## 1fraea2019001

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### Executive summary — institutional and policy changes
- National-level reforms and initiatives:
  - Established the High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF).
  - Enhanced monitoring of financial stability risks; prepared to manage the Brexit fall-out.
  - Introduced macroprudential measures and implemented financial reform measures included in Loi PACTE—Action Plan for Business Growth and Transformation.
  - Initiatives on digital finance, crypto-assets, green finance, and combating cyber risk.
- European-level developments:
  - Banking Union (BU); Capital Requirements Regulation/Capital Requirements Directive (CRR/CRD); Solvency II; efforts towards a Capital Markets Union (CMU).

### Financial system resilience and performance
- Improvements since 2012:
  - Capital positions and asset quality have improved.
  - Insurers’ solvency ratios stable and bolstered by Solvency II implementation.
  - Household savings and balance sheets relatively sound; house prices broadly aligned with fundamentals.
- Areas of concern:
  - Private nonfinancial sector and public debt continued to rise.
  - Consolidated corporate debt: 89 percent of GDP (netting out loans among nonfinancial corporates) though unconsolidated NFC debt rose to 141 percent of GDP at end-2017.
  - Household debt: 58 percent of GDP in 2017 (from 53 percent in 2010).
  - General government debt: almost 100 percent of GDP in 2018 (from 83 percent of GDP in 2009).
  - Bank credit growth: around 5 ½ percent in 2018 and in the first four months of 2019.
  - Total financial system assets: about 600 percent of GDP; combined assets of the four G-SIBs: EUR 6.3 trillion as of end-2017 (about 80 percent of total banking assets), or about 270 percent of France’s GDP.
  - Share of nonbank in total financial assets: 40 percent in 2017; investment funds assets: reached 60 percent of GDP at end-2018 (insurers 36 percent; households 18 percent of investor base).
  - Profitability subdued: aggregate insurer return on equity between 6 and 8 percent in recent years; banks’ ROE: 6.5 in 2018.

### Key vulnerabilities and transmission channels
- Banking sector:
  - Banks have adequate capital and liquidity buffers to withstand a sizable shock but profitability and margins remain under pressure.
  - Reliance on wholesale funding remains sizable; vulnerabilities to increases in wholesale funding costs and large outflows, including in U.S. dollars.
  - LCR and NSFR are adequate; LCR well above 100 percent but U.S. dollar LCR lower for some banks; maintaining NSFR in U.S. dollars appears challenging.
- Insurers:
  - Broadly resilient to market shocks; median SCR ratio drops by 38 percentage points to 166 percent in the adverse stress test but remains above the 100 percent regulatory threshold.
  - Vulnerabilities from concentrated exposures to parent banks (on-balance-sheet exposures can reach more than 50 percent of an insurer’s eligible capital).
- Corporates:
  - Tail of highly indebted corporates increases default risk; under adverse scenario debt-at-risk (ICR<2) would rise to above 11 percent of GDP (falling to 7.2 percent of GDP with use of cash buffers).
  - Bank large exposures to corporate debt-at-risk average 11 percent of CET1 capital at end-2017 among six banks; restricting to corporates with debt-to-equity > 100 percent, exposures average 6.5 percent of CET1 capital.
- Financial conglomerates and bancassurance:
  - FCs provide revenue diversification but are complex to manage and exposed to contagion and reputational risks; insurers and banks hold large common exposures through marketable securities.
  - Nonbanks (insurers and investment funds) play a growing role and deepen cross-border and non-EU exposures.

### FSAP stress-test results — bank solvency
- Adverse scenario design:
  - Targets 5 percent probability Growth-at-Risk severity over a three-year horizon: GDP falls 7.1 percent below baseline by 2021; inflation and asset prices undershoot baseline by 2.3 and 25 percentage points, respectively.
  - French sovereign risk premia increase by 150 basis points.
  - Corporates and sovereigns in low- and high-spread EA countries face decompressions of term premia by 120 and 240 basis points, respectively.
- CET1 outcomes:
  - No bank falls below the minimum 8 percent CET1 over the five-year horizon.
  - In the adverse dynamic scenario, total CET1 capital ratio declines by 270 basis points.
  - In the adverse static scenario, CET1 falls by 430 basis points; adverse static with funding cost loop: 540 basis points.
  - Aggregate leverage ratio falls by 100 basis points under the adverse scenario.
- Drivers:
  - Increase in loss provisions against credit risk is the main driver of capital depletion.
- Policy implications:
  - Increase share of stable longer-term funding; include intragroup activity risks in testing; consider buffers in major currencies.

### FSAP liquidity stress findings
- Liquidity buffers:
  - Central bank reserves up to 10 percent of assets reported for some banks; high counterbalancing capacity with low concentration.
  - Liquidity buffers adequate to absorb shocks over five-day and one-month horizons in EUR; vulnerabilities remain for significant wholesale funding withdrawals especially in U.S. dollars.
  - Liquidity gap in U.S. dollars appears manageable (only up to 1 percent of total assets) but could cause contagion in case of U.S. dollar market stress.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Consider liquidity buffers to cover at least 50 percent of wholesale funding outflows over a horizon of up to five working days for all major currencies.
  - Monitor and possibly limit banks’ use of collateral swaps to improve U.S. dollar HQLA.

### FSAP insurance solvency stress tests
- Scope and approach:
  - Top-down Solvency II-based tests covering nine insurance groups (70 percent life and 40 percent nonlife gross written premiums domestically).
  - Scenarios aligned with banking adverse shocks; single-factor shocks simulate default of parent bank.
- Results:
  - Median SCR ratio drops 38 percentage points to 166 percent; three quarters of participants remain above 160 percent.
  - Median assets over liabilities decline from 108 to 107 percent from baseline to adverse scenario.
  - Steepening yield curve benefits insurers (liability valuations decline more than asset valuations).
- Vulnerabilities and recommendations:
  - Monitor insurer exposures to parent banks and consider concentration limits relative to eligible capital.
  - Enhance macro stress tests, enforce high-quality supervisory reporting, and use results to challenge companies’ ORSA.

### Corporate and household-sector risks
- Nonfinancial corporates:
  - NFC unconsolidated debt rose from 110 percent of GDP in 2010 to 141 percent of GDP at end-2017; consolidated corporate debt-to-GDP 89 percent.
  - Bond issuances and loans among NFCs account for bulk of the increase; cash holdings increased at macro level.
  - Debt-at-risk dynamics: under stress debt-at-risk (ICR<2) rises to above 11 percent of GDP; with cash buffers falls to 7.2 percent of GDP.
- Households and housing market:
  - Household financial savings rate net of debt increase: about 4.5 percent of disposable income.
  - Price-to-income ratio of residential real estate stable; house prices broadly aligned with fundamentals though Paris and a few cities show inflation.
  - Younger and lower-income households show increased DSTI and leverage; proportion of households with LTV > 90 percent increased among middle income groups and in bottom half of income distribution.
  - House price Growth-at-Risk (one year ahead, 5th percentile) shows tail risks have declined recently but adverse macrofinancial shocks could increase severity.

### Contagion, cross-border exposures, and systemic footprint
- Cross-border scale:
  - Banking cross-border claims and liabilities around 135 percent of GDP.
  - Foreign investors hold 50–55 percent of debt securities issued by the sovereign, banks, and NFCs.
  - Insurers: one-third of assets held abroad; insurers hold the largest exposures to the French government and domestic NFCs.
- Evolution 2011–2017 marketable securities cross-border exposures:
  - Banks: cross-border positions decreased by 39 percent (increased domestic holdings).
  - Insurers: cross-border exposures increased by 25 percent to €1.15 trillion.
  - Investment funds: cross-border exposures increased by 47 percent to €784 billion.
- Spillovers:
  - Outward spillovers from France greatest within the EA: Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Italy; outside EA: United Kingdom susceptible.
  - France susceptible primarily to shocks from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.
  - Inward spillover risks to France have declined since last FSAP, notably with respect to the United States.

### Financial sector oversight, governance, and macroprudential framework
- Governance and independence:
  - Reform of governance arrangements needed to align with international standards for internationally active firms; government should not be present on decision-making supervisory committees of AMF or ACPR.
  - ACPR functions of resolution and supervision need coordination but critical decision-making should remain independent; avoid supervisory vetoes that could imply forbearance.
  - ACPR and AMF should have autonomy to determine resource levels; address legislative ceilings on headcount and remuneration constraints.
- Macroprudential toolkit and HCSF role:
  - HCSF has broad hard and soft powers and an explicit mandate; BdF and ACPR produce semi-annual risk assessments.
  - Evaluate effectiveness of macroprudential measures, intensify monitoring, and stand ready to act.
  - Consider engagement with ECB on use of Pillar II measures for bank-specific residual risks from corporate concentration; consider sectoral SRB if risks intensify.
  - Develop analytical framework for borrower-based measures for corporates and expand macroprudential toolkit for nonbanks.
  - Fiscal measures to weaken debt bias recommended (see policy recommendations below).
- Financial conglomerate oversight:
  - Financial Conglomerates Directive’s aggregation approach is positive but insufficient; lacks powers to impose conglomerate-level prudential requirements.
  - Reporting on intragroup transactions and risk concentration is infrequent; stress testing and liquidity assessment at conglomerate level lacking.
  - Recommend quarterly or more regular reporting of intragroup flows and stocks; develop guidance and common reporting templates; consider concentration thresholds for direct and common exposures.

### Crisis management, resolution, and safety nets
- Resolution and safety nets:
  - ACPR acts as Resolution Authority for banks, insurers, and investment firms; FGDR plays critical role in deposit insurance and resolution fund.
  - FGDR’s Supervisory Board composed of 12 active financial sector executives; recommendation to change eligibility to independent members only.
  - Insurance resolution framework (Sapin II and Ordinance 1608) provides new tools but does not include bail-in and needs additional powers, safeguards, and privately financed resolution funding.
  - RRP for insurers at an early stage; recovery plans improving but operationalization needs further development.
- ELA and FX:
  - BdF ELA scheme well aligned with euro system framework but should explore mechanisms for ELA in currencies other than euros and clarify ELA collateral readiness.
  - Consider modalities for contingent arrangements (public guarantee under strict safeguards) admissible under state aid rules.

### FSAP key policy priorities (summary)
- Continue pre-emptive management of systemic risks:
  - Evaluate effectiveness of macroprudential measures; intensify monitoring; engage with ECB and EU agencies on Pillar II and sectoral SRB; expand toolkit for corporates and nonbanks; incentivize equity financing via fiscal measures.
- Ensure adequate liquidity management and buffers:
  - Consider imposing additional liquidity buffers in all major currencies; monitor collateral swaps and U.S. dollar liquidity positions.
- Further integrate conglomerate-level monitoring and oversight:
  - Strengthen systemic risk monitoring, reporting, and cross-sectoral oversight; common guidance and stress testing at conglomerate level.
- Enhance governance, financial sector policies, and financial integrity:
  - Strengthen operational independence and resource autonomy of ACPR and AMF; implement Loi PACTE reforms; review regulated savings framework; enhance AML/CFT supervision, especially of smaller banks rated high-risk.
- Reinforce crisis management, safety nets, and resolution arrangements:
  - Continue implementing BRRD instruments; strengthen insurer resolution framework (including powers to mandate bail-in and privately financed resolution funding); improve RRP for nonbanks.

### 2019 selected FSAP recommendations and timing (I= immediate (within one year), NT= near term (1–3 years), MT= medium term (3–5 years))
- Preemptive Management of Systemic Vulnerabilities:
  - Engage with ECB and other EU agencies on use of Pillar II measures to address bank-specific residual risk from concentration of exposures to large indebted corporates. Agency: ACPR. Timing: I
  - Develop analytical framework for borrower-based measures for corporates. Consider a sectoral Systemic Risk Buffer (SRB) if risks intensify. Agency: HCSF. Timing: NT
  - Evaluate options to further incentivize corporates to finance through equity rather than debt. Agency: MoF. Timing: NT
- Ensuring Adequate Liquidity Management and Buffers:
  - Develop with the ECB options to manage any disruptions in wholesale funding markets. Consider, as appropriate, liquidity buffers to cover at least 50 percent of wholesale funding outflows over/up to five days horizon for all major currencies. Agencies: ACPR, ECB. Timing: NT
  - Actively engage with the ESRB and others for a speedy development of liquidity and leverage related tools for insurers and investment funds. Agencies: BdF, HCSF, ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
- Further Integration of Financial Conglomerate Oversight:
  - Report intragroup exposures and transactions within conglomerates on a flow and stock basis at quarterly or regular frequency. Develop guidance to address direct and indirect, and common exposures of entities in the conglomerate. Agencies: ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
  - Develop with the ECB and other EU agencies liquidity risk management requirements and stress testing at the conglomerate level. Agencies: ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
  - Strengthen conglomerate oversight and work with the Joint Committee of the ESAs to finalize common reporting templates, and with the ECB on common supervisory guidance for conglomerates. Agencies: ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
- Enhancing Governance, Financial Policies and Financial Integrity:
  - The ACPR and AMF should have autonomy to determine their resource levels based on a forward-looking review of supervisory and monitoring needs. Agencies: ACPR, AMF, MoF. Timing: I
  - To avoid perception of conflict of interest and facilitate operational independence, the government should recuse itself from all supervisory decision-making committees at the ACPR and the AMF. Agency: MoF. Timing: I
  - Reduce further the spread between market interest rates and the return on regulated savings products. Ensure timely and effective implementation of CDC governance reform under the Loi PACTE and undertake a full review of regulated savings framework at the appropriate time. Agency: MoF. Timing: NT
  - Enhance AML/CFT supervision of smaller banks rated as high-risk. Agencies: ACPR, Tracfin. Timing: I
- Reinforcing Crisis Management, Safety Nets, Resolution Arrangement:
  - Work toward an enhanced resolution framework for insurers by including wider powers to restructure liabilities (bail-in), and enhanced safeguards and funding. Agency: ACPR. Timing: MT
  - The eligibility of the FGDR’s Supervisory Board membership, which is formed by bank executives in activity, should be changed to independent members only. Agency: FGDR. Timing: MT
  - Develop modalities for providing ELA in currencies other than euros and establish general rules that may assist banks in identifying assets, which might be proposed as ELA collateral and buttress their operational readiness to pledge them. Agencies: BdF, ACPR. Timing: MT

### Box 1 — Gap analysis of default risk and capital (key messages)
- Model outcomes and historical pattern:
  - Positive risk gaps (elevated risks) observed in 2002, 2008, 2012, and present.
- Comparative vulnerability:
  - Corporate balance sheets are more vulnerable than banks when applying 2008 GFC shocks; corporate default risk high relative to potential and aggregate corporate capital low relative to potential.
- Solvency stress test key result:
  - Aggregated CET1 capital ratio rises slightly under baseline and fell by around 400 bps over five years under the adverse scenario; adverse scenario has larger impact on internationally active banks.

### Selected macroeconomic and financial indicators (highlights from Table 4 and Table 5)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2017 2.2; 2018 1.5; 2019 1.3; 2020 1.4.
- Nominal GDP (billions of euros): 2018 2,349; 2019 2,415; 2024 2,837.
- CPI (year average): 2018 2.1; 2019 1.3.
- General government gross debt (percent of GDP): 2018 98.6; 2019 99.2; 2024 96.2.
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2018 9.1; 2019 8.8; 2024 7.4.
- Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (deposit-takers): 2018 18.7.
- ROA (parent-company basis): 2018 0.4; ROE (parent-company basis): 2018 6.5.
- Nonperforming loans to total gross loans: 2018 2.8.
- Liquid assets to total assets: 2018 13.7.
- Notes: Table figures are presented as in the source and projections are staff projections.

_Italic: Source: IMF Financial System Stability Assessment — France, Executive Summary._

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 8

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Key institutional and policy changes since 2012
- At the national level:
  - Established the High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF).
  - Enhanced monitoring of financial stability risks.
  - Prepared to manage the Brexit fall-out.
  - Introduced macroprudential measures.
  - Implemented financial reform measures included in Loi PACTE—Action Plan for Business Growth and Transformation.
  - Initiatives on digital finance, crypto-assets, green finance, and combating cyber risk.
- At the European level:
  - Banking Union (BU).
  - Capital Requirements Regulation/Capital Requirements Directive (CRR/CRD).
  - Solvency II.
  - Efforts towards a Capital Markets Union (CMU).

### Financial system resilience and performance
- Improvements since 2012:
  - Capital positions and asset quality have improved.
  - Banking business is better placed to handle cross-border contagion, including from exposures to high-yield EA economies.
  - Insurers’ solvency ratios have been stable and bolstered by effective implementation of Solvency II.
  - Household savings and balance sheets are relatively sound.
  - House prices presently appear broadly aligned with fundamentals.
- Areas of concern:
  - Private nonfinancial sector and public debt has continued to rise.
  - Consolidated corporate debt is, on average, not higher than in many peer countries, but there is some concentration of vulnerable corporate debt.
  - Bank credit to nonfinancial firms and households has expanded relatively fast.
  - Profitability is subdued; margins remain under pressure due to the interest rate environment, lower revenue from market-related business, and stronger market competition.
  - Reliance of banks on wholesale funding is better managed but still sizable.
  - Nonbanks—insurers and investment funds—are playing a larger role given the growing cross-border and non-EU exposures.
  - The incomplete BU and slow progress towards CMU create uncertainty and constrain faster shifts in business models.

### Key vulnerabilities and transmission channels
- Banking and insurance business lines, and the corporate sector, carry important financial vulnerabilities requiring close attention.
- Banks:
  - Adequate capital and liquidity buffers to withstand a sizable shock.
  - An increase in wholesale funding costs could pose further risks to profitability and solvency.
  - Liquidity challenges from large outflows of wholesale funding, including in U.S. dollars, and from any acceleration of fragmentation of international liquidity.
- Insurers:
  - Broadly resilient against market shocks.
  - Vulnerabilities from concentrated exposures, mostly to their parent banks.
- Corporates:
  - Risks from a tail of highly indebted corporates appear manageable, though stress tests show some banks’ large exposures to highly indebted corporates may increase notably under stress.
- Financial conglomerates (FC) and bancassurance model:
  - FCs provide revenue diversification and have imparted stability.
  - Model is complex to manage and exposed to contagion and reputational risks.
  - Banks and insurers hold large common exposures through marketable securities, creating susceptibility to similar market shocks.
  - Insurers’ concentrated exposures to their parent banks indicate vulnerabilities to unexpected large funding withdrawals affecting all business lines within the FC.
  - Insurers and investment funds are beginning to play a larger role in supporting group performance via risk transfer arrangements and conglomerate-level prudential optimization.

### FSAP key policy priorities
- Continue pre-emptive management of systemic risks:
  - Authorities have proactively used macroprudential measures to address buildup of systemic risk including private nonfinancial sector debt.
  - Recommended actions: evaluate effectiveness of measures, intensify monitoring, stand ready to act; engage with the ECB and other EU agencies on possible use of bank-specific Pillar II measures to address bank-specific residual risks from concentration of exposures to large indebted corporates; consider use of a sectoral systemic risk buffer (SRB); expand macroprudential toolkit for corporates and nonbanks; further incentivize financing through equity fiscal measures.
  - Note: Some actions will require interagency consultations.
- Ensure adequate liquidity management and buffers:
  - While aggregate bank liquidity buffers appear adequate, supervisors are encouraged to consider imposing additional liquidity buffers in all major currencies to minimize risks related to potential disruptions in wholesale funding in case of severe shocks.
- Further integrate conglomerate-level monitoring and oversight:
  - Stronger systemic risk monitoring and cross-sectoral oversight practices of liquidity and solvency conditions are crucial.
  - Enhanced supervisory coordination to monitor and limit risks from direct and indirect exposures between entities within the FC.
  - Common guidance, reporting, integrated liquidity risk management requirements, and stress testing at the conglomerate level are recommended.
- Enhance governance, financial sector policies, and financial integrity:
  - Governance and operational independence reforms are required to ensure oversight authorities are properly positioned and resourced.
  - Aggressively pursue implementation of financial sector reforms envisaged in Loi PACTE.
  - Review the Regulated Savings framework.
  - Enhance AML/CFT framework.
- Reinforce crisis management, safety nets, and resolution arrangements:
  - Continue implementing crisis management instruments under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
  - Recovery and resolution planning for nonbanks needs attention.
  - Insurer resolution framework strengthened, but assessment against the FSB’s Key Attributes suggests further enhancements are needed, such as powers to mandate bail-in of liabilities and privately financed resolution funding.

### 2019 Key FSAP recommendations (selected items and timing)
- Preemptive Management of Systemic Vulnerabilities
  - Engage with ECB and other EU agencies on use of Pillar II measures to address bank-specific residual risk from concentration of exposures to large indebted corporates. Agency: ACPR. Timing: I
  - Develop analytical framework for borrower-based measures for corporates. Consider a sectoral Systemic Risk Buffer (SRB) if risks intensify. Agency: HCSF. Timing: NT
  - Evaluate options to further incentivize corporates to finance through equity rather than debt. Agency: MoF. Timing: NT
- Ensuring Adequate Liquidity Management and Buffers
  - Develop with the ECB options to manage any disruptions in wholesale funding markets. Consider, as appropriate, liquidity buffers to cover at least 50 percent of wholesale funding outflows over/up to five days horizon for all major currencies. Agencies: ACPR, ECB. Timing: NT
  - Actively engage with the ESRB and others for a speedy development of liquidity and leverage related tools for insurers and investment funds. Agencies: BdF, HCSF, ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
- Further Integration of Financial Conglomerate Oversight
  - Report intragroup exposures and transactions within conglomerates on a flow and stock basis at quarterly or regular frequency. Develop guidance to address direct and indirect, and common exposures of entities in the conglomerate. Agencies: ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
  - Develop with the ECB and other EU agencies liquidity risk management requirements and stress testing at the conglomerate level. Agencies: ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
  - Strengthen conglomerate oversight and work with the Joint Committee of the ESAs to finalize common reporting templates, and with the ECB on common supervisory guidance for conglomerates. Agencies: ACPR, AMF. Timing: NT
- Enhancing Governance, Financial Policies and Financial Integrity
  - The ACPR and AMF should have autonomy to determine their resource levels based on a forward-looking review of supervisory and monitoring needs. Agencies: ACPR, AMF, MoF. Timing: I
  - To avoid any perception of a potential conflict of interest and facilitate operationally independent functioning, the government should recuse itself from all supervisory decision-making committees at the ACPR and the AMF. Agency: MoF. Timing: I
  - Reduce further the spread between market interest rates and the return on regulated savings products. Ensure timely and effective implementation of CDC governance reform under the Loi PACTE and undertake a full review of regulated savings framework at the appropriate time. Agency: MoF. Timing: NT
  - Enhance AML/CFT supervision of smaller banks rated as high-risk. Agencies: ACPR, Tracfin. Timing: I
- Reinforcing Crisis Management, Safety Nets, Resolution Arrangement
  - Work toward an enhanced resolution framework for insurers by including wider powers to restructure liabilities (bail-in), and enhanced safeguards and funding. Agency: ACPR. Timing: MT
  - The eligibility of the FGDR’s Supervisory Board membership, which is formed by bank executives in activity, should be changed to independent members only. Agency: FGDR. Timing: MT
  - Develop modalities for providing ELA in currencies other than euros and establish general rules that may assist banks in identifying assets, which might be proposed as ELA collateral and buttress their operational readiness to pledge them. Agencies: BdF, ACPR. Timing: MT

*Timing legend: I= immediate (within one year), NT= near term (1–3 years), MT= medium term (3–5 years).*

*Source: IMF Financial System Stability Assessment — France, Executive Summary.*

### 1.      Growth declined in 2018 but remained

### 1fraea2019001 - 1.      Growth declined in 2018 but remained

### Growth and outlook
- Real GDP growth:
  - peaked at 2.3 percent in 2017.
  - slowed to 1.7 percent in 2018.
  - expected to reach 1.3 percent in 2019.
- Growth drivers:
  - primarily supported by private consumption and investment.
- Labor market:
  - unemployment has started to decline.

### Financial conditions and credit
- Monetary and credit environment:
  - Financial conditions have remained accommodative.
  - Bank credit growth: around 5 ½ percent in 2018 and in the first four months of 2019.
  - Credit-to-GDP gap: estimated at 2.7 percent at end-2018 (slightly below the 3.2 percent level in 2017).
- Financial cycle observations:
  - Low borrowing costs supported an acceleration of the financial cycle, evidenced by a pickup in bank credit, leverage, financial asset prices, and real estate.
  - Fierce price competition among banks compressed margins, especially on housing loans.
  - Large cash reserves at the ECB deposit facility have earned negative returns.
- Methodological note:
  - The credit-to-GDP gap is constructed as the deviation from a moving average of the credit-to-GDP ratio over previous eight quarters.

### Leverage and balance-sheet vulnerabilities
- Private and public leverage compared to the EA:
  - Nonfinancial corporate (unconsolidated) debt: increased from 110 percent of GDP in 2010 to 141 percent of GDP at end-2017.
  - Consolidated corporate debt-to-GDP (netting out loans among nonfinancial corporates): 89 percent of GDP.
  - Household debt: rose from 53 percent of GDP in 2010 to 58 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - General government debt: rose to almost 100 percent of GDP in 2018 from 83 percent of GDP in 2009.
- Implication:
  - High private and public leverage leaves balance sheets with reduced space to accommodate shocks.
- Note on data:
  - Figures are based on national account data, which may not yet incorporate the reclassification on the French National Railways (SNCF) into the general government for the years 2016 and 2017.

### Financial conglomerate structure and exposures
- Systemic institutions and scale:
  - Four global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and one large global asset manager within the FCs.
  - One global systemically important insurer and a large global reinsurer present.
  - Total financial system assets: about 600 percent of GDP.
  - Combined assets of the four G-SIBs: EUR 6.3 trillion as of end-2017 (about 80 percent of total banking assets), or about 270 percent of France’s GDP.
  - FCs active in about 80 countries with important exposures to Belgium, Germany, Italy, United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and several emerging markets.
- Nonbank share and sector scale:
  - Share of nonbank in total financial assets: 40 percent in 2017.
  - Insurance sector: one of the largest in the EU with more than 700 firms.
  - Investment funds assets: reached 60 percent of GDP at end-2018.
  - Investor base of investment funds: insurers (36 percent) and households (18 percent).
  - About half of funds are invested domestically and the rest in the EA, and globally.
- Business models:
  - FCs combine banking, insurance, and asset management through partnerships and subsidiaries.
  - Two G-SIBs have large foreign operations (almost 80 percent of their assets) and important investment banking activities; two others are more retail-oriented and domestically focused.
  - Bancassurance model integrates products, client services, liquidity management, and income flows across sectors.
- Evolution and adaptation:
  - Two of the four G-SIBs have closed or announced closing proprietary trading subsidiaries.
  - Several banks announced reorganizations of retail networks.
  - Fintechs and nonbanks are impacting domestic retail financial services; financial groups are developing green finance products.
  - Banks and insurers are proactively adopting climate risk management practices.
- State role in savings intermediation:
  - “Regulated savings” amounting to some 11 percent of GDP at end-2017 are centralized at and managed by the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC).
  - Regulated savings are popular due to favorable tax treatment, government guarantees, and fixed returns.
  - This particularity may impact the funding profile of banks, the prudential treatment of such savings, and profitability.
  - The Livret A rate is set periodically by the Minister of Finance based on a formula and could act as a reference for some other products, such as the annual return on life insurance.

### Financial sector performance and profitability
- Banks:
  - Capital and asset quality have improved, but profitability remains challenged.
  - Interest margins improved since the GFC but are still among the lowest in the EA.
  - Lending spreads in the domestic market are especially low due to low interest rates, fixed rate mortgages, and low margins on corporate lending.
  - Retail funding cost is higher for French banks, likely due to regulated savings schemes and competition.
  - High reliance on wholesale funding could leave banks vulnerable to changing market conditions, especially in the short-term market.
  - Operational margins are squeezed by low cost-efficiency.
  - Suggested measures noted: more flexible labor market and further consolidation in branch networks could reduce cost rigidities.
- Earnings outlook:
  - Continued weakness in profitability is expected.
  - Banks have tried to increase business volumes and fee-generating activities, expanded mortgage market shares, and increased distribution of insurance and asset management products.
  - Impediments: time needed for transformation to impact profitability, need to improve IT infrastructure, competition from fintech and nonbanks.
  - Incomplete BU and slow progress towards CMU constrain opportunities for risk taking and balance sheet growth in the EA.
- Insurers:
  - Solvency ratios stable since Solvency II introduction.
  - Aggregate return on equity: between 6 and 8 percent in recent years.
  - Most French insurers can meet the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) ratio without transitional measures.
  - Life insurers have expanded into unit-linked business to reduce capital requirements.
  - Nonlife combined ratio: below 100 percent in the last five years (underwriting profit).
  - Investment holdings: high share in fixed-income securities.
    - Half of sovereign bond exposures are domestic.
    - 70 percent of corporate bonds are rated A or better.
  - Stress-test notes: figures based on stress test participants only; excluding unit-linked and index-linked insurance.

### Nonfinancial firms and households balance sheets
- Nonfinancial corporations (NFCs):
  - NFC debt has risen as a percent of GDP; bond issuances and loans among NFCs account for bulk of increase.
  - Bank credit has also grown across sectors and firm sizes but at a slower pace.
  - Cash holdings increased at the macro level; low interest rates contain debt service ratios.
  - At the consolidated level, firm-level debt ratios and interest coverage ratios (ICRs) broadly in line with peers, though a tail of weak firms exists.
  - Recent debt increase concentrated in several sectors; cash buffers have not increased commensurately among firms with weak debt-servicing capacity.
- Households:
  - Household debt has risen since the GFC but is not high in international comparisons.
  - Aggregate household balance sheets appear strong: financial assets have accumulated faster than debt, including investments in life insurance and saving accounts.
  - Households’ financial savings rate net of the increase in debt: about 4.5 percent of disposable income.
  - Note: some household segments may be developing vulnerabilities and should be monitored closely.
- Housing market:
  - House prices appear broadly aligned with fundamentals.
  - Recent price inflation reflects developments in specific markets, including Paris and a few other cities.
  - Price-to-income ratio of residential real estate has been stable.
  - Many households have renegotiated housing loans at low fixed interest rates and are protected from future rises in market interest rates.

### Interconnectedness and cross-border exposures
- Cross-border scale and interlinkages:
  - Banking business is global with a third of claims and liabilities (around 135 percent of GDP) being cross-border.
  - Insurance liabilities are mostly with households and one-third of their assets are held abroad.
  - Foreign investors hold 50-55 percent of debt securities issued by the sovereign, banks, and NFCs.
  - NFCs have large intra-sectoral linkages and are strongly interconnected with the financial sector and the rest of the world via equity claims, loans, and debt securities.
  - Insurers have the largest exposures to the French government and to domestic NFCs.
  - Banks’ holdings of French government bonds dominate, but exposures to nonbanks have been increasing.
  - Higher holdings of NFC marketable securities by insurers and funds account for bulk of increase in marketable securities of NFCs since 2011.
- Evolution of marketable securities cross-border exposures (2011–2017):
  - Banks: cross-border positions decreased by 39 percent; increased domestic holdings.
  - Insurers: cross-border exposures increased by 25 percent to €1.15 trillion.
  - Investment funds: cross-border exposures increased by 47 percent to €784 billion.
  - Common cross-border exposures (similarity in portfolio compositions) are relatively high.

### Systemic risk analysis — key vulnerabilities
- The FSAP risk analysis considered vulnerabilities including:
  - (i) continued pressures on bank earnings and dependence on wholesale funding in major currencies for some international activities;
  - (ii) high leverage and low debt-servicing capacity among a tail of the nonfinancial corporations despite low interest rates;
  - (iii) significant exposures to EA countries with high debt levels.
- The FSAP examined the resilience of banks, insurers, and corporates from a systemic risk perspective.

*Source: IMF staff, FRANCE — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 18.      The key risks considered are (Table 6):

### 18. The key risks considered

### Key risks
- An abrupt tightening of financial conditions and distress in U.S. dollar funding market arising from shifts in market expectation of tighter U.S. monetary policy.
- A sustained rise in risk premia for banks and sovereigns from a disorderly Brexit and/or from concerns about debt levels in some EA countries.
- A weaker than expected European economic growth from global protectionism and retreat from multilateralism, adverse market reactions to debt burdens and Brexit, and weakening of reform implementation in France.

### Cross-border common exposures
- Figure 9: common exposure measures portfolio overlap (function of the distance between vectors; non-linear function of correlation). High common exposure indicates significant portfolio overlap and susceptibility to similar shocks.

---

### Bank Solvency

- Adverse stress scenario design:
  - Combines lower growth and tighter financial conditions while ECB monetary policy remains accommodative and policy rates constant.
  - Targets the severity benchmark under the 5 percent probability predicted by the Growth-at-Risk (GaR) model over a three-year horizon.
  - GDP falls 7.1 percent below baseline by 2021 before gradually rebounding.
  - Inflation and asset prices undershoot the baseline by 2.3 and 25 percentage points, respectively.
  - French sovereign risk premia increase by 150 basis points.
  - Corporates and sovereigns in the low- and high-spread EA countries face higher risk premia via decompression of term premia by 120 and 240 basis points, respectively.
- Scenario reporting variants:
  - (i) baseline;
  - (ii) adverse dynamic (banks can increase fees and commission income, deleverage portfolios, and write off loans);
  - (iii) adverse static;
  - (iv) adverse static with funding cost loop projections.

- Capital buffers and exposures:
  - Capital buffers include Pillar 2 Requirement (P2R) and Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) imposed by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
  - Banks primarily exposed to losses from corporate lending and rises in wholesale funding costs linked to higher risk premia.
  - Credit risks from housing loans contained due to: (i) relatively strong aggregate households’ balance sheets; (ii) no evidence of significant misalignment in house prices; (iii) strong social safety nets; (iv) fixed rate housing loans; (v) interest rate risks on these exposures being hedged.
  - Shocks to wholesale funding costs have higher impact on banks with higher wholesale dependence and lower earnings.

- Stress test outcomes and magnitudes:
  - No bank would face a capital ratio below the minimum 8 percent of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) over the five-year horizon.
  - In the adverse dynamic scenario, total CET1 capital ratio declines by 270 basis points.
  - In the adverse static scenario and adverse static with funding cost loop tests, CET1 capital ratio would fall by 430 basis points and 540 basis points, respectively.
  - Shocks to real estate prices, valuation of Level 3 assets, or LGDs on mortgage portfolios do not, individually, lead to an additional significant fall in CET1 capital.
  - In the baseline, system-wide CET1 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) declines very modestly over the three-year horizon.

- Policy implication:
  - Some banks would benefit from increasing the share of stable longer-term funding to reduce reliance on short-term wholesale funding and increase resilience to funding risks.
  - Testing should include risks from intragroup activities (e.g., insurance, asset management), considering dynamic income and balance sheet adjustments.
  - Note: dynamic stress test shows lower CET1 depletion relative to EBA tests due to loans transitioning back to performing status and counter-cyclical increases in non-interest income.

---

### Liquidity Stress

- Liquidity environment:
  - ECB accommodative monetary policy and collateral framework provide abundant liquidity.
  - Liquidity buffers in EUR are high, including central bank reserves up to 10 percent of assets.
  - Counterbalancing capacity is well diversified across instruments with strong credit ratings.

- Structural ratios and FX considerations:
  - Overall LCR and NSFR are adequate for all banks.
  - LCR is well above 100 percent, although LCR in U.S. dollars is lower for some banks with volatile flows.
  - Maintaining the NSFR in U.S. dollars appears challenging.
  - Some banks use collateral swaps to improve U.S. dollar liquidity positions.

- Cash flow and short-run vulnerabilities:
  - Liquidity buffers adequate to absorb shocks over five-day and one-month horizons.
  - Significant withdrawals of wholesale funding from institutions and corporates pose vulnerabilities in the short run, including in U.S. dollars.
  - Liquidity gap in U.S. dollars appears manageable (only up to 1 percent of total assets) but could result in contagion risks in case of stress in the U.S. dollar market.
  - U.S. dollar liquidity/collateral transfer across jurisdictions could become an issue in times of stress.

- Policy recommendations:
  - Authorities encouraged to consider policies to minimize impact of disruptions in wholesale funding markets including in U.S. dollars.
  - Consider requirements to hold buffers to cover at least 50 percent of outflows over a horizon of up to five working days from wholesale funding providers in all relevant currencies.
  - Link requirements with monitoring of banks’ use of collateral swaps to improve their liquidity ratios.

---

### Insurance Solvency

- Scope and approach:
  - Top-down stress tests built on EU Solvency II framework covering nine insurance groups on a consolidated basis (accounting for 70 and 40 percent in the domestic life and nonlife gross written premiums respectively).
  - Scenarios aligned with banking stress test shocks with greater focus on market risks and concentrated exposures to domestic banks.
  - Complementary single factor shocks simulate default of parent bank to assess spillovers.

- Results:
  - Median SCR ratio drops 38 percentage points to 166 percent because of higher bond credit spreads; SCR ratio at all firms remains above the 100 percent regulatory threshold.
  - Steepening yield curve benefits insurers as decline in liability valuations exceeds valuation effect on assets.
  - Impact more pronounced for insurers with larger life business and savings products.
  - French life insurers have relatively high capacity to pass on losses to policyholders due to a relatively low proportion of guaranteed rates.

- Vulnerabilities and interlinkages:
  - Insurers less vulnerable to a low-for-long scenario than to higher interest rates combined with mass lapse events.
  - Insurers in conglomerates often hold very large exposures toward their parent bank; on-balance-sheet exposures toward the parent bank can reach more than 50 percent of the insurer’s eligible capital.
  - Deposit concentration with parent banks can be substantial for some insurers.
  - Additional interlinkages via derivatives or securities financing transactions.

- Policy recommendations:
  - Authorities encouraged to further monitor insurers’ exposures toward parent banks based on eligible capital and consider possible concentration limits.
  - Enhance macro stress tests of insurers and enforce high-quality supervisory reporting.
  - Use stress test results to challenge companies’ Own Risk and Solvency Assessments (ORSA) and underlying projections for premium growth and investment returns.

---

### Corporate and Households Risks

- Corporate stress tests and debt-at-risk:
  - Stress scenarios include tightening of financial conditions and lower real GDP growth consistent with the 5 percent probability GaR-derived bank solvency stress test.
  - Under this scenario, amount of debt-at-risk (ICR<2) would rise to above 11 percent of GDP.
  - With use of cash buffers, debt-at-risk (ICR<2) would fall to 7.2 percent of GDP.
  - Table 3 and Figure 10 summarize stress scenario outcomes by firm size and use of cash buffers.

- Bank large exposures to corporates:
  - Total banks’ large exposures to corporate debt-at-risk (ICR<2) average 11 percent of CET1 capital at end-2017 among six banks.
  - Restricting to corporates with debt-to-equity ratio above 100 percent, total large exposures average 6.5 percent of CET1 capital.
  - Under cross-country stress test scenario, total large banks’ exposures to corporate debt-at-risk would rise to about 15 percent of CET1 capital.
  - All current exposures to individual corporates with debt-at-risk are below the large exposure limit of 5 percent, though some would rise closer to the limit under stress.

- Households:
  - Aggregate household balance sheet vulnerabilities contained, but some households vulnerable:
    - Lower income and younger households with housing loans have experienced deterioration in balance sheets; debt service has increased as a share of income while financial buffers have declined.
    - Younger households appear to have increased leverage.
  - Residential house prices aligned with fundamentals; risks currently low at national level though some markets (e.g., Paris) show inflation.
  - Price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios above long-term averages but deviations not high compared to peers and have improved in recent years.
  - House price Growth-at-Risk (one year ahead, 5th percentile) shows left tail of distribution has shifted up in recent years; near-term tail risks in residential market have declined but adverse macrofinancial shocks could significantly increase severity of adverse house price shocks.

- Policy implication:
  - Joint macrofinancial feedback analysis points to need to strengthen corporate balance sheets.

---

### Contagion Risks

- Interconnectedness:
  - French banking system remains among the most interconnected in the world but more diversified since last FSAP.
  - French banks reduced and diversified cross-border exposures in marketable securities and increased presence in relatively smaller banking systems.

- Spillovers:
  - Outward spillovers from France have greatest impact within the EA (Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Italy); outside the EA, the United Kingdom is susceptible.
  - France is susceptible primarily to shocks from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.
  - Within the EA, Germany is primary source of inward spillovers.

- Trends:
  - Inward spillover risks to France have declined since last FSAP, notably with respect to the United States (declined since 2012 Q4), translating into an overall lower vulnerability index.

- Data and monitoring limitations:
  - Exposures in marketable securities between banks and insurers are not readily accessible; missing exposures in instruments other than marketable securities across financial entities.
  - Partial data completeness may understate interconnectedness and contagion.
  - Authorities are making efforts to monitor broader coverage of exposures and better understand cross-sector and intragroup holdings.

---

### Financial Sector Oversight — Cross-cutting Issues

- Oversight quality:
  - Oversight practices maintain high standards and adaptability; critical given presence of many G-SIBs, insurers, and large asset managers.
  - Advent of SSM and European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) increased demands on ACPR and AMF, bringing operational challenges and strengthened macroprudential oversight.

- Institutional capacity recommendations:
  - ACPR and AMF should have autonomy to determine their own resource levels based on forward-looking review of current and projected demands.
  - Current constraints: lack of budgetary autonomy; legislative ceilings on headcount; governance of fees levied and retained; ACPR constrained by BdF salary scales.
  - Recommendations: allow ACPR and AMF to offer more market-based salaries to protect skill sets, and allow AMF to retain excess fees — consistent with practices in jurisdictions with large internationally active financial groups, G-SIBs, asset managers, and insurers.

*Source: 1fraea2019001 - 18. The key risks considered are (Table 6), IMF staff report content provided above.*

### 42.      In line with international standards consistent with financial systems with

### 1fraea2019001 - 42. In line with international standards consistent with financial systems with

### Governance arrangements and supervisory independence
- Reform of governance arrangements is needed to align with international standards for financial systems with internationally active financial firms; this would strengthen oversight and eliminate any perception of conflict of interest.
- The government should not be present on any decision-making supervisory committees or colleges of either the AMF or ACPR.
- Loi PACTE has rectified the government presence on the AMF’s Sanctions Committee, but:
  - The AMF should re-assess whether it is appropriate to allow individuals employed by entities supervised by the AMF to sit on that Committee.
  - A short biography of all members of the boards, colleges, and committees of the ACPR should be published.
- Within ACPR, functions of resolution and supervision require good cooperation and coordination, but critical decision making should remain independent; for insurance, the supervision college has veto power over the resolution college and memberships overlap — perception of conflict should be avoided.

### Macroprudential policies and tools
- France has established a macroprudential framework that supports willingness and ability to act; the HCSF has broad hard and soft powers, an explicit mandate for financial stability, and can request information from both regulated and unregulated entities.
- The BdF and the ACPR produce, on a semi-annual basis, an assessment of risks to financial stability discussed at HCSF meetings.
- It is still too early to determine the real impact of macroprudential tools applied to bank-based finance so far; evaluation of effectiveness and possible adjustments by the HCSF are desirable.
- The reduction in the large exposure limit to 5 percent of bank capital (for large indebted corporates) is an important step to contain concentration risk, but:
  - Its scope is limited to large corporates and does not directly address nonbank finance.
- The countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was increased in a two-step move to 50 bps to build buffers in the banking system against broader vulnerabilities in the corporate and household sector; this measure does not address risks related to growing nonbank finance.
- France should actively engage at the EU level to broaden the macroprudential toolkit for the corporate sector:
  - Few sectoral banking tools for corporates exist at EU level; no tools directly address market-based finance risks.
  - Authorities should engage with the ECB on possible use of Pillar II measures to address residual corporate exposure risks.
  - Consideration could be given to introduction of a sectoral SRB calibrated to corporate exposures if corporate vulnerabilities continue to build.
  - HCSF has power to introduce borrower-based tools for corporates but designing such tools is inherently challenging; France should develop an analytical framework and engage at EU level.
- Fiscal measures to weaken debt bias are recommended:
  - The HCSF should recommend the MoF to further weaken the debt bias, if needed, by complementing the legislated reduction in the Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate to 25 percent by 2022 with:
    - (i) an interest deductibility based on fixed debt-to-equity rule (denying interest deductibility if debt-to-equity exceeds some fixed value);
    - (ii) an allowance for corporate equity, supplementing deductibility of interest with a similar deduction for the normal return on equity.
- Macroprudential readiness is required for the rise in insurance and asset management business lines; ACPR and AMF monitor sectoral risks but the macroprudential toolkit remains largely incomplete.
- Strengthen risk monitoring and reporting requirements:
  - Concentrated exposures insufficiently analyzed at sectoral and group level.
  - Nonbank financial institutions and large exposures between sectors and among FCs should be further incorporated in HCSF reporting and systemic risk monitoring.
  - HCSF should analyze transmission of shocks between financial balance sheets within a FC; extend macro stress testing to investment funds and insurance companies; and liquidity stress testing at the conglomerate level.
  - Quarterly or more regular flow data on intragroup transactions in a conglomerate should be reported.
  - HCSF should consider development of concentration thresholds for direct exposures within conglomerates and common exposures among entities.
- Some additional tools could be brought under HCSF remit and its powers enhanced with a formal “comply or explain” mechanism (examples: O-SII buffer, capital tools on residential or commercial real estate entrusted to ACPR (Art. 124 and 164 CRR); leverage limits for investment funds entrusted to AMF).

### Financial conglomerates oversight
- The Financial Conglomerates Directive creates a non-intrusive “aggregation” or “supplementary” approach; positive but insufficient:
  - Framework does not promote active engagement between sectoral authorities.
  - Authorities can obtain information on unregulated entities in the wider group but have no powers to impose conglomerate-level prudential requirements.
  - Capital adequacy is assured to the extent double gearing is avoided, but framework does not support consideration of group risks or conclusion that FC solvency is appropriate for its risks.
- Reporting on intragroup transactions and risk concentration is infrequent; stress testing is encouraged but not conducted at FC level; liquidity is not assessed at FC level.
- No prudential requirements for related party transactions exist, permitting relationships with connected entities and risk concentrations to reach critical levels without proper observation.
- Progress can be achieved through stronger domestic voluntary supervisory coordination, but long-term improvements require broader legislative and regulatory changes and revision of the dated Financial Conglomerates Directive.
- Ongoing EU regulatory changes have placed heavy burdens on national competent authorities and the ECB; work within the ECB and under the ESAs to enhance supervisory guidance and reporting consistency is under way; these objectives are at risk if national competent authorities lack operational independence.
- Greater cooperation and collaboration between sectoral supervisors is needed; limited supervisory touch points were observed despite high-quality work.

### Regulated savings and CDC governance
- Governance arrangements of the CDC will be enhanced under Loi PACTE by bringing it formally under supervision and regulation of the ACPR; this is welcome given CDC receives public deposits and a full state guarantee.
- FSAP tasks following Loi PACTE:
  - Ensure ACPR is properly remunerated for its activity and increased burden.
  - Practical and legal arrangements of the state guarantee should be worked out and agreed upon.
  - Conduct a review of regulated savings policy and its impact on the financial system and on affordable housing policies, in light of banking system risk profile related to heavy reliance on wholesale funding and weak profitability.
  - FSAP supports efforts to reduce the spread between market interest rates and the rate of return of Livret A to enhance monetary policy transmission and improve allocation of savings and financing.
  - Given systemic significance of regulated savings, review framework to align it with reforms promoting market-based savings and financing and deepening of Paris as a key financial center of Europe.

### Banks
- Less significant institutions (LSIs) are well supervised by ACPR under ECB oversight; LSIs account for only 1.5 percent of French banking assets—excluding a central counterparty and EU branches—and are diversified by size and business model.
- LSI sector was resilient during the financial crisis and the ECB has assessed French LSIs to be low risk.
- Decisions under national law affecting LSIs and significant institutions (SIs) have addressed 2012 FSAP recommendations:
  - ACPR's powers regarding major acquisitions have been strengthened to receive prior notification of proposed acquisitions by credit institutions so it can consider them ex ante.
  - These powers are unlikely to be used for LSIs, but add to ECB armory which clarified exclusive competence for SIs.
- Weakened powers of ACPR under national law related to transactions with related parties must be addressed:
  - Previously, related-party transactions in aggregate greater than 3 percent of own funds were deducted from own funds; CRR maximum harmonization removed these deductions and no replacement framework (e.g., large exposure limits) exists.
  - This gap must be remedied as such transactions expose firms to multiple vulnerabilities.

### Insurance
- Implementation of Solvency II is progressing well; Solvency II has been implemented since January 1, 2016.
- French insurance companies are significant users of the Volatility Adjustment (VA); companies representing more than 90 percent of the technical provisions in the French insurance industry use the VA.
- The French insurance market relies largely on the standard method to calculate the SCR, with only two major (re)insurance groups using full internal models.
- French and EU authorities should enhance liquidity monitoring:
  - EIOPA discussion paper released in March 2019 indicates additional reporting on liquidity risk and improved monitoring are under consideration at the European level for macroprudential purposes.
  - ACPR and EIOPA should move toward putting these proposals in place; ACPR encouraged to begin field testing such requirements at the earliest opportunity.
  - ORSA and the Solvency and Financial Condition Report (SFCR) should be required to explicitly address liquidity risk in both quantitative and qualitative ways.
  - ACPR should continue improving ORSA implementation and embedding ORSA in insurance company risk culture.
- Improve quality of data reporting:
  - Annual Quantitative Reporting Templates (QRTs) submitted to ACPR should be audited; currently they are not required to be audited and there is no audit requirement for SFCRs disclosed to the public.
  - Audit assurance processes are recommended for systems and procedures used to complete QRTs and SFCRs.
  - ACPR should review intensity and frequency of onsite supervision relative to offsite supervision; consider more focused and regular onsite inspections by adding flexibility in rules around inspection frequency.

### Investment services
- French investment services sector is one of the most significant in the EU and is well supervised on a risk-based approach consistent with EU frameworks; sector spans large credit institutions to small financial advisers and includes non-French entities using EU passport.
- AMF and ACPR apply risk-based supervision with resources commensurate to risks; extensive cooperation between national supervisors mitigates potential gaps.
- Implementation of MiFID II and MiFIR has been particularly challenging; CMU initiative will continue to evolve the landscape.
- Brexit and new French crypto-assets regime could increase risks:
  - Brexit could lead to a material increase in the number of investment firms in France in a relatively short period, potentially exacerbating AMF resource constraints.
  - France introduced a specific regulatory regime for initial coin offerings (ICOs) and crypto-assets that appears to balance innovation and investor protection; close monitoring and increased supervisory resources will be necessary once the regime is in place.

### AML/CFT
- Significant progress made aligning France’s AML/CFT framework with revised FATF standard and European AML Directives (AMLD); Fourth European AMLD transposed, including risk-based preventive measures and transparency of beneficial ownership.
- Improvements in legal framework for seizure and confiscation and supervision of nonfinancial businesses and professions; steps to strengthen AML/CFT in France’s overseas territories.
- France’s first national money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risk assessment is being finalized.
- New legislation to strengthen regulation and supervision of activities involving crypto-assets was enacted in April 2019.
- Gaps and supervisory observations:
  - AML/CFT supervision of banks, real estate agents, and company domiciliation agents targets higher-risk entities to varying degrees, but lawyers are subject to little AML/CFT oversight.
  - ACPR assesses ML/TF risks of individual banks but onsite inspections focus on large financial groups; need to increase oversight of smaller banks rated high-risk and speed up issuing penalties.
  - Systematic ML/TF risk assessments of real estate agents and company domiciliation agents would better inform supervision focus and resources.
  - To enable effective AML/CFT oversight of lawyers, the National Bar Council should work with local bar associations to promote unified understanding of ML/TF risks and develop consistent risk-based monitoring programs, procedures, and disciplinary actions.
- Progress made on prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of TF and ML with cross-border dimension; Tracfin financial intelligence has been used extensively, resulting in identification and investigation of several networks funding terrorist activities, and over a hundred TF convictions secured between 2010 and

*1fraea2019001*

### 2017. The National Financial Prosecutor was created to focus on financial crimes, particularly those

### 1fraea2019001 - 2017. The National Financial Prosecutor was created to focus on financial crimes, particularly those

### Crisis management and safety nets — overview
- France is better placed today to manage a crisis. The ACPR acts as the Resolution Authority (RA) for banks, insurers, and investment firms and can start liquidation procedures for institutions under its supervision.
- Arrangements at the EA level are allowing national authorities to refocus their oversight towards LSIs.
- The BdF and Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution (FGDR) play a critical role in Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) provision, deposit insurance and investor protection.
- Policyholder protection of insurance contracts is mainly in the hands of two policyholder protection schemes (PPSs).
- The HCSF does not have a specific crisis function, but its mandate supports inter-agency policy coordination.

### Insurance resolution framework — status and gaps
- France established a comprehensive resolution framework for insurers based on the Sapin II law, enacted in December 2016 and Ordinance 1608 of November 2017.
- The framework provides for a broad set of new resolution tools, such as transfers of assets and liabilities, and bridge entities, but does not include a bail-in tool.
- The framework applies to all insurance entities subject to Solvency II, except for the part on recovery and resolution planning (RRP), which currently applies only to 14 insurers covering a large share of the market.
- The framework is designed to apply to insurers that breach capital requirements while remaining balance sheet solvent in a Solvency II sense (i.e., assets still cover liabilities). In case of insolvency, the framework leads to liquidation.

- Findings and recommended enhancements:
  - The resolution framework for insurers should have additional tools (notably, bail-in), safeguards, and legal protection of contractors, and a scheme for privately financed resolution funding.
  - Overall preparedness would benefit from tests and simulation exercises at various levels.
  - The two PPSs, Fonds de Garantie des Assurances de Personnes (FGAP) and Fonds de Garantie des Assurances Obligatoires de dommages (FGAO), have a narrow scope of work and are not prepared to support resolution processes, only compensation under liquidation procedures.
  - Footnote: Both FGAO and FGAP are specialized by types of insurance, are governed by a Board of Directors, and supervised by the MoF.

### Recovery and resolution planning (RRP) and inter-agency colleges
- RRP cycles are more advanced for bank SIs, followed by those for LSIs, and are at an early stage for insurers.
- Recovery plans are gradually improving and becoming more focused on governance and feasibility of recovery options, though operationalization and quantification of recovery options require further development.
- For LSIs, the strategy is to opt for liquidation in cases of failure.
- Assessment of RRPs has improved coordination between ACPR’s Supervision and Resolution Departments.

- Governance and independence concerns:
  - Membership of the supervision and resolution colleges have significant overlaps.
  - For an entity under ACPR’s remit to be declared as failing or likely to fail the resolution college must consult the supervisory college, which amounts to a veto. This feature could raise concerns about independence and the possibility of supervisory forbearance.
  - France chose not to adopt financial stabilization tools available under the BRRD, which would be helpful to manage system-wide crises.
  - ACPR needs to deploy enough resources for RRP, particularly for insurers.

### Deposit insurance, FGDR governance, and resolution fund
- The FGDR design is well aligned with EU standards, both as a deposit guarantee scheme and as a resolution fund, but the Supervisory Board membership needs reform.
- FGDR governance:
  - The Supervisory Board is composed of 12 active financial sector executives and an Executive Board that deals with day-to-day decisions.
  - There is a separation of functions between both levels of authority and specific practices geared to avoid conflict of interest.
  - In line with good practices, eligibility for Supervisory Board membership should be changed to include only independent members.
- FGDR roles and funding:
  - The FGDR also manages the investor protection scheme, which covers retail investors from losses due to fraud and operational risk by investment service providers.
  - The resolution fund, covering a subset of LSIs, is on track to reach its funding target by 2024 and could be tapped to support the application of Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) resolution tools.
  - The FGDR is represented in the resolution college when it must decide on the resolution modality for entities under its remit (LSIs, insurers, and investment service providers).

### BdF ELA scheme — alignment and enhancements
- The BdF ELA scheme is well aligned with the euro system framework but would benefit from enhancements.
- Given the importance of FX wholesale funding in the banking system, establishing mechanisms and rules regarding ELA in FX needs to be explored, including feasibility of advance agreements and conditions for swap lines for this purpose.
- ELA can be provided to a bank in resolution; to anticipate cases in which ELA collateral would be insufficient, the BdF could establish rules to help banks:
  - (i) identify in advance which assets in their balance sheets might be proposed as ELA collateral, and
  - (ii) buttress their operational readiness to pledge them.
- Contingent arrangements, such as a public guarantee at the national or European level under strict safeguards, could add readiness to the ELA scheme; such arrangements would be admissible under state aid rules revised as recommended by the EA FSAP.
- Footnote: See IMF “Euro Area Policies: Financial System Stability Assessment, June 2018.” The Technical Note on Systemic Liquidity Management covers these issues in detail.

### Preparedness for conglomerate failure
- An important challenge is ensuring preparedness to deal with failure of a conglomerate.
- Recommendation: In the medium term, RRP exercises should incorporate the intra-conglomerate dimension, including for safety net arrangements.
- By checking the separability of business units, the resolvability analysis will partly cover these aspects, but more can be done in full coordination with EU institutions.
- Authorities need to ensure operational readiness; conducting intra and inter-institutional crises simulations and tests would help identify potential gaps.

*Source: IMF country report excerpt.*

### Box 1. Gap Analysis of Default Risk and Capital of Nonfinancial Corporates and Banks

### Box 1. Gap Analysis of Default Risk and Capital of Nonfinancial Corporates and Banks

### Model description and methodology
- The model examines default risks and aggregate capital of the nonfinancial corporate sector and the banking sector relative to their potential (sticky vs. flexible capital structure).
- Risk gaps and capital gaps between sticky and flexible capital structure (potential) are calculated.
- The model used for the FSAP captures various feedback effects between the sectors.
- Positive risk gap denotes periods with too much risk relative to potential.
- Positive capital gap denotes periods with too little capital relative to potential.
- Illustration of axis scaling used in the figure:
  - For risk, 0.005 equals to 0.5 percent excessive default risk in absolute terms.
  - For capital, 0.2 equals to a 20 percent gap relative to the nominal amount of aggregate capital.

### Historical pattern of risk gaps
- Risks are elevated (positive risk gap) during four periods:
  - the 2002 technology crisis,
  - the 2008 GFC,
  - the 2012 European sovereign debt crisis,
  - and present.

### Comparative vulnerability: nonfinancial corporates versus banks
- Applying the same shocks that occurred during the 2008 GFC shows:
  - Corporate balance sheets are more vulnerable than those of the banks.
  - Default risk of the nonfinancial corporate sector is high relative to its potential level.
  - Aggregate capital of the nonfinancial corporate sector is low relative to its potential level.
  - Bank default risk and aggregate bank capital are closer to their potential levels.

### Relationship between risk and capital gaps
- When risk is too high (positive risk gap), capital tends to be too low (positive capital gap).

### Solvency stress test key result
- Aggregated CET1 capital ratio:
  - rises slightly under baseline
  - fell by around 400 bps over five years under the adverse scenario
  - the adverse scenario has a larger impact on internationally active banks

*Source: IMF staff calculations.*

### 1. CET1 Ratio under Different Scenarios

### 1. CET1 Ratio under Different Scenarios

### CET1 and Leverage under Stress
- Aggregate leverage ratio will fall by 100 bps under the adverse scenario.
- Regulatory minimum (CET1 context shown on figures): 8%.

### Leverage Ratio under Different Scenarios
- Changes in Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) are predominantly associated with credit risk.

### Cumulative Changes in RWA (Since 2018, in billions of euros)
- Time series labels shown: 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023.
- Scenario labels shown: Baseline, Adverse, Adverse static.
- Bank categories shown: GSIB; Other.
- Chart axes and markers indicate percentage scales from 0% to 16% for some panels and 0% to 6% for others; separate panels for GSIB and Other.

### Drivers of Capital Depletion
- Increase in loss provision against credit risk is the main driver of capital depletion.

### Contributions to Changes in Capital Ratio
- Scenario labels: Baseline; Adverse; Adverse static.
- Components illustrated include change in Risk weighted assets and multiple risk/profit items (see Net Profit Components).

### Net Profit Components (Millions of euros)
- Scenario labels: Baseline; Adverse; Adverse static.
- Components listed in figures:
  - Net Profit (before losses due to stress)
  - Loss provisions (credit risk)
  - Net Interest Income
  - Net non-interest income
  - Losses/Gains on market portfolios (investment, trading), etc., net
  - Share of profits of associates
  - Others
  - Extraordinary items
  - Taxes
- Market and risk items shown in decomposition panels:
  - Interest rate risk
  - Credit spread risk
  - Repricing risk in the trading and FVOCI books
  - Foreign exchange rate risk
  - Equity risk
  - Losses from derivatives
  - Other market risk
  - Other comprehensive income
  - Dividends
  - Other

### Quantitative scales and sample values shown in figures
- Percentage scales: -4.0%, -3.0%, -2.0%, -1.0%, 0.0%, 1.0%, 2.0% (for 2019–2023 panels).
- Bar chart ranges: -200,000 0 200,000 and -100,000 -80,000 -60,000 -40,000 -20,000 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 (Millions of euros axis).

### Liquidity and Stable Funding
- The liquidity coverage ratio is well above 100 percent.
- LCR funding structure is diversified and concentrated in high quality liquid assets.
- Overall, net stable funding ratio is also above 100 percent, though dollar funding ratio remains challenging.
- NSFR funding structure is tilted towards wholesale funding sources.

### LCR and NSFR Panels: labels and composition
- Time series labels: 14:Q4, 15:Q4, 16:Q4, 17:Q4, 18:Q4.
- LCR series shown: Total LCR: GSIB; Total LCR: Other; US dollar LCr: all banks.
- Composition categories for LCR: Counterparty is central bank; Counterparty is non-central bank; Retail deposits; Committed facilities; Operational deposits; Non-operational deposits; Other unsecured funding; Derivatives; Totalcurrency; US dollar.
- NSFR panels:
  - Range of available USD NSFR
  - Composition categories: Secured; Unsecured: CB and sov.; Unsecured financial; Unsecured NFC; Other; Derivatives.
  - Bank categories: GSIB; Other; All banks.

### Counter-balancing Capacity and Encumbrance
- There is a high level of counter-balancing capacity with low concentration.
- Most of encumbered assets are sovereign securities.
- The use of collateral swaps in U.S. dollar HQLA is relatively high.

*Source: IMF staff estimates.*

### 6. Asset Encumbrance 7. Collateral Swaps

### 6. Asset Encumbrance 7. Collateral Swaps

### Liquidity Stress Test — Asset Encumbrance and Currency Results
- Sources: COREP reports; and IMF staff estimates.
- Results: Total Currency — Number of Banks with Negative Counterbalancing Capacity (CBC) shown across scenarios S1–S5 and tenors: 3-month MCBC, 3-month FCBC, 5-day MCBC, 1-month MCBC, 1-month FCBC. (Charts present distribution by bank type: Total, G-SIBs, Domestic, Other.)
- Results: U.S. Dollars — Number of Banks with Negative CBC and Liquidity Surplus/Deficit (Percent of total assets) across the same scenarios and tenors.
- Liquidity position drivers under Wholesale Outflow Scenario (U.S. dollars):
  - Components plotted (Billions): CBC at day 0 (bef. haircut); CBC at day 0 (aft. haircut); Outflow — Unsec issuances; Outflow — Sec issuances; Outflow — Repo; Outflow — Retail; Outflow — Operational; Outflow — Coporate; Outflow — CB and Fin Inst; Outflow — Other; Inflow — Repo; Inflow — Retail; Inflow — Corporate; Inflow — CB and Fin Inst; Inflow — Other; Outflow — Memo items; CBC Cash and CB exposure; CBC Level 1; CBC Level 2; CBC Other CB eligible sec; CBC Committed lines rec; Liquidity surplus.
  - Scales illustrated include ranges from -400 to 200 (smaller panels), -700 to 300, and -2,500 to 2,000 (largest panel), showing magnitudes of each component in different scenario/timing panels.
- Figure caption: Source: IMF staff estimates.

### Insurance Risk Analysis — Solvency and Exposures
- Median assets over liabilities:
  - Declines from 108 to 107 percent from the baseline to adverse scenario.
  - Display includes pre-stress and post-stress interquartile range, median, mean.
- Impact of shocks on asset and liability valuation (Percent):
  - Asset and liability valuation impacts broken down by equity, property, corporate, sovereign, investment funds, interest rate; net effect shows a -7% to +1% range for components.
- Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) ratio:
  - Median SCR ratio drops from 204 to 166 percent; three quarters of participants remain above 160 percent.
- Life insurance lapses:
  - Lapse rates follow a seasonal pattern and have been lower in 2018 than in previous years (4-week moving average plotted for 2013–2018).
- Home bias and exposures:
  - The home bias of French insurers in sovereign and banking exposures is high—more pronounced only in four other Euro Area countries. Chart lists country codes (AT BE CY EE FI FR DE GR IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PT SK SI ES) with exposures.
  - On-balance sheet exposures towards the parent bank can reach more than 50 percent of eligible capital for some insurers (chart: Exposure towards Parent Bank (Percent of capital)).
- Sources: IMF Staff calculations based on EIOPA and ACPR data.

### Housing Loan Vulnerabilities
- Debt-Service-to-Income (DSTI) and Leverage by income decile:
  - DSTI increased for all income groups; charts show Debt Service to Income Ratio, by Income Decile (Percent) and Debt-to-Income Ratio by Income Decile (Ratio) for 2010 and 2014.
- Age cohort patterns:
  - Debt service to income has increased particularly among younger age cohorts (15–34, 35–44, 45–64) between 2010 and 2014; leverage (Debt-to-Income Ratio) increased for younger cohorts and remained stable in older cohorts.
- High LTV loans and financial net worth:
  - Proportion of households with Loans-to-Value Ratios > 90 percent is highest among middle income groups and increased in the bottom half of the income distribution.
  - The bottom half of income distribution (including the lowest decile) experienced a worsening of its financial net worth.
- Data sources: INSEE, Enquête Patrimoine; ECB Household Finance and Consumption Surveys; IMF staff calculations.

### Real Estate Market — Prices and Valuation
- Price-to-income:
  - The average price-to-income ratio is close to its historical high; percent deviation from the average over 1990:Q1–2018:Q2 plotted (OECD source).
- Regional trends:
  - Since the GFC, the price-to-income ratio has declined both in Ile-de-France and in Province.
  - Housing Price to Income Ratio by Region indexed to 1996 = 100 shows Ile-de-France and Province series from 1996–2015.
- Housing valuation:
  - National housing valuation (percentage deviation of actual price from equilibrium level) plotted with baseline and alternative specification across 2000–2017 (range shown roughly -4 to +8 percent in charts).
  - Ile-de-France and Provincial France valuation series shown separately for 2000–2017.
- Sources: INSEE; IMF staff estimates; OECD.

### Cross-Border Contagion
- Systemic footprint and vulnerability:
  - French banks are as globally systemic as during the last FSAP in 2012; plotted Contagion Index, Credit and Funding Shock (Percentage of capital) comparing 2012 Q4 and 2018 Q3 across country codes (AT BE CH DE FI GB HK IN JP NL PT SG US).
  - French banks are relatively less vulnerable compared to 2012 (Vulnerability Index plotted with same country list).
- Bilateral contagion patterns:
  - Countries most susceptible to contagion from France: The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, and Belgium (Contagion from France, Credit and Funding Shock (Percentage of capital) chart).
  - French banks are most exposed to the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States (Contagion to France, Credit and Funding Shock (Percentage of capital) chart).
- Sources: BIS; and IMF staff estimates.

### Systemic Risk Monitoring — Framework
- Four-block strategy components (Source: French Authorities):
  - Diagnostic: Macro projections, EWS and indicators, Macro models, Scenario design.
  - Bank impact: Credit risk models, Market risk models, Solvency impact at individual level.
  - System impact: Interbank contagion and liquidation of assets, Aggregate solvency losses.
  - Macroprudential policy calibration: DSGE model with financial variables and macroprudential rule, Calibration of macroprudential tools.

### Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2015–24 (Table 4)
- Real economy (change in percent):
  - Real GDP: 2015 1.1; 2016 1.2; 2017 2.2; 2018 1.5; 2019 1.3; 2020 1.4; 2021 1.5; 2022 1.5; 2023 1.5; 2024 1.5.
  - Domestic demand: 2015 1.5; 2016 1.7; 2017 2.1; 2018 1.0; 2019 1.0; 2020 1.1; 2021 1.4; 2022 1.7; 2023 1.9; 2024 2.0.
  - Private consumption: 2015 1.5; 2016 2.1; 2017 1.0; 2018 0.9; 2019 0.8; 2020 1.0; 2021 1.4; 2022 1.7; 2023 2.0; 2024 2.1.
  - Gross fixed investment: 2015 1.0; 2016 2.8; 2017 4.5; 2018 2.9; 2019 1.8; 2020 1.8; 2021 2.3; 2022 3.2; 2023 3.3; 2024 3.3.
- Nominal GDP (billions of euros): 2015 2,198; 2016 2,229; 2017 2,292; 2018 2,349; 2019 2,415; 2020 2,488; 2021 2,565; 2022 2,649; 2023 2,741; 2024 2,837.
- CPI (year average): 2015 0.1; 2016 0.3; 2017 1.2; 2018 2.1; 2019 1.3; 2020 1.5; 2021 1.6; 2022 1.7; 2023 1.8; 2024 1.9.
- General government balance (percent of GDP): 2015 -3.6; 2016 -3.4; 2017 -2.7; 2018 -2.6; 2019 -3.3; 2020 -2.4; 2021 -2.5; 2022 -2.5; 2023 -2.6; 2024 -2.6.
- Revenue (percent of GDP): 2015 53.2; 2016 53.2; 2017 53.8; 2018 53.6; 2019 52.4; 2020 52.0; 2021 51.6; 2022 51.5; 2023 51.4; 2024 51.4.
- Expenditure (percent of GDP): 2015 56.8; 2016 56.6; 2017 56.5; 2018 56.2; 2019 55.7; 2020 54.4; 2021 54.1; 2022 54.0; 2023 54.0; 2024 54.0.
- General government gross debt (percent of GDP): 2015 95.6; 2016 96.6; 2017 98.5; 2018 98.6; 2019 99.2; 2020 98.7; 2021 98.2; 2022 97.6; 2023 97.0; 2024 96.2.
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2015 10.4; 2016 10.1; 2017 9.4; 2018 9.1; 2019 8.8; 2020 8.4; 2021 8.1; 2022 7.9; 2023 7.6; 2024 7.4.
- Exports of goods and services (percent of GDP): 2015 31.9; 2016 31.7; 2017 32.1; 2018 32.0; 2019 33.3; 2020 33.2; 2021 33.6; 2022 33.8; 2023 33.9; 2024 34.1.
- Imports of goods and services (percent of GDP): 2015 -32.3; 2016 -32.4; 2017 -33.0; 2018 -33.1; 2019 -33.9; 2020 -33.5; 2021 -33.6; 2022 -33.9; 2023 -34.5; 2024 -35.0.
- Potential output (change in percent): 2015 1.0; 2016 1.1; 2017 1.3; 2018 1.4; 2019 1.4; 2020 1.5; 2021 1.5; 2022 1.5; 2023 1.6; 2024 1.5.
- Output gap: 2015 -0.8; 2016 -0.8; 2017 0.1; 2018 0.2; 2019 0.1; 2020 0.1; 2021 0.0; 2022 0.0; 2023 0.0; 2024 0.0.
- Sources: Haver Analytics, INSEE, Banque de France, and IMF Staff calculations. (Projections noted in table.)

### Core Financial Soundness Indicators, 2013–18 (Table 5)
- Deposit-taking institutions (notes indicate differing consolidation methods across years).
- Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets:
  - 2013 15.1; 2014 15.3; 2015 16.6; 2016 17.4; 2017 18.9; 2018 18.7.
- Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets:
  - 2013 13.2; 2014 13.6; 2015 13.8; 2016 14.5; 2017 15.3; 2018 15.4.
- Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital:
  - 2013 11.4; 2014 9.6; 2015 9.1; 2016 9.2; 2017 15.0; 2018 13.6.
- Bank provisions to Nonperforming loans:
  - 2013 104.7; 2014 103.8; 2015 104.2; 2016 103.0; 2017 50.6; 2018 50.4.
- Nonperforming loans to total gross loans:
  - 2013 4.5; 2014 4.0; 2015 3.9; 2016 3.9; 2017 3.1; 2018 2.8.
- Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans (Deposit-takers):
  - Nonfinancial corporation: 2013 39.2; 2014 39.1; 2015 38.5; 2016 38.6; 2017 3.0; 2018 3.2. (Note: 2017–18 consolidated data not comparable with earlier unconsolidated data.)
  - Households (including individual firms): 2013 19.0; 2014 19.5; 2015 18.8; 2016 19.1; 2017 16.3; 2018 15.7.
- ROA (aggregated data on a parent-company basis):
  - 2013 0.4; 2014 0.2; 2015 0.3; 2016 0.7; 2017 0.4; 2018 0.4.
- ROE (aggregated data on a parent-company basis):
  - 2013 10.1; 2014 4.4; 2015 7.7; 2016 14.8; 2017 6.4; 2018 6.5.
- Liquid assets to total assets:
  - 2013 30.6; 2014 27.1; 2015 12.5; 2016 12.6; 2017 13.9; 2018 13.7.
- Liquid assets to short-term liabilities:
  - 2013 165.2; 2014 178.5; 2015 17.5; 2016 19.9; 2017 20.7; 2018 19.6.
- Sources: Banque de France, ACPR. Notes on methodology and consolidation differences accompany the table.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — Key Risks, Likelihood, and Expected Impact (Table 6)
- Sharp tightening of global financial conditions:
  - Overall level of concern: Low.
  - Relative likelihood: High (market expectation of tighter U.S. monetary policy triggered by strong wage growth and higher-than-expected inflation).
  - Expected impact if materialized: Medium. Impacts include less favorable borrowing conditions, higher funding costs, valuation losses, loss of market confidence, negative growth shocks, and FX liquidity impact.
- Rising protectionism and retreat from multilateralism:
  - Overall level of concern: High.
  - Relative likelihood: High.
  - Expected impact if materialized: High. Near-term effects include hit to exports and investment, reduced growth, higher policy-related risk premia, mark-to-market losses on sovereign securities.
- Weaker-than-expected global growth:
  - Overall level of concern: High.
  - Relative likelihood: High.
  - Expected impact if materialized: Medium. Effects include lower growth, lower profitability of nonfinancial corporations, deterioration in public finance.
- Weakening of reform implementation in France:
  - Overall level of concern: High.
  - Relative likelihood: High.
  - Expected impact if materialized: Medium. Effects include lower medium-term growth, deterioration in public finance and private balance sheets.
- Further pressure on traditional bank business models:
  - Overall level of concern: Medium.
  - Relative likelihood: Medium.
  - Expected impact if materialized: Medium. Risks include loss of confidence, distress at one or more major banks, systemic reverberation, and wider sovereign yield spreads.
- Capital outflows and slowdown in China and large EMs:
  - Overall level of concern: Medium.
  - Relative likelihood: Medium.
  - Expected impact if materialized: Medium. Effects include losses from exposures to emerging markets and slower export growth.
- Source: French authorities. (Table includes explanatory footnotes on EU and national supervisory roles.)

### Financial Sector Oversight Structure (Table 7)
- Coverage across banking, insurance, investment service providers, market infrastructure operators, and asset management:
  - Legislation and Regulation: EU-level actors (EC, EP, Council) and respective ESAs (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA); National: Government, Parliament, and AMF where applicable.
  - Supervision:
    - Microprudential: EU — ECB SSM (for banking); national prudential — ACPR.
    - Conduct: National — AMF.
    - Macroprudential: EU — ESRB (warnings & recommendations); National — HCSF with proposal power from BdF.
    - Resolution: EU — SRB; National — ACPR (with ECB involvement indicated).
- Footnotes detail roles of ESAs, AMF, interactions with ECB/SSM, and powers such as CRR/CRD IV instruments and SRB/SSM competencies.

### Macroprudential Tools — Cross-Country Comparison (Table 8)
- Overview for France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, U.K. on availability and activation of macroprudential tools.
- Selected indicators for France:
  - Countercyclical capital buffer: Yes / Yes (Available / Active).
  - Capital conservation buffer: Yes / Yes.
  - Systemic risk buffer: Yes / No.
  - Household sector tools:
    - Household sector capital requirement: Yes / No.
    - Cap on loan-to-value ratio: Yes / No.
    - Cap on loan-to-income ratio: Yes / No.
    - Cap on debt-service to income ratio: Yes / No.
    - Limits on new loans with high LTV ratio: Yes / No.
    - Limits on new loans with high LTI ratio: Yes / No.
  - Liquidity tools (banking sector):
    - Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR): Yes / Yes.
    - LCR by currency: Yes / No.
    - Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): No / No.
  - Tools for SIIs and interconnectedness:
    - Capital surcharges for SIIs: Yes / Yes.
    - Limits on size of exposures between financial institutions: Yes / Yes.
- Notes clarify scope (e.g., broad-based tools applicable to banking sector/investment firms) and country-specific details (e.g., Netherlands cap on LTV applies only to new residential mortgages).
- Source: IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey.

*Italic: Source PDF: 1fraea2019001 - 6. Asset Encumbrance 7. Collateral Swaps (IMF staff estimates, figures and tables included in the chapter).*

### Appendix I. Implementation of 2012 FSAP Recommendations

### Appendix I. Implementation of 2012 FSAP Recommendations

### Overall Financial Sector Oversight
- Key recommendation: Enhance public disclosure of financial institution conditions and risks.
  - Implementation status: PD.
  - Note: "In authorities’ views, public disclosure of financial institution conditions and risks has been satisfactory. This FSAP will take a fresh look at this issue."
- Key recommendation: Give serious consideration to modifying MoF participation in the Boards of ACP and AMF to support independence of the supervisory process.
  - Implementation status: NA.
  - Note: "The authorities continue to view that the structure does not threat the independence of the supervisory process by ACPR and AMF. This FSAP will take a fresh look at this issue."
- Key recommendation: Eliminate limits on headcount for ACP, AMF, and H3C.
  - Implementation status: NA.
  - Note: "The authorities noted do not have any plan to eliminate limits on headcount for budget control. This FSAP will review this."

### Banking Supervision
- Key recommendation: Continue monitoring banks’ funding position and availability of collateral to access liquidity through the secured debt market and/or central bank facilities.
  - Implementation status: D.
  - Note: "Reporting and supervisory arrangements introduced under the SSM have addressed monitoring of funding, collateral, etc."
- Key recommendation: Give ACP powers to assess the suitability of Board members (of both banks and insurance companies) and to require removal of all unsuitable Board members.
  - Implementation status: D.
  - Note: "The ACPR/ECB are notified of appointment and reappointment and may object and deny such appointment and require removal of one or more Board members. Hence an important power is in place. The assessment of the suitability of Board members (individually and collectively) is supported by an ECB Guide of May 2017 on fit and proper assessments and an EBA/ESMA Guideline published in September 2017. However, it remains unclear, if there is an expectation/obligation for the ACPR/ECB to undertake an assessment of the suitability of Board members."
- Key recommendation: Give ACP powers to ensure it receives prior notification of major acquisitions and is, therefore, able to consider them ex ante.
  - Implementation status: NA.
  - Note: "The finding from the EA FSAP for major acquisitions was materially non-compliant. The explanation is as follows: The SSM legislative framework does not provide an adequate or consistent basis for ECB banking supervision to approve or reject, and impose prudential conditions on, major acquisitions or investments by a credit institution. In particular: (i) there are no prior notification or approval requirements for acquisitions in an undertaking outside the financial sector; (ii) requirements relating to the acquisition of a qualifying holding in another EU credit institution are focused on safeguarding the sound and prudent management of the target, not the acquiring institution; (iii) there are no explicit requirements on the acquisition of holdings in credit institutions outside the EU; and (iv) there are no harmonized procedures or criteria at EU level for assessment of major acquisitions by credit institutions, including whether the acquisitions expose the credit institution to undue risks or hinder effective supervision."
- Key recommendation: Require full and consistent disclosure of the capital treatment in place and the related financial interactions within complex groups.
  - Implementation status: NA.
  - Note: "The authorities continue to view that current practices are following the European regulations in effect, and the IMF assessment leads to an erroneous representation of the actual situation, while recognizing the specific characteristics of the French business model."

### Insurance Supervision
- Key recommendation: Introduce enforceable legal and regulatory corporate governance requirements.
  - Implementation status: D.
- Key recommendation: Require insurance companies to have internal audit and actuarial control functions.
  - Implementation status: D.
- Key recommendation: Enhance insurance companies’ disclosures, including on valuation of technical provisions; risk exposures and concentrations; risk management; corporate governance; and sensitivity results from forms of stress testing.
  - Implementation status: D.

### Securities Regulation
- Key recommendation: Establish stronger conflict-of-interest arrangements to govern industry participation in the AMF Board.
  - Implementation status: NA.
  - Note: "The membership of the AMF Board continues to include active market participants appointed by the Finance Minister."
- Key recommendation: Strengthen AMF’s supervision of investment service providers and financial advisors by increasing onsite work, including inspections.
  - Implementation status: D.
  - Note: "The AMF’s supervision has been stepped up across all categories of investment service providers, including through onsite inspections."
- Key recommendation: Provide greater enforcement powers to the H3C and increase its staffing levels.
  - Implementation status: PD.
  - Note: "The European audit reform was completed in June 2014 and was implemented in France in 2016. The results of this reform included a substantial increase in the enforcement powers of the H3C. However, there has been less progress on the objective of increasing staffing levels although efforts are continuing in this regard."

### Resolution Framework
- Key recommendation: Modify composition of Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD) Board to limit the potential for conflict of interest.
  - Implementation status: PD.
- Key recommendation: Expand FDG’s powers in the resolution process, to assume assets and liabilities from a failing bank.
  - Implementation status: D.

### Central Counterparties
- Key recommendation: LCH.Clearnet SA should measure its exposures continuously throughout the business day.
  - Implementation status: D.
- Key recommendation: Carry out annually an external audit of LCH.Clearnet SA business continuity plan, including that of the in-sourcing company.
  - Implementation status: PD.

### AML/CFT
- Key recommendation: Strengthen the implementation of AML/CFT measures in the overseas territories.
  - Implementation status: PD.
- Key recommendation: Complete legislation to enable the authorities to seize laundered property.
  - Implementation status: D.

*Source: Appendix I. Implementation of 2012 FSAP Recommendations*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2019/1fraea2019001.pdf_
