## 1afgea2020003

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### Recent economic developments and COVID-19 impact
- Armed conflict and fragility: security spending of 30 percent of GDP annually; poverty rose to 55 percent in 2017 from 39 percent in 2013.
- Aid dependence: grants of about 40 percent of GDP, about two thirds security-related; current aid commitments expire by year-end; donor conference scheduled for November 23-24 for pledges for 2021–24.
- COVID-19 impact:
  - Output expected to contract by 5 percent in 2020, down from 3.9 percent growth in 2019 (baseline assuming infections don’t intensify).
  - Services and industry suffered most; agriculture spared due to favorable weather.
  - Pandemic and containment measures led to a collapse in economic activity in the first half of the year; easing since late May supports gradual recovery.
- Inflation and food security:
  - Inflation spiked to 8.7 percent in April; CPI growth moderated to 5.9 percent by end-August.
  - Projected headline inflation: 5 percent by year-end.
- Poverty and livelihoods:
  - World Bank estimates: about 25 percent employment vulnerable; poverty rate likely increased to 61–72 percent.
- Health system capacity: pandemic exposed long-standing weaknesses (hospital beds per 100,000; doctors per 100,000; Composite Health Security Index referenced).

### Fiscal and external developments (recent outcomes)
- Fiscal deterioration:
  - Tax revenue dropped by 40 percent in April–May year-on-year (partly due to 45-day extension of first quarter tax filing).
  - Transfer of Af 12.8 billion of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) profits partially offset shortfall.
  - Urgent health and social spending amounted to 1.3 percent of GDP through June.
  - Overall budget deficit in January–June widened to 1.6 percent of 2020 GDP.
  - Revenue for January–September stood at 83 percent of the last year’s level.
- Balance of payments and reserves:
  - Border closures and disruption of air corridors hit exports; remittances fell as workers returned.
  - Imports held up due to essentials, medical supplies, and aid-financed imports.
  - Current account deficit before grants projected to widen to 31 percent of GDP this year.
  - To be financed by official grants of about 43 percent of GDP (increase over 2019 due to COVID-related aid).
  - Gross international reserves: At $9.3 billion at end-July; are about 1 22 percent of the adjusted metric.
- External financing needs:
  - Protracted balance of payments need estimated at about $1.1 billion over 2020–23.

### Program request, access, and financing
- Authorities requested an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement.
- Staff proposes an 80 percent of quota (SDR 259.04 million, about $370 million), three-and-a-half year ECF arrangement with semi-annual reviews.
- Phasing and use:
  - Access frontloaded: 71 percent of access available at approval and first review; small even disbursements in 2022–23.
  - ECF disbursements in 2020–21 directed to the budget; disbursements in 2022–23 directed to DAB.
- Financing under the arrangement to help address about $1.1 billion BOP need over 2020–23.
- IMF quota: SDR 323.80 million.

### Program objectives, pillars, and design
- Goals:
  - Preserve macroeconomic stability and create conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth.
  - Support recovery from the pandemic, catalyze donor aid commitments, and address a protracted BOP need.
  - Anchor on Afghanistan’s National Development Framework II (ANPDF II).
- Two pillars:
  1. Macroeconomic framework to navigate the crisis and create conditions for recovery.
  2. Address structural fragilities obstructing sustainable and inclusive growth and equitable social outcomes.
- Design features:
  - Accommodates pandemic mitigation spending while providing setting to exit COVID-19 crisis.
  - Streamlined conditionality, measured deadlines for structural benchmarks, and flexibility to adapt to shocks.
- Program focus areas: mobilize domestic revenue, improve quality of public spending, bolster the financial sector, support anti-corruption efforts.
- Landmark reforms: VAT implementation, strengthening the anti-corruption regime, and, subject to fiscal space and donor support, building a social safety net.

### Fiscal policy stance, mid-year budget, and FY2021 targets
- 2020 actions and targets:
  - Draft mid-year budget envisages about 3.0 percent of GDP spending on COVID-19 in 2020, with about 60 percent directed to healthcare and social protection.
  - Authorities rolling out a 1.5 percent of GDP social relief package financed by the World Bank, of which two-thirds will be executed this year.
  - Target households with incomes of $2 per day or lower (twice the national poverty line); about 90 percent of households fall under this cut-off.
  - Authorities target a 3.0 percent of GDP fiscal deficit in 2020.
  - Mid-year Budget Amendment selected numeric items (verbatim as in source):
    - Revenue: 31.8 2.2
    - Domestic Revenue: 17.3 1.2
    - DAB profits transfer: 12.8 0.9
    - Fees from Afghan Telecom: 2.00.1
    - Fees collected by the Afghan Telecommunication Regulatory Authority: 1.00.1
    - Other one-off revenues: 1.50.1
    - The World Bank's grants to finance social distribution program (REACH): 14.6 1.0
    - Expenditure: 40.5 2.8
    - Covid-19-related expenditure: 42.6 2.9
    - Of which for health: 6.6 0.4
    - Building hospitals and purchasing beds: 1.8 0.1
    - Other health outlays: 4.8 0.3
    - Of which for social: 17.4 1.2
    - Bread distribution: 2.8 0.2
    - World Bank-supported social distribution program (REACH): 14.6 1.0
    - Of which for others: 18.7 1.3
    - Short-term employment program: 6.7 0.5
    - Measures to expedite the supply of agricultural commodities: 5.9 0.4
    - Transfers to provinces to fight COVID-19: 2.3 0.2
    - Wheat purchase program: 1.7 0.1
    - Other outlays: 2.1 0.1
    - Other additional expenditure: 13.0 0.9
    - Operating expenditure: 8.3 0.6
    - Development expenditure: 4.7 0.3
    - Expenditure cuts: -15.1 -1.0
    - Operating expenditure: -9.6 -0.7
    - Development expenditure: -5.5 -0.4
    - Net impact on the budget deficit: 8.7 0.6
    - Memorandum: Nominal GDP 1465.9
- FY2021 target:
  - Cap FY2021 deficit at 2.2 percent of GDP.
  - Pandemic spending projected at about 2 percent of GDP in FY2021, including the WB-financed social support program.
- Medium-term aim:
  - Improve operating balance excluding grants and bring overall deficit to under one percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Protect development spending while mobilizing domestic revenue.
- Social protection:
  - Increase pro-poor spending from 3.7 percent of GDP in 2019 to 5.3 percent of GDP in 2020 and 4.7 percent of GDP in 2021 (indicative targets).
  - Plan to build a targeted social safety net with donor technical and financial assistance.

### Monetary policy, reserves, and debt outlook
- Exchange rate and reserves:
  - Program exchange rate for monitoring: 76.7 Afghanis per one U.S. dollar (cash rate as of June 1, 2020).
  - Gross international reserves (memorandum): 2018: 8,273; 2019: 8,573; 2020 (Est.): 8,249; 2020 (RCF): 8,896; 2021 (Proj.): 8,149; 2022 (Proj.): 8,788; 2023 (Proj.): 8,688 (millions of U.S. dollars).
  - Staff considers reserves broadly adequate given Afghanistan’s risk profile; an adjusted metric (100 percent of currency in circulation, all foreign currency deposits, and three months of imports) used.
  - At end-July reserves: $9.3 billion (source note above).
- Debt outlook:
  - Despite low public debt, Afghanistan’s risk of debt distress is “high”.
  - Public debt projected to remain at about 10 percent of GDP by end-2025 even with pandemic-related increases; remain below 25 percent of GDP in the long term under assumptions.
  - High risk arises because, as grants are replaced with loans, the debt service to exports indicator breaches its threshold in the 2030s.
  - Authorities preparing to issue sukuk next year to tap domestic savings and catalyze debt market development.
- Monetary policy stance:
  - DAB to target reserve money with capital notes and foreign exchange auctions as primary tools to achieve price stability.
  - DAB will let the exchange rate move freely in response to external shocks while exercising prudence on foreign exchange sales.
  - DAB inflation objective: keep headline inflation in the range of 2–8 percent.
  - Reserve money growth targets: 12.4 percent in 2020 and 10.9 percent in 2021.

### Financial sector stability and banking measures
- Banking sector conditions:
  - Fallout from the pandemic intensifying strains in weak banks; NPLs rose since the beginning of the year.
  - No liquidity pressures so far owing to sector high liquidity and DAB actions.
  - Gross loans declined, mainly due to charge-offs.
- DAB emergency and post-pandemic measures:
  - March emergency measures: freeze on loan classification; suspended enforcement of prudential requirements; delayed implementation of IFRS 9 to June 2021.
  - DAB ended the freeze on loan classifications on July 1 and recommenced enforcement of prudential requirements while exercising flexibility on penalties.
  - Post-pandemic sector recovery plan: unwinding emergency measures, suspending dividend payouts by all banks, encouraging credit access via digital means.
  - High-risk banks subject to dedicated recovery, capital augmentation, and governance strengthening monitored by DAB.
  - WB-funded capitalization of the Credit Guarantee Fund to provide partial credit guarantee for SME loans.
  - Establishment of a dedicated DAB department to strengthen consumer protection and financial literacy.
  - IMF TA requested to upgrade framework for early intervention, resolution, and crisis management; DAB updating contingency plans and establishing a unit to oversee winding down of defunct institutions.
- Nonbank sector:
  - Phased corporatization of MSPs and FXDs over three years; new NBFSD established to supervise MSPs, FXDs, corporate money services, and EMIs.
  - AML/CFT work: 2019 NRA to be published by end-2020; DAB to prepare national AML/CFT strategy by September 2021; all banks to undergo AML/CFT examinations by year-end.

### Structural reforms, revenue mobilization, and VAT
- Domestic revenue strategy:
  - Revenue mobilization underpinned by post-pandemic recovery in compliance, VAT introduction in 2022, and fees from pipeline and power transmission projects starting in 2023.
  - Domestic revenue rose by 3 percentage points of GDP in 2016–19 mostly due to one-offs; collection remains below potential, especially in customs.
  - Measures: targeted and graduated collection methodologies (first review SB), risk profiles for large taxpayers, automating tax filing and collection.
- VAT reform:
  - VAT implementation postponed from 2021 to 2022 in view of the pandemic.
  - Proposed 10 percent VAT to replace Business Receipt Tax (BRT), could yield 1.2 percent of GDP net revenue.
  - Authorities requested IMF TA to update VAT yield estimate and consider a simple tax scheme for taxpayers below the VAT threshold.
  - To mitigate impact on poor, authorities have exempted a number of basic goods and will study compensatory spending measures.
- Customs reform and anti-leakage:
  - 2019 actions: developed multi-criteria risk profiles; recommended removal of licenses for 123 noncompliant trading companies (through June).
  - Planned: enhance risk analysis by mid-2021; launch mobile verification teams; transit vehicle tracking; link tax and customs systems with warehouse records, appeals, core banking, and DAB for e-payment; strengthen internal control and merit-based recruitment with WB support.

### Governance, anti-corruption, transparency, and procurement
- Anti-corruption and transparency measures:
  - Build on gains in legal and institutional frameworks; operationalize and build capacity of anti-corruption institutions; boost asset declaration regime effectiveness; strengthen accountability of public spending, including pandemic response.
  - Prior actions and commitments:
    - Public procurement prior action on September 30, 2020: from November, all bidders must submit beneficial owner information to the National Procurement Agency (NPA); NPA to publish beneficial ownership information of winning bidders within 30 days of contract signing.
    - Government intends to publish its first quarterly report on pandemic spending by end-October.
    - SAO to audit select pandemic spending and publish audit reports by June 2021.
    - AOP to complete systematic digitalization of all current year asset declarations in machine-readable format and publish declarations by end-September 2021.
    - Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to be fully staffed by March 2021 and begin operations in June 2021.
  - Beneficial ownership and FATF compliance: rules for politically exposed persons by June 2021.
- Public financial management:
  - Public expenditure review (PER) scheduled for 2021.
  - New civil service pay policy to be implemented in the Ministry of Finance first; automated payroll verification.
  - New PIM regulations to be adopted by end-2020 to institutionalize Project Evaluation Committee and mandate rule-based project selection.
  - Plan to have 2020 financial statements of the five largest SOEs audited externally by September 2021 and prepare a report on SOE financial performance by end-2021.

### Debt sustainability assessment (DSA) and policy implications
- DSA judgment: Afghanistan’s risk of external and overall debt distress is high.
- Aid dependence: donor grants of about 40 percent of GDP finance underlying fiscal and external deficits.
- Long-run risk driver: projected shift from grants toward debt financing causes PV of debt-to-exports ratio to breach thresholds in the 2030s.
- Public debt trajectory:
  - Public debt projected: 2018: 7.4; 2019: 6.1; 2020 (Est.): 8.7; 2020 (RCF): 7.7; 2021 (Proj.): 8.9; 2022 (Proj.): 9.0 (percent of GDP).
- Downside risks: political uncertainty, insecurity, faster-than-expected drop in aid, severe weather shocks.
- Policy recommendations from DSA:
  - Mobilize domestic revenue.
  - Enhance effectiveness of public spending.
  - Strengthen management of fiscal risks from SOCs and PPPs.
  - Strengthen debt management and develop domestic debt market (sukuk).
  - Ensure external borrowing is concessional (grant element at least 35 percent).

### Monitoring, performance criteria, and reporting
- Program monitoring:
  - Quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets for December 2020, June 2021, and December 2021 include floors on NIR, ceilings on reserve money, ceiling on DAB’s net credit to central government (NCG), continuous ceilings on new nonconcessional external debt, and prohibition on external payment arrears.
  - Additional indicative targets: ceiling on operating budget deficit excluding grants; floors on revenue, Treasury discretionary cash balance, and social and priority spending.
  - Test dates: December 21, 2020; June 21, 2021; December 21, 2021; June 21, 2022; December 21, 2022; June 21, 2023.
  - Reviews scheduled: first review on or after April 21, 2021; second on or after October 20, 2021; third on or after April 20, 2022.
- Reporting requirements (selected):
  - DAB net international reserves: weekly (lag: no later than one week).
  - Monetary statistics: biweekly (lag: no later than ten days).
  - Core budget operations: monthly (lag: no later than four weeks).
  - External debt data: quarterly (lag: no later than six weeks).
  - CPI: monthly (lag: four weeks).
  - Financial Stability Indicators and bank-level reports: monthly (lag: one month).
  - Quarterly structural-benchmark progress reports by MoF and DAB.

### Risks, scenarios, and contingent measures
- Main risks to outlook:
  - Deeper and more prolonged pandemic; uncertain security conditions; potential shortfalls in donor grants; political uncertainty; ongoing conflict; fragilities.
- Conjunctural shock scenario (pandemic intensifies):
  - Would deepen 2020 recession, make 2021 recovery shallower, plummet revenues, increase pandemic spending, widen 2020-21 budget deficits, and amplify financing needs.
  - Possible mitigating measures: ensure health sector resourced; maintain macro stability; mobilize external grant financing; curtail nonessential spending; accelerate structural reforms when feasible.
- Contingency fiscal response if crisis persists into early 2021:
  - Use November pledging conference to request increased grants or frontloading; shift expenditure to priority areas; introduce one-off revenue measures.
- Other selected risks from Risk Assessment Matrix:
  - Widespread social discontent and political instability (Likelihood: High; Impact: High).
  - Intensified geopolitical tensions and security risks (Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium).
  - Climate change and natural disasters (Likelihood: Medium/ Low; Impact: Medium).
  - Deeper-than-expected decline in aid inflows (Likelihood: Medium; Impact: High).

### Staff recommendation, macro projections, and key statistics (verbatim projections and select series)
- Staff supports authorities’ request for a three-and-a-half-year ECF with access of SDR 259.04 million (80 percent of quota).
- Real GDP:
  - 2018: 1.2
  - 2019: 3.9
  - 2020 (Est., RCF): -3.0
  - 2020 (Proj., RCF): -5.0
  - 2021 (Proj.): 4.5
  - 2022 (Proj.): 4.0
- Consumer prices (period average):
  - 2018: 0.6
  - 2019: 2.3
  - 2020 (Est.): 5.4
  - 2020 (RCF): 4.8
  - 2021 (Proj.): 4.5
  - 2022 (Proj.): 4.8
- Domestic revenues (percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 14.3
  - 2019: 14.1
  - 2020 (Est.): 10.2
  - 2020 (RCF): 12.1
  - 2021 (Proj.): 12.6
  - 2022 (Proj.): 12.0
- Overall balance (including grants):
  - 2018: 1.6
  - 2019: -1.1
  - 2020 (Est.): -3.5
  - 2020 (RCF): -3.0
  - 2021 (Proj.): -1.4
  - 2022 (Proj.): -2.2
- External financing requirement and identified financing (selected):
  - Gross financing requirement 2020: 5,853 (millions of U.S. dollars).
  - Financing gap 2020: 903 (millions of U.S. dollars).
  - Identified provisional financing for 2020: IMF RCF and ECF: 338; Other IFIs and bilateral donors: 557; Grant for debt relief under CCRT: 57; DSSI: 400.

### Key structural benchmarks and prior actions (selected)
- Prior action met on September 30, 2020: NPA revised procurement regulations to require collection and publication of beneficial ownership information starting November 1, 2020.
- Structural benchmarks candidates (dates and rationale, verbatim items include):
  - SAO to undertake audits of select COVID-19 emergency spending and publish audit reports — Date: End-June 2021 — Area: Governance, anti-corruption.
  - Government to submit to parliament amendments to the VAT Law to eliminate the BRT — Date: End-June 2021 — Area: Fiscal.
  - Afghanistan Customs Department to enhance multi-criteria risk profiles and implement across all customs offices — Date: End-June 2021 — Area: Fiscal.
  - Afghanistan Revenue Department to introduce risk differentiation framework and create risk profiles for all large taxpayers — Date: End-September 2021 — Area: Fiscal.
  - AOP to complete systematic digitalization of current year asset declarations and publish them — Date: End-September 2021 — Area: Governance, anti-corruption.

### COVID-19 response: actions, coverage, and social relief
- Epidemiological snapshot as of September 15:
  - 38,815 COVID-19 cases
  - 1,426 deaths
  - 32,098 recoveries
  - Daily new recorded cases averaged about 130 in recent weeks.
- Government relief and programs:
  - Bread provision program launched in April; ended in June.
  - Waived electricity bills of less than Af 1,000 ($13) for a family residence in Kabul for two months; paid utility bills of previous two months for half of city’s households.
  - World Bank-funded social distribution program (REACH) of 1.5 percent of GDP targeting households with incomes of $2 per day or less; coverage about 90 percent of households.
  - Government allocated $160 million for short-term employment programs and agriculture.
- Policy implications: need to ensure effectiveness and transparency of pandemic spending; publish quarterly report and undertake SAO audits to avoid misuse and mitigate corruption vulnerabilities.

_This summary is derived from Annex I, MEFP excerpts, and accompanying tables and annexes in the IMF document content unit 1afgea2020003._

### Annex I

### Annex I — Recent Economic Developments

### Recent economic impact of conflict and COVID-19
- The armed conflict and fragility have hindered development: security spending of 30 percent of GDP annually; growth weak; unemployment high; poverty rose to 55 percent in 2017 from 39 percent in 2013.  
- Afghanistan depends heavily on aid: grants of about 40 percent of GDP, about two thirds security-related, finance most underlying fiscal and current account deficits. Current aid commitments expire by year-end; donor conference scheduled for November 23-24 where pledges for 2021–24 will be made.  
- The COVID-19 pandemic inflicted heavy damage: the pandemic and containment measures led to a collapse in economic activity in the first half of the year. With easing of containment since late May, activity is regaining footing. Assuming infections don’t intensify, output is expected to contract by 5 percent this year, down from 3.9 percent growth in 2019.  
- Inflation and food security: inflation spiked to 8.7 percent in April due to border closures and panic buying; CPI growth moderated to 5.9 percent by end-August as resumed trade and a new harvest boosted foodstuffs supply. Food’s share in the consumption basket has likely risen, implying headline inflation may be higher for many households.  
- Poverty and livelihoods: World Bank estimates suggest vulnerable employment and poverty effects—about 25 percent employment vulnerable per World Bank in cited estimate; the World Bank indicates poverty rate likely increased to 61–72 percent.  
- Health system capacity: pandemic exposed long-standing weaknesses in the health system and limited capacity; health infrastructure indicators referenced (hospital beds per 100,000; doctors per 100,000; Composite Health Security Index).

### Fiscal and external developments
- Fiscal deterioration related to the pandemic:
  - Tax revenue dropped by 40 percent in April–May year-on-year, in part due to 45-day extension of first quarter tax filing.  
  - The shortfall was partially offset by transfer of Af 12.8 billion of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) profits.  
  - Urgent health and social spending amounted to 1.3 percent of GDP through June.  
  - The overall budget deficit in January–June widened to 1.6 percent of 2020 GDP.  
  - Revenue for January–September stood at 83 percent of the last year’s level.  
- Balance of payments:
  - Border closures and disruption of air corridors hit exports; remittances fell as workers returned from host countries, especially oil exporters.  
  - Imports held up due to essentials, medical supplies, and aid-financed imports.  
  - The current account deficit before grants is projected to widen to 31 percent of GDP this year.  
  - It will be financed by official grants of about 43 percent of GDP, with the increase over 2019 due to COVID-related aid.  
- External financing needs and program financing:
  - Authorities requested an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. Staff proposes an 80 percent of quota (about $370 million), three and-a-half year ECF arrangement with semi-annual reviews.  
  - Financing under the arrangement will help address a protracted balance of payment need, estimated at about $1.1 billion over 2020–23.  
  - Afghanistan’s IMF quota is SDR 323.80 million.

### Program objectives, design, and policy content
- Program goals:
  - Preserve macroeconomic stability and create conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth; support recovery from the pandemic; catalyze donor aid commitments; and address a protracted balance of payments need.  
  - Program anchored on Afghanistan’s National Development Framework II (authorities’ development strategy under preparation for the November donor conference).  
- Program design features:
  - Accommodates spending to mitigate the pandemic and its socioeconomic impact while providing a macroeconomic setting to exit the COVID-19 crisis.  
  - Focus will shift in recovery to reversing fiscal deterioration and addressing fragilities hindering sustainable growth and equitable social outcomes.  
  - Streamlined conditionality, measured deadlines for structural benchmarks, and flexibility to adapt to changing environment and shocks.  
- Macro-financial stability measures:
  - Maintain prudent fiscal policy, stable inflation with a flexible exchange rate, and a healthy financial sector.  
  - Sustain efforts to preserve financial sector stability in the post-COVID environment; maintain low debt, a prudent Treasury cash balance, and an adequate level of international reserves.  
- Fiscal reforms and public financial management:
  - Revenue mobilization supported by VAT adoption in 2022 and post-pandemic recovery in compliance underpinned by reforms to improve tax and customs administration.  
  - Expenditure priorities include a new civil service pay policy, a public expenditure review, and strengthened management of state-owned assets and liabilities.  
- Financial sector reforms:
  - Reform state-owned commercial banks, reduce informality in the sector, bolster regulatory and supervisory frameworks, including enhanced AML/CFT oversight.  
- Governance and anti-corruption measures:
  - Build on recent gains in legal and institutional anti-corruption frameworks. Reforms to operationalize and build capacity of anti-corruption institutions, boost effectiveness of the asset declaration regime, and strengthen accountability of public spending, including pandemic response.  
- Social safety net:
  - Landmark reforms include VAT implementation, strengthening the anti-corruption regime, and, subject to fiscal space and donor support, building a social safety net over the medium term.

### Risks, implementation capacity, and staff assessment
- Key risks to the outlook:
  - Deeper and more prolonged impact of the pandemic; uncertain security conditions; potential shortfalls in donor grants.  
  - Political uncertainty, ongoing conflict, and longstanding fragilities could complicate program implementation, lower growth, and widen financing gaps.  
- Program implementation considerations:
  - Capacity to repay the Fund judged adequate.  
  - Continued ownership, capacity development, and sustained donor aid are critical for program success.  
  - Program faces substantial risks given pandemic impact, fragilities, political uncertainty, and conflict; design allows flexibility and streamlined conditionality to adapt.

*Source: Annex I, "Recent Economic Developments", from the IMF document titled "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN: REQUEST FOR A 42-MONTH ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY — Executive Summary, October 22, 2020."*

### 10.      The Afghani has been broadly stable against the U.S. dollar, and DAB’s international

### 10.      The Afghani has been broadly stable against the U.S. dollar, and DAB’s international

### Exchange rate, foreign exchange supply, and reserves
- Subdued activity lowered demand for foreign exchange while supply was boosted as households and returning migrants used foreign exchange savings to supplement lost income.
- With DAB’s foreign exchange sales reduced, large official inflows fueled reserve accumulation.
- Staff considers reserves to be broadly adequate given the Afghanistan’s risk profile which the traditional reserve metric does not capture well.
- An adjusted metric—comprising 100 percent of currency in circulation, all foreign currency deposits, and three months of imports—accounts better for downside risks, including from fragility, insecurity, and faster-than-expected decline in aid.
- Gross international reserves:
  - At $9.3 b illion at end-July
  - Are about 1 22 percent of the adjusted metric

### Banking sector and financial stability
- The fallout from the pandemic is intensifying strains in weak banks.
- There have been no liquidity pressures thanks to the sector’s high liquidity and DAB’s timely actions.
- The banking sector faces weak assets and profitability, partly due to banks’ limited financial intermediation.
- March emergency measures by DAB:
  - Freeze on loan classification
  - Suspended enforcement of prudential requirements
  - Delayed implementation of IFRS 9 to June 2021
- NPLs rose since the beginning of the year as some banks applied internal loan classification rules or adopted IFRS 9 ahead of the revised deadline.
- DAB actions and oversight:
  - Enhanced monitoring; ready to intervene
  - Supported resumption of enforcement of prudential requirements while exercising flexibility in penalties and prudential triggers
  - Implementing a post-pandemic sector recovery plan including unwinding emergency measures, suspending dividend payouts by all banks, and encouraging credit access via digital means
  - WB-funded capitalization of the Credit Guarantee Fund to provide partial credit guarantee for SME loans
  - Establishment of a dedicated DAB department to strengthen consumer protection and financial literacy
  - High-risk banks subject to dedicated post-pandemic recovery, capital augmentation, and governance strengthening monitored by DAB
  - IMF TA requested to upgrade framework for early intervention, resolution, and crisis management
  - DAB updating contingency plans and establishing a unit to oversee winding down of defunct institutions

### Outlook and risks
- Baseline growth outlook:
  - Output could return close to the pre-pandemic level in the fourth quarter, implying a 5 percent contraction in 2020.
  - Growth could rebound to 4 percent in 2021.
  - Medium-term growth could settle at 4.0–4.5 percent, assuming no significant security deterioration, continued reforms, and sustained aid.
- External position:
  - Current account deficit without grants expected to improve due to sustained exports growth and expansion of domestic production substituting imports.
  - Current account surplus after grants would shrink as aid is projected to decline.
- Main risks:
  - Depth and duration of the pandemic (see Annex II): an intensification before year-end would deepen the 2020 recession, make 2021 recovery shallower, plummet revenues, increase pandemic spending, widen 2020-21 budget deficits, and amplify financing needs.
  - Fragilities related to peace negotiations outcome, possible shortfalls in aid, reform fatigue, adverse regional security developments.
  - Vulnerability to natural disasters: floods, droughts, and earthquakes.
- Policy response implication:
  - A strong policy response, possibly with emergency revenue measures, and larger donor support would be required if pandemic intensifies to finance government operations, including health and social spending.

### Extended Credit Facility — Strategic issues and program design
- 2016–19 ECF arrangement contributed to macroeconomic stability and improved economic governance but growth disappointed due to 2018 drought, armed conflict, political upheaval, weak governance, and constraints to doing business.
- Authorities finalizing 2021–25 development strategy (ANPDF II), to be presented at the November conference; ANPDF II has two phases: transition from pandemic containment to recovery, then support growth that creates jobs, reduces poverty, and facilitates human capital accumulation.
- Labor market challenge:
  - Nearly 500,000 Afghans entering the labor force yearly; strong private sector-led growth required to absorb them.
- Growth potential sectors:
  - Agriculture (accounts for a quarter of GDP and employs 40 percent of the workforce)
  - Services
  - Mining (conditional on security and governance)
- Climate vulnerability:
  - Given vulnerabilities to climate change, especially in agriculture, climate adaptation and mitigation designated among selection criteria for public projects.

### Program pillars and priorities
- Program objectives: restoring and preserving macro-financial stability and supporting sustainable growth and poverty reduction.
- Two pillars:
  1. Macroeconomic framework to navigate the crisis and create conditions for recovery.
  2. Address structural fragilities obstructing sustainable and inclusive growth and equitable social outcomes.
- Program focus areas: mobilize domestic revenue, improve quality of public spending, bolster the financial sector, support anti-corruption efforts.
- Landmark reforms include VAT implementation, strengthening the anti-corruption regime, and, subject to fiscal space and donor support, building a social safety net.
- Implementation considerations:
  - Strong ownership, sustained donor aid, and prioritization critical for success.
  - Only four structural benchmarks (SB) for the first review due to capacity limitations.
  - Performance criteria feature adjustors and buffers given elevated uncertainty.

### First pillar — Macro-financial stability: Fiscal policy
- Pandemic-related fiscal measures and mid-year budget:
  - Draft mid-year budget envisages about 3.0 percent of GDP spending on COVID-19 in 2020, with about 60 percent directed to healthcare and social protection.
  - Authorities rolling out a 1.5 percent of GDP social relief package financed by the WB, of which two-thirds will be executed this year.
  - Targeting households with incomes of $2 per day or lower (twice the national poverty line); about 90 percent of households fall under this cut-off.
  - Budget includes outlays for agriculture to boost domestic food security and compensate for loss of exports.
- Fiscal targets and adjustments:
  - Authorities will target a 3.0 percent of GDP fiscal deficit this year.
  - Revenue expected to recover through gradual pick-up in activity and because no extensions were granted for the second and subsequent quarter tax filings.
  - Authorities cutting lower-priority spending (O&M, vehicle purchases, renovations, travel, etc.) and raising fees from the Telecom sector.
  - ECF disbursements in 2020–21 will be directed to the budget to ease financing constraints; without ECF disbursements government would need to tighten fiscal stance or risk exhausting Treasury cash balances.
- Mid-year Budget Amendment proposed measures (selected numeric items preserved exactly as in source):
  - Revenue: 31.8 2.2
  - Domestic Revenue: 17.3 1.2
  - DAB profits transfer: 12.8 0.9
  - Fees from Afghan Telecom: 2.00.1
  - Fees collected by the Afghan Telecommunication Regulatory Authority: 1.00.1
  - Other one-off revenues: 1.50.1
  - The World Bank's grants to finance social distribution program (REACH): 14.6 1.0
  - Expenditure: 40.5 2.8
  - Covid-19-related expenditure: 42.6 2.9
  - Of which for health: 6.6 0.4
  - Building hospitals and purchasing beds: 1.8 0.1
  - Other health outlays: 4.8 0.3
  - Of which for social: 17.4 1.2
  - Bread distribution: 2.8 0.2
  - World Bank-supported social distribution program (REACH): 14.6 1.0
  - Of which for others: 18.7 1.3
  - Short-term employment program: 6.7 0.5
  - Measures to expedite the supply of agricultural commodities: 5.9 0.4
  - Transfers to provinces to fight COVID-19: 2.3 0.2
  - Wheat purchase program: 1.7 0.1
  - Other outlays: 2.1 0.1
  - Other additional expenditure: 13.0 0.9
  - Operating expenditure: 8.3 0.6
  - Development expenditure: 4.7 0.3
  - Expenditure cuts: -15.1 -1.0
  - Operating expenditure: -9.6 -0.7
  - Development expenditure: -5.5 -0.4
  - Net impact on the budget deficit: 8.7 0.6
  - Memorandum: Nominal GDP 1465.9
- FY2021 target:
  - Authorities will cap the FY2021 deficit at 2.2 percent of GDP.
  - Pandemic spending projected at about 2 percent of GDP in FY2021, including the WB-financed social support program.
- Medium-term fiscal framework:
  - Aim to improve operating balance excluding grants and bring overall deficit to under one percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Protect development spending while mobilizing domestic revenue.
- Social protection:
  - Authorities increasing pro-poor spending from 3.7 percent of GDP in 2019 to 5.3 percent of GDP in 2020 and 4.7 percent of GDP in 2021 (indicative targets).
  - Plan to build a targeted social safety net with donor technical and financial assistance.

### First pillar — Macroeconomic stability: Debt and monetary policy
- Debt outlook:
  - Despite low public debt, Afghanistan’s risk of debt distress is “high”.
  - Public debt would remain at about 10 percent of GDP by end-2025 even with pandemic-related increases.
  - Public debt would remain below 25 percent of GDP in the long term given small fiscal deficits (under 1 percent of GDP) projected over the medium term and commitment to borrow on concessional terms.
  - High risk of debt distress arises because, as grants are replaced with loans, the debt service to exports indicator breaches its threshold under the baseline in the 2030s.
  - Government preparing to issue sukuk next year to tap domestic savings and catalyze debt market development.
- Monetary policy:
  - DAB should continue strengthening effectiveness of monetary policy.
  - With constrained monetary transmission, DAB will continue to target reserve money—with capital notes and foreign exchange auctions as primary policy tools—to achieve price stability.
  - DAB will let the exchange rate move freely in response to external shocks while exercising due prudence on foreign exchange sales.
  - Enhancing DAB’s monetary policy toolkit and communication and increasing use of the Afghani are priorities to improve monetary transmission and anchor inflation expectations.
  - Over time DAB may rely more on Afghani-denominated instruments for monetary policy operations, although continued foreign exchange supply to the market is expected as large official inflows are channeled through the budget.

### Second pillar — Structural reforms (fiscal and revenue mobilization)
- Domestic revenue:
  - Raising domestic revenue key to reduce aid dependence and meet development needs.
  - Domestic revenue rose by 3 percentage points of GDP in 2016–19, but mostly due to one-offs; collection remains below potential, especially in customs.
  - Revenue mobilization under the program will be underpinned by post-pandemic recovery in compliance, VAT introduction in 2022, and starting in 2023 fees from pipeline and power transmission projects.
  - Measures include targeted and graduated collection methodologies to boost taxpayer compliance (first review SB), creating risk profiles for large taxpayers, and automating tax filing and collection.
- VAT reform:
  - VAT implementation postponed from 2021 to 2022 in view of the pandemic and in consultation with IMF, WB, and EU.
  - Proposed 10 percent VAT would replace the cascading business receipt tax (BRT) and could yield 1.2 percent of GDP net revenue while eliminating BRT’s distortions.
  - Authorities requested IMF TA to update VAT yield estimate and will consider a simple tax scheme for taxpayers below the VAT threshold to keep them under the tax net when BRT abolished.
  - To mitigate impact on the poor, authorities have exempted a number of basic goods and will study need for compensatory spending measures.

*Source: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.*

### 34.      Significant leakages in customs should be reduced (MEFP ¶27–31). The Customs

### 34.      Significant leakages in customs should be reduced (MEFP ¶27–31)

### Customs reform and anti-leakage measures
- Action plan objectives: encourage compliance, facilitate cross-border and transit trade, modernize customs and its workforce.
- 2019 actions:
  - Developed multi-criteria risk profiles for major crossing points and inland customs offices to detect noncompliance through better targeting.
  - Recommended removal of licenses for 123 noncompliant trading companies (through June).
- Planned enhancements:
  - Enhance risk analysis by mid-2021 to better identify high-risk traders and shipments.
  - Launch mobile verification teams, transit vehicle tracking, and trader identity verification.
  - Further automation of customs processes to improve information exchange with customs of trading partners, detection of fraud, and internal risk management.
  - Link tax and customs administration systems with:
    - warehouse inventory records,
    - the appeal process,
    - the core banking system and DAB to facilitate e-payment.
  - Strengthen internal control and adopt merit-based recruitment with WB support to improve workforce integrity and reduce corruption.

### Public financial management, budget planning, and oversight
- Public expenditure and civil service reforms:
  - Public expenditure review (PER) with a medium-term perspective scheduled for 2021 to establish top-down parameters for savings and aid strategic allocation of public resources (MEFP ¶33, 34, 35).
  - New 2019 civil service pay policy to be implemented in the Ministry of Finance first; links compensation with verified competencies and will be supported by an automated payment system for payroll verification.
  - Define eligible purposes and establish reporting requirements for contingency reserves (budgeted up to 3 percent of spending) by end-2020.
  - New SAO law, once implemented, will strengthen SAO’s authority and capacity to evaluate public finances.
- PFM functionality and project selection:
  - Need to advance sectoral and project prioritization to align budget with national priority programs; supported by Fiscal Strategy Paper (FSP).
  - Initial implementation in the Ministries of Public Health and Education.
  - New public investment management (PIM) regulations to be adopted by end-2020 to institutionalize Project Evaluation Committee and mandate rule-based project selection.
- Oversight of public entities and fiscal risks:
  - Need to strengthen management of fiscal risks and contingent liabilities from PPPs; creation of an integrated database of public investments and PPP projects including life-cycle service payments and contingent commitments.
  - MoF should be entrusted with strong budget and fiscal risk management authority at every stage of PPP project cycle.
  - SOE oversight: build capacity of MoF’s SOE department and collect relevant financial information.
  - Plan to have 2020 financial statements of the five largest SOEs audited externally by September 2021 and prepare a report on SOE financial performance by end-2021.
  - Analysis of fiscal risks from PPPs and SOEs to be included in the FY2022 FSP and budget.

### Financial sector reforms and AML/CFT
- State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs):
  - SOCBs hold over one-quarter of banking system's assets and pose quasi-fiscal risks; reforms to be stepped up (MEFP ¶38, 39).
  - High Economic Council announced merger of Bank-e-Millie Afghan and New Kabul Bank as part of reform strategy with WB support; contracting advisors for merger is the first review SB.
- Corporatization and supervision of nonbank institutions:
  - DAB implementing phased corporatization of money service providers and foreign exchange dealers over the next three years per U.S. Treasury TA.
  - Established a department to supervise nonbank financial institutions and is establishing regulatory and supervisory frameworks, including AML/CFT, to prevent unlicensed operations.
- AML/CFT measures:
  - 2019 AML/CFT National Risk Assessment (NRA) will be published by end-2020 and will inform a national action plan through 2023.
  - By September 2021, DAB will prepare a national AML/CFT strategy prioritizing risk mitigation measures.
  - All banks will undergo AML/CFT examinations by year-end, and nine nonbank institutions have been examined already.12
  - Formed interagency Oversight Committee to coordinate preparations for the 2022 AML/CFT assessment by the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

### Governance, anti-corruption, and transparency measures
- Progress and challenges:
  - National anti-corruption strategy developed, anti-corruption law enacted, institutions established, and asset declaration regime adopted under 2016–19 ECF; implementation remains tardy.
- Program reform priorities:
  - Improve operationalization and capacity of anti-corruption institutions, boost effectiveness of asset declaration regime, and strengthen accountability of public spending, including COVID-19 response.
  - Pandemic spending transparency:
    - Government intends to publish its first quarterly report on pandemic spending by end-October (RCF commitment).
    - Audit of select pandemic spending by the SAO and publication of audit reports to be completed by June 2021 (MEFP ¶48); audit will focus on large domestically financed items.
  - Public procurement prior action (PA) on September 30, 2020:
    - From November, all entities bidding for public contracts must submit beneficial owner information to the National Procurement Agency.
    - National Procurement Agency will publish beneficial ownership information of winning bidders within 30 days of contract signing (MEFP ¶48).
  - Beneficial ownership and FATF compliance:
    - Government making regulatory and institutional changes required by FATF; FATF standards to be used to develop rules applicable to politically exposed persons by June 2021 (MEFP ¶47).
  - Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC):
    - Operationalize ACC, fully staffed by March 2021 with civil society input and begin operations in June 2021 (MEFP ¶45).
    - ACC expected to take over handling of asset declarations pursuant to the Anti-Corruption Law.
    - Update National Strategy for Combating Corruption (dating back to November 2018) by March 2021.
  - Asset declaration regime enhancements:
    - Digitization and risk-based verification of declarations (MEFP ¶46).
    - Administrative Office of the President (AOP) to digitize current year declarations and publish senior officials’ declarations online in machine-readable format.
    - Continue work on improving and expanding public registries of land, property, and companies and integrating them with asset declaration regime.
    - Joint efforts by AOP, DAB, and donors to develop locally based training capacity on anti-corruption and asset declarations.
  - Criminal justice and prosecution improvements:
    - Review Penal Code to tighten pre-trial custody procedures and improve transparency of court proceedings.
    - Develop regulations and protocols to clarify coordination between Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) prosecutors and Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) inspectors and MCTF’s reporting line to the Minister of Interior (to formalize MCTF affiliation with ACJC).

### Business environment
- Constraints: insecurity, weak governance and institutions, infrastructure gaps limit transit hub potential and investment attractiveness.
- Remaining challenges: investment freedom (starting a business, enforcing contracts, quality of judicial proceedings), financial intermediation, quality of education, gender equality.
- Fund staff will support donors, particularly the WB, to help authorities improve the business climate (MEFP ¶44).

### Program modalities, access, phasing, and monitoring
- Access and phasing:
  - Access proposed at 80 percent of quota (SDR 259.04 million, about $370 million or 1.8 percent of GDP).
  - Phasing frontloaded in line with projected BOP needs (about $900 million in 2020–21).
  - 71 percent of access will be available at the approval and first review, with small, even disbursements in 2022–23.
- Use of disbursements:
  - Disbursements in 2020–21 directed to the budget.
  - Disbursements in 2022–23 directed to DAB.
- Fiscal and cash management:
  - Program sets an indicative floor of Af 10 billion on the Treasury’s discretionary cash balance.
- Monitoring and triggers:
  - Program performance monitored by semi-annual reviews using quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets, and SBs (MEFP Table 1, Table 2).
  - SBs for the second review: preliminary agreement reached on measures that could be proposed as SBs at next review; not proposed for IMF Executive Board approval at this time.
- Program risks and capacity:
  - Outlook subject to high uncertainty and substantial implementation risks given the pandemic, longstanding fragilities, and capacity challenges.
  - IMF TA to be mobilized to support implementation of structural reforms (Annex III, Table 2).
  - Capacity to repay:
    - IMF credit outstanding projected to peak at 7.6 percent of reserves in 2023-24.
    - Repayments projected at 4.8 percent of exports in 2027.
    - Under the most extreme downside scenario for exports in the DSA, repayments could reach 17 percent of exports in 2027.
  - Authorities’ track record of servicing IMF debt is strong.
- Parliamentary authorization:
  - Authorities seeking parliament’s authorization to request a disbursement.14
  - RCF disbursement initially rejected by Lower House, later approved by Upper House.
- Debt relief and DSSI:
  - Authorities received debt service suspension from bilateral creditors (0.02 percent of GDP of eligible debt service).
  - Afghanistan received first tranche (SDR 2.4 million) of debt service relief from IMF under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust and will receive the same amount under the second tranche.

### Financing assurances, donor support, and safeguards
- Donor support:
  - Donors supportive; baseline assumes gradual decline in grants with increased share disbursed to the budget.
  - Program fully financed for next 12 months, good prospects for remainder.
- DAB safeguards assessment:
  - 2020 safeguards assessment found capacity constraints and need to strengthen DAB’s autonomy, governance structure, and internal controls (MEFP ¶49).
  - Priority recommendation: enact amendments to DAB law (submitted to parliament in 2017 but not ratified) set as a first review SB.
  - Internal audit function should be modernized.
  - DAB and MoF signed Memorandum of Understanding clarifying responsibilities for holding and repaying RCF disbursement and prospective ECF disbursements directed to the budget.

### Staff appraisal and outlook
- Challenges:
  - Armed conflict, fragility, insecurity, political uncertainty, and weak institutions constrain development.
  - Average growth over past five years below population growth; many social indicators stagnated.
- Pandemic impact:
  - Pandemic amplified challenges, inflicted heavy damage to economy and livelihoods, and set back progress toward self-reliance.
  - Authorities’ response and donor support prevented a humanitarian crisis.
- Outlook scenarios:
  - If pandemic intensifies, recovery halts and fiscal and external financing needs increase sharply.
  - With political stability, good policies, and sustained donor support, growth after pandemic could settle at about 4 percent.
  - Lasting improvement in security with a peace agreement would materially lift development prospects.
- Purpose of Fund-supported program:
  - Support post-pandemic recovery and move toward self-reliance.
  - Preserve macro-financial stability, reverse fiscal deterioration caused by pandemic, protect development spending, maintain low debt and adequate international reserves, ensure price stability.
  - Structural reforms to improve fiscal governance, bolster financial sector stability, and combat corruption; focus on Fund’s comparative advantage and complement donor-supported reforms.
  - Frontloaded phasing of access justified by BOP needs from pandemic; conditionality streamlined relative to 2016–19 ECF given strained implementation capacity.
  - Continued realism in program design, agility in response to shocks, and capacity development essential to meet objectives.

*Source: IMF country document (MEFP excerpts).*

### 52.      The program allows a temporary fiscal loosening to boost pandemic spending and

### The program allows a temporary fiscal loosening to boost pandemic spending and accommodate revenue shortfalls.

### Fiscal policy and revenue mobilization
- The authorities have prioritized mitigating the social and economic impact of the pandemic in their revised 2020 budget targeting a 3.0 percent of GDP deficit.
- As the recovery gets underway, the program aims to:
  - Gradually bring the deficit down.
  - Rebuild government deposits.
- With grants projected to decline over the medium term, increasing much needed development and social spending will require mobilizing domestic revenue.
- These efforts are essential for decisively tackling poverty, including by establishing a social safety net in step with gaining ground on self-reliance.

### Fiscal structural reforms
- Resolute fiscal structural reform effort is essential for self-reliance.
- Revenue and customs administration reforms should focus on:
  - Boosting compliance.
  - Reducing leakages through better risk targeting, detection of fraud, and stronger internal control.
- Resuming, as soon as feasible, preparations for the VAT introduction in 2022 will be key to the success of this landmark reform.
- On the expenditure side, the program will support reforms to:
  - More closely align spending with national priorities.
  - Improve budget formulation, execution, and evaluation.
- Enhancing oversight of public entities and risks stemming from PPPs is identified as an essential next step in reforming public financial management.

### Monetary policy and central bank governance
- Monetary policy should remain focused on price stability with a flexible exchange rate serving as a shock absorber.
- Enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy and DAB’s communication in the context of macroeconomic stability would help anchor inflation expectations and boost confidence in the Afghani.
- Enacting the amendments to the DAB law aimed at strengthening its autonomy and governance structure will be essential to ensure that it can effectively pursue its price and financial stability mandates.

### Banking sector oversight and financial stability
- Rising strains in banks call for intensified oversight and timely intervention by DAB.
- A healthy banking sector with good governance and risk management practices is critical to support the post-pandemic recovery and the authorities’ goal of financial inclusion.
- Recommended actions:
  - Address weak banks in a timely manner, completing the special review of weak banks with priority given to high-risk banks.
  - Intensify implementation of SOCBs reforms, including progressing with the merger of Bank-e-Millie Afghan and New Kabul Bank.
  - Continue strengthening oversight, including AML/CFT, of the nonbank sector.

### Anti-corruption, transparency, and public financial governance
- Firm progress in anti-corruption reforms is needed to reassure domestic and external stakeholders.
- Focus areas:
  - Operationalizing relevant institutions.
  - Strengthening the effectiveness of prosecution of corruption offences.
  - Strengthening the use of the asset declaration regime and AML/CFT as anti-corruption tools.
- With planned digitization of asset declarations, the asset declaration regime should become a critical tool for civil servants’ accountability.
- The completion of the prior action on procurement signals the authorities’ commitment to strengthen governance of public spending.
- Authorities should ensure full accountability and transparency of pandemic spending, including:
  - Publishing the first quarterly report on such spending.
  - Commissioning its audit by the SAO.

### Private sector development and business environment
- Improving the business environment is critical for private sector-led growth.
- Needed measures include:
  - Easing regulations.
  - Strengthening property rights.
  - Boosting access to markets and finance.
  - Promoting gender equity to enable a vibrant private sector to emerge.

*Source: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (excerpts).*

### 58.      Staff supports the authorities’ request for a three-and-a-half-year arrangement under

### 1afgea2020003 - 58.      Staff supports the authorities’ request for a three-and-a-half-year arrangement under

### Staff recommendation and program request
- Staff supports the authorities’ request for a three-and-a-half-year arrangement under the ECF, with access of SDR 259.04 million (80 percent of Afghanistan’s quota).

### Macroeconomic outlook and growth projections
- Real GDP:
  - 2018: 1.2
  - 2019: 3.9
  - 2020 (Est., RCF): -3.0
  - 2020 (Proj., RCF): -5.0
  - 2021 (Proj.): 4.5
  - 2022 (Proj.): 4.0
- Nominal GDP (in billions of Afghanis):
  - 2018: 1,328
  - 2019: 1,470
  - 2020 (Est.): 1,548
  - 2020 (RCF): 1,466
  - 2021 (Proj.): 1,690
  - 2022 (Proj.): 1,598
- Nominal GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2018: 18.4
  - 2019: 18.9
  - 2020 (Est.): 18.9
  - 2020 (RCF): 19.0
  - 2021 (Proj.): 19.9
  - 2022 (Proj.): 20.0
- Consumer prices (period average):
  - 2018: 0.6
  - 2019: 2.3
  - 2020 (Est.): 5.4
  - 2020 (RCF): 4.8
  - 2021 (Proj.): 4.5
  - 2022 (Proj.): 4.8
- Consumer prices (end of period):
  - 2018: 0.8
  - 2019: 2.8
  - 2020 (Est.): 4.5
  - 2020 (RCF): 5.0
  - 2021 (Proj.): 5.0
  - 2022 (Proj.): 4.5

### Public finances (central government)
- Domestic revenues and grants (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 30.6
  - 2019: 26.9
  - 2020 (Est.): 25.5
  - 2020 (RCF): 30.3
  - 2021 (Proj.): 25.9
  - 2022 (Proj.): 26.0
- Domestic revenues (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 14.3
  - 2019: 14.1
  - 2020 (Est.): 10.2
  - 2020 (RCF): 12.1
  - 2021 (Proj.): 12.6
  - 2022 (Proj.): 12.0
- On-budget grants (excl. donors' direct spending outside the budget) (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 16.3
  - 2019: 12.9
  - 2020 (Est.): 15.3
  - 2020 (RCF): 18.2
  - 2021 (Proj.): 13.3
  - 2022 (Proj.): 14.0
- Expenditures (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 28.9
  - 2019: 28.0
  - 2020 (Est.): 28.9
  - 2020 (RCF): 33.3
  - 2021 (Proj.): 27.3
  - 2022 (Proj.): 28.2
- Operating (central government, in percent of GDP) 2/:
  - 2018: 19.4
  - 2019: 18.5
  - 2020 (Est.): 21.8
  - 2020 (RCF): 21.8
  - 2021 (Proj.): 18.6
  - 2022 (Proj.): 19.3
- Development (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 9.5
  - 2019: 9.5
  - 2020 (Est.): 7.1
  - 2020 (RCF): 11.6
  - 2021 (Proj.): 8.7
  - 2022 (Proj.): 8.9
- Operating balance (excluding grants) defined as domestic revenues minus operating expenditures 3/:
  - 2018: -5.1
  - 2019: -4.5
  - 2020 (Est.): -11.7
  - 2020 (RCF): -9.6
  - 2021 (Proj.): -6.0
  - 2022 (Proj.): -7.3
- Overall balance (including grants):
  - 2018: 1.6
  - 2019: -1.1
  - 2020 (Est.): -3.5
  - 2020 (RCF): -3.0
  - 2021 (Proj.): -1.4
  - 2022 (Proj.): -2.2
- Public debt (public sector only; incorporates committed but not yet delivered debt relief) (percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 7.4
  - 2019: 6.1
  - 2020 (Est.): 8.7
  - 2020 (RCF): 7.7
  - 2021 (Proj.): 8.9
  - 2022 (Proj.): 9.0

### Monetary sector and central bank (DAB)
- Reserve money (levels in Afghanis):
  - 2018: 333.2
  - 2019: 368.6
  - 2020 (Est., RCF): 407.6
  - 2020 (RCF, Proj.): 414.4
  - 2021 (Proj.): 445.0
  - 2022 (Proj.): 459.7
  - 2023 (Proj.): 508.1
- Currency in circulation (levels in Afghanis):
  - 2018: 228.2
  - 2019: 259.3
  - 2020 (Est.): 276.2
  - 2020 (RCF): 297.5
  - 2021 (Proj.): 303.8
  - 2022 (Proj.): 327.2
- Broad money (M2) (levels in Afghanis):
  - 2018: 486.0
  - 2019: 513.7
  - 2020 (Est.): 535.0
  - 2020 (RCF): 565.1
  - 2021 (Proj.): 563.1
  - 2022 (Proj.): 626.1
  - 2023 (Proj.): 696.3
- Interest rate, 28-day capital note (in percent):
  - 2018: 3.0
  - 2019: 3.0

### Financial sector indicators and balance sheet highlights
- Central bank net foreign assets (in billions of Afghanis):
  - 2018: 608.2
  - 2019: 659.8
  - 2020 (Est.): 699.2
  - 2020 (RCF): 654.3
  - 2021 (Proj.): 701.2
  - 2022 (Proj.): 661.7
  - 2023 (Proj.): 670.6
- Gross international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars) – memorandum items:
  - 2018: 8,273
  - 2019: 8,573
  - 2020 (Est.): 8,249
  - 2020 (RCF): 8,896
  - 2021 (Proj.): 8,149
  - 2022 (Proj.): 8,788
  - 2023 (Proj.): 8,688
- Import coverage of reserves (in months of next year's import of goods and services):
  - 2018: 13.5
  - 2019: 14.5
  - 2020 (Est.): 12.5
  - 2020 (RCF): 14.3
  - 2021 (Proj.): 13.9
  - 2022 (Proj.): 13.9
  - 2023 (Proj.): 13.4

### External sector, trade, and financing
- Exports of goods (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2018: 875
  - 2019: 864
  - 2020 (Est.): 641
  - 2020 (RCF): 558
  - 2021 (Proj.): 831
  - 2022 (Proj.): 747
- Imports of goods (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2018: 6,596
  - 2019: 6,158
  - 2020 (Est.): 6,408
  - 2020 (RCF): 6,009
  - 2021 (Proj.): 6,507
  - 2022 (Proj.): 6,285
- Merchandise trade balance (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: -31.1
  - 2019: -28.0
  - 2020 (Est.): -30.6
  - 2020 (RCF): -28.6
  - 2021 (Proj.): -28.6
  - 2022 (Proj.): -27.7
- Current account balance (excluding official transfers) (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: -31.4
  - 2019: -27.0
  - 2020 (Est.): -33.4
  - 2020 (RCF): -30.6
  - 2021 (Proj.): -30.2
  - 2022 (Proj.): -28.5
- Current account balance (including official transfers) (in percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 12.2
  - 2019: 11.7
  - 2020 (Est.): 4.9
  - 2020 (RCF): 9.3
  - 2021 (Proj.): 5.8
  - 2022 (Proj.): 8.0
- Total external debt (percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 6.8
  - 2019: 6.1
  - 2020 (Est.): 8.5
  - 2020 (RCF): 7.7
  - 2021 (Proj.): 8.6
  - 2022 (Proj.): 8.7

### External financing requirement and identified financing (Table highlights)
- Gross financing requirement (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2020: 5,853
  - 2021: 5,724
  - 2022 (Proj.): 5,330
  - 2023 (Proj.): 5,248
  - 2024 (Proj.): 5,161
- Current account deficit (excluding grants) (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2020: 5,817
  - 2021: 5,688
  - 2022 (Proj.): 5,296
  - 2023 (Proj.): 5,208
  - 2024 (Proj.): 5,112
- Available financing (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2020: 4,950
  - 2021: 5,500
  - 2022 (Proj.): 5,311
  - 2023 (Proj.): 5,230
  - 2024 (Proj.): 5,161
- Official transfers (grants) (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2020: 7,590
  - 2021: 7,295
  - 2022 (Proj.): 6,962
  - 2023 (Proj.): 6,901
  - 2024 (Proj.): 6,826
- Financing gap (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2020: 903
  - 2021: 224
  - 2022 (Proj.): 191
  - 2023 (Proj.): 190
  - 2024 (Proj.): 90
- Identified financing (provisional) equals financing gap for 2020–2024:
  - 2020: 903
  - 2021: 224
  - 2022 (Proj.): 191
  - 2023 (Proj.): 190
  - 2024 (Proj.): 90
- Of which IMF RCF and ECF (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2020: 338
  - 2021: 217
  - 2022 (Proj.): 191
  - 2023 (Proj.): 190
  - 2024 (Proj.): 90
- Other identified provisional financing items (2020):
  - Other IFIs and bilateral donors: 557
  - Grant for debt relief under CCRT: 57
  - Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI): 400

### Fiscal tables and budget details (selected levels in billions of Afghanis)
- Revenues and grants (total):
  - 2018: 405.9
  - 2019: 395.9
  - 2020 (RCF): 394.5
  - 2020 (Proj.): 444.1
  - 2021 (Proj.): 438.0
  - 2022 (Proj.): 415.5
  - 2023 (Proj.): 468.9
  - 2024 (Proj.): 540.1
  - 2025 (Proj.): 575.2
  - 2026 (Proj.): 610.9
- Domestic revenues (levels in billions of Afghanis):
  - 2018: 189.9
  - 2019: 207.0
  - 2020 (RCF): 157.2
  - 2020 (Proj.): 177.8
  - 2021 (Proj.): 212.8
  - 2022 (Proj.): 191.8
  - 2023 (Proj.): 247.2
  - 2024 (Proj.): 308.9
  - 2025 (Proj.): 335.3
  - 2026 (Proj.): 367.0
- Total expenditures (levels in billions of Afghanis):
  - 2018: 384.2
  - 2019: 411.5
  - 2020 (RCF): 448.0
  - 2020 (Proj.): 488.6
  - 2021 (Proj.): 461.6
  - 2022 (Proj.): 450.7
  - 2023 (Proj.): 490.4
  - 2024 (Proj.): 549.6
  - 2025 (Proj.): 589.4
  - 2026 (Proj.): 631.7

*Source: Afghan authorities, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, WITS database, and IMF staff estimates and projections.*

### 1. Principal

### 1. Principal

### PRGT repayments and obligations
- PRGT repayments (existing obligations): 1.24.83.83.25.022.738.937.535.733.916.20.00.00.00.0
- PRGT interest: 0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
- SDR assessments: 0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
- SDR net charges: 0.00.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1
- Total obligations (existing): 1.24.93.83.25.022.839.037.635.834.016.30.10.10.10.1
- Total obligations (percent of quota): 0.41.51.21.01.67.012.011.611.110.55.00.00.00.00.0

### Obligations from prospective drawings
- PRGT repayments (prospective): 0.00.00.00.00.00.026.647.349.951.851.825.34.51.90.0
- PRGT interest (prospective): 0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
- Total obligations (prospective): 0.00.00.00.00.00.026.647.349.951.851.825.34.51.90.0
- Total obligations (prospective, percent of quota): 0.00.00.00.00.00.08.214.615.416.016.07.81.40.60.0

### Cumulative obligations (existing and prospective)
- PRGT repayments (cumulative): 1.24.83.83.25.022.765.484.885.685.768.025.34.51.90.0
- PRGT interest (cumulative): 0.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0
- SDR assessment and net charges (cumulative): 0.00.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.10.1
- Total obligations (cumulative): 1.24.93.83.25.022.865.584.985.785.868.125.44.62.00.1

### Outstanding Fund credit, end of period and memorandum items
- Outstanding Fund credit, end of period: 282.4429.8439.0448.8443.9421.2355.8271.0185.499.731.76.51.90.00.0

Memorandum items:
- Outstanding Fund credit, in percent of Exports of goods and services 3/: 44.249.937.834.530.826.321.215.410.05.11.50.30.10.0...
- External public debt: 27.035.833.832.029.526.016.610.15.72.60.70.10.00.0...
- Gross official reserves: 4.47.07.37.67.67.37.35.53.82.00.60.10.00.0...
- GDP: 2.13.13.02.92.82.52.01.50.90.50.10.00.00.0...
- Quota: 87.2132.7135.6138.6137.1130.1109.983.757.330.89.82.00.60.0...
- Total Obligations, in percent of Exports of goods and services 3/: 0.20.60.30.20.41.43.94.84.64.43.31.10.20.1...
- Total Obligations, in percent of External public debt: 0.10.40.30.20.31.43.13.22.72.31.50.50.10.0...
- Total Obligations, in percent of Gross official reserves: 0.00.10.10.10.10.41.31.71.81.81.40.50.10.0...
- Total Obligations, in percent of GDP: 0.00.00.00.00.00.10.40.50.40.40.30.10.00.0...
- Total Obligations, in percent of Quota: 0.41.51.21.01.67.020.226.226.526.521.07.81.40.6...

- Quota (per line item): 323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8323.8

Source: Fund staff estimates and projections.

---

### Table 11 — Policy measures discussed with the authorities (structural benchmarks candidates)
- The Supreme Audit Office to undertake audits of select COVID-19 emergency spending in FY2020 (as outlined in ¶48 of the MEFP) and publish its audit reports.
  - Area: Governance, anti-corruption
  - Date: End-June 2021
  - Rationale: Strengthen accountability and governance.

- The government to submit to parliament amendments to the VAT Law to eliminate the Business Receipt Tax (BRT), including under the VAT threshold, in consultation with the IMF staff.
  - Area: Fiscal
  - Date: End-June 2021
  - Rationale: Simplify tax regulation and allow tax administration to focus on the VAT.

- Afghanistan Customs Department to enhance multi-criteria risk profiles, including by expanding the number of risk criteria for goods and authorized operators, and implement them across all customs offices to increase detection of non-compliance through better selectivity criteria setting and targeting.
  - Area: Fiscal
  - Date: End-June 2021
  - Rationale: Improve compliance and reduce leakages and corruption.

- Afghanistan Revenue Department to introduce the risk differentiation framework and create risk profiles for all large taxpayers to better detect non-compliance.
  - Area: Fiscal
  - Date: End-September 2021
  - Rationale: Improve revenue collection efficiency and reduce leakages.

- The AOP to complete systematic digitalization of all current year asset declarations in machine-readable format and publish the declarations of government officials (as specified in ¶46 of the MEFP) on its website.
  - Area: Governance, anti-corruption
  - Date: End-September 2021
  - Rationale: Strengthen accountability and governance and reduce corruption.

### Annex I — COVID-19 and the Government’s Response: key findings and actions
- Epidemiological snapshot as of September 15:
  - 38,815 COVID-19 cases
  - 1,426 deaths
  - 32,098 recoveries
  - Number of daily new recorded cases averaged about 130 in recent weeks.
  - Note: Actual infections likely higher due to low testing capacity.

- Timeline and containment:
  - First recorded case in late February.
  - Countrywide lockdown on March 28; lifted after Eid holidays in May.
  - Containment measures gradually removed over the summer due to poor compliance.

- Vulnerabilities and social impact:
  - Afghanistan’s fragilities: weak health system, widespread poverty, constrained access to water and sanitation, high-density settlements, low education.
  - Armed conflict limits government access to territories controlled by insurgents.
  - Returnees strain capacity: about 313,000 returning migrants since beginning of 2020 until the pandemic’s peak in early June (nearly 0.5 million as of mid-September).
  - Disproportionate impact on women and girls: more limited access to healthcare and information; reports of more job losses, higher levels of violence, and increased incidents of child marriage.

- Government response and fiscal actions:
  - Contingency funds used to establish testing labs, dedicated wards, procure medical supplies.
  - Bread provision program launched in April to prevent hunger; ended in June.
  - In May, government waived electricity bills of less than Af 1,000 ($13) for a family residence in Kabul for two months and paid utility bills of the previous two months for half of city’s households.
  - Authorities unveiled a 1.5 percent of GDP social distribution program (funded by the World Bank) targeting households with incomes of $2 per day or less (twice the national poverty line).
  - Government allocated $160 million for short-term employment programs and agriculture to finance investment in irrigation, storage facilities, and agroprocessing.

- Policy implications:
  - Financial buffers and policy credibility provided space to respond: discretionary cash balances, international reserves, low debt, ability to tap emergency RCF loan.
  - Need to ensure effectiveness of pandemic spending by enhancing budget execution controls and transparency to avoid misuse and mitigate corruption vulnerabilities.

### Annex II — Risk Assessment Matrix (selected risks, likelihoods, impacts, and mitigating measures)
- Conjunctural shocks and scenarios:
  - Unexpected shift in the COVID-19 pandemic:
    - Likelihood: High/ Low
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: High
    - Downside: Larger than currently expected economic contraction in 2020 (and a shallower recovery in 2021); additional job losses and higher poverty; higher pandemic spending and revenue losses; worsening fiscal and external financing gaps; return of refugees and migrant workers putting pressure on labor market and social services; escalating social pressures undermining reforms.
    - Upside: Faster recovery if effective vaccine widely available; stronger-than-projected economic recovery in 2021.
    - Possible mitigating measures: Ensure health sector resourced; maintain macroeconomic stability; mobilize external financing focusing on grants; allow fiscal position to loosen financing permitting; curtail nonessential spending; accelerate structural reforms once recovery underway.

  - Widespread social discontent and political instability:
    - Likelihood: High
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: High
    - Impact: Larger economic contraction, higher unemployment and poverty, lower investor and consumer confidence, weaker reserves and exchange rate, weakened support for reforms.
    - Mitigating measures: Safeguard macroeconomic stability; curtail nonessential spending; strengthen communication; accelerate governance and anti-corruption reforms.

  - Oversupply and volatility in the oil market:
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: Low
    - Impact: Lower fuel prices could benefit economy when recovery begins.
    - Mitigating measures: Maintain macro stability; allow exchange rate to adjust.

  - Intensified geopolitical tensions and security risks:
    - Likelihood: High
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: Medium
    - Impact: Intensified warfare, refugee flows, depressed market sentiment, capital flight, downward pressure on exchange rate, weaker growth.
    - Mitigating measures: Maintain macro stability; allow exchange rate to depreciate while preventing disorderly markets; support well-balanced expenditure to finance security and targeted relief; strengthen AML/CFT regime.

- Structural risks:
  - Accelerating de-globalization:
    - Likelihood: High
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: Low (overall low due to limited integration in global value chains)
    - Impact: Transmission through trade, lower investment and remittances affecting fiscal revenues, reserves, exchange rate.
    - Mitigating measures: Improve business climate; foster competitiveness and domestic financial intermediation; strengthen monetary and fiscal policies; promote regional economic integration.

  - Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure:
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: Low
    - Mitigating measures: Educate financial community and public; develop supervisory capacity and cyber resilience.

  - Climate change and natural disasters:
    - Likelihood: Medium/ Low
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: Medium
    - Impact: Weaker and more volatile growth; pressure on fiscal resources; possible higher poverty and internal displacement.
    - Mitigating measures: Safeguard macro stability; create fiscal space for climate mitigation (drought-resistant crops, irrigation, storage); screen investments for climate adaptation.

- Country-specific risks:
  - Retreat from sustainable macroeconomic policies:
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: High
    - Impact: Drawdown of government deposits, pressure to allow central bank financing, loss of reserves and confidence in Afghani, rising inflation and growth risks.
    - Mitigating measures: Solidify commitment to prudent policies; entrench macro stability through prudent budgeting and institutional setup.

  - Deeper-than-expected decline in aid inflows:
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: High
    - Impact: Lower public spending, weaker growth, increased unemployment and poverty, depreciation pressures.
    - Mitigating measures: Accelerate growth-enhancing reforms; mobilize domestic revenue; improve spending effectiveness; strengthen governance and anti-corruption enforcement.

  - Peace process failure after withdrawal of foreign troops:
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Expected Economic Impact if Realized: High
    - Impact: Intensified warfare, large refugee flows, pressure on currency and capital flight, weaker growth and higher poverty.
    - Mitigating measures: Maintain macro-stability; support well-balanced expenditures to finance security and targeted relief; foster resilience of domestic institutions.

### Annex III — Country Engagement Strategy: sources and consequences of fragility
- Key social and economic progress since 2001:
  - GDP per capita has quadrupled.
  - Life expectancy increased to 64 years from 56 years.
  - Maternal mortality declined to 396/100,000 births from 1,600 since 2001.

- Remaining challenges and recent trends:
  - GDP per capita remains the lowest in the immediate region and lags other low-income countries on social indicators.
  - Growth weakened and GDP per capita stagnated since the reduction of international troops in 2011–14, with increased violence and reduced aid.
  - Poverty rate increased to 54.5 percent in 2016/17 from 33.7 percent in 2007/08.
  - Inequality (Gini coefficient) rose to 0.33 from 0.28 over the same period.

- Fragility features constraining development:
  - Heavy reliance on foreign aid amounting to 40 percent of GDP (including security expenses).
  - Challenging business environment with weaknesses in rule of law and regulatory quality.
  - Poor infrastructure and delivery of public services, especially in rural areas.
  - COVID-19 exposed frailties in healthcare and social protection systems and strained administrative capacity.

*Source: Fund staff estimates and projections.*

### 3.      Afghanistan’s multi-dimensional fragilities stem from various deficiencies. Corruption

### 3.      Afghanistan’s multi-dimensional fragilities stem from various deficiencies. Corruption

### Drivers of fragility and security context
- Corruption and weak governance undermine the rule of law and hinder the emergence of strong public institutions.
- Limited capacity and a difficult operating environment place weak institutions at risk of capture by powerful vested interests, challenging their ability to design and implement consistent policies and reforms and ensure adequate and effective provision of public goods, including security, infrastructure, social protection, enabling business environment, etc.
- The armed conflict and instability are described as the root cause of fragility in Afghanistan:
  - The government controls about half of the country’s territory (where two-thirds of population reside) with the Taliban operating in the rest.
  - The conflict has resulted in the loss of life, damage to the infrastructure, and more than 2.6 million registered refugees from Afghanistan—the second highest in the world.
  - Security needs force the state with limited means to divert substantial resources to security.
  - Both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections ended in dispute, requiring drawn-out negotiations with international engagement and significantly delaying government formation.

### Fund engagement, past performance, and objectives
- Afghanistan established a strong track record implementing Fund-supported programs:
  - The 2016–19 Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement contributed to macroeconomic stability and improved economic governance.
  - Four out of five success indicators have been met.
  - The program supported progress towards self-reliance and catalyzed aid, though growth disappointed due to armed conflict, political upheaval, weak infrastructure, and other constraints to doing business.
- The Fund’s priorities and potential intensified engagement:
  - The Fund remains committed to helping Afghanistan tackle fragilities that impede inclusive growth and better social outcomes.
  - The authorities requested a successor ECF arrangement to support the ANPDF II for 2021–25 and address a protracted balance of payments need.
  - A credible path toward durable political settlement from peace talks could transition Afghanistan to a pivotal moment and intensify the Fund’s engagement.
  - The proposed program aims to catalyze financing from donors that seek assurances of prudent macroeconomic policies and ongoing economic reforms.

### Proposed ECF objectives and policy focus
- The proposed ECF arrangement aims to aid the authorities’ response to the pandemic and post-pandemic recovery:
  - Initial stage: safeguard macroeconomic stabilization, entrench financial sector resilience, and allow for a temporary fiscal loosening to mitigate the immediate human and social impact of COVID-19.
  - Recovery stage: reverse fiscal deterioration, boost social spending, and address structural fragilities to support sustained growth, strong job creation, and poverty reduction.
- Specific policy emphases:
  - Fiscal policy:
    - Preserve sustainability and protect development spending amid declining aid.
    - Revenue mobilization, strengthening fiscal governance, and boosting the level and effectiveness of pro-growth and pro-poor spending, including financing infrastructure to facilitate regional integration.
    - Strengthen social protection by creating fiscal space for a new targeted social safety net.
  - Financial sector reforms:
    - Strengthen resilience and facilitate development of the financial sector to support inclusive growth.
    - Address weak banks, complete reforms of state-owned banks, and promote financial inclusion.
  - Monetary policy:
    - Continue to aim for price stability with exchange rate flexibility.
    - Strengthen monetary policy transmission and reduce dollarization.
  - Governance reforms:
    - Improve transparency and effectiveness of key state functions.
    - Operationalize the anti-corruption regime, boost the utility of the asset declaration system, and improve the business environment and institutions (e.g. rule of law, contract enforcement).

### Lessons from past engagement and implementation guidance
- Close engagement with authorities is imperative for policy continuity and program implementation:
  - The Fund has not had a Resident Representative since 2014; missions do not travel to Afghanistan for security reasons.
  - Staff maintained engagement through missions outside Afghanistan and frequent exchanges, including teleconferencing.
  - Since the onset of COVID-19, staff completed two remote missions—to discuss a disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility in April and, in July-August, an economic reform program negotiation for the new three-and-a-half year ECF.
- Program design and delivery considerations:
  - Realism in program design to account for capacity constraints, which are further tightened by the pandemic.
  - Agility to adapt the arrangement as domestic, regional, and external conditions evolve; structural benchmarks and performance criteria will be determined on a rolling basis.
  - Capacity development (CD) integrated with the ECF arrangement.
  - Donor coordination, including close coordination with the World Bank, ADB, EU, and bilateral donors, and engagement in development partner forums.
  - Outreach to stakeholders (e.g., civil society, non-governmental organizations, and the business community) and use of press releases and mission statements to inform wider audiences.

### Technical assistance and capacity development priorities
- Key TA and training needs (2019–21) include:
  - Fiscal policy and revenue administration:
    - Preparation for VAT implementation, establishment of a refund system and VAT audit (METAC 2020, 2021).
    - Development of compliance improvement plan in the Single Large Taxpayer Office (METAC July 2019).
    - Revenue impact analysis of replacing Business Receipt Tax with VAT (FAD March 2019).
    - Strengthening customs administrations, including compliance risk management (METAC 2019, August 2020).
  - Public financial management:
    - Strengthening oversight over State-Owned Corporations, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), and fiscal risks (LEG; FAD July 2020).
    - Assessing contingent liabilities from PPPs (FAD 2020–21).
    - Public investment cycle planning (FAD 2021).
    - Cash planning and forecasting (METAC September 2019).
  - Financial sector stability:
    - Strengthening banking resolution framework (LEG; MCM 2020–21).
    - Corporate governance as part of bank supervision and regulation (MCM 2020–21).
  - Monetary policy and central bank governance:
    - Monetary policy framework diagnostic (MCM 2020).
    - Debt management framework (MCM 2021).
    - DAB procurement framework (FIN 2021).
  - Governance:
    - Legal framework on beneficial ownership and implementation (LEG 2021).
    - Strengthening the asset declaration regime, its effectiveness and use (IMF (LEG) 2021).
    - Review of AML/CFT legal framework and capacity of relevant agencies in advance of the Asia Pacific Group assessment (LEG 2021).
  - Economic statistics:
    - External statistics: unrecorded exports, imports, and remittances (STA 2020).
    - Back-casting the national accounts (METAC 2021).
    - Developing quarterly national accounts (METAC October 2020).
    - Price statistics (STA, METAC April 2019).
    - Balance of payments (METAC April 2019, 2020).
- Customizing CD and ensuring follow-through:
  - Extensive hands-on follow-through is required given weak capacity.
  - Coordination of Fund TA with development partners (especially the World Bank, ADB, EU, and DFID) is important.
  - Prior to the pandemic, TA and training were delivered outside Afghanistan due to security risks; remote delivery during the pandemic may increase participation but poses logistical challenges (e.g., 8.5-hour time difference).

### 2016–19 ECF: Selected structural reforms (high-level synthesis from table)
- Fiscal Policy:
  - Improve budget transparency by tracking contractual commitments through the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System.
  - Adopt risk-based customs clearance procedures to improve detection of fraud and report customs revenue online in near-real time.
  - Establish a Single Large Taxpayer Office to raise tax revenue yield and improve its predictability.
  - Establish a legal framework for asset declaration regime by select public officials by enacting relevant legislation.
  - Advance debt management framework and adopt State-Owned Corporation Law.
  - Operationalize the asset declaration regime, requiring submission of declarations under penalty of law and publicize declarations on the official website in a local language and English.
  - Strengthen public investment management and advance adoption of standards under the EITI; implement EITI Board recommendations.
  - Conduct a forensic audit of the Kabul Bank's assets recovery process and propose ways to improve recoveries.
- Governance:
  - Bolster the legal framework for combatting corruption by enacting the Anti-Corruption Law in line with the UN Convention on Anti-Corruption.
  - Strengthen corruption prevention efforts by establishing the High Council for Anti-Corruption, chaired by the President, and the Anti-Corruption Judicial Center.
  - Establish a legal framework for asset declaration and operationalize it.
  - Adopt Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Law to manage fiscal and contingent risks from PPPs.
  - Strengthen anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework as agreed with FATF, resulting in removal from FATF monitoring in 2017.
- Financial Sector:
  - Strengthen risk and crisis management capacity by establishing Financial Stability Committee comprising MoF and DAB.
  - Strengthen the financial sector by recapitalizing New Kabul Bank, including providing an appropriate capital cushion and core banking systems.
  - Restore DAB’s Lender of Last Resort capacity by extinguishing its Af 29.3 billion exposure from the Kabul Bank crisis.
  - Launch a long-term strategy to reform state-owned commercial banks addressing business model and governance deficiencies and minimizing operational risk.
  - Bolster DAB’s regulatory and supervisory capacity, develop risk management plans for weak banks, and strengthen capacities to resolve defunct banks.
  - Launch National Financial Inclusion Strategy including sharia-compliant banking.
- Monetary Policy:
  - Foster confidence in the Afghani, while allowing exchange rate flexibility.
  - Maintain inflation in single digits.
  - Strengthen monetary policy instruments and transmission (implied by broader TA priorities).

### Authorities’ views and request for Fund support
- Authorities view the Fund’s financial and technical assistance as having helped implement sound macroeconomic policies and structural reforms supporting an inclusive growth agenda.
- They broadly agreed with staff’s assessment of sources and consequences of fragility and policy priorities.
- They emphasized realism and agility in program design, close donor coordination, and the invaluable role of CD and training.
- Formal request and financing specifics:
  - The authorities request a three-and-half-year ECF arrangement to fight COVID-19, support the reform agenda, and address a protracted balance of payments need.
  - They request financing in the amount of SDR 259.04 million (80 percent of Afghanistan’s quota) during the arrangement from November 6 , 2020 to May 5, 2024.
  - They thanked the IMF for the $223 million emergency disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility in April.

*Excerpted and summarized from the IMF staff report chapter.*

### 6.      We believe that the economic and financial policies set forth in the attached Memorandum

### 6.      We believe that the economic and financial policies set forth in the attached Memorandum

### Commitments and consultations
- The authorities consider the policies in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) adequate to achieve the objectives of the economic program and commit to take any additional measures that may become appropriate.
- The government will consult with the IMF on adoption of additional measures and in advance of any revisions to the policies contained in the MEFP, in accordance with the Fund’s policies on such consultation.
- The government intends to remain in close consultation with Fund staff and provide timely information necessary for monitoring economic developments and implementation of policies under the ECF-supported program.
- Request to publish: the staff report, this letter of intent, the attached MEFP and TMU, including all annexes, attachments, and other ECF-related documents, be published on the IMF website.

### Parliamentary engagement and ownership
- Parliament authorization: the government has engaged parliament and hopes to secure soon its authorization to receive disbursements under the ECF in line with the Afghan Constitution, which requires such approval for any government borrowing from external sources.
- The authorities consider parliament’s approval a signal of joint ownership, by the government and parliament, of reforms supported by the ECF.

### Program scope and objectives (through May 5, 2024)
- The MEFP reviews recent economic developments and sets the economic objectives and policy framework for a three-and-half-year ECF arrangement.
- Program aims:
  - Support response to COVID-19 and reforms addressing structural weaknesses.
  - Provide a macroeconomic framework for crisis navigation and a foundation for sustained recovery.
  - Address social and economic legacies of COVID-19 and help finance balance-of-payments needs.
  - Improve fiscal governance, bolster the financial sector, combat corruption, and strengthen social protection.

### Recent economic developments and near-term outlook
- Output: expected to contract by 5 percent in 2020.
- Sectoral impact: services and industry suffered most; agriculture spared due to favorable weather.
- Recovery assumption: with gradual easing of containment measures since late May and avoiding resurgence of infections, economic activity expected to return close to the pre-pandemic level in the fourth quarter.
- Inflation:
  - Spiked to 8.7 percent y/y in April due to border closures and panic buying.
  - Subsided to 5.9 percent in August.
  - Projected headline inflation: 5 percent by year-end.
- International reserves: about $9.3 billion; assessed as broadly adequate given high-risk environment.
- Fiscal accounts (through end-September 2020):
  - Tax revenue fell by 15 percent compared to the same period last year.
  - Af 12.8 billion transfer of DAB profits based on its 2019 audited financial report partially offset revenue shortfall.
  - Urgent COVID-related health and social spending amounting to 1.3 percent of GDP through June.
  - Overall budget deficit widened to Af 24 billion in January–June.
  - Treasury discretionary cash balance fell to Af 21 billion by end-June from Af 36 billion at end-2019.
- Financial sector:
  - No liquidity pressures so far, aided by DAB actions.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) have increased since the beginning of the year.
  - Some banks proceeded with implementation of IFRS 9 ahead of the revised June 2021 deadline.
  - Gross loans declined, mainly due to charge-offs.
  - Activity of MSPs and FXDs slowed; utilization of mobile banking services and digital payments through EMIs increased.

### COVID-19 relief, recovery, and social protection
- Social relief package: amounting to 1.5 percent of GDP, with World Bank support, targeting households with incomes of $2 per day or lower (twice the national poverty line).
  - Coverage: about 90 percent of all households; near-universal in scope; delivered in 2020-21.
  - Rural households: equivalent of $50 in essential food staples and hygiene products.
  - Urban households: combination of cash and in-kind equivalent to $100, in two tranches.
- Other measures: cancellation of some lower-performing projects to create fiscal space; investment in digital infrastructure to expand access to remote work and learning technology.
- Poverty impact: World Bank estimates poverty could rise to 61–72 percent from 55 percent in 2016-17.
- Pro-poor spending (indicative target): 5.3 percent of GDP in 2020 and 4.7 percent of GDP in 2021.
- Medium-term intent: put in place a targeted social safety net program; create fiscal space under the ECF and engage development partners for co-financing and program design.

### Structural and development priorities
- Medium-term growth priorities: agriculture, extractive industries, and services.
- Agriculture strategy: increase investment (e.g., irrigation, land management) to boost productivity, processing, and storage; prioritize climate adaptation measures.
- Labor market challenge: absorb nearly 500,000 Afghan youth entering the labor market annually.
- Governance and anti-corruption:
  - Strengthened anti-corruption laws, anti-corruption strategy, and asset declaration regime already implemented.
  - Focus going forward: effective implementation, targeting high-level corruption, stamping out impunity, and strengthening institutions.
- External support: aid finances development and covers underlying fiscal and external deficits; pledging conference scheduled for November 23–24 (renewal of mutual commitments sought).

### Macroeconomic framework and targets
- Growth:
  - Expect growth to resume in 2021, with the economy expanding by up to 4 percent.
  - Growth should accelerate in 2022–23 before stabilizing at 4 percent over the long term.
- Fiscal stance:
  - Fiscal deficit allowed to widen in 2020 to accommodate pandemic-related spending and revenue shortfalls.
  - Mid-year budget revision submitted to parliament in October accounts for expected shortfall and accommodates almost 3 percent of GDP spending for COVID-19 related programs.
  - COVID-19 spending components:
    - Health package: Af 6.6 billion.
    - Social package: Af 2.8 billion (bread distribution program concluded) and Af 14.6 billion spending under the World Bank-supported social distribution program (the remainder will be executed next year).
    - Wheat purchase program: Af 1.7 billion.
    - Transfers to provinces to finance COVID-19 response: Af 2.3 billion.
    - Packages to support agriculture: Af 5.9 billion.
    - Short-term jobs: Af 6.7 billion.
  - Donor support for pandemic response: expected to amount in total to 2.9 percent of GDP.
- Contain overall deficit to 3.0 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Measures: discontinued pandemic-related tax relief measures in July; cutting lower priority spending (nonperforming projects, operation and maintenance, vehicle purchases, renovations, travel).
  - Nontax revenue sources to be collected:
    - Fees from Afghan Telecom: Af 2.0 billion.
    - Fees collected by the Afghan Telecommunication Regulatory Authority: Af 1.0 billion.
    - Dividends from state-owned North Coal Enterprise: Af 1.5 billion.
  - Financing for 2020 deficit: drawing on the treasury’s discretionary cash balances, the $223 million RCF disbursement, and $115 million prospective ECF disbursement.
- Medium-term fiscal path:
  - Draft FY2021 budget to be submitted by mid-November containing deficit of 2.2 percent of GDP (first review structural benchmark).
  - Intent to bring overall budget deficit below 1 percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Revenue mobilization measures: post-pandemic recovery in collection, VAT introduction in 2022, and fees from pipeline and power transmission projects expected in 2023 and beyond.
- Debt policy:
  - Continue to rely on grants and concessional debt financing with minimum 35 percent grant element.
  - Will not contract any non-concessional external loans and will consult with IMF staff on terms of any new external debt in advance of contracting it.
  - Preparing legislative, institutional, and regulatory framework for government sukuk and preparing for an inaugural issue in 2021 to tap domestic savings.
- Monetary policy:
  - Target: low and stable inflation with reserve money as operational target.
  - DAB inflation objective: keep headline inflation in the range of 2–8 percent.
  - Reserve money growth targets: 12.4 percent in 2020 and 10.9 percent in 2021.
  - Exchange rate: committed to exchange rate flexibility; Afghani to move with market trends, intervening only to avoid disorderly market conditions.
  - DAB intends to study impact of government sukuk on money markets and consider adding sukuk to monetary policy toolkit.
  - Promote greater use of Afghanis and accelerate implementation of the National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS).

_This summary is derived from the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) and accompanying text provided in the content unit._

### 23.      DAB has largely phased out emergency pandemic measures. With DAB ending the freeze

### 23.      DAB has largely phased out emergency pandemic measures. With DAB ending the freeze on loan classifications on July 1, we expect further asset quality deterioration and an uptake in loan restructurings.

### Banking sector measures and supervisory stance
- DAB ended the freeze on loan classifications on July 1.
- DAB recommenced enforcement of all prudential requirements from July to support transparency and supervisory effectiveness, while exercising flexibility in applying penalties and prudential triggers pursuant to banks’ corrective action plans.
- DAB developed a post COVID-19 improvement plan for the banking sector to apply from July 2020 to December 2021. The plan envisages:
  - unwinding remaining emergency measures contingent on further normalization;
  - expanding electronic, mobile, and branchless banking;
  - supporting credit recovery, focusing on SMEs, including through partial credit guarantees from the Afghanistan Credit Guarantee Fund;
  - reducing banks’ operating costs and suspending dividend payments for all banks for the rest of 2020.
- The emergency measures for the nonbank sector expired in July.
- While capital, in excess of the regulatory ratio, and provisioning buffers remain sufficient to absorb expected losses in most banks, some weaker banks will likely need capital injection to meet the regulatory requirement.
- DAB resumed on-site examinations in July and is closely monitoring high-risk banks through off-site assessments and on-site examinations.
- DAB has developed a one-year plan for high-risk banks including recovery, capital augmentation, corporate governance and risk management reforms, and supervision and enforcement actions; bank-specific plans will be informed by a special review of high-risk banks to be undertaken with World Bank support.
- DAB will update contingency plans for adverse events at individual banks and establish a dedicated unit to oversee the winding down of defunct banks and other financial institutions under its supervision.

### Risks and contingency scenario
- Given elevated uncertainty, authorities prepare for a possibility that the crisis becomes more severe and protracted than currently envisaged.
- If the pandemic were to persist through early 2021, projected consequences include:
  - deeper contraction in 2020 and a more sluggish recovery in 2021;
  - significantly worse fiscal position as revenues slip and health and social spending soars;
  - severe strain on the health system and social services and heightened political and social instability.
- In that scenario, planned policy responses include using the November pledging conference to request increased grants or their frontloading, shifting expenditure (including donor-financed projects) to where most needed, and introducing one-off revenue measures.

### Fiscal reforms — revenue mobilization and tax administration
- Immediate priority: restore compliance and tax revenue intake to pre-pandemic levels.
- Large taxpayers:
  - adopt by end-December 2020 targeted and graduated methodologies aimed at increasing filing and payment compliance rates (first review structural benchmark);
  - introduce a risk differentiation framework and create risk profiles for all large taxpayers to better detect non-compliance by September 2021.
- Administrative improvements:
  - implement electronic filing, public awareness campaigns, and direct engagement with businesses and professional organizations to embed tax compliance culture;
  - integrate the Afghanistan Payments System (APS) with SIGTAS and link SIGTAS with the Afghanistan Central Business Registry (ACBR).
- VAT adoption:
  - medium-term focus is VAT adoption by 2022;
  - decision to postpone VAT adoption by one year to January 2022 following consultations with World Bank, EU, and IMF;
  - established a VAT adoption steering committee and progressed appointment of a VAT implementation team in 2020;
  - to simplify administration, the large taxpayer office has the same threshold as the VAT;
  - by end-June 2021, government will submit to parliament amendments to the VAT Law to eliminate the Business Receipt Tax (BRT) under the VAT threshold and to introduce a tax scheme for taxpayers below the VAT threshold following thorough analysis and consultation with IMF staff.

### Customs reforms, anti-corruption, and automation
- Risk-based targeting and compliance:
  - Afghanistan Customs Department risk management unit developed 91 multi-criteria risk profiles (MCRPs) in ASYCUDA for customs offices at Kabul airport and provinces of Nangarhar, Herat, Kandahar, Balkh, Nimroz, and Farah.
  - In 2020, based on risk analysis, 123 non-compliant companies were recommended for license suspension and removal from ASYCUDA.
  - Enhance MCRPs by expanding risk criteria and implement across all customs offices by June 2021.
  - Launch mobile verification teams authorized to examine compliance after imports are released from customs by mid-2021.
  - Require installation of a transit vehicle tracking system to prevent transit system abuse and introduce identity verification to combat fraud and misreporting on customs declarations.
- Digital and cross-border measures:
  - plan to introduce automatic vehicle registration at the border (and its automatic renewal) and registration of smartphones when their shipments cross the border;
  - explore connecting digital weight scales used at eight border crossings to ASYCUDA to verify declared cargo volumes and discharge international transit only upon confirmation of reception by neighboring customs through ASYCUDA;
  - aim to integrate these measures into ASYCUDA with assistance from the World Bank and UNCTAD (ASYCUDA).
  - signed mutual assistance agreements with China, Iran, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; plan agreements with India, Pakistan, Russia, UAE, and others over time.
- Automation timelines:
  - automation of payment processing of import taxes and duties will begin with adopting electronic declarations required of traders and brokers, then automate warehouse inventory records and link them to ASYCUDA, and automate the appeal process linked to ASYCUDA.
  - By end-2020, expect to introduce e-payment by linking ASYCUDA and SIGTAS to the core banking system and DAB under the World Bank’s Incentive Program Development Policy Grant (IP DPG).
- Trade facilitation and customs procedures:
  - finalize procedures for duty-free shops, import guarantees, treatment of perishable goods, and implement a tariff specification code procedure in 2020;
  - in 2021, introduce procedures for payments of customs debt, treatment of intellectual property rights, disposal and destruction of hazardous goods, application of preferential tariffs, and develop guidelines for determination of origin of property and accede to the Revised Kyoto Convention of the World Customs Organization.
- Integrity and recruitment:
  - as of mid-2020, referred to the Attorney General cases against nearly 600 customs officers based on internal audit suspicions of corrupt activities;
  - preparing to introduce a merit-based recruitment process, including higher pay and exams to confirm ethical and professional qualifications, supported by the World Bank’s IP DPG.

### Extractive industries, transparency, and public expenditure management
- Extractive industries:
  - aim to become a conforming member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) by advancing a compliant, effective, and transparent fiscal regime for natural resources.
  - After suspension from EITI in January 2019, remedial steps taken; established a transparency portal with data on issued mineral rights, licenses, and related payments.
  - Second validation by EITI took place in July and August 2020; preliminary assessment: Afghanistan has fully addressed 13 of the 19 corrective actions and made “meaningful progress” on the remaining six corrective actions.
  - Look forward to EITI Board consideration in October and a final decision by November.
- Public expenditure review:
  - planning to launch a public expenditure review in 2021 to evaluate spending effectiveness and identify efficiency improvements and savings.
- Civil service pay policy and payroll automation:
  - fully implement new civil service pay policy adopted last year to link increased compensation and verified competencies; first implemented in the MoF then adopted government-wide.
  - set up automated payroll system linked with Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) to generate payroll based on data from HRMIS.
  - project supported by the World Bank TAGHIR project.
- Public financial management reforms:
  - strengthen budget process, public investment management (PIM), and management of fiscal risks from PPPs, SOE/SOCs, and guarantees; improve fiscal reporting and transparency.
  - Budget and PIM specifics:
    - identify key priority sectors and submit draft Fiscal Strategy Paper (FSP) at start of each budget cycle to guide allocations and link to National Priority Programs (NPPs);
    - reallocate resources at each mid-year budget review based on implementation progress, time/cost overrun, and forward spending needs.
    - implemented forward baseline estimation (FBE) methodology in 2018–19; plan pilots with two ministries to produce a Portfolio Budget Statement and an annual report with financial statements by mid-2021.
    - adopt by end-December 2020 new PIM regulations (with World Bank help) to formalize formulation, selection, appraisal, and approval of public investment projects; institutionalize a Project Evaluation Committee; require feasibility criteria and alignment with development priorities.
  - PPPs and fiscal risk management:
    - ensure MoF assesses associated fiscal risks before entering into any PPP contract and on an ongoing basis; work on an integrated database of public projects including PPPs’ service payments and guarantees.
    - starting in 2021, expand PPP information disclosed in the FSP and budget document.
  - SOE/SOC oversight:
    - build capacity of department of state-owned enterprise/corporations (SOE/SOCs) to conduct operational and financial oversight by hiring requisite staff and seeking technical assistance.
    - start collecting full financial information for the ten largest SOE/SOCs—income statement, balance sheet, and financial flows between the government and the SOE/SOCs—by end-2021.
    - intend to have the 2020 financial statements of the five largest SOE/SOCs externally audited by end-September 2021.
    - department to submit by end-2021 a comprehensive report on SOE/SOCs’ financial performance to the Oversight Board.
    - seek IMF support, including training, to quantify fiscal risks from SOE/SOCs and PPPs for inclusion in the FY2022 FSP and budget document.
  - Contingency reserve and PFEM Law:
    - PFEM Law allows up to three percent of the total budgeted expenditures to be allocated to a contingency reserve.
    - by end-December 2020, government will adopt and publish regulation on contingency budget management to: (i) define eligible purposes for use of contingency reserves; (ii) include provisions allowing early or pre-emptive responses to disasters; and (iii) establish full reporting requirements, including publication of utilization of all contingency reserves by expenditure category.
  - Supreme Audit Office (SAO):
    - with World Bank support, submitted to parliament a revised SAO law to strengthen operational independence and capacity consistent with international practice and relevant provisions of the Constitution and PFEM Law.

### Financial sector policy priorities and state-owned commercial bank reform
- DAB priorities:
  - develop and implement a risk-based supervision framework;
  - enhance internal capacity to supervise banks’ implementation of IFRS 9;
  - automate off-site supervisory data collection and analyses.
- Post-pandemic plan for high-risk banks (see Banking sector measures).
- State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) reform:
  - Presidential decree authorizes merger of Bank-e-Millie Afghan and New Kabul Bank; merger will create the second largest bank with about 21 percent of system assets.
  - By mid-April 2021, the MoF will sign a contract with advisors to support the merger (first review structural benchmark); related World Bank project aids the merger.
  - Advisory support scope: financial and operational due diligence, integration of technology and business processes, and other relevant issues.
  - Ensure close coordination between MoF team leading the project and DAB supervisors for prudential monitoring of SOCBs.

*IMF staff summary of chapter content.*

### 39.      We will redouble efforts to improve recovery of Kabul Bank Receivership (KBR) assets.

### 39.      We will redouble efforts to improve recovery of Kabul Bank Receivership (KBR) assets.

### KBR asset recovery
- KBR asset recovery is designated one of the top priorities of the commission established under Presidential decree to assist recovery of NPLs.
- The commission, of which DAB is a member, has restarted meetings and will ensure timely and effective implementation of recommendations of the KBR asset recovery diagnostic completed last year.
- By end-2020, planned actions:
  - (a) implement recommendations of the diagnostic for recovery of assets outside Afghanistan, acquisition and implementation of accounting software, and completion of compilation and audit of receivership financial statements; and
  - (b) provide the first progress report on the recovery of assets and other objectives pursuant to the new and the continuing measures.

### Formalization and oversight of nonbank financial services
- DAB has embarked on reforms to formalize unregulated financial services and implement an oversight framework for nonbank financial institutions.
- Phased corporatization of MSPs and FXDs over the next three years has commenced, consistent with U.S. Treasury TA.
- Branchless banking regulation issued in late 2019 includes a framework for authorization of qualifying agents of banks, including MSPs and FXDs; no application submitted so far.
- A new nonbank financial supervision department (NBFSD) has been established to oversee:
  - over 3,300 MSPs and FXDs,
  - nine corporate money services businesses, and
  - four EMIs.
- NBFSD current focus:
  - implementing supervisory and AML/CFT oversight frameworks,
  - enforcing against unlicensed financial operations,
  - building capacity,
  - developing regulatory framework for other nonbank financial operations.

### Strengthening resolution, crisis management, and deposit insurance
- Plan to amend banking law with IMF technical assistance to introduce a more robust resolution framework in line with international practices.
- Amendment objectives include:
  - (i) establish clear objectives and scope of the resolution regime, distinction between early intervention and resolution, revision of grounds for appointing a conservator and petitioning for receivership;
  - (ii) strengthen DAB’s and conservator’s powers;
  - (iii) introduce recovery and resolution planning;
  - (iv) specify the mandate of the new resolution unit.
- Strengthening the deposit insurance system with World Bank technical and funding support and reviewing the framework for emergency liquidity assistance.

### Financial intermediation deepening and financial inclusion
- Policy measures to promote:
  - broader use of credit and collateral registries by banks,
  - risk-sharing and partial credit guarantee schemes,
  - encouragement of term lending instead of bank overdrafts.
- Expectation that sukuk issuance will stimulate domestic debt market development and channel domestic savings to investment.
- DAB actions:
  - established a new department for consumer protection and financial literacy,
  - leverage high mobile device penetration to expand core financial services and reduce cash dependence,
  - continue upgrading retail payment infrastructure and support development of digital finance.
- SME credit support: strengthen capacity of the Afghanistan Credit Guarantee Fund with World Bank funding.

### AML/CFT strengthening and implementation timetable
- Commitment to strengthen AML/CFT regime in line with findings of the 2019 National Risk Assessment (NRA).
- Completed Afghanistan’s first AML/CFT NRA last year; plan to publish by December 2020; NRA provides basis for national action plan through 2023.
- DAB continued to enhance AML/CFT supervisory capacity despite pandemic, including reviews of regulations and internal procedures.
- Planned and completed supervisory actions:
  - Banking supervision department plans to conduct AML/CFT examinations of all 12 banks by year-end.
  - NBFSD completed AML/CFT inspections of 40 MSPs and FXDs in 2019 and nine so far in 2020, imposing sanctions for noncompliance, including suspension and revocation of licenses.
- Formed an interagency Oversight Committee to coordinate preparations for the AML/CFT assessment by the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) in 2022.
- Planned legal and strategic actions:
  - review AML/CFT legal and regulatory framework to identify shortcomings and reforms needed in the criminal justice system;
  - by September 2021, develop a national AML/CFT strategy outlining policy priorities and guiding risk mitigation measures.

### Business environment reforms
- Recent reforms: reduced cost of obtaining a business license, introduced electronic tax filing, approved new limited liability company and insolvency laws.
- Planned actions:
  - link SIGTAS with the ACBR to ease issuance of digital Tax Clearance Certificates and facilitate business license renewals;
  - focus on improving timeliness and quality of judicial proceedings in commercial cases (e.g., case management), strengthen contract enforcement and property protection;
  - improve education and training programs to nurture entrepreneurship and marketable skills.

### Anti-corruption agenda and asset declaration digitalization
- National Strategy for Combating Corruption (NSCC) last updated November 2018; benchmark completion rates reported as 79 percent for 2019 and 90 percent for 2018.
- Updating NCSS with target completion by March 2021.
- Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to be fully staffed by March 2021 (pursuant to selection process agreed with civil society) and begin statutory functions by June 2021; ACC expected to take over handling of asset declarations after operations start in June 2021.
- Asset declaration modernization:
  - AOP building capacity and coordination to advance illicit enrichment cases and developing anti-corruption and asset declaration training with DAB and partners.
  - Updates to regulation on asset declarations and AOP internal rules finalized in September 2020 to facilitate digitalization.
  - AOP will complete systematic digitalization of all current year asset declarations in machine-readable format and publish declarations of government officials on its website https://www.aop.gov.af/dr/index by end-September 2021.
  - Continue enhancing public registries of land, property, and companies to support verification and transparency.

### Criminal justice, beneficial ownership, and PEPs framework
- Prioritize criminal enforcement on high-impact corruption cases and continue efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system.
- Undertake review of the Penal Code, including clarifying bail procedures and publication of reasoned court decisions (faisala).
- Implement reforms to the prosecution service detailed in the Action Plan for Improving Detection and Prosecution of Corruption Cases.
- Formalize affiliation of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) with the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) pursuant to the Anti-Corruption Law and develop regulations/protocols clarifying relationships and reporting lines (including MCTF reporting directly to the Minister of Interior).
- Leverage AML/CFT framework in anti-corruption efforts by making legal, regulatory, and institutional changes to ensure identification, documentation, and registration of beneficial owners in line with FATF requirements.
- Review legislative and regulatory framework to develop uniform rules applicable to politically exposed persons by June 2021 pursuant to the FATF standard.

### Transparency, procurement, and COVID-19 spending audits
- Transition to e-procurement and development of an online procurement portal on NPA’s website.
- Prior action under the ECF arrangement:
  - NPA revised procurement regulations to require in all public procurements, starting November 1, 2020, collection of beneficial ownership information in bidding documents and online publication of beneficial ownership information of all entities contracting with the government within 30 days of contract signing.
  - This prior action was Met on September 30, 2020.
- Pandemic-related transparency:
  - Commenced preparation of the first quarterly report on pandemic-related spending in September 2020, aiming to publish by end-October.
  - SAO directed to undertake audits of COVID-19 spending items in FY2020 (health spending including building hospitals; bread distribution and wheat purchase programs; package to support agriculture; transfers to provinces for COVID-19 response) and publish reports by end-June 2021.

### Safeguards and DAB governance
- Commit to meeting the Fund’s safeguards policy requirements and implement recommendations of the recent safeguards assessment by the IMF’s Finance Department.
- Key commitments:
  - work with parliament to secure enactment of amendments to the DAB law, submitted to parliament in 2017, by end-March 2021 (first review structural benchmark);
  - by June 2021, DAB will adopt a procurement policy establishing adequate controls and oversight and engage a reputable audit firm to review its internal control systems.

### Data improvements
- Recognize deficiencies in national accounts and balance of payments statistics and plan to correct them.
- Request continued technical assistance and training from international partners, including the IMF.

### Program modalities, monitoring, and commitments
- ECF arrangement will be monitored through quantitative targets, indicative targets, and structural benchmarks listed in the MEFP.
- Test dates for monitoring performance: December 21, 2020; June 21, 2021; December 21, 2021; June 21, 2022; December 21, 2022; and June 21, 2023.
- Reviews scheduled:
  - first review on or after April 21, 2021;
  - second review on or after October 20, 2021;
  - third review on or after April 20, 2022.
- Further commitments during the program period:
  - will not impose or intensify restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions;
  - will not introduce or modify multiple currency practices;
  - will not conclude bilateral payments agreements inconsistent with Article VIII;
  - will not impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments purposes.
- Engagement: will work with international partners, especially the IMF and the World Bank, to implement the outlined reforms.

*Source: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan — IMF Extended Credit Facility documentation (content unit 1afgea2020003).*

### 1. Program exchange rates are used for formulating and monitoring quantitative

### 1. Program exchange rates are used for formulating and monitoring quantitative

### Exchange rates and valuation rules
- All assets and liabilities denominated in U.S. dollars will be converted into Afghanis at a program exchange rate of 76.7 Afghanis per one U.S. dollar, which corresponds to the cash rate as of June 1, 2020.
- Gold holdings will be valued at $1,629.80 per troy ounce, the average price during January–May, 2020 sourced from the IMF website on primary commodity prices.
- Assets and liabilities denominated in SDRs and in foreign currencies other than the U.S. dollar will be converted into U.S. dollars at the exchange rates as of June 1, 2020.

### Quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets (overview)
- Performance criteria for December 2020, June 2021, and December 2021 (specified in Table 2 of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies) include:
  - Floor on net international reserves (NIR) of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB);
  - Ceilings on reserve money in domestic currency;
  - Ceiling on DAB’s net credit to the central government (NCG);
  - Continuous ceilings on contracting and/or guaranteeing new medium- and long-term nonconcessional external debt by the public sector;
  - Continuous ceilings on contracting and/or guaranteeing new short-term external debt by the public sector;
  - Continuous prohibition on accumulation of external payment arrears, excluding interest on preexisting arrears;
  - Continuous prohibition on lending from state-owned banks or DAB to, or government-guaranteed borrowing by, public enterprises in need of restructuring.
- The above performance criteria also constitute indicative targets for March 2021 and September 2021.
- Additional indicative targets for December 2020, March 2021, June 2021, September 2021, and December 2021:
  - Ceiling on the operating budget deficit of the central government excluding grants;
  - Floors on revenue of the central government; Treasury discretionary cash balance; and social and other priority spending.

### Institutional scope and definitions
- Central government includes: Office of the President, the ministries, other state administrations and governmental agencies (including the attorney general’s office); the National Assembly; and the judiciary (including the Supreme Court).
- Government includes: budgetary central government, extra-budgetary central government, local government (including government departments), and official agencies that do not seek profit and whose budgets are issued independent of the annual operational or development budgets.
- Public sector comprises: the government (as defined), pension administration, DAB, and nonfinancial public enterprises.
- Public enterprises or corporations: enterprises wholly or majority owned by the government, including entities covered by the State-Owned Enterprise (Tassady) Law, Corporations and Limited Liability Companies Law, and other government entities engaged in commercial activities but not covered by the Tassady Law.

### Debt definitions and concessionality calculations
- “Debt” follows the “Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements” (IMF Executive Board Decision No. 15688–(14/107), adopted December 5, 2014) and means a current contractual liability requiring future payments in assets or services.
- Forms of debt include:
  - (i) loans (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans, buyers’ credits, credits extended by the IMF), and temporary exchanges equivalent to fully collateralized loans (repurchase agreements, official swaps);
  - (ii) suppliers’ credits;
  - (iii) leases, where debt is the present value (at inception) of lease payments expected during the agreement period (excluding payments covering operation, repair, maintenance).
- Arrears, penalties, and judicially awarded damages arising from failure to make debt payments are debt.
- External debt is debt owed to a non-resident.

- Concessionality rule for program purposes:
  - A debt is concessional if it includes a grant element of at least 35 percent.
  - Grant element = (PV of debt subtracted from nominal value) expressed as a percentage of nominal value.
  - Discount rate used is 5.0 percent.
  - For variable-rate debt linked to benchmark plus fixed spread, PV uses a program reference rate plus the fixed spread.
    - Program reference rate for the six-month USD LIBOR is 2.42 percent and will remain fixed for the duration of the program.
    - Spread of six-month Euro LIBOR over six-month USD LIBOR is -250 basis points.
    - Spread of six-month JPY LIBOR over six-month USD LIBOR is -250 basis points.
    - Spread of six-month GBP LIBOR over six-month USD LIBOR is -150 basis points.
    - For interest rates on currencies other than Euro, JPY, and GBP, the spread over six-month USD LIBOR is 150 basis points.
    - Where variable rate is linked to a benchmark other than six-month USD LIBOR, a spread reflecting the difference between the benchmark and six-month USD LIBOR (rounded to the nearest 50 bps) will be added.

### Definitions of fiscal and monetary indicators for program monitoring
- Revenues of the central government:
  - Defined in line with GFSM 2001 but on a cash accounting basis, excluding grants.
  - Include taxes and other compulsory transfers, property income, sales of goods and services, social contributions (excluding pensions contributions received by the central government), interest, fines, penalties and forfeits, and voluntary transfers received from nongovernment other than grants.
  - Exclude grants and other noncompulsory contributions from foreign governments and international organizations; receipts collected on behalf of non-central government units; receipts from sale of nonfinancial assets; transactions in financial assets and liabilities such as borrowing (excepting interest payments); and transfer of profits from DAB to the Treasury.
  - Revenues recognized on a cash basis; AFMIS reports (monthly financial statements prepared by the Treasury department) are the basis for program monitoring. Exceptional advanced payments treated as if received on the normal due date.
- Net international reserves (NIR):
  - Defined as reserve assets minus reserve related liabilities of DAB expressed in U.S. dollars.
  - Reserve assets (BPM6 definition) include monetary gold, SDRs, Afghanistan’s reserve position in the IMF, foreign currency cash, and readily available deposits abroad; assets must be readily available and liquid.
  - Excluded from reserve assets: pledged/collateralized assets; claims on residents; precious metals other than monetary gold; assets in nonconvertible currencies; illiquid assets; claims on foreign exchange arising from derivatives in foreign currencies vis-à-vis domestic currency.
  - Reserve related liabilities include foreign exchange liabilities of DAB to nonresidents; Afghanistan’s outstanding credit to the IMF; foreign currency reserves of commercial banks held at DAB; commitments to sell foreign exchange from derivatives; and arrears on principal or interest to commercial banks, suppliers, or official export credit agencies.
- Reserve money in domestic currency:
  - Defined as currency in circulation plus Afghani-denominated commercial bank deposits at the central bank (including balances maintained by commercial banks in the DAB’s overnight facility) and Afghani-denominated deposits of other institutional units at the central bank.
- DAB’s net credit to the central government (NCG):
  - Defined as difference between DAB’s claims on the central government and central government deposits at DAB.
  - Claims include the “promissory note” outstanding (face value) of DAB’s claim on a bank in liquidation guaranteed by the MoF.
  - In line with DAB law, DAB will not extend credit to the government or purchase government securities in the secondary market other than for monetary operations.
- New non-concessional external debt (ceiling):
  - Zero ceiling, continuous, on nominal value of new nonconcessional borrowing from nonresidents contracted or guaranteed by the public sector with original maturities of one year or more.
  - Ceiling applies to debt and commitments contracted or guaranteed for which value has not yet been received.
  - Exclusions: refinancing credits, rescheduling operations, credits extended by the IMF, and credits on concessional terms as defined.
  - Guarantee arises from explicit legal obligation of public sector to service debt in event of debtor nonpayment or implicit legal/contractual obligation to finance shortfall.
- Zero ceiling on short-term external debt:
  - Continuous zero ceiling on contracting or guaranteeing new external debt with original maturity up to and including one year.
  - Exclusions: rescheduling operations (including deferral of interest on commercial debt) and normal import-related credits.
  - Debt valued in U.S. dollars at exchange rate prevailing when contract or guarantee becomes effective.
- Continuous performance criterion on external payment arrears:
  - Non-accumulation of new external payment arrears on external debt contracted or guaranteed by the central government or DAB.
  - External payment arrears = external debt service obligations (principal and interest) falling due after approval of arrangement and not paid when due per contractual agreements (including contractual grace period).
  - Exclusions: (i) arrears arising from interest on stock of arrears outstanding as of approval of arrangement; (ii) external arrears subject to debt rescheduling agreements or negotiations.
- Borrowing by public enterprises in need of restructuring:
  - Zero ceiling on new lending from state-owned banks or DAB to, or government-guaranteed domestic and external borrowing by, public enterprises in need of restructuring (continuous).
  - “State-owned banks” = banks wholly or majority owned by the government.
  - “Public enterprises in need of restructuring” = enterprises that: (a) have not had an audited balance sheet in past two fiscal years; (b) have been identified by MoF for liquidation; or (c) are subject to restructuring plans without cabinet-approved restructuring plans.
  - Applies to new loans/financial contributions from DAB or state-owned banks and explicit government guarantees for borrowing by these public enterprises.
  - Note: As of July 31, 2020, state-owned banks comprise Bank-e -Millie Afghan, Pashtany Bank, and New Kabul Bank.
- Operating budget deficit of the central government excluding grants:
  - Defined as revenues of the central government minus operating budget expenditure recorded in AFMIS and reported in monthly financial statements.
- Treasury’s discretionary cash balance:
  - Defined as total discretionary cash balance at the Treasury single account in DAB, including unrestricted funds in TSA, discretionary development fund (code 20,000), balance in provinces (unspent funds), cash reserve/realized exchange gain account, and floor limit (minimum threshold of Treasury funds).
- Rerouting of Treasury’s IMF accounts to DAB’s balance sheet:
  - MoF designated as fiscal agent and DAB as depository.
  - For program purposes, government financial positions arising from dealing with the IMF are treated as if DAB has assumed these positions and established corresponding counter position vis-à-vis the Treasury calculated as: Afghanistan’s outstanding credit to the IMF and SDR allocation minus the sum of SDR holdings, reserve tranche position, and the outstanding credit under the 2016–19 Extended Credit Facility arrangement.
- Social and other priority spending:
  - Defined as sum of pro-poor spending identified per the Afghanistan National Development Strategy poverty profile by the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Health, and Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled within the central government’s operating budget for a fiscal year.

### Adjustors to NIR floor and NCG ceiling
- Core budget development spending (assumption for adjustors) — accumulative over the respective year (Billion Afghani):
  - December 21, 2020: 169
  - June 21, 2021: 43
  - December 21, 2021: 142
- If core budget development spending exceeds these projections (up to the appropriated amount), then:
  - NIR floor adjusted downward and NCG ceiling adjusted upward by the difference between actual and projected development spending.
- External financing of the core budget and receipts from sale of nonfinancial assets — accumulative over the respective year (Billion Afghani):
  - December 21, 2020: 290
  - June 21, 2021: 95
  - December 21, 2021: 249
- External financing of the core budget defined as: sum of on-budget operating and development grants and net external loans (disbursement of external loans to the MoF minus repayments of external loans by the MoF).
- If external financing of the core budget and receipts from sale of nonfinancial assets collectively exceed (fall short of) these projections:
  - NIR floor will be adjusted upward (downward) and NCG ceiling will be adjusted downward (upward) by the difference between actual and projected levels.
  - The downward adjustment to the NIR floor for these projections is capped at $400 million.
  - The upward adjustment to the NCG ceiling for these projections is capped at Af 30.7 billion.

*Source: 1afgea2020003.*

### 24. Should some expenditure currently financed directly by donors outside the budget

### 24. Should some expenditure currently financed directly by donors outside the budget 

### On-budgeting of donor-financed expenditures and fiscal adjustments
- If expenditure currently financed directly by donors outside the budget is moved onto the operating budget:
  - The NIR floor will be adjusted downward, and the NCG ceiling and the indicative targets (ceilings) for the operating budget deficits of the central government, excluding grants, will be adjusted upward, by the actual amount of these expenditures on the condition that:
    - (i) the moving on budget of these expenditures is justified by a statement from donors indicating their decision to stop financing them; and
    - (ii) they are subject to a supplementary appropriation approved by parliament.
  - The downward adjustment to the NIR floors for these conditions will be capped at $300 million.

- If the MoF recapitalizes (receives dividend from) DAB:
  - The NCG ceiling will be adjusted upward (downward) by the amount of this recapitalization (dividend).

### Provision of information to the IMF — reporting requirements, frequencies, and lags
- General: Actual outcomes to be provided with the frequencies and lags indicated; any data showing non-observance of continuous performance criteria must be provided immediately.

- DAB net international reserves:
  - Frequency: weekly
  - Lag: no later than one week after the end of each week
  - Notes: provided at actual and program exchange rates and gold price.

- Monetary statistics (including exchange rates, government accounts with DAB, currency in circulation, reserve money, and a monetary survey):
  - Frequency: biweekly
  - Lag: no later than ten days after the end of the two-week period (four weeks in the case of the monetary survey)
  - Monetary survey includes balance sheet of DAB and a consolidated balance sheet of the commercial banking sector; DAB balance sheet at actual and program exchange rates and gold price.

- Detailed cash flow on gross and net international reserves:
  - Frequency: biweekly
  - Lag: no later than ten days after the end of the two-week period.

- Core budget operations and their financing:
  - Frequency: monthly
  - Lag: no later than four weeks after the end of the month
  - Notes and requirements:
    - Official reports: monthly financial statements from the AFMIS.
    - Financing structure: grants and loans should be separately identified.
    - Expenditure data: on a consistent cash basis, separate identification of direct payments by donors included in budget development spending, with a counterpart grant figure.
    - Core operating expenditures: reported monthly using budget appropriation economic and administrative classification in addition to program and functional classification.
    - Core development expenditures: reported separately monthly using budget program classification in addition to economic, administrative, and functional classification consistent with the operating budget.
    - All data should compare outturns against the approved budget.
    - Core operating and development revenues and expenditures should also be reported by province, separately on the same monthly basis.

- External debt data:
  - Frequency: quarterly
  - Lag: no later than six weeks after the end of the quarter
  - Required content for bilateral and multilateral creditors:
    - (i) details of new loans contracted or guaranteed during the quarter, including the terms of each new loan;
    - (ii) the stock of debt at the end the quarter, including short-term debt, and medium- and long-term debt;
    - (iii) loan disbursements and debt service payments (interest and amortization) during the quarter;
    - (iv) the stock of committed but undelivered debt relief at the end of the quarter and debt relief received during the quarter;
    - (v) information on all overdue payments on short-term debt, and on medium- and long-term debt, including new external arrears (if any);
    - (vi) total outstanding amount of arrears.

- National accounts and trade:
  - National accounts data: annually and no later than three months after the end of the year.
  - Merchandise trade data: quarterly and no later than eight weeks after the end of the quarter.

- Consumer price indexes (CPIs):
  - Monthly CPI for Kabul and other major cities (“national” CPI)
  - Lag: four weeks after the end of each month.

- State electricity company (DABS) financials:
  - Frequency: four-monthly
  - Lag: three-month lag
  - Coverage: financial flows and other key variables aggregated and disaggregated by regional hubs for the preceding 12 months; in the last four-monthly period of the year, a forecast for the following fiscal year.
  - Format: use the template agreed with IMF staff, with all lines filled in, excluding the disaggregation of losses into technical and nontechnical for regions outside Kabul.

- Financial Stability Indicators for each commercial bank:
  - Frequency: monthly
  - Lag: one-month after the end of each month
  - Indicators to include: banks’ prudential ratios, capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, portfolio quality indicators (e.g., nonperforming loans, provisions as percentage of classified loans), concentration ratio, related loan ratio, information on open foreign exchange positions, large loan and deposits statistics, income and expense information such as net income to total assets ratio (ROA), rate of return on capital, net interest margin, and other relevant information.
  - Also required: monthly balance sheet and income statement for each bank compiled from supervisory submissions, and the Summary Analysis of Condition and Performance of the Banking System.

- Lending to public enterprises from each commercial bank:
  - Frequency: monthly with a one-month lag after the end of each quarter
  - Report items for each bank:
    - (i) aggregate value of outstanding loans to all public enterprises;
    - (ii) disaggregated value of outstanding loans by public enterprise for each bank’s top 10 borrowers;
    - (iii) indicators of the quality of these loans.
  - Note: public enterprises defined as in paragraph 7 of the source.

- Kabul Bank receiver reports:
  - Frequency: quarterly
  - Content: activity and cost reports, status and financial details of asset recovery, progress updates pursuant to implementation of recommendations of the Kabul Bank asset recovery diagnostic, and disbursements of net proceeds.

- Documents related to asset recovery:
  - Copies of mutual legal assistance requests (evidence and banking and property information redacted), copies of MOUs covering international cooperation with foreign jurisdictions.

- MoF TSA accounts and cash projections:
  - Monthly details of discretionary cash balances in MoF’s Afghani- and U.S. dollar-denominated TSA accounts, and the discretionary development account.
  - Update of the monthly summary report of financial flows under operating and development budgets (discretionary and nondiscretionary).
  - Updated monthly cash projections for the next 12 months, and annual cash projections for the current and following fiscal year.

- Treasury cash balance:
  - Frequency: weekly report on the Treasury (discretionary and nondiscretionary) cash balance.

- Banking sector reporting:
  - Monthly CAMEL rating for all banks, monthly income statements and balance sheets for all banks, consolidated income statement and balance sheet for all banks.

- Structural benchmarks documentation:
  - Copies of documents related to progress on structural benchmarks under the program, such as draft legislation, memoranda of understanding, strategies, implementation plans, transmittal letters, etc.

- Quarterly structural-benchmark progress reports:
  - The MoF and DAB will send reports by the end of each quarter documenting progress with implementing structural benchmarks under the program.
  - Reports must include relevant documentation, explain any deviations from the initial reform timetable, specify expected revised completion date, and include details on major economic and social measures expected to affect program sequencing (e.g., changes in legislation or regulations).

### Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) — assessment and key findings
- Overall judgment:
  - This debt sustainability analysis (DSA) assesses Afghanistan’s risk of external and overall debt distress as high.

- Aid dependence and implications:
  - Donor grants of about 40 percent of GDP currently finance Afghanistan’s underlying fiscal and external deficits.
  - Given aid dependence and limits to official concessional financing, both external and public debt are expected to remain low for the next decade, producing mechanical signals of moderate risk in that period.
  - However, the financing mix is projected to shift away from grants towards debt financing in the long run, warranting the use of the extended 20-year period for assessment.

- Baseline breaches and long-run indicators:
  - In the longer horizon, the ratio of present value of debt to exports repeatedly breaches the threshold under the baseline scenario, suggesting the high-risk rating.

- Downside risks:
  - Political uncertainty, continued insecurity, faster-than-expected drop in aid, and severe weather shocks.

- Policy priorities recommended:
  - Mobilize domestic revenue.
  - Enhance the effectiveness of public spending.
  - Strengthen management of fiscal risks, including those from state-owned corporations (SOCs) and public private partnerships (PPPs).
  - Diversify exports.
  - Strengthen debt management, including through local debt market development.

### Public debt coverage, composition, and short-term developments
- Coverage:
  - DSA covers debt contracted by the central government and central bank debt owed to the IMF.
  - Borrowing is done only by the central government; state and local governments cannot borrow by themselves (Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law, 2005).
  - Majority of outstanding debt contracted through external loans to finance infrastructure projects.
  - Central government has issued no guarantees for external borrowing by state/local governments or SOCs.
  - The government’s debt to the central bank (DAB) due to the Kabul Bank exposure was repaid in late-2019; a small residual payment remains to be paid after the impact of the COVID crisis abates.

- SOCs and PPPs fiscal risk management:
  - Authorities are building capacity to systematically analyze risks from SOCs and PPPs.
  - Key vulnerabilities: lack of systematic financial reporting, analysis, and disclosure; absence of consolidated fiscal risk oversight mandate by the Ministry of Finance.
  - A recent IMF technical assistance mission proposed a reform agenda to strengthen the framework for analyzing and managing risks from SOCs and PPPs.
  - A five-year plan for PPPs has been developed; over a hundred projects are in the pipeline; six projects already under contract.
  - Budget and fiscal strategy paper do not quantify contingent liabilities from PPP projects.
  - Due to lack of systematic data, this DSA uses default levels of SOE debt (2 percent of GDP) for the contingent liability stress test and financial market contingent liability levels at default 5 percent of GDP, leading to a total contingent liability shock of 7 percent of GDP.

- Debt stock and profile (end-2019):
  - Total public external debt: US$1,147 million or 6.1 percent of GDP.
  - Creditor composition (end-2019): ADB 50%, WB 30%, Other multilateral 9%, Bilateral 11% (as presented in the source).

- COVID-19 impact and 2020 financing:
  - Overall deficit, excluding COVID-related grants, projected to widen to 6 percent of GDP in 2020 (compared to 0.8 percent of GDP projected before the shock).
  - Financing in 2020 assumed through around 3 percent of GDP grants from the WB, ADB, and other bilateral donors, and disbursements under Rapid Credit Facility (US$223 million) and the proposed Extended Credit Facility (US$115 million) from the IMF.
  - Public debt projected to increase to 7 .7  percent at end-2020.

- Debt relief and suspension initiatives:
  - Afghanistan granted debt relief under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT) and requested debt service suspension under the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI).
  - CCRT expected to provide relief on debt payments to the IMF of about US$14 million in 2020–22, lowering PV of debt payments.
  - DSSI is a net-present-value (NPV) neutral exercise; around US$4 million of interest and principal payments falling due to bilateral creditors between May 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020 will instead be paid starting 2022.
  - The grant for the debt service falling due in the 12 months from April 14, 2021 is subject to the availability of resources under the CCRT.

### Debt management strategy and capacity building
- Concessional borrowing policy:
  - Authorities committed to contracting external loans only with a grant element of 35 percent or higher.
  - Government borrowed US$30 million in external loans in 2019; borrowing increases to US$338 million in 2020, all from the IMF, due to the pandemic.
  - In 2021–25, authorities are considering borrowing around US$850 million (4 percent of 2021 GDP) for development projects.

- Domestic market development and instruments:
  - Debt management capacity needs strengthening, including development of the domestic debt market to manage sustainability risks as grants decline.
  - Ongoing efforts: IMF and World Bank support on debt management stock-taking and reform roadmap; specialized training on effective debt management.
  - ADB assisting with formulation and implementation of a medium-term debt strategy and plans to provide training on debt recording and analysis tools by end-2020.
  - World Bank assisting with an assessment of SOCs’ financial position.
  - Draft Sukuk law developed as prerequisite to issuing sukuk financing; currently under review by development partners.
  - DSA assumes authorities start issuing a three-year domestic sukuk in 2021:
    - Annual net issuance in 2021–25 assumed at about 0.3 percent of GDP with the interest rate of 7 percent.

### Macroeconomic and projection assumptions (Box 1 and realism tools)
- Growth and grants assumptions:
  - Medium-term growth projected to be slightly lower than in the 2019 December DSA due to COVID-19.
  - Long-term GDP growth remains unchanged at 4 percent.
  - Assumes decline in grants as percent of GDP in the medium and long run.
  - Baseline assumes slight fall in expenditures; primary deficits projected to be similar to previous DSAs.
  - Financing needs assumed to be covered mainly by external loans.
  - New external borrowing assumed with a grant element of above 35 percent (as opposed to 60 percent in previous DSAs).
  - Authorities prioritized diversification of exports; framework assumes strong export growth in the long run.

- Realism tools and fiscal paths:
  - Forecast errors for external and public debt levels and their forecast errors have been small in the past five years.
  - The economy expected to contract by 5 percent in 2020 and the fiscal balance to worsen substantially due to the pandemic.
  - Over time, gradual fiscal adjustment will reduce the deficit to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - The three-year primary balance adjustment (between 2019 and 2022) projection is -0.2 percent.

- Investment-growth and capital stock estimation:
  - Contribution of public capital accumulation to GDP growth as in previous DSA.
  - Government capital investment contribution should decline over the long term as the private sector becomes a more significant driver.
  - Due to lack of government capital stock data, staff estimated public capital stock using the average share of government investment in total investment over the past five years (69 percent) and the total historical capital stock as estimated by the World Bank at 78 percent GDP as of end-2017.

### External DSA conclusions and vulnerabilities
- External DSA: staff assesses Afghanistan’s risk of external debt distress as high.
- Projection horizon: 20-year projection period used for mechanical risk rating.
- Main driver of long-run risk: gradual replacement of grants by debt financing leads to higher debt accumulation; PV of external debt-to-exports ratio crosses threshold after 2030 and remains above it.
- Liquidity indicators: debt service to revenue ratio remains at low levels under baseline; debt service to exports ratio reaches its threshold during the second decade.
- Most vulnerable to shocks to exports; combination shocks and export shocks drive extreme breaches (PV of debt to GDP, PV of debt to exports, and debt service-to-exports).
- Emphasis: mobilizing domestic revenue and boosting exports critical for future debt sustainability, along with continued donor support.

*Source: 1afgea2020003 - 24. Should some expenditure currently financed directly by donors outside the budget*

### 2033. Among the other indicators, the PV-to-revenue ratio and the debt service-to-revenue ratio are most

### 1afgea2020003 - 2033. Among the other indicators, the PV-to-revenue ratio and the debt service-to-revenue ratio are most

### Debt sustainability assessment
- Afghanistan’s overall risk of public debt distress is assessed as high.
- Both external and public debt levels are projected to remain low over the first decade of projections, and the mechanical signals over that horizon suggest moderate risk of debt distress.
- Given the projected decline in grants, an extended period is more appropriate; over a 20-year horizon, mechanical signals are consistent with a high overall risk of debt distress.
- Afghanistan’s debt sustainability is dependent on a sustainable transition from grants-based financing to concessional loan financing.
- Among sensitivity indicators, the PV-to-revenue ratio and the debt service-to-revenue ratio are most sensitive to the growth shock.

### Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Continued sound macroeconomic policy, improved revenue mobilization, and strengthened debt management capacity are required given the high risk of public debt distress.
- As the COVID-19 crisis abates, authorities should:
  - Reverse the fiscal deterioration caused by the pandemic.
  - Mobilize domestic revenue to create space for development spending and reduce dependence on aid.
  - Ensure that projects financed through external concessional borrowing have strong potential to support inclusive growth.
  - Continue to improve debt management capacity and strengthen management of fiscal risks, including from SOCs and PPPs.

### Authorities’ views and program request
- Authorities agreed with the DSA conclusions and remain committed to fiscal prudence and relying on donor grants and concessional borrowing to ensure debt sustainability.
- Authorities highlighted the need to increase revenue and investments for growth and job creation.
- Authorities requested targeted TA on debt management, support for domestic debt market development through sukuks, and fiscal risk management for SOCs and PPPs.
- Request for a successor 42-month ECF arrangement, equivalent to 80 percent of quota, with frontloaded disbursements to meet sizable near-term fiscal and external financing needs.
- Government policies over the medium term will be guided by the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF II) for 2021-25; ANPDF II to be presented at the donor pledging conference in Geneva later in November.

### Recent economic developments and outlook
- The statement date: November 6, 2020.
- Impact of COVID-19:
  - Economy expected to contract by 5 percent in 2020.
  - Expansion of 4 percent projected in 2021 and likely to be sustained over the medium term.
  - Aggravation of acute poverty; need for an effective social safety net with wide coverage.
- Monetary and external:
  - Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) has maintained overall price stability with temporary inflation spikes from negative supply shocks.
  - Afghani relatively stable; real effective exchange rate (REER) has appreciated significantly.
  - Large influx of crisis-related donor support and lower import demand helped DAB build official foreign exchange reserves to comfortable levels.
- Fiscal:
  - Fiscal policy loosened considerably in 2020 due to revenue shortfall and higher spending to mitigate the crisis.
  - Mid-term budget amendment (pending with Parliament) allocated 3 percent of GDP to Covid-related spending on healthcare and social protection.
  - Includes World Bank-supported social relief package totaling 1.5 percent of GDP, of which 1 percent of GDP is earmarked for 2020 for near universal coverage of households in poverty.
  - Projected 2020 budget deficit of 3 percent of GDP (including grants) to be financed almost equally by external loans (including the RCF and prospective ECF disbursements accruing to the budget) and drawdown of treasury balances at DAB.
- Banking sector:
  - Crisis has hurt banks’ asset quality and profitability; a few weak banks may need capital injection.
  - High-risk banks under dedicated post-pandemic plan with DAB monitoring recovery, recapitalization, and corporate governance.
  - Presidential decree authorized merger of Bank-e-Millie Afghan with New Kabul Bank to create the second largest bank.
  - DAB corporatizing money service providers and foreign exchange dealers and established a department to supervise nonbank financial institutions.
  - All banks will undergo AML/CFT assessments by end-2020.

### ECF policy building blocks
- Objective: preserve macroeconomic stability, support recovery while protecting the vulnerable, and implement structural reforms for sustained, inclusive growth when traction permits.
- Fiscal policy and reforms:
  - Tighten fiscal stance beginning in 2021 after accommodative 2020 measures.
  - Debt ratios expected to rise as loans replace grants; sustainability hinges on prudent fiscal policy and sufficient donor aid.
  - Protect key social and development spending during fiscal tightening.
  - Create a targeted social safety net with donor support.
  - Domestic revenue mobilization priorities:
    - Tap new durable revenue sources — notably a VAT from 2022 to replace the current cascading business receipt tax.
    - Plug customs leakages.
    - Enforce tax compliance.
    - Strengthen public financial management and oversight.
  - New law to strengthen authority of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO) and its capacity to evaluate public finances.
  - SOEs to face greater operational and financial oversight.
  - Transparency: public procurement procedures revised end-September requiring beneficial ownership information in all public procurements to be collected and published within 30 days starting November 1.
  - As committed under the RCF, government published first quarterly report on pandemic-related spending at end-October; SAO audit reports on pandemic spending planned for mid-2021.
- Monetary, exchange rate, and financial policies:
  - DAB committed to price stability and flexible exchange rate with interventions limited to containing excessive volatility.
  - Maintain foreign exchange reserves consistent with the country’s risk profile.
  - Strengthen monetary policy transmission, enhance toolkit, and improve market communication.
  - Introduce sukuk as an instrument of saving and to help develop a debt market and potentially serve as a market-based instrument of monetary policy.
- Structural reforms:
  - Focus on job-rich, equitable growth and harnessing private sector potential.
  - Address institutional gaps: quality of education, gender inequality, adequacy and enforceability of the judiciary, and ease of doing business.
- Fighting corruption:
  - Authorities reaffirm commitment to step up fight against corruption, focusing on serious and blatant instances.
  - Strengthen criminal justice system.
  - Make legal and institutional changes to ensure beneficial ownership identification and registration are in line with FATF requirements.
  - Digitalization to strengthen asset declaration regime and civil servant accountability.
  - Authorities to expand anti-corruption plans in presentation to the Geneva conference.

### Key figures and timelines (verbatim)
- Risk assessment: high (overall risk of public debt distress).
- Projection horizons: first decade (moderate mechanical signals); 20-year horizon (mechanical signals consistent with high risk).
- Statement date: November 6, 2020.
- ANPDF II coverage: 2021-25.
- Requested ECF arrangement: 42-month ECF, equivalent to 80 percent of quota.
- Economic growth: contract by 5 percent in 2020; expansion of 4 percent in 2021.
- Mid-term budget Covid allocation: 3 percent of GDP.
- World Bank-supported social relief package: totaling 1.5 percent of GDP, of which 1 percent of GDP is earmarked for 2020.
- Projected 2020 budget deficit: 3 percent of GDP (including grants).
- VAT planned from: 2022.
- Publication requirement for beneficial ownership: starting November 1, collected and published within 30 days.
- SAO audit reports on pandemic spending: planned for mid-2021.
- AML/CFT assessments for all banks: by end-2020.

*Source: Excerpt from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan DSA and IMF staff statement (November 6, 2020).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2020/english/1afgea2020003.pdf_
