## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (cr18239)

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### Context and program scope
- Gradual economic recovery persisted with solid growth for the second consecutive year.
- Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement approved in July 2016 with total access of SDR 250.55 million (about $350 million).
- Completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement triggers a disbursement equivalent to SDR 31.43 million, bringing total disbursements under the current arrangement to SDR 156.26 million (about $220 million).
- Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) was 76 percent in 2017.

### Review of program performance
- All quantitative performance criteria (PCs) and indicative targets (ITs) at end-December 2017 were met, most with substantial margins.
- Structural benchmarks (SBs):
  - Six of eight SBs met.
  - Submission of the new statistics law to parliament completed in February 2018 rather than December 2017.
  - Continuous benchmark on fuel pricing was not observed starting in January 2018.
- Staff recommended:
  - Modification of the end-December 2018 PCs, particularly the primary balance;
  - Establishment of new end-June 2019 PCs;
  - Modification of the continuous PCs on new non-concessional external debt;
  - Completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement.

### Recent economic developments and outlook
- Growth:
  - Real GDP grew by more than 4 percent in both 2016 and 2017.
  - Growth drivers: transport, manufactured exports, and other services; weaker public investment and tourism.
  - Medium-term growth projected to reach 5 percent in 2018 and surpass that level over the next three years.
  - Real GDP projections (selected): 4.2 (2016), 4.1 (2017), 4.2 (2018 Prel. Est.), 5.1 (2019), 5.0 (2020), 5.6 (2021), 5.4 (2022), 5.3 (2023).
- Inflation and monetary policy:
  - Inflation accelerated to 9 percent (y-o-y) at end-2017; core inflation 6 percent (source notes core inflation 6.3 percent in Dec 2017 elsewhere).
  - Inflation fell to 7.4 percent (y-o-y) in April 2018 as rice prices stabilized.
  - Policy rate raised from 8.3 percent to 9.5 percent during 2017.
- External sector and reserves:
  - Current account deficit of 0.3 percent of GDP in 2017, smaller than projected.
  - Central bank purchased $272 million in foreign exchange; reserves rose by $414 million to reach 4.0 months of import cover by end-2017.
  - Real effective exchange rate appreciated by 3.6 percent by end-2017.
- Credit and liquidity:
  - Growth in credit to the private sector: 8.9 percent y-o-y in real terms (end-March 2018).
  - Bank liquidity managed through deposit auctions; some volatility.

### Fiscal execution and supplementary budget (2017–2018)
- 2017 fiscal execution:
  - Tax revenue rose to 11.5 percent of GDP—its highest level since 2008.
  - Wage bill contained at 5.8 percent of GDP.
  - Transfers to JIRAMA limited to budgeted amounts (1.2 percent of GDP in one summary; elsewhere MGA 450 billion = 1.3 percent of GDP shown).
  - Past government domestic arrears paid off as planned (0.6 percent of GDP).
  - JIRAMA faced larger cash needs than planned by 0.4 percent of GDP and covered them by issuing promissory notes.
  - Foreign-financed investment fell significantly short of targets.
- Supplementary budget submitted May 25, 2018 (approved June 29, 2018):
  - Projected domestic primary balance remains positive at 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - Supplementary budget lower than initial budget by 0.6 percent of GDP.
  - Main changes:
    - Additional 0.25 percent of GDP in transfers to JIRAMA (two-thirds related to repayment of promissory notes).
    - Additional 0.15 percent of GDP for wages and salaries.
    - Additional 0.1 percent of GDP in transfers for the civil service pension fund.
    - Temporary support for some textile companies: 0.05 percent of GDP.
    - Offsetting measures: postponement of the annual salary increase and removal of about 1,000 “ghost workers” from the payroll.
  - Financing:
    - Revenue projections revised upwards by 0.16 percent of GDP to reach 12.0 percent of GDP.
    - As part of agreement with oil distributors, tax payments of 0.2 percent of GDP are expected to be delayed until 2019.
    - Additional financing needs (0.5 percent of GDP) to be covered by domestic financing and additional budget support (0.1 percent of GDP).

### Fuel pricing, distributor liabilities, and agreement
- Background:
  - Reference price defined in 2013; automatic adjustment mechanism instituted February 2016.
  - Fuel price administration historically costly (up to 1.5 percent of GDP per year 2010–2012; up to 0.8 percent of GDP each year 2013–2015).
- Early 2018 developments:
  - Pump prices frozen in January and February 2018; gap with reference price widened as world prices rose.
  - Margin reduction in February (about 4 percent of the reference price) and price increases totaling about 5 percent in March and April were insufficient; gap reached about 6 percent by end-May.
- Agreement (late May 2018) between authorities and fuel distributors:
  - Contain liabilities at end-2018 to 0.25 percent of GDP through price adjustments and/or margin reductions; price adjustments started with a 1.3 percent price increase in June (prior action).
  - Align pump prices with the reference price by end-2018; thereafter prices to adjust automatically with a smoothing formula.
  - Pay off the liability in 2019 through a price surcharge.
  - Defer payment of taxes into 2019 to mitigate distributors’ financial impact (amount comparable to the liability).
- Staff noted paying off 0.25 percent of GDP would require a surcharge of about 5 percent and emphasized the value of automatic fuel price adjustment.

### JIRAMA reform, losses, and tariff implications
- Objective: phase out transfers to JIRAMA for operating losses by 2020; progress remains challenging.
- Measures and progress:
  - Installed 3,600 smart meters (meeting in advance the end-June 2018 SB); planning for 30,000 prepaid meters.
  - Begun referring cases of electricity theft to the judicial system.
- Under current projections: it will be necessary to raise tariffs substantially in real terms to eliminate operating losses.
- JIRAMA’s liabilities from past losses require attention once operating losses are controlled.

### Revenue mobilization and tax incentives
- Achievements:
  - Tax revenue increased by 2 percentage points of GDP since 2015; net tax-to-GDP ratio 9.9 percent in 2014 and 11.5 percent in 2017.
  - New tax policy unit became operational in September 2017.
- Near-term targets:
  - Objective to reach 12.0 percent of GDP in 2018 and at least 12.3 percent in 2019.
- Petroleum taxation:
  - Expected additional revenue from the TPP increase for 2018: MGA 134 billion (0.3 percent of GDP).
  - First three months of 2018: TPP revenue increased by MGA 23.7 billion; VAT on petroleum products added MGA 8.5 billion; total additional revenue in Q1: MGA 32.3 billion.
- Risks from incentives:
  - New laws on Special Economic Zones and on Industrial Development (Dec 2017 and Apr 2018) offer generous tax incentives.
  - Staff cautioned incentives must be cost-based, limited in scope, and piloted; authorities committed to limited pilots and cost-based incentives (MEFP, ¶16).

### Public investment capacity and debt stance
- Implementation capacity constraints have limited scaling up of public investment, especially for foreign-financed projects.
- 2017 actions:
  - Adopted a strategy and launched the Organization for the Coordination and Monitoring of Investments and their Financing (OCSIF).
- Debt strategy:
  - Authorities committed to maintaining a moderate risk of debt distress, primarily relying on concessional financing.
  - External financing supports increasing social spending; medium-term aim to finance a growing share from domestic resources.

### Debt sustainability, external borrowing, and DSA findings
- Risk of external debt distress assessed as "Moderate".
- Public DSA:
  - Total PPG debt: 41.3 (2015), 38.4 (2016), 36.0 (2017) percent of GDP.
  - External debt: 2,534 (2015), 2,535 (2016), 2,808 (2017) US$m; external debt percent of GDP 28.4 (2015), 26.7 (2016), 25.3 (2017).
  - PV of PPG external debt: 14 percent of GDP in 2017; projected to increase to 22½ percent of GDP by 2023 in the DSA baseline.
- Projected external borrowing (Table 12):
  - 2018: USD 1,372 million total; 91 percent concessional (USD 1,243 million), 9 percent non-concessional (USD 129 million).
  - 2019: USD 781 million total; 86 percent concessional (USD 674 million), 14 percent non-concessional (USD 106 million).
  - Uses (2018): Infrastructure USD 1,100 million (80 percent), Budget Financing USD 53 million (4 percent), Other USD 218 million (16 percent).
- DSA stress tests:
  - Some stress scenarios breach debt thresholds (notably a 30 percent depreciation shock in 2019).
  - Public DSA more sensitive to growth and fiscal shocks than external DSA.

### Monetary, financial sector, and statistical reforms
- Monetary policy and liquidity management:
  - BFM introduced foreign exchange swaps in 2017; encouraged banks to be more active in interbank market.
  - Measures envisaged: deterrent penalty rates for repeated reserve requirement violations; increase interest rate on standing lending facility; submit draft repo-promoting legislation by end-December 2018 (SB).
  - Surrender requirement on export proceeds considered temporary and to be phased out.
- Financial sector reforms:
  - New microfinance law with resolution framework adopted in 2017.
  - New banking law to be submitted to Parliament by end-December 2018 (SB); law on financial stability to be submitted in 2019.
  - Risk-based supervision targeted for full implementation by end-2019.
  - Mobile money expanded rapidly: active mobile money accounts grew by 89 percent a year over 2010–16.
- Statistics:
  - New statistics law adopted by Parliament in March 2018.
  - Revised annual national accounts published (rebased from 1984 to 2007; revised series for 2015–2016 finalized Q1 2018).
  - Quarterly national accounts and rebased GDP series to be published by end-2018.

### Program monitoring, TMU adjustments, and safeguards
- Program monitoring:
  - Modifications: from end-September 2018 the domestic primary balance PC excludes external budget grants (TMU ¶9).
  - Debt monitoring capacity upgraded from "weak" to "adequate" in February 2018; shift to PV-based PC on new debt planned, with nominal ceilings retained as indicative targets.
  - Proposed changes: slight reduction in the domestic primary fiscal balance (floor) and strengthened floors/ceilings for NFA, NDA, and tax revenue based on performance; targets extended until end-June 2019.
- Central bank safeguards:
  - 2017 safeguards assessment found progress; BFM publishes audited financial statements; action plan to adopt IFRS by end-December 2020 (starting with pro-forma IFRS for 2018).
- Data reporting and TMU exchange rates (program values):
  - MGA/SDR 4,443.86; U.S. Dollar/SDR 1.389049; Euro/SDR 1.270538; and others as specified in TMU.

### Risks
- Main risks are political or exogenous:
  - Presidential elections planned for November and December 2018 increase political uncertainty.
  - Higher oil prices, natural disasters, terms of trade shocks, and weaker-than-expected revenue generation pose downside risks.
  - Specific channels: larger transfers to JIRAMA, slower investment scaling-up, and donor support erosion.
- Staff assessment: external sustainability robust but overall moderate risk of debt distress.

### Staff appraisal and policy recommendations
- Macroeconomic assessment:
  - Madagascar’s recovery continues; after rising by more than 4 percent in 2016 and 2017, real GDP projected to grow by about 5 percent in 2018 with inflation contained and a strong external position.
  - All quantitative PCs and ITs met at end-December 2017; six of eight SBs fully met.
- Key recommendations and priorities:
  - Create fiscal space for priority spending by:
    - Limit growing liability to fuel distributors and implement an automatic pricing formula (cost-recovery pricing with smoothing) as soon as possible.
    - Accelerate JIRAMA reforms to eliminate operating losses by 2020, including gradual tariff increases in real terms and readiness to adjust tariffs if costs rise.
    - Ensure the wage bill is realistic, affordable, and adequate to meet key social objectives.
  - Continue strengthening macroeconomic stability, maintain single-digit inflation, enhance public investment capacity, improve economic governance and anti-corruption measures, and advance financial sector reforms.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and selected sections (cr18239).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Context and program scope
- Gradual economic recovery has persisted, with solid growth for the second consecutive year.
- Implementation of the authorities’ economic program is supported by an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement approved in July 2016.
- The ECF arrangement has total access of SDR 250.55 million (about $350 million).
- Completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement leads to a disbursement equivalent to SDR 31.43 million, bringing total disbursements under the current arrangement to SDR 156.26 million (about $220 million).
- Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) was 76 percent in 2017.

### Review of program performance
- All quantitative performance criteria (PCs) and indicative targets (ITs) at end-December 2017 were met, most with substantial margins.
- Six of eight structural benchmarks (SB) were met; one SB (submission of the new statistics law to parliament) was completed in February 2018 rather than December 2017; the continuous benchmark on fuel pricing was not observed starting in January 2018.
- Staff recommended:
  - Modification of the end-December 2018 PCs, particularly the primary balance;
  - Establishment of new end-June 2019 PCs;
  - Modification of the continuous PCs on new non-concessional external debt;
  - Completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement.

### Focus of policy discussions
- Maintain momentum on program objectives: promoting inclusive growth, creating fiscal space for priority investment and social spending, and advancing structural reforms in economic governance and the financial sector.
- Fiscal policy discussions emphasized containing losses by the public utility JIRAMA and managing government liabilities to oil distributors arising from fuel pricing policy.

### Recent economic developments and outlook
- Growth:
  - In 2017, the economy grew by more than 4 percent for the second year in a row.
  - Growth drivers: transport, manufactured exports, and other services; weaker growth in public investment and tourism.
  - Medium-term growth projected to reach 5 percent this year and surpass that level for the next three years.
- Inflation and monetary policy:
  - Inflation accelerated to 9 percent (y-o-y) at end-2017 due to a poor rice harvest; core inflation was 6 percent.
  - Inflation fell to 7.4 percent (y-o-y) in April 2018 as rice prices stabilized.
  - Policy rate raised from 8.3 percent to 9.5 percent during 2017.
- Fiscal execution (2017):
  - Tax revenue rose to 11.5 percent of GDP—its highest level since 2008.
  - Wage bill contained at 5.8 percent of GDP.
  - Transfers to JIRAMA limited to budgeted amounts (1.2 percent of GDP).
  - Past government domestic arrears paid off as planned (0.6 percent of GDP).
  - JIRAMA faced larger cash needs than planned by 0.4 percent of GDP and covered them by issuing promissory notes, increasing future budget transfer needs in 2018-20.
  - Foreign-financed investment fell significantly short of targets.
- External sector and reserves:
  - Current account deficit of 0.3 percent of GDP in 2017, smaller than projected.
  - Central bank purchased $272 million in foreign exchange; reserves rose by $414 million to reach 4.0 months of import cover by end-2017.
  - Real effective exchange rate appreciated by 3.6 percent by end-year.
- Credit and liquidity:
  - Growth in credit to the private sector: 8.9 percent y-o-y in real terms (end-March 2018).
  - Reserve money growth and bank liquidity were managed through deposit auctions, with some volatility.

### Risks
- Higher oil prices are weighing on the economy.
- Political uncertainty related to Presidential elections planned for late 2018 has complicated reform implementation (for example, adjusting fuel prices) and may limit policy execution or hamper private sector activity.
- Vulnerability to exogenous shocks such as natural disasters or terms of trade shocks.
- External sustainability assessed as robust but with a moderate risk of debt distress.

### Performance under the program (highlights)
- The floor on the domestic primary balance, the program’s fiscal anchor, was observed with a significant margin.
- Central bank net foreign assets (floor) and net domestic assets (ceiling) were observed with substantial margins.
- PCs related to external debt were observed.
- Priority social spending surpassed its indicative target (floor).
- Structural agenda progress:
  - Reforms implemented include: strategy to enhance public investment management capacity; new law on social protection; a new Tax Identification Number; implementing the law on electronic money.
  - Continuous benchmarks on transparency in PPPs and JIRAMA’s procurement were met; continuous benchmark on fuel pricing was not observed.

### Key fiscal policy adjustments and measures
- Supplementary budget submitted May 25, 2018, aligned with revised program targets:
  - Projected domestic primary balance remains positive at 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - Supplementary budget lower than initial budget by 0.6 percent of GDP.
  - Quality of spending improving more slowly but remains consistent with full financing and increasing priority spending.
- Main changes in the supplementary budget:
  - Additional 0.25 percent of GDP in transfers to JIRAMA, two-thirds related to repayment of promissory notes issued in late 2017; JIRAMA hiked tariffs by 10 percent on average in January 2018.
  - Additional 0.15 percent of GDP for wages and salaries.
  - Additional 0.1 percent of GDP in transfers for the civil service pension fund.
  - Temporary support for some textile companies: 0.05 percent of GDP.
  - Offsetting measures included postponement of the annual salary increase and removal of about 1,000 “ghost workers” from the payroll.
- Financing the supplementary budget:
  - Revenue projections revised upwards by 0.16 percent of GDP to reach 12.0 percent of GDP, based on first-quarter overperformance.
  - Overperformance attributed to improved tax administration (especially at customs) and effects of higher oil prices.
  - As part of agreement with oil distributors, tax payments of 0.2 percent of GDP are expected to be delayed until 2019.
  - Additional financing needs (0.5 percent of GDP) to be covered by domestic financing and additional budget support (0.1 percent of GDP).

### Fuel pricing, distributor liabilities, and agreement
- Incomplete fuel price adjustments generated liabilities to fuel distributors; authorities sought to avoid a lasting budget impact.
- Disagreement on margins led to no price adjustments in early 2018, creating a gap with market-based reference prices.
- Margin reduction in February (about 4 percent of the reference price) and price increases totaling about 5 percent in March and April were insufficient as world prices rose; gap reached about 6 percent by end-May.
- In late May, authorities and fuel distributors agreed to:
  - Contain liabilities at end-2018 to 0.25 percent of GDP through price adjustments and/or margin reductions; price adjustments started with a 1.3 percent price increase in June (prior action).
  - Align pump prices with the reference price by end-2018 through price adjustments and/or margin reductions, after which prices would adjust automatically with a smoothing formula.
  - Pay off the liability in 2019 through a price surcharge.
  - Mitigate distributors’ financial impact by deferring payment of taxes into 2019 (for an amount comparable to the liability).
- Staff noted that paying off 0.25 percent of GDP would require a surcharge of about 5 percent and emphasized the value of automatic fuel price adjustment to avoid lasting budget impacts.

### Structural and sectoral priorities going forward
- Continue strengthening macroeconomic stability and maintaining stable inflation.
- Enhance growth prospects through:
  - Sustained reform of the financial sector.
  - Strengthening public investment capacity.
  - Improving economic governance and combating corruption.
- Address spending quality pressures and sustain improvement in spending composition over the medium-term.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (cr18239)*

### 16.      Discussions addressed ongoing efforts to increase priority public spending over the

### 16.      Discussions addressed ongoing efforts to increase priority public spending over the

### Increasing priority public spending: objectives and medium-term strategy
- Program aims progressively to:
  - increase the share of higher priority spending, especially for public investment and social needs;
  - reduce the share of lower priority spending, such as transfers to JIRAMA;
  - control the wage bill while meeting basic needs; and
  - increase revenue mobilization.

### JIRAMA reform, losses, and tariff implications
- Objective: phase out transfers to JIRAMA for operating losses by 2020; this remains challenging.
- Cost-lowering (preferred route) has advanced more slowly than planned.
- Measures and progress:
  - Technical transmission losses: reduce by improving distribution network with World Bank support.
  - Non-technical losses: actions underway to cut theft and unpaid bills; results may take time.
  - Recent operational steps: installed 3,600 smart meters (meeting in advance the end-June 2018 SB); planning for 30,000 prepaid meters; begun referring cases of electricity theft to the judicial system.
- Under current projections:
  - It will be necessary to raise tariffs substantially in real terms to eliminate operating losses.
  - JIRAMA’s large stock of liabilities from past losses will require attention once operating losses are brought under control.
- Integration: reform of JIRAMA needs to be integrated in the overall electricity sector strategy, which aims to significantly increase access to electricity and the share of renewable energy.

### Wage bill: size, forecasting, and reform needs
- Current assessment:
  - Wage bill is less than 6 percent of GDP.
  - Considered not excessive compared to Madagascar’s peers and given needs for security, education, and health.
- Requirements going forward:
  - Wage bill should be accurately forecast, sufficient to cover compensation commitments, and restrained while meeting essential needs.
  - Forecasts need to be more comprehensive and accurate, fulfilling existing compensation commitments.
  - Challenge: create an affordable and productive civil service that ensures essential public services with adequate compensation.

### Other transfers and fiscal prioritization
- Near-term: budget transfers to the civil servant pension fund need to cover its deficit, while medium-term needs are reduced through concrete reforms (MEFP ¶12).
- Important to avoid new demands for transfers by:
  - automatically adjusting fuel prices;
  - fully implementing agreement with fuel distributors to pay off this year’s liabilities;
  - ensuring support to textile companies remains temporary.

### Public investment capacity and debt stance
- Scaling up public investment has fallen short due to constrained implementation capacity, especially for projects financed by foreign loans.
- 2017 actions:
  - Authorities adopted a strategy and launched the Organization for the Coordination and Monitoring of Investments and their Financing (OCSIF).
- Implementation needs:
  - Determined implementation with cooperation of external development partners is necessary to step up public investment.
- Debt and financing stance:
  - Authorities committed to maintaining a moderate risk of debt distress (including primarily relying on concessional financing) and carefully managing risks to macroeconomic stability, such as overheating.
  - External financing is supporting increasing social spending; over the medium-term authorities aim to finance a growing share from their own resources.

### Revenue mobilization: progress and risks from incentives
- Achievements:
  - Recent progress in tax revenue: 2 percentage points of GDP since 2015, largely attributable to enhanced tax administration, improvements in the VAT refund process, and better relations with businesses.
  - IMF TA noted significant potential for further improvement and stressed the need for stronger control.
  - New tax policy unit became operational in September 2017.
- Risks from new tax incentives:
  - New laws on Special Economic Zones and on Industrial Development (adopted in December 2017 and April 2018 respectively) offer generous tax incentives.
  - Staff cautioned that tax incentives must be carefully designed to attract additional investment with minimum foregone revenue; concerns included long stability clauses and apparent redundancy of investment regimes.
  - Authorities committed to begin implementation on a limited pilot basis offering cost-based incentives and restricting eligibility (MEFP, ¶16).

### Maintaining stable inflation and monetary policy actions
- Performance:
  - Authorities have maintained inflation in single digits despite liquidity management challenges.
  - Vanilla price shock and related accumulation of international reserves created volatility in banks’ excess reserves; management avoided inflationary pressures.
- BFM liquidity management objectives and measures:
  - Encourage banks to be more active in the interbank market and gradually move toward a more forward-looking framework over the medium term.
  - Main measures envisioned:
    - introducing deterrent penalty rates for repeated violations of reserve requirements;
    - increasing the interest rate on its standing lending facility;
    - submitting draft legislation to the Parliament to promote repo transactions by end-December 2018 (SB).
  - BFM introduced foreign exchange swaps in 2017 as an additional liquidity tool; staff stressed swaps should be performed only through competitive auctions and under exceptional circumstances.
- Foreign exchange market development:
  - Market is shallow with periods of exchange rate volatility.
  - Authorities maintain a partial surrender requirement on export proceeds to support liquidity; this is considered a capital flow management measure under the IMF’s Institutional View.
  - Staff view: surrender requirement should be temporary and phased out; authorities are developing a plan but consider it currently necessary given market shallow conditions.
  - Authorities working, with IMF TA support, to modernize legislation and regulations of the foreign exchange market.

### Financial sector reforms and inclusion
- Financial stability and supervision reforms advancing in line with 2016 FSAP recommendations (Annex II).
  - New microfinance law with a resolution framework adopted in 2017.
  - New banking law (first overhaul in 20 years) planned to be submitted to Parliament by end-December 2018 (SB); being developed with IMF TA to enhance powers and independence of CSBF and reinforce corrective supervisory measures.
  - Law on financial stability to be submitted in 2019.
- Financial inclusion:
  - Traditional banking penetration is low; Madagascar lags many low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
  - Electronic money services nearly doubled every year over 2010-16, offering promise for inclusion (Text Figure 2).
  - New law on electronic money adopted in 2016; related decrees issued in 2017.
  - Challenges for state-owned savings institutions (postal savings and Caisse d’Epargne de Madagascar, CEM); authorities formulating new strategies, including proposal to reclassify CEM as a micro-financial institution.

### Economic governance, anti-corruption, and PFM reforms
- Legal framework:
  - New laws to update legal framework with international standards are advancing (Annex III).
  - Parliament has adopted all but two draft laws: AML/CFT and asset recovery.
  - Staff stressed importance of approving remaining laws to reduce risks of international censure (“grey listing”) and loss of correspondent banking relationships.
- Enforcement and institutions:
  - First anti-corruption center opened in June 2018; second planned by end-2018.
  - Authorities enhancing reporting on corruption cases; all final court decisions by anti-corruption centers to be published starting end-December 2018 (SB).
  - Senior government officials required to declare assets; BIANCO to introduce formal mechanism to verify asset disclosures in 2018 and preparing a strategy to make declarations sufficiently comprehensive and eventually published.
- Public Financial Management (PFM):
  - PEFA self-assessment in December 2017 found broadly satisfactory implementation of reform plans (MEFP, ¶19), though weaknesses remain.
  - Priorities for future action:
    - (i) budget execution;
    - (ii) budget coverage, including better integration of autonomous entities, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and Public Private Partnerships;
    - (iii) implementation of the Public Procurement Code passed in 2017 and the recommendations of the 2017 audit of the review agency for procurement;
    - (iv) reinforcement of ex-post controls;
    - (v) debt management strategy, in line with recommendations from the recent DEMPA.

### Program monitoring, safeguards, capacity, and financing
- Debt monitoring:
  - Upgrade in debt monitoring capacity in February 2018 from weak to adequate.
  - Proposed change under IMF debt limits policy: performance criterion on ceilings on the present value of new debt contracted (instead of ceilings on new non-concessional debt contracted in nominal terms).
  - At authorities’ request, nominal ceilings would remain as indicative targets (MEFP, ¶31 and TMU, ¶15-16).
- Modifications to program targets:
  - Proposed changes for end-September and end-December 2018 (MEFP, Table 1):
    - (i) slight reduction in the domestic primary fiscal balance (floor), consistent with the supplementary budget and an adjustment in the definition while still advancing program objectives;
    - (ii) strengthened targets for net foreign assets (floor), net domestic assets (ceiling), and tax revenue (floor), based on good past performance.
  - All proposed targets extended until end-June 2019, the last test date under the current arrangement.
- Structural agenda:
  - Focuses on implementation of existing commitments, supported by IMF technical assistance across revenue administration, PFM, monetary and FX policy, financial sector development, governance, and statistics (Annex IV).
  - Main challenge: achieving full implementation given capacity constraints.
- Data and statistics:
  - New statistics law adopted by Parliament in March 2018 (MEFP, ¶27); resources devoted to the statistical system remain constrained.
- Financing and Fund repayment capacity:
  - 2018 budget fully financed.
  - Prospects for full financing in 2019 are good; first half of 2019 already fully financed.
  - Madagascar’s capacity to repay the Fund is strong:
    - Outstanding obligations based on existing and prospective drawings would peak at 3.3 percent of GDP in 2019.
    - Annual repayments would peak at 0.4 percent of GDP in 2024 (Table 14).
- Central bank safeguards and transparency:
  - 2017 update safeguards assessment found progress (strengthened legal framework, established audit committee).
  - BFM publishes audited financial statements in a timely manner; internal audit and reserves management capacity enhanced via TA.
  - May 2018 safeguards monitoring mission: procurement practices related to currency operations being strengthened; transparency of financial reporting still lags.
  - BFM developing action plan to fully adopt IFRS for accounts of end-December 2020, starting with pro-forma IFRS financial statements for 2018; TA will be needed.
  - Bank expects to eliminate stockpile of old bank notes by end-June 2018 and undertake periodic internal audits of bank-wide procurement policy implementation.

### Risks to program and outlook
- Main risks are political or exogenous (Annex V, Risk Assessment Matrix):
  - Presidential elections planned for November and December; political instability has risen in the pre-electoral period.
  - Political instability could reverse economic progress, hamper reform implementation capacity and economic activity, and accentuate fiscal risks.
  - Specific risk channels:
    - Larger than anticipated transfers to JIRAMA would reduce space for higher priority expenditure;
    - Slower than expected scaling up of investment would delay acceleration in growth;
    - Terms of trade shocks (e.g., higher import prices for oil) or natural disasters could weigh on external accounts and lead to fiscal slippages.

### Staff appraisal and policy recommendations
- Macroeconomic assessment:
  - Madagascar’s gradual economic recovery continues, supported by generally strong performance under the ECF arrangement.
  - After rising by more than 4 percent in both 2016 and 2017, real GDP is projected to grow by about 5 percent in 2018, with inflation contained, a sustainable and improving fiscal situation, and a strong external position.
  - All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets under the ECF arrangement were met at end-December, most by substantial margins; six of eight structural benchmarks fully met.
- Fiscal strategy and outlook:
  - Fiscal strategy for 2018 maintains progress toward steadily raising revenue and gradually improving quality of public spending.
  - Some additional spending needs (primarily for the wage bill and JIRAMA) were accommodated in a supplementary budget for 2018.
  - Revenue performance is improving faster than expected; domestic primary surplus is smaller, but budget remains fully financed with lower domestic financing than 2017 and no crowding out expected.
  - Policy mix considered adequate to maintain progress toward program goals.
- Key recommendations and priorities:
  - Create fiscal space for priority spending by:
    - limit growing liability to fuel distributors and implement an automatic pricing formula (with cost-recovery pricing and a smoothing mechanism) as soon as possible to avoid future liabilities;
    - accelerate reforms at JIRAMA to meet goal of eliminating operating losses by 2020, including gradual tariff increases in real terms and readiness to adjust tariffs if costs rise in the interim;
    - ensure the wage bill is realistic, affordable, and adequate to meet key social objectives.

*Source: cr18239 - 16.      Discussions addressed ongoing efforts to increase priority public spending over the*

### 40.      It is also essential to continue improving revenue mobilization, and the risks posed by

### cr18239 - 40.

### Revenue mobilization and tax incentives
- It is also essential to continue improving revenue mobilization, and the risks posed by new tax incentives for investment warrant careful management.
- Continued reforms in tax administration remain vital, notwithstanding the impressive progress to date.
- The authorities’ plans for limited pilot projects on special economic and industrial zones with tax incentives are reassuring to some degree; nevertheless, it is critical to restrict the geographic and sectoral scope, to rely on cost-based incentives, and to prevent abuse.
- Eroding the tax base would deprive the budget of the resources needed for critical infrastructure and social needs, in turn undercutting the authorities’ growth strategy.

### Public investment, implementation capacity, and debt management
- A successful scaling up of public investment—also central to the growth strategy—depends on enhancing implementation capacity.
- Execution has fallen short of ambitious targets; going forward, enhancing implementation capacity, especially coordination, will be critical for maintaining current plans and ensuring investment efficiency.
- Staff welcomes the authorities’ debt strategy and commitment to preventing the risk of debt distress from deteriorating from a moderate risk.
- It also remains important to actively manage any risks to macroeconomic stability from scaling up, such as overheating.

### Governance and anti-corruption
- Enhancing governance and fighting corruption also remain central to the success of the program.
- Concrete results in fighting corruption can take time, and it requires sustained efforts on many levels.
- The authorities have strengthened anti-corruption legislation, and it is crucial to complete upgrading the legal framework to international standards, including AML/CFT and asset recovery laws.
- Legislative reforms are only effective if they are enforced by independent institutions, such as the anti-corruption centers.

### Financial sector reform and inclusion
- Improved access to finance is an important ingredient of inclusive growth in Madagascar.
- Financial sector reforms rightly aim to combine financial inclusion with stronger supervision and modernization of the banking law, monetary policy framework, and foreign exchange market.

*cr18239 - 40.*

### 44.      Based on Madagascar’s performance and commitments under the program, staff

### 44. Based on Madagascar’s performance and commitments under the program, staff

### Program decision and staff recommendation
- Staff recommends the completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement.
- Staff supports authorities' request for:
  - (i) the modification of the end-December 2018 PCs,
  - (ii) the establishment of new end-June 2019 PCs, and
  - (iii) the modification of the continuous PCs on new non-concessional external debt contracted by the central government or BFM with an original maturity of (a) more than one year and (b) up to and including one year.

### Inflation and external developments (2004–18)
- Inflation peaked in late 2017 because of soaring rice prices and started to decline in 2018; core inflation is at its lowest level in the last three years.
- External developments:
  - Growing mining exports improved the current account after 2009, but it is now declining because of scaled-up public investment.
  - Vanilla price boom boosted export revenues by about 5 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - A roughly stable NEER since 2016 has triggered an REER appreciation because inflation is higher than the average of Madagascar’s trading partners.
- Current account balance series (percent of GDP) shown for 2006–2018p (chart display; see source for levels).

### Monetary developments (2016–18)
- Broad money growth is primarily driven by accumulation of net foreign assets and credit to the private sector.
- Base money growth is driven by net foreign assets; the central bank undertook significant liquidity operations in the first half of 2018 to control bank liquidity.
- High vanilla prices increased demand for currency because small-scale farmers largely hold savings in cash, causing fluctuations in bank reserves.
- Key monetary series (year-on-year percent growth items and levels shown in source tables and figures).

### Financial sector developments (2002–18)
- Credit growth accelerated starting in 2012.
- Non-performing loans peaked in late 2013 and have been decreasing since then.
- Banks are on average sufficiently capitalized, liquid, and very profitable (with differences among banks).
- Mobile money: number of active mobile money accounts grew by 89 percent a year over 2010–16, though Madagascar lags many LICs in Sub-Saharan Africa on financial access indicators.
- Financial soundness indicators (selected):
  - Non-performing loans to total gross loans: 8.2 percent (Dec 2017, 4-quarter avg), 7.9 percent (Mar 2018).
  - Return on equity: 36.8 percent (Dec 2017), 43.2 percent (Mar 2018).
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 13.6 percent (2016, Dec 2016), series available in table.

### Medium-term macroeconomic prospects (2008–23)
- Reforms and scaled-up public investment should sustain growth above the Sub-Saharan African average.
- Fiscal deficit projected to peak in 2020 because of scaled-up spending on capital expenditure.
- Official lending for scaling-up will finance the current account deficit over the medium term.
- Import cover projected to stabilize at 4.3 months over the medium term.
- Real GDP growth projections (selected series from Table 1 / Figure 4):
  - Real GDP at constant prices: 4.2 (2016), 4.1 (2017), 4.2 (2018 Prel. Est.), projections 5.1 (2019), 5.0 (2020), 5.6 (2021), 5.4 (2022), 5.3 (2023).
- Current account balance (including grants) projections (percent of GDP): -0.3 (2018), -4.0 (2019), -2.2 (2020), -4.8 (2021), -3.4 (2022), -4.3 (2023) as reported in Table 1.

### Government revenue, spending, and fiscal framework
- Tax revenue rose by almost 1.5 percentage points of GDP between 2015 and 2017, and is forecast to increase by another 0.5 percent of GDP in 2018.
- Spending composition improved despite unexpected needs for wages and transfers (mainly to JIRAMA).
- Selected fiscal figures (percent of GDP, Table 1 and Table 4):
  - Total revenue (excluding grants): 11.2 (2016), 11.7 (2017), 11.8 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 12.1 (2019), 12.2 (2020), 12.3 (2021).
  - Tax revenue: 10.9 (2016), 11.4 (2017), 11.5 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 11.9 (2019), 12.0 (2020), 12.1 (2021).
  - Total expenditures: 16.0 (2016), 18.5 (2017), 17.1 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 18.0 (2019), 18.0 (2020), 20.1 (2021).
  - Capital expenditure (percent of GDP): 5.2 (2016), 6.3 (2017), 5.5 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 8.1 (2019), 7.3 (2020), 10.5 (2021).
  - Overall balance (commitment basis): -1.3 (2016), -3.5 (2017), -2.4 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected -3.0 (2019), -2.3 (2020), -5.1 (2021).
- Financing composition (percent of GDP, Table 1):
  - Foreign borrowing (net): 0.7 (2016), 2.3 (2017), 1.4 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 3.1 (2019), 2.5 (2020), 4.8 (2021).
  - Domestic financing: 1.4 (2016), 2.1 (2017), 0.9 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 0.4 (2019), 0.7 (2020), 0.4 (2021).

### Balance of payments and external financing
- Vanilla export revenue jump contributed about 5 percent of GDP in 2017.
- Balance of payments (Table 5, selected items in millions of SDRs and percent of GDP):
  - Current account (including grants): 40.9 (2016), -281.4 (2017), -25.3 (2018 Prel. Est.), -361.2 (2019), -184.8 (2020) in millions of SDRs as tabulated.
  - Exports, f.o.b. (millions SDRs): 1,556.4 (2016), 1,724.1 (2017), 2,020.9 (2018 Prel. Est.), projections to 2,766.2 (2023).
  - Imports, f.o.b. (millions SDRs): -1,746.4 (2016), -2,308.3 (2017), -2,343.2 (2018 Prel. Est.), projections to -3,474.6 (2023).
  - Gross official reserves (millions of SDRs): 834 (2016), 991 (2017), 1,087 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 1,673 (2023).
  - Months of imports of goods and nonfactor services: 3.9 (2016), 3.7 (2017), 4.0 (2018 Prel. Est.), projected 4.3 (2023).

### External borrowing and projected debt composition (2018–19)
- Projected external borrowing (Table 12):
  - 2018: USD 1,372 million total; 91 percent concessional (USD 1,243 million), 9 percent non-concessional (USD 129 million).
  - 2019: USD 781 million total; 86 percent concessional (USD 674 million), 14 percent non-concessional (USD 106 million).
  - Uses of debt financing (2018): Infrastructure USD 1,100 million (80 percent), Budget Financing USD 53 million (4 percent), Other USD 218 million (16 percent).
  - Creditor type (2018): Multilateral USD 763 million (56 percent), Bilateral Non-Paris Club USD 547 million (40 percent), Bilateral - Paris Club USD 22 million (2 percent), Other USD 40 million (3 percent).

### Quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets (Sept 2017–Mar 2018)
- Selected performance criteria status (Table 9):
  - Fiscal floor on primary balance excl. foreign-financed investment (commitment basis): targets and preliminary estimates shown in MGA (billions); status entries include "Met" for many dates (detailed series in table).
  - Central bank floor on net foreign assets (millions of SDRs): e.g., target 506, adjusted 464, estimation 615 — Status: Met (end-March 2018 row; full series in table).
  - Ceilings on new nonconcessional external debt (original maturity >1 year and ≤1 year) monitored with grant element thresholds; specific ceilings and "Met" statuses recorded in table.

### Structural benchmarks (Oct–Dec 2017)
- Met benchmarks:
  - Adopt by the Cabinet a medium-term strategy to enhance public investment management capacity (End-Dec. 2017) — Met.
  - Submit new law on social protection to Parliament to strengthen coordination (End-Dec. 2017) — Met.
  - Employ the new Tax Identification Number (TIN) throughout all departments of the Ministry of Finance and Budget and CNAPS (End-Dec. 2017) — Met.
  - Publish terms and conditions of all PPP contracts on the Ministry of Finance and Budget website within one month of signature — Continuous benchmark — Met.
  - Notify World Bank and IMF staff in advance of any single source procurement contracts for JIRAMA purchases — Continuous benchmark — Met.
  - Issue implementing decrees and regulations for the new law on electronic money (End-Dec. 2017) — Met.
- Not met or delayed:
  - Adopt and implement an automatic fuel pricing formula with a smoothing mechanism by end-September 2018 (continuous benchmark) — Not met; liabilities to fuel distributors started to accumulate in January 2018.
  - Submit to Parliament a new statistics law modernizing and regulating data collections (End-Dec. 2017) — Not met; submitted to Parliament in February.

### External financing requirements and sources (2015–19)
- Total financing requirements (USD millions): 859 (2015), 911 (2016), 963 (2017 Prel. Est.), 1,131 (2018 Proj.), 1,454 (2019 Proj.); 2018–19 total 2,585.
- Available financing components (2015–19): foreign direct and portfolio investment, budget support loans, project support, IMF RCF disbursement and ECF arrangement, etc., with detailed amounts listed in Table 11.

### Indicators of capacity to repay the Fund (2018–32)
- Fund obligations based on existing and prospective credit (millions of SDRs, selected):
  - Total obligations (millions of SDRs): 2.7 (2018), 4.1 (2019), 7.2 (2020), 13.3 (2021), 19.6 (2022), 38.2 (2023), peak to 57.3 (2025) then decline per table.
- Outstanding IMF credit based on existing and prospective drawings (millions of SDRs): 248.8 (2018), 308.6 (2019), 302.5 (2020), projected decline to 0.0 by 2030 onward in the profile.
- Memorandum items (selected): Exports of goods and services (millions of SDRs) and debt service series are presented in the source tables.

*Source: IMF staff report text, figures, and tables as provided in the content unit.*

### Annex I. Fuel Price Subsidies

### Annex I. Fuel Price Subsidies

### Background and mechanics
- Fuel subsidies were introduced in 2010 with the stated objective of preserving the purchasing power of the population against the sharp rise in international oil prices.
- Subsidies took several forms, such as the reduction or suspension of taxes or a preferential exchange rate for oil imports, to compensate the fuel distributors.
- An agreed reference price was defined in 2013, calculated monthly according to international oil prices, exchange rate, costs of transport and distributions, and taxes.
- Based on the volume of oil sold, the fuel distributors were owed a subsidy equal to the difference between pump and reference prices.

### Fiscal cost and distributional impact
- The system of fuel price administration cost up to 1.5 percent of GDP per year between 2010 and 2012.
- It cost up to 0.8 percent of GDP each year between 2013 and 2015.
- This cost was higher than the total budget allocated for priority social spending over the same period.
- Distributional effects:
  - Kerosene is widely consumed by the poorest (for basic heating or lighting), but kerosene represents only a small part of total consumption (and therefore of subsidies).
  - Consumption of gasoline and diesel is concentrated in the top welfare quintile.
  - Fuel subsidies in Madagascar disproportionally benefited the wealthier households and were highly regressive.
- Broader evidence: fuel price subsidies generally do not reach those people most in need and could advantageously be replaced by more cost-effective and well targeted social safety net instruments.

### Administrative and fiscal consequences
- Financing the subsidy cost under severe budget constraints led to fiscal anomalies, including:
  - Forcing the cost onto the Central Bank through a preferential exchange rate for fuel distributors (this preferential exchange rate was fully removed at the end of 2015).
  - The accumulation of government arrears in the payment of subsidies.
  - The suspension of payment of certain taxes owed by fuel distributors.

### Reform: removal process and automatic price adjustment mechanism
- With the return to constitutional government and the sharp fall in international oil price starting in 2014, the government initiated the process of removing fuel subsidies.
- Gradual increases of pump prices took place starting July 2014.
- The government instituted an automatic price adjustment mechanism in February 2016 to clear the gap between the reference prices and the pump prices.
- Performance in 2016–2017:
  - The new scheme worked satisfactorily in 2016 and 2017.
  - Pump prices were adjusted regularly, closely following the evolution of the reference prices, although occasionally with a small ad hoc deviation.
  - Any liability to oil distributors in case of temporary gap between the pump prices and the reference prices was settled through further increases in pump prices in following months, avoiding any budget cost.
  - This approach limited the liability to oil distributors to a very low level.
  - The gap was even in favor of the government in the second half of 2017, as prices at the pump remained above the reference price for several months.

### Early 2018 developments and current liability
- In early 2018 the favorable situation reversed:
  - The reference price increased significantly due to the upward reversal of international oil prices.
  - Pump prices were frozen in January and February 2018.
  - Despite an agreement on a reduction in oil companies' margins found in February and increases in pump prices in March and April, the gap with the reference price has significantly increased.
- Liability to oil distributors:
  - The liability to the oil distributors is still limited at 0.1 percent of GDP at the end of May 2018.
  - This liability would increase if the gap between pump and reference prices is not reduced in coming months.

*Source: Annex I. Fuel Price Subsidies (cr18239).*

### Appendix I. Letter of Intent

### Appendix I. Letter of Intent

### Recent developments and program purpose
- The attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) reviews recent economic developments and performance under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement and updates government policies and objectives for the rest of 2018 and 2019. These policies are based on the government’s National Development Plan (NDP).
- Madagascar requests IMF Executive Board approval for: (i) a modification of the performance criteria at end-December 2018 on the primary balance excluding foreign-financed investment (floor), new nonconcessional external debt with original maturity of more than one year (ceiling), new nonconcessional external debt with original maturity of up to and including one year (ceiling), the net foreign assets (floor), and the net domestic assets (ceiling); and (ii) the request for the completion of the third review.
- At the third review the authorities are seeking total financial support from the Fund equivalent to 12.9 percent of their quota, or SDR 31.4 million.
- The authorities agree to publication of this Letter of Intent, the attached MEFP and Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU), and the IMF staff report after Executive Board approval.

### Macroeconomic developments (summary)
- Growth
  - The economy grew by an estimated 4.2 percent in 2017.
  - The manufacturing export sector of the free-trade zone registered annual growth of around 25 percent.
- Shocks and sectoral impacts
  - Madagascar coped with a drought lasting into early 2017, the worst cyclone in 13 years in March 2017, and an epidemic in Q4 2017; the epidemic is estimated to have reduced growth by as much as 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Rice production was estimated about 20 percent below the 2016 level and 10 percent below the five-year average.
  - Rice imports doubled to 591,000 tons in 2017 to maintain supply near average levels in most regions.
- Inflation
  - Inflation reached 9 percent year-on-year at end-2017, one percentage point higher than expected earlier in the year.
  - Rice prices reached nearly 29 percent y-o-y in December 2017.
  - Core inflation (without food and energy) was 6.3 percent y-o-y in December 2017.
  - Price of imported products rose by 5.2 percent y-o-y at end-2017.
- External sector and reserves
  - Central bank (BFM) accumulated more foreign exchange reserves than projected, taking import coverage above 4 months.
  - Exchange rate nearly stable in nominal effective terms for the second year in a row; real effective appreciation due to inflation differential with trading partners.
- Monetary and banking conditions
  - Commercial bank excess reserves fluctuated in 2017; reserves fell in June and July then increased as the central bank bought foreign exchange and largely sterilized liquidity.
  - Policy rate (taux directeur) was raised from 8.3 percent to 9.5 percent during 2017.

### Fiscal performance in 2017 and program compliance
- Overall fiscal execution aligned with second-review plans under the ECF.
- Revenue and expenditure
  - Tax and customs revenue rose by more than 20 percent in 2017 compared to 2016.
  - Non-tax revenue increased sharply due to dividends from State shareholdings in some banks and oil companies.
  - Transfers to JIRAMA were limited at MGA 450 billion (1.3 percent of GDP) despite larger than planned operating losses.
  - Domestically financed investment reached about 90 percent of the planned amount; externally financed investment reached 83 percent of the MGA 1510 billion (4.2 percent of GDP) envisaged at the time of the second review.
  - Priority social spending reached 1 percent of GDP, above the indicative target.
  - Civil servants and military pension fund deficit slightly exceeded plans (about MGA 10 billion).
- Quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets through end-December 2017
  - All quantitative performance criteria (PC) and indicative targets (IT) through end-December 2017 were observed, most with significant margins.
  - Floor on primary balance (excluding foreign financed investments) met by a margin of 0.5 percent of GDP.
  - Total gross tax revenue reached MGA 4,328 billion against a target of MGA 4,132 billion (margin of 5 percent).
  - Priority social spending reached MGA 358 billion against MGA 298 billion (20 percent margin).
  - Central bank net foreign assets exceeded the floor by $427 million.
  - Central bank net domestic assets were 51 percent below the ceiling.
  - Ceilings for new non-concessional external debt and zero ceilings for external arrears were observed.
- Structural reform implementation
  - Of five structural benchmarks for end-December 2017, four were fully achieved; one was completed with a two-month delay.
  - Two of three continuous benchmarks were met; the continuous benchmark on implementation of an automatic fuel price mechanism was not met.
  - The draft statistics law was submitted in January 2018 and adopted in March 2018.
  - An agreement with fuel distributors on a plan to limit existing liability to MGA 100 billion by end-2018 and eliminate it by end-2019 was reached on May 30, 2018.

### Economic outlook and risks
- Outlook
  - Growth anticipated around 5 percent in 2018 and expected to stay at least at this level for several years given planned scaling up of public investment and rising private sector activity.
  - Authorities continue to target 6 percent growth and will assess further growth-enhancing structural reforms.
  - Inflation projected to fall under 8 percent in 2018, then gradually towards 5 percent per year, barring shocks.
- Risks
  - Downside risks: susceptibility to weather shocks, epidemics, limited implementation capacity, and fiscal risks from delays in SOE reforms which could require increased budget transfers and impede growth.
  - Upside risks: successful acceleration of public investment scaling-up and realization of announced private investment and foreign direct investment plans.

### Macroeconomic and structural policy measures (2018–19)
- Fuel pricing
  - Commitment to avoid persistent liability to oil distributors by reducing margins and implementing cost-recovery pricing with an automatic formula and smoothing mechanism.
  - Provisional agreement in late February 2018 to reduce distributors’ margins by MGA 140 per liter; further discussions on margin modifications ongoing.
  - Pump price increases implemented: average of MGA 205/liter through three adjustments — 87 in March, 68 in April, and 50 in June (prior action for conclusion of the third ECF review).
  - Plan to progressively eliminate the difference between pump prices and reference prices by December 2018 based on current projections for world oil prices and exchange rates.
  - Government intends to limit the existing liability to MGA 100 billion by end-2018 and eliminate it by end-2019.
- JIRAMA (state-owned utility)
  - Board adopted a revised 2018 budget on June 13, 2018, limiting projected operational losses and financial needs to agreed government transfers of MGA 309 billion.
  - Revised budget includes planned repayment of MGA 82 billion of promissory notes issued in 2017 and additional costs from higher oil prices.
  - Technical support from World Bank on cost reductions and revenue measures; efforts to improve bill collection including installation of smart meters (structural benchmark for end-June 2018).
  - Transfers to JIRAMA for operating losses to be phased out progressively by 2020.
- Wage bill and pension fund
  - Crosschecking payroll to eliminate at least 1,000 workers in irregular situations, yielding savings of at least MGA 6 billion in 2018.
  - Budgeted increases for salaries and pensions postponed to May 2018.
  - Additional needs amount to MGA 76 billion (0.16 percent of GDP) for 2018.
  - Civil servants pension fund needs an additional MGA 33 billion (0.08 percent of GDP) in 2018.
- Revenue mobilization and budget revision
  - To offset additional budget needs, plan to increase net tax revenue by MGA 65 billion compared to the original Budget Law.
  - A Revised Budget Law, consistent with ECF performance criteria and indicative targets, was submitted to Parliament on May 25.
- Medium-term fiscal strategy and fiscal risk management
  - Contain the wage bill to about 5.7 percent of GDP in 2019.
  - With World Bank technical support, assess parametric pension changes (contribution rates, years of eligible service, highest average remuneration, age of retirement, yearly accrual rate) possibly implementable from 2019.
  - Domestically financed investments planned to increase from 2.0 percent of GDP in 2017 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2019.
  - Priority social spending to increase from 1.0 percent of GDP in 2017 to 1.1 percent of GDP in 2018 and 1.3 percent of GDP in 2019.
  - Strengthen fiscal risk management, publish an annex to the 2018 budget, and take timely measures if risks materialize.
  - Take stock of public-sector guarantees (including to SOEs) and study provisioning for new guarantees (for instance for 15 percent) starting with the 2019 budget.
  - Manage PPP fiscal risks via procedures and institutional framework; plan to set limits on overall guarantees for PPPs and publish terms and conditions of all PPP contracts within one month of signature on the website of the MFB (continuous benchmark).
- Investment capacity and public investment management
  - Establishment of the Organization for the Coordination and Monitoring of Investments and their Financing (OCSIF) to coordinate and trouble-shoot investment.
  - Adoption in December 2017 of a medium-term strategy to develop investment capacity (structural benchmark).
  - Ensure all new investment projects are reviewed by the Ministry of Economy and Planning for consistency with investment management and national development strategies.
  - Examine scope for integrating more cost-benefit analysis into planning.

*Letter of Intent dated June 25, 2018, signed by Ms. Vonintsalama Sehenosoa Andriambololona, Minister of Finance and Budget, and Mr. Alain Hervé Rasolofondraibe, Governor, Central Bank of Madagascar.*

### 13.      Our efforts to increase revenue collection are also central to enabling more priority

### 13.      Our efforts to increase revenue collection are also central to enabling more priority

### Revenue collection progress and near-term targets
- Net tax-to-GDP ratio: 9.9 percent in 2014; 11.5 percent in 2017.
- Objectives: reach 12.0 percent of GDP in 2018 and at least 12.3 percent in 2019.
- Drivers: continuing implementation of action plans for tax and customs administration and IMF FAD technical assistance (February 2018).

### Petroleum product taxation impact (TPP and VAT)
- Expected additional revenue from the TPP increase for 2018: MGA134 billion (equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP).
- First three months of 2018: TPP revenue increased by MGA 23.7 billion.
- VAT on petroleum products, calculated after application of the TPP, added MGA 8.5 billion.
- Total additional revenue from this measure in the first quarter: MGA 32.3 billion.

### Institutional capacity and tax policy analysis
- Tax policy unit: fully operational; completed an impact analysis of certain tax measures.
- Unit responsibilities: enhanced analysis on domestic tax and custom revenue (macro and sectorial analysis, including modeling), data across services, and inter-service collaboration.
- Further TA requested from the IMF and others to maximize impact.

### Measures to increase domestic tax collections (target: from 5.8 to at least 6.5 percent of GDP by 2019)
- Target baseline and goal: 5.8 percent of GDP in 2017 to at least 6.5 percent of GDP by 2019.
- Expand services under performance contracts: from 19 in 2017 to 36 in 2018 (32 percent of the 111 operational units).
- Taxpayer segmentation consolidation:
  - Directorate of Large Enterprises (DGE) taxpayers: 0.2 percent of total taxpayers and 80 percent of total tax collection.
  - Regional Companies Services (SRE): taxpayers with turnover between MGA 200 million and 4 billion; represent less than 10 percent of tax revenue.
- Unique tax identification number (TIN): already implemented across MFB departments; goal to extend TIN requirement to all ministries by end-December 2018 (structural benchmark).
- Strengthen fiscal control and tax litigation treatment to increase revenue and improve taxpayers’ confidence.
- Recovery plan for outstanding tax payments (Restes à recouvrer, RAR): RAR represented MGA 741 billion (2.1 percent of GDP) at end-2017; focus on recoverable claims.
- VAT threshold and controls: in light of AFRITAC March 2017 remarks on risks of lowering VAT liability threshold to MGA 100 million, implementation of the AFRITAC-proposed control plan to reinforce VAT efficiency.

### Customs modernization and performance
- Performance contracts extended to anti-fraud unit in September 2017 (structural benchmark); plan to expand to smaller customs offices and establish a central customs clearance center.
- Migration to ASYCUDA World: largest customs project in 2018; aim for all major offices to be equipped by end of June 2018 to improve sequencing and timeliness of clearance operations.
- Need to improve control of high-risk sectors, including exceptional tax regimes (imports of free trade zones) and future regimes (law on special economic zones).

### New tax incentives, Special Economic Zones (SEZ), and pilot approach
- Implementation of new law on Special Economic Zones (approved by Parliament in April 2018): start with pilot projects limited to at most two geographic locations, focusing exclusively on exports in one or two clearly defined sectors.
- Law for Industrial Development: implementation to start with pilot projects limited to at most two geographic locations, focusing on one or two clearly defined sectors.
- Tax code revisions and implementing decrees for these laws will:
  - Rely on cost-based incentives (investment credits or accelerated depreciation exclusively for capital goods) rather than profit-based incentives.
  - Consolidate all tax incentives into the tax law.
  - Adopt rules-based approaches to avoid discretion in granting tax incentives.
- Prior to further actions: assess costs and benefits of pilots.
- Plan to review the tax code to harmonize tax incentive regimes (including free trade zones or zones franches) in the medium-term with IMF and partner TA.
- Publication plan: publish an annex to the budget with estimates of the fiscal costs of key tax incentives starting with the 2019 Budget.

### Enhancing economic governance and fighting corruption
- Legislative progress and pending laws:
  - Adopted laws: law against traffic of precious woods (2015), anti-corruption law (2016), law on anti-corruption centers (2016), international cooperation law in criminal matters (2017).
  - Submitted to Parliament in December 2017 but not discussed: asset recovery law and the anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing law (AML/CFT).
- Implementation decrees: plan to issue all outstanding implementation decrees (associated with the anti-corruption law, international cooperation law and AML/CFT law) by end-October 2018.
- Institutions and transparency:
  - First quarterly statistics on corruption cases by BIANCO and SAMIFIN to be published in July (see TMU Tables 2-5).
  - First anti-corruption center opened in Antananarivo on June 15, 2018; aim to open one more center before year-end.
  - Publish all final court decisions by anti-corruption centers, with searchable internet access, starting by end-December 2018 (structural benchmark).
  - BIANCO to introduce mechanism to verify asset disclosures in July 2018.
  - Draft strategy for necessary legal reforms on asset declarations by end-June 2018 to ensure comprehensiveness, verifiability, sanctions, and progressive public online availability.

### Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms and transparency
- PEFA self-evaluation completed in January 2018: found progress and persistent weaknesses.
- Three-year Strategic Plan of Modernization of PFM: first-year measures implemented broadly as planned.
- Actions under way:
  - Medium term fiscal framework developed in 2017; Tax Policy Unit to review revenue forecasts and improve wage bill forecasts with IMF TA.
  - Enhance management of fiscal risks and budget coverage by better supervising and integrating autonomous entities, SOEs, and PPPs.
    - Submit revised law governing National Public Establishments (EPN) to Parliament by end-June 2018 (EPN account for 0.5 percent of GDP in 2018) (structural benchmark); issue application decrees before end-2018.
    - 2019 budget to include more information about SOEs, autonomous public establishments, and PPPs.
  - Implement Code of Public Procurement (2017): issue decree to formalize funding and separation of regulation and control functions by end-2018; incorporate audit follow-up actions into PFM action plan by end-June 2018.
  - Study migrating to an e-procurement system and establish a public registry of companies that have violated procurement regulations, expected before end-2018.
  - Strengthen debt management strategy: update and report statistics regularly, document contingent liabilities exhaustively, extend domestic debt maturity to reduce rollover and interest rate risks; recent DEMPAnoted progress and areas for improvement.
  - Strengthen audit bodies and internal inspections, especially the Court of Auditors (Cour des comptes); begin publishing statistics on actions of the Council of Budgetary and Financial Discipline from end-June 2018.
  - Review organization of the PFM reform steering committee to improve coordination and leadership.

### Maintaining stable inflation and monetary policy measures
- Commitment: keep inflation in single digits.
- Challenges: larger-than-anticipated accumulation of international reserves over 2016-17 created bank liquidity; BFM containment actions ongoing.
- BFM objectives: improve management of commercial bank reserves; transition from monetary to interest rate targeting; safeguard inflation target.
- Measures:
  - Introduced progressive, deterrent, penalty rates for repeated violations of reserve requirements and increased the interest rate on BFM’s standing lending facility.
  - Increasing use of fine-tuning operations in case of significant liquidity shocks and continuing progressive increases in the interest rate on the standing lending facility.
  - Commitment to perform foreign exchange swap operations in competitive auction format under specific conditions: (i) traditional instruments ineffective in managing liquidity; (ii) lack of collateral in banking system for liquidity injection; (iii) outright FX interventions not appropriate.
  - Support use of collateral for interbank lending by (i) submitting draft legislation to Parliament to promote repo transactions by end-December 2018 (structural benchmark); (ii) giving BFM real-time access to information on Treasury bonds (BTFs); (iii) introducing appropriate discounts on debt instruments when used as collateral for borrowing from BFM.

### Foreign exchange market efficiency and surrender requirement reform
- Background: surrender requirement introduced at 100 percent in August 2014, reduced to 70 percent in June 2016.
- Plan: MFB and BFM developing plan to phase out surrender requirement gradually with objective of adopting it by end-September 2018, depending on requested TA provision.
- BFM requested IMF TA in 2018 to review and propose improvements to FX legislation and regulation; draft new or revised foreign exchange law/decree expected in July 2018.

### Financial sector development, stability, and supervision
- Financial inclusion and legal framework:
  - Decrees and instructions on electronic money and electronic money institutions issued in December 2017.
  - Law regulating private credit bureau adopted and enacted.
  - Law on the Integrated Information System (IIS) adopted and enacted.
- Financial Stability Unit (FSU): operational; continues to publish annual “Financial Stability Report”.
- Microfinance: improved supervision and control; new microfinance law includes a new resolution framework.
- Banking law and prudential framework:
  - Plan to submit new banking law to Parliament by end-December 2018 to: (i) improve bank recovery and resolution framework; (ii) enhance powers and independence of CSBF; (iii) reinforce framework for corrective supervisory measures with specific triggers, responsibilities, and time limits (structural benchmark).
  - Develop new prudential regulations, revise capital definition and capital adequacy regulations, and issue them in conjunction with the banking law.
  - Draft macro-prudential strategy elaborated; plan to submit a “law on financial stability” to Parliament in 2019 to establish national structure for systemic risk analysis and crisis management.
- Risk-based supervision (RBS): aim for full implementation by end of 2019; action plan adopted in December 2017; IMF TA supporting capacity building and data quality improvements for off-site returns.
- Non-bank institutions:
  - CEM (Caisse d’Epargne de Madagascar): developed action plan; first step conversion into a microfinance institution.
  - PAOMA (Paositra Malagasy): limiting new product development and undertaking full audit of customer accounts; working group to elaborate a development plan for PAOMA by end-September 2018.
- BFM modernization and IFRS adoption:
  - Commitment to full implementation of IFRS; action plan to fully adopt IFRS for accounts of 2020 (expected by April 2021), starting with gap analysis and pro-forma IFRS financial statements for fiscal year 2018.
  - Consideration of BFM capital adequacy and potential impacts of full IFRS implementation as part of longer-term strategy for financial autonomy; TA to be requested.
  - Destruction of old bank notes: stockpile at end-December 2017 to be eliminated by end-June 2018.
  - Internal audit department to conduct in 2019 a review of implementation of the revised bank-wide procurement policy approved in June.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2018/cr18239.pdf*

### 2017. This audit will be repeated periodically. More broadly, we will continue our efforts to

### cr18239 - 2017

### Improving the Quality of Statistics
- A new statistics law, modernizing and regulating data collection, was adopted by Parliament in March 2018. The law was prepared with technical assistance from the UNDP and will be followed by decrees to:
  - spell out organizational arrangements;
  - strengthen coordination among ministries;
  - improve information and data flows.
- Measures to address statistical shortcomings across domains:
  - Real sector:
    - Revised series of annual national accounts for the 2007-2014 period with base year updated from 1984 to 2007 were published in June 2017.
    - Revised series for 2015-2016 were finalized in the first quarter of 2018.
    - Quarterly national accounts are being finalized under the new base year; INSTAT will switch to publication of the rebased GDP series by the end of 2018.
    - Quarterly business survey re-launched by BFM since the last quarter of 2017 is helping quarterly estimates and projections.
    - INSTAT plans to publish a reweighted consumer price index (CPI) based on the 2019 household survey.
  - Monetary and financial statistics:
    - Efforts focus on consolidation of balance sheets of micro-financial institutions in preparation of the monetary survey.
  - Balance-of-payments statistics:
    - Emphasis on enhancing information through launches of surveys in the tourism and transport sectors.
  - Government finance statistics:
    - After moving to the 2014 GFSM in 2018, objective is to extend statistical coverage from the central government to the general government including local authorities and national public establishments (EPN).
- Resource commitment and constraints:
  - Authorities remain committed to allocating sufficient human, financial, and material resources to production of statistics.
  - Some shortcomings (e.g., suspension of publication of industrial production indices) are due to financing issues.
  - Government will continue to support INSTAT and expects increased technical and financial assistance from partners.

### Program Monitoring: Schedule, Definitions, and Changes
- Review schedule and test dates:
  - Fourth, fifth, and sixth reviews scheduled to be completed on or after November 20, 2018, May 20, 2019, and November 20, 2019, respectively.
  - Test dates: end-June 2018, end-December 2018, and end-June 2019, respectively.
- Monitoring frameworks:
  - Program evaluated through semi-annual reviews based on quantitative performance criteria (PCs) and structural benchmarks. Definitions and reporting requirements are in the accompanying Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU).
  - Quantitative targets proposed through end-June 2019; structural benchmarks likewise (Tables referenced in source).
- Modifications to program monitoring going forward:
  - Starting with the end-September 2018 indicative target, the definition of the PC on the domestic primary fiscal balance is modified to exclude external budget grants (TMU ¶9). Rationale: measure efforts to cover operating expenses from own resources while financing most investment with concessional external financing. New targets revised for expected external budget support.
  - Transition to rebased national accounts will not impact IMF-supported program objectives, as objectives are set in nominal terms for quantitative targets or as changes as a percentage of GDP for medium-term objectives.
  - Considering Madagascar’s debt monitoring capacity upgrade from weak to adequate in February 2018, and in line with IMF debt limits policy:
    - Madagascar will shift from PCs on nominal ceilings for non-concessional debt contracted to a PC for the present value (PV) of new debt contracted.
    - Nominal ceilings on non-concessional borrowing will be maintained as indicative targets during a transition period (TMU ¶24).
    - Limits are intended to preserve debt sustainability and a moderate risk of debt distress while accommodating investment plans.
  - Debt limits will continue to be reviewed under the ECF arrangement.

### Structural Benchmarks and Prior Actions (selected)
- Prior Action for the third review:
  - Increase fuel pump prices by MGA 50 per liter in June.
- Selected structural benchmarks and deadlines:
  - Employ the new Tax Identification Number (TIN) throughout all ministries. — End-Dec. 2018. Rationale: Important to reduce fraud.
  - Adopt and implement an automatic fuel pricing formula with a smoothing mechanism by end-September 2018, while avoiding any budget costs from fuel pricing in the interim. — Continuous benchmark. Rationale: Critical to contain transfers.
  - Install 3,500 smart meters for JIRAMA. — End-June 2018. Rationale: Critical to contain transfers.
  - Publish terms and conditions of all PPP contracts within one month of signature on Ministry of Finance and Budget website. — Continuous benchmark. Rationale: Critical to enhance transparency and accountability.
  - Notify World Bank and IMF staff in advance of any single source procurement contracts for JIRAMA’s purchases of fuel and electricity and purchases and rentals of generators. — Continuous benchmark. Rationale: Critical to enhance transparency and accountability.
  - Revise and submit to Parliament the law governing the National Public Establishments (Etablissements publics nationaux, EPN). — End-June 2018. Rationale: Critical to PFM (EPNs account for 10 percent of spending).
  - Start publishing all final court decisions by anti-corruption centers with searchable internet access. — End-Dec. 2018. Rationale: Critical to economic governance.
  - Submit to Parliament draft legislation to promote repo transactions. — End-Dec. 2018. Rationale: Critical for monetary policy.
  - Submit to Parliament a new banking law to: (i) improve bank recovery and resolution framework in line with FSSA recommendations; (ii) reinforce framework for corrective bank supervisory measures (specific triggers, responsibilities, time limits); and (iii) enhance powers and independence of the financial supervisor (CSBF), including legal protection for its staff and Board members. — End-Dec. 2018. Rationale: Central for financial stability.

### Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU): Key Definitions, Data Provision, and Quantitative Criteria
- General:
  - TMU contains definitions and adjuster mechanisms for measurement of quantitative PCs and indicative targets in Tables 1 and 2.
  - Unless otherwise specified, all quantitative PCs and indicative targets evaluated in terms of cumulative flows from beginning of each calendar year.
  - External and domestic defined on a residency basis.
  - Government for TMU purposes comprises the scope of operations of the treasury shown in the opérations globales du Trésor (OGT); excludes state-owned enterprises and sub-national authorities.
- Program exchange rates (exact values):
  - Malagasy Ariary (MGA)/SDR 4,443.86
  - U.S. Dollar/SDR 1.389049
  - Euro/SDR 1.270538
  - Australian dollar/SDR 1.903723
  - Canadian dollar/SDR 1.926401
  - Japanese Yen/SDR 167.377024
  - Swiss Franc 1.375855
  - U.K. Pound Sterling/SDR 0.937470
  - Foreign currency accounts denominated in currencies other than the SDR will first be valued in SDRs and then be converted to MGA. Amounts in other currencies than those reported above and monetary gold will first be valued in SDRs at the exchange rates and gold prices that prevailed on December 31, 2015, and then be converted to MGA.
- Data provision to IMF staff (selected):
  - Data for all variables subject to quantitative PCs and indicative targets provided monthly with a lag of no more than four weeks for NFA and NDA of the Central Bank of Madagascar (CBM) and eight weeks for other data. Authorities will promptly transmit any data revisions.
  - Financial Intelligence Unit (SAMIFIN) to publish quarterly data (no later than end of month following the quarter) on reports sent to BIANCO related to suspicions of laundering of proceeds of corruption.
  - BIANCO to publish quarterly data (no later than end of month following the quarter) on number of persons indicted, number of persons convicted by a first instance court decision, number of persons convicted pursuant a final court decision, and number of verifications of assets disclosures of public officials.
- Quantitative performance criteria: overview
  - Performance criteria refer to net foreign assets and net domestic assets of the central bank, external payments arrears, non-concessional new external debt owed or guaranteed by the central government and/or the central bank, and the domestic primary balance (commitment basis).
  - PCs set for end-June 2018, end-December 2018, and end-June 2019; indicative targets for end-September 2018 and end-March 2019.
- Fiscal aggregate: Floor on Primary Balance (commitment basis)
  - Measurement:
    - March and June 2018: Domestic tax and non-tax revenue plus current (budgetary) grants less domestically-financed capital expenditures and current spending excluding interest payments.
    - Starting September 2018: Domestic tax and non-tax revenue less domestically-financed capital expenditures and current spending excluding interest payments.
  - For primary balance calculation:
    - Tax revenues measured net of the refund of VAT credits.
    - Current spending excluding interest payments = wages and salaries + goods and services + transfers and subsidies + treasury operations (net) excluding VAT refunds.
    - Primary balance calculated cumulatively from beginning of calendar year.
  - Illustrative values using end-December 2017 data (reference):
    - Primary balance excluding foreign financed investment (commitment basis) 179
    - Primary balance excluding foreign financed investment and grants (commitment basis) -362
    - Domestic tax revenue (net of VAT refunds) 4,118
    - Domestic non-tax revenue 122
    - Current grants 541
    - Domestically-financed capital expenditures 700
    - Current expenditures 3,902
    - Wages and salaries 2,076
    - Goods and services 282
    - Transfers and subsidies 1,467
    - Treasury operations (net of VAT refunds) 77
- External debt: arrears and ceilings
  - Accumulation of new external payment arrears:
    - Arrears consist of overdue debt-service obligations related to loans contracted or guaranteed by the government or CBM.
    - Debt service obligations considered overdue if not paid 30 days after due date or after end of a creditor-agreed grace period.
    - Excludes arrears when creditor has accepted in writing to negotiate alternative payment schedules.
    - Monitoring continuous from end-May 2016.
  - Ceilings on new external debt and concessionality definitions:
    - Debt is concessional if grant element ≥ 35 percent; semi-concessional if grant element ≥ 20 percent.
    - Grant element calculated as (nominal value − present value) / nominal value. Present value discounted using a 5 percent discount rate.
    - Where an agreement contains multiple disbursements with interest rates linked to a reference rate since signature, the interest rate at signature applies for PV and grant element calculation for all disbursements.
    - Definition of debt for program monitoring follows Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements, Executive Board Decision No. 15688-(14/107), adopted December 5, 2014 (see Annex 1). External debt defined by residency of creditor.

*Source: Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding; Tables and sections from the IMF staff report included in cr18239.*

### 14.      For loans carrying a variable interest rate in the form of a benchmark interest rate plus a fixed

### 14. For loans carrying a variable interest rate in the form of a benchmark interest rate plus a fixed spread, the PV of the loan would be calculated using a program reference rate plus the fixed spread (in basis points) specified in the loan contract.

### Variable-rate loan present value (PV) methodology
- The program reference rate for the six-month USD LIBOR is 3.37 percent and will remain fixed for the duration of the program.
- For loans carrying a variable interest rate (benchmark + fixed spread), PV is calculated using:
  - the program reference rate for six-month USD LIBOR (3.37 percent) plus
  - the fixed spread (in basis points) specified in the loan contract.
- Spreads of other benchmark rates over six-month USD LIBOR (to be applied as specified):
  - Six-month Euro LIBOR over six-month USD LIBOR: -249 basis points.
  - Six-month JPY LIBOR over six-month USD LIBOR: -286 basis points.
  - Six-month GBP LIBOR over six-month USD LIBOR: -108 basis points.
  - For currencies other than Euro, JPY, and GDP, the spread over six-month USD LIBOR is -209 basis points.
- Where the variable rate is linked to a different benchmark interest rate, a spread reflecting the difference between that benchmark rate and the six-month USD LIBOR (rounded to the nearest 50 bps) will be added.
- Note: The program reference rate and spreads are based on the “average projected rate” for the six-month USD LIBOR over the following 10 years from the Fall 2015 World Economic Outlook (WEO).

### External debt performance criteria and ceilings
- A performance criterion (ceiling) applies to the PV of new external debt, contracted or guaranteed by the government or CBM; applies to debt for which value has not yet been received, including private debt with official guarantees.
- PV and associated grant element (GE) are determined using the Fund’s concessionality calculator or excel template.
- Monitoring targets:
  - Calculated from January 1, 2018 and observed continuously from completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement (ceiling subject to an adjustor).
  - Two continuous ceilings apply to new non-concessional external debt with nonresidents with original maturities of more than one year, contracted or guaranteed by the government or CBM (including private debt with official guarantees):
    - Ceiling for new non-concessional external debt with grant element of less than 35 percent (cumulative since January 1, 2016).
    - Ceiling for new non-concessional external debt with grant element of less than 20 percent (cumulative since January 1, 2016).
  - Continuous ceiling for new non-concessional external debt with original maturities up to and including one year contracted or guaranteed by the government or CBM (cumulative since end-May 2016).
- Exclusions from ceilings (paragraphs 15–19):
  - (i) the use of IMF resources;
  - (ii) debts incurred to restructure, refinance, or prepay existing debts, to the extent debt is incurred on more favorable terms than the existing debt and up to the amount of the actually restructured/refinanced/prepaid debt (this also applies to liabilities of Air Madagascar assumed by the government in the context of a strategic partnership agreement);
  - (iii) debts classified as international reserve liabilities of CBM;
  - (iv) concessional debts (for the short-term ceiling) and normal import financing (a financing arrangement for imports is “normal” when the credit is self-liquidating).

### Monetary aggregates — Net Foreign Assets (NFA) and Net Domestic Assets (NDA) of CBM
- Floor on NFA of CBM:
  - Evaluated using the end-period stock, calculated using program exchange rates.
  - NFA defined as the difference between CBM’s gross foreign assets and total foreign liabilities, including debt owed to the IMF.
  - All foreign assets and liabilities converted to SDRs at program exchange rates (paragraph 4).
  - Reference values at end-December 2017:
    - Foreign Assets: MGA billions, end-2017 exchange rates (A) 4,988.039
    - SDR millions, end-2017 exchange rates (B) 1,086.925
    - SDR millions, program exchange rates (C) 1,099.836
    - Foreign Liabilities: MGA billions, end-2017 exchange rates (D) 1,458.186
    - SDR millions, end-2017 exchange rates (E) 317.748
    - Net Foreign Assets: SDR millions, program exchange rates (F) = (C) – (E) 782.088
- Ceiling on NDA of CBM:
  - Evaluated using the end-period stock, calculated at program exchange rates.
  - NDA defined as the difference between reserve money and NFA of CBM valued in MGA using program exchange rates; includes net credit to government, credit to the economy, claims on banks, liabilities to banks (including proceeds of CBM deposit auctions—appels d’offres négatifs, and open market operations), and other items (net).
  - Reference values at end-December 2017:
    - Net Foreign Assets: SDR millions, program exchange rates (A) 782.088
    - MGA billions, program exchange rates (B) 3,475.489
    - Base Money: MGA billions, end-2017 exchange rates (C) 4,558.154
    - Net Domestic Assets: MGA billions, program exchange rates (D) = (C) – (B) 1,082.665

### Indicative targets, priority spending, and revenue
- Floor on Priority Social Spending:
  - Includes domestic spending primarily related to nutrition, education, health, and provision of social safety nets.
  - Calculated cumulatively from the beginning of the calendar year.
  - Floor set as sum of budget allocations in the Loi de Finance to the Ministries of Health, Education, Population and Water, excluding salaries and externally financed investment.
- Floor on Gross Tax Revenue:
  - Measured on a gross basis (before refund of VAT credits); comprises all domestic taxes and taxes on foreign trade received by central government treasury.
  - Excludes: (1) receipts from local sale of in-kind grants; (2) gross inflows for signature bonus receipts from auction of hydrocarbon and mining exploration rights; (3) tax arrears recorded in context of regularization operations (e.g., recapitalization of Air Madagascar in 2016).
  - Revenue measured on a cash basis as reported in the table of government financial operations prepared by the Directorate of Budget and the Directorate of Treasury in the Ministry of Finance and Budget.
  - Floor calculated cumulatively from the beginning of the calendar year.
  - Reference: For the year ending December 2017, gross government tax revenue was MGA 4,329 billion, comprised of net tax revenue of MGA 4,118 billion and VAT refunds of MGA 211 billion.
- Ceilings on New Non-Concessional External Debt:
  - From completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement onwards, ceilings for non-concessional debt with maturities of more than one year (paragraph 16; cumulative since January 1, 2016) and of less than one year (paragraph 18; cumulative since end-May 2016) serve as indicative targets.

### Structural benchmark: fuel pricing
- Definition and monitoring of avoiding budget costs from fuel pricing:
  - Until adoption and implementation of fully automatic fuel pricing mechanism with smoothing formula, authorities will calculate estimated net liabilities to fuel distributors generated by discretionary fuel price adjustments, determined either by fuel price structure in place as of November 2017 or a new fuel price structure established in a memorandum of understanding between government and fuel distributors.
  - The cumulative stock of these liabilities will be measured from January 2017.
- Avoiding budget cost from fuel pricing requires:
  - (i) cumulative stock of these liabilities is at most MGA 100 billion (i.e., government liability to distributors of at most MGA 100 billion) by end-2018;
  - (ii) difference between average pump prices and average reference prices is eliminated by end-December 2018;
  - (iii) cumulative stock of net liabilities to fuel distributors will be paid off during 2019 through a price surcharge and, consequently, no transfers will be due to be paid by the government budget to the fuel distributors.
- Reporting requirement:
  - Authorities will provide to IMF staff the calculations for the estimate of the monthly flow and stock for these net liabilities for each month, as well as the minutes of the agreement with the fuel distributors, by the 14th day of that month.

### Memorandum items
- Official external program support:
  - Defined as grants and loans, including in-kind aid when products are sold by the government and receipts are earmarked for a budgeted spending item, and other exceptional financing provided by foreign official entities and the private sector and incorporated into the budget.
  - Does not include grants and loans earmarked to investment projects.
  - Calculated as cumulative flow from January 1, 2016.
- Official external program grants:
  - Defined as grants, including in-kind aid when products are sold by the government and receipts are earmarked for a budgeted spending item, and other exceptional financing provided by foreign official entities and incorporated into the budget.
  - Does not include grants earmarked to investment projects.
  - Calculated as a cumulative flow from the beginning of the calendar year.
- New concessional external debt:
  - New concessional external debt contracted or guaranteed with original maturity of more than one year by the central government or the CBM measures such debt with a grant element of at least 35 percent.

### Use of adjusters (performance-criteria adjustments)
- Performance criteria on NFA and NDA of the CBM:
  - Will be adjusted in line with deviations from amounts projected in the program for official external program support; deviations calculated cumulatively from January 1, 2016.
  - Floor on NFA:
    - Adjusted downward (upward) by the cumulative deviation downward (upward) of actual from projected budget support (official external program support).
    - Adjustment capped at the equivalent of SDR75 million, evaluated at program exchange rates as described in paragraph 4.
  - Ceiling on NDA:
    - Adjusted upward (downward) by the cumulative deviation downward (upward) of actual from projected budget support (official external program support).
    - Adjustment capped at the equivalent of SDR75 million, evaluated at program exchange rates as described in paragraph 4.
- Performance criteria on primary balance:
  - Adjusted in line with deviations from amounts projected for official external program grants; deviations calculated cumulatively from the beginning of each calendar year.
  - March and June 2018:
    - Floor on the primary balance excluding foreign-financed investment (commitment basis) will be adjusted downward by the cumulative downward deviation of actual from projected official external program grants, calculated at quarterly period-average actual exchange rates.
    - Adjustment capped at the equivalent of SDR 30 million, evaluated at program exchange rates as described in paragraph 4.
  - Starting September 2018:
    - Floor on the primary balance excluding foreign-financed investment and grants (commitment basis) will be adjusted downward by the cumulative upward deviation of actual from projected official external program support (grants or loans on concessional terms), calculated at quarterly period-average actual exchange rates as described in paragraph 4.
- External debt ceiling adjustor:
  - An adjustor of up to 5 percent of the external debt ceiling set in PV terms applies in case deviations are prompted by a change in the financing terms (changes in interest rates, maturity, grace period, payment schedule, commissions, fees).
  - The adjustor cannot be applied when deviations are prompted by an increase in the nominal amount of total debt contracted or guaranteed and are subject to debt sustainability.

### Data reporting requirements (selected highlights)
- Central Bank of Madagascar (CBM):
  - Total daily CBM gross purchases/sales of foreign exchange — breakdown by currency purchased: Daily, next working day.
  - Stock of gross international reserves (GIR) and net foreign assets (NFA), both at program and market exchange rates: Monthly.
  - Balance sheet of CBM: Monthly, within two weeks of the end of each month.
  - Monetary survey: Monthly, within six weeks of the end of each month.
- Ministry of Finance and Budget (MFB):
  - Preliminary revenue collections (customs and internal revenue): Monthly, within three weeks of the end of each month.
  - Treasury operations (OGT): Monthly, within eight weeks of the end of each month.
  - Stock of domestic arrears, including arrears on expenditure and VAT refunds: Monthly, within eight weeks of the end of each month.
  - Priority social spending as defined by the indicative target: Monthly, within eight weeks of the end of each month.
  - Public and publicly-guaranteed debt stock at end of month, including creditor and instrument breakdowns; external public or publicly guaranteed loans signed since January 1, 2016 specifying nominal value, calculated grant element and PV, and terms: Monthly, within four weeks of the end of each month.
- INSTAT and OMH:
  - Consumer price index data (INSTAT): Monthly, within four weeks of the end of each month.
  - Petroleum shipments and consumption (OMH): Monthly, within four weeks of the end of each month.

*Source: cr18239 - 14.      For loans carrying a variable interest rate in the form of a benchmark interest rate plus a fixed spread*

### Annex I. Guidelines on Performance Criteria with Respect to

### Annex I. Guidelines on Performance Criteria with Respect to External Debt

### Definition of "debt" (Guidelines excerpt)
- Debt is a current (i.e., not contingent) liability created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services, requiring the obligor to make one or more payments in assets (including currency) or services at some future point(s); such payments discharge the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract.
- Primary forms of debt:
  - i) Loans: advances of money to the obligor by the lender made on the basis of an undertaking that the obligor will repay the funds in the future (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans and buyers’ credits) and temporary exchanges of assets equivalent to fully collateralized loans under which the obligor is required to repay the funds, and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements).
  - ii) Suppliers’ credits: contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until sometime after delivery of goods or services.
  - iii) Leases: arrangements under which property is provided for use for specified period(s) usually shorter than the total expected service life; for these guidelines, debt is the present value (at inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected during the agreement excluding payments that cover operation, repair, or maintenance.
- Under this definition, arrears, penalties, and judicially awarded damages arising from failure to make payment under a contractual obligation that constitutes debt are debt.
- Failure to make payment on an obligation not considered debt under this definition (e.g., payment on delivery) will not give rise to debt.

### Madagascar — DSA risk assessment and summary findings
- Risk of external debt distress: "Moderate" (in line with the June 2017 DSA).
- Public DSA: total (domestic and external) PPG debt sustainable under the baseline; risks to domestic debt not assessed as significant.
- Stress tests:
  - Breach the prudent benchmark for the public DSA (covering both domestic and external debt).
  - In some instances, stress tests breach the prudent benchmark for the external DSA.
- Main sources of vulnerability:
  - Shocks to GDP growth are the main potential source of vulnerability, especially for the public DSA.
  - Additional risks: weaker currency, widened fiscal deficits, lower exports, higher interest rates.
- DSA reflects updated and more detailed loan data, which include marginally less favorable financing conditions than in the last DSA.

### Coverage, methodology, and thresholds
- DSA includes public external and domestic debt and guarantees of the central government; excludes local government debt and SOE debt other than through direct central government guarantees.
- Debt measure: gross basis; residency criterion used to split external versus domestic debt.
- CPIA and indicative thresholds:
  - Average CPIA in 2014-16: "3.2".
  - Indicative thresholds for countries with weak overall CPIA scores:
    - PV of debt-to-GDP ratio: "30 percent".
    - PV of debt-to-exports ratio: "100 percent".
    - PV of debt to fiscal revenues ratio: "200 percent".
    - Debt service to exports ratio: "15 percent".
    - Debt service to revenue ratio: "18 percent".
    - Indicative threshold for PV of total PPG debt: "38 percent of GDP".
- Debt monitoring capacity:
  - World Bank CPIA debt monitoring capacity score over 2014-16: "4.5" — meriting upgrade from "weak" to "adequate".
  - As a result, external debt limits in IMF programs would be specified in present value (PV) terms from end-December 2018 onwards; existing nominal limits on non-concessional borrowing become indicative targets.

### Recent developments and current debt situation (key figures)
- Total public debt trajectory:
  - Rose from "31 percent of GDP" in 2008 to "41 percent of GDP" in 2015.
  - Fell by "2.9 percent" in 2016 and by "2.4 percent" in 2017 to "36 percent of GDP".
  - Note: debt is far below the pre-HIPC peak of "95 percent of GDP".
- Debt service to revenue ratio: "24 percent" in 2017 (from "27 percent" in 2015).
- External share of debt: "70 percent" of debt is external.
- Composition and stocks (end-of-period amounts and ratios reported in Table 1):
  - Domestic debt (amounts in US$m): "1,153" (2015), "1,109" (2016), "1,185" (2017); percent of GDP: "12.9" (2015), "11.7" (2016), "10.7" (2017); percent of total: "31.3" (2015), "30.4" (2016), "29.7" (2017).
  - Securities (inc. BTA, BTF, BTS): "333" (2015), "526" (2016), "669" (2017); percent of GDP: "3.7", "5.5", "6.0"; percent of total: "9.0", "14.4", "16.8".
  - Debt to the Central Bank: "269" (2015), "283" (2016), "330" (2017); percent of GDP: "3.0", "3.0", "3.0"; percent of total: "7.3", "7.8", "8.3".
  - Arrears: "346" (2015), "210" (2016), "147" (2017); percent of GDP: "3.9", "2.2", "1.3"; percent of total: "9.4", "5.7", "3.7".
  - Other inc. loans: "206" (2015), "90" (2016), "39" (2017); percent of GDP: "2.3", "0.9", "0.4"; percent of total: "5.6", "2.5", "1.0".
  - External debt (amounts in US$m): "2,534" (2015), "2,535" (2016), "2,808" (2017); percent of GDP: "28.4", "26.7", "25.3"; percent of total: "68.7", "69.6", "70.3".
  - Multilateral creditors: "1,950" (2015), "2,052" (2016), "2,276" (2017); percent of GDP: "21.8", "21.6", "20.5"; percent of total: "52.9", "56.3", "57.0".
  - Paris Club: "133" (2015), "127" (2016), "130" (2017); percent of GDP: "1.5", "1.3", "1.2"; percent of total: "3.6", "3.5", "3.3".
  - Non-Paris Club: "356" (2015), "333" (2016), "324" (2017); percent of GDP: "4.0", "3.5", "2.9"; percent of total: "9.7", "9.2", "8.1".
  - Commercial & Guaranteed: "94" (2015), "23" (2016), "78" (2017); percent of GDP: "1.1", "0.2", "0.7"; percent of total: "2.6", "0.6", "2.0".
  - Total PPG debt (US$m): "3,687" (2015), "3,644" (2016), "3,994" (2017); percent of GDP: "41.3", "38.4", "36.0"; percent of total: "100.0" for each year.
- SOE-related and contingent items:
  - Recapitalization of Air Madagascar included in baseline: one-off government support to assume past arrears of "0.8 per-cent of GDP", paid partly in 2017 and partly in 2018; financing included domestic issuances (specific T-Bonds) and external financing of "$40 million from an international bank".
  - Explicit government guarantees for JIRAMA’s external borrowing included; amounts limited to less than "0.5 percent of GDP".
  - JIRAMA’s total domestic and external liabilities: estimated at "4½ percent of GDP".
  - Contingent liabilities from other SOEs (postal savings scheme and Caisse d’Epargne de Madagascar, CEM) would likely amount to less than "1 percent of GDP".
  - SOE liabilities consisting mostly of tax arrears amount to "1¼ percent of GDP" (more than half accounted for by Jirama).
- Banking sector: most banks financially solid with deposits exceeding loans; dollarization not pronounced; banks’ foreign assets generally exceed foreign liabilities.
- Central Bank debt composition notes:
  - Statutory advances about "30 percent" of the debt owed to the central bank are planned to be reduced.
  - Excluding on-lending, debt to the central bank has been declining in nominal terms.
- Stock of domestic arrears: "1.3 percent of GDP" after declines in 2016 and 2017.
- Debt owed to the Central Bank has remained constant at "3 percent of GDP" since 2015.
- Commercial and guaranteed loans increased their share to "2 percent" in 2017.

### Underlying assumptions and financing conditions
- Loan activity (2016-17):
  - Loans contracted worth approximately "$1.3 billion" in nominal terms and "$0.7 billion" in PV terms.
- Loans planned for 2018-19 (authorities’ plans): approximately "$1.4 billion" (nominal) and "$0.8 billion" (PV).
- Disbursements in 2016-17: about "$0.4 billion" in nominal terms.
- Average interest rate on new disbursements: "1.6 percent" (¼ percent higher than in the 2017 DSA).
- Average maturity of new disbursements: "27½ years" (broadly unchanged).
- Average grace period: decreased by "1 year" to "4½ years".
- Cumulative semi-concessional and non-concessional borrowing since start of 2016 to end-December 2017:
  - Total semi-concessional and non-concessional borrowing: "$173 million".
  - IMF program ceiling: "$383 million".
  - Non-concessional borrowing: "$55 million" (ceiling: "$100 million").
- Long-term projection of grant element of new borrowing: declines from over "40 percent" in the short term to "26 percent" in 2038.

### Baseline macroeconomic assumptions (Box 1 and Table 2 highlights)
- Real GDP:
  - Projected to peak at about "5½ percent" in 2019.
  - Medium-term growth: about "5 percent".
- Current account:
  - Exports higher than expected in 2017 due to higher vanilla and metal prices; current account deficit revised downward, especially for 2018.
- Fiscal variables:
  - Delay in disbursements of externally-financed investment led to fiscal expenditure and the primary deficit being revised downward in 2018 and upward over subsequent years.
  - Grant support revised down.
- Select numeric projections from Table 2 (2018–2023, 2018 DSA series):
  - Real GDP growth (percent): "5.0" (2018), "5.4" (2019), "5.3" (2020), "5.2" (2021), "4.9" (2022), "4.9" (2023).
  - Non-interest CA deficit (percent GDP): "1.1" (2018), "2.4" (2019), "3.4" (2020), "3.7" (2021), "3.9" (2022), "3.6" (2023).
  - Primary deficit (percent of GDP): "1.4" (2018), "3.5" (2019), "4.4" (2020), "4.2" (2021), "3.7" (2022), "3.1" (2023).
  - Total revenues, excl grants (percent of GDP): "12.2" (2018), "12.5" (2019), "13.0" (2020), "13.4" (2021), "13.6" (2022), "13.9" (2023).
  - Grants (percent of GDP): "3.4" (2018), "2.7" (2019), "1.4" (2020), "1.4" (2021), "1.4" (2022), "1.4" (2023).
- Comparison with 2017 DSA (select items):
  - 2017 DSA Real GDP growth (percent): "5.3" (2018), "5.9" (2019), "5.5" (2020), "5.2" (2021), "5.0" (2022).
  - 2017 DSA Non-interest CA deficit (percent GDP): "4.9" (2018), "4.6" (2019), "3.8" (2020), "3.7" (2021), "3.5" (2022).
  - 2017 DSA Primary deficit (percent of GDP): "3.6" (2018), "3.4" (2019), "2.8" (2020), "2.5" (2021), "2.4" (2022).
  - 2017 DSA Total revenues, excl grants (percent of GDP): "11.8" (2018), "12.2" (2019), "12.7" (2020), "13.1" (2021), "13.5" (2022).
  - 2017 DSA Grants (percent of GDP): "3.6" (2018), "3.4" (2019), "2.4" (2020), "2.3" (2021), "2.3" (2022).

*Prepared by the Staffs of the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association; approved by David Owen and Zuzana Murgasova (IMF) and Paloma Anos Casero (IDA).*

### 12.      The main risks to these assumptions relate to revenue generation, the exchange rate,

### 12.      The main risks to these assumptions relate to revenue generation, the exchange rate,

### Main risks to baseline assumptions
- Key risks: revenue generation, the exchange rate, persistence of donor grant support, and possible negative developments related to the elections later in 2018.
- Specific risk channels:
  - Weaker revenue performance could accelerate debt accumulation.
  - Faster-than-expected depreciation of the Ariary would increase the real value of the existing debt stock.
  - Tighter global financial conditions could spill over to unexpectedly higher interest rates from some lenders.
  - Any lack of reform progress could complicate donor engagement and reduce grant support.
  - The electoral period could weaken expenditure restraint and economic confidence, affecting growth, the exchange rate, and donor support.
- Offsetting positive risks:
  - Stronger-than-projected exchange rate or revenue generation would boost debt service capacity.
  - Structural fiscal reforms could stimulate additional donor support in the medium to long term.
- Natural disaster risk: risks from recurrent natural disasters are already incorporated in the baseline and additional risks are limited.

### External DSA — Baseline scenario and outcomes
- Recent history and baseline path:
  - PPG external debt: 26.7 percent of GDP in 2016 to 25.3 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - Nominal external debt: $2.5 billion in 2016 to $2.8 billion in 2017.
  - PPG external debt anticipated to edge up to 25.5 percent of GDP in 2018 and reach 37 percent in 2023.
  - Overall external debt including private debt expected to rise moderately over the medium term.
  - Under the baseline, external PPG debt is expected to be 32 percent of GDP in 2038 as foreign financing decreases.
- Drivers:
  - Nominal GDP growth in US dollar terms was boosted by real activity and real appreciation of the Ariary.
  - Inflows from transfers and FDI are projected to almost match the trade deficit and other outflows, including from the mining sector.
  - FDI is assumed to remain substantially below the 2011 and 2012 levels.
- Present-value (PV) indicators:
  - PV of PPG external debt: 14 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - PV projected to increase to 22½ percent of GDP by 2023 (21 percent in the 2017 DSA) and remain broadly constant until 2038 (16 percent in 2017 DSA).
- Private external debt:
  - Projected to decline as loans related to a major mining project are repaid.
  - Not assessed to pose a significant threat to external sustainability because ultimate liability is held by multinational shareholders rather than resident entities.

### External DSA — Sensitivity analysis
- Tests applied: six standard bound tests plus two alternative scenarios (historical average over 2008-17 and less favorable financing).
- Test outcomes:
  - Nine out of 40 tests breach the external PPG debt thresholds.
  - Four shocks breach the debt-to-GDP threshold:
    - A depreciation of 30 percent relative to the baseline in 2019 would result in the PV breaching the debt-to-GDP threshold of 30 percent in 2023 and heading back to it over the long term (considered the most severe test).
    - Less favorable financing breaching in the longer term.
    - A combination of less severe shocks breaching in 2023.
    - The historical scenario generates a breach.
  - The same four shocks would cause temporary breaches to the PV of debt-to-revenue threshold of 200.
  - A shock to exports makes the PV of debt-to-exports ratio breach its threshold temporarily.
  - Debt service indicators: stress tests generate no breaches; external debt service capacity appears robust.

### Public DSA — Baseline scenario and outcomes
- Total PPG debt (external plus domestic):
  - Estimated at 36 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - Expected to rise to 44 percent of GDP over the medium term and remain broadly steady thereafter.
  - Much of the medium-term increase is in external debt as authorities seek external concessional financing and rely less on domestic sources.
  - Between 2023 and 2038, debt is expected to fall by 1 percent of GDP, with a slight decline in the share of external debt as domestic debt markets deepen.
- PV of total PPG debt:
  - Projected to increase throughout the projection horizon and reach 34½ percent of GDP in 2038.
  - Debt consistently below the threshold of 38 percent.
  - PV of debt relative to revenue including grants projected to reach 198 percent in 2023 and remain broadly stable thereafter.
- Drivers: primary deficit (including foreign-financed capital projects and grants) is the main driver of debt dynamics; real GDP growth exceeding interest rates helps contain debt over the longer term.

### Public DSA — Sensitivity analysis
- Tests and breaches:
  - In six out of eight stress tests, the PV of total PPG debt as a share of GDP breaches the risk benchmark (usually in the long term).
  - The most extreme shock—a one standard deviation reduction in GDP growth in 2019-20 relative to its historical average—would breach the PV of debt-to-GDP threshold (38 percent) during 2023 and continue rising to 60 percent by 2038 if no corrective measures are taken.
  - A smaller yet more persistent growth shock, or a smaller growth shock combined with a fiscal balance shock, also breaches the benchmark over the long term.
  - A one-time depreciation would also breach the threshold over the long term.
  - A large increase in debt-creating flows in 2019 (for example, an unexpectedly large unknown contingent liability) would breach the threshold over the long term.
- Comparative sensitivity: total PPG debt projections are more sensitive to shocks than external debt projections.
- Policy implication from simulations: policies that promote stable GDP growth and further improvements in revenue generation and expenditure control and management are essential for PPG debt sustainability.

### Conclusion and policy recommendations
- Overall assessment:
  - Breaches of debt thresholds only under stress scenarios result in a moderate risk rating.
  - Current external debt ratios are lower than in the 2017 DSA due in part to better-than-expected vanilla and other commodity exports, a better-than-expected current account balance, and a stronger-than-anticipated Ariary.
  - Authorities are expected to be able to service current and future debt; only some shocks challenge external debt sustainability while external debt service capacity appears robust.
  - Total PPG debt is more vulnerable to deviations from baseline assumptions, especially slower GDP growth, higher primary deficits (for example from disappointing revenue collection), or one-off increases in debt-creating flows (for example contingent liabilities related to SOEs).
- Measures under way and recommended priorities:
  - 2017 actions: revenue mobilization efforts, operationalization of a new institution to manage public investment (OCSIF), and generally satisfactory expenditure execution.
  - Further measures: improve revenue collection and budgetary execution, strengthen project implementation and debt monitoring capacity, and improve policy and institutional performance.
  - Additional initiatives: promote governance, build a sound financial sector, strengthen monitoring and management of SOEs (including the National Public Establishments) to contain debt risks and maintain favorable financing conditions and higher potential economic growth.

*Source: cr18239 - 12.      The main risks to these assumptions relate to revenue generation, the exchange rate,*

### 23.      The DSA informed discussions with the authorities during the March 2018 mission. Staff

### 23.      The DSA informed discussions with the authorities during the March 2018 mission. Staff

### Summary of mission discussions and technical work
- Staff stressed that proposed IMF program limits and borrowing plans need to be consistent with debt sustainability and the overall macroeconomic framework.
- Staff emphasized the importance of growth-friendly policies and measures to manage the fiscal balance for debt sustainability.
- Staff clarified the distinction between nominal debt ratios and those measured in PV terms and worked with technical staff to refine calculations of PVs for both IMF program monitoring and to inform broader debt management.
- The authorities broadly concurred with the overall assessment and the policy implications.
- While agreeing on the baseline projections, the authorities believed that scaling up public investment could have a stronger than projected impact on growth.

### Key external debt indicators (selected series from the External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2015-38)
- External debt (nominal) 1/: 47.4 44.3 38.7 37.0 37.5 38.8 40.0 41.0 41.5 39.3 36.9 33.9
- of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG): 28.4 26.7 25.3 25.5 27.8 30.7 33.3 35.5 37.0 31.6 36.1 31.8
- Change in external debt: 3.7 -3.1 -5.6 -1.7 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.5 -1.1 -0.1
- Identified net debt-creating flows: 1.6 -6.2 -8.5 -2.7 -1.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.8 0.0
- Non-interest current account deficit: 0.4 -2.0 -0.9 5.9 7.7 1.1 2.4 3.4 3.7 3.9 3.6 3.0 2.8 4.2 3.2
- PV of external debt: ...... 27.6 26.1 25.7 26.0 26.4 26.8 27.0 24.2 24.3
- PV of PPG external debt: ...... 14.2 14.6 16.1 17.9 19.7 21.3 22.5 23.4 22.3
- PV of PPG external debt in percent of exports: ...... 40.0 42.0 47.3 53.5 59.1 64.0 68.2 66.5 57.4
- PV of PPG external debt in percent of government revenues: ...... 119.7 119.1 128.4 137.9 147.1 156.0 161.4 154.0 136.0
- Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent): 20.8 19.0 15.0 13.1 11.5 10.4 9.4 8.5 7.7 5.3 7.1
- PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent): 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.1 4.3 4.8
- Total gross financing need (Millions of U.S. dollars): 249.2 -12.1 155.2 318.5 420.5 517.4 539.5 547.3 465.9 279.6 1371.2
- Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio: -3.4 1.2 4.7 2.8 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.1 3.9 4.2

### Key macroeconomic assumptions (selected)
- Real GDP growth (in percent): 3.1 4.2 4.2 2.4 3.1 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.2 4.9 4.9 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.6
- GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent): -11.5 -1.5 10.4 2.5 9.2 3.5 2.9 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.1 2.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
- Effective interest rate (percent) 5/: 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.8 0.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.7 1.5 2.2 1.8
- Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent): -10.7 7.2 21.6 7.2 15.0 6.5 6.2 6.4 6.4 5.9 5.4 6.1 6.3 6.8 6.8
- Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent): -12.7 3.3 25.5 4.1 18.0 13.0 7.1 7.5 6.7 6.0 4.1 7.4 6.7 7.2 6.7
- Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP): 10.4 11.2 11.8 12.2 12.5 13.0 13.4 13.6 13.9 15.2 16.4 15.5
- Aid flows (in Millions of US dollars) 7/: 144.0 348.9 333.7 719.3 888.5 879.0 901.0 884.0 854.7 734.8 1090.4
  - of which: Grants: 144.0 348.9 333.7 430.5 372.1 207.3 220.6 230.9 245.6 282.8 436.4
  - of which: Concessional loans: 0.0 0.0 0.0 288.8 516.4 671.7 680.3 653.1 609.1 452.0 653.9

### Debt sustainability stress tests and sensitivity analysis (selected outcomes)
- Table 4 (PV of debt-to-GDP ratio, PV of debt-to-exports ratio, PV of debt-to-revenue ratio) shows baseline and alternative scenario paths for 2018-2038 with specific scenario outcomes, including:
  - Baseline PV of debt-to-GDP ratio (selected years): 15 16 18 20 21 23 23 22
  - Alternative scenario A2 (less favorable loan terms) PV of debt-to-GDP: 21 5 17 20 23 26 28 31 34
  - Bound test B6 (One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2019) PV of debt-to-GDP: 15 22 25 27 29 31 32 31
- Debt service-to-revenue ratio (baseline and scenarios):
  - Baseline: 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.1 4.3 4.8
  - Scenario A1 (historical averages): 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.5 5.3 6.7
  - Scenario B2 (export shock): 2.3 2.6 3.6 4.5 4.7 4.9 7.6 7.3

### Public sector debt framework (selected)
- Public sector debt (percent of GDP): 41.3 38.4 36.0 35.1 36.5 39.0 41.3 43.4 44.9 44.3 44.0
- Change in public sector debt: 5.5 -2.9 -2.4 -0.9 1.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.5 -0.2 0.1
- Identified debt-creating flows: 4.4 -2.9 -3.4 -1.9 1.0 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.4 -0.6 -1.1
- Primary deficit: 2.5 0.4 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.4 3.5 4.4 4.2 3.7 3.1 3.4 1.2 0.4 1.0
- Revenue and grants: 11.8 14.7 14.7 15.7 15.3 14.4 14.8 15.0 15.3 16.4 17.5 16.7
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure: 14.3 15.2 16.3 17.1 18.8 18.8 19.0 18.8 18.5 17.6 17.8
- PV of public sector debt: ...... 24.8 24.2 24.7 26.2 27.7 29.2 30.4 31.7 34.5
- Gross financing need: 10.5 9.3 9.6 8.8 10.2 10.8 10.4 9.9 9.2 7.8 9.9

### Public debt sensitivity analysis (selected)
- PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio (baseline and scenarios): baseline 24 25 26 28 29 30 32 35; scenarios A1, A2, A3, B1-B5 show higher trajectories under adverse assumptions (specific scenario values reported in Table 6).
- PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio (baseline and scenarios): baseline 154 162 182 187 194 198 193 197; alternative scenarios produce materially different paths (see Table 6).
- Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio (baseline and scenarios): baseline 17 16 17 17 16 19 24; stress scenarios produce higher ratios (see Table 6).

### Memoranda and technical notes (selected)
- Nominal GDP (Millions of US dollars): 9744 10001 11500 12499 13553 14603 15609 16601 17607 23386 40227.1
- Nominal dollar GDP growth: -8.7 2.6 15.0 8.7 8.4 7.7 6.9 6.4 6.1 7.4 5.8 5.4 5.7
- PV of PPG external debt (in Millions of US dollars): 1571.6 1783.4 2140.0 2570.7 3023.0 3469.8 3888.0 5366.1 8799.9
- (PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent): 1.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.2 2.5 2.7 1.2 1.1 1.3
- Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP): ......... 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.1 1.9 2.1
- Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing): ......... 71.6 63.5 53.9 53.3 54.0 55.0 56.8 51.0 54.9

*Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.*

### 1. The supplementary budget law submitted to parliament on May 25, 2018 was approved

### 1. The supplementary budget law submitted to parliament on May 25, 2018 was approved

### Recent developments and program performance
- The supplementary budget law submitted on May 25, 2018 was approved without modification by parliament on June 29, 2018 and is consistent with the performance criteria and indicative targets of the ECF arrangement for the rest of 2018.
- Presidential election calendar:
  - First round: November 7, 2018
  - Second round: December 19, 2018
  - New president inauguration: planned for mid-January 2019
  - Government expected to remain in place until inauguration.
- Economic performance and shocks:
  - Real GDP growth stood above 4 percent for the second year in a row in 2017, driven mainly by transport, manufactured exports, and other services.
  - Inflation: 9 percent y-o-y at end-2017; 7.4 percent y-o-y in April 2018 (rice-price-fueled).
  - Adverse 2017 shocks included a drought, a major cyclone, and an outbreak of plague.
- Program monitoring and implementation:
  - All end-2017 quantitative performance criteria (PCs) and indicative targets (ITs) were met.
  - Some PCs (including the floor on the domestic primary balance and the one related to external debt) and some ITs (priority social spending and the ceiling on the central bank net domestic assets) were observed with a significant margin.
  - All five structural benchmarks (SB) for end-2017 were implemented; one completed with delay (new statistics law submitted in February 2018, rather than December 2017).

### Fiscal stance, supplementary budget, and revenue measures
- Fiscal policy objective for 2018 onward: create space for growth-supporting public investment and social spending by mobilizing more revenue and improving the quality and composition of spending.
- Supplementary budget features:
  - Consistent with program objectives, including a positive primary balance of 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - Supplementary budget is 0.6 percent of GDP lower than the initial budget.
  - Projected favorable fiscal stance backed by more optimistic revenue projections based on overperformance in the first quarter of 2018.
- Revenue-side measures and reforms:
  - Introduction of performance contracts with management-level staff to increase custom duties.
  - Higher oil prices and performing VAT contributed to revenue performance.
  - Additional measures: use of the new Tax Identification Number (TIN) throughout all departments of the ministry of finance and budget and social security offices (end-2017 SB).
- Spending-side priorities and measures:
  - Scale up public investment financed by domestic resources and foreign loans.
  - Strategy: phase out or rationalize transfers to make room for efficient public investment and social spending.
  - Organization created: Organization for the Coordination and Monitoring of Investments and their Financing (OCSIF) to coordinate project selection and implementation across ministries and implement donors’ procedures.
  - JIRAMA (national electricity company): operational losses and financial needs constitute the bulk of budget transfers.
    - With World Bank support, transfers contained in the 2018 budget via cost reduction and revenue increase measures, including improved bill collection and installation of smart meters.
    - Going forward: lower production costs, reform JIRAMA and the electricity sector, raise tariffs, and appropriate sequencing to progressively phase out transfers.
  - Wage bill and fuel price measures:
    - Wage bill contained in 2017; crosschecking payroll and workforce data expected to yield savings on around 1,000 ghost workers in 2018.
    - Provisional agreement in February to reduce distributors’ margins by MGA 140 per liter.
    - Pump prices increased in March, April and June by an average of MGA 205 per liter.
    - Further measures under consideration: possible further modifications to margins and incremental steps towards automatic price adjustments.
- Expected outcome: combined efforts in revenue mobilization and spending restraint should create fiscal space for public investment and social spending in education, health and security.

### Debt sustainability and borrowing strategy
- Staff assessment: country’s risk of external debt distress remains moderate.
- Debt monitoring capacity: upgraded from “weak” to “adequate” following a higher score in the 2014-16 World Bank CPIA.
- Authorities’ commitment: prioritize concessional borrowing in their debt strategy to preserve debt sustainability.
- Agreement to fully take account of implications of the new status from end-December 2018 onwards.

### Monetary policy and financial sector reforms
- Central bank response:
  - Managed inflationary pressures and appreciation pressures on the Ariary from high world vanilla prices; high liquidity in the banking system added to inflationary pressures.
  - Measures planned to strengthen the monetary policy framework, including improving the functioning of the interbank market.
- Financial sector development and supervision:
  - Reforms underway to enhance financial stability and supervision.
  - New banking law aimed at strengthening supervisory powers to be submitted to parliament by end-December 2018.
  - A law on preventing systemic risks and managing financial crises to be submitted to parliament in 2019.
- Financial inclusion and products:
  - New law on microfinance enacted; sets stage for revamping Paositra Malagasy (PAOMA) and Caisse d’Epargne de Madagascar (CEM).
  - Electronic money services nearly doubled every year over 2010-16; new law on electronic money recently entered into force to support this trend.

### Structural transformation and industrial policy
- Authorities’ strategy for structural transformation centers on three draft laws enacted:
  - Law on Special Economic Zones (SEZ)
  - Law for Industrial Development (LID)
  - Law on Free Trade Zones
- Objectives:
  - Spur diversification toward industrial activities including agroindustry, construction-related products and consuming goods.
  - Leverage water endowments to create a competitive harbor for regional and international trade via free trade zone.
- Implementation approach:
  - Incremental approach through pilot projects and policy adjustment.
  - Commitment to continue improving draft laws, including attention to fiscal implications.
  - Efforts to attract private investment without unduly jeopardizing revenue mobilization.

### Economic governance and anti-corruption measures
- Institutional and legal reforms:
  - New laws adopted including the anti-corruption law to facilitate disclosure of assets by concerned public officials.
  - Draft laws submitted to parliament in December 2017 pending discussion: asset recovery law; anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing law (AML/CFT).
- Enforcement and institutions:
  - Reinforcement of anti-corruption office (BIANCO) and financial intelligence unit (SAMIFIN).
  - Anti-corruption center established; another center scheduled to be opened this year.
- Public financial management, procurement, PPPs, and SOEs:
  - Development of a medium-term fiscal framework to improve fiscal transparency.
  - SOEs better covered by the budget.
  - PPP Unit created to finalize procedures in coordination with ministries and the National Committee for PPPs.
  - Two bodies created to oversee public procurements with emphasis on increasing competitive bids.
  - With UNDP assistance, steps to elaborate a catalog of benchmark prices of goods and services in public procurements to ensure value for money.

### Conclusion and request
- Program results and commitments:
  - Despite challenging domestic and external context, Madagascar sustained strong economic performance under the ECF-supported program: growth remained robust, the domestic primary balance was in surplus, and progress was made on structural reforms.
  - Authorities committed to continuing fiscal consolidation to create fiscal space for public investment and social spending, and to lay the basis for strong and inclusive growth while further improving economic governance.
- Request to IMF Executive Board:
  - Authorities request the Board’s support for completion of the third review under the ECF arrangement and for modification of performance criteria.

*Statement by Mr. Sembene, Executive Director for Madagascar, Mr. Razafindramanana, Alternate Executive Director, and Mr. Alle, Senior Advisor to Executive Director — July 11, 2018*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2018/cr18239.pdf_
