## EVALUATING AND REINFORCING THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA’S FISCAL STRATEGY

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### Overview and purpose
- Evaluates Australia’s principles-based fiscal framework anchored in the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 and the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS).
- Focus: MTFS as the medium-term fiscal anchor, accountability mechanisms, and options to reinforce fiscal strategies in current and prospective macroeconomic environments.
- Key proposal directions:
  - Link debt and budget balance objectives more explicitly.
  - Strengthen accountability and transparency.
  - Reduce variability of the fiscal policy toolkit by using less distortionary taxes and protecting productive infrastructure spending.

### Legal framework, MTFS objective, and historical phases
- Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 requires the Commonwealth to set out and report an MTFS consistent with “Principles of Sound Fiscal Management.”
- Principles include: prudent management of fiscal risks and the level of debt; sustaining national saving; smoothing the economic cycle while accounting for economic risks; maintaining spending and taxation consistent with a stable, predictable tax burden; accounting for impacts on future generations.
- MTFS objective (historical and current): maintain or achieve budget balance or budget surpluses either “on average, over the course of the economic cycle” or “over the medium term.”
- Reference period begins FY1998/99. Historical phases: pre-GFC strong economy; GFC and commodity boom recovery to late 2011; post-2011 adjustment period.

### MTFS policy elements and FY2018/19 specifics
- FY2018/19 policy elements:
  1. Reprioritize government spending towards quality government investment to boost productivity and workforce participation.
  2. Reduce the Commonwealth government’s share of the economy, freeing resources for private investment, with:
     - a falling ratio of payments to GDP
     - stabilizing then reducing net debt over time
  3. Support revenue growth and maintain the tax-to-GDP ratio at or below 23.9 percent.
  4. Strengthen the Commonwealth government’s balance sheet by improving net financial worth over time.
- Budget repair strategy (post-GFC): deliver budget surplus building to at least 1% of GDP in the medium term (originally by FY2023/24 in FY2014/15 and FY2015/16 budgets).
- Short-term stimulus example: FY2009/10 Temporary Stimulus.

### Accountability and reporting architecture
- Regular reports required by the Charter:
  - Budget (Budget Economic and Fiscal Outlook) — usually presented in May before the fiscal year beginning July 1.
  - Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO) — by the end of January each year or within 6 months after the last budget.
  - Final Budget Outcome (FBO) — within 3 months of the end of each financial year.
- PEFO: published within 10 days of the election of the House of Representatives being called; issued jointly by the Secretaries of the Treasury and the Department of Finance.
- Intergenerational Report: released every five years to assess long-term fiscal sustainability over the next 40 years.
- Monthly financial statements: required by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013; published as soon as practicable after the end of each month.
- Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), established in 2012:
  - Provides independent analysis and policy costings; publishes election costings; produces research and the National Fiscal Outlook.

### Key evaluative findings
- MTFS anchor (medium-term budget balance/surplus) has functioned under a principles-based framework but:
  - Commonwealth budgets have recorded deficits since 2008.
  - Net public debt has risen substantially, though debt ratios remain low in international comparison.
  - Debt increase has at times conflicted with political preferences for low net debt amid large net external liabilities.
- Post-GFC environment: more volatile, monetary policy historically looser, effective lower bound on nominal interest rates may occur more often — challenging a budget-balance-only anchor.

### Issues identified with current MTFS implementation
- Five key issues:
  - Reliance on a flow medium-term fiscal anchor has allowed debt to drift upward; desired debt level not clearly defined.
  - Political economy pressures make it unclear whether consistent surpluses can be maintained.
  - Considerable uncertainty about shocks and their implications for budget balance paths at budget release; systematic review of uncertainty effects could be valuable.
  - Transparency exists but is not equivalent to accountability; no clear mechanism for systematic, repeated, independent evaluation of fiscal policy and the fiscal framework.
  - Fiscal policy toolkit relies on automatic stabilizers; limited conventional monetary policy space and greater economic variability reduce toolkit effectiveness.

### Policy recommendations and areas for strengthening the framework
- Introduce a more explicit link between debt and budget balance objectives to prevent debt drift when the effective lower bound is encountered more frequently.
- Augment the accountability framework to encourage transparency and public debate and hold governments more fully to account. Options include:
  - Release a Budget Policy Statement well in advance of the upcoming budget (e.g., at MYEFO or when the budget process begins).
  - Formally legislate the MTFS (example: United Kingdom’s Charter of Budget Responsibility).
  - Increase the role of the PBO to include regular reviews of fiscal policy (modeled on the UK OBR); consider review frequency (annual may be too demanding; gaps longer than 3 years may reduce usefulness); allow for government public reply.
  - Use the PBO as a long-term repository of knowledge and centralize evaluation (including Intergenerational Report work).
- Reform the fiscal policy toolkit to reduce variability and protect productive infrastructure spending:
  - Shift towards GST (indirect taxes) from CIT and PIT (direct taxes).
  - Index PIT brackets by inflation to reduce bracket creep.
  - Broaden the GST base.
  - Commit to maintaining and adding infrastructure investment (focus on net acquisition of non-financial assets).

### Quantified illustrative alternative fiscal toolkit (calibration highlights)
- Illustrative measures:
  - GST revenues increased by 2 percent of GDP to the Commonwealth; CIT and PIT each decreased by 1 percent of GDP.
  - PIT brackets indexed to inflation.
  - GST applied to all household consumption; statutory GST rate falls to roughly 5 percent, all else equal.
  - Government net infrastructure investment target: 0.7 percent of potential output (FY2018/19 level) to maintain and grow infrastructure capital stock.

### Modeling approach — ANZIMF
- Model: Australia-New Zealand Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (ANZIMF), based on IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model (GIMF).
- Structure:
  - Annual, multi-region, micro-founded non-Ricardian general equilibrium model comprising five regions: Australia, China, rest of Asia, United States, remaining countries bloc.
  - Fiscal sector: seven tax instruments and four spending instruments; distinguishes Commonwealth and State-level governments with separate debts and budgets.
- Fiscal instruments in ANZIMF (model): GST, CIT, PIT, dividend income tax, payroll tax, property tax, other lumpsum taxes; spending: government consumption, infrastructure investment, general lumpsum transfers, lumpsum transfers to LIQ households.

### Downside scenario — shocks and macro effects
- Scenario shocks (summary):
  - Permanent downward revision in expected productivity in all countries outside Australia; Australia experiences 1/3 the size of the global productivity shock via spillovers.
  - Fall in housing prices lasting into the medium term in numerous advanced economies; 10 percent decline on impact in year 1 in nontradable sector net worth for specified regions including Australia.
  - Short-term increases in corporate financing costs that persist (corporate risk premia: 2 percentage points on impact in year 1; 1 percentage point thereafter for five years).
- Global outcomes relative to baseline:
  - After 4 years, real GDP in the rest of the world is about 6 percent lower.
  - Global commodity prices fall by 10 percent.
- Spillovers to Australia:
  - Real GDP: 3.0 percent lower in the short term; 2.2 to 2.3 percent lower in the long term.
  - Mechanisms: lower exports via trade and commodity channels; REER depreciation raising import costs but aiding exports; lower imported productivity gains.
- Fiscal handling in scenario:
  - Australian debt allowed to drift for first 40 years; debt-to-GDP stabilizes only after shocks play out.
  - Transfers move only via automatic stabilizers; transfers not used to stabilize debt-to-GDP (default fiscal rule in ANZIMF).

### Comparative results: benchmark vs alternative calibration
- Alternative calibration yields smaller fiscal impacts for the Commonwealth under the downside scenario:
  - Revenues fall by only 0.5 percent of GDP instead of larger declines under the benchmark (text truncated in source).
- Annex II calibration table (selected percent of GDP comparisons):
  - Deficit: benchmark 0.9; alternative 0.9
  - Net Debt: benchmark 18.0; alternative 18.0
  - Revenues: benchmark 21.2; alternative 21.2
  - GST: benchmark ...; alternative 2.0
  - Company Tax (CIT): benchmark 5.4; alternative 4.4
  - Personal Income Tax (PIT): benchmark 11.1; alternative 9.1
  - Dividend Income Tax: benchmark 0.6; alternative 1.6
  - Gross Infrastructure Investment: benchmark 0.7; alternative 0.7
  - Revenue Transfer to States: benchmark 3.1; alternative 3.1
- Key features in alternative calibration:
  - GST base as a percent of consumption: benchmark 50; alternative 100
  - Inflation elasticity of the PIT rate: benchmark 0.5; alternative 0.2

### Alternative calibration: fiscal and macroeconomic effects (summary)
- Stronger GST base reduces pressure on Commonwealth deficit by almost 1 percent of GDP.
- Debt-to-GDP deteriorates less under the alternative calibration due to better deficit position and marginally better real GDP outcome.
- Lower CIT rates relative to benchmark help investment in the long term.
- Commonwealth defends government investment, maintaining infrastructure capital stock, supporting productivity and slightly stronger real GDP (long-term improvement of 0.2 percentage points reported).
- Trade-offs: alternative calibration yields stronger fiscal position but higher taxes overall; short-term consumption is slightly worse.

### Short-term fiscal multipliers (alternative toolkit; average 2-year response to a 2-year, 1 percent of GDP change)
- Increased government investment — 0.98
- Increased government consumption — 0.81
- Increased transfers to liquidity-constrained households — 0.39
- Cut in GST — 0.29
- Cut in CIT — 0.25
- Cut in PIT — 0.19
- Increased transfers to all households — 0.11
- Implication: highest returns from spending measures, then transfers to LIQ households, then tax cuts (GST, CIT, PIT), with transfers to all households least stimulatory per ANZIMF.

### Implementation requirements and institutional considerations
- Implementation requires restatement of the government investment policy element and legislative changes.
- Tax reform contingent on COAG agreement on:
  - Redefinition of the GST tax base.
  - Permitting the Commonwealth to retain a fixed share of GST revenues.
- Institutional reforms (examples):
  - Formal MTFS legislation, Budget Policy Statement, enhanced PBO remit and regular independent fiscal reviews.

### Final recommendations (condensed)
- Introduce a clearer, explicit link between debt and budget balance objectives to mitigate debt drift under constrained monetary policy environments.
- Augment accountability and transparency: Budget Policy Statement, formal MTFS legislation, and regular PBO reviews of fiscal outcomes relative to the MTFS.
- Reform the fiscal toolkit to reduce variability: shift toward less distortionary indirect taxes (broader GST base), index PIT brackets to inflation, and protect/commit to productive infrastructure spending.
- Recognize trade-offs: alternative toolkits can preserve fiscal space and reduce volatility but may raise taxes and have distributional and consumption effects.

_Italic line: Source: Excerpt from "Evaluating and Reinforcing the Commonwealth of Australia’s Fiscal Strategy", January 18, 2019._

### References ________________________________________________________________________ 29

### EVALUATING AND REINFORCING THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA’S FISCAL STRATEGY

### Overview and purpose
- Evaluates Australia’s experience with its principles-based fiscal framework anchored in the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998.
- Focuses on the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) as the effective medium-term fiscal anchor, its accountability mechanisms, and options to reinforce and enhance fiscal strategies in current and prospective macroeconomic environments.
- Key proposal directions: link debt and budget balance objectives more explicitly; strengthen accountability and transparency; reduce variability of the fiscal policy toolkit by using less distortionary taxes and protecting productive infrastructure spending.

### The fiscal framework and the MTFS
- Legal cornerstone: Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 requires the Commonwealth government to set out and report against an MTFS consistent with “Principles of Sound Fiscal Management.”
- Principles include: prudent management of fiscal risks and the level of debt; following policies to sustain national saving; smoothing the economic cycle while accounting for economic risks and their fiscal impacts; maintaining spending and taxation consistent with a stable, predictable tax burden; accounting for impacts on future generations.
- MTFS objective (historical and current): to either maintain or achieve budget balance or budget surpluses either “on average, over the course of the economic cycle” or “over the medium term.”
- Historical phases since inception (broadly aligned with economic phases): pre-GFC strong economy; GFC and commodity boom recovery to late 2011; post-2011 adjustment period. (Reference period begins FY1998/99.)

### MTFS policy elements and recent specifics
- MTFS has been implemented through a set of policy elements drawing on taxes, infrastructure spending, and debt management.
- FY2018/19 policy elements (as reported):
  - 1 Reprioritize government spending towards quality government investment to boost productivity and workforce participation.
  - 2 Reduce the Commonwealth government’s share of the economy, freeing resources for private investment to stimulate productivity and growth, with:
    - a falling ratio of payments to GDP
    - stabilizing then reducing net debt over time
  - 3 Support revenue growth by supporting policies that drive growth, maintaining the tax-to-GDP ratio at or below 23.9 percent.
  - 4 Strengthen the Commonwealth government’s balance sheet by improving net financial worth over time.
- Budget repair strategy (post-GFC): deliver budget surplus building to at least 1% of GDP in the medium term (originally by FY2023/24 in FY2014/15 and FY2015/16 budgets). Budget repair achieved by offsetting new spending with spending reductions and using unexpected windfalls to pay down debt.
- Short-term/temporary stimulus: FY2009/10 Temporary Stimulus to support the economy during the recession.

### Accountability and reporting architecture
- Regular reports required by the Charter:
  - Budget (Budget Economic and Fiscal Outlook) — usually presented in May before the fiscal year beginning July 1.
  - Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO) — by the end of January each year or within 6 months after the last budget.
  - Final Budget Outcome (FBO) — within 3 months of the end of each financial year.
  - The Charter prescribes contents: outcomes; (Budget and MYEFO) MTFS in detail, forecasts, analysis for revenues and expenditures, risks and deviations from prior reports.
- PEFO (Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Outlook): published within 10 days of the election of the House of Representatives being called; issued jointly by the Secretaries of the Treasury and the Department of Finance; provides updated economic and fiscal forecasts, sensitivity analysis, and risks.
- Intergenerational Report: released every five years by the Treasurer to assess long-term fiscal sustainability over the next 40 years.
- Monthly financial statements: required by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013; published by the Minister for Finance as soon as practicable after the end of each month.
- Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), established in 2012:
  - Provides independent analysis, primarily policy costings.
  - Publishes election costings; other costings are confidential unless authorized.
  - Produces research and the National Fiscal Outlook aggregating Commonwealth and State budgets.

### Key evaluative findings
- The MTFS anchor (medium-term budget balance/surplus) has functioned under a principles-based framework but:
  - Commonwealth budgets have recorded deficits since 2008, reflecting weaker post-GFC economic performance and automatic stabilizers.
  - Net public debt has risen substantially in this context, although gross and net public debt ratios remain low in international comparison.
  - The increase in debt has been larger than expected given a medium-term fiscal anchor and has at times conflicted with political preferences for low net debt amid large net external liabilities.
- The post-GFC environment is more volatile, with monetary policy historically remaining loose and the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates possibly occurring more often — circumstances that challenge a budget-balance-only anchor.

### Policy recommendations and areas for strengthening the framework
- Introduce a more explicit link between debt and budget balance objectives to prevent debt drift in macroeconomic environments where the effective lower bound may be encountered more frequently.
- Add to the accountability framework to further encourage transparency and public debate and to hold governments more fully to account.
- Reduce variability of the fiscal policy toolkit by:
  - Using less distortionary taxes in the least distortionary manner (broader tax bases).
  - Protecting productive infrastructure spending to better preserve fiscal space and provide greater flexibility in the face of large shocks.
- Lessons drawn from international comparison (New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom) and prior IMF work (e.g., Dizioli et al., 2017) support consideration of deficit and debt anchors, enhanced accountability mechanisms, and careful calibration of fiscal instruments.

### Modeling and scenario analysis referenced
- The paper uses the Australia-New Zealand Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (ANZIMF) to examine the fiscal policy toolkit.
- Annexes include:
  - I ANZIMF — The Australia-New Zealand Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model.
  - II Alternative Calibration of Australia’s Fiscal Block.
  - III Key Assumptions Underlying the Downside Scenario.
  - IV Effects of the Downside Scenario Outside of Australia.
- Figures and tables cited include empirical and scenario material, for example:
  - Figures: Australia’s Fiscal Position; Downside Scenario – Economic Impact in Australia; Downside Scenario – Fiscal Impact on the Commonwealth Government.
  - Tables: Commonwealth MTFS since the Inception of the Charter; FY2018/19 Policy Elements for the MTFS; Cross-Country Comparison of Fiscal Frameworks; Mapping the FY2018/19 MTFS into the Charter; Short-Term Multipliers.

*Source: Excerpt from "Evaluating and Reinforcing the Commonwealth of Australia’s Fiscal Strategy", January 18, 2019.*

### 14.      The state of the economic cycle, especially for Australia, is sometimes difficult to

### 1ausea2019009 - 14.      The state of the economic cycle, especially for Australia, is sometimes difficult to

### Economic cycle and output gaps
- Australia has not had a recession in over 26 years using the standard NBER definition of an output contraction lasting for at least two quarters.
- The output gap provides a more nuanced view of the cycle than simple recession dating.
- All four countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom) saw an increase in their net debt positions with the onset of the GFC.
- Three of the four countries experienced protracted negative output gaps after the GFC despite allowing for stimulus within their fiscal frameworks.
- Australia: negative output gap in 2009 nearly closed in 2012, followed by another downturn starting in 2013 after the end of the global commodity boom; rebound from 2015 narrowed the output gap only very gradually, with the output gap repeatedly returning to -1 percent of real GDP since 2009.
- New Zealand: negative output gap starting in 2009 because of commodities and links with Australia.
- United Kingdom: negative output gap starting in 2009 was protracted, similar to some euro area economies.
- Canada: experienced the sharpest downturn in 2008 but recovered the fastest, reflecting U.S. spillovers and the domestic policy response.

### Fiscal outcomes and MTFS implementation across countries
- The scaling of the fiscal balance roughly indicates the scale of automatic stabilizers to the output gap of roughly 0.5, in line with values for all four countries (Price and others, 2015).
- Australia
  - MTFS has been flexible to change with economic circumstances.
  - Net debt continued to rise before stabilizing in 2016.
  - Fiscal stimulus (and the large deficit) played some role in sustaining output growth over this period.
- New Zealand
  - MTFS shown to be achievable.
  - May have resulted in a larger output gap for a longer period compared to the other three countries.
  - Has generally had countercyclical fiscal policy; evolution of net debt to GDP reflects this.
- Canada
  - Achieved goals similar to Australia and New Zealand without a formal framework.
  - Fiscal balance has been much less variable, mildly countercyclical.
  - Net debt to GDP ratio broadly stable since 2011.
- United Kingdom
  - Weak outcomes over the 2000s; did not exploit the period of excess demand prior to the GFC.
  - Began reform in 2011 with a Charter for Budget Responsibility and an Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
  - Stabilized net debt starting in 2015 despite other shocks (such as Brexit).

### Recent updates to fiscal frameworks (selected facts)
- Australia introduced the PBO in a major reform in 2011, with minor modifications in 2013.
- New Zealand legislated major changes in 2005 and 2013; considering addition of a fiscal council.
- United Kingdom started reform in 2011; last updated its charter in autumn 2016 and changed timing of budget document releases.
- Canada continues to discuss a fiscal rule and updated legislation over the past 10 years after removing its explicit debt rule in 2006.

### Interaction of the Charter and the MTFS (Australia)
- The MTFS has focused on government finances over a flexible horizon related to the economic cycle, aligning with the Charter’s purpose to “maintain[ ] the on-going economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia.”
- The Charter’s five “Principles of Sound Fiscal Management” have shaped policy conduct since 1998, fostering continuity and flexibility to moderate the economic cycle.
- The Charter influenced State adoption of similar frameworks; e.g., Queensland enacted the Fiscal Accountability Act in 2009 requiring a Charter of Fiscal Responsibility.

### Mapping the MTFS policy elements to outcomes (Australia)
- The MTFS policy elements are summarized in Table 4 (as in source). Key mappings and outcomes include:
  - Stabilize then reduce net debt over time (2b): May be stabilizing starting 2016/17; reduction has yet to occur.
  - Improve net financial worth (4): Financial assets improve, but borrowing offsets.
  - Moderate the economic cycle (ii): Yes during recessions (GFC), not as clear during expansions.
  - Limit on tax to GDP (3): Being tied to an explicit number may mistake cyclical improvement as a permanent opportunity for tax cuts.
  - Reduce payments to GDP (2a): Met outside of recessions.
  - Reprioritize spending towards quality investment (1): Improving; still low relative to pre-GFC; remains important for rising health and aged care needs.
  - Maintain integrity of the tax system (d): Not explicitly in MTFS; relies on policy conduct; generally, tax changes are not enacted without careful consideration.

### MTFS Element 1 — Reprioritize spending towards quality government investment
- Commonwealth-level government investment declined after the GFC but strengthened in recent years.
- States carry substantial responsibility for infrastructure; public non-financial corporations have been an important channel for marquee projects (National Broadband Network, Western Sydney Airport, Brisbane-Melbourne Inland Railway).
- Infrastructure Australia (since 2012) provides arm’s-length costing and advisory services, audits federally significant projects, and develops a 15-Year Infrastructure Plan to elevate investment in high-quality projects with strong benefit-cost ratios.

### MTFS Element 2 — Control expenditure / reduce share of government in the economy
- The Commonwealth government’s share of the economy has not been reduced during the life of the Charter by measures of payments-to-GDP and net debt.
- Budget repair strategy aims to stabilize expenditure (offsetting new measures with new cuts) and, as the economy strengthens, reduce debt with an increasingly large fiscal surplus that is to stabilize at 1 percent of GDP.
- Reduce the expenses-to-GDP ratio
  - Expenses (net of interest and GST payments to States) peaked at 22 percent in FY2009/2010, troughed at 20.9 percent of GDP in FY2012/13, and are estimated to have returned to that trough in FY2017/18 as the cyclical position improved.
  - Interest payments vary from 0.3 to 1.0 percent of GDP; GST payments to States vary from 3 to 4 percent of GDP.
  - Since FY2008/09 and FY2009/10 fiscal stimulus, the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) began to ramp up in 2013 and went nationwide starting in 2016.
- Stabilize and reduce net debt
  - Net debt has only stabilized starting in FY2016/17.
  - Pre-GFC, net debt declined substantially and even became a net asset position; the GFC drove debt up consistent with the MTFS objective to moderate the cycle.
  - Output gap repeatedly returning to -1 percent of real GDP since 2009; stabilization of net debt to GDP ratio is notable though level of net debt is only close to stabilizing as of FY2018/19.

### MTFS Element 3 — Maintain the tax-to-GDP ratio at or below 23.9 percent of GDP
- A tax ceiling returned to the MTFS in FY2018/19: 23.9 percent of GDP, the average tax collection during FY2000/01 to FY2007/08.
- Prior practices tied tax ceilings to other year values (e.g., FY2007/08) in earlier budgets and medium-term scenarios.
- Tax collection ratios generally follow commodity price and economic cycles:
  - Personal income tax (PIT) and GST follow the economic cycle.
  - Corporate income tax (CIT) follows the commodity price cycle given the preponderance of mining and natural gas exporters.
- Risks of a tax-to-GDP ceiling:
  - May be inconsistent with running surpluses over the cycle if surpluses are cyclical rather than structural.
  - FY2018/19 budget reduced personal income taxes and retreated from a planned 2019 increase in the Medicare levy to secure NDIS funding, consistent with the 23.9 percent ceiling if revenue strength is structural.
  - Explicit ceiling may not sufficiently consider structural adjustments such as using potential output rather than real GDP.

### MTFS Element 4 — Increase net financial worth over time
- Commonwealth net financial worth has been strongly tied to stabilization of net debt.
- Net financial assets improved pre-GFC and deteriorated post-GFC.
- The present discounted value of unfunded pension liabilities as a share of GDP has increased and occasionally revalued; forecasting uses a forecasted discount rate of 6 percent in budgets up to and including FY2017/18; 5 percent starting in FY2018/19; the actual discount rate is used in published ABS statistics.

### Options and issues for enhancing the fiscal framework
- MTFSs over two decades have broadly met Charter principles but implementation issues have emerged; five key issues identified:
  - Reliance on a flow medium-term fiscal anchor (budget balance over the cycle) has allowed debt to drift upwards because there is no strongly stated desired level of debt beyond “maintaining ... debt at prudent levels.”
  - Political economy pressures make it unclear whether consistent surpluses could be maintained; tendency to commit to spending surpluses before they are definitively identified as structural.
  - Considerable uncertainty about shocks and their implications for budget balance paths at the time the budget is released; systematic review of uncertainty effects could be valuable.
  - Transparency exists but is not equivalent to accountability; no clear mechanism for systematic, repeated, independent evaluation of fiscal policy and the fiscal framework.
  - Fiscal policy toolkit relies on automatic stabilizers; the new environment of limited conventional monetary policy space and greater economic variability (post-GFC and post-terms-of-trade boom) reduces the effectiveness of the toolkit.

*Source: Commonwealth of Australia Treasury; ABS; IMF staff calculations.*

### 31.      There are three broad areas of reform to help address these issues. First, a more explicit

### There are three broad areas of reform to help address these issues. First, a more explicit

### Introducing an Explicit Link Between Debt and Deficits
- Problem statement:
  - The Charter and the budget balance anchor in the MTFS were introduced when the primary concerns were preventing larger current account deficits and increasing national savings.
  - The Charter was formulated in a more favorable baseline environment; cycles can be longer and shocks larger (e.g., the GFC), introducing a large element of debt drift.
  - The current framework has no clearly stated policy options to bring the debt back to more prudent levels, which themselves are not clearly defined.
- Options to introduce a link between debt and deficits:
  - Formalize feedback from debt to deficits.
  - Introduce a medium-term debt target as a fiscal anchor.
- Evidence from prior analysis:
  - Dizioli and others (2017) analyzed options for debt anchors with varying degrees of cyclical flexibility under three shocks: a large boom-bust in commodity prices; a temporary but substantial increase in aggregate demand; a large-scale consolidation in net debt.
  - Key findings:
    - A debt anchor would perform better than a simple deficit target.
    - The best-performing debt target allowed the level of debt to vary from its target for roughly 5 years, rather than correcting deviations immediately or allowing longer variation.
  - Similar conclusions drawn in other country experiments such as Canada (Kinda 2015).

### Augmenting the Accountability Framework
- Current strengths:
  - Transparency is already very high; timely analysis via the Budget and the MYEFO.
  - The PBO provides timely research and assembles the National Fiscal Outlook.
- Suggested enhancements (three options):
  - Follow New Zealand’s Budget Policy Statement (BPS) model:
    - Release well in advance of the upcoming budget (e.g., at the time of the MYEFO or when the budget process begins in Parliament around September).
    - Clearly set policy goals guiding the forthcoming budget, consistent with the MTFS.
    - Reinforced at budget time by a Fiscal Strategy Report (Australia already has a fiscal strategy chapter in the Budget).
    - Expected effect: more year-to-year linking for fiscal strategy and reduced incentives to change short-term objectives without strong justification.
  - Legislate the MTFS formally in advance of the budget or at the beginning of a new government:
    - Example: United Kingdom’s Charter of Budget Responsibility where the MTFS is an Act of Parliament with formal fiscal targets and escape clauses.
    - Expected effect: opens proposed changes to public debate and creates a legal commitment that raises the cost of changing the MTFS.
  - Increase the role of the PBO to include regular reviews of fiscal policy:
    - Modeled on the United Kingdom’s OBR as an arm’s length fiscal council.
    - Regular reviews would improve understanding of uncertainty and budget processes; could compare FBOs versus the MTFS and provide more granular analysis relative to Budgets.
    - Frequency considerations: annual may be too demanding; more than 3 years apart would probably reduce usefulness.
    - Possibility for a public reply by the government to review findings (most useful with frequent review cycles).
    - Reviews released publicly with media coverage, similar to Budget and MYEFO.
- Additional role for the PBO:
  - Serve as a long-term repository of knowledge for implementing the fiscal framework.
  - Centralize reviews to build institutional knowledge and complement existing PBO research.
  - Could assume evaluation work such as the Intergenerational Report, reducing perceptions of politicization.

### Reforming the Fiscal Policy Toolkit
- Objective:
  - Reconfigure the fiscal policy toolkit to better serve the MTFS by making fiscal stabilization elements more certain and less variable while preserving automatic stabilizers.
- Summary of long-standing policy discussions and proposed measures:
  - Shift towards GST (indirect taxes) from CIT and PIT (direct taxes) to maximize efficiency.
  - Indexation of PIT brackets by inflation to reduce reliance on bracket creep.
  - Broaden the GST base to minimize variability in tax collection.
  - Commit to maintaining infrastructure and adding new infrastructure investment.
- Rationale and effects:
  - Shifting tax burden towards indirect taxes:
    - A GST-reliant tax mixture produces less volatility than a mix relying on PIT and CIT.
    - Indirect taxes generally have less negative effects on economic output than direct taxes.
  - Indexation of personal income tax brackets:
    - Minimizes inflation-driven bracket creep; bracket creep from real wage increases cannot be eliminated.
    - Reduces uncertainty around PIT revenues by tying bracket movements to inflation rather than difficult nominal income forecasts.
  - Expanding the GST tax base:
    - The GST tax base is estimated to cover only 50 percent of consumption (OECD 2015); New Zealand covers roughly 95 percent of consumption.
    - A broader GST base that generates the same revenues should lead to less variability in tax revenues over the economic cycle.
  - Committing to an infrastructure investment target:
    - Infrastructure investment enhances productivity.
    - There is a demonstrable gap for Australia’s infrastructure needs; a commitment could be set as a share of a GDP measure such as potential output.
    - Allowances should be made to maintain additional capital stock; focus on net acquisition of non-financial assets as well as gross investment.
- Quantified alternative fiscal policy toolkit (for illustration):
  - GST revenues are increased by 2 percent of GDP, and given to the Commonwealth, while CIT and PIT are each decreased by 1 percent of GDP.
  - Personal income tax brackets are indexed to inflation so that households only move to higher tax brackets only as real income increases.
  - GST is applied to all of household consumption which reduces the statutory GST rate to roughly 5 percent, all else being equal.
  - Government investment spending maintains the infrastructure capital stock at its current level and increases the stock annually at a net infrastructure investment to potential output ratio of 0.7 percent (its FY2018/19 level).

### Exploring a Downside Scenario
- Modelling framework:
  - The downside scenario is quantified using the Australia and New Zealand Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model, ANZIMF (based on the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model).
  - ANZIMF is an annual, multi-region, micro-founded non-Ricardian general equilibrium model of the global economy comprising five regions: Australia, China, the rest of Asia, the United States, and a bloc of the remaining countries.
  - Fiscal sector in the model includes seven tax instruments (GST, CIT, PIT, dividend income tax, payroll tax, property tax, and other lumpsum taxes) and four spending instruments (government consumption, infrastructure investment, general lumpsum transfers, and lumpsum transfers targeted to poorer households).
  - Model distinguishes Commonwealth and State-level governments with separate debts, deficits, expenses and revenues; the experiment focuses on the Commonwealth’s fiscal policy toolkit.
- Scenario setup and interpretation:
  - No strict debt or deficit target in the experiment; deficit allowed to drift for more than 40 years, so debt varies between current and alternative toolkits.
  - Results are indicative of reductions in volatility of fiscal instruments and implications for economic outcomes; a toolkit inducing less debt drift would also induce less economic variability under a debt target.
- Downside scenario shocks (summary):
  - A substantial recession outside Australia originating in China, the United States, the rest of Asia and other advanced economies, with:
    - A permanent downward revision in the expected path of productivity in all countries.
    - A fall in housing prices that lasts into the medium term in numerous advanced economies (with consequent wealth effects).
    - Short-term increases in the cost of corporate financing that persist in the longer term.
  - Relative to the baseline, after 4 years, real GDP in the rest of the world is about 6 percent lower.
  - Global commodity prices fall by 10 percent.
  - Because of the productivity shock, real exchange rates generally appreciate against Australia and countries less affected by the recession.
- Spillovers to Australia:
  - Direct trade channel depressing Australian exports.
  - Commodities channel depressing commodity exports and inducing a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER), which increases import costs but helps exports somewhat.
  - Lower global productivity spills over to Australia as it imports technology gains from abroad.
  - Aggregate outcomes:
    - Generally, real GDP is 3.0 percent lower in the short term, and 2.2 to 2.3 percent lower in the long term.
- Comparative results under current vs. alternative fiscal toolkits:
  - The alternative calibration has smaller impacts on the Commonwealth’s fiscal outcomes; revenues fall by only 0.5 percent of GDP instead of [text cut off in source].
  - The downside scenario comparisons illustrate that an alternative toolkit designed to reduce variability in fiscal instruments can reduce fiscal and economic volatility under severe external shocks.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and analysis as presented in the supplied content.*

### 1.2 percent of GDP, as the collection of PIT and GST are more stable relative to GDP. The stronger

### F. Conclusions

### Alternative calibration: fiscal and macroeconomic effects
- Stronger revenues from the broad GST tax base extend to the State level, as only about 30 percent of GDP revenues go the Commonwealth.
- The stronger tax position reduces the pressure on the Commonwealth’s deficit by almost 1 percent of GDP.
- The debt-to-GDP ratio deteriorates less under the alternative calibration, attributable partly to the better deficit position driven by better tax collection and marginally better real GDP outcome.
- Lower CIT rates relative to the benchmark calibration help investment in the long term.
- Real GDP is stronger in part because the Commonwealth defends the downward pressure on government investment.
- Alternative calibration offsets yearly depreciation of the infrastructure capital stock (a feature of the alternative calibration only), maintaining the productivity-enhancing infrastructure stock and allowing for stronger economic growth than under the benchmark calibration.
- The Commonwealth only accounts for a portion of the infrastructure stock; the rest is at the State level, so the effect is smaller than in other countries.
- Trade-offs:
  - The alternative calibration delivers a stronger fiscal position for the Commonwealth but does so by delivering higher taxes than it would otherwise.
  - Real GDP does slightly better under the alternative calibration in the long term (0.2 percentage points) in the short term, it is not substantial.
  - Consumption does slightly worse, hit by higher-than-benchmark levels of PIT and GST.

### Short-term multipliers (under the alternative toolkit)
- Multipliers are the average 2-year response of real GDP to a 2-year, 1 percent of GDP change in the relevant fiscal instrument.
- Fiscal Instrument — Multiplier:
  - Increased government investment — 0.98
  - Increased government consumption — 0.81
  - Increased transfers to liquidity-constrained households — 0.39
  - Cut in GST — 0.29
  - Cut in CIT — 0.25
  - Cut in PIT — 0.19
  - Increased transfers to all households — 0.11
- Within the ANZIMF context, the greatest return would come from spending measures, then transfers to liquidity-constrained households, followed by cuts to GST, CIT or PIT, and finally transfers to all households.

### Implementation requirements for the alternative calibration
- Restatement of one policy element and legislative changes are required.
- A more specific statement of the policy element related to government investment would be needed.
- The tax reform could allow the Commonwealth to return to a more general specification of the policy element related to taxation without a specific numeric component, subject to agreement with the State level through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).
- Tax reform contingent on COAG agreement on:
  - Redefinition of the tax base for the GST.
  - Permitting the Commonwealth to retain a fixed share of the revenues.

### Recommendations to strengthen Australia’s fiscal framework and MTFS
- Introduce a more explicit link between debt and budget balance objectives, to mitigate public debt drift in an environment where macroeconomic policies might be constrained by the lower effective bound on policy interest rates; discretionary spending may need to play more of a role in macroeconomic stabilization.
- Add to the accountability framework to further encourage transparency and public debate, and hold governments even more to account. Possibilities include:
  - A Budget Policy Statement.
  - Formally legislate the MTFS.
  - Give PBO the role to regularly and systematically review fiscal outcomes relative to the MTFS.
- Reduce the variability of the fiscal policy toolkit by using less distortionary taxes (indirect versus direct) in the least distortionary manner (a broader GST base) while protecting productive infrastructure spending.
  - The illustrative alternative toolkit helps better preserve fiscal space and provide greater flexibility in face of large shocks, but has costs in terms of economic outcomes and is appropriate only if the economic environment is indeed more volatile than in the past.

### Overall assessment
- The Charter and the MTFS with its policy elements have been a workable fiscal framework for the Commonwealth, although it could be reinforced with augmentations addressing the treatment of debt, accountability, and the fiscal policy toolkit.
- Options to deal with debt treatment, accountability framework, and fiscal toolkit should help strengthen the statement and implementation of Australia’s fiscal strategy and reinforce its fiscal framework in the current and prospective economic environment.

### Annex I — ANZIMF (summary)
- ANZIMF is an annual, multi-region, micro-founded general equilibrium model comprising five regions: Australia, China, the rest of Asia, the United States, and a bloc of the remaining countries.
- It is an annual, micro-founded DSGE model with commodity and services sectors and a detailed fiscal sector, based on the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model (GIMF).
- Consumption dynamics:
  - Driven by saving households and liquidity-constrained (LIQ) households.
  - Saving households face a consumption-leisure choice based on overlapping generations (OLG) models (Blanchard (1985), Weil (1989), Yaari (1962)), where government bonds are treated as wealth, making the model non-Ricardian.
  - LIQ households cannot save, consuming all their income each period, amplifying non-Ricardian short-term properties.
- Private investment relies on the Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator; investment cumulates to private capital stock for tradable and nontradable firms.
- Government absorption consists of exogenously determined spending on consumption goods and infrastructure investment; infrastructure spending cumulates into an infrastructure capital stock subject to constant but low depreciation; a permanent increase raises economy-wide productivity.
- Nominal side:
  - Depends on implicit Phillips’ curves and monetary policy.
  - Core price is CPI; wage inflation is a key driver for CPI inflation.
  - Monetary policy is typically an inflation forecast targeting regime with an interest rate reaction function reliant on expected inflation.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and text in 1ausea2019009 (excerpts).*

### 6.      Trade is tracked bilaterally between all regions. The flows react to demand, supply and

### 1ausea2019009 - 6. Trade is tracked bilaterally between all regions. The flows react to demand, supply and

### Trade structure and sectors
- Trade is tracked bilaterally between all regions and reacts to demand, supply and pricing (i.e. the terms of trade and bilateral real exchange rates) conditions.
- There are flows for non-commodity goods and services, and commodities.
- Commodities trade and its related demand and supply equations are based on coal and metals (especially iron ore).
- Non-commodities trade is broken into:
  - final goods (consumption and investment),
  - consumption services,
  - intermediate goods.
- Sectors relative to standard GIMF:
  - Commodities: relatively narrow definition covering only coal, iron ore, and other minerals; have a global market and global prices; net trade among countries.
  - Services: restricted to tourism (mostly travel, accommodation, and food services) and education (mostly travel and correspondence courses); produced from tradable and nontradable goods; part of consumption with relatively inelastic demand vis-à-vis consumption goods; traded bilaterally; prices enter directly into the CPI basket.

### Fiscal sector structure in ANZIMF
- Fiscal instruments:
  - Nine tax instruments: personal income tax (PIT), dividend income tax, corporate (or company) income tax (CIT), goods and services tax (GST; also known as value-added tax, VAT), payroll tax, property tax, other lumpsum taxes, and social security taxes on households and firms.
  - Four spending instruments: government consumption, infrastructure investment, general lumpsum transfers, lumpsum transfers targeted to LIQ households.
- Fiscal policy aims:
  - Maintain a debt target, expressed as a deficit target in flow space, using available fiscal instruments to reconcile the government budget constraint.
  - Deficit varies cyclically because of automatic stabilizers; OECD simple average semi-elasticity: a 1 percent increase in the output gap generates a 0.50 percent fall in the deficit; for Australia the semi-elasticity is 0.54.
- Australian specifics:
  - Distinct Commonwealth and State levels; State level includes state, territorial and local governments.
  - Transfer of revenues from Commonwealth to State level is an explicit instrument.
  - Both levels have government debt and independent budget constraints.
  - Treatment of corporate and dividend taxation: assumption that 90 percent of dividends are franked, so dividend income will be 11 percent of the size of corporate income tax revenues, or 0.6 percent of GDP.

### Australia’s Fiscal Sector Calibration in ANZIMF (Table 2; Percent of GDP)
- General (total)
  - Deficit: 1.0 0.9 0.1
  - Net Debt: 19.0 18.0 1.0
  - Revenues: 40.0 21.2 18.8
- Revenues (disaggregated)
  - General Sales Tax (GST) 2/: 3.6 ... 3.6
  - Excise Taxes: 2.2 1.3 0.9
  - Company Tax (CIT): 5.4 5.4 ...
  - Personal Income Tax (PIT): 11.1 11.1 ...
  - Dividend Income Tax: 0.6 0.6 ...
  - Payroll Tax: 1.4 ... 1.4
  - Property Tax 3/: 3.0 ... 3.0
  - Royalties: 1.9 ... 1.9
  - Revenue Transfer to States 4/: 3.1 ... 3.1
  - Other (modelled as lumpsum): 7.7 2.8 4.9
- Expenditures (disaggregated)
  - Expenditures: 39.1 22.1 17.0
  - Consumption: 17.9 7.9 10.0
  - Gross Infrastructure Investment: 3.3 0.7 2.6
  - Lumpsum Transfers: 13.8 9.5 4.3
  - Debt interest payments: 1.0 0.9 0.1
  - Revenue Transfer to States 4/: 3.1 3.1 ...

Notes in table:
- 1/ "State" level includes state, territorial and local governments.
- 2/ GST revenue is collected directly by the State level in ANZIMF; in practice, it is collected by the Commonwealth and then passed on to the State level.
- 3/ Includes land taxes and stamp duties.
- 4/ Excludes GST revenues (or "GST entitlement").

### Alternative calibration under the downside (risk) scenario (Annex II; Table 1; Percent of GDP)
- Key design: GST introduced at the Commonwealth level to collect 2 percent of GDP in revenues, offset by equal decreases of 1 percent of GDP for firms and households (firms: lower CIT; households: higher dividend income taxes from unfranked dividends; PIT lowered).
- Benchmark vs Alternative (Percent of GDP)
  - Deficit: 0.9 0.9
  - Net Debt: 18.0 18.0
  - Revenues: 21.2 21.2
  - General Sales Tax (GST): ... 2.0
  - Excise Taxes: 1.3 1.3
  - Company Tax (CIT): 5.4 4.4
  - Personal Income Tax (PIT): 11.1 9.1
  - Dividend Income Tax: 0.6 1.6
  - Other (modelled as lumpsum): 2.8 2.8
  - Expenditures: 22.1 22.1
  - Consumption: 7.9 7.9
  - Gross Infrastructure Investment: 0.7 0.7
  - Lumpsum Transfers: 9.5 9.5
  - Debt interest payments: 0.9 0.9
  - Revenue Transfer to States 1/: 3.1 3.1
- Key Features listed:
  - GST base as a percent of consumption: 50 100
  - Inflation elasticity of the PIT rate: 0.5 0.2

Additional calibration note:
- Assumption that the lowering of revenues of the 1.0 percent of GDP associated with dividend taxation accrues only to OLG households, as LIQ households do not hold dividends.

### Key model assumptions (Annex III.A)
- All agents have perfect foresight.
- Model has non-linearities in the financial accelerator and potential non-linearities in monetary policy conduct (zero-interest-rate floor or monetary accommodation features not used here); otherwise approximately linear for small shocks.
- All countries share the same economic structures, differing only by parameterization and calibration.
- Benchmark calibration based on parameter values consistent with:
  - 2015 for great ratios to GDP (capital stock, government debt and deficit, net foreign assets and current account, national accounts aggregates, trade flows),
  - 2015 and 2016 for services data,
  - 2018 for fiscal data.
- Real exchange rate is a “jumper,” adjusting immediately in the first year to shocks; follows forward-looking risk-adjusted uncovered interest rate parity condition; no financial friction brings net foreign asset position to steady state; net foreign asset position solves endogenously within OLG framework.
- No substantial financial market channels beyond the financial accelerator; assumes complete domestic ownership of firms.
- All net foreign asset positions are denominated in U.S. dollars in all countries.
- Model is annual frequency; some dynamics, particularly first-year investment detail, are lost.

### Downside scenario shocks and assumptions (Annex III.B)
- Scenario composed of three separate shocks occurring across regional blocks:
  1. Lower productivity:
     - Occurs in all regions outside Australia, with negative productivity spillovers to Australia.
     - Permanent reduction in tradables and nontradables productivity of 5 percent.
     - Phasing: -2 percentage points on productivity growth in years 1 and 2, and -1 percentage point on growth in year 3.
     - Australia experiences a shock 1/3 the size of the global shock due to spillovers.
  2. Lower housing wealth:
     - Occurs in the United States, the advanced economies (75 percent of the remaining countries block), and Australia.
     - 10 percent decline on impact in year 1 in nontradable sector net worth.
  3. Increased corporate risk premia:
     - Occurs in all regions, including Australia.
     - Five-year increase in corporate risk premia for both tradable- and nontradable-producing firms: 2 percentage points on impact in year 1; 1 percentage point thereafter.
- Fiscal handling in scenario:
  - Australian debt allowed to drift for first 40 years; debt-to-GDP stabilizes only after shocks play out.
  - Transfers move only in response to automatic stabilizers; transfers are not used to stabilize debt-to-GDP (default fiscal rule in ANZIMF).
  - Other regional blocks (China, United States, rest of Asia, remaining countries block) use the default fiscal rule.

### Effects of the downside scenario outside Australia (Annex IV)
- Scenario leads to substantial recession outside Australia:
  - Real GDP contracts up to 6.5 percent by the second year on average across economies, relative to baseline.
  - Investment declines roughly 12 to 14 percent lower by the end of year 2.
  - Commodity demand contracts, especially in China.
  - Inflation is between 0.3 percent and 0.8 percent lower globally by year 3.
  - Monetary policy offsets lower real interest rates between 0.7 and 1.1 percentage points by the third year.
- Scenario assumes only automatic stabilizers act as fiscal response because few countries have substantial fiscal space.

*Source: IMF staff calculations as presented in the supplied chapter content.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2019/1ausea2019009.pdf_
