical insufficient involvement of internal audit in the ICAAP process (now less common).
  - Assessment practices primarily through annual full-scope on-site inspections and approval process of head of internal audit.
- Assessment of Principle 26: Largely Compliant
- Recommendations for internal control and audit:
  - Introduce specific NBR guidelines/methodologies for supervisors on internal control and audit to facilitate consistent on-site examinations (especially for areas not spelled out or subject to interpretation).
  - Introduce a specific requirement that the internal audit is kept informed in a timely manner of any material changes made to the bank’s risk management strategy, policies or processes.
  - Conduct periodic industry-level analyses on the design and implementation of internal control and audit requirements (e.g., review of reporting framework to Board, relationships with parent senior management and control functions where applicable, staffing levels) to identify best practices, outliers and gaps.

### Principle 27 — Financial reporting and external audit (EC1)
- Supervisor responsibility: holds the bank’s Board and management responsible for ensuring financial statements are prepared in accordance with accounting policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally and supported by recordkeeping systems.
- Legal and regulatory requirements:
  - NBR Order 27/2010 of 16 December 2010 (based inter alia on Accounting Law No. 82/1991) requires Romanian banks to prepare financial statements both on a solo and consolidated basis in compliance with IFRS standards (amended for application of EU IFRS standards as adopted under EU regulation 1606/2002).
  - International auditing standards implemented since emergency government ordinance 90/2008 on statutory audit.
  - Article 152–2 of the banking law requires annual and, as the case may be, annual consolidated financial statements of credit institutions to be audited by financial auditors, in accordance with international standards and practices.
  - Article 152: “credit institutions shall permanently keep accounting records according to the provisions of the Accounting Law No.82/1991, republished, and shall draw up annual financial statements and, accordingly, consolidated annual financial statements providing a fair view of the financial position, financial profitability, cash flows and other information related to the activity performed.”

*From: cr18171 (Section 3, Chapter V of No. 5/2013).*

### Annex 1 to NBR Order No. 27/2010 indicates Article 13–2, that: “members of the

### Annex 1 to NBR Order No. 27/2010 indicates Article 13–2, that: “members of the

### External audit requirements and supervisory powers (EC2–EC9, AC1)
- EC2 — Requirement and supervisory expectation:
  - Banks are required to have their accounts audited by the independent external auditor.
  - NBR Order 27/2010 (Article 21 of the methodological annex) requires: “the duly approved annual financial statements, together with the management report and the audit report signed by the liable person, as stated by the law, shall be published as laid down by the laws in force.”
  - The supervisor holds the bank’s Board and management responsible for ensuring that the financial statements issued annually to the public bear an independent external auditor’s opinion as a result of an audit conducted in accordance with internationally accepted auditing practices and standards.
- EC3 — Valuation practices and verification:
  - Banks must prepare financial statements in compliance with IFRS.
  - Preparation and reliability of financial statements, including valuation practices, are reviewed by external auditors.
  - Valuation practices are assessed during NBR on-site inspections; attention is paid to credit exposures (including reviewing a sample of credit files) and banks are frequently required to adjust provisioning policies and provisioning levels.
  - NBR actions since 2013 increased provisioning efforts by Romanian banks for problem assets.
  - 2013 EU CRR requirements cited for trading book prudent valuation, including systems and controls sufficient to provide prudent and reliable valuation estimates and documented policies and procedures (elements (a) and (b) quoted in source).
- EC4 — Scope and standards of external audits:
  - Banking Law Article 154 allows NBR to establish the scope of external audits of banks for purposes other than the preparation of financial statements.
  - External audit of financial statements is based on International auditing standards as implemented in Romania, including the use of a risk and materiality based approach.
- EC5 — Audit coverage:
  - International auditing standards (referred to in the Audit Directive and transposed in Romania) cover loan portfolio, loan loss provisions, non-performing assets, asset valuations, trading and other securities activities, derivatives, asset securitizations, consolidation of and other involvement with off-balance sheet vehicles and the adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting.
- EC6 — Approval, rejection and withdrawal of auditors:
  - NBR can reject and rescind the appointment of an external auditor lacking adequate expertise or independence or failing to observe ethical and professional conduct (Article 155 and Article 157 quoted).
  - In practice, NBR approves external auditing firms rather than individuals.
  - Powers to sanction external auditors rest with the Public Interest Oversight Board for the Accountancy Profession (CSIPPC) and the judiciary; NBR is a member of the CSIPPC.
  - External auditors of Romanian banks typically belong to networks of large international auditing firms (Ernst and Young, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte, KPMG and Mazars), except the credit cooperative network.
- EC7 — Auditor rotation:
  - Banking law requires rotation of external auditors but does not set a specific rotation period; allows rotation of the audit coordinator (interpreted by NBR as the signing partner) rather than the firm.
  - NBR required banks in 2014 to update internal policies on auditor rotation; NBR indicated banks established obligation to replace the external auditor or to rotate the signing partner within a period of seven years from the date of designation.
  - Twenty-three banks appointed their external auditor (firm) after 2012 and five small banks in 2001–2008 (as of November 2017). For the latter, NBR ensured the coordinator/signing partner was regularly rotated (example: signing partner rotated in 2016 after a seven-year tenure).
- EC8 — Regular engagement with audit firms:
  - NBR met with all external audit firms regularly (at least annually until 2017 and quarterly starting with Q1 2017).
  - Since 2017, information exchange is based on the 2016 EBA guidelines on communication between competent authorities and statutory auditors/audit firms; example meetings in 2016 on Law 77/2016.
  - External auditors are invited case-by-case to the Supervision Department for discussions (e.g., provisions on credit exposures).
- EC9 — Auditor reporting obligations and protection:
  - Banking law requires external auditors to inform NBR of material issues identified during their work and protects auditors against legal actions when reporting in good faith.
  - Article 156 quoted specifying obligations to inform NBR and protection from breach of professional secrecy and liability.
- AC1 — Access to auditors’ working papers:
  - Banking law allows NBR to access “all the documents drawn up by the financial auditors during the audit” (Article 156–5). This provision was never explicitly used.

### Assessment of Principle 27
- Assessment: Compliant
- Key findings:
  - Banks must prepare financial statements in compliance with IFRS as implemented in the EU and have them certified by an external auditor approved by NBR.
  - Auditors authorized to practice in Romania must meet international standards on audit and are subject to independent oversight.
  - Romanian banks generally use auditors from networks of the four biggest global auditing firms and a large French auditing firm, except the credit cooperative network.
  - Since 2014, banking law requires banks to design and implement policies on external auditors’ rotation; rotation can apply to the firm or the signing partner.
  - Most banks rotated the firm; five small banks appointed auditors in 2001–2008 and rotated only the signing partner, with tenures not exceeding seven years.
- Supervisory note:
  - NBR could usefully document in an internal methodology criteria used to assess adequacy of banks’ rotation policies and set a maximum time limit to guide supervisory assessments.

### Disclosure and transparency (Principle 28 — EC1–EC5, AC1)
- EC1 — Legal and regulatory disclosure framework:
  - Disclosure requirements largely unified at the EU level:
    - Part Eight of CRR (Article 431 and ff) corresponds to Basel II Pillar 3 disclosures with EU specificities.
    - IFRS standards (IAS 1, IFRS 7, IFRS 10, IFRS 11, IFRS 12, IFRS 13, IAS 27) endorsed in the EU and Romania for banks.
  - NBR confirmed disclosure requirements fully applicable for banks incorporated in Romania, including subsidiaries of EU banks.
  - Financial and prudential disclosure is required of all banks in Romania on an annual basis.
  - CRR does not yet cover BCBS disclosure amendments since 2015; EU amendments expected to be ready in 2018 to incorporate BCBS 2015 amendments.
  - EBA issued guidelines on disclosure (draft guidelines on IFRS 9 transitional arrangements 2017; Guidelines on disclosure under Part Eight of the CRR 2016; Guidelines on LCR disclosure 2017). NBR is reviewing and planning to introduce them into regulatory requirements in 2018.
  - Pillar 3 information is not required to be audited; disclosures in accordance with IFRS are audited.
  - Article 433 CRR requires Pillar 3 disclosures at least on an annual basis and institutions to assess need for more frequent publication for rapidly changing items.
  - Specific requirements apply to branches of third countries (Article 76 and ff. of the banking law).
- EC2 — Scope and content of disclosures:
  - Required qualitative and quantitative information drawn from CRR Pillar 3, CRD Articles 89 and 90, IFRS 7 and IAS 1; items listed include statement of financial positions and P&L, risk management, scope of application, own funds, capital requirements, exposures, indicators of global systemic importance, credit risk, market risk, operational risk, securitization, remuneration, equities risk, interest rate risk, unencumbered assets, leverage, liquidity risk, activities, turnover, total employees, profit and loss, tax paid and subsidies received in different jurisdictions and return on assets.
  - Disclosures on exposures and transactions with related parties (IAS 24) and accounting policies are required in financial statements, with some exceptions noted for CRR Articles.
  - IFRS guidance on aggregation/disaggregation and comparative information referenced (IAS 1.29, IAS 1.30, IFRS 7).
- EC3 — Group structure disclosures:
  - For supervisory purposes, scope of consolidation is the prudential scope; Pillar 3 disclosures relate to prudential consolidation.
  - CRR requires disclosure of differences between accounting and prudential consolidation bases and brief description of entities (fully consolidated, proportionally consolidated, deducted from own funds, neither consolidated nor deducted).
  - Financial statements require disclosures on name and registered office of subsidiaries, associates, proportionally consolidated entities, indirect subsidiaries, immaterial entities excluded from consolidation, proportions of capital and voting rights and rationale for consolidation.
- EC4 — Review and enforcement of disclosure standards:
  - NBR verifies that prudential disclosure statements comply with existing requirements as part of annual on-site examinations and off-site process; conducts specific verifications without a specific methodology or check lists.
  - NBR intervened in 2016 to have one bank publish online its 2015 financial statements in a timely fashion.
  - External auditors provide detailed external verification of financial disclosure; ASF expected to review disclosure practices for listed banks (3), but no particular exchanges with NBR noted.
- EC5 — Public aggregate information:
  - NBR regularly publishes aggregate information on the banking system (balance sheet structure, capital ratios, income earning capacity, risk profiles) on the NBR and EBA websites.
  - Information as of June 2017 was available at the time of the assessment (which took place in November).
  - There is no single repository in Romania where individual banks’ disclosures could be accessed online; information must be found per bank.
- AC1 — Over-period disclosures:
  - Disclosures more often use end-of-period values, but some average or over-the-period values are requested for prudential disclosure (e.g., Article 442 (c), Article 449 (n) (iv), Article 443 CRR) and financial disclosure (e.g., IFRS 7.42 G c).

### Assessment of Principle 28
- Assessment: Compliant
- Key findings and supervisory observations:
  - Financial and prudential disclosure requirements are detailed and largely unified at the EU level and fully applicable to banks incorporated in Romania.
  - Disclosure requirements apply on an annual basis (unless material events occur); NBR could consider requiring, at least for significant banks, more frequent disclosure.
  - NBR verifies individual disclosure requirements as part of supervisory processes and during exchanges with external auditors.
  - NBR publishes detailed and updated information on banking activity and risks.
  - NBR could usefully conduct a review of disclosure practices on governance aspects across the banking industry and formulate recommendations accordingly.

### Abuse of financial services (Principle 29 — EC1)
- EC1 — AML/CFT legal framework:
  - Core elements of Romania’s AML/CFT regime are established in specialized laws and regulations implementing the 40 FATF Recommendations and transposing requirements of the Third European AML Directive (Directive 2005/60/EU).
  - At the time of assessment, the main legislation was Law No. 656 of December 2002 on the prevention and sanctioning of money laundering and on setting up certain measures for the prevention and combating of terrorism financing, as updated by law No. 125 of

*Source: cr18171 - Annex 1 to NBR Order No. 27/2010 (extract).*

### 2017. Further amendments to the AML/CFT legal framework are expected to come into

### cr18171 - 2017. Further amendments to the AML/CFT legal framework are expected to come into

### Legal framework and NBR mandate
- Further amendments to the AML/CFT legal framework are expected to come into force in December 2017.
- According to Article 24 paragraph 1a; Article 10b of the AML/CFT Law; Article 17 paragraph 1; and Article 3 of Government Emergency Ordinance No. 202/2008 on the implementation of international sanctions, the NBR is the national competent authority for monitoring conformity with the AML/CFT and international sanctions obligations for all credit institutions operating in Romania, including the branches of foreign banks.
- NBR tasks in preventing money laundering and combating terrorism financing:
  - to supervise the implementation of the relevant legal provisions;
  - to impose specific measures or sanctions for failure to comply with relevant legislation.
- NBR tasks regarding relevant international sanctions applicable in the financial and banking fields:
  - to oversee the implementation of international sanctions;
  - to ensure the dissemination of legislation instituting mandatory international sanctions in Romania;
  - to adopt specific regulations on overseeing the enforcement of international sanctions;
  - to impose specific measures or sanctions for breach of applicable laws, etc.

### Supervisory expectations, CDD, and internal safeguards
- AML/CFT Law imposes obligations regarding Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and internal safeguard measures.
- Banking Laws and Regulations No. 5/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions cover:
  - provisions to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing;
  - prevention of other criminal activities that may harm the normal functions of credit institutions.
- Supervisors determine the adequacy of policies and processes of credit institutions.
- Supervisory expectations (EC2) include ensuring banks have adequate policies and processes that:
  - promote high ethical and professional standards;
  - prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities;
  - include prevention and detection of criminal activity, and reporting of such suspected activities to the appropriate authorities.
- Article 37 of Banking Law: when assessing suitability of CI’s shareholders/members (and those involved in management of entities in the same group) expected to manage the institution, the NBR will exchange information with other national and international competent authorities for granting authorization; this information may be used for ongoing assessment of compliance conditions for the pursuit of business.
- NBR may require the Romanian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) (the National Office for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering) to submit relevant information regarding the risk of ML/TF related to assessed persons and entities.

### Know-Your-Customer (KYC) norms and NBR Regulation No. 9/2008
- Supervisory expectations regarding policies and processes to guard against criminal activities are contained in the AML/CFT Law and NBR Regulation No. 9/2008, which define conditions for applying CDD measures in normal, low, and high risk cases.
- Credit institutions must have AML/CFT systems in place; KYC norms must correspond with the nature, volume, complexity, and area of activities, adapted to the risk level related to customer categories and to the degree of risk related to products/services offered.
- Article 5 of NBR Regulation No. 9/2008 describes essential elements that KYC norms must include to meet AML/CFT obligations.
- KYC norms requirements:
  - shall be approved by the institution’s management and reviewed when necessary, at minimum once a year;
  - shall be known by the entire staff with responsibilities in the field of know-your-customer for the purpose of money laundering or terrorism financing prevention;
  - shall be submitted to the NBR – Supervision Department within five days of their approval, or modification by the institution’s competent bodies.

### Supervision activities, risk assessment, and inspections
- Verification that banks have adequate policies and processes to prevent misuse for criminal activities is done on-site and off-site by the NBR.
- The NBR has assessed the ML/TF risks of the banking sector, ranked banks according to their ML/TF risks, and established a detailed methodology to ensure a more risk-based approach to its AML/CFT supervisory activities.
- Inspection objectives regarding compliance with AML/CFT legislation cover a broader range of institutional aspects that may impact the efficiency of prevention systems and are structured to provide a risk based evaluation of supervised entities.
- Data and information are obtained from off-site supervision (regular requests for relevant data and information) and on-site supervision (including in prudential supervisory activities).
- Information collected focuses on institutions’ understanding of inherent ML/TF risk factors and factors that mitigate the risk of ML/TF inherently associated with an assessed entity or cluster.
- In 2016, 39 inspections were conducted.
- In addition to scheduled inspections, one narrowly‑targeted thematic inspection was conducted following concerns raised by the public prosecution about possible AML/CFT violations by one credit institution.
- For noncompliance with AML/CFT (?) requirements, orders were imposed for remedial action plans and letters of recommendation were sent to improve the framework for managing the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing.

### Sanctions, enforcement outcomes, and STR reporting
- Thirty-eight sanctions were imposed to 20 institutions for offences committed—19 warnings and 19 fines (the latter totaling RON 335,000).
- During on-site examinations, special attention was given to verification of transactions flagged by the anti-money laundering software of credit institutions and not reported to the FIU; attention was also given to reasons STRs were not filed and to the degree that transaction reporting was required.
- Whenever a lack of caution in analysis was detected, sanctions were imposed and the suspicious transactions were reported to the FIU.
- The increase in the number of sanctions imposed to financial institutions supervised by the NBR appears to have led to an increase in the number of STRs (from 4.610 in 2015 to

*IMF mission report excerpt*

### 8.555 in 2016

### cr18171 - 8.555 in 2016

### Reporting of suspicious activities (EC3, EC4)
- Banks must report suspicious activities and incidents of fraud to the financial intelligence unit (FIU) and to the NBR when such activities/incidents are material to the safety, soundness or reputation of the bank (Article 160 of NBR Regulation No. 5/2013; Article 5 and Article 6 of AML/CFT Law).
- Supervisory practice:
  - In 2016, six notifications concerning suspicious transactions of money laundering identified by inspection teams were submitted to the FIU and another notification was submitted to the prosecutors with competencies in this field.
  - In the first semester of 2017, the Supervision Department of the NBR notified the FIU seven times regarding suspicious money laundering transactions identified by the inspection teams. In six cases, the prosecutors were notified.
- Procedure: Article 24 of AML/CFT Law requires the NBR to immediately inform the FIU when obtained data contains suspicions of ML, TF, or other infringements.
- On-site examinations include analysis of transactions flagged by anti-money laundering software that were not reported to the FIU, and review of reasons STRs were not filed.

### Customer due diligence and KYC expectations (EC5)
- Supervisory expectations and legal basis:
  - AML/CFT Law and NBR Regulation No. 9/2008 define conditions for applying CDD measures in normal, low, and high-risk cases.
  - Credit institutions must have KYC Norms in place (Article 5 of NBR Regulation No. 9/2008) and submit KYC norms to NBR – Supervision Department within 5 days of approval or modification.
- KYC Norms must include, at minimum:
  - a customer acceptance policy;
  - customer identification and ongoing monitoring procedures;
  - details of standard, simplified and enhanced CDD measures;
  - procedures for ongoing monitoring to detect unusual and suspect transactions;
  - procedures for transactions/relations with jurisdictions that do not impose enforcement of CDD;
  - adequate record-keeping procedures and access to records;
  - procedures and control systems for KYC program implementation and efficiency assessment, including external audit;
  - standards for employment and training programs of KYC staff;
  - reporting procedures, internal and to competent authorities.
- Specific legal provisions:
  - Article 18 of AML/CFT Law: enhanced CDD mandatory in higher-risk situations; Article 18 paragraph (2) mandates enhanced CDD in at least three situations:
    - for the persons who are not physically present when the transactions are carried out;
    - for correspondent banking relationships with credit institutions from states which are not Member States of the European Union or of the European Economic Area;
    - for transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons, who are residents of another Member State of the European Union or of the European Economic Area or of a third country.
  - Article 16 of NBR Regulation No. 9/2008: extra CDD measures for potentially higher risk customers/transactions, including higher-level approvals, measures to establish source of wealth, and enhanced monitoring.
  - Article 19 of AML/CFT Law: keep a copy of proof of identity or identity references for a period of at least five years starting from the termination date of the business relationship.
  - Article 17 of AML/CFT Law: imposes simplified CDD measures in some instances (e.g., electronic money, customer is a credit or financial institution from a Member state of the EU); scope of forgoing measures is not clear.
- Supervisory verification:
  - NBR checks on-site, based on customer samples, how CDD requirements are applied and whether customer data are updated as required.
  - If internal norms do not provide regular updates of customers' data differentiated by risk level, the NBR compels institutions to introduce such provisions via letter of recommendation or imposing measures.

### Politically exposed persons (PEPs)
- Article 3 of Law No. 656 defines PEPs broadly (prominent public functions, their families and close associates). Former PEPs are those entrusted with prominent functions at any time in the preceding year.
- The definition covers domestic, foreign and international organization PEPs. Domestic PEPs are subject to enhanced due diligence if they present higher ML/TF risk (Article 18 paragraph 2). Foreign PEPs residing in Romania are not subject to enhanced due diligence under current rules.

### Correspondent banking (EC6)
- Legal framework and requirements:
  - Enhanced CDD measures are mandatory for correspondent relations with credit institutions from third countries (countries outside the EU and EEA), per AML/CFT law and Government Decision No. 594/2008 Article 12 paragraph 3. Required measures include:
    - gather sufficient information about the third-country credit institution to understand its activity and reputation;
    - assess the control mechanisms implemented by the third-country credit institution to prevent ML/TF;
    - obtain approval from executive management before establishing a new correspondent relation;
    - establish, based on documents, the liability of each credit institution;
    - if correspondent account is directly accessible to clients of the third-country institution, ensure that institution has applied standard CDD measures for those clients and can provide information on them upon request.
  - Article 12 of AML/CFT Law prohibits correspondent relationships with shell banks.
- Gap: law does not require similar enhanced measures for intra-EU correspondent banking relationships.

### Controls, governance, and supervision (EC7, EC8, EC9, EC10, EC11)
- Supervisory monitoring and reporting:
  - NBR supervises banks’ compliance with AML/CFT requirements and that banks report suspicious transactions to FIU (Article 5 of AML/CFT Law; Articles 37 of 3AMLD and 48 of 4AMLD referenced).
  - Banks must appoint one or more persons responsible for implementation of AML/CFT law and communicate names to FIU (Article 20 of AML/CFT Law). These persons establish policies and procedures on CDD, reporting, record-keeping, internal control, risk assessment and compliance management.
- Internal controls and audit:
  - Credit institutions must include procedures and control systems of KYC program implementation and efficiency assessment, including external audit (Article 5 of NBR Regulation No. 9/2008).
  - Banking Law and NBR Regulation No. 5/2013 require robust governance arrangements, internal control mechanisms, technical and professional requirements for key positions, and training.
  - NBR has access to documents drawn up by financial auditors.
- Human resources and training:
  - Inspection teams assess staff qualifications, continuous training, and testing of acquired knowledge.
  - Article 24 of NBR Regulation No. 9/2008: institutions required to impose high standards for employment, including reputation and integrity checks.
- Reporting lines and management information (EC10):
  - KYC norms must include internal reporting procedures; Compliance Directorate must have direct reporting lines to management body.
  - Article 27 of NBR Regulation No. 5/2013: management body must ensure adequate internal alert procedures for staff to communicate concerns.
  - Article 35 paragraph (5) of NBR Regulation No. 5/2013: control functions must regularly report to management on major deficiencies with follow-up measures and impact assessment.
- Whistleblower protection (EC11):
  - Article 9 of AML/CFT Law: application in good faith of reporting provisions cannot give rise to disciplinary, civil or criminal liability.

### Cooperation and information sharing (EC12)
- Legal and practical cooperation:
  - Article 8 paragraph (8) of AML/CFT Law: FIU shall provide the NBR with information on suspicious transactions and typologies of ML/TF.
  - Article 24 paragraph (2): NBR informs the FIU when obtained data contains suspicions of ML/TF.
  - NBR participates in Interinstitutional Council meetings established under Article 13 of Government Emergency Ordinance No. 202/2008 for cooperation on international sanctions.
  - NBR cooperates with supervisory authorities, the FIU, and the Financial Supervisory Authority under the mandate of the Board, observing professional secrecy requirements.
  - Cross-border supervision includes colleges, joint visits and information requests; NBR informs competent authorities on main deficiencies identified in AML/CFT activity of branches of credit institutions from Member States.
  - NBR has signed bilateral and multilateral Memorandums of understanding and Cooperation agreements concerning supervision.

### In-house resources and outreach (EC13)
- NBR resources:
  - Specialized division for AML/CFT supervision within the Supervision Department with on-site and off-site supervision teams of around twenty staff members; number of staff is in the process of being increased.
  - The AML/CFT division provides guidelines, best practices, statements, briefings adopted by international standard setting bodies and organizations for AML/CFT and for freezing funds and economic resources.
- 2016 sector communications/materials provided to banking sector included:
  - EU Good practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures adopted by the EU Council nr.7383/1/15, REV 1;
  - Guide on methods financing the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and high-risk transactions associated with them, developed by Egmont (confidential);
  - FATF Public Statements;
  - Confidential information on relevant risk indicators for detecting TF and requiring supervised institutions to take adequate measures and report to the central bank.

### Supervisory activity, sanctions, and enforcement outcomes
- Inspections and supervisory activity:
  - Verification that banks have adequate policies and processes is done on-site and off-site by the NBR. In 2016, 39 inspections were conducted. One narrowly‑targeted thematic inspection was also conducted to follow-up on concerns expressed by the public prosecution.
  - NBR assessed ML/TF risks banks face, ranked banks according to identified risks, and established a detailed methodology for a risk-based AML/CFT supervisory approach.
- Sanctions and remedial actions:
  - In 2016, for noncompliance with legal provisions governing the prevention and sanctioning of ML/TF:
    - orders were imposed for remedial action plans and letters of recommendation were sent;
    - 38 sanctions for offences committed were applied to 20 institutions—19 warnings and 19 fines (the latter totaling RON 335,000).
  - In the first semester of 2017, 52 sanctions—32 warnings and 20 fines (the latter totaling RON 435,000)—were applied to 24 institutions.
  - Follow-up of remedial measures assumed by banks is monitored off-site.

### Assessment of Principle 29 — Large Compliant
- Strengthening and implementation:
  - AML/CFT Supervision was strengthened to align with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and its risk-based supervision requirements.
  - NBR is in the early stages of implementing a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision.
  - A new enhanced AML/CFT law will be enforced in February 2018.
- Remaining shortcomings noted by assessors:
  - Only correspondent banking relationships with banks outside the EU are subject to enhanced due diligence; under the FATF standard, enhanced due diligence should apply to all correspondent banking relationships, including intra-EU relationships.
  - Requirements for foreign politically-exposed persons are based on residence rather than the country where the person exercises or exercised functions.
  - Simplified due diligence is imposed in specific circumstances without a sound assessment establishing these circumstances present low ML/TF risks.
- Recommended actions for authorities:
  - Continue implementing a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision.
  - Ensure that simplified due diligence is authorized only in instances of proven low ML/TF risks.
  - Ensure that banks are required to implement CDD measures with respect to foreign politically exposed persons in line with FATF Recommendation 12.
  - Ensure that the requirements related to correspondent banking relationships also apply to intra-EU correspondent banking relationships.

*Source: cr18171 - 8.555 in 2016*

### 1. Responsibilities,

### 1. Responsibilities

### Banking supervision responsibility and legal framework
- Banking supervision in Romania falls exclusively within the responsibility of the central bank.
- Laws and regulations are regularly updated.

### Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors (Grade: MNC)
- The NBR, as a supervisory authority, possesses stable governance arrangements and effective operational independence.
- The NBR dedicates large resources to supervision, in terms of staff, equipment and other variable costs.
- The NBR adopted detailed arrangements to prevent and manage conflicts of interests at all levels.
- Identified weaknesses:
  - The fit and proper criteria the standing committees of Parliament responsible for the appointment of Board members expect applicants to meet are unknown.
  - The Minister of Public Finance (and its State Secretary) is allowed by law to attend NBR Board meetings (which could compromise its independence).
  - The NBR as an institution is not protected against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging its duties in good faith.
  - The reason(s) for removal of a Board member do not have to be disclosed.
  - There is no post-employment or cooling-off period framework covering situations where a staff or Board member intends to take (or takes) a position in a bank supervised by the NBR.

### Cooperation and collaboration (Grade: LC)
- Arrangements are in place to facilitate and ensure cooperation with relevant domestic and foreign authorities.
- Cooperation among domestic authorities is organized, including with the ASF which regulates insurance, pension and capital market activities.
- Cooperation with EU authorities is intense.
- Identified shortcoming:
  - There are no regular meetings between the NBR and ASF to discuss the situation and risk profiles of individual institutions and groups active in banking and other sector(s) supervised by the ASF and the issues of common interests, and coordinate (or agree on joint) supervisory actions.

### Permissible activities (Grade: C)
- Only licensed credit institutions can provide banking services.

### Licensing criteria (Grade: C)
- The NBR has exclusive competence for granting and withdrawing the license of banks incorporated in Romania and branches of banks located outside the EU.
- The NBR last licensed a bank in 2009.
- The licensing framework defines clear criteria for licensing.
- The ownership structure of locally incorporated banks and branches of EU banks is transparent.

### Transfer of significant ownership (Grade: LC)
- The NBR implements a rigorous definition of transfer of significant ownership, in line with the provisions of CRD IV, as well as requirements on the transparency of bank ownership.
- This largely, but may not fully, cover the transfer of beneficial ownership.
- While banks keep close contacts with the NBR, there is no specific requirement that banks notify the NBR as soon as they become aware of any material information which may negatively affect the suitability of a major shareholder or a party that has a controlling interest.

### Major acquisitions (Grade: C)
- The NBR has a detailed framework to review major acquisitions.
- As part of the consolidation of the Romanian banking system, the NBR reviewed and approved four requests for acquisitions in the past five years (all related to mergers between banks licensed in Romania).

### Supervisory approach (Grade: LC)
- The Romanian regulatory framework has implemented the provisions of the CRR, CRD IV and BRRD (resolvability assessment).
- As of January 2016, the NBR Board approved the implementation of EBA SREP Guidelines into national supervisory practices.
- The new EBA SREP methodology is still in the early stage of implementation.
- Identified shortcomings:
  - There is no systematic process with securities and insurance supervisors (ASF) before on-site examinations of banking groups to discuss a common view of risks in the particular banking group supervised, supervisory approaches, and potential concerns on the banking group or subsidiaries.
  - The off-site monitoring tools do not seem to have embedded a forward-looking view of a bank’s risk profile.
  - More risk-focused, banking industry-wide thematic analyses triggered by detected trends or recent events, and thematic examinations across systems seem to be limited.

### Supervisory techniques and tools (Grade: LC)
- The SREP is a core supervisory tool of banking supervision in Romania.
- It deploys a good mix of onsite and offsite supervisory tools and techniques.
- The NBR has broad information collecting power by legislation; in particular, the Central Credit Register allows supervisors to access high-granularity data.
- Identified shortcomings:
  - During SREP, there is no structured/independent review to ensure consistency and accuracy on scoring, findings, and measures of the supervisory report. Considering the recent adoption of the EBA SREP methodology in Romania, the quality assurance procedure is critical.
  - With regard to the off-site supervision, a significant part of this off-site function includes the approval/rejection of requests concerning amendments in a bank’s situation (including approvals of middle managers of each bank). This responsibility, despite positive benefits, could limit to a certain extent the ability of the NBR to maintain a thorough and deeper analysis of the risks that banks, banking groups, and the banking industry are facing.
  - There is no systematic process of regular meeting with nonexecutive/independent members after on-site examination to discuss findings and the remedial actions (See CP14).

### Supervisory reporting (Grade: LC)
- The Romanian banking system has been required to report financial information based on IFRS at consolidated level since 2006 and at individual level since January 2012.
- The supervisory reporting/validation rules and templates are mainly governed by a harmonized EU reporting framework.
- In case of solo FINREP, as required by national legislation, the reporting templates are consistent with those at EU reporting requirements.
- Identified shortcomings:
  - There are no explicit guidelines/criteria for hiring third parties who conduct supervisory tasks to assess the quality of the work performed by those experts, or obligating them to report to the NBR promptly any material shortcomings identified.
  - There is no explicit/regular evaluation process in place to periodically review the information collected to determine that it satisfies a supervisory need, particularly in the case of additional prudential returns (except the ones collected according to the common European reporting framework).

### Corrective actions and sanctioning powers of supervisors (Grade: LC)
- The NBR has a range of supervisory, sanction measures, and administrative penalties available for use when, in the supervisor’s judgment, a bank is not complying with laws, regulations, or supervisory actions.
- In practice, corrective actions and sanctioning powers are exercised in a forceful manner and a broad range of measures have been applied to banks, management, the Board, and/or individuals.
- Identified weaknesses:
  - There is an insufficient amount of mandatory review and analysis processes for ensuring consistency, accuracy, and justification of inspection outcomes and supervisory/sanction measures across the banking system.
  - There is no consistent internal independent review process present to ascertain that the degree/type of measures or the corrective actions are adequate according to the law and regulations and consistent across the banking system.
  - With respect to supervisory follow-ups, the time frame described in the internal rules of the NBR is not always kept; assessors note that the process of supervisory reports and written orders were in many cases delayed.
  - Wrap-up meetings after on-site inspection were not held in an official manner, which would hinder banks from implementing supervisory measures in a prompt manner.
  - The overall follow-up procedures are set by the internal rules in the NBR, not by laws or regulations.
  - Among the measures required by the EC4, the NBR, as a competent authority, does not have the explicit power to facilitate a takeover by or merger with a healthier institution per Banking Law.
  - There is no systematic or regular process informing the supervisor of nonbank related financial entities (including ASF), of the NBR’s actions, and there is no process to coordinate its action with them.
- Note: Approximately 45 cases were submitted to the board within a five-year period with 18 cases being contested in court. Some of the issues were about clarification of findings.

### Consolidated supervision (Grade: LC)
- The majority of the credit institutions are subsidiaries of European banking groups.
- Consolidated supervision of the whole group is performed by ECB or respective authorities while the NBR is responsible for the supervision of the Romanian subsidiary at individual and sub-consolidated levels.
- The NBR conducts SREP assessments on a consolidated basis.
- Identified shortcomings:
  - Limited systematic procedures in place for overall monitoring and assessment of contagion and reputation risks that may jeopardize the safety and soundness of the bank and the banking system.
  - As off-site activities of consolidated supervision, the quarterly key risk indicators are mainly monitored on a solo basis rather than both solo and consolidated basis.
  - In terms of fit and proper standards on the owners and senior management of parent corporates, the formal fit and proper reviews are conducted in the stage of acquisition or granting licenses, and not conducted on a regular basis.

### Home-host relationships (Grade: C)
- The NBR is only a host supervisor.
- It is a member of 15 EU colleges of supervisors, which allow for effective exchanges of information and unified supervisory actions (including joint decisions).
- Close coordination is in place for crisis management and resolution, at the domestic level with the resolution arm of the NBR and, for large banks active in Romania, within EU supervisory and resolution colleges.
- All Romanian banks prepared recovery plans starting in 2016; resolution plans were also prepared for almost all of these institutions (and their groups where applicable).

### Corporate governance (Grade: LC)
- Corporate governance requirements were strengthened at the EU level and transposed in Romania starting in 2013.
- Both regulations and the supervisory process appropriately make the management body responsible for ensuring banks operate in a safe and sound manner.
- The NBR conducts a thorough review process, including challenging interviews, before approving members of the management body, and during the on-site full-scope examinations.
- Identified shortcomings:
  - The NBR only requires subsidiaries to have an “adequate” number of independent members of the management body. Banks usually only have 1 or 2 independent member(s), which is insufficient to foster challenging other executive and nonexecutive members and, where appropriate, lead the work of specialized committees (only the audit committees currently has to be chaired by an independent member).
  - The NBR does not yet meet on a regular basis with its non-executive and independent members (neither as part of the off-site process nor during on-site examinations) (See CP9).
  - The NBR only sends letters detailing serious shortcomings or transmitting on-site reports to senior management, rather than to the management body in its supervisory capacity.
  - Regulations do not include:
    - an explicit provision for banks to notify the supervisor as soon as they become aware of any material and bona fide information that may negatively affect the fitness and propriety of a bank’s Board member or a member of the senior management; and
    - requirements regarding the nomination and appointment of Board members across the banking group.
  - The NBR has not yet performed qualitative analyses on corporate governance arrangements and practices at the industry level (to complement individual work and SREP analyses).

### Risk management process (Grade: LC)
- Regulations set detailed and demanding risk management requirements for banks.
- Discussions with the NBR confirmed the importance placed on risk management during on-site inspections.
- The NBR has not yet developed an internal methodology to guide the review of risk management aspects, in addition to the SREP guideline.
- Identified areas where explicit requirements would complement supervisory practices:
  - The banks’ Boards and senior management understand the limitations and uncertainties relating to the output of the models and the risk inherent in their use.
  - The banks’ Boards and senior management understand the risks inherent in major management initiatives (such as changes in systems, processes, business model and major acquisitions).
  - Uncertainties attached to risk measurement need to be recognized.

### Capital adequacy (Grade: LC)
- Romania is subject to EU common regulatory framework, and applies the CRR and CRD IV.
- Two banks have been approved to use advanced approach to calculate credit risk regulatory capital and three banks for operational risks.
- Although the number of banks applying the advanced approach is small, those banks using the approach are large banks with a considerable percentage based total own funds requirement (credit risk: 17 percent, operational risk: 38 percent).
- Noteworthy:
  - In December 2014, the RCAP assessment team of the Basel Committee reviewed EU-wide capital framework and concluded that certain features deviated from Basel standards.
  - There is no dedicated team or unit within the Supervision Department responsible for evaluating, approving, reviewing and overseeing banks’ internal models.

### Credit risk (Grade: C)
- Key regulatory requirements regarding credit risk management exist and were significantly strengthened based on new EU requirements and the Romanian experience with problem assets.
- The NBR implemented a thorough supervisory process, with an emphasis on credit risk.
- The NBR regularly requires corrective actions or takes sanctions where appropriate.
- For subsidiaries of EU banking groups, as well as for the main branch of an EU banking group, credit risk management is addressed by supervisory colleges.

### Problem assets, provisions, and reserves (Grade: C)
- Nonperforming exposures (NPE) increased rapidly and dramatically after 2007 with a peak at 2013, but declined to 6.4 percent in December 2017.
- The NBR was instrumental in promoting this rapid reduction through many initiatives designed to ensure the timely recognition and realistic provisioning of NPEs (e.g., interim June audits, independent collateral revaluations, full provisioning of high risk exposures, write-offs etc.).
- The NBR continues to closely monitor NPEs, thanks to detailed and regular reporting.
- Requirements regarding the frameworks to address problem loans exist and their implementation is closely monitored.
- The NBR intends to amend existing requirements to incorporate key elements of the EBA 2017 guidelines on credit risk management practices and accounting for expected credit losses.

### Concentration risk and large exposure limits (Grade: LC)
- The NBR applies EU-wide large exposure regime and the banks’ concentration risk management is assessed in the context of SREP assessment.
- The CRR allows that competent authorities may set a lower limit than EUR 150 million as an absolute limit, but the NBR has not exercised this option.
- As a result, as of June 2017, around 29 percent of Romanian banks apply the large exposure limit of EUR 150 million (i.e., 100 percent of capital limit) instead of 25 percent of capital.
- Assessors note that some credit institutions have exposures to a group entity of around 80–90 percent of capital at a point of time.
- Although banks’ internal limits are reviewed during on-site, it is not entirely clear how and in what procedure the NBR determines that the internal limit set by each institution and the relevant transactions are appropriate.
- There is no explicit requirement in the regulation that the bank’s policies and processes require all material concentrations to be regularly reviewed and reported to the bank’s Board.

### Transactions with related parties (Grade: MNC)
- The current regulation on RP transactions does not meet important ECs under this CP.
- Specific deficiencies:
  - The definition of affiliated parties is not comprehensive enough to meet the requirements in this CP. The current definition fails to capture any person in a key position or a major individual shareholder of other group entities within a banking group including the parent bank/company itself; the definition of affiliated parties also does not explicitly include “special purpose entities.”
  - In terms of identification of related parties, the authorities mention that the NBR, in practice, may exercise discretion in applying the definition on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, there is no explicit presumption power of the NBR in the regulation.
  - There is no explicit provision that requires that the “write-off” of RP exposures exceeding specified amounts is subject to prior approval by the board.
  - The information on RP transactions collected is not sufficiently granular to capture the exact characteristic during off-site supervision.
  - Overall RP regulation only describes high level principle, does not give clear guidance to banks, and lacks sufficient substance.

### Country and transfer risks (Grade: MNC)
- The NBR will check the country/transfer risk policies and processes implemented by banks if the country and transfer risks are significant for a bank or banking group.
- The NBR regulation for country risk/transfer risk management are not sufficiently comprehensive to meet the ECs in this CP.
- Specific shortcomings:
  - Regulation includes only high level principles similar to this BCP text. The NBR does not give any further/specific guidance to banks through regulation or documented instruction. There is no on-site inspection manual in this regard, so it is difficult to ensure what and how supervisors should examine during on-site inspections. For example, the regulation is silent in the essential areas to be developed by banks and examined by supervisors to manage country and transfer risks (e.g., procedures for dealing with country risk such as contingency plans or exit strategies in times of crisis, oversight mechanism, a periodic review requirement by the board).
  - There are no specific regulatory provisioning standards for country risk and transfer risk in Romania.
  - There are no specific stipulations in the regulation that banks include appropriate scenarios into their stress testing programs to reflect country and transfer risk analysis for risk management purposes.
  - Although FINREP/COREP reporting contains geographical breakdown information, the necessary information for country risk management, such as risk classification or (internal/external) country rating, is not included in the reporting.
  - It is not clear how supervisors perform a banking group-wide country risk analysis across each entity to form a comprehensive view of country risk.

*Source: cr18171 - 1. Responsibilities*

### 22. Market risk C

### 22. Market risk C

### Market risk — findings
- In the Romanian banking system, the level of the market risk is low for most of the Romanian credit institutions that do not have complex instruments that may expose the bank to significant risk.
- As of June 2017, RWAs for market risk were around three percent of total RWAs.
- No banks are using the advanced approach for computing market risk capital charge.
- CRR and EBA SREP guidelines are stipulated in a comprehensive way and the NBR conducts on-site inspection on all credit institutions annually.
- There is no market risk specialist in the supervision department; one should be assigned to build up expertise in this area.

### Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB) — findings
- The NBR assesses IRRBB risk management, risk profile, appetite, tolerance and the stress tests made by the credit institutions during yearly on-site examination.
- The Basel Committee published a new guideline on standards for IRRBB in April 2016, but the NBR has not yet updated the IRRBB rules, since the updating process is based on the EU-wide regulatory amendment process.
- There is no explicit provision that requires “independent” validation of any models used by the functions tasked with managing interest rate risk (including review of key model assumptions).

### Liquidity risk — findings
- Banks are required to have a strategy that enables prudent management of liquidity risk and compliance with liquidity requirements, including regular stress testing and contingency funding plans.
- The NBR conducts on-site inspection annually and off-site quarterly for all banks.
- The EU-wide requirement follows the LCR set by the BCBS broadly, but with some divergences that could result in improved ratios. However, the impact is not significant in Romanian context (i.e.,: no covered bonds holdings, conservative eligibility criteria regarding certain HQLA level 1 asset, and high level of average LCR ratio in the banking industry, etc.)

### Operational risk — findings
- In Romania, three banks have been allowed to use AMA, two are using SA, and the rest use BIA to calculate operational risk regulatory capital.
- As of June 2017, RWAs for operational risk have been around 15 percent of total RWAs.
- A comprehensive guideline on cyber security and information technology for banks has not been implemented yet.
- Regarding IT resources, the Supervisory Department has one IT systems specialist but does not have a dedicated unit.
- With respect to operational risk reporting, the scope of reporting is not sufficiently broad as this EC require. There is no template/framework specifying the minimum elements the bank should report to the NBR, and the timing is also unclear.

### Internal control and audit — findings
- The NBR regularly assesses for each bank incorporated in Romania compliance with its detailed requirements on internal control and audit.
- Beyond regulatory and SREP requirements (which cover essential topics but with limited details), there is no internal methodology to guide on-site inspections on internal control and audit (detailed scope, criteria to assess specific areas, group approaches etc.) and ensure these aspects are reviewed in a comprehensive and consistent manner.
- Banks are not specifically required to ensure that the internal audit is kept informed in a timely manner of any material changes made to the bank’s risk management strategy, policies or processes.
- Industry level analyses are not conducted on internal control and audit.

### Financial reporting and external audit — findings
- Banks are required to prepare financial statements in compliance with IFRS and have them certified by an external auditor which complies international standards on audit and is approved by the NBR.
- Banks’ external auditors belong to the networks of the four big global audit firms and a large French audit firm (with the exception of the credit cooperative network).
- Rotation requirements are implemented since 2014, either for the firm or the signing partner. All banks adopted specific policies and most rotated the firm.
- Five small banks appointed their external auditor in 2001–2008 and only rotated the signing partner. The NBR confirmed that the tenure of these signing partners did not exceed seven years.
- There is no internal methodology defining criteria used by the NBR to assess the adequacy of banks’ policies on rotation and the NBR has not set an explicit maximum time limit to guide supervisory assessments.

### Disclosure and transparency — findings
- Financial and prudential disclosure requirements applied to banks are detailed and largely unified at the EU level.
- The NBR verifies individual disclosure requirements and published detailed and updated information on banking activity and risks.

### Abuse of financial services (AML/CFT) — findings
- AML/CFT Supervision was strengthened in recent years to align with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and risk-based supervision.
- In 2016, 39 inspections were conducted, and one narrowly‑targeted thematic inspection was also conducted.
- Shortcomings noted:
  - Under Romanian law, only correspondent banking relationships with banks outside the EU are subject to enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures. Under the FATF standard, however, EDD should be implemented with respect to all correspondent banking relationships, and no exception is currently made for intra EU correspondent banking relationships.
  - Simplified due diligence is imposed in specific circumstances without a sound assessment that would have established that these circumstances present low ML/TF risks.

### Key numeric indicators
- As of June 2017, RWAs for market risk: around three percent of total RWAs.
- As of June 2017, RWAs for operational risk: around 15 percent of total RWAs.
- NPL ratio: plummeted from a peak of 21.9 percent in 2013, to 6.4 percent as of December 2017.

### Recommended supervisory actions (selected, relevant to market/IRRBB/operational risk)
- Market risk:
  - Build up supervisory capacity by having a dedicated market risk specialist.
- IRRBB:
  - Include explicit requirement that banks conduct independent (internal or external) validation of any models used by the functions tasked with managing interest rate risk (including review of key model assumptions).
  - Update current regulation based on EU-wide regulatory amendment process reflecting new standards for IRRBB which were published in April 2016.
- Operational risk:
  - Introduce guidelines on a comprehensive information and communication technology risk as intended.
  - Enhance IT risk supervisory capacity (e.g., establish a specialized unit/ increase IT specialists).
  - Expand the scope and required items of reporting on operational risk events to keep the NBR apprised of developments affecting operational risk in a timelier and comprehensive manner.
- Internal control and audit:
  - Prepare an internal methodology to guide on-site inspections on internal control and audit (scope, criteria to assess specific areas, group approaches for subsidiaries, etc.).
  - Specifically require banks to ensure that the internal audit is kept informed in a timely manner of any material changes made to the bank’s risk management strategy, policies or processes.
  - Consider conducting industry level analyses on internal control and audit.
- Financial reporting and external audit:
  - Prepare an internal methodology defining criteria used by the NBR to assess the adequacy of banks’ policies on rotation of external auditors (and set a maximum time limit to guide supervisory assessments).
- Disclosure:
  - Consider the opportunity to require, at least for significant banks, more frequent disclosure (than on an annual basis).
- Abuse of financial services:
  - Continue implementing a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision.
  - Ensure that simplified due diligence is authorized only in instances of proven low ML/TF risks.
  - Ensure that banks are required to implement CDD measures with respect to foreign politically exposed persons in line with FATF Recommendation 12.
  - Ensure that the requirements related to correspondent banking relationships also apply to intra-EU correspondent banking relationships.

*Source: cr18171 - 22. Market risk C (IMF Financial Sector Assessment excerpt).*

### 63.      The independence of the NBR continued to be strong as part of a broader process in

### 63.      The independence of the NBR continued to be strong as part of a broader process in

### Independence and legal protection
- Independence of the NBR continued to be strong in the context of Euro adoption and involves ensuring compliance with the European Commission and the ECB recommendations included in the Convergence Reports.
- Under the current Statute, NBR Board Members and personnel tasked with prudential supervision have legal protection against lawsuits while exercising their duties, in good faith, and their legal costs are covered by the NBR.
- The NBR will pursue amending the NBR Statute to “Introduce a legal provision protecting the NBR as an institution against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging its duties in good faith.” The NBR will seek to build consensus among all policy makers to achieve this aim.

### Transparency and governance
- The NBR welcomes the recommendation to “Introduce a legal provision that the reason(s) for removal of a Board member have to be publicly disclosed”.
- Given the NBR Statute and the two Chambers of the Romanian Parliament’s Internal Regulation on joint activities (which stipulates that the meetings of the joint parliamentary standing committees are generally open to the public), the causes for dismissal are supposed to be publicly-available, although this is not explicitly stated in the law.

### Ethics, conflicts of interest, and post-employment restrictions
- The NBR has recently implemented a Code of Ethics, applicable to its staff and Board Members, which expressly regulates conflicts of interests and other cases of misconduct.
- Detection of conflicts of interest is also promoted by an updated whistleblowing framework, in line with international best practices, aimed at encouraging staff to file reports.
- To “Adopt and implement a post-employment or cooling-off period framework covering situations where a staff or Board member intends to take (or takes) a position in a bank supervised by NBR (or that it has directly supervised)”, the NBR will implement policies in line with this recommendation.

### Supervisory approach, techniques, tools (CP 8 and 9)
- The FSAP mission provided specific recommendations on supervisory practices as an opportunity for improvement; the NBR will adjust its supervisory practices to become as fully compliant as possible with the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision.
- The NBR agrees that further development of its supervisory approach will make supervision more effective and broadly in line with the requirements of the 2012 BCP.
- The NBR notes that, regardless of some internal processes not exhaustively formalized, all banks are adequately supervised within the current supervision framework, and that the NBR has a good understanding of both individual banks and the banking industry as a whole.
- Some key indicators have been maintained well above the EU banking system average. The NBR took important decisions, with good results, to decrease NPLs stock and strengthen the supervision of NPL.
- Supervisory manuals and processes have been revised to align with international best practices as part of an established ongoing improvement framework. As a result, the following will be enhanced:
  - the consistency and objectivity in SREP score, findings and supervisory measures/sanctions, e.g., through an independent unit in charge with the quality review of SREP assessment outcomes and management of findings, measures, and follow-ups data base);
  - the forward-looking components of supervisory framework and more risk focused based approach (e.g., bottom up stress-testing tools, performing thematic reviews etc.);
  - the dialogue between supervisors and nonexecutive/independent banks board members through regular meetings after on-site examinations.

### Home-host relationships (CP 13)
- The FSAP evaluation contributes to efforts to strengthen the bank resolution function and further develop internal preparedness for dealing with failing banks.
- The NBR acknowledges the importance of continuous tests and has planned a simulation exercise for 2018 to test the resolution operational readiness/preparedness.

### Country and transfer risks (CP 21)
- In response to the statement that “There are no specific regulatory provisioning standards for country risk and transfer risk in Romania.”, the NBR reiterates that starting in 2018, EU Member States will no longer be allowed to impose additional deductions from banks’ capital (according to Article 481 paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012).
- The prudential provisioning would have the effect of affecting the capital so that EC4 could not be implemented without harming the observance of the above-mentioned EU Regulation.

### Operational risk (CP 25)
- The NBR acknowledges the necessity to enhance IT risk supervisory capacities as well as expertise in the area of internal risk models assessment and review.
- Capacity enhancements will occur either by recruitment process or by identifying proper training for the staff in charge with these tasks, reflecting a very fast-changing, high-demanding and competitive environment.

### Abuse of financial services (CP 29)
- The legal shortcomings mentioned for this CP are mainly due to the regime accepted and applicable at the EU level and are derived from the former EU Directives.
- The NBR notes that the new Directive (EU) 2015/849 addresses these problems, and consequently its mandatory transposition in the national law will solve the deficiencies revealed.

*Source: cr18171 - 63.      The independence of the NBR continued to be strong as part of a broader process in*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2018/cr18171.pdf_
